

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(79th Congress)

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 13

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 7 AND 8

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



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HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Pages	Transcript pages	Hearings
1	1- 399	1- 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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13	7 and 8.
14	9 through 43.
15	44 through 87.
16	88 through 110.
17	111 through 128.
18	129 through 156.
19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
22 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments.

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses. The names are listed in a column on the left, and the addresses are listed in a column on the right. The names are: John Doe, Jane Smith, and Bob Johnson. The addresses are: 123 Main St, 456 Elm St, and 789 Oak St.

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Exhibit No.	Period, from and to, introduced	Exhibit No.	Description
1	23 11-15-45	1	Selection of intercepted diplomatic messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between July 1 and Dec. 8, 1941.
2	24 11-15-45	254	Selection of intercepted messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between Dec. 2, 1940, and Dec. 8, 1941, concerning military installations, ships movements, espionage reports, etc.
3	87 11-16-45	317	Navy Department dispatch No. 252203 dated Nov. 25, 1941, directing the routing of trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits.
4	142 11-16-45	318	Chart showing plotting record of early plane flights Dec. 7, 1941, obtained by Opana Radar Detector Station.
5	153 11-16-45	318	Army compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Colonel Thielen as illustrating his narrative statement.
6	153 11-16-45	337	Navy compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Admiral Inglis as illustrating his narrative statement.
7	172 11-17-45	391	Photostatic copy of Opana Radar Detector Station plot, submitted by Senator Ferguson, identified by Admiral Inglis, previously marked "Exhibit 3-B in evidence" in proceedings before Army Pearl Harbor Board.
8	233 11-19-45	391	Material obtained by Army and Navy primarily from Japanese sources, relating to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
8-A	1792 12-18-45	413	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8-B	1792 12-18-45	415	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8-C	1792 12-18-45	424	Report dated Dec. 4, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
8-D-----	2480 1-5-46	425	Report dated Dec. 13, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
9-----	256 11-19-45	923	Selection of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral J. O. Richardson, from Jan. 18, 1940, to Feb. 10, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
10-----	279 11-20-45	1000	Letter dated Jan. 24, 1941, from Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War regarding defenses of Pearl Harbor, and reply by Secretary of War, dated Feb. 7, 1941; letter from Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated Feb. 7, 1941, transmitting the above letters with instructions and receipt therefor.
11-----	319 11-21-45	1006	Memorandum dated Oct. 16, 1940, from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Hart, concerning a proposed blockade of Japan in the event of aggressive action over the reopening of the Burma Road.
12-----	363 11-21-45	1013	Letters from War Department and Navy Department with enclosures, dated Nov. 7, 1945, and Nov. 14, 1945, respectively, to Congressman Frank B. Keefe, concerning data on amounts requested by the services, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and contract authorizations for the years 1932 through 1941.
13-----	387 11-21-45	1019	Study of the air situation in Hawaii dated Aug. 20, 1941, by Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, for Commanding General, Army Air Forces, through Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
14-----	397 11-21-45	1040	Letter dated Apr. 14, 1941, from Assistant Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department to the Adjutant General, entitled "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor" in reply to letter of Feb. 7, 1941, on this subject (see exhibit No. 10), enclosing Annex No. 7 to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Joint Estimate Hawaiian Air Force, and Patrol Wing 2 (Naval Base Defense Air Force), and Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security).
15-----	401 11-23-45	1042	Dispatches from Ambassador Joseph E. Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State, dated Jan. 27, 1941, Nov. 3, 1941, and Nov. 17, 1941; memorandum dated Feb. 1, 1941 from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, advising him of contents of above message dated Jan. 27, 1941, which reported Japan would make surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in event of trouble with United States.

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16-A	3839 2-6-46	1077	(a) Memorandum, "Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation", dated Nov. 3, 1941, for the President, from Secretary Hull, dated Nov. 3, 1941. (b) Minutes of The Joint Board, dated Nov. 3, 1941. (c) Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation", dated Nov. 3, 1941, for General Marshall by General Grew.
16-B	4341 2-13-46	1081	Undated note from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, attached to letter dated Oct. 30, 1941, from Secretary Morgenthau to the President, transmitting a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
17	402 11-23-45	1083	Message dated Nov. 7, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, delivered through the Department of State.
18	402 11-23-45	1084	Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 27, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.
19	402 11-23-45	1201	Documents relating to proposed "Mores Visions", including Secretary Hull's recommendation dated Nov. 26, 1941, to President Roosevelt. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit).
20	402 11-23-45	1226	Memorandum dated Nov. 29, 1941, by Secretary Hull for the President, and attached draft of a proposed message from the President to Congress, and proposed message from President to Emperor of Japan.
21	402 11-23-45	1246	Message dated Dec. 6, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Emperor of Japan, and related documents, including draft of proposed message dated Oct. 17, 1941.
22	458 11-23-45	1252	Two dispatches dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, London, to State Department; memorandum of conversation dated Nov. 30, 1941, between Secretary Hull and British Ambassador, with attached memorandum; memorandum handed to Mr. Hornbeck by Netherlands Minister on Nov. 21, 1941; dispatch from Secretary of State to United States Consul, Manila, P. I., dated Nov. 29, 1941. All documents concern intelligence information relating to Japanese military and naval units in the Far East.
22-A	1694 12-15-45 2065 12-31-45	1262	(a) British draft, dated Aug. 10, 1941, of proposed parallel communications to Japanese Government; (b) Two messages from the President (at Atlantic Conference) to Secretary Hull, Nos. 121645 and 169115; (c) Draft, dated Aug. 15, 1941 (not used), of proposed communication to the Japanese Ambassador brought to State Department by Sumner Welles following (Atlantic) conference between the President and British Prime Minister. Revised draft (not used), dated Aug. 16, 1941, of draft dated Aug. 15, 1941 (c) above), of proposed statement to the Japanese Ambassador, prepared by Sumner Welles. (See p. 556, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 29, for text of statement made to Japanese Ambassador by the President on Aug. 17, 1941.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
22-B	1783 12-18-45	1269	Memorandum, dated Aug. 10, 1941, prepared by Sumner Wells of his conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning proposed parallel action with reference to Japan.
22-C	1783 12-18-45	1275	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, prepared by Sumner Wells, of conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, attended by Welles, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Harry Hopkins concerning "British-American Cooperation".
22-D	1783 12-18-45	1292	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, of conversation between Sumner Wells and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning "British-American Cooperation" at the Atlantic Conference, and Welles' subsequent conversation with the President.
23	476 11-24-45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
24	476 11-24-45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 30, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
25	574 11-26-45	1301	Dispatch, dated Dec. 1, 1941, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, reporting reaction in Japan to the Secretary's proposal of Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note). See pp. 766 to 770, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, for proposal dated Nov. 26, 1941, to the Japanese Government.
26	634 11-27-45	1303	Dispatch, dated Sept. 24, 1940, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State concerning general policy toward Japan (so-called "green light" dispatch).
27	670 11-27-45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Introduction (pamphlet edition, 1942). Department of State Publication 1853.
28	670 11-27-45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Introduction and Documents (cloth edition, 1943), Department of State Publication 1983.
29	670 11-27-45	1315	"Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941", vols. I and II (1943). Department of State Publication 2008.
30	670 11-27-45	1315	"Ten Years in Japan", by Joseph C. Grew, Simon and Schuster (1944).

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31	11 28-40	1310	1311
32	778 11-29-45	1326	His Majesty's Imperial Japanese Navy, from April 4 to Dec. 2, 1941, from United States diplomatic officials in foreign countries reporting to the War Department, and comments of Japanese representatives in those countries concerning possible break in United States-Japanese relations.
33	778 11-29-45	1334	Selection of messages between War Department and Hawaiian Department from July 8 to Dec. 7, 1941. Included are certain messages sent by the War Department to the Western Defense Command, to General MacArthur in the Philippines, and to Commanding General, Panama, as well as their replies. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33-A	2092 12-31-45	1385	Selection of Military Intelligence Estimates prepared by G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., covering period July 7 to Dec. 6, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
34	825 11-30-45	1389	Secretary of War's copy of memorandum, dated Oct. 2, 1941, from Col. Hayes A. Kroner to the Chief of Staff, concerning "Japanese-American Relations", bearing note in handwriting of Secretary Stimson.
35	828 11-30-45	1390	Memorandum, dated Oct. 18, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for Chief of Staff, concerning "Resignation of Japanese Cabinet" and proposed message to Army outpost commanders.
36	830 11-30-45	1393	Memorandum, dated Jan. 31, 1942, prepared by Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, concerning "Warnings Sent to Hawaii Prior to Dec. 7, 1941", with enclosures.
37	839 11-30-45	1395	Photostatic copy of draft of General Marshall's message of Nov. 27, 1941, to General Short, containing phrase "hostile action possible at any moment", which draft contains a sentence that did not appear in the message as transmitted to General Short. (See Exhibit No. 32 for message sent.)
38	841 11-30-45	1409	Selection of dispatches sent and received by the Navy Department entitled "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
39	928 12-4-45	1409	Paraphrase of message, dated Dec. 3, 1941, from General Miles to Military Attaché, Tokyo, concerning the handling of his codes and secret documents.
40	954 12-4-45	1412	Memoranda for the record on events of Dec. 7, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff; Col. W. B. Smith, Secretary, General Staff; Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Col. J. R. Deane, Secretary, General Staff.
41	988 12-5-45	1413	Dispatch, dated Dec. 7, 1941, from CinCAF to OPNAV (870645) concerning report of promised armed support to British under certain conditions.
			Information from documentary evidence on interception, decoding, and translating of Japanese messages; Nos. 901, 902, 907, 910 (so-called pilot message, 14 part message, 1 o'clock delivery message, and code destruction message).

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
42	990 12-5-45	1416	Copy of Army Regulation No. 10-15, dated Aug. 18, 1936, with amendments up to Dec. 7, 1941, entitled "General Staff—Organization and Duties".
43	997 12-5-45	1422	Instructions dated Jan. 27, 1941, of Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff concerning staff conversations to be held with representatives of British Commonwealth.
44	1001 12-5-45	1423	Compilation entitled "Copies of Defense Plans", which contains extracts from various basic Army and Navy plans, to illustrate defensive measures contemplated against air attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
45	1019 12-5-45	1471	Memorandum, dated Nov. 27, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Far Eastern Situation" and warning messages to outpost commanders.
46	1027 12-5-45	1472	Photostatic copies of replies by General MacArthur and General Short to warning messages of Nov. 27, 1941, with routing slip.
47	1041 12-5-45	1476	Supplementary documents concerning the Nov. 5, 1941 Marshall-Stark memorandum for the President (see Exhibit No. 16), including dispatch dated Nov. 3, 1941, from Ambassador Gauss to State Department; message dated Nov. 2, 1941, from Chiang Kai-Shek to President Roosevelt; memorandum for Director of Naval Intelligence concerning "Dispatch from Alusna, Chungking, 399859"; dispatch 399859 from Alusna, Chungking, to OPNAV dated Oct. 30, 1941, and another same date, same correspondents; message dated Oct. 28, 1941, from General Magruder, Chungking, to War Department.
48	1044 12-5-45	1481	Two memoranda dated Nov. 17, 1941, by Brig. General Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers", and letter dated Dec. 20, 1941, to Gen. Delos C. Emmons, from General Marshall, concerning unity of command in Hawaii.
48-A	2093 12-31-45	1484	Memorandum, dated Dec. 5, 1941, from General Marshall for General Gerow, concerning coordination of command.
49	1053 12-6-45	1485	Report dated Mar. 27, 1941, of United States-British Staff conversations (ABC-1).
50	1053 12-6-45	1551	Report of American-Dutch-British Staff conversations at Singapore, dated Apr. 27, 1941 (A. D. B.).

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Report entitled "Joint Canadian-United States Radio Defense Plan No. 2" (ABC 22)		
51	1053 12-6-45	Compilation of communications between the War Department and General Herron at Hawaii, concerning 1940 alert of Hawaiian Department. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
52	1053 12-6-45	Compilation of correspondence between General Marshall and General Short from Feb. 7 to Oct. 28, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
53	1063 12-6-45	"Notes on General Council Meeting", Feb. 19, 1941, concerning "Defense Objectives" (revised Feb. 13, 1941).
54	1067 12-6-45	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff", on Feb. 25, 1941, at which air defense of Pearl Harbor was discussed.
55	1067 12-6-45	Memorandum, dated May 13, 1941, concerning "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department" by Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony, for the Chief of Staff.
56	1076 12-6-45	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Secretary of War, May 19, 1941", concerning use of planes in proposed expedition against Martinique, referring to supply of B-17 bombers that were not dispatched to Hawaii.
57	1077 12-6-45	List of President's appointments with military representatives from Oct. 1 to Dec. 7, 1941; telephone calls through White House switchboard on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941; White House dinner guests on Dec. 6, 1941; list of President's appointments on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
58	1083 12-6-45	General Marshall's aide memoire to the President concerning "Defense of Hawaii".
59	1092 12-6-45	General Marshall's memorandum for the President concerning "Ground Forces".
60	1094 12-6-45	Photostatic copy of Dec. 7, 1941, warning sent by General Marshall to theater commanders.
61	1112 12-7-45	Minutes of The Joint Board meeting, Nov. 26, 1941, at which the situation in the Pacific was discussed.
62	1284 12-10-45	Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General in connection therewith.
63	1345 12-11-45	

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
64	1544 12-13-45	1645	Tentative draft of Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, 1941.
65	1541 12-13-45	1677	Memorandum, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to Special Navy and Army Observers, London, instructing them to advise British that United States disapproves A. D. B. Report for reasons stated.
66	1642 12-15-45	1680	Dispatch, dated Dec. 6, 1941 (#61255), from CinCAF to OPNAV, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, by R. E. Schuirmann, for the State Department, relating contents of the dispatch which reported the sighting of Japanese convoys in Far Eastern waters.
67	1642 12-15-45	1682	Intercepted messages, dated Aug. 17, 1941, from Japanese Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, repeating the material handed him that date by President Roosevelt after the President's return from the Atlantic Conference (so-called "parallel action message").
68	1675 12-15-45	1689	Log of U. S. S. <i>Boise</i> for period Nov. 25 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and map showing position of the ship on certain dates.
69	1677 12-15-45	1715	Table showing scheduled inspections of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November and December 1941.
70	1695 12-15-45	1716	Message, dated Aug. 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, concerning the President's statements to the Japanese Ambassador on Aug. 17, 1941.
71	1696 12-15-45	1719	Message, dated Aug. 25, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, quoting an extract from radio address of Prime Minister Churchill on Aug. 24, 1941. The extract refers to Japanese policies.
72	1696 12-15-45	1721	Dispatch dated Aug. 1, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, and the Ambassador's reply dated Aug. 2, 1941; both concerning the report of Japanese aggression against Thailand; digest of Secretary of State's news conference on Aug. 6, 1941, when he was questioned concerning reports of Japanese aggression against Thailand.
73	1700 12-15-45	1727	Three State Department drafts, all dated Oct. 16, 1941, of a proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan, and a memorandum expressing views of officers in the Far Eastern Division of State Department on the matter. No message was sent to the Emperor at that time (fall of the Konoye cabinet in Japan).

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74	1703 12-15-46	1756	Three messages from State Department to Far Eastern officer, advising American citizens to leave the Orient, dated Oct. 6, 1940, Feb. 11, 1941, and Nov. 19, 1941.
74-A	2768 1-10-46	1741	Memorandum, dated Dec. 4, 1941, from Far Eastern Affairs Division officers to the Secretary of State concerning British suggestion on exchange of nationals with Japanese Government in event of hostilities.
75	1705 12-15-45	1744	Three messages, all dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, explaining the delivery of the so-called "Ten Point Note" on that date to the Japanese Ambassadors and their oral comments upon its receipt, and furnishing Ambassador Grew with the text of the note.
76	1709 11-16-45	1754	Translation of notes regarding discussion between Adolf Hitler, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, State Minister Meisner, and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin, Apr. 4, 1941, as introduced at the Nuremberg trials on Nov. 23, 1945.
77	1712 12-15-45	1757	Message, dated Aug. 31, 1940, from United States Embassy, Peiping, China, to State Department presenting summary of situation in Japan and Manchuria as prepared by A. T. Steele, correspondent for Chicago Daily News, which summary is referred to in Ambassador Grew's message dated Sept. 12, 1940 (Joint Committee Exhibit No. 26), his so-called "green light" dispatch.
78	1724 12-17-45	1768	Navy dispatches concerning "Kra Peninsula Alert (1941)". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
79	1724 12-17-45	1770	Navy dispatches concerning Netherlands East Indies Alert (1941). (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
80	1724 12-17-45	1774	Office of Naval Intelligence "Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations" dated Nov. 1, Nov. 15, and Dec. 1, 1941.
81	1724 12-17-45	1837	Selection of Office of Naval Intelligence periodic estimates and memoranda dated from Apr. 17 to Dec. 6, 1941.
82	1728 12-17-45	1864	Navy Regulations concerning Duties of Intelligence Division (OP-16).
83	1754 12-17-45	1866	Message, dated Dec. 3, 1941 (931850), from OPNAV to CinCAF, CinPAC, COM 14, and COM 16, advising them of instructions Japanese sent on Dec. 2, 1941, to certain consular and diplomatic posts to destroy most of their codes and secret documents.
84	1775 12-17-45	1867	Transcript of telephone call on Dec. 3, 1941, between Japanese citizen in Honolulu and person in Tokyo (so-called "Mori telephone call").

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
85-----	1799 12-18-45	1870	Selection of Navy Department memoranda reporting Japanese fleet locations during period Nov. 4 through Dec. 3, 1941.
86-----	1825 12-18-45	1901	Tabulation showing Naval combatant strength of the Axis and Allied Powers as of May 1, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941, in both Atlantic and Pacific Ocean areas.
87-----	1889 12-19-45	1907	Memorandum, dated Dec. 15, 1945, prepared by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, concerning "Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on June 17, 1940", with attached documents referred to therein.
88-----	1912 12-19-45	1937	Sections of document "Organization of the Office of Naval Operations, Oct. 23, 1940", concerning duties of "War Plans Division (OP-12)".
89-----	1938 12-20-45	1937	Memorandum prepared by Gen. L. T. Gerow, regarding the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy "For Defense Against Air Attack in Hawaii".
90-----	2066 12-31-45	1941	Dispatch dated Dec. 18, 1941, from the State Department to the American Legation, Bern, Switzerland, concerning Swiss Government's offer to represent American interest in Japanese-occupied territories, and instructions for closing of diplomatic stations under certain emergencies.
91-----	2067 12-31-45	1950	Dispatches dated Dec. 15, 1941 (2), Feb. 16, 1942, and Mar. 25, 1942, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State Department, relating action taken in Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers, and confidential papers and records after outbreak of hostilities.
92-----	2068 12-31-45	1960	Photostatic copy of pp. 591 to 618, vol. 377, Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, containing statement by Prime Minister Churchill before the House of Commons on Jan. 27, 1942.
93-----	2075 12-31-45	1974	Photostatic copy of p. 2, G-2 Record Section Register of Incoming Cables on Dec. 5, 1941.
94-----	2078 12-31-45	1975	3 intercepted messages dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, transmitting the so-called "Ten Point Note" which was handed to the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull on that date.
95-----	2091 12-31-45	1987	Memoranda dated July 12, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, concerning his conversation with Admiral J. O. Richardson on July 11, 1940, and a handwritten note by Admiral H. R. Stark.

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106	12-31-45	12-31-45	12-31-45	2144
107	1-4-46	1-4-46	1-4-46	2258

Memorandum dated July 10, 1940, and study "Questions on Certain Features of the Far Eastern Situation and certain Problems of United States Far Eastern Policy, July 4, 1940", attributed to Stanley K. Hornbeck.	Memorandum dated Sept. 21, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, for Under Secretary Sumner Welles, concerning a Navy proposal for execution of a fleet problem involving simulated attack on the Panama Canal during January 1941, and three related memoranda.	Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, by Secretary Stimson for the President concerning "Japanese Convoy Movement Toward Indo-China".	Memorandum dated Sept. 26, 1944, prepared by J. W. Ballantine and M. M. Hamilton, relating their recollection of the delivery of intercepted Japanese messages to Secretary Hull's office by Lieutenant Commander Kramer on the morning of Dec. 7, 1941.	Transcript of Interrogation on Dec. 8, 1941, of (Japanese) Prisoner of War No. 1, by Naval Intelligence officers at Honolulu, statement by the prisoner, and memorandum concerning "Investigation of Japanese Submarine Aground in Waimanalo Bay".	Log of U. S. S. <i>Enterprise</i> from Nov. 24 to Dec. 16, 1941, inclusive.	Log of U. S. S. <i>Lexington</i> from Dec. 5 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.	"Report of Action With Japanese Air Force at Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941", by Commander. <i>Enterprise</i> Air Group to his Commanding Officer, dated Dec. 15, 1941.	"U. S. S. <i>Lexington</i> War Diary" for period Dec. 7 to Dec. 25, 1941, inclusive.	Certain estimates of Japanese Situation and Intentions as made by British agencies and relayed to this Government during period from Oct. 21, to Nov. 22, 1941.	Compilation of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral H. E. Kimmel from Jan. 13 to Dec. 12, 1941.	"Appendix to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Pearl Harbor Investigations", prepared by Navy Department. It contains endorsements by Secretary James Forrestal, Judge Advocate General, Admiral T. L. Gatch, and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, to the Hewitt Report, and endorsements by the same officials to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry's Findings of Fact.
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Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
107-A----	2479 1-5-46	2393	"The Findings, Conclusions and Action by the Secretary of the Navy", including the Fourth Endorsement by Secretary Forrestal to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry, and a summary of an offer by the Navy Department of a General Court Martial for Rear Adm. H. E. Kimmel.
108-----	2364 1-4-46	2432	Memorandum, dated Nov. 2, 1944, by Stanley K. Hornbeck attached to his memorandum of Feb. 28, 1944, which related to an attached third memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck dated Nov. 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of situation and certain probabilities", described by him as "a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been leaks and misrepresentation".
109-----	2476 1-5-46	2444	Guide to Symbols, and series of maps submitted by Admiral R. N. Turner, showing the location of ships Dec. 1 to 6, inclusive, 1941.
110-----	2477 1-5-46	2444	Compilation of letters from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral T. C. Hart, from Feb. 9, 1940, to Nov. 8, 1941.
111-----	2495 1-15-46	2457	Letter dated Dec. 5, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Mr. Wendell Willkie, concerning proposal from Australian Minister for Mr. Willkie to make a trip to Australia, together with related correspondence and memoranda.
112-----	2496 1-15-46	2458	Dispatches and other material referred to in footnotes to Admiral Kimmel's prepared statement before the Joint Committee. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
113-----	2558 1-16-46	2502	Letter, dated Aug. 13, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Task Force Commanders, concerning Employment Schedules, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942, and attached Employment Schedules for Task Forces 1, 2, and 3.
113-A----	2807 1-19-46	2532	Letter, dated Feb. 21, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Commanders, concerning "Battle Organization and Condition Watches".
113-B----	2807 1-19-46	2534	Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, dated Oct. 31, 1941, concerning "Task Forces—Organization and Missions".
113-C----	3449 1-31-46	2538	(a) Revised Employment Schedules of Task Force 9, submitted pursuant to Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, together with documents which approve same; (b) Watch and Duty Schedules for Patrol Wing 2 (December 1941).

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114	2559	2600	2672	2700	2707	2713	2714	2716	2721	2727	2735
1-16-46	1-16-46	2601	3449	2558	2559	5015	2559	2559	2559	2561	2588
115	1-16-46		1-31-46	1-16-46	1-16-46	2-20-46	1-16-46	1-16-46	1-16-46	1-16-46	1-16-46
115-A											
115-B											
116											
117											
117-A											
118											
119											
120											
121											
122											

With Dec. 46, and before Gen. Admiral Kimmel to his commanders, dated July 21 and July 26, 1941; Promulgating WPPac-46, which is U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan - Rainbow Five (Navy Plan 5-1, Rainbow 5).
 Communications Intelligence Summaries concerning location of Japanese Fleet Units: (a) Fourteenth Naval District Summaries, dated Nov. 1 to Dec. 8, 1941; (b) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer Reports dated Oct. 27 to Dec. 2, 1941; (c) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Memorandum dated Dec. 1, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
 Fourteenth Naval District "Communication Intelligence Summaries of Dec. 9 and 10, 1941, showing assumed Composition of Japanese Striking Force".
 Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, dated Nov. 27, 1941.
 Selection of correspondence of Admiral H. R. Stark, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, and others from Feb. 11, 1941, to Oct. 3, 1941, concerning anti-torpedo baffles for protection of ships in harbor against torpedo plane attacks.
 Selection of Army and Navy correspondence from Jan. 16, to Feb. 14, 1941, concerning the air defenses of the Hawaiian Islands.
 Letter dated Feb. 17, 1941, concerning "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," from Gen. W. C. Short to his Commanders.
 Memoranda, dated Nov. 30 and Dec. 5, 1941, of Admiral Kimmel, entitled "Steps to be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War within Next Twenty-Four Hours".
 Radio Log of Bishop's Point Radio Station, Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
 (a) Memorandum dated Dec. 19, 1941, by Admiral Bellinger for Admiral Kimmel concerning "Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of Dec. 7, 1941"; (b) Compilation of dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid drills were held during 1941; (c) Report of Army-Navy Board dated Oct. 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas, Hawaiian area.
 Statement by Admiral H. E. Kimmel and copies of correspondence submitted by him, concerning the circumstances of his retirement by the Navy Department, and related matters.
 Selected correspondence in June and August 1941 of Admiral H. E. Kimmel, Admiral C. C. Bloch, and Gen. W. C. Short concerning aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
123-----	2588 1-16-46	2736	Selection of correspondence, memoranda, and dispatches concerning the proposed construction of a combined operating center for Army and Navy in Hawaii from Oct. 29, 1941, to Jan. 7, 1942.
123-A-----	5015 2-20-46	2743	Additional selection of correspondence and memoranda concerning Joint Operations Centers for Army and Navy from Oct. 17, 1941, to Jan. 10, 1942. (See also Exhibit No. 123.)
124-----	2674 1-17-46	2749	Intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages between Washington and Tokyo, dated Aug. 18 to Aug. 29, 1941, inclusive, concerning United States-Japanese negotiations and the United States note to Japan dated Aug. 17, 1941. These intercepted messages are additional to those published in Joint Committee Exhibit No. 1.
125-----	2678 1-17-46	2801	Log of the <i>U. S. S. Wright</i> from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and chart of locations of the ship on Nov. 27 and Dec. 7, 1941.
126-----	2767 1-19-46	2832	(a) Navy Department General Order No. 143, dated Feb. 3, 1941, entitled "Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States"; (b) excerpts from Navy Regulations, setting forth the general duties of a Commander in Chief; (c) Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions (1941), dated July 14, 1941.
127-----	2768 1-19-46	2867	Correspondence, memoranda and dispatches concerning the aircraft situation in Hawaii after Dec. 7, 1941. (See also Exhibit No. 112, p. 77, for letter dated Jan. 7, 1942, by Admiral Nimitz on same subject.)
128-----	2768 1-19-46	2870	Selected correspondence relating to the proposed prosecution of Japanese consular agents in Hawaii, recommended by United States Attorney in Hawaii by letter dated June 4, 1941.
129-----	2842 1-19-46	2875	Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46), and letter dated May 26, 1941, from Admiral H. R. Stark promulgating the plan.
130-----	2879 1-21-46	2941	Selection of memoranda and dispatches contained in files of State Department concerning Japanese and United States air reconnaissance in Pacific prior to Dec. 7, 1941, including dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to State Department forwarding note from Japanese Government protesting reported flight of United States planes over Taiwan Nov. 20, 1941, and State Department's reply to Ambassador Grew.
131-----	2892 1-21-46	2943	Testimony of Admiral H. E. Kimmel before the Roberts Commission, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Army Pearl Harbor Board.

122	2917 1 21 40	2043	Selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 7874-7877, Joint Committee Transcript): (a) Memorandum "Report on Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the American Ambassador, 7:30 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (b) Memorandum "List of Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the British Ambassador, 8:00 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (c) Memorandum written by one Matsumoto, Head of Treaty Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "On the Declaration of War against the United States and Great Britain—Meeting of Privy Council, Dec. 8, 1941."
132-A	5137 2-20-46	2046	Additional selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 13662-13665 Joint Committee Transcript): (a) Diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington which had not been completely intercepted, being Washington to Tokyo Nos. 881, 941, and Tokyo Circular Nos. 2288, 2313 and 2193; (b) Memoranda of three conversations on Aug. 19, 29 and 30, 1941, between German Ambassador Ott and Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda and Vice-Minister Amano; (c) Memoranda dated Sept. 6 and 13, 1941, concerning basic conditions for a peace settlement between Japan and China; (d) Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, summary of the progress of Japanese-American negotiations.
133	2965 1-23-46	2953	Statement by Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attacks Dec. 7, 1941, introduced at his request. Identical with exhibit he introduced before Roberts Commission and Army Pearl Harbor Board.
134	2965 1-23-46	3124	Dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from War Department to Gen. W. C. Short, concerning reinforcement of advance Pacific bases, and five charts and Bureau of the Census publication on the Population characteristics of Hawaii used by General Short in his prepared statement before the Joint Committee.
135	2965 1-23-46	3171	Compiled summary of evidence concerning time of sending and receipt of War Department warning messages of Nov. 27-28, 1941, and replies thereto, together with photostatic copies of the messages.
136	2966 1-23-46	3187	Memorandum dated Nov. 14, 1941, by Lt. Col. C. A. Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, concerning operation of radar equipment during recent military exercises, and attached transmitting memorandum for Special Assistant to Secretary of War.
137	2966 1-23-46	3187	Four original reports concerning training and operations time schedules of radar stations, Hawaiian Department, from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and related material.
138	2976 1-23-46	3195	Photostatic copy of memorandum bearing approval of Gen. W. C. Short of report prepared by Gen. F. L. Martin dated Aug. 20, 1941, entitled "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii". (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 13.)

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Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
139	3006 1-23-46	3196	Two reports dated Oct. 17 and 25, 1941, entitled "G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation" by Lt. Col. G. W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department.
140	3188 1-26-46	3203	Selection of memoranda by the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Judge Advocate General, including proposed charges against Maj. Gen. W. C. Short, retired, prepared by the office of the Judge Advocate General, and related material.
141	3311 1-28-46	3254	File of Capt. E. M. Zacharias, U. S. Navy, entitled "Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading Up to It".
142	3324 1-29-46	3302	Compilation of Material Relating to so-called "Winds" code. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
142-A	3324 1-29-46	3318	(a) Memorandum dated Dec. 5, 1941, concerning interception by Portland F. C. C. station of Japanese Weather Broadcast; (b) Federal Communications Commission, Radio Intelligence Division, Night Watch Log for Nov. 24 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
142-B	3674 2-4-46	3321	Additional material concerning translation of Circular No. 2494, from Tokyo, dated Dec. 7, 1941 (see p. 251, Exhibit No. 1), subsequent to the original translation.
142-C	3741 2-5-46	3322	Letter dated Feb. 4, 1946, from State Department to Committee Counsel enclosing paraphrases of three messages, two from London dated Dec. 15, 1945 and Jan. 31, 1946, and one from The Hague, dated Jan. 26, 1946, regarding the so-called "winds" messages, indicating no interception by the British or Dutch Governments of a "winds execute" message prior to Dec. 8, 1941.
142-D	3780 2-5-46	3323	Material from Hawaiian office, Federal Communications Commission, concerning the so-called "winds" code.
143	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Roberts Commission appointed Dec. 18, 1942, by the President. (See Parts Nos. 22 through 25.)
144	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Inquiry conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, retired, pursuant to precept dated Feb. 12, 1944, of the Secretary of the Navy. (See Part No. 26.)
145	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened by the Secretary of War pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 27 through 31.)

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146	3929 2-7-46	3322	Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, convened by the Secretary of the Navy pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 18, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 32 and 33.)
147	3929 2-7-47	3332	Proceedings of Investigation conducted by Col. Carter W. Clarke, U. S. Army, Sept. 14, 15, and 16, 1944, and continued from July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945. (See Part No. 34.)
148	3929 2-7-46	3332	Report of Investigation during the period Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945, conducted by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, A. U. S., for the Secretary of War, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. (See Part No. 35.)
149	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., pursuant to precept dated May 2, 1945, of the Secretary of the Navy, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (See Parts Nos. 36 through 38.)
150	4083 2-8-46	3333	Letter dated Mar. 18, 1944, from Admiral H. E. Kimmel, retired, to Admiral W. E. Halsey, suggesting questions for Comdr. A. D. Kramer concerning the so-called "winds" message.
151	4421 2-13-46	3335	Six memoranda prepared by Capt. L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, during May, June, and July, 1945 in connection with the inquiry conducted by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, concerning intercepted Japanese messages. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
152	4794 2-18-46	3351	Memorandum dated Dec. 23, 1941, "General Observations of Damage by Projectiles in the City of Honolulu on Dec. 7, 1941", prepared by employees of the Honolulu Board of Water Supply, and a map of the city of Honolulu, T. H., showing points struck by projectiles, Dec. 7, 1941.
153	5009 2-19-46	3353	Prepared statement dated Dec. 1, 1945 entitled "The War Record of Civilian and Industrial Hawaii", with attached Exhibits, submitted to the Joint Committee by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.
154	5013 2-20-46	3430	Compilation of selected correspondence between Gen. H. H. Arnold and Gen. F. L. Martin from Aug. 15 to Nov. 27, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
155	5068 2-20-46	3435	Original Radar Plot of Detector Station OPANA, Dec. 7, 1941.
156	5122 2-20-46	3436	Memorandum dated June 21, 1941 prepared by Col. Moses W. Pettigrew concerning "Final Recommendations Far Eastern Intelligence Organization".
157	5201 4-11-46	3441	Reports, findings, and conclusions of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements. (See Part No. 39.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
158	5201 4-11-46	3441	Compilation of selected documents obtained from State Department files relating to United States-British Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
159	5201 4-11-46	3488	Compilation of selected material obtained from State Department files relating to United States-Chinese Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
160	5240 4-11-46	3502	Transcript of remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 8:30 (p. m.) and continuing at 9 o'clock with legislative leaders, on Dec. 7, 1941.
161	5241 4-11-46	3508	Drafts of Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson of a proposed message for the President to deliver to Congress on the state of relations with the Japanese Government. (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 19 for final draft by Secretary Hull.)
161-A	5464 5-23-46	3520	Draft of a proposed message to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains suggestions made in the memoranda by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, as shown in exhibit No. 161.
162	5269 4-11-46	3534	Log of the Watch Officer, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, from 1145, Dec. 6, 1941, to 2000, Dec. 7, 1941.
162-A	5464 5-23-46	3543	Naval communications referred to by serial numbers in Log of the Watch Officer, as shown in exhibit No. 162.
163	5292 4-11-46	3557	Log of the U. S. S. <i>Helena</i> from Nov. 26 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive.
164	5292 4-11-46	3593	Reports made by Gen. W. C. Short and his subordinate officers to the War Department concerning the attack on Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
165	5292 4-11-46	3643	Copy of a partial translation of a document relating to a Feb. 23, 1941, conference between German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima.
166	5468 5-23-46	3648	State Department dispatch No. 5682 dated Dec. 5, 1941, to the American Embassy in London. (This dispatch is mentioned in American Embassy, London, dispatch No. 5923 dated Dec. 6, 1941, to State Department, which appears in exhibit No. 21.)

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167	5404 5-23-46	3652	(e) State Department file copy of document handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassador on Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note); (b) State Department statement to the press on Nov. 26, 1941, concerning the delivery of (a); (c) State Department Press Release No. 585, dated Dec. 7, 1941, concerning the delivery of (a); (d) memorandum dated Dec. 2, 1941, concerning President Roosevelt's remarks at his press conference that date, relating to delivery of (a) and general Far East matters.
168	5468 5-23-46	3666	Compilation of documents from State Department files which are dated in November and December 1941, concerning a proposed <i>modus vivendi</i> , which documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 18. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
169	5469 5-23-46	3696	Compilation of documents relating to conversations between State Department officials and representatives of the Thailand Government, between Aug. 6 and Dec. 8, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
170	5469 5-23-46	3789	Compilation of documents from War Department files concerning the retirement of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) These documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 140.
171	5469 5-23-46	3942	Compilation of documents from Navy Department files concerning the retirement of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
172	5469 5-23-46	3978	Compilations made by War and Navy Departments of data concerning airplanes and antiaircraft guns produced and their distribution from Feb. 1 to Nov. 30, 1941.
173	5469 5-23-46	3985	Memoirs of Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister of Japan, and related documents.
174	5469 5-23-46	4030	Compilation of miscellaneous documents from State Department files. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
175	5470 5-23-46	4115	Memorandum from Secretary of Navy dated Dec. 5, 1941 and letter from Secretary of War dated Dec. 6, 1941, submitting estimates concerning Japanese forces in Indochina and adjacent areas, to the Secretary of State for delivery to the President, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Secretary of State for the President.
176	5470 5-23-46	4121	Compilation of location of United States naval forces in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East, also foreign naval forces in the Pacific and Far East, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
177	5470 5-23-46	4182	Compilation of State Department documents dated in 1939, concerning a proposal made by former Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma for United States-Japanese understanding. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
178	5470 5-23-46	4209	Compilation of documents from Ambassador Joseph C. Grew to the President and the State Department, and attached memoranda. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
179	5470 5-23-46	4241	Miscellaneous documents from the files of the late President F. D. Roosevelt, as furnished to the Committee, concerning Far East matters.
180	5471 5-23-46	4551	Organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington, D. C., and Hawaii, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
181	5520 5-23-46	4565	The United States News, extra number, Sept. 1, 1945, publishing reports of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry, and related documents.
182	5537 5-23-46	4702	Compilation of military intelligence estimates, prepared by G-2, War Department, for period Jan. 1 to July 1, 1941.
183	5468 5-23-46	4766	Material compiled at request of Senator Ferguson by letter dated May 20, 1946, to Committee counsel (p. 5464), including data concerning the test bombing of the <i>Ulich</i> by the Army Air Corps in 1937, and data concerning the program of the Army Air Corps for 1940-45 production of B-17 4-engine bombers.

EXHIBIT NO. 7

(Exhibit No. 7 is a map of Oahu, T. H., showing the record of the Opana radar detector station, 7 December 1941. This map is printed as Item No. 18 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

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(5) Source Documents used by Navy in compiling the "Navy Summary of the Japanese Plan for the Attack on Pearl Harbor".....	431
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CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGE DATED 14 OCTOBER 1945 FROM MACARTHUR'S HEADQUARTERS TO WAR DEPARTMENT

Japanese say many records were burned. However, complete report, with chart of task force, now being written and to be sent by air. Preliminary information received from the Japanese Navy is as follows: On 5 November 1941, plan for attack on Pearl Harbor was adopted, and on 1 December 1941 Cabinet Council decided on commencement of hostilities. Order that hostile action should open on 8 December was issued by Imperial General Headquarters on 2 December. Navy section of Imperial General Headquarters and Combined Fleet Headquarters were involved in discussions and decisions to make attack.

Commander in Chief Combined Fleet on 25 November ordered task force to leave Hitokappu Bay next morning and proceed to 42° North—170° East by afternoon 3 December for complete refueling. Attack force was organized as follows: 1st Air Squadron (Kaga and Alagi [Akagi]), 2nd Air Squadron (Hiryu and Soryu), 5th Air Squadron (Zuikaku and Shokaku), 3rd Squadron (Hiei and Kongo), 8th Squadron (Tone and Chikuma), 4 destroyer divisions making one squadron, 8 transports and 2 submarines.

Japanese lost 27 aircraft; estimate damage to U. S. Navy at 2 battleships (Oklahoma and West Virginia) sunk, 4 battleships and 4 heavy cruisers damaged, one transport and one destroyer sunk, and 350 planes burned or shot down.

Intelligence from Hawaii was obtained through (a) American broadcasts from Hawaii, (b) reports from Naval Attache in Washington, (c) reconnaissance submarines in Hawaiian waters just before outbreak of war and, (d) things heard from ships which called at Hawaii mid-November.

PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGES DATED 15 OCTOBER 1945 FROM MACARTHUR'S HEADQUARTERS TO WAR DEPARTMENT

1. We are continuing local investigation.

2. As early as possible information available to Allied Technical Intelligence Service on Pearl Harbor attack will be forwarded. Material consisting of partial coverage from captured documents is already collated, but still on way to Tokyo from Manila. Documents on which collation is based have already been sent to Washington.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (28 Oct 45) GB

26 OCTOBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data with Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attn: A. C. of S., G-2)

1. In compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the attached documents, Inclosures Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5, are forwarded in amplification of preliminary report contained in our radio CAX 53287, 13 October 1945.

2. Investigation is being continued through the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. A copy of a questionnaire which has been furnished and Liaison Committee in order to guide their efforts into the most productive channels and to insure the most complete coverage pos-

ible is attached hereto as Inclosure No. 4. A further report will be submitted as soon as answers to the questionnaires are received and translated.

For the Supreme Commander:

/s/ H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Ass't Adjutant General.

5 Incls:

- Incl 1—Report, Liaison Committee, 8 Oct 45.
- Incl 2—Report, Liaison Committee, 10 Oct 45.
- Incl 3—Report, Liaison Committee, 11 Oct 45.
- Incl 4—Questionnaire to Liaison Committee.
- Incl 5—Map, Routes of Jap Fleet.

(Incl. #1)

LIAISON COMMITTEE (TOKYO) FOR THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY

8 OCTOBER 1945.

N. D. No. 108.

To: Colonel F. P. Munson, USA

G-2, GHQ of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

We forward herewith a general survey concerning the attack on Hawaii which has been hastily prepared in accordance with your oral instruction to Commander Yamaguchi, I. J. N. of the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, 1,000 hours 8 October 1945.

K. NAKAMURA,
Rear Admiral, I. J. N.,
Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.

General Survey of the Attack on Hawaii Prepared in Accordance with Oral Instruction by Col. Munson to Commander Yamaguchi of the Liaison Committee for the Imperial Army and Navy.

I. Operational Orders

(A) Orders of the Imperial General Headquarters

(1) Imperial Naval Order

(a) (Issued 1 December)

Japan, under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense, has reached a decision to declare war on the United States of America, British Empire and the Netherlands. Time to start an action will be given later.

(2) The instruction by the Chief of the Naval General Staff under the Authority delegated to him by the Imperial Naval Order. (Later abridged: Naval General Staff Instruction).

(a) (Issued 1 December)

The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall, at the start of war, direct his attack on the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area to reduce it to impotency, using the First Air Fleet as the nucleus of the attack force.

(3) Imperial Naval Order

(a) (Issued 2 December)

The hostile actions against the United States of America, the British Empire and the Netherlands shall be commenced on December 8.

(4) Naval General Staff Instruction

(a) (Issued 2 December)

Bear in mind that, should it appear certain that the Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the forces of the Combined Fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their bases.

(B) Orders of the Headquarters of the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet and other Headquarters.

The subject matters are being investigated through members connected with the said forces of that period.

II. Means used to gain intelligence from Hawaii and other sources

- (1) Reports of Naval Attache in Washington D. C. (Announcements by American Authorities and Press reports were the sole source.)
- (2) Hearings of ships which called at Hawaiian ports in mid-November.
- (3) Through submarines on reconnaissance duty in Hawaiian waters immediately preceding the outbreak of war.
- (4) Radio Broadcasts from Hawaii.

III. Organization of Attacking Force

- First Air Squadron (Akagi and Kaga)
- Second Air Squadron (Soryu and Hiryu)
- Fifth Air Squadron (Shokaku and Zuikaku)
- Third Squadron (Kongo and Hiei)
- Eighth Squadron (Tone and Chikuma)
- First Destroyer Squadron (Abukuma, 6th Destroyer Division, 17th Destroyer Division, 21st Destroyer Division and 27th Destroyer Division)
- Supply Force (8 Transports)
- Submarine Force (2 Submarines)

IV. Movement of Attacking Force (See attached Map)

V. Estimated Damage inflicted on American Navy

- Sunk—2 Battleships (West Virginia and Oklahoma)
- 1 Destroyer
- 1 Transport
- Seriously Damaged—4 Battleships
- 4 Heavy Cruisers
- Aircraft shot down or burned—over 350

VI. Losses of Japanese Navy

- Failed to Return—27 aircrafts

N. B.—As this report hastily prepared based on the combined memory of those who were connected with the event, certain corrections will be expected to be made.

(Incl #2)

LIAISON COMMITTEE (TOKYO) FOR THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY

10 OCTOBER 1945.

N. D. No. 123

To: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Re: N. D. No. 108, 8 October 1945.

Subject: Additions to the Answers already given to the questions regarding the Attack on Hawaii.

1. Additional operational orders:

- (a) Units of the attacking force assembled in Hitokappu Bay (Etorofu-jima), by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.

N. B.—About 14 November the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet issued the above order because he recognized Hitokappu Bay as the most suitable place for enabling the attacking force to meet any new development in the situation, as well as to keep its location and movements secret.

- (b) The attacking forces left Hitokappu Bay by order of the Imperial General Headquarters.

N. B.—Around 21 November the situation had seemed to be approaching to a stage where commencement of hostilities would be inevitable. The Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, issued the following order (Imperial Naval Order) to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall order necessary forces to advance to the area in which they are to wait in readiness and shall station them in such positions that, in the event of the situation becoming such that commencement of hostilities be inevitable, they will be able to meet such situation promptly."

But as the Japanese Government had sent Ambassador Kurusu to the United States by that time and was doing its utmost to bring the Japanese-American

negotiations to an amicable settlement, an instruction had already been issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff to the effect that the attacking forces were to return and re-assemble in the event of the negotiations with the United States proving successful.

[2] 2. Information regarding the departure from Hitokappu Bay of the force, of which the nucleus was the First Air Squadron, was given to no one outside of the Japanese Navy.

Even within the Navy, the only those who knew of the above fact were in addition to the attacking force itself, the leading officers of the Navy Section of the Imperial General Staff and of the Combined Fleet Headquarters and a certain restricted number of officers intimately concerned with the fleet operation.

3. "Radio broadcasts from Hawaii" which we have mentioned as one source of information were the broadcasts made to the general public.

K. NAKAMURA,

Rear Admiral, I. J. N.

Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.

(Incl #3)

LIAISON COMMITTEE (TOKYO) FOR THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY

11 OCTOBER 1945.

N. D. No. 130

To: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters of The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

In compliance with your letter delivered on 11 October, we forward hereby our report as follows:

1. Order to the attacking force to assemble at Hitokappu Bay.

The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 7 November:

"The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall assemble in Hitokappu Bay by 22 November for re-fueling".

2. Order giving the details of the mission of the attacking forces.

The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 25 November:

(a) "The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the U. S. Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The first air-raid is planned for the dawn of X day (exact date to be given by later order).

"Upon completion of the air-raid, the Task Force, keeping close co-ordination and guarding against the enemy's counter-attack, shall speedily leave the enemy waters and then return to Japan".

(b) "Should the negotiations with the United States prove successful, the Task Force shall hold itself in readiness forthwith to return and re-assemble".

3. Order directing the attacking force to proceed on its mission:

[2] The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 25 November:

"The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall leave Hitokappu Bay on the morning of 28 November and advance to 42° N 170° E (standing-by position) on the afternoon of 3 December and speedily complete re-fueling".

4. Exact time when the attack on Hawaii was decided upon.

(a) By way of preparation for the opening of hostilities, the plan of naval operations against the United States, Great Britain and Netherlands (including the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor) was adopted on 5 November.

(b) Commencement of hostilities was decided upon by Cabinet Council on 1 December.

(c) On 2 December the Imperial General Headquarters issued an order that hostile action was to be opened on 8 December.

5. The following agencies of the Imperial Japanese Government were concerned in the discussions and decisions to execute the attack on Pearl Harbor:

The Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters and the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet.

N. B.—Since this report is based on the combined memory of those who were connected with the matter, it is possible that some revisions may have to be made as a result of further investigation.

K. NAKAMURA,
Rear Admiral, IJN.
Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.

(Incl #4)

[1]

QUESTIONNAIRE

17 OCTOBER 45.

To be answered completely. Answers to be substantiated by copies of all plans, orders, maps, photos, reports, and other official documents available. In case a question is answered from memory, so state, giving name, rank, and official position.

1. Who first thought of or proposed a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?
(Give names or agencies, e. g. Admiral ———, General Staff, Naval General Staff, War Ministry, etc.)
2. When?
(Give date or approximate date as accurately as possible, e. g. August 1940, Spring of 1941, year 1922—any time such a proposal *first* was considered either for actual use or in strategic planning, study, or discussion).
3. Was this maneuver or any similar maneuver included in pre-war Japanese plans for possible use in event of war with U. S.?
4. If so, describe it as given in these pre-war plans.
(State objectives, forces to be employed, routes of approach, what you expected to accomplish, etc.)
5. When was the decision made to actually attack Pearl Harbor.
(Gives dates as accurately as possible, e. g. 1 September 1941, Spring of 1941)
6. Who made this decision? (e. g. War Ministry, Chief of Staff, War Ministry, or some combination of persons or agencies.)
7. If this decision was made in a conference give date (or approximate date) of that conference and the names of all known persons attending.
8. What factors were considered in arriving at this decision? (e. g. Desire to cripple Pacific Fleet so as to gain freedom of action against P. I.; Destroy U. S. main Pacific base?; Gain time for P. I. campaign? Protect mandated islands? or what?)
- [2] 9. Who worked up the details of the plan as it was actually executed? (e. g. Planning Section, General Staff? Naval Staff? Individuals?) **NOTE:** When I say Plan, I differentiate between *plans* or staff studies and the actual *orders* issued to put the plan in effect.
10. When did this work begin?
11. When the plan was completed who finally approved it?
12. When was the plan finally approved?
13. What persons and agencies knew about this plan? (e. g. the Emperor, the War Ministry, the General Staff, the Naval Staff, the Cabinet, The consul at Honolulu, Military Attaches to ——— The Ambassador at Washington, Kurusu, etc) **NOTE:** Names of individuals and agencies are both desired—for example, the Cabinet as a whole might not have been informed but the War Minister would. Also: state persons who had partial knowledge, e. g. the Emperor might have known you planned to attack but not without declaring war, etc.
14. What sources furnished information on which the plan was based? Give names, rank and positions. (e. g. Military attaches, Consuls, Japanese Civilian resident of Honolulu, Broadcasts, New articles).
15. What features of information were obtained from each of the above-listed sources?
16. How and by whom was the detailed information plotted on the maps carried by your aviators obtained? (e. g. Accurately plotted and named ship berths, barracks, azimuths on which to approach, etc.).
17. How was this information checked while the Task Force was en route?
18. What part did local agents in Hawaii play?
- [3] 19. Were any photographs taken by the above persons of fleet units in the harbor?
20. If so, when (particularly the date of the last taken).

21. Give complete details of how the plan was developed. Discuss:

- a. Obstacles considered and how they were overcome.
- b. Partial decisions made and by whom.
- c. How were the commanders and particular units to participate (Both fleet units and air units) selected?
- d. Why was the route you selected chosen?
- e. What provision was made against discovery en route?
- f. What action was to be taken if discovered?
- g. What deceptive measures to draw U. S. attention elsewhere were employed?
- h. What action was to be taken if the attack failed?

22. How was the date of December 7 selected and for what reasons?

23. How was the time of attack selected? For what reasons?

24. Give detailed composition of Task Force (Naval Vessels and Air Units).

25. Were any of these Fleet Units or Air Units to be detached at any time during the operation, e. g. to attack secondary targets?

26. Give scheme of maneuver for air attack. Include:

- Number and type of planes assigned to attack each target. Why?
- Routes of groups of planes from carrier to target. Why?
- Time each group was to strike its target.
- Route(s) of escape after attack? Why was this route (these routes) selected?

27. Discuss use of midget-submarines.

(Why used, number used, whether you expected any back, did you get any back, and other details, conclusions, as to usefulness of this weapon.)

(4) 28. Was the plan in any way tentative or contingent. If so, give details: (e. g. If the U. S. had made some concession was it to be abandoned or changed? If the U. S. Pacific Fleet had put to sea what changes would have been made?)

29. Furnish a copy of each of the following:

- a. The Plan for the Pearl Harbor Operation.
 - b. Any Staff Studies or other subsidiary documents thereto.
 - c. The Order (with all amendments thereto) that put the plan in effect.
- Note: If any document is not available give all details of it you can from memory if necessary. (Items furnished from memory will be so marked.)

30. When did you begin assembling the Task Force?

31. Where did it assemble?

32. When did it move out on its mission?

33. Had an amicable settlement appeared likely or been agreed upon while the Task Force was en route what action was then to be taken.

34. Did everything go as planned?

35. If not, what change or mishaps occurred and why?

36. Was the task force ever discovered and/or attacked while en route?

37. Were any non-Japanese vessels sighted en route?

38. If so, what was done about them?

39. Why did you not follow up the air attack with a surface attack? With a landing?

40. List your losses.

41. List estimated U. S. losses.

42. From what sources did you determine U. S. losses?

(5) 43. Did you launch any additional raids or make any reconnaissance against Hawaii by either air, submarine, or surface vessels immediately following the attack. (e. g. night after attack, following day, etc.)


44. If any questions remain unanswered, state exact reason in each case. (e. g. "All copies of order burned on surrender," "Adm. ——— who is only person who knew this was killed on (date).").

45. Did you have any submarine operating in the Hawaiian area prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

46. If so, where were these submarines based, what were their operation instructions, what reports did they render during and after the attack, and were there any casualties among these submarines?

47. If submarines were used, how long did they remain in the Hawaiian area?

48. What information pertaining to the Pearl Harbor attack was received from Japanese merchant vessels before the attack on Pearl Harbor?



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (1 Nov. 45) GB

1 NOVEMBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.

To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.

(Attention: A. C. of S., G-2)

1. Reference our communication AG 350.05 (26 October 1945) GB, same subject, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945 and WX 73561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, a partial detailed report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report was compiled by the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in response to our Questionnaire furnished the Liaison Committee on 17 October, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of 26 October (referred to above) and includes detailed information in answer to questions 1-13 inclusive, 21-28 inclusive, and 30-47 inclusive, thereof.

3. In view of the fact that the Japanese records of this operation have been largely destroyed, the bulk of this information has been obtained by interrogation of important figures in the Japanese Military and Naval Establishments of the time. Sources of such items of information are stated in the text.

4. The Japanese report that answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and question 48 (which concern their sources of military intelligence on which operational plans were based) will require further investigation, which is now in progress. Documentary evidence required by Question 29 was destroyed at the time of surrender; however, efforts to reconstruct it, at least partially, from memory and from fragmentary sources, are being continued. This additional information will be forwarded as soon as received and translated.

For the Supreme Commander:

/s/ H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

1 Incl: Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.

(Incl. 1)

1082 ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

Note: Translation of a document requested by Colonel MUNSON, Historical Investigation Section, G-3, 17 October-20 October 1945.

REPLY TO A QUESTIONNAIRE CONCERNING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Doc. #1082

DRM/FMO/HDP

Pp 1 I. Paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 48 (that is, the information therein) are under special investigation and the answers will be forwarded later.

II. The reply to Paragraph 29 (concerning orders) will be delayed because all the copies of the orders were burned at the time of the surrender. A detailed report based on the recollections of the people concerned and on fragmentary sources, without the aid of documents which should be available, is in preparation.

Pp 2 (Note: The following Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 are based on the recollections of Chief of Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; member of Operations Section Naval General Staff, Comdr. MIYO, Tatsukichi; Combined Fleet Staff members Capt. KUROSHIMA, Kameto, and Comdr. WANATABE, Yasuji.)

1. Who conceived and proposed the PEARL HARBOR surprise attack?
Adm. YAMAMOTO, Isoroku, then CinC, Combined Fleet.

2. When was this done?

The first part of January 1941. (CinC YAMAMOTO ordered Rear Adm. ONISHI, Takijiro, at that time Chief of Staff of 11 Air Fleet, to study the operation.)

3. *Was the said action (or similar actions in anticipation of a war against the UNITED STATES) included in JAPAN'S prewar plans?*

No.

4. *If this is so, write the facts shown in the prewar plans.*

(No statement.)

Pp. 3 (Note: The following Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 are based on the recollections of Adm. NAGANO, Osami, then Chief of the Naval General Staff.)

5. *When was it decided to attack PEARL HARBOR?*

3 Nov. 41. This date was set by the Chief of the Naval General Staff, NAGANO, when CinC, Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO came to TOKYO.

6. *Who made the foregoing decision?*

Chief of the Naval General Staff NAGANO.

7. *If the decision was made in conference, give time of said conference and names of all persons present.*

It was not made in conference.

Pp. 4 (Note: The following Paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 are based upon the recollections of Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; Comdr. MIYO, Tatsukichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General Staff; and Capt. KUROSHIMA, Kameto, a member of the Combined Fleet Staff.)

8. *What important factors were considered in reaching this decision?*

The factors considered were: (1) rendering impotent the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet in order to gain time and maintain freedom of action in the SOUTH SEAS Operation (including the PHILIPPINE Islands), and (2) the defense of our mandated islands.

9. *Who were the persons who worked out the details of the actual plan?*

Members of Naval General Staff Operations Section, Combined Fleet Operations Staff and 1 Air Fleet Operations Staff.

10. *When was the above undertaking started?*

In the first part of September 1941.

11. *Who made the final confirmation of this plan when it was completed?*

CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

Pp. 5. 12. *When was the final confirmation of this plan made?*

1 Dec. 41.

13. *Who were the people and organizations who knew of this plan?*

(Note: This answer is based on the recollections of the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Adm. NAGANO, Osami; Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; and Comdr. MIYO, Tatsukichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General Staff.)

Those connected with the Navy are as follows:

(1) Those who knew the complete plan in advance:

Chief of the Naval General Staff

Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff

Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff

Members of Operations Section Naval General Staff

The commanders in chief, the chiefs of staff and most of the staff members of the Combined Fleet Hq and 1 Air Fleet Hq

(2) Those who knew a part of the plan in advance:

Chiefs of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Naval General Staff

Navy Minister

Navy Vice-Minister

Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, Navy Ministry

Chiefs of Sections 1 and 2, Bureau of Naval Affairs, and some of their personnel

Commander in chief of each fleet of the Combined Fleet, their chiefs of staff and some of the staff members.

Pp. 6

(3) Those who knew the general outline of the plan in advance:

The Emperor. (The Emperor knew of the objective of attacking the main strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet with a task force after the last ultimatum to the UNITED STATES Government had been delivered.)

(Note: Any persons other than those connected with the Navy are unknown. However, it is certain that none of the Japanese officials who were in the UNITED STATES or its possessions, including Ambassador NOMURA, Ambassador KURUSU, the Navy and Army officers attached to the embassy in the UNITED STATES and the Imperial Consul in HONOLULU, knew anything about this plan in advance.)

Pp. 7

(Note: The replies in Paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 are based on the recollections of the Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; Comdr. MIYO, Takkichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General Staff; Combined Fleet Staff members Capt. KUROSHIMA, Kameto, and Comdr. WATANABE, Yasuji; and the commanding officer, officer of the Air Unit, Comdr. FUCHIDA, Mitsuo.)

21. Write a detailed report on how this plan could have been improved.

a. The obstacles which were considered and how they were overcome.

(1) The impossibility of refueling at sea due to rough weather was considered. To overcome this difficulty, the ships with a limited cruising range were deck-loaded with drums of heavy oil, and heavy oil was stowed in open spaces inside the ship. In the eventuality that there were no opportunity to refuel at sea, all the ships except the destroyers had a cruising radius extending to approximately E Long 160°. In the event the destroyers were unable to refuel there was a plan to have them separate and return. In actual fact, however, the sea was comparatively calm and the scheduled refueling was possible.

(2) It was decided that a torpedo attack against anchored ships was the most effective method of putting the main strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet in the HAWAII area out of action for a considerably long period of time. Hence, the following two obstacles were considered:

(a) The fact that PEARL HARBOR is narrow and shallow.

(b) The fact that PEARL HARBOR was probably equipped with torpedo nets.

(c) In regard to point (a), it was planned to attach stabilizers to the torpedoes and launch them from an extremely low altitude.

(d) In regard to point (b), since success could not be counted on, a bombing attack was also employed.

b. Were local decisions made and, if so, by whom?

There were none.

c. How were the units and commanding officers who were to participate selected (surface forces and air forces)?

Pp. 9 Air forces: The basic unit was organized by attaching the flight personnel of Car Div 4 (RYUJO and RYUHO) to Car Div 1 (AKAGI, KAGA) and Car Div 2 (SORYU and HIRYU), which were at that time the most highly trained units in the Combined Fleet. Car Div 5, because it had just been organized, was supplemented by highly trained flight personnel from every unit in JAPAN, and, by further concentrated training, it was planned to bring them to peak efficiency.

Surface forces: As for a possible, vessels with a long cruising range were selected. Persons of ability were selected for commanding officers.

d. What were the reasons for the actual course selected?

Three courses were considered for the HAWAII Operation. The northern course which was actually used, a central course which headed east following along the HAWAII Archipelago, and a southern route passing through the MARSHALL Islands and approaching from the south. On the northern route, although it was far from the enemy patrol screen of land-based airplanes and there was little chance of meeting commercial vessels, the influences of weather and topography were strong. Refueling at sea and navigation were difficult. On the central and southern routes the advantages and disadvantages are generally just the opposite to those of the above-mentioned route. Although

Pp. 10

It may be assumed that these routes would be preferable for purposes of refueling at sea, the chances of being discovered by patrol planes were great because the routes near WAKE, MIDWAY, PALMYRA, JOHNSTON Islands, etc. Consequently, it could hardly be expected that a surprise attack could be made.

The ability to refuel and a surprise attack were the keys to this operation. If either of them failed the execution of the operation would have been impossible. However, the refueling problem could be overcome by training. On the other hand, a surprise attack under all circumstances could not be assured by our own strength. Therefore, the northern route was selected.

e. What preparations were made for the prevention of discovery enroute?

(1) By electing the route so as to pass between MIDWAY and the ALEUTIANS, we would pass outside the patrol zones of the patrol planes.

(2) Screening destroyers were sent ahead in the path of the fleet and in the event any vessels were encountered, the main body of the fleet would make a severe change of course and endeavor to avoid detection.

Pp. 11 (3) Complete radio silence was carried out.

f. In the event of being discovered what countermeasures would have been taken? The day of the attack was designated as X-day.

If discovered prior to X-2 day, we would have returned without executing the air attack. In the event of being discovered on X-1 Day, the question of whether to make an attack or to return would have been decided in accordance with the local conditions.

g. What means of deception were taken so as to direct the attention of the UNITED STATES elsewhere?

The Main Force in the INLAND SEA Area and the land-based air units in the KYUSHU Area carried on deceptive communications, and deceptive measures were taken to indicate that the Task Force was still in training in the KYUSHU Area.

h. If the attack had failed, what countermeasures would have been taken?

In order to bring in the Task Force it was planned to send the Main Force in the INLAND SEA out to the PACIFIC Ocean.

Pp. 12 22. State reasons for and particulars of the selection of the date of 7 December.

(1) The Imperial Headquarters Navy Section generally acknowledged 8 December (JAPAN time) to be suitable from an operational standpoint and made the decision in cooperation with the leaders of the Combined Fleet.

(2) For a dawn attack in the HAWAII Area in December, the tenth would have been suitable from the standpoint of the dark of the moon. However, since it was expected that the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet, in accordance with its habits during maneuvers, would enter the harbor on Friday and leave on Monday, the eighth was decided on so as to hit between these days.

Pp. 13 23. How was the time for the attack selected and for what reasons?

In order to assure the success of the attack and still avoid a night attack, the take-off time of the airplanes was set as near to dawn as possible. The attack time was set at 0330 hours (JAPAN time). Sunrise that day was at 0230 hours.)

7.3. A. Details of the composition of the Task Force (ships and air strength).

(Note: These numbers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Commander FUJIMURA, Kikaku, who was then commander of the ASAGI Air Unit.)

(1) Ships.

UNIT	COMMANDER	COMPOSITION	NOTE
Air Attack Force	Under direct command	Six aircraft carriers AGATO SUICAKU KAGA KIKYO MIDAY SUICAKU	Air attack
Screening Unit	Com 2nd Div 1 Rear Adm CHIKI, Suzuhara	One light cruiser MAGARA Five destroyers MAGARU MAGARU MAGARU MAGARU MAGARU AKIKORO KASUGI ABASHI KASUGI KIKIYAKI	Screen; cover
Support Force	Com 2nd Div 3 Rear Adm KIKIYAKI, Suzuhara Adm MAGARU	Two battleships KIKI KIKIYAKI Two heavy cruisers YOSHIO CHIKIYAKI	Screen; support
Patrol Unit	Com 2nd Div 2 Capt KIKIYAKI, Kikyo	Three submarines 1-19 1-21 1-23	Patrol ship lanes
Midway Neutralization Unit	Com 2nd Div 7 Capt KIKIYAKI, Kikyo	Two destroyers AKIKORO MAGARU	Attack air base on Midway
1 Supply Unit	Captain of STOKUO MARU (special) (supply ship)	Five tankers KIKYO (1st) MARU STOKUO MARU KIKYO (2nd) MARU STOKUO MARU KIKYO (3rd) MARU STOKUO MARU	
2 Supply Unit	Captain of STOKUO MARU (special) (supply ship)	Three tankers STOKUO MARU STOKUO MARU STOKUO MARU	Supply

Pp. 15 (2) Air Strength.
 (a) Reconnaissance Unit.

Type	Type of airplane	Number of airplanes	Ships on which based	Duty
Airplanes for reconnaissance just before the attack.	Type Zero Reconnaissance Seaplanes.	2	<i>Tone</i> (1)..... <i>Chikuma</i> (1)	Reconnaissance of PEARL HARBOR and LAHAINA Anchorage just before the attack.
Search-patrol planes.	Type 95 Reconnaissance Seaplanes.	4	<i>Hiei</i> (1)..... <i>Kirishima</i> (1) <i>Tone</i> (1) <i>Chikuma</i> (1)	Patrolling waters around OAHU.

9. (b) Amount Due

UNIT	COMMISSION	TYPE OF AIRCRAFT	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT	TYPE OF ATTACK	ARMAMENT (Each Aircraft)	TARGETS
1 Attack Unit	Carrier	14	14	Horizontal bombing attack	One 500-lb armor-piercing bomb	Battleships
2 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14			
3 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14			
4 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14			
5 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14	Torpedo bombing attack	One 500-lb aerial torpedo	Battleships Aircraft carriers
6 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14			
7 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14			
8 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14			
9 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14	Dive bombing attack	250-lb bomb 500-lb armor-piercing bomb	Aircraft carriers Battleships Cruisers
10 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14			
11 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14			
12 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14			
13 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14	Air control and strafing attack	Two 20-mm MGs Two 7.7-mm MGs	Aircraft carriers Battleships Cruisers
14 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14			
15 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14			
16 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14			
17 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14	Horizontal bombing attack	One 250-lb bomb One 500-lb armor-piercing bomb	Aircraft carriers Battleships Cruisers
18 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14			
19 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14			
20 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14			
21 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14	Dive bombing attack	Two 250-lb bombs Two 500-lb armor-piercing bombs	Aircraft carriers Battleships Cruisers
22 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14			
23 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14			
24 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14			
25 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14	Air control and strafing attack	Two 20-mm MGs Two 7.7-mm MGs	Aircraft carriers Battleships Cruisers
26 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14			
27 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14			
28 Attack Unit	14 Carrier	14	14			


10. Control Air Pollution

Patrol	Type of Airplane	Number of Airplanes	Help on Water Base	Type of Patrol
Patrol 1	Type Seve	18	ARMED - 9	Direct air escort
			LOAD - 9	
Patrol 2	Carrier	12	ARMED - 9	Airplanes ready to flight deck
	Fighter	54	ARMED - 5	
Patrol 3	18		ARMED - 9	Airplanes ready to support deck
			ARMED - 9	

- Notes
1. Direct air escort was carried out from an hour before sunrise until 45 minutes after sunset.
 2. The patrols alternated every two hours.

2. The patrols alternated every two hours.

(1) SWIRL OF MOVEMENTS OF AIR UNITS AFTER THEY CAME IN SIGHT OF CANY.



1. Second Attack Dail.
2. Ordered to deploy at 0410 hours.
3. Dive bombing unit
4. Attack now ordered at 0420 hours
5. Horizontal Bombing Unit
6. LANTERN
7. KIDMAN
8. PMSD Island
9. Patrol Attack Dail.

1. Ordered to deploy at 1110 hours.
2. Attack run started at 1120 hours.
3. Five bombing hits.
4. RESULTS.
5. Personnel Beating Halls.
6. Personnel Beating Halls.
7. RESULTS.
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100. RESULTS.

Pp 18 25. During this operation were any of the fleet units or air forces diverted to attack secondary targets?

(Note: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was in command of the AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

(1) The MIDWAY Neutralization Unit (AKEMBONO, USHIO) left TOKYO Bay about 1 December, arrived at MIDWAY during the night of 8 December, bombarded the air base, and returned to the western part of the INLAND Sea. The SHIRIYA moved with this unit and served as a supply ship.

(2) On 18 December, while proceeding back from HAWAII, two aircraft carriers (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU), two cruisers (TONE, CHIKUMA), and two destroyers (TANIKAZE, URAKAZE) were diverted to WAKE Island. They were sent by Combined Fleet orders to support the WAKE Invasion Operation.

Pp 19 26. (NOTE: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was in command of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

a. Explain the plans of action and the reasoning therein, for the air attack, giving the number and type of airplanes used against each target.

(1) First Attack.

(a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (50 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).

Target: Battleships.

Reasoning:

(1) It was presumed that the American battleships could be effectively crippled by 800-kg armor piercing bombs, dropped from an altitude of 3,000 meters or more.

Pp 20 (2) Horizontal bombing is relatively inaccurate, however, it was estimated that, with the degree of training the bombing unit had, an 80% ratio of hits could be expected against stationary battleships if formations of five airplanes were employed from an altitude of 3,000 meters or more. Therefore, it was concluded that about four battleships could be effectively crippled with 10 formations of bombers.

(3) Because of the accuracy of torpedo attacks, we desired to use as many of them as possible. However, both bombing attacks and torpedo attacks were used for the following reasons:

(a) If torpedo nets were layed, the attack would otherwise be unsuccessful.

(b) Launching torpedoes into shallow water such as that in PEARL HARBOR requires a special technique.

(c) Ordinarily, ships were moored in pairs abreast each other. Consequently, bombing attacks were the only effective method against the inside ships.

(b) Torpedo Bombing Unit (40 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).

Target: Battleships and aircraft carriers.

Reasoning:

Torpedo bombing is very accurate. Therefore, the pilots most skillful at shallow water torpedo bombing were selected and an attempt made to put as many battleships and carriers temporarily out of action due to underwater damage as the conditions previously related in "(c)" would permit. (Because the carriers were not at their anchorages on the day of the attack, the airplanes concentrated on the battleships.)

(c) Dive Bombing Unit (54 Type 99 Carrier Bombers).

Target: Air bases.

15 Attack Unit (27 airplanes)—Hangars and grounded airplanes at FORD Island.

16 Attack Unit (27 airplanes)—Hangars and grounded airplanes at WHEELER.

Reasoning:

Pp 22 (1) Since the primary objective of this attack was to put the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet temporarily out of action, the attack was directed at the battleships and carriers. However, fighter plane bases were attacked first because it was necessary to prevent a counterattack by American fighter planes against our

main attack units—the horizontal bombing and torpedo bombing units.

(2) It had been concluded that WHEELER Field was a UNITED STATES Army fighter plane base and that carrier planes from the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet were usually kept at FORD Island.

(d) Fighter Striking Unit (45 Type Zero Carrier Fighters).

Targets: Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes.

2 Fighter Striking Unit—FORD Island and HICKMAN.

4 Fighter Striking Unit—WHEELER and BARBERS POINT.

6 Fighter Striking Unit—KANEHOE.

Reasoning:

(1) At the beginning of the attack the fighter striking unit was to maintain a single formation and patrol over OAHU, attacking any enemy fighter planes which got into the air.

(2) If no fighter opposition were met in the air, the unit was to split up as indicated above and attack grounded airplanes on the various airfields on OAHU, thereby preventing a counterattack.

(2) Second Attack.

(a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (54 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).

Target: Air bases.

6 Attack Unit—Hangars and grounded airplanes at HICKHAM.

5 Attack Unit—Hangars and grounded airplanes at KANEHOE, FORD Island and BARBERS POINT.

Reasoning:

By putting the American airplanes on OAHU temporarily out of action, a counterattack against the Task Force could be prevented.

(b) Dive Bombing Unit (81 Type 99 Carrier Bombers).

Target: Aircraft carriers and cruisers.

Reasoning:

(1) Although the 250-kg bombs which the airplanes were able to carry could not pierce the armor of the battleship, it was estimated that they would be effective against the UNITED STATES cruisers and carriers of that time.

(2) It was estimated that there were then four or five American carriers operating in the HAWAII Area. They were the targets of this dive bombing unit. (Since the aircraft carriers were not at their anchorages on the day of the attack, most of the blows were directed against battleships.)

(c) Fighter Striking Unit (36 Type Zero Fighters).

Targets: Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes.

2 Fighter Striking Unit—FORD Island and HICKHAM.

4 Fighter Striking Unit—WHEELER and KANEHOE.

Reasoning:

Same as stated previously.

b. Explain the courses, and the reasoning therein, which the air units followed from the aircraft carriers to the targets.

Both the First and Second Attack Units proceeded directly from the carriers to OAHU. They flew at an altitude of 3,000 meters. (Dense clouds hung at about 2,000 meters that day, so the airplanes flew above them.)

The positions of the carrier groups were as follows:

(1) The airplanes in the First Attack Unit took off at 0130 hours. The carriers were 230 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of LANAI Island.

(2) The airplanes in the Second Attack Unit took off at 0245 hours. The carriers were 200 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of LANAI Island.

The movements of the airplanes after they came in sight of OAHU is shown in the appended sketch.

c. Give the times at which each unit attacked its target.

First Attack Unit.

Dive Bombing Unit

WHEELER Field—0325 hours.

Torpedo Attack Unit

Battleships at FORD Island Anchorage—0327 hours.

Horizontal Bombing Unit

Same as above—0235 hours.

Fighter Striking Unit

Began ground strating—0330 hours.

Second Attack Unit.

All three units—Dive Bombing Unit, Horizontal Bombing Unit and Fighter Striking Unit—attacked their targets about 0430 hours. However, details are not available because the Commanding Officer of the Second Attack Unit, Lt. Comdr SHIMAZAKI, was killed in combat in January 1945.

(Note: The times at which the attacks started have been indicated. Both First Attack and the Second Attack continued for 30 minutes to an hour).

Pp. 27 d. What courses did the airplanes follow on their flight back to the carriers? Why were these courses chosen?

A rendezvous was made with the Fighter Striking Unit 20 nautical miles bearing 340° from KAENA* Point. From there all units proceeded directly back to the carriers.

Because of the flying time involved, no thought was given to withdrawing on courses designed to deceive possible opposition.

Pp. 29 27. How were midget submarines used?

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at that time.)

a. Reasons for use:

To cause the greatest possible damage to the enemy through co-operation in the assault by the air forces.

b. How many were used?

Five.

c. Were they expected to return?

While the probability that they would be able to return was very small, it was not thought to be wholly impossible. All midget submarine personnel, however, were prepared for death and none expected to return alive. (They were precursors of the KAMIKAZE Attack Units.)

d. Did any return?

None were recovered, though all possible recovering measures were exhausted.

e. Give a detailed report and criticism on the effectiveness of this weapon.

Pp. 30 The submarines which were on patrol duty outside the entrance to PEARL HARBOR witnessed a great explosion within the harbor at 1631 hours 8 December (2101 hours, 7 December, HAWAII time). A radio report on the success of the attack was received from one of the midget submarines at 1811 hours the same day (0041 hours, 8 December, HAWAII time).

It was impossible to determine the total damage inflicted since there were no further detailed reports. This report did not confirm the daylight attack on 8 December; but it was verified that the night attack on the same day had been carried out, and it was inferred that great damage was caused to one or more large war vessels.

Pp. 31 28. Was this a well-elaborated plan or one developed for the emergency?

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Capt TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi, Chief of Operations Section, Naval General Staff, and of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

a. Had the UNITED STATES made concessions would the plan have been discarded or modified?

(TOMIOKA) It would have been discarded.

b. If the American fleet had been at sea, how would the plan have been modified?

(Replies by FUCHIDA:)

(1) Had the American fleet sought to intercept our Task Force or had there been a significant threat to the attack as planned, we would have counterattacked.

(2) Had the American fleet left port we would have scouted an area of about 300 miles around OAHU and were prepared to attack. If the American fleet could not be located, we were to withdraw.

Pp. 32 (Note: The following replies, Paragraphs 30-38, are based on the recollections of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at the time of the attack.)

30. *When did the Task Force begin to form?*

The various forces were to leave the several areas where they might be on or about 15 November, to proceed as single vessels or in small formations and to rendezvous in TANKAPPU-WAN by 22 November.

31. *Where was the rendezvous?*

TANKAPPU-WAN.

32. *When did the Task Force get underway on its mission?*

It sailed from TANKAPPU-WAN at 0600 hours 28 November.

33. *Was there any provision to receive word of a settlement while this Task Force was underway? What steps would have been taken if a compromise had been reached?*

Depending on orders, the Task Force would have returned to TANKAPPU-WAN, HOKKAIDO, or to MUTSU-KAIWAN.

34. *Did everything proceed according to plan?*

Yes.

Pp. 33 35. *If it had not done so, what changes or mishaps might have arisen and why?*

(No statement.)

36. *Was the Task Force sighted or attacked while underway?*

No.

37. *Was any shipping, other than Japanese, seen while underway?*

None.

38. *If any such shipping had been encountered, what measures would have been taken?*

(No statement.)

Pp. 34 39. *Why was the air assault not continued, and why was it not followed up by surface units or by a landing?*

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at the time of the attack.)

(1) The object of this attack was to destroy the capital strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet and to delay any attack which it might make across the PACIFIC. Hence this objective could be accomplished by air attack alone. Furthermore, since the whereabouts of the American task forces were unknown, and since the chances of scouting them were small, in face of a possible counterattack in co-operation with the 50-odd remaining HAWAII-based large airplanes, the advantages of a quick withdrawal were apparent. Consequently, no naval assault was undertaken.

(2) No landing operation was planned because it would have been impossible to make preparations for such a landing in less than a month after the opening of hostilities, and because it was recognized that the problems of speed and of supplies for an accompanying convoy would have made it unlikely that the initial attack could have been accomplished without detection.

Pp. 35 (Note: The following paragraphs, 40, 41 and 42 are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

40. *What damage did the Japanese receive?*

In the First Attack:

Fighter planes.....	3
Dive bombers.....	1
Torpedo bombers.....	5
Total	9

In the Second Attack:

Fighter planes.....	6
Dive bombers.....	14
Total	20
Grand total.....	29

41. What was the estimated damage to American forces?

(1) Naval vessels:

Sunk: 4 battleships

1 cruiser

2 tankers

Pp. 36

Heavily damaged: 4 battleships

Lightly damaged: 1 battleship

(2) Airplanes

Shot down: Approximately 10 Airplanes.

Burned or destroyed on the ground: Approximately 250 airplanes

Total: Approximately 260 airplanes.

It is impossible to determine how many others, presumably a considerable number were destroyed in the hangars.

42. How was the damage inflicted on the Americans determined?

(1) From reports of flight personnel upon their return.

(2) From studies of photographs taken by flight personnel.

(Note: No reconnaissance planes were used to assess the results immediately after the attack, but one element of fighter planes was ordered, after completing its mission, to fly as low as possible to observe the results.)

Pp. 37 43. Were any of the air, submarine or surface units employed in additional attacks on HAWAII or in reconnaissance immediately after the main attack?

(Note: The following paragraph is based on the recollections of Cmdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, at that time Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit, and of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet.)

A part from reconnaissance by submarines stationed at the mouth of PEARL HARBOR on the eve of the day of the attack, none engaged in follow-up attacks or in reconnaissance.

Pp. 38 (Note: The replies in paragraphs 45, 46 and 47 are based on the recollections of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at the time of the attack.)

45. Were any submarines operating in Hawaiian waters prior to the attack on PEARL HARBOR?

Submarines were stationed on lookout duty in Hawaiian waters, the day before the Task Force strike, on the evening of 7 December. They were ordered not to attack until the Task Force strike was verified.

46a. If there were, where were these submarines based?

Most of the submarines departed from JAPAN for a rendezvous at KWAJALEIN, to proceed thence to HAWAII. A few, which were delayed in leaving JAPAN, changed course and proceeded directly to HAWAII.

b. What were their operation orders?

Pp. 39 The orders given to the submarines were as follows: Part were to proceed with the Task Force, screening it as it proceeded toward HAWAII; the majority of the submarines were to take up lookout stations in Hawaiian waters by the evening of 7 December, while the midget submarines were to scout and reconnoiter a possible attack by the enemy fleet as well as strike into PEARL HARBOR.

At the same time, they were given strict orders not to attack until the Task Force strike had been verified.

c. Were reports made during and after the attack?

When the Task Force and the midget submarine strikes were completed, the midget submarines reported as follows:

(1) Report of the attack as observed by a midget submarine on the of 8 December.

(2) A midget submarine radioed the same night "Surprise attack succeeds".

(3) A report on the departure of midget submarines and that it was impossible to recover their personnel though all recovery measures had been tried.

d. What damage was sustained by the submarines?

Pp. 40 One submarine was detected and depth-charged by patrol vessels near the entrance to PEARL HARBOR. Though it ran afoul of the antisubmarine net, it extricated itself, after some damage, and returned safely. Apart from this case there was one other submarine lost off PEARL HARBOR; the time and place of its sinking are unknown.

47. How long did the submarines remain in Hawaiian waters?

The submarines continued operations in the vicinity of HAWAII from 8 December, the day of the attack, until early January of the following year. During this time, most of the submarines proceeded to the west coast of the UNITED STATES to destroy shipping, and part of the submarines returned to JAPAN. Only a small number remained in the Hawaiian area for the maximum length of time.

End

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (8 Nov 45) GB

8 NOVEMBER 1945.

Subject. Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.

To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.

(Attention: A. C. of S., G-2)

1. Reference our communications AG 350.05 (1 November 1945) GB, and AG 350.05 (26 October 1945) GB, same subject, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional partial report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report contains answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and to question 48 of our questionnaire to the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army and Navy, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of 26 October referred to above.

For the Supreme Commander:

/S/ H. W. Allen
H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

1 Incl: Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.

(Incl 1)

Doc No. 1668

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

NOTE: Translation of document requested by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

PEARL HARBOR QUESTIONNAIRE

26 OCTOBER 1945

The answers to questions 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 48 of Colonel MUNSON'S questionnaire of 17 October, the PEARL HARBOR Attack are contained herein. NOTE: Because of the deaths of Commander KANAMOTO, Yoshihira (28 December 1942), and Commander NAKAJIMA, Minato (6 August 1943), who were staff officers in the Intelligence Department of the Naval General Staff, and because of the pertinent records have been burned, these answers are based upon the recollections of Commander TACHIBANA, Itaru, who was on duty in the Intelligence Department at that time.

14. Sources of intelligence?

Such matters as the strength of the UNITED STATES Fleet in the HAWAII area, the condition of military installations, the days upon which the fleet moved out of and into port, the location and condition of moorages, waters in which maneuvers were held, air patrols, etc.; were used as basic intelligence material. This material was collated by the Intelligence Department of the Naval General Staff and used as the basis for the operation plan.

The primary sources were:

1. Naval attache to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

2. Public newspapers in the UNITED STATES.
3. American radio broadcasts (public).
4. Crews and passengers on ships which put in at HONOLULU.
5. General information.
15. Characteristics of Intelligence?

Emphasis was placed on material collected statistically over a number of years.

16. How and from whom were the details on the maps carried by personnel of the air units obtained?

A. The location of the anchorages shown on the maps was determined on the basis of information gathered from the sources mentioned in "14", beginning in the early part of 1941. Information on the condition of the fleet moorages in PEARL HARBOR in the early part of November was forwarded to Fleet Headquarters. Fleet Headquarters then corrected its information accordingly.

B. Information on barracks and other military installations was compiled from the sources listed in "14".

C. The general outlines of the approach to OAHU for both the Attack Force and the air units were determined from information provided by the previously named source. Factors taken into consideration in the choice were American air patrols, sea patrols, etc. The routes selected were judged to be those upon which there was slight chance of encountering a patrol, merchant ships, etc.

17. In what way did the Attack Force check on information while it was underway?

As information was gathered from the sources mentioned in, "14" it was forwarded to the Attack Force.

18. What role was played by agents in HAWAII?

None.

19-20. Photographing of ships in the harbor and opportunities for same.

Applicable facts not available.

48. What pertinent information was received from merchant ships prior to the attack?

Merchant ships provided fragmentary information on moorages in PEARL HARBOR, ship and air unit maneuvers, the names of vessels encountered in the HAWAII area, etc. This information was used in the statistical collation of information mentioned in "14".

EXHIBIT NO. 8-A

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (12 Nov 45) GB

12 NOVEMBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.

To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attention: A. C. of S., G-2).

1. Reference previous correspondence above file and subject, and in compliance with your radios WX 73711 War Sec, 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 1941, an additional document is forwarded herewith.

2. This document provides further amplification previously furnished by the Japanese in answer to question 27 and questions 45-47 inclusive of our questionnaire of 17 October 1945 with respect to submarine operations in connection with the Pearl Harbor attack, and which was forwarded on 1 November 1945.

For the Supreme Commander:

/s/ H. W. Allen
H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Asst Adjutant General.

1 Incl: Notes of Correspondent.

[A newspaper Article Published in the Yomiuri-Hochi, 30 October 1945]

[1]

THE EVE OF "PEARL HARBOR"

An early chapter in the History of War Crimes.

December 8, 1941. This is the fatal date when the American People as one resolved themselves to "Remember Pearl Harbor!" But long before this date Japan's submarine offensive on Pearl Harbor were going on and several eery periscopes were feeling out movements of American fleets from the rough sea. The former War Correspondent Hanakata has only now made public his notes taken at that time from direct narrations of the late Captain (then Lt Commander) Katsuji Watanabe of "I No. 69" and the late Rear Admiral (then Captain) Shinki Nakaoka of the 11th Detachment of the 3rd Submarine Fleet.

"The Japanese submarine detachment belonged to the Sixth Fleet, whose flagship was the light cruiser Katori. In early November orders for war preparation were given to this detachment, and on 11 November over ten submarines of the First and 3rd Detachments, including "I" Nos. 69, 74, 75 and others left Yokosuka Naval Base, with knowledge of the growing war fever in Washington and Tokyo.

"The submarine fleet followed a course due east in line ahead, stretching over 20 miles. They navigated at surface speeds of from 12 or 13 to 20 knots. But when they got near the Hawaiian waters they extended and followed their respective courses. The duties of the submarine fleet were known as (a) to feel the movements of American fleets around Pearl Harbor; (b) to disptach "special submarines" from their decks and to observe their war results; (c) to attack escaping American war vessels, if any; (d) to rescue operators of "special submarines", down fliers and others wherever possible.

"In Hawaiian waters the submarines floated on the sea in the night, and in the day time they submerged to periscope depth. The schedule of Pearl Harbor attack at 0300 on December 8th was transmitted to the submarine fleet two or three days beforehand. On 7th "I No. 74" sighted the carrier *Lexington* but no trouble ensued.

"The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was carried on as had been scheduled. Before this, five large sized "I" type submarines belonging to the First Submarine Detachment had launched "special submarines" from their decks. That was the departure of the now well known Commander Iwasa and other members of "special attack parties".

"The submarines followed the upheaval in the harbor only through occasional land explosions coming through the deep water, and they confirmed the Harbor Battle at night when they emerged from the bottom of the sea. At 1631 (2101 Hawaiian time) Rear Commander Watanabe of "I No. 69" detected from the periscope a huge fiery column which marked the end of the USS *Arizona*.

[2] "Lt. Commander Watanabe's radio intercepted dispatches in relation to this were by the enemy and his "I No. 69" was pursued by enemy destroyers which dropped depth charges madly. Under this circumstance "I No. 69" dived 60 to 70 meters beneath the surface, though her ordinary diving capacity had been set at 30 meters. The submarine sustained damage here and there and finally was caught by submarine wires. She struggled hard and just managed to get away from the wires. Altogether this old submarine remained submerged about 39 hours. All hopes of rescuing fellow-fighters who had been shot down had been abandoned."

The notes from direct narration by Captain Watanabe and Rear Admiral Nakaoka end here. But Mr. Hanakata observes that most of the officers and crews of Japanese submarines, including those participating in the siege of Pearl Harbor, perished at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean, the prey of American radio locators. For example, the said Captain Watanabe perished with his submarine in 1943 around the Gilbert Islands. Rear Admiral Nakaoka was promoted to be captain of the crack cruiser *Atago* but he also was killed in action by enemy bombs on the bridge of that vessel.

The Yomiuri-Hochi 30 October 1945.

I certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief the foregoing notes represent a true report of the information given me by the late Captain Watanabe and the late Rear Admiral Nakaoka at the time of interview.

/s/ M. HANAKATA.

EXHIBIT NO. 8-B

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (29 Nov 45) GB

29 NOVEMBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.

To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attention Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2).

1. Reference our communications of 26 October 1945, 1 November 1945, and 8 November 1945, same file number and subject, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec, 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional partial report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report contains a reconstruction from memory of certain Japanese documents relative to the attack, all originals of which are reported to have been burned at the time of surrender. The reconstructions have been obtained by the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army and Navy in compliance with question 29 of our questionnaire of 17 October 1945, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of 26 October referred to above.

For the Supreme Commander:

/sgd/ H. W. Allen
H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, A. G. D.
Asst. Adjutant General.

1 Incl: Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.

[1] Dec 1976

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

Note: Translation of a document requested by Colonel MUNSON, Historical Investigation Section, G-2.

REPLY TO A QUESTIONNAIRE CONCERNING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

22 OCTOBER 1945.

Navy Ministry

The answers to Question 29 of Col. MUNSON's questionnaire on the PEARL HARBOR attack, dated 17 October, are contained herein.

29. Copies of the following will be submitted:

1. Operation plan for the PEARL HARBOR attack.
2. Operational research and other documents related to the attack.
3. Orders relative to carrying out the plan (together with all revisions).

All copies of the above items were burned at the time of the surrender, and as a result no documents are available. The essential points in the orders relative to carrying out the operation are hereby submitted. The information is based on the recollections and inquiries of the following three men:

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff.

Section Orders and Directives

Rear Admiral TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi (then a captain and chief of Operation's Section, Naval General Staff).

Combined Fleet Orders

Rear Admiral KUROSHIMA, Kameto (then a captain and member of Combined Fleet Senior Staff (SHUSEKI SAMBO).)

Task Force Orders

Capt FUCHIDA, Mitsuo (then a commander and in command of AKAGI Air Unit).

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 1 (essentials).

5 Nov 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

A. Because it is feared that war with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS is inevitable, it has been decided that for the sake of the Empire's defense general operational preparations will be completed by the first part of December.

B. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will carry out the necessary operational preparations.

C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 1 (essentials)

9 Nov 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

A. The Combined Fleet will prepare itself for the possibility that war with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS may become inevitable in the first part of December. The necessary forces will be sent to the prepared points at a suitable time prior to the beginning of operations.

B. A strict watch against possible surprise attacks will be maintained during these movements.

[3] C. The operation policy in the event hostilities break out with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS is set forth in the Separate Volume.

NOTE: The part of the operation policy relating to the HAWAII area is recalled as follows:

"At the very beginning of hostilities the UNITED STATES Fleet in the HAWAII area will be attacked by a force having 1 Air Fleet as its nucleus. An attempt will be made to destroy the American fleet"

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order (essentials).

21 Nov. 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO.

A. At the appropriate time the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will order the forces necessary for carrying out the operation to proceed to rendezvous areas.

B. If friendly forces are challenged by American, English or Dutch forces during the operational preparations, the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet is authorized to use force in order to protect the friendly forces.

C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 5 (essentials).

21 Nov. 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

A. In the event that an agreement is reached in the negotiations between the UNITED STATES and JAPAN the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will immediately order the forces for the operation to return.

B. The use of force mentioned in Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 5 is limited to the following cases:

1. If American English or Dutch surface forces should proceed into Japanese territorial waters for reconnaissance purposes.

[4] 2. If American, English or Dutch surface forces approach Japanese territorial waters and it is recognized that they are jeopardizing our forces.

3. If aggressive action imperiling our forces is taken by American, English or Dutch surface forces outside territorial waters.

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 9 (essentials).

1 Dec. 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

A. It has been decided that JAPAN will commence hostilities with the UNITED STATES, ENGLAND and the NETHERLANDS in the first part of December.

B. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will destroy enemy surface and air forces in the ORIENT, and, in the event enemy fleets attack, will intercept and destroy them.

C. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, in co-operation with the Commander in Chief Southern Army, will rapidly attack important American.

English and the Dutch bases in the ORIENT, and will occupy and protect them.

D. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will co-operate in the operations of the CHINA area fleet when necessary.

E. The times for starting the movement of forces for the above will be given in a later order.

F. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 9 (essentials).

1 DEC. 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

The Combined Fleet operations against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS will be based upon the Separate Volume—"Imperial Navy's Operation Policy against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS".

[5] Note: As far as can be remembered, the Operation Policy in the Separate Volume was entirely the same as the Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive of 5 November.

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 12 (essentials).

2 DEC. 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

A. Beginning 8 December, the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will start using military power in accordance with Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 9.

B. The use of military force against the NETHERLANDS will be started after moves have been made against the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN.

C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Chief of Naval General Staff Verbal Directive.

2 DEC. 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO (given to him while he was in TOKYO).

It is to be understood beforehand that if an agreement is reached in the negotiations between JAPAN and the UNITED STATES before the use of military power has started, the Combined Fleet forces will be directed by special order to return.

Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order—(essentials).

Flagship NAGATO HIROSHIMA-WAN

7 Nov. 41

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku

CinC Combined Fleet

[5] Combined Fleet Order

The Task Force will gather in HITOKAPPU-WAN and remain there to take up supplies until 22 November. Every precaution will be taken to insure secrecy in movements.

Note: About the time the above order was issued, a Combined Fleet order (giving directions for carrying out the Operation Policy) based on Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 1 was also issued. Detailed information as to its contents is not available. (It is thought that it was about the same as Paragraph 1 of Task Force Operation Order 1, which was issued later).

418 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order—(essentials).

Flagship NAGATO HIROSHIMA-WAN
22 Nov. 41

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku
CinC Combined Fleet

Combined Fleet Order

A. The Task Force will move out from HITOKAPPU-WAN and proceed to the HAWAII area, maintaining the greatest secrecy as to its movements and a close watch against submarine or air attacks. At the opening of hostilities the Task Force will attack the main strength of the UNITED STATES Fleet in the HAWAII area and inflict crippling damage on it.

The first attack will be at dawn on X-Day (to be given in a later order).

At the conclusion of the air attacks the force will regroup and withdrawn immediately to JAPAN, being prepared at all times to meet enemy counterattacks.

B. In the event an agreement is reached in the negotiations with the UNITED STATES, the Task Force will immediately return to JAPAN.

NOTE: In ND No 130 of 11 Oct 45 it was stated that this order was issued 25 November. However, that was an error, and the date of the order has now been corrected to 22 November.

Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order—(essentials).

Flagship NAGATO HIROSHIMA-WAN
25 Nov. 41

[7]

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku
CinC Combined Fleet

Combined Fleet Order

The Task Force will move out of HITOKAPPU-WAN on 26 November and proceed without being detected to the evening rendezvous point (Lat 40° N, Long 170° W), set for 3 December, where refueling and supply will be carried out as quickly as possibly.

NOTE: In accordance with this order the Task Force moved out of HITOKAPPU-WAN at 0600 hours on 26 November.

Combined Fleet Dispatch Operation Order—(essentials).

Time of origin: Approximately 1730 hours, 2 Dec 41.

Text: X-Day will be 8 December.

Task Force Ultrasecret Operation Order 1 (essentials).

Flagship AKAGI, HITOKAPPU-WAN
23 Nov 41

NAGUMO, Chuichi
Task Force Commander

Task Force Order

A. The Task Force will proceed to the HAWAII area, taking every precaution to insure the secrecy of its movements. The force will attack the enemy fleet in the HAWAII area and attempt to cripple it.

The first air attack has been set for 0330 hours on X-Day.

When the attacks have been completed the force will quickly withdraw. Upon returning to JAPAN the force will be re-equipped and supplied and then assigned a task in the Second Phase Operations.

If, while underway, the Force is intercepted by the enemy fleet, encounters a powerful enemy force, or it appears that the enemy is going to attack in order to gain the advantage, the Task Force will attack immediately.

B. Chart (See next page.)

2. The allocation of strength will be shown in the table below.

UNIT	COMMAND	STRENGTH	DUTY
Air Force	CinC 1 Air Fleet	1 Air Fleet	Air Attack
Screening Unit		Flag of Des Ron 1; Des Div 17 Des Div 18; AKEGUMO	Screen; cover
Support Force		Bat Div, 3, - 2D (TW Presumably, less 2 elements.); Oru Div 8	Screen; support
Patrol Unit		Flag; I-19; I-21; I-23	Patrol ship lanes
Midway Neutralisation Unit		Des Div 7, - 2D (TW Presumably less 2 elements.)	Attack on MIDWAY Air Base
Supply Force	Captain of KYOKUJO MARU (船長)	KENTO (倉本) MARU; KYOKUTO MARU; KOKUTO (国友) MARU; SHINKOKU (新国) AKEROMO MARU TOHO MARU; TOMI (東受) MARU; NIPPON MARU	Supply
	Captain of TOHO MARU (船長) (Special duty ship)		

[8] C. Movements of each force.

1. General:

The entire force (except the MIDWAY Neutralization Unit) will leave HITOKAPPU-WAN by special order. The force will proceed to the rendezvous point (Lat 42° N, Long 170° W) in convoy at a speed of from 12 to 14 knots, making every effort to conceal its movements and maintaining a strict watch against submarine and air attacks. Refueling will be carried out at every opportunity en route. When X-Day (the day upon which hostilities will be started) is designated, the force will proceed from the rendezvous point to the point where contact will be made with the enemy (Lat 32° N, Long 157° W).

Beginning at 0700 hours on X-1 Day, the force will proceed due south at high speed (approximately 24 knots), arriving at the point from which the airplanes will be launched (200 nautical miles north of the enemy anchorage) at 0100 hours on X-Day. Air attacks will then be made against the enemy fleet and important air bases on OAHU.

Upon completion of the air attacks, the airplanes will be taken aboard and the force will withdraw. It will proceed west, staying at least 800 nautical miles north of MIDWAY, to the regrouping point (Lat 30° N, Long 165° and from there the western part of the INLAND SEA. It will arrive there about X-15 Day and begin preparations for the Second Phase Operations.

If the air attacks have been a complete success and there is little chance of an enemy counterattack, or if the problems of supply necessitate it, a return course which passes near MIDWAY may be taken. In this event, Car Div 5 and the two ships of Bat Div 3 will be dispatched from the Task Force on the night of X-Day to early in the morning of X-1 Day, and will make an air attack against MIDWAY.

If by some chance a powerful enemy force has cut off the return route, the Task Force will proceed south through the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS to the MARSHALLS.

If it is anticipated that this fuel supply is insufficient for proceeding to the return route rendezvous point, the Screening Unit will be detached and sent back.

2. Patrol Unit:

The Patrol Unit will accompany the main unit.

If the Screening Unit is detached, the Patrol Unit will be the advance screen for the main unit, and it will be responsible for screening the airplanes, during landings and takeoffs.

After the air attacks the Patrol Unit will screen on the side nearest the enemy; if the enemy attacks, the unit will engage and pursue him utilizing all available strength.

3. MIDWAY Neutralization Unit:

The unit will leave TOKYO Bay about X-6 Day, and after refueling, will proceed to MIDWAY taking every precaution to conceal its movements. It will arrive at MIDWAY on the night of X-Day, attack the air base, and withdraw. After refueling, it will return to the western part of the INLAND SEA.

[9] The SHIRIYA will accompany the unit and act as the supply ship.

The Supply Force will accompany the main unit to the point where the enemy will be contacted. After refueling the ships there, it will proceed immediately to the regrouping point and wait for the rendezvous to be made arriving there by 0800 hours on X-6 Day. While proceeding to the regrouping point the unit will stay at least 800 nautical miles north of MIDWAY.

D. In the event that the operation is cancelled while the Task Force is under way, the force will return immediately to HITOKAPPU-WAN, HOKKAIDO or MUTSU-KAIWAN.

Task Force Ultrasecret Operation Order 3 (essentials).

Flagship AKAGI, HITOKAPPU-WAN

23 Nov 41

Nagumo, CHUICHI

Task Force Commander

Task Force Order

The plan for the air attack against HAWAII is as follows:

A. Movements of Air Attack Force.

At 0600 hours on X-1 Day the force will be 700 nautical miles bearing 0° from Point Z (western tip of LANAI Island). Beginning at 0700 hours on X-1 Day the force will increase its speed to 24 knots, following a 180° course.

At 0130 hours on X-Day the First Attack will take off from a point 230 nautical miles bearing 0° from Point Z. At 0245 hours the Second Attack Unit will take off from a point 200 nautical miles bearing 0° from Point Z.

When all the airplanes of the Second Attack Unit have taken off, the force will withdraw on a northerly course at approximately 24 knots.

It is estimated that the airplanes of the First Attack Unit will return between 0630 hours and 0800 hours and the airplanes of the Second Attack Unit between 0645 hours and 0715 hours.

When the units return preparations will be made immediately for the next attack. Carrier attack planes will be armed with torpedoes.

If the land based air power has been completely knocked out, repeated attacks will be made immediately in order to achieve maximum results. However, if a powerful enemy force is in route to attack, subsequent attacks will be directed against it.

B. Organization of air attack units.

As shown in Separate Tables.

C. Targets.

1. First attack unit.

[19] 2. 1 Group (SHUDAN)

(1) Not more than four battleships and four carriers.

(2) Order of selection.

First battleships, then carriers.

B. 2 Group will attack enemy land based air power as indicated below

(1) 15 Attack Unit

FORD Island—hangars and grounded airplanes.

(2) 16 Attack Unit

WHEELER Field—hangars and grounded airplanes.

(3) Fighter Striking Unit

Enemy airborne or grounded airplanes.

2. Second Attack Unit 2. Group will bomb enemy air bases as indicated below.

(1) 5 Attack Unit

KANEOHE, FORD Island and BARBERS POINT—hangars and Grounded planes.

(2) 6 Attack Unit

HICKHAM Field—hangars and grounded airplanes.

b. 2 Group will have four or five aircraft carriers as its target. If there are an insufficient number of carriers present, cruisers and battleships will be attacked in that order.

c. Fighter Striking Unit

Enemy airborne or grounded airplanes.

D. Outline of attack procedure.

1. First Attack Unit.

2. Surprise will be the basis of the attack. 1 Group Torpedo Bombing Unit will attack first; 1 Group Horizontal Bombing Unit next, and 2 Group last.

b. The Fighter Striking Unit will, as a single formation at the beginning come over the target area at about the same time as 1 Group. Its main function will be to eliminate opposition from enemy fighters.

If no opposition is encountered in the air, the unit will switch to the following strafing assignments against grounded airplanes.

(1). 1 and 2 Fighter Striking Units

Ford and HICKHAM

(2). 3 and 4 Fighter Striking Units

WHEELER and BARBERS POINT

(3). 5 and 6 Fighter Striking Units

KANEOHE

C. In the event that the enemy has maintained strict lookouts and opposition is strong, the units will attack in the following order, with only a slight time interval between attacks.

(1) Fighter Striking Unit

(2) Ship Bombing Unit

(3) Horizontal Bombing Unit

(4) Torpedo Bombing Unit

2. Second Attack Unit.

The entire unit will attack at about the same time.

The Fighter Striking Unit will follow the outline of movements given for the Fighter Striking Unit of the First Attack Unit. However, if no opposition is

encountered in the air, strafing will be carried out as follows: 2. 1 and 2 Fighter Striking Units.

FORD AND HICKAM

- b. 2 and 4 Fighter Striking Units.

WHEELER and KANE OHE

[11] 3. Outline for attack in case most of the carriers and battleships are anchored outside of PEARL HARBOR.

2. The organization, targets, etc will be the same as that set forth in the previous section. However, 1 Group of the First attack Unit will increase its use of torpedo planes.

b. Each air attack unit will first hit the fleet and then OAHU, maintaining its formation as a single group and striking under Air cover of the Fighter Striking units.

However, if the attacks against the fleet anchorage proceed smoothly, the forces which didn't participate in those attacks will move on immediately to OAHU, while the units which participated will return to their ships.

4. Regrouping and returning:

a. The regrouping point following the attack will be 20 nautical miles bearing 340° from the western tip (KAENA POINT) of OAHU. The airplanes will rendezvous at an altitude of 1,000m (if clouds are present at about that altitude the rendezvous will be made below them).

b. The attack units will wait at the regrouping points for about 30 minutes. After making the rendezvous with the fighter striking units they will return to their ships.

c. The fighter striking units will cover the return of the main attack units and intercept any enemy pursuit.

E. Reconnaissance:

1. Reconnaissance before the attack.

No special reconnaissance will be made.

2. Reconnaissance just before the attack.

The two reconnaissance seaplanes of Cru Div 8 (DAIHACHI SENTAI) will be launched at 0030 hours on X-day. Without being detected they will reconnoiter the PEARL HARBOR and CAHAINA anchorages, and report whether or not the enemy fleet (particularly carriers and battleships) is at these anchorages.

3. Scouting and search.

The reconnaissance seaplanes of Cru Div 8 (DAIHACHI SENTAI) will be launched about 0800. They will search over as wide an area as possible, between the Task Force and the enemy and along the channels on the east and west sides of OAHU. They will report the presence of enemy surface force moving out to attack and its movements, the presence of counter-attacking enemy airplanes and their movements, etc.

4. Following the attack, if conditions permit, one element of the fighter planes (will be designated by the commanding officer of the fighter units) will conduct a highspeed, low altitude reconnaissance of the damage done to ships and airplanes.

F. Air Patrol:

From 1 hour before sunrise until 45 minutes after sunset on the day of attack, Air Patrol Readiness Disposition 1, Plan B will be used.

RESEARCH DESIGN

TYPE		COMMANDER		TYPE of AIRPLANE	NUMBER of AIRPLANE	TYPE of ATTACK	ARMAMENT (each plane)
F1055	Group	1	Comdr.	Comdr. FUCHIDA	15	Horizontal	One No 60,
				14. Comdr. HANJIMOTO	15	Bombing	Mark 5
				14. ANS	10	Attack	Bomb
				14. Comdr. KUROKI	10		
		(Hiller)	14. Comdr. MURAKA	12	Torpedo	One Type-	
			14.	Bombing	21 Aerial		
			14. KIMURA	12	Attack	Torpedo	
			14. MATSUDA	8			
	4	Special	Attack Unit		8		
					8		
400002	Group	2	30.	14. Comdr. SAKAMAKI	27	Dive Bombing	One No. 25
				14. KAWANO	27	Attack	Land Bomb
	3	Fighter	30.	14. Comdr. KITA	9	Air Control	
				14. HIRATA	9	and	
				14. KAWANO	9	Strafing	
				14. KAWANO	6	Attack	
		Fighter	30.	14. KAWANO	6		
				14. KAWANO	6		
				14. KAWANO	6		
				14. KAWANO	6		
400003	Group	1	14.	14. Comdr. KAWANO	27	Horizontal	One No 25, land
				14. KAWANO	27	Bombing	Ordinary Bombs
	2	Comdr.	14. Comdr. KITA	18	Dive	One No 25,	
			14. KAWANO	18	Bombing	Ordinary	
			14. KAWANO	18	Attack	Bomb	
			14. KAWANO	27			
	3	Group	30.	14. KAWANO	9	Air control	
				14. KAWANO	9	and	
				14. KAWANO	9	Strafing	
				14. KAWANO	9	Attack	

EXHIBIT NO. 8-C

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (4 Dec 45)GB

4 DECEMBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.

To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attention Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2)

1. Reference previous correspondence same file number and subject and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec., 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional partial report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report contains data in amplification of the original Japanese answer to question 14 of our questionnaire of 17 October 1945. A copy of this questionnaire was forwarded as Inclosure No. 4 to our communication of 26 October 1945, and the original Japanese answer to question 14 thereof was included in inclosure to our communication of 8 November 1945.

3. This report completes the series of partial reports obtained through the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army and Navy, which series collectively provide all data available from known Japanese sources on subjects listed in your radio WX 73711, War Sec., 7 October 1945. However, should additional data come to light incident to future investigations of Japanese conduct of the war, same will be promptly forwarded.

For the Supreme Commander:

/S/ E. D. Law, Jr.
E. D. Law, Jr.
Major, AGD,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

1 Incl: Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.

[1] 3543 B
N. D. 406

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

NOTE: Translation requested by Colonel MUNSON, G-2.

17 NOVEMBER 1945.

To: Colonel F. P. MUNSON

From: Rear Admiral NAKAMURA

Answers with reference to a letter to Rear Admiral Nakamura from Colonel Munson dated 10 November 1945

1. In the report sent by the HONOLULU consul-general to the Foreign Ministry, anything concerning the Navy was reported to the Intelligence Section of the Naval General Staff by that Ministry. These reports, it is recollected, were gradually increased in number as the relations between AMERICA and JAPAN became more tense.

The above reports by the consul-general were chiefly items concerning the general political and economic situation in HAWAII and the UNITED STATES as seen from HAWAII, items concerning the Japanese living in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, and partly items concerning military matters. Thus, although there were things going on in HAWAII, as was reported at that time such as concentration of American fleet units in the PEARL HARBOR area and the considerable hastening of expansion of military installations in the HAWAIIAN area, to which great attention was attracted as compared with reports by diplomatic establishments located in other areas, it is recalled that there was nothing which required special surveillance as far as the data for an attack on the UNITED STATES fleet in HAWAII were concerned.

(Since the staff officer connected with the documents reporting the above facts has died and the various records have been burned, the foregoing is the conjecture of commander TACHIBANA, Tomo who worked in the same department at that time.)

The Intelligence Section of the Naval General Staff was having a most [2] difficult time judging the habits, strength, and security situations of the Ameri-

can fleet in the HAWAIIAN area. Owing to this, the Intelligence Section of the Naval General Staff had been for years compiling material by carefully collecting, making into statistics, and analyzing bits of information obtained from Naval officers at WASHINGTON, newspapers and magazines published in AMERICA, American radio broadcasts, signal intelligence, passengers and crews of ships stopping over at HONOLULU, other foreign diplomatic establishments, commercial firms, and the like.

The foregoing statistical method of estimation had been in use for a considerable length of time. Publications with information on important moorings within PEARL HARBOR had already been compiled.

Furthermore, if we were to go into the facts mentioned above more minutely, and if two or three examples which made a relatively strong impression were given, they would appear as follows:

A. American radio broadcasts 5 December 1941 (or 6 December 1941) (American time).

The UNITED STATES broadcast of the number of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and others entering (or anchored) in PEARL HARBOR was overheard.

B. Signal intelligence.

According to the signals of the American ships, the number of ships and small craft of the UNITED STATES fleet anchored in PEARL HARBOR or out on training was deduced. Again by combining the flying time (judged according to signal situations) of airplanes shuttling between bases and aircraft carriers out on training missions, and the location of UNITED STATES fleet units as seen by passengers and crews of ships stopping over at HONOLULU, the training areas of the UNITED STATES fleet were determined. The zone, time, etc., of airplane patrols at HAWAII were deduced in the same way.

C. Newspapers and magazines published in the UNITED STATES

Material was obtained for deduction of AMERICA'S war preparation, progress and expansion of military installations, location and capabilities of warships and airplanes, army strength at HAWAII, PANAMA, PHILIPPINES and other places, etc.

D. Observation submarines

With an observation submarine operating at a lessening distance outside the islands, the sphere of observation of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS was gradually made smaller (It reached outside of PEARL HARBOR on 6 December—American time). Thus, the ships out at sea, ships at LAHAINA, the airplane patrols, etc., were ascertained.

The above submarine, while out at sea, did not discover an American fleet at sea or at LAHAINA, but met aircraft carriers and patrol planes.

II. The gist of "... and other general intelligence" contained in the last items of the answer with reference to question No. 14, dated 17 October, was the reports for foreign diplomatic establishments, commercial firms in [3] foreign countries, etc., to the Foreign Ministry, the main store of the commercial firm, etc., chiefly on the general political and economic situation (some military matters included) of the country where the establishment or firm was located. These reports were not important enough from the standpoint of intelligence to have a special write-up, and were considered on their own merits.

EXHIBIT NO. 8-D

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (18 Dec 45) BG

18 DECEMBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
(Attention: A. C. of S., G-2.)

1. Reference Par 8 of our communication, same file number and subject dated 4 December 1945, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945 and WX 75581, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl

Harbor on 7 December 1941, copies of three (3) interrogations of Japanese Navy and Civil Officers are forwarded herewith.

2. These interrogations, obtained by Naval sources, are believed to provide further amplification of data previously forwarded.

For the Supreme Commander:

/s/ E. D. Law, Jr.,

E. D. Law, Jr.

Major, AGD, Asst. Adj. Gen.

3 Incls:

Incl 1—Interrogation Capt. Genda.

Incl 2—Interrogation Mr. Kase.

Incl 3—Interrogation Mr. Tanomogi.

[1]

[Copy]

NAVAL TECHNICAL MISSION

Date: 28 Nov. 1945.

Place: FLTLOSCAP

Interrogation No. 10

Subject: Pearl Harbor Attack.

Personnel Interrogated: Captain Minoru Genda; Air Operations officer on staff of Admiral Nagumo during attack on Pearl Harbor. He was with Admiral Nagumo aboard his Flagship Akagi. Captain Genda was given the responsibility of planning the attack.

Interrogators: Captain Robinson and Captain Payton Harrison, USNR.

Interpreter: Douglas Wada.

Summary:

The idea of the surprise attack originated with Admiral Yamamoto during a conversation with Admiral Onishi of the 11th Carrier Division about February 1, 1941. Captain Genda was present at this meeting and remembers Yamamoto saying, "If we have war with the United States we will have no hope of winning unless the U. S. Fleet in Hawaiian waters can be destroyed." After some further discussion Yamamoto directed Onishi to draw up a plan for a surprise attack. Captain Genda was later called in by Onishi to draw up broad outlines for such a plan and determine its feasibility and possibility of success.

About September 1st map games were begun at the War College in Tokyo, to test the plan on the game board and work out all details connected therewith. The following Naval officers were the only ones who had knowledge of the plan and who worked on it at the War College at this time; Admirals Yamamoto, Ugaki, Naguno, Yamagushi, Okusaka; Captains Onishi, Genda, Kuroshima; Commanders Sasaki, Ono; following members of the Navy General staff: Admiral Fukudome, Captains Sanagi and Toniooka, Commander Miyo.

On about November 15th Admiral Yamamoto finally approved the plan and gave it to Admiral Naguno with orders covering the manner of its final execution. On November 22nd the striking force rendezvoused at Etorofu and departed on its mission at 0800 hours Nov 28th. A speed of from 12 to 14 knots was maintained and the Task Force fueled at sea whenever the weather permitted, in order to keep full tanks. The weather was stormy and refueling difficult. It was, however, because of the weather conditions prevailing in this part of the Pacific at this time of year that the northern route was chosen. They didn't expect to meet any shipping, and fog and stormy weather would impair visibility conditions, anyway. Twice after departure information was received from Naval General Headquarters in Tokyo giving the dispositions of the U. S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor. The second despatch on this subject was received three days before the attack, or December 5th.

[2] The green light to execute the attack was sent by Admiral Yamamoto from his Flagship the Yamato on December 2nd. The message was "NIITA KAYAMA NOBORE" and means climb mount NIITAKA. This was the code phrase meaning "proceed with attack". There was an additional part to the message specifying X-Day as December 8th at the time this message was received, the striking force was near the 180th meridian at latitude 42.

In the early morning of December 7th the Force was 700 miles north of Lanai, at which time it turned south and commenced the dash in at a speed of 26 knots. The following was the composition of the striking force:

- 6 Carriers with Akagi Flagship of Admiral Naguno.
- 2 Battleships; Hiei and Kiroshima.
- 2 Heavy Cruisers; Tone and Chikuma.
- 9 Destroyers with light cruiser Abukuma as flagship.
- 3 Submarines; I-19, I-21, and I-23.

Following is the number and type of planes used in the attack:

Fighters	81
Dive bombers	145
Horizontal bombers	104
Torpedo planes	40
Total	370

Of the fighters, 39 were kept around the Carriers as interceptors, in case the U. S. planes got in the air and made an attack. They went out in two waves about one half hour apart. At time of launching position of striking force was about 200 miles north of western tip of Lanai.

Several planes were sent early which got over Pearl about daylight and reported that the Fleet was in.

Surprise was expected, but if the U. S. Forces were on the alert and the attack discovered, all attacking planes were to drive home the attack regardless.

A very close watch was kept on Hawaiian broadcasts by Commander Ono, Staff Communication officer. Admiral Naguno and his staff felt that they could sense from these broadcasts whether or not the Forces on Oahu had an inkling of the impending attack. They felt they could judge the tenseness of the situation by these broadcasts. Since KGU and KGMB were going along in their normal manner, Naguno felt that our forces were still oblivious to developments.

For several days prior to the attack the Jap Force had been intercepting messages from our patrol planes. They had not broken the code, but they had been able to plot in their positions with radio bearings and knew the number of our patrol planes in the air at all times and that they were patrolling entirely in the south western sector from Oahu.

[3] The three submarines were placed in a line 100 miles ahead of the carriers for the final dash southward. Surface speed of these submarines was 23 knots. If they sighted any planes or shipping they were to submerge, get clear and radio the striking force as soon as it was safe to surface.

Everything went off according to plan. Total Japanese losses were 29 planes.

[1] (Incl 2)

[Copy]

NAVAL TECHNICAL MISSION

Interrogation No. 9.

Subject: Information received by Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Japanese Consul General in Honolulu.

Personnel Interrogated: Mr. Toshikazu Kase, in charge of North American Section of Foreign Office at time of attack on Pearl Harbor. Undergrad work Amherst; graduate study at Harvard in international law, and relations 1928. Member of Foreign Office since late 1940. Became Chief of Section 1 (dealing with North America, i. e. U. S. and Canada) in October 1941. Held this post for about a year.

Where Interrogated: Office of the Fleet Liaison Officer with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Interrogator: Captain Peyton HARRISON, USNR.

Interpreter: Lt. (jg) S. E. SPRAGUE.

Summary:

Mr. Kase stated that he was personally acquainted with Mr. Kita, former Consul-General in Hawaii. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor Mr. Kita sent

messages to the foreign office every few days informing it of the presence of units of the U. S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor. Although the Foreign Office received these wires, they paid little attention to them. Instead, they passed them right along to the Navy Ministry. Mr. Kase believes that all these despatches have been destroyed. At the time of receipt these despatches were not considered of any significance by the foreign office, but were considered just a matter of routine. However, "in the light of after events", Mr. Kase "can look back and see that Kita's telegrams had some significance". The foreign office was very busy with its negotiations with accredited representatives in Washington, and matters concerning the whereabouts and activities of the U. S. Fleet were not a matter of interest. Mr. Kase was busy sending despatches to Nomura and Kurusu and trying to improve the tense situation. The Navy department was not cognizant of these messages being sent to the foreign office representatives in Washington. The foreign ministry deliberately kept things from the Navy Department and vice versa. "Every Ministry had its own secrets". Mr. Kase had no recollection of the presence of a certain Mr. Morimura who arrived at the Consul-General Office Honolulu, in the spring of 1941. Mr. Kase "could not speak with authority" on the question as to whether or not Mr. Morimura could have been sent by the war or Navy Departments with special and secret instructions to Consul-General Kita.

[2] Q. What instructions were given Mr. Kita, Japanese consul at Honolulu, regarding transmission of information about U. S. fleet or military installations in Hawaii?

A. I don't recall any specific instructions he had. He may have had general instructions to be followed in case of disturbances because of the presence in Hawaii of many "hyphenated" citizens. After I became Chief of Section in October 1941 I don't recall any specific instructions being given him.

Q. We know that Kita sent messages to Japan before the outbreak of war concerning the U. S. Fleet. To whom were messages sent? Did you see them?

A. They came through the Foreign Office and I saw them, perhaps without knowing their significance. As far as I am aware, the Foreign Office gave him no specific instructions about sending such information. He made reports as a routine matter. Messages were addressed to the Foreign Minister.

Q. Those messages sent about the whereabouts of the U. S. Fleet; are any copies of these messages now in the Foreign Office?

A. No, I don't think so. When I left my section, I take it for granted my section had these telegrams. There were two successors to me since I left my office. Department buildings were destroyed in May. I doubt if copies of messages are there.

Q. Did Kita state every two or three days what ships were in Pearl Harbor?

A. I remember there were a few telegrams of that sort. I would put them aside. We were more interested in the course of negotiations. At that time we were intensely absorbed in negotiations proper between Tokyo and Washington. Such affairs as Kita's telegrams did not get much of our attention.

Q. Who was most interested in these telegrams?

A. I suppose the Navy Minister.

Q. Who would know whether such telegrams are available?

A. The chances are they have all been destroyed, don't you think so? Very short telegrams, usually, not even occupying a full page. These telegrams were not considered important at all from our point of view. Very likely they have been burned. The Foreign Office served as a channel—we just had a look at them. We thought they were just matters of routine. In the light of after-events, I can look back and see that Kita's telegrams had some significance. But we did not know at the time.

Q. Do you recall any trouble Kudo got into involving shipment of scrap iron?

A. No. I don't recall him.

Q. Interrogator recounted l'affaire Kudo and its expose in newspapers.

A. Rather crude practice, wasn't it? I don't like to impugn his honor, but I don't think Mr. Kudo is one of our career men. I don't think that was done with knowledge of the Foreign Office.

Q. Boxes were addressed to Foreign Office in Tokyo.

A. Oh?

Q. Can you find out where Mr. Kudo is?

A. We can find out for you. I shall have his whereabouts found out.

[3] Q. You say you were absorbed in negotiations at the time. You were sending despatches to Nomura?

A. Yes, we were primarily interested in that. I was engaged in clerical work of the negotiations.

Q. Did Navy Ministry have knowledge of these despatches?

A. No, I don't think so. Some were kept secret from Navy Department. Every ministry has its own official secrets. The majority of telegrams were not given to the fighting services. They were not in a position to request that just as we were not in a position to request their despatches. The gist of negotiations and their progress were sometimes discussed at joint conferences.

Q. We know Kita was sending telegrams. Who would have given him such instruction?

A. I don't know who would have given him such instructions.

Q. Couldn't someone in Navy Department have given him instructions without your knowing it? Wouldn't that have been possible?

A. (Hesitation.) It might have been possible. But not through Foreign Office by telegram. Every telegram to Kita had to pass through Foreign Office and be approved. I don't recall any specific instructions transmitted to Kita through Foreign Office.

Q. In the spring of 1941, Mr. Morimura arrived in Honolulu to assist Mr. Kita. Do you know Mr. Morimura?

A. I was not aware of his existence. I became Chief of Section in October 1941 and was deeply absorbed in the Tokyo-Washington negotiations. I really did not have time to learn about minor officials in all the consulates.

Q. Well, who would know of his existence and his work? Whose place did you take?

A. Mr. Yuki, who accompanied Mr. Kurusu to Washington. I don't know exactly how long he was there before me. He is now councillor of embassy at Bangkok.

(At some point about here, interrogator described Morimura's activities.)

Q. Would it have been possible for the Navy Department to send Mr. Morimura to Honolulu?

A. I don't know. I can't speak with any authority. That was before my time.

Q. Who was Foreign Minister and Vice-Minister?


A. Togo was Foreign Minister and Nishi was Vice-Minister. They assumed office in October 1941.

Q. Would it have been possible for Morimura to have had instructions from Navy Department to give to Kita?

A. I'm not qualified to answer that question. I don't know anything about this affair. I can't even say whether it was possible.

Foreign Minister—Togo

Vice Foreign Minister—Nishi



SOURCE DOCUMENTS USED BY NAVY IN COMPILING THE "NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"

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1. Japanese Combined Fleet Top Secret Operating Order #1-----	431
2. Japanese Combined Fleet Top Secret Operating Order #2-----	485
3. Japanese Submarine Operations (Pearl Harbor Attack)-----	487
4. Navy study "Time Table of Japanese Submarine Operations"-----	488
5. Translations of Captured Japanese Documents "Japanese Submarine School Notes Concerning Early War Experience off Hawaii"-----	497
6. Translation of Captured Japanese Document, "Patrol Operations of Japanese Submarine I-69 off Pearl Harbor"-----	503
7. Translation of Captured Japanese Document "The Southern Cross by Kuramoti, Iki"-----	512
8. Translation of Captured Japanese Documents (a) "Japanese Submarine School Notes Concerning Early War Experiences off Hawaii", (b) "Japanese Instructions to Yatsumaki Butai", (c) "Japanese Places of Military Importance in the Kurile Islands"-----	525
9. Translation of Captured Japanese Document "Professional Notebook of an Ensign in the Japanese Navy"-----	538
10. Interrogation of Japanese Prisoners of War Captured from the Japanese Submarine I-1 which participated in Attack on Pearl Harbor-----	613
11. Interrogation of Japanese Prisoners of War who participated in attack on Pearl Harbor as member of crew of the (CV) Kaga-----	619
12. Navy Department Study of Japanese Espionage in Hawaiian Islands "Pre-War Espionage in the Hawaiian Islands, Report on Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet"-----	627
13. Navy Department Study "Sorties by Enemy Sub-Carried Planes and Sub-Carrier Identification"-----	649
14. Japanese Battle Lessons on Supply in the Greater East Asia War Supply Battle Lesson No. 1 (Translation)-----	653
15. Parallel translation of Source Document 14, supra-----	667
16. U. S. Navy Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, Volume 1, No. 22, 8 December 1944-----	704
17. Photostatic copy of original Japanese document captured on Saipan consisting of notes on fueling at sea of Pearl Harbor Striking Force-----	767
18. Original Japanese document captured by U. S. Navy at Manila, the same being the original material for the translations appearing in Source Documents Nos. 1 and 2, supra-----	832

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #1

"JAPANESE COMBINED FLEET TOP SECRET OPERATION ORDER #1"

USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE

"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

SECRET

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21 COMBINED FLEET TOP SECRET OPERATION ORDER 1

Flagship NAGATO, SASEKI BAY 5 Nov 41

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku
Commander in Chief
Combined Fleet

145 of 700 copies

COMBINED FLEET ORDER

Combined Fleet Operations in the War Against the U.S. & STATE.
BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS will be conducted in accordance
with the Separate Volume.

Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order 1

Separate Volume

Page 2/2 Combined Fleet Operations in the War Against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS

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E. Protection of our sea traffic, destruction of enemy sea traffic, and mine warfare

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II. Operations of the Combined Fleet in Case War with RUSSIA Begins during the War with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, the NETHERLANDS and CHINA

A. Operation policy

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I. COMBINED FLEET OPERATIONS IN CASE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS BEGINS DURING THE CHINA OPERATIONS

A. Outline of Operations

1. In the east the American Fleet will be destroyed and American lines of operation and supply lines to the ORIENT will be cut.
2. In the west British MALAYA will be occupied and British lines of operation and supply lines to the ORIENT, as well as the BURMA Road, will be cut.
3. Enemy forces in the ORIENT will be destroyed, bases of operations will be seized, and areas with natural resources will be occupied.
4. Strategic areas will be seized and developed; defenses will be strengthened in order to establish a durable basis for operations.
5. Enemy forces will be intercepted and annihilated.
6. Victories will be exploited to break the enemy will to fight.

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B. Preparations for War and the Outbreak of War

1. Preparations for the outbreak of war

a. The empire is expecting war to break out with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS. When the decision is made to complete over-all preparations for operations, orders will be issued establishing the approximate date (Y Day) for commencement of operations and announcing "First Preparations for War". The various forces will act as follows:

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(1) All fleets and forces, without special orders, will organize and complete battle preparations in accordance with the allocation of forces for First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations. When directed by the commanding officers of the various forces, they will proceed at the proper time to the pre-operation rendezvous and wait in readiness.

(2) All forces will be on strict lookout for unexpected attacks by the American, British and Netherlands forces.

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(3) The commanding officers of the various forces may carry out such secret reconnaissance as is especially necessary to the operation.

(4) Pursuant to defense plans, 4th Fleet will begin mining the KAMPO GUNTU.

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b. When the advance forces necessary for carrying out the operation have been dispatched to the area of operations, the order "Second Preparations for War" will be issued, and each force will act in accordance with the following:

(1) Submarine forces attached to the Advance Expeditionary Force (SEMKUN BUIAI), Striking Force, Commerce Destruction Unit, Southern Area Force and South Seas Force, on orders from the commanding officers of the various forces, will proceed at the proper time to the area of operations.

(2) Remaining forces, on orders from the commanding officers of the various forces, will proceed so as to be in position for the outbreak of war.

c. After the required preparations for war have been made, if the situation changes significantly, specified forces may be returned from "Second Preparations for War" to "First Preparations for War".

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2. The outbreak of war and the use of arms theretofore

a. The time for the outbreak of war (I Day) will be given in an Imperial General Headquarters order. The order will be given several days in advance. After 0000 hours, I Day, a state of war will exist. Each force will commence operations according to plan.

b. If a serious enemy attack is received before I Day, the following measures will be taken:

(1) Forces which are attacked will counterattack immediately. Before the I Day orders are issued, counterattacks by base air forces will depend on Imperial General Headquarters Orders.

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(2) After the I Day order is issued, all forces will enter into a state of war and begin operations without waiting for special orders.

(3) Prior to the issuance of the I Day order, the outbreak of war will depend on Imperial General Headquarters orders.

c. After "Second Preparations for War" has been ordered, military force may be used in unavoidable cases such as the following:

(1) If American, British or Netherlands ships or airplanes approach the vicinity of our territorial waters and such action seems to create a danger.

(2) If our forces, while on the move outside our territorial waters, are involved in positive actions which appear to endanger them by forces of these countries.

SECRETPage
2/5**C. First Phase (MAX BURN BURN) Operations****1. Operation policy**

a. The Advance Expeditionary Force (SEKKEN BUKAI) (TH "6th Fleet" in pencil.), Striking Force (TH "1st Air Fleet" in blue pencil.), South Seas Force (TH "4th Fleet" in blue pencil.), Northern Force (TH "5th Fleet" in indelible pencil.) and Main Body (TH "Combined Fleet" in blue pencil.) will operate against the American fleet.

(TH Portion of page cut out and "Advance Expeditionary Force (SEKKEN BUKAI)" and "Striking Force" inserted in blue pencil. Along with "South Seas Force" they are presumably subjects of the following sentence.) The South Seas Force will occupy and destroy important areas in the vicinity and will be ready for the enemy fleet in the AUSTRALIA Area. The Northern Area Force will be responsible for patrols against SOVIET RUSSIA.

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b. While maintaining local superiority, the Southern Area Force (TH "2nd Fleet, 3rd Fleet, Southern Expeditionary Fleets and 11th Air Fleet" in indelible pencil.) will annihilate enemy fleets in the PHILIPPINES, British MALAYA and NETHERLANDS INDIES Area. At the same time it will co-operate with the Army as follows:

(1) The operations against British MALAYA and the PHILIPPINES will be commenced simultaneously, and the enemy air forces and fleets in these areas will be repeatedly battered by air attacks. Army advance expeditionary groups (SEKKEN HEIDAN) will be landed in strategic areas of MALAYA, the PHILIPPINES and British BORNEO as quickly as possible. Air Forces will be sent to reinforce air operations.

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(2) The results of the operations will be exploited, and the main body of Army invasion groups (HEIDAN) will be landed in the PHILIPPINES and then MALAYA in order to occupy their respective areas quickly.

(3) During the early stages of the operations the strategic areas of the CELEBES, DUTCH BORNEO and Southern SUMATRA will be occupied in the order named. The strategic areas of NEGUCCAS and TIMOR also will be occupied. Necessary air bases will be prepared in these areas.

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(4) As these air bases are completed, air forces gradually will be sent forward, and enemy air strength in the JAVA Area will be crushed. When this is accomplished, the main body of the Army invasion group (HEIDAN) will be landed in JAVA to occupy it.

(5) After the fall of SINGAPORE the strategic areas of northern SUMATRA will be occupied. Operations against BURMA will be carried out at the appropriate time to cut off the enemy supply route to CHINA.

c. If the American fleet attacks, 3rd Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Fleet will carry out Southern Area operations temporarily. The bulk of combat strength will meet the attack.

d. An element (TH "24S" written in blue pencil.) of the Combined Fleet will destroy enemy sea traffic in the PACIFIC and INDIAN Ocean Areas.

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e. In order not to arouse the hostility of THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA, every effort will be made to secure their voluntary co-operation. But in the event of hostility, obstructions to our operations will be eliminated by force.

SECRET**2. Outline of operations against the American fleet**

The classification of operations and the outline of operations are established in the following table. Each force will operate in accordance with the classification of operations indicated.

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SITUATION	CLASSIFICATION OF OPERATIONS	OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS
At Outbreak of War	(TE This portion cut out.)	
At Outbreak of War (Situation complicated by using task force for attack)	Method 2 for operations against American fleet	1. The Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) will reconnoiter and make a surprise attack on the American fleet. If conditions warrant, air bases at HOWLAND, TUTUILA, FIJI, etc., will be attacked with appropriate forces. 2. The Striking Force will prepare for the American fleet.
In Case American Fleet Operates	Method 3 for operations against American fleet	1. The Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI), Striking Force, South Seas Force and Northern Area Force will operate against the American task force. 2. If necessary, the Main Body will give support. 3. If conditions warrant, an element of 11th Air Fleet may be temporarily diverted to the east.
In Case American Fleet Proceeds to Attack	Method 4 for operations against American fleet	1. The Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI), Striking Force, South Seas Force, Northern Area Force and Main Body, deployed for interception, will operate against the American fleet. The decisive battle strength of Southern Area Force will join immediately to meet the attack. 2. Southern Area operations will be continued by 3rd Fleet, Southern Expeditionary Fleet and fighters of 11th Air Fleet.

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3. Outline of Southern Area Operations

Southern Area Operations will be based on the operation policy and on the agreement between Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet and Commander in Chief, Southern Area Army. The Southern Area Force Commander will direct the operations unless otherwise ordered.

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4. Operation periods

First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations will be classified as follows. Changes will be by special order.

a. First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations: This period will cover operations from the outbreak of war until the main body of the invasion army has been landed in the PHILIPPINES.

b. Second Period (DAI NI KI) Operations: In general, operations from the First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations until the main body of the invasion army has been landed in British MALAYA.

c. Third Period (DAI SAN KI) Operations: Operations from the end of the Second (DAI NI KI) Period Operations to the completion of the occupation of the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.

5. Allocation of forces

Allocation of forces during the First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations will be as follows.

a. Allocation of forces for First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations - Separate Table 1

b. Allocation of forces for Second Period (DAI NI KI) Operations - Separate Table 2

c. Allocation of forces for Third Period (DAI SAN KI) Operations - Separate Table 3

d. Allocation of forces for interception operations - Separate Table 4

D. Second Phase (DAI NI DAN) Operations

1. Operation policy

a. The Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) will continue to make reconnaissance raids on the American and British fleets. These fleets will be attacked by base air forces, carrier air forces, etc., at opportune times.

b. American and British lines of operation and supply lines to the ORIENT will be cut in order to strengthen the defenses of strategic areas.

c. Enemy forces in the waters under our control and remnants of the enemy in occupied areas will be mopped up in order to secure resources and protect sea traffic.

d. If the American and British fleets attack, they will be destroyed individually by taking advantage of inner lines of defense.

e. Operations to destroy American and British sea traffic will be intensified.

2. Important points which must be defended and advance bases in occupied territory

a. Important points in occupied territory which must be defended are as follows:

MANILA, DAVAO, SINGAPORE, BATAVIA, SOERABAJA, TANAKAN, MALIKPAPAN, MENADO, MAKASSAR, AMBON, PENANG, RABAU. (THE DAVAO and MENADO emphasized by blue pencil circles.)

b. Advance bases in occupied territory are expected to be as follows:

MANILA, SINGAPORE, SOERABAJA

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3. Areas expected to be occupied or destroyed

The following are areas expected to be occupied or destroyed as quickly as operational conditions permit:

- a. Eastern NEW GUINEA, NEW BRITAIN, FIJI and SAMOA
- b. ALEUTIANS and MIDWAY
- c. ANDAMAN Islands
- d. Strategic points in the AUSTRALIA Area

4. Allocation of forces

The allocation of forces for Second Phase (DAI NI DAN) Operations is established in Separate Table 5.

The allocation of forces for interception operations will be based on Separate Table 4.

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2. Protection of Sea Traffic. Destruction of Enemy Sea Traffic and Mine Warfare.

3. Operations to protect sea traffic

Sea traffic will be protected as prescribed in the Plan for Protection of Sea Traffic (1941). In addition to the following:

GENERAL PRINCIPLES		PRINCIPAL MATTERS	
Philippines and Netherlands East Indies Force	West of Long 135°00'E (EN ADA "encompassing the defense area of 3 Base Forces.") South of Lat 20° South of a line passing through the northern edge of MILVIA ROMEO at an angle of 315°	1. Control of ship movements within assigned sectors 2. Matters related to escort of ships within assigned sectors 3. Gathering and disseminating information 4. Control of communications of ships moving within assigned sectors 5. Issuing and cancelling alarms within assigned sectors	
Malay Force	South of a line passing through the northern edge of MILVIA ROMEO at an angle of 315°		
South Sea Force	East of Long 135°00'E (EN ADA "plus defense area of 3 Base Forces.") Sea area south of Lat 20°		
Northern Force	Sea area north of Lat 20° Sea area south of Lat 20°		
Other Operational Forces	All sectors of operation	Co-operation in the following matters: 1. Destruction of enemy forces in all sectors of operations 2. Escort (chiefly direct escort, depending on the situation or indirect escort) 3. Communications	

¹ Matter's Note: Revised by "Gerran" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Mine Sweeper Serial, Part 95, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the MAJESTY, SAKI WAG.

SECRET**2. Operations to destroy sea traffic****a. Policy**Page
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The immediate destruction of vital points in the sea traffic of the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS, combined with a checking of enemy forces, will aid our principal operations. We will endeavor to crush the enemy will to fight by gradually strengthening our efforts and by realizing our aims over a long period of time.

b. Outline for execution

(1) Seizure of enemy ships at the outbreak of war: Enemy ships will be seized, provided that our principal operations are not thereby impaired. Close liaison will be maintained with Imperial General Headquarters and with homeland combat forces (NAISEN BUTAI). Sectors of responsibility for each unit, in observation and seizure of enemy ships, will correspond in general to sectors of responsibility in 1, "Operations to protect sea traffic".

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(2) The Commerce Destruction Unit, as prescribed by its commanding officer and as opportunities arise in the South Seas Area after the outbreak of war, will operate between CENTRAL and SOUTH AMERICA and AUSTRALIA. Depending on the situation on the west coast of SOUTH AMERICA, one element will proceed to the INDIAN Ocean Area and will operate between AUSTRALIA and AFRICA.

(3) According to the progress of operations and to what is prescribed by the Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) commander, expeditionary forces not exceeding one submarine division will operate off the coasts of CENTRAL and NORTH AMERICA to the extent that the principal operations are not thereby hindered. The Hawaiian Area Force will endeavor to cut rear lines of supply at every opportunity.

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(4) One element of DesRons 4, 5, 6, and 7 at the end of First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations, will be assigned as directed by Southern Force Commander to destruction of sea traffic off the south coast of JAVA and at the western entrance to the MALACCA Straits. When southern First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations are completed, they will carry out a vigorous campaign of destruction of sea traffic in the INDIAN Ocean and AUSTRALIA Areas.

(5) In the pause after First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations or when opportunities arise during operations, forces for destroying sea traffic will be strengthened and will operate vigorously with surface ships and airplanes.

3. Mine warfare

Combined Fleet mine warfare will be directed by individual force commanders, in addition to conformance with the following:

Page
2/30**a. Southern area of operations**

(1) Standard practices in offensive mine warfare - Appended Table 1

(2) (Standard) Summary of bases to be protected by mines and antisubmarine nets - Appended Table 2

(3) Summary of mine and antisubmarine supplies - Appended Table 3

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(4) Outline for establishing mine barriers at the end of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations - Appended Table 4

b. South Seas Area

The 4th Fleet defense plan will be followed and offensive mine warfare will be carried on as directed by the South Seas Force Commander.

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c. When mines are laid or swept, the force commander in each case will report positions of mines, navigable sectors, etc., to the proper authorities.

d. Declarations concerning the laying of mines

Declarations will be issued by Imperial General Headquarters, after being routed through Combined Fleet Headquarters; they will be issued chiefly as a threat to the enemy.

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Exhibit 101-1 (Continued)

REARLAD PRATICES IN OPERATIVE AREA WAGMAN IN THE MIDDLE

AREA OF OPERATIONS

b. Second Period (Dai XI) Operations of First Phase (Dai IXI) Operations

SEA AREA TO BE MINE	TIME	VEHICLE TO BE USED	NUMBER OF MINES TO BE LAID	REMARKS
North entrance to SOUTHERN SEA	About 1:00	Submarine from Subdiv 6	Approximately 50	Ahead of light entrance of the minefield, similar and shallower depth.
Entrance to SINGAPORE Straits and sea areas south of MALAYA		One mine layer of 9 Base Force Ship No 3 of Mine Layer Div 17	Approximately 500	1. To prevent enemy passage. 2. To intensify mine warfare of First Period (Dai IXI) Operations.

c. During and after Third Period (Dai XII) Operations of First Phase (Dai IXI) Operations

SEA AREA TO BE MINE	TIME	VEHICLE TO BE USED	NUMBER OF MINES TO BE LAID	REMARKS
PORT MAREL	As quickly as possible	Mine layers of Mine Layer Div 17	300	To hinder passage by the enemy.
Important points in Australia	As soon as opportunities present themselves	One or two submarines from Subdiv 6 One mine layer from Mine Layer Div 17	Suitable numbers	1. To hinder passage by the enemy. 2. Type SS mines will be laid.
RAKON COLORED POND	As soon as possible after completion of SINGAPORE	One or two submarines from Subdiv 6	Suitable numbers	1. To hinder passage by the enemy. 2. Type SS mines will be laid.

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Amended Exhibit 2

(STANDARD) SUMMARY OF MINE TO BE PROTECTED BY MINE AND
ATTACHMENT DATA

AREAS TO BE MINED	CHARGE	TIME	FORCES TO BE USED	NUMBER OF MINE TO BE LAY	ATTACHMENT DATA
PHILIPPINE AREA	LIMBAYAN GULF	At time of landing	2 Base Force	Approximately 900	As suitable
	BAJANG GULF	"	1 Base Force	Approximately 300	"
	DAVAO (DINAGHATAN) Bay as conditions require)	As quickly as possible		Approximately 900	"
	MASTILA Bay	"	One element of 2 Base Force	Approximately 900	"
INDONESIA AREA	GLORIAN Bay	To be completed before outbreak of war	9 Base Force	600	
	BARABAN	Immediately after landing	1 Base Force and See 1 of Mine Layer Div 17	200	
	BAKUPAPAN	"		300	
	MACASSAR	To prevent entry by enemy ships		300	As suitable
MALAY AREA	SOKERABAJA	"		1,000	
	AMPON and KUMBARO	"		300	
	BAZATIA	"	2 Base Force	600	
	SUTUA Straits	To hinder passage by the enemy	See 2 of Mine Layer Div 17	750	
MALAY AREA	Area outside SINGAPORE Bay	Immediately after landing	9 Base Force and Ship No. 5 of Mine Layer Div 17	900	As suitable
	MALACCA Straits	To hinder passage by the enemy		600	

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Amended Table 1

SUMMARY OF MINE AND ANTIMINE SUPPLIES

SUPPLY BASES	SUPPLIES
HANOI	Type 93 Mines - approximately 4,000 Type 88 Mines - approximately 250 (an additional 120 until about March 1942) Antimine mine sets for 2 Base Unit (KONKYOCHI) - one set
PALAU	Type 93 Mines - approximately 4,000 Antimine mine sets for 1 Base Unit (KONKYOCHI) - one set

Amended Table 2

OUTLINE FOR ESTABLISHING MINE BARRIERS AT THE END OF SOUTHERN FIRST PHASE (ICHI DAN) OPERATIONS

When the southern First Phase (ICHI DAN) Operations end, mine barriers will be laid, as shown below, by making the SOUTH CHINA Sea safe, surface patrol will be facilitated. These operations will depend on special orders.

SEA AREAS TO BE MINED	NUMBER OF MINES TO BE LAID	FORCES TO BE USED	REMARKS
CARIMATA and CASPAR Straits	5,000	9 Base Force One element of Mine Layer Div 17	To prevent penetration by enemy submarines
SUNDRA Straits	600	2 Base Force	To prevent penetration by enemy submarines First stage mine warfare will be intensified.
MALACCA Straits	1,000	9 Base Force	"

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Amended Page 2

(FRAMING) SUMMARY OF PLANS TO BE FULFILLED BY MINE AND
ARTILLERY DIVISIONS

AREAS TO BE MINE	CAUTION	TIME	FORCES TO BE USED	NUMBER OF MINE TO BE LAYED	ARTILLERY DIVISIONS
LIBERTY ONLY	To prevent entry by enemy submarines	At time of landing	2 Base Force	Approximately 500	As available
MAISON GOLF	"	"	1 Base Force	Approximately 300	"
MAISON GOLF (REMARKS: May as conditions require)	"	As quickly as possible		Approximately 500	"
MAISON GOLF	"	"	One element of 2 Base Force	Approximately 500	"
MAISON GOLF	"	To be completed before outbreak of war	9 Base Force	600	
MAISON GOLF	"	Immediately after liberation	1 Base Force and 1st of Mine Layer Div 17	200	
MAISON GOLF	"	"		300	
MAISON GOLF	To prevent entry by enemy ships	"		300	As available
MAISON GOLF	"	"		1,000	
MAISON GOLF	"	"		300	
MAISON GOLF	"	"	2 Base Force	600	
MAISON GOLF	To hinder passage by the enemy	"	See 2 of Mine Layer Div 17	750	
MAISON GOLF	To prevent entry by enemy submarines	Immediately after landing	9 Base Force and Ship No 3 of Mine Layer Div 17	900	As available
MAISON GOLF	To hinder passage by the enemy	"		400	

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Appendix Table 1

SUMMARY OF MINE AND ANTISUBMARINE SUPPLIES

SUPPLY BASES	SUPPLIES
MANILA	Type 93 Mines - approximately 4,000 Type 88 Mines - approximately 200 (an additional 120 until about March 1942) Antisubmarine nets for 2 Base Unit (KOHYOCHI) - one set
PALAU	Type 93 Mines - approximately 4,000 Antisubmarine nets for 1 Base Unit (KOHYOCHI) - one set

Appendix Table 2

OUTLINE FOR ESTABLISHING MINE BARRIERS AT THE END OF SOUTHERN FIRST PHASE (ICHI DAN) OPERATIONS

When the southern First Phase (ICHI DAN) Operations end, mine barriers will be laid, as shown below, by making the SOUTH CHINA Sea safe, surface patrol will be facilitated. These operations will depend on special orders.

SEA AREAS TO BE MINED	NUMBER OF MINES TO BE LAID	FORCES TO BE USED	REMARKS
CARIMATA and CASPAR Straits	5,000	9 Base Force One element of Mine Layer Div 17	To prevent penetration by enemy submarines
SUNDRA Straits	600	2 Base Force	To prevent penetration by enemy submarines First stage mine warfare will be intensified.
ALACCA Straits	1,000	9 Base Force	"

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F. Communications

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Policy

Combined Fleet operational communications are based on Combined Fleet Wireless Communications Regulations and on the Joint Army-Navy Agreement Concerning Communications in Southern Operations. In addition, they will conform to the following provisions.

2. Dispositions for communications

a. Dispositions at the outbreak of war

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Ship, submarine and airplane communications - Appended Table 1 (base) communications - Appended Table 2 (refer to appended chart)

These dispositions will be changed in the future to meet battle conditions. The respective force commanders will change the dispositions for submarine and airplane communications as needs arise.

b. Times for taking up assignments at the outbreak of war are as follows:

CLASSIFICATION	TIME	REMARKS
Communications Unit Communications	2400 hrs, X-8	After 2400 hrs, X-2 and until specially designated, 2nd China Expeditionary Fleet and Hainan Guard District will be in the ship communications system.
Ship Communications	2400 hrs,	
Submarine Communications	X-6	
Airplane Communications	2400 hrs, X-3	
Communications for Specially Designated Forces	By special orders	
Notes:		
1. For forces which must take up their assignments before the times set forth in this table, the respective force commanders will determine the time and report it to the proper authorities.		
2. In some cases, one element will take up its assignment at a time differing from that of the remainder of the force.		

3. Communications procedure

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a. Broadcasting will be the principal means of communication within an operational force. Acknowledgment will be required when there is uncertainty concerning receipt of the message or when confirmation is required because the message is especially important.

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b. Each force, at the direction of its commanding officer, will come into the short-range communications system of the nearest communications unit (TN Add "and into its broadcast communications system.")¹ (In cases of special necessity, it will come into the long-range communications system.) Communications dealing with transportation, supply, personnel and other communications not urgent from the standpoint of operations usually will come under this

¹Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Top Secret Serial 1 Part 99, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the MAGATO, SAKI WAN.

communications system. The Striking Force, Commerce Destruction Unit and other forces operating on special missions at great distances, when they set out from their rendezvous, will come under specially designated communications systems centered around the Tokyo Communications Unit (TUTSU).

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c. All communications units will relay to the proper authorities communications of operational forces within their respective areas. Relay usually will be by broadcast, and acknowledgments will be required when confirmation of receipt is especially needed. Relays of messages classified urgent or higher will be broadcast immediately, other important messages at the times indicated in Paragraph d, below.

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COMMUNICATIONS UNIT	COMMUNICATIONS TO BE RELAYED
Tokyo Communications Unit	Communications of Striking Force, Commerce Destruction Unit and other forces under specially designated communications systems
Takao Communications Unit	Communications of submarine and airplanes under Southern Force
3rd Communications Unit	Communications of Subflot 5 and of airplanes based in PALAU within Southern Force
81st Communications Unit	Communications of airplanes and submarines operating in the SOUTH CHINA Sea Area
5th Communications Unit	Communications of submarines and airplanes under South Seas Force
6th Communications Unit	Communications of Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) submarines
Note: Frequencies to be used in broadcasts will be as shown in d. When there is no danger of interfering with the operational communications of forces, frequencies of ships may be used.	

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e. When the Main Body is in the homeland area, transmission from the flagship of Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet will control the transmission facilities of the Tokyo and Kure Communications Units (TUTSU, KURUTSU), or the Tokyo Communications Unit (TUTSU) will be assigned this work.

f. Communications outside the Fleets

Except in cases of special urgency, communications will be effected by means of the communications system through the nearest communications unit.

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4. Safeguarding communications

a. Safeguarding frequencies

Combined Fleet Top Secret Order 177, Standard Control of Frequencies Used During Operations, will be applied.

b. Safeguarding messages

(1) Code tables and call signs to be used are given as follows: Combined Fleet Top Secret Order 171, Use of Codes; Combined Fleet Top Secret Standing Order 52, Table of Combined Fleet Special Maritime Call Signs; Combined Fleet Top Secret Order 169, Abbreviated Call Signs for Exchange of Strategic Information; Combined Fleet Top Secret Order 179, Table of Symbols Indicating Emergency Classifications for Special Combined Fleet Communications.

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(2) Methods of safeguarding and distinguishing deceptive dispatches: Combined Fleet Top Secret Standing Order 39, Methods of Safeguarding and Distinguishing Deceptive Dispatches.

(3) Method of indicating dates: Combined Fleet Standing Order 51, Table of Combined Fleet Special Abbreviations for Dates.

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(a) Methods for indicating plane number are set forth as follows:

Method	Method	Method	Method
Method 1 for indicating planes	Method 2 for indicating planes	Method 3 for indicating planes	Method 4 for indicating planes
Method 5 for indicating planes	Method 6 for indicating planes	Method 7 for indicating planes	Method 8 for indicating planes
Method 9 for indicating planes	Method 10 for indicating planes	Method 11 for indicating planes	
Notes: Use of Navy Military Most Secret Serial 167, Naval Aviation Military Plane Code Table			
Device Used			
From the 1st to the 15th of odd-numbered months			
From the 16th to the end of odd-numbered months			
From the 1st to the 15th of even-numbered months			
From the 16th to the end of even-numbered months			
Reserve (Depending on special orders)			

Notes: The symbol * indicates an aircraft which is a modification of the original plane.

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5. Utilizing and interfering with enemy communications

a. Utilizing enemy communications

(1) Intercept squads attached to each fleet will utilize enemy communications as directed by the commanders in chief of the respective fleets.

(2) Intercept squads attached to communications units will be assigned to utilization of enemy communications in accordance with the following:

COMMUNICATIONS UNIT	OUTLINE
Tokyo Communications Unit	The unit will obtain information chiefly on movements of the American home fleet and airplanes; also on movements of Russian forces. Details to be prescribed by Commanding Officer, 1 Combined Communications Unit.
Tokyo Communications Unit	1. The unit will obtain information chiefly on movements of American, British and Dutch fleets and airplanes in the FAR EAST. Details to be prescribed by Commanding Officer, 1 Combined Communications Unit. 2. Depending on conditions, one element will come under the command of Commander in Chief, 11th Air Fleet. 3. As the southern operations progress, it will proceed to occupied sectors whenever suitable.
Other Communications Units	Under direction of Commanding Officer, 1 Combined Communications Unit, they will gather operational information.

b. Interference with enemy communications will be directed by the force commanders, except in cases of special orders. Each force commander (Commanding officer, 1 Combined Communications Unit), whenever conditions are favorable, will direct communications units in the area (subordinate communications units) to obstruct enemy communications.

SECRETAppendix Table 1Page
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SHIP, AIRPLANE AND SUBMARINE COMMUNICATIONS

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM	COMMUNICATIONS DISPOSITION	REMARKS
Ship Communications	Strategic Communications 2 (2 SEISUNA*) Frequency System 3 (DEMPA SOSHIKI) (3 TEN*) Communication Classification 2 (2 KUF*) (Fleet or force co-ordinated communications)	1. Flagship communications system frequencies used mainly by the flagship of the commander in chief of each fleet and by the flagship of specially established squadrons. 2. Ordinary short wave is used by the flagship of the commanding officer of a squadron and when especially needed by ordinary vessels. 3. Frequencies used in ship communications are mainly employed by Southern Force and those forces closely connected with it. Other forces use them for urgent communications. However, when the Combined Fleet is taking up interception (YOSHI) dispositions, their main use will no longer be restricted to the Southern Force. 4. Southern Force communication classification is Classification 3.
Airplane Communications	Frequency System 4 (DEMPA SOSHIKI) (4 TEN*)	
Submarine Communications	Frequency System 3 (DEMPA SOSHIKI) (3 TEN*)	The communications of Advanced Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) submarines will be determined by the commanding officers of the Advanced Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI).
Note: The use of day and night frequencies will conform with <u>Combined Fleet Wireless Regulations</u>, as well as with the following: In the main, night frequencies will be used. If reliability of communications cannot be expected of night frequencies only, day frequencies also will be used.		

Note: The symbol * indicated the exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

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Note: The symbols

SECRET**Appendix Table 2 (Continued)****Notes:**

1. The times of communications will be as usual unless specially determined.

2. When sending and receiving conditions between ships and stations in the same system are poor, an intermediate communications unit will be responsible for relay.

3. Unless otherwise ordered, Disposition 1 will be used. Subsequent alterations in dispositions or frequencies will be as prescribed by the Commanding Officer, 1st Combined Communication Unit.

4. Communications unit (base) communications in occupied territories, except where specially determined, will be as prescribed by the commanding officer of each force.


5. Reserve frequencies

5,085 (TA*14)
 10,170 (TA*15)
 5,325 (TO*23)
 10,650 (TO*24)
 5,225 (SA*25)
 10,450 (SA*26)
 4,205 (HO*71)
 8,410 (HO*72)
 16,820 (HO*73)
 4,030 (RB*11)
 8,060 (RB*12)
 16,120 (RB*13)
 6,820 (TO*51)
 13,040 (TO*48)
 4,665 (SA*14)
 9,330 (SA*15)
 18,660 (SA*16)
 6,150 (TO*43)
 12,360 (TO*44)

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Note: The symbol * indicates an exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

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(All marks varying from the original document.)

(All marks varying from the original document.)									
(Transmission of communication signs and abbreviations.)									
Class 1 Air Plant	Class 2 Air Plant	Class 3 Air Plant	Class 4 Air Plant	Class 5 Air Plant	Class 6 Air Plant	Class 7 Air Plant	Class 8 Air Plant	Class 9 Air Plant	Class 10 Air Plant
Class 11 Air Plant	Class 12 Air Plant	Class 13 Air Plant	Class 14 Air Plant	Class 15 Air Plant	Class 16 Air Plant	Class 17 Air Plant	Class 18 Air Plant	Class 19 Air Plant	Class 20 Air Plant
Class 21 Air Plant	Class 22 Air Plant	Class 23 Air Plant	Class 24 Air Plant	Class 25 Air Plant	Class 26 Air Plant	Class 27 Air Plant	Class 28 Air Plant	Class 29 Air Plant	Class 30 Air Plant
Class 31 Air Plant	Class 32 Air Plant	Class 33 Air Plant	Class 34 Air Plant	Class 35 Air Plant	Class 36 Air Plant	Class 37 Air Plant	Class 38 Air Plant	Class 39 Air Plant	Class 40 Air Plant
Class 41 Air Plant	Class 42 Air Plant	Class 43 Air Plant	Class 44 Air Plant	Class 45 Air Plant	Class 46 Air Plant	Class 47 Air Plant	Class 48 Air Plant	Class 49 Air Plant	Class 50 Air Plant
Class 51 Air Plant	Class 52 Air Plant	Class 53 Air Plant	Class 54 Air Plant	Class 55 Air Plant	Class 56 Air Plant	Class 57 Air Plant	Class 58 Air Plant	Class 59 Air Plant	Class 60 Air Plant
Class 61 Air Plant	Class 62 Air Plant	Class 63 Air Plant	Class 64 Air Plant	Class 65 Air Plant	Class 66 Air Plant	Class 67 Air Plant	Class 68 Air Plant	Class 69 Air Plant	Class 70 Air Plant
Class 71 Air Plant	Class 72 Air Plant	Class 73 Air Plant	Class 74 Air Plant	Class 75 Air Plant	Class 76 Air Plant	Class 77 Air Plant	Class 78 Air Plant	Class 79 Air Plant	Class 80 Air Plant
Class 81 Air Plant	Class 82 Air Plant	Class 83 Air Plant	Class 84 Air Plant	Class 85 Air Plant	Class 86 Air Plant	Class 87 Air Plant	Class 88 Air Plant	Class 89 Air Plant	Class 90 Air Plant
Class 91 Air Plant	Class 92 Air Plant	Class 93 Air Plant	Class 94 Air Plant	Class 95 Air Plant	Class 96 Air Plant	Class 97 Air Plant	Class 98 Air Plant	Class 99 Air Plant	Class 100 Air Plant

SECRETPage
2/65**G. Supply****1. Supply policy**

a. Generally, each ship will replenish its fuel when it falls below 60% of capacity. If battle is anticipated, however, every effort will be made to maintain capacity.

b. Ordnance, ammunition, bombs, rations and stores will be replenished to capacity at every opportunity.

2. Outline of supply

a. The allotment of bases of operations for the initial period of operations is established generally as follows:

4th Fleet, 5th Fleet, 6th Fleet - YOKOSUKA

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1st Fleet, 2nd Fleet, 1st Air Fleet, forces attached to Combined Fleet - KURE

11th Air Fleet, Southern Expeditionary Fleet, 3rd Fleet - SASANO

b. The allotment of bases of operations and supply points to the supply vessels attached to each force is established generally as follows:

Main Body, Striking Force, Advanced Expeditionary Force (SEIKEN BUTAI), South Seas Force - YOKOSUKA, KURE and vicinity

Southern Force - MAKO, TAKAO, SASANO and vicinity

Northern Force - YOKOSUKA, UMINATO and vicinity

Commerce Destruction Unit - any suitable place

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c. The allotment of supply bases is established generally as follows:

Northern Force - PARAMUSHIRO, AKKESHI, WAKKANAI, OJICHI JIMA, MARCUS Island

South Seas Force	}	SAIPAN, KWAJALEIN,
Advanced Expeditionary Force (SEIKEN BUTAI)		WOTJE, JALUIT,
TARAO, TRUK, PONSAP, PALAU (Second Period (DAI NI KI) Operations and thereafter)		

Southern Force - PALAU (until First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations have ended), SAIGON, CAMBANG

The initial full allowance for supply bases and special supply points is as determined in Appended Table 1.

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d. As the operation develops, special supply points (special stores department and special air depot) will be set up in occupied areas. They will be under the direction of the commanding officer of the forces in such areas. The following

locations have been chosen:

- (1) DAVAO
- (2) TANAKEN
- (3) BALIKPAPAN
- (4) MANILA
- (5) MAKASSAR
- (6) SOERABAJA
- (7) SINGAPORE
- (8) BATAVIA
- (9) PENANG

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e. The various forces will be supplied by supply ships attached to them.

f. If possible, supply bases will not be used to supply other than airplanes and small vessels. In particular, except in unavoidable cases, supply bases will not be used to replenish stocks of supply ships.

g. Supplies and stores for forces which have advanced into captured areas will be unloaded and transported by base forces (KOHYUCHI) (IN "Base forces" changed to "special stores department.")¹ in cooperation with forces in the area.

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h. When several forces are to be supplied at the same time, the senior commanding officer present will determine priority.

i. The assignment of supply ships is given in Appended Table 2.

j. The rendezvous and subsequent movements of supply ships attached to the Combined Fleet are given in Appended Table 3.

3. Important supply matters

a. As shown in Appended Table 5, the Combined Fleet Supply Dept will direct the over-all planning of supply for the Combined Fleet and will keep in contact with Imperial General Headquarters and each base of operations.

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b. The organization of the supply departments of the various forces (fleets) will be determined by the respective force (or fleet) commander. The supply departments of the various forces (fleets) will supply the various forces (fleets) and will maintain contact with Combined Fleet Supply Dept, each base of operations and supply points.

c. When a force is supplied by a supply ship attached to another force (fleet) or by a supply base, a report will be sent to the commanding officer of the force to which the ship is attached or to the commanding officer of the supply base.

d. When the commanding officer of the supply base furnishes considerable quantities and supplies to surface forces other than those for which he is responsible, he will submit a report on current stocks to Imperial General Headquarters, the commanding officer of the base of operations and Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet.

¹ Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Serial 1 Part 99, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the MAGATO, SAKKI MAN.

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e. When the force commander concerned finds it necessary to change the initial full allowance of the supply base or special supply point, he will make a report to Imperial General Headquarters and Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet and will notify the commanding officer of the base of operations. Each month reports and notices will be submitted in this manner concerning quantities necessary to replenish stocks.

f. Commanding officers of supply bases and officers in charge of special supply points will maintain a current inventory of stocks and requisition necessary items from the base of operations, taking into consideration stocks carried by the latter.

g. Force commanders (or commanders in chief of fleets) will indicate the quantities and types of military stores which must be carried on the supply ships. When supply ships are directed to a base of operations or to a supply point in order to restock, they will notify the commanding officer of the base (TM Add "or supply point.")¹ regarding time of arrival and quantities and types of materiel required.

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h. When stores on supply ships have to be replenished or supplemented, the force commander (or fleet commander in chief) concerned will submit a report immediately to Imperial General Headquarters and to Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet.

i. Each force commander (or fleet commander in chief) will secure from the commanding officer of the base of operations the necessary information about the movements of and the types and quantities of materiel carried by supply ships which are dispatched as replacements or additions from the base of operations or supply base to the force (or fleet).

4. Replenishment of supply ships and supply bases

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a. Supply will be carried out in such a manner that the various supply ships will not have to be restocked at one time. Supply ships will be restocked one at a time at a supply base or base of operations.

b. Supply bases and special supply points usually will be restocked by Imperial General Headquarters or the commanding officer of the base of operations.

Special orders will be issued to effect co-operation of supply ships of a force (or fleet).

The monthly replenishment allowances for supply bases and special supply points are given in Appended Table 4.

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5. Protection of ships

When supply ships are to be dispatched, the force commander (fleet commander in chief) concerned will furnish suitable protection by forming a convoy, charting the course and providing escort. Supply ships attached to the base of operations will be protected in like manner.

¹Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Serial 1 Part 99, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the MAGATU, SAKI WAN.

1. Ammunition and explosives are to be loaded on munition ships.
2. Mines will be handled as set for in Mining Operations, Appendix Table 3 (see Above.).
3. X indicates places where special supply points are to be established.
4. Indicates supply points where special fuel must be prepared.
5. Dependable supplies of raw fuel (heavy oil, coal, aviation fuel) will be prepared.
6. At MAGS and KANZIEB one month's supply of air purifying material and oxygen will be prepared (MAGS - air purifying material 30,000, oxygen 1,000; KANZIEB - air purifying material 30,000, oxygen 1,000).
7. The symbol X indicates an important MAGS installation of the original plan.

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DISPOSITION OF SUPPLY SHIPS FOR FISCAL YEAR (DAY 100) OPERATIONS

POWERS	Striking Force	American Expeditionary Force (SWINE TOTAL)	South Seas Force	Eastern Force	Northern Force	Supply Force	TOTAL
MONTIONS SHIPS	SICHELIN MARU	ARATAMA MARU [SICHELIN MARU]	[TANIGAWA MARU]	KOCHI MARU ONOH MARU TATSUKAMI MARU [SHISEN MARU]		KIHO MARU [SICHELIN MARU]	10
WATER TANKERS			YATA YAMA MARU No 1 AMALSU MARU DAIKOKU MARU [BATO MARU]	KOBE MARU OGOTO MARU [ASATAMA MARU] [KISOGARA MARU]			8
SPORERS SHIPS	HOKO MARU	No 2 KENTO MARU	KOA MARU CHICHIRU MARU OMITO MARU HOKKA MARU HAKUDA MARU	KOBEL MARU, SUZUKA MARU, KATSUMI MARU, KITAGAMI MARU, No 2 BANSEI MARU, No 5 BANSEI MARU, (OI MARU), [MIBATTI MARU], SENDAI MARU	CHEKO MARU	MAMITA MARU No 3 BANSEI MARU	19
OILERS	SHIRATA MARU KITUNTO MARU KENTO MARU SHIPON MARU SHINKU MARU KOKUTO MARU TONO MARU AKABORI MARU No 2 KIUCHI MARU	INTO MARU TOA MARU [TOKUSIMA MARU]	SEIKO MARU KOTO MARU [KALO MARU] [KIUCHI MARU]	HAYASHI MARU KELCO SAN CLARENCE MARU [TELLO MARU] [GUSTO MARU] [PICKETT MARU] [ALGOSAN MARU] [BARA MARU] [SHIOKOKU MARU] [KOTO MARU] [No 5 HINO MARU]	KANPUO TSUBOTA PHISHI MARU No 2 HISHI MARU	(including also) AD) (TS pre-assembly nine carrying aviation gasoline.)	22
COLLATERALS			SEIKITOU No 6 SHIENSI MARU MAKIHANO MARU [FASHIMO MARU] [BAKILLAN MARU]	YODOGAWA MARU AJALAZE MARU [KOSHI MARU] [KOTO MARU]	HISAN MARU	KOTO MARU	11
MISC. LAFROUS AUXILIARIES			KENTO MARU YAMAGATA MARU	SENJO MARU [KANOGA MARU]	AKASHIMARU MARU	OKITSU MARU	6
TOTAL	12	6	21	34	3	10	86

Note: ϕ denotes ships which transport aviation gasoline. (TH brackets were parentheses in original.)

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Note: ϕ denotes ships which transport aviation gasoline.

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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

GENERAL		SPECIAL		SPECIAL		SPECIAL	
EXHIBIT	DESCRIPTION	EXHIBIT	DESCRIPTION	EXHIBIT	DESCRIPTION	EXHIBIT	DESCRIPTION
1	General	2	General	3	General	4	General
5	General	6	General	7	General	8	General
9	General	10	General	11	General	12	General
13	General	14	General	15	General	16	General
17	General	18	General	19	General	20	General
21	General	22	General	23	General	24	General
25	General	26	General	27	General	28	General
29	General	30	General	31	General	32	General
33	General	34	General	35	General	36	General
37	General	38	General	39	General	40	General
41	General	42	General	43	General	44	General
45	General	46	General	47	General	48	General
49	General	50	General	51	General	52	General
53	General	54	General	55	General	56	General
57	General	58	General	59	General	60	General
61	General	62	General	63	General	64	General
65	General	66	General	67	General	68	General
69	General	70	General	71	General	72	General
73	General	74	General	75	General	76	General
77	General	78	General	79	General	80	General
81	General	82	General	83	General	84	General
85	General	86	General	87	General	88	General
89	General	90	General	91	General	92	General
93	General	94	General	95	General	96	General
97	General	98	General	99	General	100	General

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Second period (Dai NI KI) Operations and thereafter will be the same as First Period (Dai IKKI) Operations, except for the following:

Striking Force	Oil Supply	KYOKUTO MARU KANTO MARU NIPPON MARU No. 2 KYOAI MARU	Total 6
South Seas Force	"	Will add TOHO MARU	Total 22
Southern Force	"	Will add KUMOSHIO MARU KOKUYO MARU	Total 35 (TN Changed to 36) ¹
Supply Force	"	Will add SHINKOKU MARU, TOKI MARU (TN Insert SHIRIYA MARU.) ¹	Total 13 (TN Changed to 12.) ¹

¹Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Serial 1 Part 99, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard MAGATO, HARBEL AMB.

Item	Quantity	Unit Price	Total Price	Remarks
1. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
2. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
3. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
4. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
5. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
6. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
7. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
8. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
9. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
10. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
11. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
12. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
13. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
14. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
15. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
16. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
17. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
18. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
19. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
20. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
21. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
22. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
23. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
24. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
25. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
26. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
27. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
28. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
29. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
30. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
31. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
32. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
33. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
34. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
35. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
36. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
37. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
38. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
39. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
40. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
41. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
42. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
43. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
44. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
45. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
46. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
47. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
48. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
49. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
50. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
51. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
52. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
53. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
54. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
55. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
56. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
57. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
58. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
59. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
60. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
61. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
62. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
63. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
64. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
65. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
66. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
67. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
68. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
69. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
70. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
71. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
72. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
73. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
74. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
75. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
76. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
77. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
78. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
79. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
80. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
81. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
82. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
83. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
84. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
85. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
86. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
87. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
88. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
89. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
90. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
91. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
92. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
93. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
94. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
95. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
96. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
97. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
98. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
99. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	
100. 1000	1,000	1.00	1,000	


Notes: 1. The quantity will be 12.7 in each purpose gun shell. The rest will be shells for all types of medium and small caliber guns.
 2. When the type of gun is indicated, it will be in the 40, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000, 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1008, 1009, 1010, 1011, 1012, 1013, 1014, 1015, 1016, 1017, 1018, 1019, 1020, 1021, 1022, 1023, 1024, 1025, 1026, 1027, 1028, 1029, 1030, 1031, 1032, 1033, 1034, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1038, 1039, 1040, 1041, 1042, 1043, 1044, 1045, 1046, 1047, 1048, 1049, 1050, 1051, 1052, 1053, 1054, 1055, 1056, 1057, 1058, 1059, 1060, 1061, 1062, 1063, 1064, 1065, 1066, 1067, 1068, 1069, 1070, 1071, 1072, 1073, 1074, 1075, 1076, 1077, 1078, 1079, 1080, 1081, 1082, 1083, 1084, 1085, 1086, 1087, 1088, 1089, 1090, 1091, 1092, 1093, 1094, 1095, 1096, 1097, 1098, 1099, 1100, 1101, 1102, 1103, 1104, 1105, 1106, 1107, 1108, 1109, 1110, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1115, 1116, 1117, 1118, 1119, 1120, 1121, 1122, 1123, 1124, 1125, 1126, 1127, 1128, 1129, 1130, 1131, 1132, 1133, 1134, 1135, 1136, 1137, 1138, 1139, 1140, 1141, 1142, 1143, 1144, 1145, 1146, 1147, 1148, 1149, 1150, 1151, 1152, 1153, 1154, 1155, 1156, 1157, 1158, 1159, 1160, 1161, 1162, 1163, 1164, 1165, 1166, 1167, 1168, 1169, 1170, 1171, 1172, 1173, 1174, 1175, 1176, 1177, 1178, 1179, 1180, 1181, 1182, 1183, 1184, 1185, 1186, 1187, 1188, 1189, 1190, 1191, 1192, 1193, 1194, 1195, 1196, 1197, 1198, 1199, 1200, 1201, 1202, 1203, 1204, 1205, 1206, 1207, 1208, 1209, 1210, 1211, 1212, 1213, 1214, 1215, 1216, 1217, 1218, 1219, 1220, 1221, 1222, 1223, 1224, 1225, 1226, 1227, 1228, 1229, 1230, 1231, 1232, 1233, 1234, 1235, 1236, 1237, 1238, 1239, 1240, 1241, 1242, 1243, 1244, 1245, 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249, 1250, 1251, 1252, 1253, 1254, 1255, 1256, 1257, 1258, 1259, 1260, 1261, 1262, 1263, 1264, 1265, 1266, 1267, 1268, 1269, 1270, 1271, 1272, 1273, 1274, 1275, 1276, 1277, 1278, 1279, 1280, 1281, 1282, 1283, 1284, 1285, 1286, 1287, 1288, 1289, 1290, 1291, 1292, 1293, 1294, 1295, 1296, 1297, 1298, 1299, 1300, 1301, 1302, 1303, 1304, 1305, 1306, 1307, 1308, 1309, 1310, 1311, 1312, 1313, 1314, 1315, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1319, 1320, 1321, 1322, 1323, 1324, 1325, 1326, 1327, 1328, 1329, 1330, 1331, 1332, 1333, 1334, 1335, 1336, 1337, 1338, 1339, 1340, 1341, 1342, 1343, 1344, 1345, 1346, 1347, 1348, 1349, 1350, 1351, 1352, 1353, 1354, 1355, 1356, 1357, 1358, 1359, 1360, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1364, 1365, 1366, 1367, 1368, 1369, 1370, 1371, 1372, 1

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Appended Table 3

ORGANIZATION OF SUPPLY FORCES OF COMBINED FLEET

Editor's Note:
This table included in
portion of document comprising
pages 2/125-151 inclusive which
otherwise duplicates G, Supply.
The duplicate pages are omitted.



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2/96**I. Operations Other Than Those of the Combined Fleet****1. Operations of forces at naval stations and auxiliary naval stations**

a. These forces will strengthen the defense of strategic points, protect sea traffic and co-operate with the Combined Fleet or China Area Fleet in operations in the area in their charge.

b. Air forces and other necessary forces will be moved to the necessary places as conditions demand. They will be placed under the operational command of the commander in chief of the fleet concerned or of the commanding officer of the force at the naval station or auxiliary naval station in charge of the area concerned.

2. Operations of CHINA Area FleetPage
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a. In general, the fleet will continue operations against CHINA with its present strength. It will annihilate land forces and wrest control from them.

b. At the outbreak of war the force of which 2ND CHINA Expeditionary Fleet is the nucleus will co-operate with the Army to occupy HONGKONG and annihilate enemy forces stationed there.

c. The defenses and security measures within the occupied areas will be strengthened and sea traffic along the CHINA coast will be protected. At the same time every effort will be made to deny the use of the CHINA coast to enemy ships and airplanes.

d. It will co-operate, as the occasion demands, with the Combined Fleet and Southern Army in escorting Army surface transports and in defending assembly points.

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2/98**II. OPERATIONS OF THE COMBINED FLEET IN CASE WAR WITH RUSSIA BEGINS DURING THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, THE NETHERLANDS AND CHINA****A. Operation Policy**

1. The operations against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS will be modeled generally after the operation policy set forth in I.

2. The policy for operations against RUSSIA will be as follows:

a. In the event war breaks out during First Phase (DAI ICHE DAN) Operations

(1) For the most part, 5th Fleet and the homeland combat forces (MAISEN BUTAI) will be changed with defense. They will protect vital sea traffic along the coast of JAPAN and will protect strategic areas from air attack.

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(2) Thereafter, as quickly as southern operations and operations against the American Fleet permit, elements of light forces and air forces will be diverted to operations against RUSSIA.

The operations described in the above paragraph will be strengthened.

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b. In the event war breaks out after the completion of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations.

The greater part of 5th Fleet and one element of the light forces will be shifted to operations against RUSSIA. The Russian fleet in the ORIENT will be immediately annihilated. Pressure will be brought to bear along the coast of Russian territory in the FAR EAST. In co-operation with the Army, these forces will destroy enemy air strength in the MARITIME Province and USSURI Province, and occupy VLADIVOSTOK and other strategic points in the FAR EAST.

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B. Allocation of Forces.

Separate Table 6 (Will be sent later) (TN Missing.)

C. Operations Other Than Those of the Combined Fleet

1. Operations of forces at naval stations and auxiliary naval stations.

a. The naval stations at YOKOSUKA, KURE, SASEBO and MAIZURU and the auxiliary naval stations at OGINATO, CHINKAI and Port ARTHUR will strengthen security measures against Russian submarines and airplanes and will annihilate them if they appear in areas under their jurisdiction.

b. When the outer combat forces engage in active operations, air forces and other necessary forces will be transferred to the necessary points and will co-operate in these operations.

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2. Operations of the China Area Fleet

The force which has I China Expeditionary Fleet and 3 China Expeditionary Fleet as its nucleus will cover the movements of the Army forces which will be diverted from central and northern CHINA. It will escort these forces during transport at sea and deploy suitably.

III. MISCELLANEOUS REGULATIONS

A. Time to be Used

Central standard time

B. Charts to be Used

Charts (charts of military places) to be used are as follows:

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CHART (CHART OF MILITARY PLACES)	USE (ON SHIPS)
Navy Ultrasecret 347 Chart of Military Places in PACIFIC Ocean	For use in general operations (ships)
Special Chart of Military Places	1. For use in joint Army-Navy operations 2. For use in operations in narrow waters

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Charts for general operations in the MALAY Area will be established separately. (TN This note subsequently has been deleted.)¹

C. Identification of friendly and enemy forces

The identification of friendly and enemy forces will be based on Combined Fleet Doctrine and the following:

Identification between Navy ships and Japanese merchant shipping (including transports and ships attached to the Army) and between the various Army and Navy land installations (including forces) will be in accordance with Signal Regulations for Identification of Japanese Ships in wartime.

(TN Insert "but, in odd-numbered months Method 1 will be followed, in even-numbered months Method 2.")¹ (TN Add "Identification among airplanes will be based on the Joint Army-Navy Agreement Concerning Identification of Friendly Military Airplanes.")¹

¹Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet, as Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Serial 1 Part 99, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the MAGATO, MAKI WAN.

[illegible]

[illegible]

Polmer's Ship: Arrived by "Tropic" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet on Combined Warship No. 100000 Serial 1 Part 2, dated 17 Nov 48, aboard 100000, 000 1000000, 000 1000000.

Polmer's Boat: Arrived by "Tropic" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet on Combined Warship No. 100000 Serial 1 Part 2, dated 17 Nov 48, aboard 100000, 000 1000000, 000 1000000.

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Table 1 (Continued)
ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR FIRST PERIOD (DAI IKKI) OPERATIONS OF FIRST PHASE (DAI ICHI DAN) OPERATIONS
(From first preparations for war till the main army forces invading the PHILIPPINES - 1 plus 20)

FORCES	COMMANDING OFFICER	SPHERES	PRINCIPAL DUTY	DETAILS OF OPERATIONS	REMARKS
Northern Force	CinC 5th Fleet	5th Fleet Kisaratsu Airgroup CHICKI JIMA Communications Unit (TH Mine land attack planes from YOKO ED* added.) Three cargo ships	1. Will patrol and defend area in its charge. 2. Will patrol the route of the Striking Force and cover its withdrawal. 3. Will take security measures against RUSSIA.	1. Will operate in accordance with principal duty. 2. In Operation Method 1 against American Fleet, land attack planes from Kisaratsu Airgroup will patrol the route of the Striking Force and cover its withdrawal. (Bases will be HOKKAIDO and MARCUS Island.)	As directed by commanding officer.
Supply Unit					
Commerce Destruction Unit	CO 24th Squadron (SHIRAI)	24s One cargo ship	Will destroy sea traffic.	Will operate in accordance with the Outline for Sea Traffic Destruction Operations.	MANPO GUPTO
Communications Force	CO 1 Combined Communications Unit	1 Unit (less CHICKI JIMA) of 1 Combined Communications Unit	Operational communications. Communications intelligence.	Will operate according to F, "Communications."	The various places where stationed.
Attached Forces		Sec 2 of CarDiv 4 CHIYODA SEYISU YAKAZE	Will be specially ordered.	Will be established separately.	Western part of INLAND SEA.
		11 transports (TH Changed to 11 transports.)	Will furnish supplies for operational forces.	Will operate according to G, "Supply."	

Notes: 1. The assignment of supply ships will be based on Appended Table 2 of G, "Supply."
2. The patrol boundary line between Northern Force and South Seas Force will run east-west through MARCUS Island (which will be included in Northern Force area).
3. The operational boundary line between Southern Force and South Seas Force will be the boundary of BRITISH and DUTCH NEW GUINEA.
4. KI KU (TH Add "and nine land attack planes from YOKO ED*") will be under the operational command of CinC Combined Fleet after 1-Day.
5. The division of strength within the various forces may be changed appropriately.

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ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR SECOND PERIOD (DAI NI II) OPERATIONS OF FIRST PHASE (DAI IKKI DAS) OPERATIONS
 (Up to about X HQ when the landing of the main BRITISH MALLI invasion force has been completed)

FORCE	COMMANDING OFFICER	STRENGTH	PRINCIPAL DUTY	DETAILS OF OPERATIONS	REMARKS
		Destroyer 5 Submarine 4 One Subdiv of Submarine 6 AirFleet 22 36 attack planes ASAHU MURORO			
Supply Unit		35 train vessels			
Maritime Force	CinC 5 Fleet	5 Fleet KISAKATSU Air Group CHICHEI JIMA Communications Unit (CHICHEI)			
Supply Unit		Five train vessels			
Commerce Destruction Unit	OO 24 Squadron (SHIRAI)	24 gpc One train vessel			
Communications Force	OO 1 Combined Communication Unit	1 Unit (less CHICHEI JIMA Communications Unit) of 1 Combined Communications Unit	Continuation of First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations		
Attached Forces		Sen 2 of CarDiv 4 CHUYODA SHIRU (TW inserted in ink.) TAKASHI 13 transports			
Note		Same as for First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations			

Note: The symbol * indicates an exact KANJI transliteration of the original KANA.

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AMOUNTS OF LOSS FOR LOSS PERIOD (1961 AND 1962) AND PERCENTAGE OF LOSS FOR LOSS PERIOD (1961 AND 1962)

(By to end of Southern Fleet Phase (DAI IOWE RAN) Operations.)

BEFORE

UNIT	COMBATANT STATUS	FUNCTION	PERIODICITY	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	STATUS
Site 101		1-Office 1 Fleet (Class 101) 1-Office 1 1-Office 2 1-Office 3			
Working Party		1-Office 1 Fleet (Class 101) 1-Office 1 1-Office 2 1-Office 3			
Supply Unit		1-Office 1 Fleet (Class 101) 1-Office 1 1-Office 2 1-Office 3			
Alcohol Distribution		1-Office 1 Fleet (Class 101) 1-Office 1 1-Office 2 1-Office 3			
Food Distribution		1-Office 1 Fleet (Class 101) 1-Office 1 1-Office 2 1-Office 3			
Medical Unit		1-Office 1 Fleet (Class 101) 1-Office 1 1-Office 2 1-Office 3			
Water Unit		1-Office 1 Fleet (Class 101) 1-Office 1 1-Office 2 1-Office 3			
Site 102		1-Office 1 Fleet (Class 101) 1-Office 1 1-Office 2 1-Office 3			
Working Party		1-Office 1 Fleet (Class 101) 1-Office 1 1-Office 2 1-Office 3			
Supply Unit		1-Office 1 Fleet (Class 101) 1-Office 1 1-Office 2 1-Office 3			
Alcohol Distribution		1-Office 1 Fleet (Class 101) 1-Office 1 1-Office 2 1-Office 3			
Food Distribution		1-Office 1 Fleet (Class 101) 1-Office 1 1-Office 2 1-Office 3			
Medical Unit		1-Office 1 Fleet (Class 101) 1-Office 1 1-Office 2 1-Office 3			
Water Unit		1-Office 1 Fleet (Class 101) 1-Office 1 1-Office 2 1-Office 3			
Site 103		1-Office 1 Fleet (Class 101) 1-Office 1 1-Office 2 1-Office 3			
Working Party		1-Office 1 Fleet (Class 101) 1-Office 1 1-Office 2 1-Office 3			
Supply Unit		1-Office 1 Fleet (Class 101) 1-Office 1 1-Office 2 1-Office 3			
Alcohol Distribution		1-Office 1 Fleet (Class 101) 1-Office 1 1-Office 2 1-Office 3			
Food Distribution		1-Office 1 Fleet (Class 101) 1-Office 1 1-Office 2 1-Office 3			
Medical Unit		1-Office 1 Fleet (Class 101) 1-Office 1 1-Office 2 1-Office 3			
Water Unit		1-Office 1 Fleet (Class 101) 1-Office 1 1-Office 2 1-Office 3			

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2/112Separate Table 2 (Continued)

ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR THIRD PERIOD (DAI SAN KI) OPERATIONS OF FIRST PHASE (DAI ICHI DAN) OPERATIONS
 (Up to end of Southern First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations)

FORCE	COMMANDING OFFICER	STRENGTH	PRINCIPAL DUTY	OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS	REMARKS
Northern Force	Cinc 5th Fleet	5th Fleet KISABATSU Air Group CHICHI JIMA Communica- tions Unit (CHI- CHITSO) Five transports			
Commerce Destruction Unit	CO 24 Squadron (SENTAI)	24 S** One train vessel			
Communications Force	CO 1 Com- bined Communi- cations Unit	1 Unit (less CHICHI JIMA Communications Unit.) of 1 Com- bined Communications Unit		Continuation of Second Period (DAI NI KI) Operations	
Attached Forces		Sec 2 of Cardiv 4 SPTSU CHIYODA YAKAZE 13 train vessels			
Notes	Combined with First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations				

Note: The symbol ** after a conventional sign or abbreviation indicates that this is an exact reproduction of that appearing in the original document.

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Separate Table 2 (Continued)

ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR THIRD PERIOD (DAI SAN KI) OPERATIONS OF FIRST PHASE (DAI ICHI DAN) OPERATIONS
(Up to end of Southern First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations)

FORCE	COMMANDING OFFICER	STRENGTH	PRINCIPAL DUTY	OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS	REMARKS
Northern Force	CinC 5th Fleet	5th Fleet KISABATSU Air Group CHICHI JIMA Communica- tions Unit (CHI- CHITSU) Five transports			
Supply Unit		24 9** One train vessel			
Commerce Destruction Unit	CO 24 Squadron (SENTAI)				
Communications Force	CO 1 Com- bined Communi- cations Unit	1 Unit (less CHICHI JIMA Communications Unit.) of 1 Com- bined Communications Unit		Continuation of Second Period (DAI NI KI) Operations	
Attached Forces		See 2 of Cardiv 4 SPITSU CHITODA YAMAZAKI 13 train vessels			
Notes	Combined with First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations				

Note: The symbol ** after a conventional sign or abbreviation indicates that this is an exact reproduction of that appearing in the original document.

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ALLGEMEINE ANFORDERUNGEN (Allgemeine)

[illegible]

ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR INTERPRETATION (FORM 1)

FORCE	COMMANDING OFFICER	PRINCIPAL DUTY	ALLOCATION IN PREPARATION FOR HOSTILITIES ACTION-1 (Other matters will be as prescribed by doctrine.)		ALLOCATION IN PREPARATION FOR HOSTILITIES ACTION-2 (Other matters will be as prescribed by doctrine.)		ALLOCATION IN PREPARATION FOR HOSTILITIES ACTION-3 (Other matters will be as prescribed by doctrine.)	
			Strength	Outline of Operations	Strength	Outline of Operations	Strength	Outline of Operations
Commerce Destruction Unit			Eight patrol craft One element of 11 Air Fleet		Eight patrol craft One element of 11 Air Fleet		Eight patrol craft One element of 11 Air Fleet	
Communication Forces	OO 24 Communication Unit (COMINT)	Disruption of sea traffic	24 300	In accordance with Outline for Sea Traffic Destruction Operations	24 300	Same as Allocation-1	24 300	Same as Allocation-2
Communication Forces	OO 1 Combined Communication Unit	Operational communications and communications intelligence (TUSSEIN CHORD)	1 Combined Communication Unit		1 Combined Communication Unit	Same as Allocation-1	1 Combined Communication Unit	Same as Allocation-2
Supply Force	Under Direct Command	Supply	Train		Train	Same as Allocation-1	Transport	Same as Allocation-2

Notes

- When changing to these allocations during First Phase (DAI ICHI DAI) Operations, the formation of the Striking Force will be revised by special order.
- Outline of deployment for the base air force:
 - Deployment areas as follows:
 - When the enemy is attacking in the MARSHALLS Area: the major element - the MARSHALLS Area; one element - SAIPAN Island, SAIPAN and TONGAREVA.
 - When the enemy is attacking in the SAIPAN Area: the major element - SAIPAN Area; one element - TONGAREVA and MARSHALLS Area.
 - When the enemy is attacking in waters east of JAPAN: the major element - TOKYO Area; one element - MARCUS Island, SAIPAN and OMIKOTO Area.
 - Deployment depends on the swift shift of the HIDEKUNI. However aircraft carriers are used to shift fighter force units.
- The assignment of supply ships is the same as in the allocation of forces in First Phase (DAI ICHI DAI) Operations.
- Special orders will be issued for other forces not listed above.

Note: The symbol "a" after a conventional sign or abbreviation indicates that this is an exact reproduction of that appearing in the original document.

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Separate Table 5

ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR SECOND PHASE (DAI NI DAI) OPERATIONS
(From the conclusion of southern First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations on)

FORCES	COMMANDING OFFICER	STRENGTH	PRINCIPAL DUTY	OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS	REMARKS
Main Body		RetDiv 1 1 Fleet (less RetDiv 3 and CruDiv 6)	Support of entire operations.		
Advance Force	CinC 2 Fleet	2 Fleet RetDiv 3 CruDiv 6	1. Support of operations of Southern, South Seas and Southern Forces.		
Carrier Air Force	CinC 1 Air Fleet	1 Air Fleet (less CarDiv 4)	2. Destruction of enemy task force.		
Advanced Expeditionary Force	CinC 6 Fleet	6 Fleet	Continuation of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations.		
Base Air Forces	CinC 11 Air Fleet	11 Air Fleet (less one element) Two battalions of special naval landing party.	Patrol of necessary areas; base air combat.		
Southern Force	CinC 3 Fleet	3 Fleet 1 Southern Expeditionary Fleet (SS Entered in combat.) 1 Southern Expeditionary Fleet SubRon 4 SubRon 5 AKAISKI ASAKI MARU Eight patrol planes Five battalions of special naval landing party ASAKI MURORO One element of 11 Air Fleet	1. Hoping up of enemy remnants in occupied key areas; checking of enemy penetration; defense and stabilization of key points. 2. Disruption of enemy sea traffic off northwest coast of AUSTRALIA and in INDIAN Ocean. 3. Depending on the situation, attacks on enemy air bases in northern AUSTRALIA.		
South Seas Force	CinC 4 Fleet	4 Fleet CruDiv 6 AIFlot 11 2 Unit of 1 Combined Communications Unit	1. Patrolling and strengthening of defenses in South Seas Area; scouring and garrisoning of occupied key points. 2. Attacks on key points in the Bismarck Archipelago and BRITISH NEW GUINEA.		
Northern Force	CinC 5 Fleet	5 Fleet (KIKU) OHIGI JIMA Communications Unit (OHIGITSU)	1. Patrolling and strengthening defenses in Northern Area. 2. Observation of and attacks on key points in ALBERTIAN Islands. 3. Security measures against RUSSIA.		
Commerce Destruction Unit	CO 24 Squadron (SHUTAI)	24 g ^o			
Communications Force	CO 1 Combined Communications Unit	1 Unit (less OHIGI JIMA Communication Unit) of 1 Combined Communications Unit			
Attached Forces		OHYODA SETSU YAKAZE			
Note	Assignment of supply ships will be determined separately.				

Note: The symbol ** after a conventional sign or abbreviation indicates that this is an exact reproduction of that appearing in the original document.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #2
ENTITLED

"JAPANESE COMBINED FLEET TOP SECRET OPERATION ORDER #2"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460)

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

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Annex Table 1

ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR SECOND PHASE (RAI #1 RAI) OPERATIONS
(From the conclusion of southern First Phase (RAI ICHI RAI) Operations on)

FORCES	COMMANDING OFFICER	STRENGTH	PRINCIPAL DUTY	ORDER OF OPERATIONS	REMARKS	
Main Body	CinC Combined Fleet	ReDiv 1 1 Fleet (less ReDiv 3 and GraDiv 6)	Support of entire operations.			
Advance Force		CinC 2 Fleet 2 Fleet ReDiv 3 GraDiv 6	1. Support of operations of Northern, South Sea and Southern Forces.			
Carrier Air Force		CinC 1 Air Fleet 1 Air Fleet	1 Air Fleet (less GraDiv 4)	2. Destruction of enemy task force.		
Advanced Expeditionary Force		CinC 6 Fleet 6 Fleet	6 Fleet	Continuation of First Phase (RAI ICHI RAI) Operations.		
Base Air Forces		CinC 11 Air Fleet 11 Air Fleet	11 Air Fleet (less one element) Two battalions of special naval landing party.	Patrol of necessary areas; base air combat.		
Southern Force		CinC 3 Fleet 3 Fleet 1 Southern Expeditionary Fleet (SU entered in peninsula) 3 Southern Expeditionary Fleet Subdiv 4 Subdiv 5 AKAJIMA ASAKI HANO Night patrol planes Five battalions of special naval landing party ASAKI MURORO One element of 11 Air Fleet	1. Hoping up of enemy remnants in occupied key areas; checking of enemy penetration; defense and stabilization of key points. 2. Disruption of enemy sea traffic off northwest coast of AUSTRALIA and in INDIAN Ocean. 3. Depending on the situation, attacks on enemy air bases in northern AUSTRALIA.			
South Sea Force		CinC 4 Fleet 4 Fleet GraDiv 6 ASAFist 11 2 Unit of 1 Combined Communications Unit	1. Patrolling and strengthening of defenses in South Sea Area; scouring and garrisoning of occupied key points. 2. Attacks on key points in the KIMARK Archipelago and BRITISH NEW GUINEA.			
Northern Force		CinC 5 Fleet 5 Fleet (KIKU) CHIKI JIMA Communications Unit (CHIKITSU)	1. Patrolling and strengthening defenses in Northern Area. 2. Observation of and attacks on key points in ALUTIAN Islands. 3. Security measures against RUSSIA.			
Commerce Destruction Unit		CO 34 Squadron (SUWAI)	34 S-		Same as First Phase (RAI ICHI RAI) Operations	
Communications Force		CO 1 Combined Communications Unit	1 Unit (less CHIKI JIMA Communications Unit) of 1 Combined Communications Unit			
Attached Forces		CHIKI SUWAI YAKAI				
Note	Assignment of supply ships will be determined separately.					

Note: The symbol "x" after a conventional sign or abbreviation indicates that this is an exact reproduction of that appearing in the original document.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #2

ENTITLED

"JAPANESE COMBINED FLEET TOP SECRET OPERATION ORDER #2"
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COMBINED FLEET TOP SECRET OPERATION ORDER 2

Flagship NAGATO, SAENI BAY, 7 Nov. 41

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku
Commander in Chief,
Combined Fleet

COMBINED FLEET ORDER

First preparations for war

Y Day will be 8 December

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #3
(A NAVY STUDY RE ENEMY SUBMARINES)

ENTITLED

"JAPANESE SUBMARINE OPERATIONS (PEARL HARBOR ATTACK)"

USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE

"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"

(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

SECRETJAPANESE SUBMARINE OPERATIONS AND (PEARL HARBOR ATTACK)

The operations of Japanese submarines, both midget and full-size, was one of the main factors in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The Combined Fleet Secret OpOrder #1, which contained the basic plans for the Pacific-wide attacks which launched the war, contained a paragraph referring to submarine operations at Pearl Harbor. The text of this paragraph, as recalled by a reliable Japanese Chief Yeoman who was attached to the staff of the late Admiral Yamamoto, CinC Combined Fleet, read as follows:

7. The Commander of the Surprise Attack Force (Submarine Force), having the 6th Fleet (Submarine Fleet) as its main element, will have most of the submarines leave the western part of the Inland Sea on X-20 Day to attack Pearl Harbor. Its entire strength will be so disposed so as to command the harbor mouth. It will attack any enemy warship which may have escaped from the harbor. It will also carry out reconnaissance before the attack, and if the opportunity presents itself, will carry out surprise attacks on enemy warships with midget submarines. The time for such attacks will be after the flights of planes have attacked OAHU. Every possible means for recovery of midget submarines should be considered.

The organizations participating in the Pearl Harbor attack, on the basis of POW and documentary evidence, included Subrons 1, 2, and 3 (Minus Subdiv 20). This is a total of 20 submarines, not including the 5 midgets carried on the decks of five of the large submarines. Sixteen of the twenty submarines have been definitely identified as having participated (I-1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,17,16,18,20,22,24, (1)68,(1)69,(1)74). The other four, which are assumed to have participated because they were part of the same Subdivs both before and after December 7th and are not known to have had other assignments, are the I-8,9,15, and (1)75. A fairly reliable POW has suggested that the I-10 was also present, but there is no other evidence to indicate that it was.

All of the submarines participating (with the exception of the 45-ton midgets) were of the I-type; i.e., over 1,000 tons. Sixteen of them were of the Long-Range Cruiser type—over 1900 tons, with a range of above 12,000 nautical miles at 14 knots. Of these, five (I-16,18,20,22,24) were equipped with midget submarines, the five midget submarines which attempted to get in:

REPORT

Pearl Harbor. The remaining eleven Cruisers were plane-bearing submarines.

Four of the twenty were I (1)68 Class Submarines: 1400 tons, 6 torpedo tubes and a range of 8,000 miles at 16 knots.

The midget submarines used in the Pearl Harbor action (which subsequently were referred to as the "Pearl Harbor Type") were 41' in length, carried two 18" torpedoes, had a range of 175 miles at 5 knots and 18 miles at 20 knots.

When carried by the mother submarine, the midget sub is secured to the pressure hull with four heavy clamps and one auxiliary clamp. An access hatch, telephone and battery-charging leads connect the two submarines. The midget is launched by releasing the four main clamps from the parent ship and the auxiliary clamp from within the midget.

With regard to the anticipated results of the midget-submarines borne by the I-16 Class submarines, it is interesting to note that the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet, in clarifying Secret OpOrder #1 is reported by the above-quoted Japanese Chief Yeoman as stating:

The midget submarine unit has been studying and training at the Navy Yard with the CHIYODA for a year and a half, but it is still too much to hope that it has reached a stage of perfection. In any case, the crew members are supremely confident. The 6th Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks within the harbor.

PHASES OF THE ATTACK

Preliminary. According to the Secret OpOrder #1 schedule, most of the submarines in the attack force were supposed to leave the Inland Sea (presumably Kure, the major submarine base) on X-29 Day (November 18th, Honolulu time). Subron 2, composed of I-1,2,3,4,5,6,7, is reported by a reliable POW to have left YOKOSUKA two days later. The Commander of the Sixth Fleet remained behind at Kure.

Apparently most of the submarines arrived in the Pearl Harbor area a day or two before the attack. The log of the I-1 reports that on December 5th (all dates Honolulu time) it was 600 miles from Pearl Harbor. According to POW's from the I-17, this sub arrived off OAHU on the 6th.

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Before the attack started, the submarines took up scouting positions. The area around Pearl Harbor had been divided into various sectors. Thus, the I-(1)69 cruiser submerged, engaged in surveillance in Scouting Sector B, about 17 miles Southwest of Pearl Harbor, according to the captured report of its skipper. The I-17, according to POW's, took up a scouting position 10 North of Honolulu. There was also an Inner Scouting Area: a circle with a radius of 8.5 nautical miles, with Pearl Harbor as the center.

One of the features of the submarine attack plan was to send at least two midgets into the harbor prior to the air attack in order to check on the ships present and their position. One midget was detected by the USCGC CONDOR at 0350, four hours before the full aerial attack, as it was trailing the USS ANTARES, apparently hoping to slip through the net defenses following the ANTARES. This particular midget was apparently sunk by the USS WARD in 1200 feet of water. Another midget was sunk in the harbor, probably having slipped in through the net-gate which had been opened at 0458 to permit the passage of two minesweepers and not closed until 0840, three-quarters of an hour after the aerial attack. A navigation chart was recovered from a third midget which beached itself and the navigation track which was charted would have taken it all around Ford Island in Pearl Harbor. (See attached chart) The original chart was evidently a U.S. Navy H.O. chart, with detailed navigational data carefully translated into Japanese. Rough notes were scribbled on the chart. On the reverse side were further notes on navigation, etc. The sub carried a simple code which would have enabled it to transmit its information to the main force awaiting outside.

The Attack: Prior to the full aerial attack which was launched about 0800, the main function of the submarines, both full-size and midget, was reconnaissance and surveillance. After the opening of the attack the full-size submarines were supposed to exploit the situation by torpedoing the ships which were trying to escape the confinement of the Harbor while the

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midgets were supposed to slip into the harbor during the confusion and contribute to the destruction caused by the carrier-borne aerial bombardment. Simultaneously they were supposed to report the damage inflicted by all Japanese efforts back to the Commander of the Striking Force. This information was gained not only by periscope observation, but also by the aerial reconnaissance of the observation planes carried by eleven of the participating submarines. One of the factors restricting the use of this type of observation was the heavy weather which made launching difficult.

Apparently all five of the midget subs launched were lost without causing any direct damage. The Japanese admitted the loss of five midgets and only five midget-bearing submarines (I-16,18,20,22,24) are known to have participated. There is no known damage by midget submarines and at least three are known to have been sunk before they could do any damage. In addition to the one sunk trying to follow the ANTARES into the Harbor, before the full attack, two were sunk in the harbor. One damaged itself on a reef to the right of the entrance channel, and north of Buoy #1. It was spotted there at 0417 by the USS HELM which opened fire. While being fired upon it slipped off the ledge and submerged. It was apparently this midget which beached itself at QUIN, because the apparatus of the latter had been put out of commission by reef damage.

The conning towers of two midget submarines were sighted in the North Channel, one by the CURTIS. This latter midget was sunk by the USS NEUMAN, the ready duty destroyer which rammed it and depth-charged it. The fifth midget was presumably sunk in one of several successful A/S attacks which were reported by the BLUE, the RANSBY and the BREKEK. These attacks presumably accounted for the I-170 (which Japanese documents show as being unreported after December 8th) as well as the fifth midget.

Post-Attack Phase: It is clear that one of the principal functions of the submarine attack force was that of remaining in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor to pick off any damaged ships which might try to limp back to the mainland, or any other ships which might bring reinforcements to Pearl Harbor.

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We know that the I-1, which arrived on the eve of the attack did not leave the vicinity of Pearl Harbor until January 9th.

One of the most difficult situations experienced by the Japanese subs was that of the I-(1)69. At 1830 on December 7th it was ordered by the Commander of the Japanese Submarine Forces to shift from Scouting Sector D, about 17 miles Southwest of Pearl Harbor, to surveillance in the central sector of E Inner Scouting Area, a circle with a radius of 8.5 nautical miles with Pearl Harbor as the center. On the way it was forced down before it could complete recharging its batteries and subsequently was caught in an anti-sub net 4.2 miles, 130° off Barber's Point. It was kept down on the bottom below its maximum safe diving depth for 38 hours, but escaped with minor damage.

After December 7th, submarine activity, at least on the part of those submarines which took part in the original attack, tapered off. About December 14th the I-17 left for the Oregon coast. On December 20th the I-174 left the Oahu area for Kwajalein. The I-1 which remained until January 9th, had an eventful cruise, but little success. On December 10th it sighted a CV but couldn't attack. On December 13th it sighted an AO but was prevented from attacking by A/S activity. On 20th of December it sighted an AK but was unable to attack. On December 25th it was depth-charged without damage. On December 30th it shelled the harbor at Hilo. On January 1st it was sighted and attacked twice by U.S. planes without damage.

Results: In summing up the part played by Japanese submarines in the attack on Pearl Harbor it is important to note that the Japanese lost one full-size submarine (the I-(1)70) and five midgets, while American forces suffered no known damage from submarines. Balanced against this is the fact that the submarines served an important scouting function and tied up American naval units.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #4
(A NAVY STUDY RE ENEMY SUBMARINES)

ENTITLED

"TIME TABLE OF JAPANESE SUBMARINES OPERATIONS"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE

"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

SECRET

Japanese
TIMETABLE OF SUBMARINE
OPERATIONS

18 Nov. '41 Submarines scheduled to leave Western part of Inland Sea for attack on Pearl acc. to Combined Fleet Secret OpOrd #1.

20 Nov. The I-1, I-2, I-3, I-4, I-5, I-6, I-7 left Yokosuka for Pearl.

25 Nov. Com. 6th Fleet was on Hashira Shima. (KURE)

5 Dec. OHATA, PO, says I-174 arrived off OAHU at this time with 15 or 16 others.

5 Dec. I-1 was 600 miles from Pearl.

6 Dec. I-17 arrived off OAHU, took scouting position 1° North of HONOLULU.

7 Dec. I-(1)69, Flag of Subdiv 12, took up surveillance position 17 miles SW of Pearl, before attack started.

7 Dec. 0350 USCG CONDOR sighted the periscope of submerged sub when conducting sweeping operations approx 1-3/4 miles SW of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoy.

0357 CONDOR informed the USS WARD by visual signal. WARD, which was patrolling off Pearl Harbor instituted search.

0458 Net opened to permit the passage of two minesweepers. Not closed until 0840.

0633 Navy patrol plane dropped two smoke pots near midget following ANTARES.

0637 WARD sighted the periscope of unidentified sub apparently trailing the USS ANTARES then enroute to Pearl Harbor.

0640 WARD commenced attack, which is believed to have been successful.

0645 WARD reported to Commandant 14th Naval District, first time this had been reported.

0732 Patrol plane sank a hostile sub south of the entrance buoy, according to telephone call of Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO at 0740. This was later revealed to have been in cooperation with DD. Presumably this is the same action in which the WARD participated.

0751 The ready duty Destroyer, USS MONOCHAN, received orders to "proceed immediately and contact the WARD in defensive sea area" and also apparently to close the netgate. See above.

0755 Navy Yard Signal Tower telephoned Cincpac: "Enemy air raid---not drill." Almost simultaneously Japanese torpedo planes attacked the battleships.

0817 The USS HELM spotted the conning tower of a submarine to the right of the entrance channel and northward of Buoy #1. Though immediately submerging, fire was opened when the submarine again surfaced temporarily, no hits were observed.

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This sub appeared to be touching bottom on ledge of reef and in line of breakers. While still being fired at, it slipped off ledge and submerged. ~~Submerged~~

- 0830 The USS MONOGHAN, ready duty destroyer, which had been ordered to sea at 0751 but had been temporarily delayed by the initiation of the enemy action, got under way.
- 0836 The conning towers of two midget subs sighted in North Channel; one by CURTIS (AV4).
- 0837 The MONOGHAN, having observed an enemy submarine under fire of both the CURTIS and the TANGIER, proceeded at flank speed and at about 0843 rammed; thereafter dropped two depth charges. The fire of the CURTIS resulted in two direct hits on the conning tower. This submarine (midget) was later salvaged for inspection. Before the MONOGHAN dispatched it one midget fired a torp which was apparently aimed at the USS RALEIGH but passed under the bow of the DALE and exploded on Ford Island.
- 0840 Net closed. Had been opened at 0458 to permit passage of two minesweepers.
- 0915 USS BLUE dropped four and two DCs in two successive attacks on sound contact approximately four miles bearing 190° from DIAMOND Head Light.
- 0950 USS BLUE dropped 6 DCs on good sound contact; resulted in large oil slick and air bubbles over a length of 200 feet. 20° 11' 30" N 157° 49' 45" W.
- 1020 Two DCs dropped on sound contact by USS BLUE 6 miles, 200° from Diamond Head light.
- 1108 ZTB reported a periscope to USS BREEZE, patrolling off Pearl Harbor.
- 1115 BREEZE dropped two DCs with no results: bearing Barber Point 297° T, Diamond Head 078 T, Hickham Tower 357° T.
- 1135 BREEZE picked up sound of submarine in same vicinity (see 1115); dropped DCs, which brought up oil and debris. A second attack a few minutes later with four deeper DCs brought no tangible results.
- 1204 GAMBLE on sound attack dropped 3 DCs 168 T from Diamond Head, 2.5 miles.
- 1830 Commander of the Japanese Submarine Forces ordered I-(1)69 shift from Scouting Sector D, about 17 miles SW of PEARL HARBOR to surveillance in the central sector of E Inner Scouting Area (a circle with a radius of 8.5 nautical miles with Pearl Harbor as the center.)
- 2000 ~~1830~~ I-(1)69 reports sighting five DDs "during night". Received close-range DC attack from them apparently no damage.
- 8 Dec. 0145 (HONOLULU LOCAL) I-(1)69 surfaced, on course of 300° for Barber's Point, hurriedly charged batteries, while at battle speed. Sighted 2 patrol vessels, about 3 miles away.

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0536 I-(1)69 is forced down by the DD; before it had completely recharged; DD attacked it with DCs without result.

0910 I-(1)69 Caught in anti-sub net. 4.2 miles off Barber's Point, at 130°

1205? A few minutes after noon RAMSEY DCed submarine on excellent sound contact 11 miles due west of Barber's Point, bringing up positive oil bubbles.

1225? Ramsey heard sub again and DCed, deepest about 250 ft. getting positive oil indications.

9 Dec. 1950 I-(1)69 surfaced after 38 hours submerged.

10 Dec. *94 sub* I-1 sighted ^(us) CV but couldn't attack.

13 Dec. I-1 sighted ^(us) AO but was counter-attacked and couldn't attack. About this time I-17, which had held scouting position 1° North of Oahu, left for the OREGON coast.

19 Dec. *94 sub* I-(1)74 left OAHU area for KWAJALEIN, acc. to POW PO OHATA.

20 Dec. ^(us) I-1 sighted AK but couldn't attack.

25 Dec. I-1 DCed without damage.

27 Dec. I-1 Departed Pearl Area for HILO.

30 Dec. I-1 attacked HILO harbor, shelling prob. DD.

31 Dec. *94 sub* I-3 reached deployment line; received report of ^(us) CV and left line to shadow.

1 Jan. I-1 sighted by US PLANES, attacked twice; no damage.

2 Jan. I-3 returned to deployment line.

4 Jan. I-1 proceeded to East of Oahu and resumed patrol.

6 Jan. I-1 made unsuccessful attack on US DD.
I-3 sighted and attacked group of ^(us) AKs, unknown result.

9 Jan. I-1 headed for KWAJALEIN. ^(us)
94 sub I-18 rushed to attack on hearing report of CV but no result.

11 Jan. *94 sub* I-6 attacked ^(us) CV Lexington Class; claimed sinking.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #5

(TRANSLATION OF CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENTS)

ENTITLED

"JAPANESE SUBMARINE SCHOOL NOTES

CONCERNING

EARLY WAR EXPERIENCES OFF HAWAII"

USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE

"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"

(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8

IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION

OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

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CAPTURED DOCUMENTS - TRANSLATED BY ICPOA

Original Item # _____ ICPOA Item # 472 Translated by ICPOA Date 10 June 1943

Title of Publication SUBMARINE SCHOOL NOTES CONCERNING EARLY WAREXPERIENCE OFF HAWAII

IN CASE OF DIARY, RECORD, LOG, etc., GIVE WRITER'S

Organization _____

Initial Date _____

Final Date _____

June 12, 1941Instructor Maashima

It is needless to state that combat education in this current emergency is of great necessity, and it is extremely regrettable that there has been no opportunity to gather sufficient material before the graduation of the 11th. period special course students. Since, however, some materials in the category of combat instructions has been obtained with the arrival in port of submarines I-16 and I-58 recently, it has been decided to immediately mimeograph and distribute it as study material to this period's special course students. Although it is difficult to guarantee that among the items heard directly there are no points of difference with actual facts, it is believed that there are no great errors in the instructions obtained.

(1)

R. J. LAMON

1. Use of submarine escape planes.

A. After the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, the submarine I-7 received an order to carry out an aerial reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor when the opportunity presented. Although she attempted to send off a plane from the neighborhood of Midway, it was impossible to do so due to the weather. Hence she proceeded southward until in the neighborhood of Hawaii and carried out the aerial reconnaissance.

B. As on picket stations, it may be possible, depending on the weather, the ship's alert condition, terrain and other conditions, to send off the plane carried from a certain area, but it may be impossible to do so from another area. Consequently, besides the necessity of deploying airplanes carrying submarines, there is also the necessity of deploying many airplanes carrying submarines.

Since urgent execution of the above mentioned reconnaissance was not necessary, we suffered no great disadvantage, but it would be of great disadvantage, when urgency of execution is required.

2. Movement against enemy depth charges.

A. Since America's depth charge setting, for the most part, has been definitely ascertained to be in the neighborhood of 35 meters by previous investigations, submarines attached to the Sixth Fleet have evaded them at depths of 50 to 70 meters. (Some subs have evaded them at a depth of 100 meters). In the case of the I-15, (70 meters depth), she received three charges directly over her, but suffered no damage. (Judging from the opinion that the bursting charge of America's depth charges appeared to be feeble, it is doubtful as to whether the charges were directly overhead.)

B. When the safe submerging depth is thought to be about 20 meters more than the supposed depth setting of depth charges, it is deemed best to assume as far as possible a position of 20 meters or more below the depth charge's depth setting.

If not, it is deemed best to assume a position up high, but impossible to be detected, and as far above as possible from the supposed depth setting of the depth charge.

(A) The I-58 primarily used sound listening patrol /

(3) CONFIDENTIAL

to prevent any decrease in the efficiency of the listening gear, the following method was used and no unnecessary was felt because of the sound listening patrol.

3. Observation patrol.

A. (1) Slowest speed used.

(2) Ventilation stopped.

(3) In steering, mechanical power was used only for the diving rudder, while the rest was all man power.

(4) Although it was stipulated in the operational order that batteries should be charged at night at the outer edge of the patrol zone (about 10 nautical miles from harbor entrance), it was impossible to do so.

Hence, batteries were charged at a distance of 40 nautical miles from the harbor entrance and after that we returned to the patrol zone.

B. At night, when picketing by enemy patrol vessels is to be expected, it is deemed best to increase the depth of the patrol zone.

4. Patrol method of American destroyers.

A. It seems as if American destroyers are equipped with accurate and good sound detectors and they, for the most part, are executing stationary or slow speed patrol.

B. Even when an American destroyer is stationary, be on guard.

NO. 2. COMBAT DUTY

1. Identification method of friendly units when returning to friendly harbor.

A. The method carried out by I-16 is as follows:

(1) Hoisted a "Breadth Four" Ensign at the tip of the periscope.

(2) Spread a "Breadth Four" Ensign on the ladder to the bridge.

(3) Notified the time of its arrival within the 300 nautical mile arc, its position and course one or two days previously to the home combat force 内戦部隊

When returning to an advanced base, I-16 took the system of having the commandant of the advanced base force indicate the point of passage into the 300 nautical mile arc.

B. There is an example of submarine I-63 being attacked with depth charges by a friendly destroyer when leaving an advanced base. Closest attention should be paid to the identification of friendly units when entering and leaving a friendly harbor and to being alert.

1. Onshore Current.

A. The onshore current in the area of Barber's Point, Oahu, is very strong. Since submarine I-68 paid little attention to this, she sighted the breakers of Barber's Point reef at a very close distance when she raised her periscope up to observe, but she was able to prevent anything from happening by turning immediately.

B. When stationed on observation on the front line, it is necessary to take into proper consideration the onshore current when close to the shore.

2. Submerged Navigation.

1. Protected submerged navigation.

A. (1) In regard to submarine I-68, the number of days of submerged navigation was 30 for an average of 14 hours per day. Air purifier chemicals were used only once (20 pieces) and the cooler was not used.

(2) Although CO_2 reached 4.6%, O_2 reached 15% and the temperature reached $22^{\circ}C$, there seemed to be no great effect upon the men.

(3) Other than being used once when her submerged navigation continued for 36 hours, submarine I-16 did not use the air purifier. Just as in the above case, there seemed to be practically no effect upon the men.

B. (1) Although there is need for the use of air purifiers in a submerged navigation of about 14 hours, there is still a necessity for the gathering of more data for further study.

(2) It is necessary to accelerate the completion of the study "Washing purifier [洗淨式] type air purifying method."

2. Area in the Hawaiian Area.

A. During the operations of submarines of the Sixth Fleet in the Hawaiian area, waves were high every day and it has been reported that submarine I-16 found it difficult to maintain her depth even at the depth of about 18 meters and had to use her standard speed many times.

Besides, there appeared to be two or three submarines that revealed their coming tower in the presence of the enemy.

B. It is necessary to maintain the accuracy of the sound detector excellently in order to do away with any uneasiness in sound detection patrol.

Also, considering this, the periscope should be made as long as possible.

(5)

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NO. 5. COMMUNICATION

1. Underwater wireless reception ability.

A. According to the experiences of the I-16, it is reported that sensitivity is 4 at a depth of 18 meters and 3 at 20 meters in the Hawaiian area.

(Sending station UGHH)

NO. 6. (IS MISSING)NO. 7. HULL

1. Change in working of the machine guns during operations.

A. When I-16 test fired her machine guns without taking the trouble of cleaning, after conducting operations for 30 days, of which 20 days were spent in submerged navigation, one machine gun fired without any trouble, while the other fired only one shot.

2. Damages caused by depth charge attack.

A. While observing in Hawaiian area, submarine I-68 was depth charged. Of about 100 depth charges dropped, 12 exploded within 200 meters and 2 exploded directly above. The depth charge setting was within 35 meters and the sub's depth 45 meters. The damage suffered from this attack, for the most part was as follows:

- (1) Of the 172 electric lights, 75 were damaged. (Those that were not lighted were not damaged).
 - (2) Small amount of leakage from the forward door(s) of the torpedo tube(s).
 - (3) Two depth indicators began to function incorrectly.
 - (4) Sensitivity of sound detector became bad.
 - (5) Became impossible to use the transmitter of the echo range depth finder.
 - (6) Leakage in the high pressure air valve group and air pressure within ship increased greatly.
 - (7) Leakage in the Kingston valve of the negative buoyancy tank increased.
 - (8) Due to the damage to the 50 volt power supply, the rudder order telegraph went out. Because of this, the helmsman mistakenly thought that the rudder had been damaged.
 - (9) The accuracy of the (---?---) ammeter decreased.
 - (10) Leakage from the corroded tube(s) of number 1 cooler.
 - (11) Considerable leakage from the "constant use" and reserve fuel tanks.
- B. (1) Disassemble the damaged depth indicator and remove the sea water between the #1 and #2 beaks [unclear] [unclear]
- (2) To have turned off as many electric lights as possible.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #6

(TRANSLATION OF CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENT)

ENTITLED

"PATROL OPERATIONS OF JAPANESE SUBMARINE I-69 OFF PEARL HARBOR"

USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE

"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"

(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8

IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION

OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

"PATROL OPERATIONS OF JAPANESE SUBMARINE I-69 OFF PEARL HARBOR"

M. M. L. 98-100

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
NAVY DEPARTMENT

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial #47-43 Monograph Index Guide No. 907-4400
(Start new series each year, i. e. 1-40, 5-40)
(To correspond with SUBJECT guide-index. See O. M. L. Index Guide. Make separate report for each main title.)

From Op-16-FE, ONI at Washington, D. C. Date April 22, 1943

Reference Op-16-FE Serial #41-43 of April 14, 1943.
(Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc., if applicable)

Source Evaluation
(As official, personal observation, publication, press, conversation with— (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)
Identify when practicable, etc.)

Subject Japan Navy Submarines
(Nation reported on) (Main title as per index guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)

BRIEF.—(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

CORRECTION

The reference report, a translation of a captured document written by the Commander of Submarine Division No. 12 dealing with patrol operations of the Japanese submarine I-69 off Pearl Harbor, erroneously gives the date of these operations as December 8-10, 1942. This error occurs in the fourth line of the cover sheet, in the heading of the first page of the report, and in the fourth line of page 1. The date in all cases mentioned should read, "December 8-10, 1941".

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Distribution By Originator

Routing areas below for use in O. M. L.

Op-16	Gen'l Board	Op-10/11	List II, less q
Op-16-1	War College	Op-12	List III, ff only
Op-16-1-F	US (5)	Op-20 (5)	Aust. Joint Staff
Archives	BuOrd (3)	NA Chungking	(2)
Monograph	BuShips (3)	Com 11 (5)	N. Z. Joint Staff
Op-16-Fa-1 (E)	USMC	Naval Aide	(2)
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N. H. 1. 10-28

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NAVY DEPARTMENT

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

907-4400

Serial 411-43 Monograph Index Guide No. _____
(Short title and page, i. e. 1-25, 1-25)
(To correspond with SUBJECT given below. See G. M. I. Index Guide.)
From Op-16-FE, ONI Washington, D.C. Date April 14, 1944
(Title, first, last, middle, office, station, or position)
Reference _____
(Dispositive, correspondence, previous related report, etc., if applicable)
Source Captured Japanese Document Evaluation RELIABLE
(As official, personal observation, publication, press, conversation with _____)
(Identify when practicable, etc.) Navy Submarines
(As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)
Subject Japan
(Outline reported on) (Main title as per Index Guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)
NOTE—(Give clear, concise summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

The attached report is an abridged translation of a Japanese
captured document written by the Commander of Submarine Division
No. 12 dealing with patrol operations of the I-69 off Pearl Harbor,
December 8-10, 1944, during which time the I-69 was believed to
have been caught in an underwater obstruction.

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Security group label for use in G. M. I.

Op-16	Gen'l Board	Op-10/11	List II, less q
Op-16-1	War College	Op-12	List III, ff only
Op-16-1-F	MIS (5)	Op-20 (5)	Asst. Staff Mission (1)
Archives	BuOrd (3)	NA Chungking	Asst. Staff Mission (1)
Monograph	BuShips (3)	Cem 11 (5)	Asst. Staff Mission (1)
Op-16-FA-1 (8)	USMC	Naval Aide	Asst. Staff Mission (1)
Op-16-P-1	Comineh (10)	USJIC	Asst. Staff Mission (1)
Op-16-P-2	CineLant (9)	List I	Asst. Staff Mission (1)

h. J. Joint Staff (2)
h. J. Joint Staff (1)

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Report of I-69's Operations off Pearl Harbor, Dec. 8-10, 1941

The Japanese submarine I-69, (Flagship of Submarine Division 12), attached to the 3rd Submarine Squadron of the Submarine Force, was caught in an underwater obstruction while conducting surveillance of Pearl Harbor on December 9, 1941 but finally freeing herself, was able to carry on with her specified task.

The following is an abridged translation of the report of the event, submitted with various pertinent conclusions by the Commander of Submarine Division 12, and officially distributed (Japanese 6th Fleet Secret Letter #2, Part 5, Jan. 10, 1942) as reference material of value for training. (Dates are in accordance with Japanese time).

I. Circumstances Before the Event.

During daylight on December 8, the I-69 was cruising submerged, engaged in surveillance in Scouting Sector D (about 17 miles southwest of Pearl Harbor). Immediately after the attack upon the enemy by the Striking Force and the Special Attack Force, we were able to hear easily, by means of submarine sound detectors, explosions of bombs and torpedoes, and upon hearing the sound of depth charges, I judged that the Special Attack Force was engaged in heavy fighting.

At 1400 radio orders from the Commander of Submarine Forces were received, assigning the I-69 to surveillance in the central sector of E Inner Scouting Area (a circle with a radius of 8.6 nautical miles, with Pearl Harbor as the center). The orders further specified the annihilation of the remaining enemy forces.

After sunset we surfaced, in an attempt to assist as much as possible, but during the night we sighted five destroyers. While submerging, we received a close-range depth-charge attack. After that we heard enemy patrol boats continually, and could not surface. I judged that those patrol boats were disposed in all directions at intervals of 3 nautical miles. Just at this time, the waves were from 4 to 5 (sic), and . . . in proceeding awash there was difficulty in maintaining depth control without using standard speed, and battery discharge was comparatively high.

I felt keenly the need of recharging the batteries that night, judging that demands on battery power the next day would be great, and recharging difficult, because of the presence of enemy patrol boats. So, although it involved arriving at the designated patrol area somewhat behind schedule, I set course (300°) for the area southeast of Barker's Point, where I thought the enemy patrol might be comparatively lax. At 0015 on the 9th, we surfaced, making certain that no enemy patrol boats were within close range. On a course obliquely to the west, and at battle speed, we hurriedly recharged batteries.

We sighted 2 patrol vessels on our port quarter and port beam respectively, each about 5 kilometers away, and in about 30 minutes we reversed course. Pearl Harbor shone red in the sky, like a thing afire. It was already dawn, and although we operated with the land as a background, an enemy patrol vessel discovered us and fired what looked like a green Vory flare. The time was 0106 and our recharging was not yet finished (73% of used power had been replenished). In that condition we immediately submerged, and although we were depth-charged by the destroyer, the distance was great.

II. Circumstances of Running Afloat of Underwater Obstacle and Measures Taken

At 0440 (December 9) we experienced a strange vibration of the ship, and the navigator ordered the engines stopped. At the time, our course was 80°, 4 motors were running together, and depth was 37 meters. I was in my cabin resting, and upon receiving the report went directly to the conning tower. Upon learning of conditions from the submarine's Commanding Officer, I decided that we had been caught in an anti-submarine net, and ordered the engines put into reverse in order to get clear. However, the needle of the speed-gauge did not move, as if the pit log tube were broken. It being difficult to determine our movement, I began to surface the ship, and increased the angle of trim.

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A slight tremor was felt in the ship, and I stopped headway. Again I backed at full speed, but the ship did not move. The ship's trim and depth were not normal. I ordered "Blow main tank", and "Regain negative buoyancy." During these operations we surfaced, or rose to a point at which we were awash, three times. According to the observations of the Commanding Officer of the Submarine, taken at the time of surfacing, within the limits of observation of the periscope (forward of the forward end of the gun platform) we were not caught in anything. Two enemy destroyers were about 5 kilometers dead ahead. As we had now reached a situation in which we could not continue either submerged or on the surface, I decided to lie submerged and to surface at sunset.

At 0454, I stopped the electric motors, but the ship began to sink. I ordered "Blow main tank". The reading of the depth-gauge in the tower reached the extreme limit (85 meters). (We actually reached 125 meters). Seeing this condition, I thought we must be free of the net, and ordered "Ahead standard" at a depth of 40 meters, but as before there shortly occurred a slight tremor, headway was slowed, and I ordered "Stop". Again we began to sink. I ordered "Blow the main tank", but before we regained buoyancy control, the ship slowed to a stop, almost level, at a depth of 87 meters. It was 0506 when I realized we were resting on the bottom. Our estimated position was 4.2 nautical miles off Barber's Point at 130°.

III. Situation and Measures Taken

After Reaching Bottom

Although the sea bottom was below safe submersible depth, (70 meters for the I-49), our resting on the bottom was an extremely good thing for us in our situation. As soon as we had bottomed we knew from sounds similar to those made by the destroyer we had previously sighted, that it was close by; and from other sounds we learned of the approach of other patrol vessels. The enemy would stop occasionally, and if we thought they were attempting sound-detection, we exercised rigid sound control. That is to say, the use of all pumps except the oil-pressure pump, and the movement of all rudders, electric fans, gyro-compass and ventilation blower were suspended. I decided to surface at sunset, but though many hours passed there were continual sounds of patrol vessels coming and going, and since our position six miles from the harbor entrance offered considerable chance of discovery and consequent battle to the death were I to surface at sundown, I decided to wait if possible till dusk of the following night, the 10th.

After bottoming, we recorded every hour the amount of bilge water, the inclination, the air pressure and the depth. The fact that the increase per hour of bilge water was about one and a fraction metric tons, and pressure in the air reservoir was 90 (kilos), convinced me that it would be possible to surface at dusk on the following day.

Anticipating that we would have to submerge after only a short time on the surface, I charged the air reservoir with high pressure air from our (6) reserve torpedoes, and was able to raise its pressure 25 kilograms. Although I thought it impossible to use the high-pressure air compressor, since, on account of our depth, we could not take in sea water for cooling, - the engineer suggested circulating the bilgewater as a cooling medium. After effecting sound control and recharging from the reserve torpedoes, I became concerned, as time passed, over the lowering of pressure in the air reservoir, and although I didn't use the high-pressure air compressor that day, I did use it on the 10th, raising the air reservoir pressure from 105 to 138 kilograms, and reducing the air-pressure inside the ship from 891 mm to 780 mm. The additional air thus obtained subsequently proved most efficacious.

Other measures consequent upon the length of time on the bottom were as follows:

A - Air purification:

To escape detection due to noise of ventilator motors, and to economize on electric power, we used air-purifying chemicals three times when we did not hear the enemy in the vicinity (the amount of air purifier used was 80 units) over a total period of about twelve hours; oxygen was released three times for a total of 45 minutes. At 0800 on the 10th there was a reading of 4.5% carbon dioxide, and just before surfacing we must have reached approximately 5.5%, and the crew had headaches. A state was reached where walking for even a slight distance, or any exertion, caused panting.

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B - Stopping of bilgewater accumulation:

We tightened propeller-shaft packing by stuffing with waste and completely closed all valves to the outside.

C - Meals:

To prevent rise of air temperature in the ship, and to economize on power, we used no heat for cooking, but ate biscuits, canned fruit, improvised rice cakes, etc.

D - Rest:

To check increase of carbon-dioxide, we had everyone not specially employed sleep as much as possible. In anticipation of a battle to the death, and to incite the desire for a hard fight, we served sake to all hands at supper on the 9th, the first time since leaving base.

E - Defecation:

In the absence of facilities for discharging excrement, we made use of empty oil cans.

IV. Situation and Measures Taken Prior to Surfacing

On the 10th we detected the presence of enemy patrol vessels, but not so frequently as on the previous day. Sunset on the 10th being at 1253 and moonrise at 1827, I decided to surface at 1500. My estimate of the situation was as follows:

A - It was possible that there might be no enemy patrol craft in the vicinity, since they knew that the I-69 was caught underwater; and in the event that we might be able to free the ship easily and escape to a place of comparative safety, I decided to withdraw from the area and ascertain by radio the current state of affairs, before continuing the task assigned.

B - In the event that freeing the ship might require some time, and that there might be considerable chance of discovery by the enemy, and a consequent battle to the death, I decided upon preparations to make utmost use of all weapons.

C - The possibilities were that we might be unable to move, that we might have to engage the enemy whether freed or not; that if freed, we might attempt to enter Pearl Harbor, or if unsuccessful in that, to block the channel.

The measures I took with the above estimate of the situation as my basis, were as follows:

A - Preparations for battle:

Made preparations for gun, machine-gun and torpedo action.
(Anticipating action against small ships, put 2-meter depth setting on torpedoes)

B - Not Cutting Detail:

Arranged a detail of 3 officers, 2 petty officers and 14 men to take charge of appropriate stations, tools, etc.

C - Preparations for Self-destruction:

Powder from 10 high-angle gun charges was collected and arranged in the magazine with 2 tins of kerosene. Self-destruction was to be carried out if the worst came to the worst, and would follow the broadcasting of the message: "We are unable to communicate".

D - Preparations for Destruction of Secret Books:

Operational orders and special instructions for use of Codebook A

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(trial notes: K8, in Japanese), together with other papers of a highly secret character were cut up, and destroyed by being churned and pulped in a rice-pot filled with sea water. Such things as secret charts and easily combustible documents were removed to the magazine for burning at the time of explosion. Things hard to burn, and which would have to be thrown into the sea were torn up and weighted, to avoid being picked up by the enemy. The time for throwing these away was to be specially designated before the explosion.

E - Disposal of Bilge Water:

Although we tried as much as possible to prevent accumulation of bilge water, the amount was very great in the motor room. Since a large change in trim was naturally to be expected at the time of surfacing, there was great concern lest the main electric motors be soaked with bilge water. Accordingly, the bilge water in the motor room was pumped into the after torpedo tube compartment, so that, even though the after torpedo tube compartment was flooded with bilge water above the deck plating before surfacing, the main electric engines would be perfectly safe at the time of surfacing and during subsequent dive, in spite of a great inclination. We estimated that, before surfacing, the amount of foul water in the ship totaled 50 metric tons, so prepared to pump it overboard immediately upon surfacing.

V. Circumstances and MeasuresTaken at time of Surfacing

Upon completion of all pre-surfacing preparations, I assembled all warrant and higher officers, prayed for a good battle, and drank toasts with beer. We then went directly to our stations. The man in charge of listening gear reported all quiet in the vicinity. At 1457 we blew main tanks. Although the pressure in the air reservoir dropped from 138 to 85 metric tons (sic) the ship did not seem to be rising. The Senior Officer said, "We don't float". I then ordered "Cut in motors", "Port and starboard motors ahead standard", and immediately we saw that we were free of the bottom. However, the change of trim gradually increased, and although we stopped blowing the forward main tank, this inclination did not change. We then opened vents in the forward main tank, and gradually prevented further change in trim, with a maximum inclination of 25°. At 1520 we surfaced. Our period of submersion had been 38 hours.

As soon as the surfacing preparations had been completed, the net-cutting workers had been assembled, and I had instructed them not to be concerned with enemy fire, but rather to concentrate with calm certainty on cutting the net. As soon as we surfaced, the working party went directly out on deck. The lookout reported no enemy in the vicinity, and immediately the net-cutters reported no entanglement above the water line. Because the pit log tube had been damaged the previous day, it was pushed out through the bottom of the ship.

At this point, although I ordered stand-by on main engine, the oil in the engine room sump tank overflowed, as a result of the previous inclination, and for a short time it was impossible to use the engines. Both motors were ordered ahead standard, but the starboard motor didn't work. I wondered whether or not the starboard propeller were fouled in some obstruction, but when I saw the ship move forward I realized this was not so, and was greatly relieved, inasmuch as we could make out the light of an enemy attempting to challenge us. Our course was 270°. Drawing near to the coast (to starboard), I headed for other areas.

VI. Circumstances and Measures Taken After Surfacing

As the port engine had been made ready, I ordered port engine cut in, ahead standard, at 1519½. At 1533 we sighted an enemy destroyer on opposite course about 3 kilometers away at 30° to port, and quickly submerged. Immediately after surfacing we had started pumping bilge water and replenishing air, but about 25 metric tons of bilge water still remained. After diving, trim was unsteady, varying from a maximum of 55 degrees (sic) down by the head to a maximum of 35 degrees (sic) down by the stern. We reached a maximum depth of 75 meters. The pressure in the air reservoir fell to 35 kilograms and I realized it would be impossible to continue submerged. I ordered the ship to surface and fight it out, but after surfacing we did not sight the destroyer. The time was 1600.

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Again neither engine would run, because of the overflow of oil in the engine room sump tank. I ordered both motors ahead, and thenceforth proceeded on the basis that if we met the enemy we would fight a surface battle. Our course was generally northwest, with the coast for a background. At 1630, both engines were in shape, and were cut in. We went to ahead standard, ahead full, and finally flank speed. We were able to withdraw from the area without meeting any enemy.

On account of the inclination during the dive mentioned above, the inside of the ship was extremely dirty from bilge water, oil and excrement. In the after torpedo compartment, the torpedo tubes were inundated at time of submersion, then when we tilted back the forward bulkhead was covered with dirty water. Also, the battery fluid from the main storage battery had leaked out, producing a foul odor. Many hours were required for emergency repair measures. When our communications apparatus had been repaired, I radioed a report of our condition.

VII. Damage

Damage was chiefly to electrical equipment, from bilge water; and to outside optical and listening gear, from long submersion at great depth. We were not prevented from continuing our patrol, and were able to carry on our assigned task.

VIII. Views

A. I am profoundly convinced that the I-69's escape from danger was entirely due to Divine Providence, in that:

1) The depth at which we bottomed was such that a ship could remain there for a long time. Just before bottoming we had sunk to 125 meters, and although it might be only by chance that we touched bottom at an 87 meter spot, it is certainly unthinkable that we could have stayed submerged for so long a period at a greater depth.

2) There was no enemy nearby at the time of surfacing, and that we were already free of the underwater obstacle. Had we needed a long time to cut ourselves free, and had there been a very strict enemy patrol in the vicinity, we should certainly have been discovered and ended up with a fight to the death.

3) At the time we sighted the enemy destroyer at 1633, and submerged, we were not sighted by the enemy. We were unable to rig for noiseless running, and were in poor condition for submerged operation; in addition, our bow broke water.

B. More research into and improvement of stoppage of oil-leakage in submarines are needed. We know, from sound detection, that several enemy patrol vessels were directly above us. That we escaped being depth-charged is due entirely to prevention of oil-leakage.

C. Research and improvement in the field of noiseless running are needed. Although we were not depth-charged when bottomed, that was because of an entire absence of sound on our part. At many other times when we were running quiet we were depth-charged. This indicates both that the enemy's sound-detection is superior to ours, and that our being detected was because of the noise of our equipment.

D. The depth at which the overboard discharge pumps (main and auxiliary) and the electric power pump in the head can be used is too limited; it needs to be increased by about 60 meters.

E. There is immediate need of automatic depth-control gear. When entangled and unable to move, it is necessary, in order to remain below surface, to use discharge pumps a good part of the time. The sound of these pumps might easily lead to detection and attack by the enemy.

Furthermore, night-time charging of batteries is extremely difficult in patrol areas. At the outset we were barely able to do 73% of our recharging. I consider the installation of automatic depth-control gear in

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submarines assigned to reconnaissance of enemy harbors in immediate and urgent necessity.

F. Submarines should be equipped with 4 pairs of net-cutting shears of proper design. The army wire-cutters lent to this ship by the Kure Military Supply Department would be practically useless in net-cutting.

G. There should be a supply of explosives for self-destruction. When we reached our crisis, I ordered preparations for blowing up the ship, but when I saw the crew panting in the foul air of the ship, and realized they would have to suffer further while waiting for the flames from the ignition-charge to explode the magazine, I felt that it was an unbearable situation.

H. Morale was excellent.

I. We threw overboard large quantities of waste, sandals, oil, etc., upon surfacing. I am not sure whether the enemy, seeing all this in the daytime, were made to accept it as proof of our sinking. I believe there will be many cases in which there will be difficulty in determining the effects of depth-charges or attacks after a submarine is caught in a net.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #7
(TRANSLATION OF A CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENT
TELLING THE EXPERIENCES OF A JAPANESE IN THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)
ENTITLED
"THE SOUTHERN CROSS BY KURAMOTI, Iki"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

Op-16-FE
Translation No. 290
25 July 1945

b7c

An account written in flowery language of the experiences of KIRAHOTI, Iki in the attack on Pearl Harbor and in various other operations in the South Seas in 1942. The author has not been identified but was probably an enlisted man. Interspersed in the account will be found information of military interest from an historical point of view.

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INTRODUCTION

When, in after years, one looks back on the events of the past, the recollection brings with it a mood of deep and poetic emotion. Even the most unhappy events of former years are touched with beauty by the light of the past, and their unpleasantness forgotten like a dream.

Just as the sun, sinking into the sea, paints the twilight sky with rosy clouds and impresses the eye of the beholder with its beauty as its majestic form sinks moment by moment below the horizon, so the mind of man, loving the beautiful and hating the ugly, instinctively transmutates everything into beauty.

When I look at the moon, I recall an evening in my native village when I watched it together with a tender companion, in an ecstasy of love.

When I look at the clouds, I think of a day in my childhood when, scolded by my mother, I flung myself down forlornly on the bank of a pool and watched the clouds drifting away into the distant sky, until finally my grief subsided to a vague sadness and in the twilight my mother led me home.

When I look at the stars, I remember fondly a night when, out of work and wandering aimlessly, I saw through my tears the weeping Pleiades twinkling in an alien sky.

With the passage of time, all these memories of the past become ever dearer to my heart.

Now, in the midst of this great world conflict of the Twentieth Century, I have taken up arms in the service of my beloved homeland, and have made the daring voyage to the South Seas, where shines the Southern Cross. My heart is joyful. I shall set down here for future years a record of these unforgettable days, so that their recollection may bring me a lifetime of delight.

The Southern Cross!

Whether or not that name is a fitting title for this work, I do not know; but during my voyage to the South Seas that constellation impressed itself, I know not why, unforgettably upon my mind, and its name is indelibly written in my heart. Battles have followed battles, and I believe their dazzling number will remain recorded for posterity in this book, The Southern Cross.

KURANOTO, Ichi⁽¹⁾⁽¹⁾ 倉元生

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

The Great East Asia War! Accursed conflict of nations!

The peoples of this world, seeking to enlarge their countries to gratify their boundless ambition, have rushed like a raging wave into a great war such as has never before been seen in the history of the world,

Epoch-making conflict of nations!

O tragic sight!

The weak become the victims of the strong. Those who have strength are victorious; those who have not strength are defeated. The victors use the natural resources and extensive territories taken from the enemy for the benefit of their own country; and, at the same time, expand their military preparations more and more in order to prevent the rise of enemy nations from ever again gaining a foothold. Like a great tree putting down roots deeply into the ground, they try to build a firm and enduring Paradise on earth.

The vanquished are driven from their country, and as an exiled race, gathered together into forlorn companies of the living dead, drift about aimlessly on a journey without end.

As long as there exist great numbers of people leading a crowded life on the limited surface of the earth, will not their innate passions of self-interest and ambition lead them to seek the means of living a more secure existence, and thus embroil them inevitably in war after war? A study of the past history of the world will immediately make this problem clear.

However, the wars of the past have been conflicts between two nations or at most a few nations only, in which only a part of the world has stood divided. I believe it is no exaggeration to say that they are mere trifling altercations in comparison to the Great East Asia War, which may be truly called a world revolution.

Now that we have been swept into this world conflagration, I shall attempt to set down in this book a record of my part in the Great East Asia War, and the impressions I have received from the many battles in which I have taken part. But first I must express my earnest hope that, by means of the supreme love for humanity which I take as my slogan, this horrible war may soon be ended in mutual understanding among nations, and that the peaceful days of before the war may again return to the earth.

When I write thus solemnly, those who may read this book in later days may think that I am glorifying the second coming of Christ, or such a great love as described in the poems of Goethe. However, as already stated in the beginning of this book, I am an ordinary mortal born in this twentieth century, and a soldier who has taken part in this tragic upheaval out of a fervent love for the land of his ancestors.

Ah! when one thinks of it, this is a century of endless change; he who in the morning is drunk with dreams of glory may, by evening, know the bitterness of affliction. The world is on the brink of a great transformation.

While generally praising the holiness of love and mourning the tumult of the world, I must yet take up arms for the land of my ancestors and fight to the last drop of my blood. Therein lies the bitterness of life.

What a contradiction!

Below I shall attempt to set down, just as I recollect at random, a record of my participation in the war.

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HAWAII Operation (8 December)

At the time of year when green leaves turn suddenly to red in the cool winds of approaching autumn, and one begins to feel the piercing breath of the North Wind - that is to say, on 18 November 1941 - we left Kure harbor and sailed for the distant northern seas. The purpose of this operation was unknown to us.

We had taken on board warm clothing, materials for protecting the guns against the cold, and a great quantity of sea nets, but we understood nothing of this.

Day after day and night after night the ships carried out target practice.

In the newspapers that we had on board it was said that we were to attack DUTCH HARBOR, but we did not believe it.

Why did we not believe it? Consider the moderate course of Japanese diplomacy up to that time. It seemed unlikely that Japan meant at this time to lift up her hand against Britain and America. Indeed, was there not at that moment a conference in progress at Washington between America and Japan?

Our hopes were betrayed. We learned this when we went into port to refuel. Then we learnt for the first time how grave the situation was. Within the bay in that island of the bitterly cold North Pacific the air fleet was gathered. The crews, who every day were busy at conferences and discussions, were in an excited state of mind.

Finally the Navigation Officer, Lieut. Comdr. YAMOTO, told us we were to make a surprise attack on HAWAII. At last Japan would be at war with Britain and the U.S.A.!

An air attack on HAWAII! A dream come true. What will the people at home think when they hear the news? Won't they be excited! I can see them clapping their hands and shouting with joy. These were our feelings. We would teach the arrogant Anglo-Saxon scoundrels a lesson!

We must be inflexible in our course....We could not expect to return alive....Thinking that, for all we knew, we might now be eating and drinking for the last time, we gorged ourselves on wine and cakes from the canteen.

Finally, early in the morning of 26 November, our magnificent air fleet set out through the thick fog and stormy waves. Following a pre-arranged course it continued on its way toward PEARL HARBOR expecting to destroy the enemy's Pacific Fleet.

The weather grows worse, a gale blows, the seas rage, a dense fog descends. In this bitter weather, a show of actual force, a test by the gods, though tossed about in their struggle with the elements, the ships continue on their glorious way.

In the several days of danger when flags were blown away, and men washed overboard, throughout the storm, the target practice went on ceaselessly.

Every man was completely exhausted by continuous watches without sleep, and by the silent struggle with Nature; but our spirits were buoyed up by the thought that we were to strike the very first blow in this greatest of all wars.

Behind us there were a hundred million people, amongst them our own families, who had limitless faith in us. Imagine the joy of these people on the morning when we should successfully carry out this operation!

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Soon the fleet crossed the 180° date-line into the Eastern Hemisphere. About this time we received a report that a steamship was proceeding on the same course as ourselves, from SAN FRANCISCO to RUSSIA.

It was most important now to keep a good watch. There could be no doubt of our success, provided that this operation was not discovered by the enemy. Thereafter the whole crew kept watch for sight or sound of this ship; but fortunately even when near O point we had caught no sight of it. Considering the dense fog, we seemed to be under divine protection.

Finally, on the long-awaited X-Day, 8 December 1941, at 0130, we reached a point 300 miles to the north of HAWAII. Then the Imperial decree on the great battle was made public.

On this day there appeared in the clear sky a dense white cloud as if it were blessing our passage. Then from the decks of the aircraft carriers, plane after plane rose, flashing their silver wings in the sunlight, and soon there were a hundred and more aircraft in the sky.

Our Sea Eagles were now moving into a great formation. Our ten years and more of intensive training, during which we had endured many hardships in anticipation of this day -- would they now bear fruit? At this thought a thousand emotions filled our hearts as, close to tears, we watched this magnificent sight. One and all, in our hearts, we sent our pleas to the gods, and putting our hands together, we prayed.

Meanwhile, our Sea Eagles, with the drone of their engines resounding across the heavens like a triumphal song, turned their course toward PEARL HARBOR on the island of OAHU and set forth on their splendid enterprise.

About thirty minutes later the fleet received the first report that the raid had been successful.

The second wave of the air attack force, in a large formation composed of some two hundred planes, took off in the same way an hour later.

Reports come in one after another: "Enemy anti-aircraft fire is becoming more and more intense -- we are now attacking against the main force of the enemy -- we are bombing enemy airfields, the damage is enormous--"

In this moment we are repaid for all our painstaking labors. The gods themselves will bear witness to the glory of our great enterprise!

The deck is now transformed into a whirlpool of excitement. As the glorious battle results are announced one after another by the pipes of the hurrying orderlies, shouts of joy are raised on all sides, and all gloom is completely swept away.

Meanwhile the fleet moves swiftly onward at a high speed of 26 knots.

About 0900 the welcome shapes of the returning raiders begin to appear through the clouds. One by one, like fledglings longing for their nest, they come to rest on the decks of the carriers.

Well done! But have they all come back? At this moment, my most earnest hope is that our losses may be small.

Within an hour, all the planes were brought aboard. We had lost only 29 planes. It was an incredibly small number when compared with our glorious battle results; nevertheless, when their heroic end was announced, the hearts of the crew were filled with sorrow for those men, and for the fate of our special submarines (1)

(1) TOKUSHU SENKOTEI 特殊潜行艇

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Suddenly the anti-aircraft defense signal was sounded. An enemy plane, above the clouds, was insolently following in the trail of our aircraft. Intending to shoot it down with one blast from our ship, we manned our battle stations, but in a moment the enemy got away.

It was also reported that the enemy fleet was on our trail; but this was only a false alarm, and all the ships withdrew towards O point.

Thus, having inflicted upon America a loss which cannot be wiped out in a lifetime, we finally set out upon our homeward journey.

On the way, the 2nd ^{Cady} and the 5th ^{Cady} were detached and headed for MAKE Island as an attack force.

On a morning near the end of the year -- 25 December -- we entered the harbor at KURE, which we had long been yearning to see again.

On thinking back, it was a long journey. The heroic men who took part in it, the public excitement at home of which we learned by radio, and the wild waves of the stormy North Pacific, are all etched upon my heart like a vivid dream.

Ah, memorable day - 8 December 1941!

(This concludes my recollections of the

HAWAII Operation)

(NEW GUINEA) RABAU Operations

I had but a short while, but nevertheless I celebrated a victorious New Year's Day in the homeland and enjoyed to the fullest the taste of my native land. Leaving KURE behind, I set out on the long sea voyage to my second field of operations in the South Seas - to that southern land which I had longed for and dreamed of since my childhood. I stood at my lookout station watching while seas of dancing silver and gold waves and naked natives dancing in the shadow of coconut trees floated before my eyes. At length the fleet passed TAIWAN and entered the Tropical Zone. At TRUK, the land of eternal summer, we changed to our tropical uniforms.

The bright sun sent out blazing rays and it was steaming hot inside the ship. This completely dissipated my cherished illusions about the tropics. Even so, the squalls which occasionally assailed us, accompanied as they were with cool winds and rain, ameliorated the heat. Then at night the gentle evening breeze, blowing drowsily, gave delicious coolness to my hot body. Looking heavenward, stars like scattered gold and silver twinkled here and there in the evening sky. The Southern Cross, which I was seeing for the first time, glittered there among them.

The nights in the South Seas roused vague feelings of longing for home. Giving consolation for our inadequacies, the rippling waves broke against the side of the boat like sparkling scatterings of beautiful pure silver. The South Sea vegetation grew luxuriantly directly down to the beating waves and its beautiful contours were reflected on the surface of the sea. Adding the moon to this, the mid-day heat seemed a dream.

We stopped here for a certain number of days, then when the supplying was completed, finally turned toward the RABAU theater of operations and went forth to the attack. The gun shields were put up, and lookouts posted as usual.

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Since leaving KURE Harbor, how many times have I longed for a peaceful sleep in a hammock! Exhausted by work during the day, at night I lay among the machine guns on the upper deck, never closing my watchful eyes for an instant. Are the men on the homefront really aware of these hardships?

Finally, on 20 January, we launched our planes from a point 200 miles north of RABAU and NEW GUINEA. From that time until the 24th, when army units and landing forces carried out a bold landing in the face of the enemy, we sailed back and forth across the equator, moving northward during the day and southward at night. We bombed every day at dawn for about 10 times. Our beloved plane, the ABUKUMA⁽¹⁾ also took part in the bombing, receiving its baptism of fire. We did not see the enemy in this operation. Bitterly disappointed at this, we returned once again to TRUK.

Port DARTIN Operations

On 1 February we received word of the appearance of an enemy striking force on the east end of the MARSHALL Islands. Our striking force, under orders to take and exterminate this enemy immediately, headed straight for the MARSHALL Islands.

However, the hour arrived and the enemy was nowhere about, so there was nothing to do but to sail for the next field of operations, namely PALAU, where we were to carry out joint operations with the Southern Force.

PALAU Island boasts of being the most civilized among the various South Sea Islands. The South Sea Islands Government Office is located here, and both the buildings and the inhabitants are civilized in comparison with TRUK and other islands.

With its stores, parks, shrines, APAI⁽²⁾, elementary schools, and in the military line the Air Group, Stores Department, etc., it reminded me of country towns at home.

Here I approached two native girls and in exchanging conversation with them on various subjects was amazed at their skill in Japanese, at their simplicity and naivety, and at the intelligence of their profiles.

On a certain day here we were sent out to destroy PORT DARTIN, an important port on the extreme northern tip of hostile AUSTRALIA. The planes took off as in the previous battle from a point 200 miles away, and inflicted tremendous damage on the port.

Our striking force next had to prepare for the JAVA Operations in the Indian Ocean. Giving chase to an enemy submarine, we sailed into STARING BAY in the Dutch-held GELLES, which were now under occupation by our paratroop forces and landing forces.

Indian Ocean (JAVA) Operations

England and America's ambitious 100-year-old dream of advancing into the South Seas and the Orient was finally shaken to its foundations as defeat followed defeat. In spite of the fact that they were taking their deathbed gasp; still stubborn, they despatched the

(1) ABUKUMA 阿武隈

(2) APAI 7/24 unidentified.

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Combined British, Dutch and American Fleet, which now had no capital ships, and continued their throes in the JAVA area, their last defense. Our striking force, which was to help this enemy across its last river, acting in close cooperation with other South Sea forces, weighed anchor in STARING BAY on 25 February and was on its way to the salty Indian Ocean.

The fleet, keeping a strict anti-submarine patrol in the sea areas where enemy submarines navigate, advanced between the islands which intersperse the OMBAI Straits.

These waters, ripple-free as flowing oil, reminded me of the Inland Sea... (T.W. Remainder of sentence illogible)

Words at such a time fail to express what I feel. Wild ducks flying together, clouds floating majestically, a great school of dolphins -- the very picture of peace. Could it be that a bloody war was being fought on such a sea? It is not surprising that we felt a sense of wonder.

Finally the fleet made its splendid appearance in the Indian Ocean. A few hours later the 4th Cruiser Division(1) separated from the force as a detached force and left for an undisclosed destination. The remainder, 4 aircraft carriers, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and several destroyers arrived in the vicinity of CHRISTMAS ISLAND to try to sink the enemy's fleet. We received reports from the Air Fleet 11 that one enemy carrier and one destroyer were trying to make port at CHRISTMAS ISLAND. We approached this island and sent up a reconnaissance plane, but it was not able finally to locate any trace of them. No doubt the swiftly retreating enemy had learned of our approach, and had escaped under cover of night.

Grumbling over our ill luck in being again cheated out of an engagement, we changed our course and formation and headed for a supply base. Suddenly the alarm was given to man our battle stations. Wondering what had happened, we leaped to our battle stations and saw to our right a cloud of black smoke rising on the distant horizon. The big guns of the TONE(2) opened fire, belching black smoke. The destroyers up ahead also began firing.

Soon the enemy merchant ship broke into flames, and in a few minutes sank to the depths of the Indian Ocean.

From this first bombardment by our striking force, I was able to realize something of the difficulties of artillery warfare; I was surprised to learn that we had fired several hundred shells at a single merchant vessel. Several hours later we were again ordered to man our battle stations. As we took up our posts, full of fighting spirit, the big guns of the TONE in the rear were already firing and shortly thereafter the HIEI(3) also opened fire.

Finally we sighted the two enemy cruisers which were following astern. They at once made a quick 180° turn and fled into the clouds and mist.

-
- (1) 四驅隊
(2) 利根
(3) 比叡

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* Apparently it was considered too much trouble to finish them off with artillery fire; so our Sea Eagles rose with one flap of their wings from the decks of the carriers. In a few moments they sent the enemy to the bottom and came triumphantly back. In a short time the T.O.E. rescued members of the enemy crew from the same ship and returned to its group. In the meantime the destroyer ARIAKE(1) came back with 27 crewmen and other persons from the merchant ship which had previously been sunk.

We, who had not fired a single shot while we watched the artillery fight of the other ships, grieved with vexation beyond description, staring at the sky. In the meantime, off the coast of SOERABAJA and BATAVIA, our destroyer squadrons opened a day and night battle, and brilliant battle results followed in quick succession.

The enemy must have escaped somehow to Australia; not one of them was caught in our net. Finally, as a last resort, we carried out a great bombing attack on a large group of transports that were entering the harbor of BILATJAP.

About that time the weather began to get worse, belying the reputation of the Indian Ocean as the most peaceful of the seven seas. The wind velocity increased to 20 meters per second, and the ships rolled with a 20-degree list to port and starboard. Finally we gave up taking on oil from alongside and began to take it stern on because of the heavy seas.

Afterwards in the midst of the rough weather, our force resumed its ceaseless reconnaissance, moving east and west in irregular movements in search of the enemy. At that time the statements of the survivors picked up by the T.O.E. were made public.

These men knew nothing of the movements of their own fleet; they did not even know that HAWAII had been attacked. They seemed to believe that our fleet was concentrated only in the CELEBES. From this we could see how America was concealing her crushing defeats in a desperate attempt to prevent a decline in morale.

England and America, sacred countries of disguise, now your last time has come. Enemy of mankind, evil spirit of peace, the harsh blow of heaven has fallen against you.

Heaven will by no means forgive you, who for your own profit have planned an unscrupulous attack on Japan, the nation of righteousness, and on the Oriental people - you, who are trying to subjugate the world and to make the world a paradise for the white race!

Among the races who have been exploited up till now by the English and Americans are the Indians, the Malaysians, the Chinese, the Burmese, and countless other ignorant races whom civilization has bypassed. They have become the victims of the characteristic English-American policy of "squeeze and take", while the latter line their purses and nurture their overweening ambition.

They cause GANDHI to cry out for the independence of India and far away they carry on an opium war in the Republic of China.

(1) 有明

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All this is a cry from the heart of the splendid peoples of the Orient who are trying to escape the pressure which is being brought upon them by England and America.

However, now the blood of the Oriental peoples has returned to the original cherished desire of the Orientals and has been embraced by them. Their feelings are shown by the fact that they have pledged their mutual cooperation and assistance for the great undertaking of Japan, the leading power of the Orient.

Japan, who, as the leader of the Orient has opposed the powerful countries of England and America, really loves Asia and is laboring for the peace of mankind.

Our task group was now passing in the vicinity of ADMIRALTY BAY and on the eleventh we were scheduled to enter the port of KENDARI.

Although scarcely two months had passed since we left the homeland, it seemed like two years.

In the Indian Ocean, where once the German ship EMDEN played a spectacular part in the destruction of trade, there is now not a shadow of the enemy, and an uncanny silence pervades the surface of the sea where there is a faint reflection of the moon.

Operations in the Indian Ocean (CEYLON)

With regard to the attack on CEYLON, which must grace the final pages of the history of our striking force, every possible preparation for battle had been completed during the 15 days when we lay at anchor in STARING BAY. Actually it was at the very crack of dawn on 26 March 1942 when once again it sailed forth into the fleecy-capped waves of the Indian Ocean. We saw, just as we did in the Java operation, the porpoises playing near the ocean's surface, as if the quiet, gently-lapping waves of OMBAI Straits were lulling them to sleep.

There is a saying that the Indian Ocean has mountainous waves and that it is the ocean of the devil. But the Indian Ocean, shining before our eyes, was like an extremely quiet bay or a gently-rocking cradle.

Sailing around from place to place like this, a mundane feeling touched me. I was reminded of the days when I was a young bachelor with my pay envelope containing my monthly 50 ¥ converted into pure happiness, when I was swaggering through the street shops with an air of independence showing on my pimply face.

While I was waiting, so tense with excitement was I that I might easily have sold my dearest possession at bargain prices. As the saying goes, my duties were like heavy weights on my shoulders.

We continued to sail swiftly and uneventfully, loading oil from time to time, standing watch, and keeping anti-submarine lookout. What strength there is in being with speedy airplanes!

At daybreak of the day before the attack, 4 April 1942, 400 miles from CEYLON, an enemy Consolidated Flying Boat met us. The bugle stirringly sounded "aerial attack" and the entire crew took up their posts.

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Happy day! My blood ran fast and my flesh tingled as the enemy planes for which I had been waiting since the outbreak of the war appeared 30° off the port side. The shells were bursting in the air. It was more stirring than I had imagined it would be. The enemy tried to hide himself, using the white clouds as a smoke screen, but to no avail; our ships' fire sought him out, and after a few minutes of aerial warfare he came crashing down, trailing a long tail of smoke against the sky. Ah! They have exhausted all their secret methods! What feelings the enemy must have experienced during those few minutes! What a lamentable way to spend one's last few moments of life!

Early on 5 April, for which we had been waiting, our force reached a point 200 miles south of Ceylon. The weather was excellent for good aerial bombardment.

Before daybreak, a huge formation of planes set out for the enemy's last stronghold, COLOMBO in CEYLON. This attack was timed to take place just at the time of an Anglo-Indian conference. Piercing the morning haze like impetuous falcons, the planes soon disappeared from sight.

In less than an hour we received our first reports. According to these, we obtained brilliant results from aerial attacks on an enemy escorted convoy, on ground installations and airfields, and on an enemy plane on patrol duty. The planes returned to the ships safely.

Meanwhile, shipborne reconnaissance seaplanes went out to search for the enemy, looking to the west and to the south for ships and small craft. Presently, we received a wireless message from a plane of the 8th Cruiser Division to the effect that one carrier and one destroyer had been sighted. A carrier bomber unit was despatched instantly and sank them immediately. (Two enemy cruisers were mistaken for a carrier and destroyer).

The force, going outside its patrol radius, sailed north and then south in irregular movements.

Finally, after our supplying was completed, we turned to our next field of attack, TRINCOMALEE.

We launched the attack from a point 200 miles to the east at dawn on 9 April, in fine weather. Inasmuch as our large flying boats had been shooting down enemy craft for some time, we thought it likely that the enemy was expecting an attack on this occasion. However, our bold and intrepid fliers will turn the tables on the English by using their own strategy of crushing the enemy with a single blow. When we see the enemy, we will shoot him down without fail. The enemy faces the gris prospect of certain death.

The enemy's military installations at TRINCOMALEE were bombed until there were none remaining. Furthermore, our fleet dispatched its reserve forces and in the work of a moment sank the aircraft carrier *REMBE* and a destroyer which were cruising in neighboring waters. We seemed to be inspired with superhuman powers.

At this point, an enemy heavy bomber unit consisting of 9 planes audaciously attacked our force; but because the bombs fell from an altitude of 6000 meters, they did no more harm than startling the fish in the sea. Our 25 mm. machine guns pursued the planes above the ships and spurring fire in unison, brought down seven of them. This one battle certainly proved how weak the fighting capacity of enemy planes is.

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The face of the braggart Churchill who before the war disdained and scorned Japan, and the face of the miserable Churchill who now stumbles straight to defeat, would bear resemblance to the face of an actor who plays a double role of sorrow and gloom.

The striking force in the BAY OF BENGAL and our force killed each other; the BAY OF BENGAL force said it had been carrying on operations for five days and had obtained great results.

The English sun of military power in India, having finally lost its last vestige of defense, seemed on the point of setting.

The great British Empire has been shaken to its foundations, and its dream of world domination has been turned into a nightmare.

The passage of time has now fulfilled its purpose. Heaven has sent down its blessing upon the righteous, and crushed the wicked with an iron hand. Now this earth, which was made for the general benefit of all mankind, will be wholly transmuted into the paradise that has been the cherished hope of Eastern peoples. Japan, at the head, loudly sounds the knell of tyranny, and Japan, who leads the East to rebirth, is most fitted to bestow the blessing of the gods.

Back to our longed-for mother country! At long last we return to our home port. In frankness I admit that I shed a tear as we bade farewell to the skies of the Southern Seas. The ship, seeming to quiver with joy, passed through the beautiful MALACCA STRAITS on a northerly course.

We were on our way to our distant homeland, our hearts filled with emotion; loaded with honor, the best gift we could take to our native land was our glorious victory and our triumphal song.

Soon, as we were approaching the most northerly extremity of the PHILIPPINES, we received word by radio that an enemy task force had suddenly appeared at a point 750 miles south of Tokyo. Our force was ordered to destroy the enemy immediately. We sped to the attack at a high speed of 20 knots, intending to attack the enemy as long as our fuel held out. By an irony of fate, however, before we were able to reach this point, on the 18th of December several cities in the TOKYO district of Japan suffered an air attack on a small scale.

We wept bitter tears and were filled with indignation; but although we continued the search for the enemy, we were unable to find him. However, it could not be helped and we followed the pre-arranged course that should have led us to the enemy, until, on the 28th, the whole fleet dispersed in home waters and we hastened to our longed-for home ports.

Friends and comrades of the striking force, for a long time we have suffered and been happy together; together we have rendered a great service to our country. Now the time has come for us to part; but, sooner or later, the day will come when we shall be together again. Until then, enjoy yourselves and be happy! While my heart is grieved at this sad parting, I shall try to write a few lines of feeble verse.

(T.N. The "few lines of feeble verse" (eight pages) have been omitted)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #8
(TRANSLATION OF THREE CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENTS)
ENTITLED

(A)
"JAPANESE SUBMARINE SCHOOL NOTES
CONCERNING
EARLY WAR EXPERIENCES OFF HAWAII"
(same as SOURCE DOCUMENT #5, SUPRA)

(B)
"JAPANESE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE YATSUMAKI BUTAI"

(C)
"JAPANESE PLACES OF MILITARY IMPORTANCE IN THE KURILE ISLANDS"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

INTELLIGENCE CENTER, PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
NAVY NUMBER 128 (ONE TWO EIGHT)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

FE

ML/jfm

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30 June 1943 Serial AS-300921

Japanese

L11-1/EP37

From: Officer in Charge.
To: Distribution List Contained in Paragraph 2.
Subj: ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents,
Item No. 472 - "Submarine School Notes Concerning
Early War Experiences Off Hawaii."
ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents,
Item No. 473 - "Instructions to the Yatsumaki Butai."
ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents,
Item No. 474 - "Places of Military Importance in the
Kurile Islands."

1. The enclosures forwarded herewith need not be reported and when no longer of value should be destroyed. No report of destruction is required.

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1. Subject translations
2. Original Documents #472 and 473 (to ONI only)

*Copy to Nelson &
Capt. Hancock*

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CAPTURED DOCUMENTS - TRANSLATED BY ICPOA

Original Item # _____, ICPOA Item # 172 Transl. by ICPOA Date 10 June 1963Title of Publication SUBMARINE SCHOOL NOTES CONCERNING EARLY WAREXPERIENCES OFF HAWAII

IN CASE OF DIARY, RECORD, LOG, etc., GIVE WRITER'S

Organization _____

Initial Date _____ Final Date _____

Jan. 12, 1941Instructor Maeshima

It is needless to state that combat education in this current emergency is of great necessity, and it is extremely regrettable that there has been no opportunity to gather sufficient material before the graduation of the 11th. period special course students. Since, however, some materials in the category of combat instructions has been obtained with the arrival in port of submarines I-16 and I-68 recently, it has been decided to immediately mimeograph and distribute it as study material to this period's special course students. Although it is difficult to guarantee that among the items heard directly there are no points of difference with actual facts, it is believed that there are no great errors in the instructions obtained.

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(2)

NO. 1. TACTICS

1. Use of submarine carried planes.

A. After the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 8, the submarine I-7 received an order to carry out an aerial reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor when the opportunity presented. Although she attempted to send off a plane from the neighborhood of Nihaui, it was impossible to do so due to the weather. Hence she proceeded southward until in the neighborhood of Hawaii and carried out the aerial reconnaissance.

B. When on picket station, it may be possible, depending on the weather, the enemy's alert condition, terrain and other conditions, to send off the planes carried from a certain area, but it may be impossible to do so from another area. Consequently, besides the necessity of deploying airplane carrying submarines, there is also the necessity of deploying many airplanes carrying submarines.

Since urgent execution of the above mentioned reconnaissance was not necessary, we suffered no great disadvantage, but it would be of great disadvantage, when urgency of execution is required.

2. Movement against enemy depth charges.

A. Since America's depth charge setting, for the most part, has been definitely ascertained to be in the neighborhood of 35 meters by previous investigations, submarines attached to the Sixth Fleet have evaded them at depths of 50 to 70 meters. (Some subs have evaded them at a depth of 100 meters). In the case of the I-16 (70 meters depth), she received three charges directly over her, but suffered no damage. (Judging from the opinion that the bursting charge of America's depth charges appeared to be feeble, it is doubtful as to whether the charges were directly overhead.)

B. When the safe submerging depth is thought to be about 20 meters more than the supposed depth setting of depth charges, it is deemed best to assume as far as possible a position of 20 meters or more below the depth charge's depth setting.

If not, it is deemed best to assume a position up high, but impossible to be detected, and as far above as possible from the supposed depth setting of the depth charge.

(A) The I-58 primarily used sound listening patrol Chōon shōkai 聴音哨戒了

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(3) CONFIDENTIAL

to prevent any decrease in the efficiency of the listening gear, the following method was used and no uneasiness was felt because of the sound listening patrol.

3. Observation patrol.

- A. (1) Slowest speed used.
- (2) Ventilation stopped.
- (3) In steering, mechanical power was used only for the diving rudder, while the rest was all man power.
- (4) Although it was stipulated in the operational order that batteries should be charged at night at the outer edge of the patrol zone (about 10 nautical miles from harbor entrance), it was impossible to do so. Hence, batteries were charged at a distance of 40 nautical miles from the harbor entrance and after that we returned to the patrol zone.
- B. At night, when picketing by enemy patrol vessels is to be expected, it is deemed best to increase the depth of the patrol zone.

4. Patrol method of American destroyers.

- A. It seems as if American destroyers are equipped with accurate and good sound detectors and they, for the most part, are executing stationary or slow speed patrol.
- B. Even when an American destroyer is stationary, be on guard.

Ch. 2. GREAT BAY

1. Identification method of friendly units when returning to friendly harbor.

- A. The method carried out by I-16 is as follows:
 - (1) Hoisted a "Broadth Four" Ensign at the tip of the periscope.
 - (2) Spread a "Broadth Four" Ensign on the ladder to the bridge.
 - (3) Notified the time of its arrival within the 300 nautical mile arc, its position and course one or two days previously to the home combat force [内戦部隊]
- When returning to an advanced base, [we] took the system of having the commandant of the advance base force indicate the point of passage into the 300 nautical mile arc.
- B. There is an example of submarine I-63 being attacked with depth charges by a friendly destroyer when leaving an advanced base. Closest attention should be paid to the identification of friendly units when entering and leaving a friendly harbor and to being alert.

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No. 3. NAVIGATION, WEATHER AND SEA CONDITION

1. Onshore Current.

- A. The onshore current in the area of Barber's Point, Oahu, is very strong. Since submarine I-68 paid little attention to this, she sighted the breakers of Barber's Point reef at a very close distance when she raised her periscope up to observe, but she was able to prevent anything from happening by turning immediately.
- B. When stationed on observation on the front line, it is necessary to take into proper consideration the onshore current when close to the shore.

No. 4. MANEUVERING FOR ATTACK

1. Protracted submerged navigation.

- A. (1) In regard to submarine I-68, the number of days of submerged navigation was 30 for an average of 14 hours per day. Air purifier chemicals were used only once (20 pieces) and the cooler was not used.
- (2) Although CO² reached 4.6%, O² reached 15% and the temperature reached 32°C., there seemed to be no great effect upon the men.
- (3) Other than being used once when her submerged navigation continued for 36 hours, submarine I-16 did not use the air purifier. Just as in the above case, there seemed to be practically no effect upon the men.
- B. (1) Although there is need for the use of air purifiers in a submerged navigation of about 14 hours, there is still a necessity for the gathering of more data for further study.
- (2) It is necessary to accelerate the completion of the study "Washing purifier" [洗淨式] type air purifying method.

2. Waves in the Hawaiian Area.

- A. During the operations of submarines of the Sixth Fleet in the Hawaiian area, waves were high every day and it has been reported that submarine I-16 found it difficult to maintain her depth even at the depth of about 18 meters and had to use her standard speed many times.
- Besides, there appeared to be two or three submarines that revealed their conning tower in the presence of the enemy.
- B. It is necessary to maintain the accuracy of the sound detector excellently in order to do away with any uneasiness in sound detection patrol.
- Also, considering this, the periscope should be made as long as possible.

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Ex. 5. COMMUNICATION

1. Underwater wireless reception ability.

- A. According to the experiences of the I-16, it is reported that sensitivity is 4 at a depth of 18 meters and 3 at 20 meters in the Hawaiian area.

(Sending station USAMT)

Ex. 6. (IS MISSING?)Ex. 7. HULL

1. Change in working of the machine guns during operations.

- A. When I-16 test fired her machine guns without taking the trouble of cleaning, after conducting operations for 30 days, of which 20 days were spent in submerged navigation, one machine gun fired without any trouble, while the other fired only one shot.

2. Damage caused by depth charge attack.

- A. While observing in Hawaiian area, submarine I-68 was depth charged. Of about 100 depth charges dropped, 12 exploded within 200 meters and 2 exploded directly above. The depth charge setting was within 35 meters and the sub's depth 45 meters. The damage suffered from this attack, for the most part was as follows:

- (1) Of the 172 electric lights, 75 were damaged. (Those that were not lighted were not damaged).
 - (2) Small amount of leakage from the forward door(s) of the torpedo tube(s).
 - (3) Two depth indicators began to function incorrectly.
 - (4) Sensitivity of sound detector became bad.
 - (5) Became impossible to use the transmitter of the echo range depth finder.
 - (6) Leakage in the high pressure air valve group and air pressure within ship increased greatly.
 - (7) Leakage in the Kingston valve of the negative buoyancy tank increased.
 - (8) Due to the damage to the 50 volt power supply, the rudder order telograph went out. Because of this, the helmsman mistakenly thought that the rudder had been damaged.
 - (9) The accuracy of the (---) ammeter decreased.
 - (10) Leakage from the corroded tube(s) of number 1 cooler.
 - (11) Considerable leakage from the "constant use" and reserve fuel tanks.
- B. (1) Disassemble the damaged depth indicator and remove the sea water between the #1 and #2 beaks $\int \frac{V_{16}}{H} - 7$
- (2) To have turned off as many electric lights as possible.

(5)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

CAPTURED DOCUMENTS - TRANSLATED BY ICPOA

Original Item # _____ ICPOA Item #473 Transl. by ICPOA Date 6 June 1943

Title of Publication INSTRUCTIONS TO THE YATSUMAKI BUTAI

Originator _____

IN CASE OF DIARY, RECORD, LOG, etc., GIVE WRITER'S

Organization _____

Initial Date 14 October 1942 Final Date _____

The following translation was made from a document recovered from a two-man submarine raised May 7, 1943, by the salvage ship, USS ORTOLAN, under the Command of Lt. Commander A.A. Holland. The sub was located in Visale Bay, N.M. GUADALCANAL. The submarine was raised, but on account of a storm, broke loose and sank again.

October 14, 1942At SeaINSTRUCTIONS TO THE YATSUMAKI BUTAI

1. On the evening of the 14th. after 2300 the midget subs will be launched West of Savo Island.
 2. Each unit will accomplish its mission according to the plan.
 3. In order to avoid confusion with the 8th Fleet and the Transport Group to-night, you will proceed submerged at a great depth until 0300 on the 15th.
 4. Midget submarines which have fired torpedoes and/or which have insufficient battery power remaining will proceed immediately to the shores of friendly places, if possible, to KAITIHO.
 5. As there is at present no information for the evaluation of the true worth of the midget submarine, it is expected that each man will, both in the attack and the withdrawal, exert his every effort, and in this way (do his part) in supplying this information.
 6. Be confident in the August Virtue of His Majesty, in Providential Assistance, and in your ability which you have constantly developed.
- Go forth undaunted,
"Heaven helps those who help themselves".

End.

Commanding Officer of the CHITODA,
HARADA, SATORU (AKIRA?).

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CAPTURED DOCUMENTS - TRANSLATED BY ICPOA

Original Item # _____, ICPOA Item # 47A, Transl. by ICPOA Date June 11, 43Title of Publication PLACES OF MILITARY IMPORTANCE IN THE KURILE ISLANDSOriginator Technician of the Fisheries Experimental Station

IN CASE OF BUREAU, RECORD, LOG, etc., GIVE WRITER'S

Organization _____

Initial Date _____ Final Date _____

TRANSLATOR'S FOREWORD

The following is a revised translation of a Japanese document captured in the recent ATU operations. The original translation was made by the Advanced Intelligence Center, North Pacific Area. The ICPOA Revision includes the following points:

1. Addition of positions (in latitude and longitude) of all geographical points mentioned in the original document.
2. The pronunciations for all geographical points in the following revised translation, are the pronunciations listed in Index of Japanese Place Names, Appearing in Japanese Hydrographic Publications, prepared by Intelligence Section, CINCPAC Fleet, 1942.
3. Explanatory notes have been added.
4. Minor errors in the original translation have been corrected.

There is disagreement concerning the proper pronunciation of many place names in the Kurile Islands, even in Japanese reference materials. For the sake of uniformity, and because it is thought to be the most accurate source, the CINCPAC Index has been used to ascertains the correct pronunciation for the place names included in the following translation. The CINCPAC Index contains every geographical point mentioned in the following translation with one exception. This exception is GYUKAKU, 47°09'N, 152°18'E, on SHIRASHIRU Island. The translators have ascertained the position of GYUKAKU with the help of "Japanese Naval Air Chart," NO. 11 (War Department Map Collection Office reproduction). Any material in the following which is not a direct translation from the original document is indicated by brackets and the abbreviation "T.N.," reading "translator's note."

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PLACES OF MILITARY IMPORTANCE IN THE KURILE ISLANDS

Notes by a technician of the Fisheries Experimental Station

AKATSUKI 6174, Force

INFORMATION BULLETIN

1. This publication contains statements by a technician of the HOKKAIDO Government.

2. By Mr. _____

Time: 1935 - 1940

Season: June to August

Place: Kurile Islands [T.N. - Chishima Islands]

A general investigation of aquatic fauna has been made (salmon, salmon-trout, shark, shellfish).

The vessel used was a 26.76 ton, 60 HP, semi-diesel.

PROTECTED HARBORS IN THE KURILE ISLANDS

1. The Kuriles:

The Kurile Islands are divided into the Southern Kuriles, Central Kuriles, and Northern Kuriles.

- A. Southern Kuriles: KUNASHIRI Island [T.N. KUNASHIRI Island 44°16' N, 146°00' E], ETOROFU Island [T.N. 45°04' N., 147°48' E]. (These are populated.)
- B. Central Kuriles: URUPPU Island [T.N. 45°56' N., 150°00' E], CHIRIHOI Islands [T.N. North CHIRIHOI, 46°32' N., 150°53' E.; South CHIRIHOI, 46°28' N., 150°49' E], SHINCHI Island [T.N. SHIMUSHIRU Island, 46°58' N., 152°02' E], KETOI Island [T.N. KETOI Island, 47°20' N., 152°30' E], USHISHIRU Island [T.N. 47°32' N, 152°49' E], RASHO-A Island [T.N. HASHO-A Island, 47°45' N., 153°01' E], MATSU-A Island [T.N. 48°05' N. 153°13' E], SHAGIKOTAN Island [T.N. SHASUKOTAN Island 48°49' N., 154°06' E], HARUSUKOTAN Island [T.N. 49°07' N., 154°31' E], ONNEKOTAN Island [T.N. ONKOTAN Island, 49°25' N., 154°45' E].
- C. Northern Kuriles: HOROLEUSHIRO Island [T.N. PARAMUSHIRU ISLAND, 50°20' N. 155°50' E], SHUMUSHU Island [T.N. SHIMUSHU Island. 50°45' N., 156°20' E], ARAIDO Island, [T.N. ARAIDO Island, 50°52' N., 155°34' E], (Populated during the summer for fishing.)

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2. Animals to be Found in the Kuriles

Walrus, sea-otters, and seals are native. Foxes are bred by the Department of Agriculture and Forestry only in the Central Kuriles. Near the shore, AZU MATI, SOHI [F.N. Translation for these fish unknown], salmon and salmon-trout (returning up the rivers) and BOTAN Shrimp are found. Cod and TUBA Crabs are to be found off-shore.

3. Plants to be Found in the Kuriles:

There are forests as far north as URUPPU Island; but on the islands north of OIRIKOI Island, only creeping pines and black alders, no taller than 6 feet, and weeds exist. There is a type of sea-weed known as KAIHOPPA, about 15 meters in length, which has its leaf sections floating on the surface. Also there is sea-weed and sea-moss. [F.N. The Japanese term MORI has been translated as "sea-moss". MORI, or ASAKUSA MORI, is an edible red sea-weed. Its leaves are about 10 cm. wide and 20 cm. long. It grows best in winter. The weed is made into dried MORI, and is largely cultivated in estuaries where the water is brackish. It grows on sticks which are stuck into the sand at low tide. The mature leaves are dried. Yearly production of MORI is valued at 15,000,000 YEN, ranking next after sardines and herring as a fisheries product.]

4. Sea Routes from OTAHU [F.N. Position of port is $43^{\circ}12' N.$, $141^{\circ}01' E.$], HOKKAIDO to the Northern Kuriles.

A. OTAHU to the SOYA Straits [F.N. $45^{\circ}45' N.$, $142^{\circ}00' E.$]; heading in a southerly direction along KITAMI Coast [F.N. The area known as the KITAMI Coast extends along the northern coast of HOKKAIDO from about $142^{\circ}10' E.$ to $145^{\circ}23' E.$]; going from ABASHIRI [F.N. $44^{\circ}01' N.$, $144^{\circ}17' E.$] toward IKABANDTSU Point [F.N. $45^{\circ}26' N.$, $147^{\circ}56' E.$] on ETOROPU Island, heading in a northerly direction along the archipelago; passing through the OHEHOTAN Channel [F.N. $49^{\circ}50' N.$, $155^{\circ}05' E.$]; and coming out on the Pacific side. Distance: 860 nautical miles.

B. OTAHU to SOYA Straits and direct to the Northern Kuriles. Distance: 800 nautical miles.

5. Protected Harbors.

Harbors suitable for small vessels ("**" indicates harbors suitable for large vessels also).

(1) ETOROPU Island:

* SHANA area: [F.N. Position of port of SHANA is $45^{\circ}14' N.$, $147^{\circ}53' E.$]

(4)

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Offers good shelter even from north-westerly winds. There is a waterfall suitable for drinking water purposes. There is a salmon-trout canning factory. Practical Importance: It is a natural harbor; there are fishing establishments.

Remarks: On the Pacific shore, there is the harbor of HITOKAPPU $\sqrt{T.N. 44^{\circ}58' N., 147^{\circ}41' E.}$ which is suitable for large vessels.

(2) URUPPU Island:

FUTAOOSHIMA $\sqrt{T.N.}$ Small island near S.W. tip of URUPPU, position of island is $45^{\circ}38' N., 149^{\circ}27' E.$; There are shoals between FUTAOOSHIMA and URUPPU which reduce the force of the breakers. There is no water suitable for drinking.

* KOSHIMA Bay $\sqrt{T.N. 46^{\circ}14' N., 150^{\circ}20' E.}$; A sheltered harbor with a sandy bottom. Water from the KADSEN River $\sqrt{T.N. 46^{\circ}13' N., 150^{\circ}20' E.}$ (position of mouth) is suitable for drinking. Salmon and Salmon-trout ascend the KADSEN River in the fall.

Remarks: KOBUNE Bay $\sqrt{T.N.}$ Position of KOBUNE port is $45^{\circ}56' N., 150^{\circ}12' E.$ is on the Pacific side. Off the mouth of the Bay, is KOBURI INA, 28 meters high, which serves as a good landmark for entering the Bay. $\sqrt{T.N.}$ TOGARI L/A is a pointed rock, $45^{\circ}55' N., 150^{\circ}12' E.$ There is water suitable for drinking.

(3) CHIRIHOI Islands:

* OKINA Bay $\sqrt{T.N. 46^{\circ}32' N., 150^{\circ}56' E.}$ on Northern CHIRIHOI Island. Has sandy bottom. No drinking water.

(4) SHIMOSHINU Island:

SHIMOSHINU Bay $\sqrt{T.N. 46^{\circ}52' N., 151^{\circ}51' E.}$; It is not a good harbor, but has a sandy bottom. Nearby is UMEURA $\sqrt{T.N.}$ probably $46^{\circ}52' N., 151^{\circ}48' E.$ where there is drinking water. HUROKON Bay $\sqrt{T.N. 47^{\circ}09' N., 152^{\circ}13' E.}$; A harbor suitable for small ships. Water has entered the crater; and the depth of the water and quality of the bottom is suitable for mooring in the area on the eastern side of a line running from the mouth of the bay to the Agriculture and Forestry Department's fox farm.

The mouth of the bay is narrow and shallow, and therefore it is easier to enter the harbor by having small boats indicate the shallowest areas, and having the ship pass in between them.

(4)

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* GYUKAKU [T.N. Pronunciation not confirmed. Position is $47^{\circ}09' N.$, $152^{\circ}18' E.$; Do not confuse with GYUKAKU on PARAMUSHIRU Island.] Although the bottom is not good, it offers good shelter from N.W. winds. There is a road connecting with EUBOTOM Bay.

(5) MATSUNA Island

There is shelter between YAMATO Bay [T.N. $48^{\circ}05' N.$, $153^{\circ}16' E.$] and BAKUO Island [T.N. $43^{\circ}05' N.$, $153^{\circ}17' E.$]. Although the bottom is rocky, the area is bounded by the two islands, and the wind and waves can be avoided. Drinking water is available. There is a naval air-field.

(6) SHASUKOTAN Island:

OTOME Bay [T.N. $48^{\circ}48' N.$, $154^{\circ}04' E.$]. A semicircular bay with sandy bottom. It is not a good harbor because of the wide mouth. Drinking water is available.

(7) OHSUTAN Island:

SHO Bay [T.N. $49^{\circ}37' N.$, $154^{\circ}49' E.$]. It is not a good harbor, but is suitable as shelter from south-easterly winds. There is drinking water. In respect to the north-westerly winds, the Pacific side is of value.

KUROISHI Bay [T.N. $49^{\circ}26' N.$, $154^{\circ}49' E.$]. Since KUROISHI Bay is on the Pacific side, it is of value when prevailing winds are from the west.

(8) PARAMUSHIRU Island:

KARUMANTOU [T.N. Position of port is $50^{\circ}22' N.$, $155^{\circ}36' E.$]. There are harbor facilities and a fine broadwater.

PARAMUSHIRU Straits [T.N. $50^{\circ}43' N.$, $156^{\circ}10' E.$] are the straits between PARAMUSHIRU and SHIMUSHU Islands, and constitute the most valuable area in the Northern Kuriles. KATAOKA Bay [T.N. $50^{\circ}44' N.$, $156^{\circ}11' E.$], MURAKAMI Bay [T.N. $50^{\circ}44' N.$, $156^{\circ}09' E.$], KASHIWABARA Bay [T.N. $50^{\circ}41' N.$, $156^{\circ}09' E.$] and canning factories are located along the straits. There are turbot [T.N. flatfish] in KASHIWABARA Bay. The fishing industry flourishes on PARAMUSHIRU and SHIMUSHU during the summer, and fishery installations are located at various points along the coast.

KATAOKA Bay is a naval base and KASHIWABARA Bay is an army base.

[T.N. The original document was not classified]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #9

(TRANSLATION OF A CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT
DEALING WITH EVENTS IN THE JAPANESE WAR
COMMENCING THREE WEEKS BEFORE THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
AND CONTINUING THROUGH MANY JAPANESE-UNITED STATES ACTIONS
INCLUDING THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR,
GUAM, WAKE ISLAND, THE BISMARCK SEA OPERATIONS, RABAU, THE
BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA, THE FIRST, SECOND AND
THIRD SEA BATTLES OF THE SOLOMONS ISLANDS,
THE JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS IN ATTU AND KISKA ISLANDS
IN THE ALEUTIANS, ETC., TO 20 SEPTEMBER 1943)

ENTITLED

"PROFESSIONAL NOTEBOOK OF AN ENSIGN IN THE JAPANESE NAVY"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

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25 February 1944 - Serial ADM-250629

12 04

From: Officer-in-Charge.
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Subj: Translation of Captured Japanese Document -
JICPOA Item No. 4986 - Professional Notebook of an Ensign in the
Japanese Navy.
Source: Captured TARANA 24 November 1943.

1. Subject translation, forwarded herewith, need not be reported and
when no longer of value should be destroyed. No report of destruction is
necessary.

M. Legendre
M. LEGENDRE,
By direction.

Encl:

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JICPOA Item #4986

TRANSLATION OF CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENT

Captured TARAWA 24 November 1943

Received JICPOA 6 December 1943

TRANSLATOR'S FOREWORD

JICPOA Items #4986 and #4986-A represent a complete translation of the professional notebook of Ensign NAKAMURA, Toshio (中村 敏雄), IJN. Although the material in the notebook is of uneven value, it was felt that a complete translation would be of interest inasmuch as it represents the activities of an officer from the time he first boarded ship until shortly before the GILBERTS operation.

Part of the material in the book seems to have been examined by some higher ranking officer, and, in some cases, the notation "Not Permitted" accompanied by a series of blue pencil marks, is found over passages which were thought censorable. However, the notebook itself bears the classification "MILITARY - VERY-SECRET" (GUNGOKUH) on the cover, which seemed protection enough to the writer of the book for including material of a highly confidential nature.

Nothing is known of the circumstances of capture of the notebook or of the fate of the writer. Since no torpedo boat unit was at TARAWA at the time of the American landing, it is entirely possible that the author escaped and is still alive.

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CHRONOLOGY OF PERSONAL HISTORY

15 November 1941	Received commission as Passed Midshipman from the Navy Department.
15 November	Received orders from the Navy Department assigning me to the KAKO (CA). Junior Division Officer, 2nd Division, and Machine Gun Fire Control Officer.
1 December	Received orders from Navy Department assigning me to the AOBA (CA). Staff Officer and Look-Out Officer.
1 April 1942	Received orders from the AOBA relieving me of duties as Look-Out Officer and appointing me to Navigation Department, and as Junior Division Officer 7th Division.
15 April	Received orders from the AOBA relieving me of duties to Navigation Department and as Junior Division Officer 7th Division and appointing me Coding Officer and Junior Division Officer 6th Division.
25 April	Received orders from the AOBA relieving me of duties as Coding Officer and appointing me Communications Officer.
1 June	Commissioned Ensign by the Cabinet.
1 June	Notified by the Navy Department of my assignment to the AOBA.
15 July	Assignment to AOBA confirmed by Navy Department.
15 August	Attached to the DesDiv 9 by the Navy Department.
5 September	Notified by AOBA to leave the ship and to take up position on NOWAKI (DD).
9 September	Assigned to the MIZUGUMO (DD) by the Com DesDiv 9.
23 September (?)	Assigned to the ASAGUMO as Navigating Officer by the Co DesDiv.9.

DIARY

15 November 1941	Graduated from the Naval College at ETAJIMA. Made a midshipman in the Navy.
November	Ordered aboard the KAKO (CA) at KURE as Junior Officer, 2nd Division and Machine Gun Fire Control Officer.
19 November	KAKO entered drydock #3 at KURE.
21 November	Granted leave and returned home.
23 November	Returned to my ship.
24 November	KAKO left drydock.
25 November	KAKO left KURE; anchored in HASHIRA SHIMA Channel.
26 November	Paid our respects to the Commander-in-Chief, 6th Fleet, on HASHIRA SHIMA.
29 November	Left HASHIRA SHIMA Channel. (??)
2 December	Anchored at HAMA SHIMA.
4 December	Ordered aboard the AOBA (CA) as lookout officer (MIHARISHI).
December	Left HAMA SHIMA (to assist the GUAM Occupation Force).
7 December	Imperial Rescript to the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet: (rendered elsewhere).
	The Reply of the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet: (rendered elsewhere).
	The Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, to the Combined Fleet, (rendered elsewhere).
8 December	The Emperor has proclaimed war on the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND. Imperial rescripts sent to the Ministers of the Army and Navy. Our striking force has delivered a successful surprise attack on HAWAII.

Results:

Sunk:

1 CALIFORNIA Class BB
1 MARYLAND Class BB
1 ARIZONA Class BB
1 UTAH Class BB
1 Unidentified Ship
2 Heavy Cruisers
1 Oiler

Heavily Damaged:

1 CALIFORNIA Class BB
1 MARYLAND Class BB
1 NEVADA Class BB
1 Cruiser

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(continued)Moderately Damaged:1 NEVADA Class BB
4 CruisersOur Losses:9 Fighter Planes
15 Bombers
5 Reconnaissance PlanesShot Down:

450 planes

Landings were made by our southern forces at KOTA BHARU, SINGORA, BATAAN, BANGKOK, and AMBOINA Bay; BASTO was occupied. Our troops entered the International Settlement at SHANGHAI. The British Gunboat, PENGUIN, was sunk there. A detachment of American Marines at PEKING laid down their arms. SINGAPORE, MIDWAY, WAKE, CLARK FIELD, GUAM, HONGKONG, DAVAO were bombed.

9 December The American sea-plane carrier LANGLEY was sunk (off DAVAO).
10 December The Emperor was overjoyed with the results of the HAWAII operation, sending another rescript to the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet.
Offensive and defensive alliance with THAILAND signed. WAKE attacked. The destroyers HAYATE and KISARAGI were sunk by shell-fire.
Landings effected at VIGAN. One sub-chaser sunk. GUAM, APARRI, MAKIN, TARAWA occupied.
Minesweeper #19 wrecked off the mouth of the CAGAYAN River.
The 11th Air Fleet participated in a naval battle of the MALAY PENINSULA. PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE sunk.
11 December Tripartite Pact signed. WAKE attacked. Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, the recipient of another imperial rescript declaring the Emperor's pleasure over the naval battle off the MALAY PENINSULA. GERMANY and ITALY declare war on the UNITED STATES. Landings effected at LEGASPI.
12 December Our ship, the AOKA, anchored at TRUK.
13 December Left TRUK.
14 December The main naval force has arrived at HASHIRA SHIMA.
16 December AOKA anchored at ROI.
17 December SHINONOME (DD) wrecked 15 kms. north of BARAM Point while on patrol duty off MIRI. The RO-66 collided with the RO-62 and sank.
20 December PANAMA, COSTA RICA, NICARAGUA, HONDURAS, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, GUATEMALA, CUBA and HAITI all declared war on our Empire.
21 December AOKA left ROI (to assist the WAKE Occupation Force).
22 December Landings effected at LINGAYEN.
23 December Occupation of WAKE completed.
The (TS: HATAI) Striking Force has arrived at HASHIRA SHIMA.
25 December AOKA returned to ROI and anchored.
HONGKONG surrenders.
Landings effected at JOLO in a surprise attack.
Two enemy subs sunk off LINGAYEN Bay (by the destroyers ASUKAZE and SATSUKI).
26 December KUCHING occupied. The SAGIRI (DD) sunk by an enemy torpedo.
Minesweeper #6 and the #2 UNYO Maru (ARS) were bombed and sunk. The MURASAME (DD) collided with Minesweeper #20 at TIKAO. MANILA bombed. One enemy destroyer, two subs, and ten merchantmen sunk. The ASUKAZE sank a sub off LINGAYEN.
27 December The American Army commander in the PHILIPPINES declared MANILA an open city. MANILA was bombed and ten merchantmen sunk. The NOJIMA (AF) was torpedoed and ran aground.
29 December The RO-60 ran aground south of ROI.
31 December The YAMAGUMO (DD) hit a mine off LINGAYEN Bay.
An enemy sub sank off LAOAG.
1 January 1942 LABUAN and BRUNEI occupied.
3 January MANILA surrendered.
4 January The MYOKO (CA) was bombed off MALALAG in DAVAO Bay. Has returned to SASEBO, damaged and with casualties.
5 January AOKA left ROI at 0000, returned at 1000. (A report had been received that an enemy carrier and two cruisers had left HAWAII for WAKE. We were ordered to leave at night on search and guard duty.)

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6 January 1942 Left ROI at 0200, returned at 1030 on same mission.
 7 January Left ROI for TRUK.
 9 January The KANKO Maru (カノ丸) was torpedoed and sunk in the DUTCH EAST INDIES.
 Two more enemy subs have been sunk.
 10 January Anchored at TRUK.
 12 January The LEXINGTON sunk by the I-6.
 TARAKAN surrendered.
 Minesweepers #13 and #14 sunk off LINKAS.
 The mineslayer, PRINS VAN ORANJE, sunk.
 13 January MENGACHU FORT on LINKAS Island captured.
 18 January Left TRUK.
 The I-131 sank a 10,000 merchantman north of TIMOR.
 The BANSHU Maru (万手丸) hit a mine and sank.
 The ASO Maru (阿蘇丸) (AP-AK) was severely damaged.
 20 January At 1800 crossed the equator at 148°37' E. Long. going south.
 (Fighter planes from the ZUIKAKU shot down an enemy flying boat that was approaching us. We spotted five of its crew floating on the water, and picked them up as prisoners.)
 One special duty ship and several of our merchantmen have been sunk at SINGAPORE.
 21 January Our forces attacked an enemy force concentrating at CEBU and sank several merchantmen.
 The NANA Maru (ナナ丸) (AP-AK) was sunk (in the south).
 The ASAGUMO (DD) collided with the OI Maru (大井丸).
 Landings effected at the mouth of the SAMUPAI River and the mouth of KENDARI Bay.
 One of our destroyers has damaged six enemy merchantmen in the INDIAN OCEAN.
 22 January Have reached the southernmost point on our course (4°9' S., 150°55'30" E.)
 23 January BANAKA (?) Airfield on GERIIN (?) Island occupied. As the result of an enemy torpedo attack, the TATSUKAMI Maru (龍神丸) (AK), TSURUGA Maru (鶴岡丸) (AK), and the KURETAKI Maru (久留田丸) were sunk; the SUMINOURA Maru (水無瀬丸) and Patrol Boat #37 were heavily damaged.
 RAIBUL occupied.
 24 January Crossed the equator at 150°E. going north at 0555. Recrossed it going south at 150°51' E. at 1240. The MYOKEN Maru (御前丸) (AK) was sunk off GILI JANG. Landings effected at KENDARI and BALIKPAPAN.
 25 January The TONGGWA Maru (利根丸) was grounded.
 26 January Reached the southernmost point on our course at 1430 (4°45' S., 149°52' E.).
 27 January The British destroyer, THUNET, was sunk.
 Landings made on PAMANGKAT. SANBASU (?) occupied.
 30 January AOKA anchored in RAIBUL Harbor at 0800.
 (Handed over our prisoners.) Left RAIBUL at 1730.
 KULMI occupied.
 31 January Anchored in YSA EL PASSAGE.
 Our forces have progressed towards SINGAPORE.
 Landings effected at AMBOH, ROTAN, and PONTIAN.
 29 January MINKATAN (?) and PONTIANAK occupied.
 1 February Left YSAHEL PASSAGE. An enemy striking force appeared in the MARSHALLS Area and we have received reports that they are attacking there. We left immediately for KWAJALEIN.
 The enemy force is composed of 2 carriers, five heavy (?) cruisers, and five destroyers.
 3 February The Submarine I-62 sank a 10,000 ton tanker off COLOMBO.
 4 February J.A.V. SEA Battle.
 Enemy Losses:

- 1 Dutch Cruiser (J.A.V. Class) sunk.
- 1 Dutch Cruiser (DE RUYTER Class) sunk.
- 1 Dutch Cruiser (J.A.V. Class) medium damage.
- 1 American Cruiser (MARBLEHEAD Class) medium damage.

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5 February 1942 The Submarine RO-34 sank a destroyer in the SUNDA STRAITS.
 2 February 0116. Crossed the equator bearing north, 153°50' E.
 4 February KWAJALEIN. Entered the Harbor at ROI.
 5 February KWAJALEIN. Left ROI. Anchored at the main island at KWAJALEIN.
 6 February KWAJALEIN. Departed from the main island.
 7 February The HOYO (大月丸) Maru ran aground outside KEBIN Bay.
 The Submarine I-124 had a gunnery engagement with an English destroyer and was sunk.
 8 February The NATSUSHIO (DD) was sunk by torpedoes.
 9 February The KISOGAMA (木曾川丸) Maru was sunk off SAIGON by an enemy submarine.
 Successful landings were carried out at MAKASSAR, AENBATO-BATO, SURUMI, and GAGIATA.
 10 February TRUK. Entered the harbor at TRUK.
 12 February The YAMATO (BB) became the flagship of the Combined Fleet.
 15 February SINGAPORE fell.
 16 February A message from the throne on the occasion of the fall of SINGAPORE.
 19 February The MYOKO (大友丸) Maru was sunk off NOLLO SAKI by an enemy submarine.
 20 February TRUK. Departed from TRUK. An enemy task force composed of 1 BB, 2 carriers, 2 cruisers and 9 destroyers has appeared at a bearing of 75°46' off RABUL and our force has set out to capture or annihilate it. It seems that the enemy is planning to carry out a surprise attack on TRUK.
 Successful landings were carried out at LULU and KOEPANG.
 BALI Island has been occupied.
 The Submarine I-60 was sunk, in a naval battle off BATAAN.
 4 destroyers were sunk and 2 cruisers and 1 destroyer were badly damaged. The MICHISHIO (DD) and OSHIO (DD) were badly damaged.
 23 February TRUK. Entered the harbor at TRUK. RAHATO (?) has been occupied.
 24 February 2 enemy cruisers and 2 destroyers have carried out an attack in the vicinity of WAKE Island.
 25 & 26 February A submarine shelled the American mainland. The submarine RO-63 met with an accident in the vicinity of WAKE Island.
 27 February In a naval battle off SOERABAYA, 5 cruisers and 6 destroyers were sunk. Their force consisted of 5 cruisers and 9 destroyers.
 28 February The Submarine I-58 sank a 15,000 ton fueling ship in the SUNDA STRAITS. The Submarine I-4 sank a freighter south of JAVA.
 2 March TRUK. Departed at 1000. Engaging in the Fourth Campaign (SR Operations).
 4 March Crossed the equator at 0015 bearing southward, 150°54' E. An enemy carrier attacked MARCUS Island. The enemy force was composed of the ENTERPRISE, SALT LAKE CITY, NORTHAMPTON, and a number of destroyers. The ERIMO (特選丸) (AO) was sunk by torpedoes.
 5 March At 0600 entered the harbor at RABUL. Took on provisions. Departed at 1700.
 8 March Successful landing carried out in MENATEI Island.
 9 March Swept the sea around KUINKOROR (2) and anchored there.
 10 March The SNLF has landed and are cleaning out the enemy along the coast. Departed at 1615.
 11 March Entered the harbor at RABUL. Fueled.
 14 March Departed from RABUL.
 15 March Entered the harbor at KUINKOROR and stood by.
 17 March Departed from KUINKOROR.
 18 March Anchored in MELLE CHANNEL (メレエバエー).
 26 March Departed from MELLE CHANNEL.
 27 March Entered the harbor at RABUL. Fueled.

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28 March 1942	Departed from RABAU. Engaging in the Fifth Campaign.
30 March	Landing at SHORTLAND successful.
1 April	Entered harbor of RABAU. Left the same day.
2 April	Anchored in MELLE CHANNEL.
7 April	Departed from MELLE CHANNEL.
8 April	Crossed the equator bearing north, 148°13' E.
10 April	Entered the harbor at TRUK.
30 April	Departed from TRUK to engage in the Fifth Campaign.
5 May	Entered the harbor at SHORTLAND.
6 May	Departed from SHORTLAND.
7 May	Attacked by enemy planes. The SHOHO (CV) was sunk at a bearing of 56°, 52 miles off DEBOYN& Island.
9 May	Entered the harbor at SHORTLAND.
	Took on provisions and departed the same day.
11 May	The OKINOSHIMA (海 / 島) (CM) was sunk by torpedoes.
12 May	Entered the harbor at KIETA. The SNLF landed. There was no sign of the enemy.
13 May	Anchored at SHORTLAND. Took on provisions and departed the same day bound for TRUK, our destroyer alone.
16 May	Entered the harbor at TRUK.
17 May	Departed from TRUK, bound for KURE.
22 May	Entered the harbor of KURE at 1300.
25 May	Entered No. 3 Dock at KURE.
26-31 May	Had leave. Returned to ship.
29 May	Left the Dock. Moored to land at A Anchorage.
8 June	Changed mooring to No. 18 Buoy.
10 June	Departed from the harbor on a trial cruise. Returned the same day. Practiced avoiding torpedoes while cruising. Tested our speed over a measured course.
16 June ?	Departed at 0900. At 1745 entered the harbor at NAGAHAMA.
17 June	Departed from NAGAHAMA at 0900. At 1745 entered the harbor of KITSUKI.
18 June	Departed from KITSUKI bound for TRUK.
23 June	Entered the harbor at TRUK.
30 June	Departed from TRUK.
2 July	Crossed the equator (the 9th time) bearing south. Time - 0230. The HOYO (海 / 丸) Maru drew alongside our port side and we refueled in tow.
5 July	Entered the harbor at KIETA.
6 July	Drew alongside the HOYO Maru (海 / 丸) and refueled. When we had finished, we left the harbor.
7 July	Anchored in REKATA LAGOON.
10 July	2 destroyers dropped anchor.
14 July	Departed at 1200.
16 July	Entered MELLE Channel.
18 July	Set out for KUINKORORA.
19 July	Entered the harbor at KUINKORORA.
21 July	Departed from KUINKORORA bound for RABAU (our destroyer alone). Refueled and left port the same day bound for YSABEL PASSAGE.
22 July	Anchored in YSABEL PASSAGE. There were 2 destroyers and we remained there until the 26th.
26 July	Departed from YSABEL PASSAGE and anchored in MELLE CHANNEL.
1 August	RABAU. Departed from RABAU. Anchored in MELLE CHANNEL.
7 August	Departed from MELLE CHANNEL. Received news that an enemy task force was attacking TULAGI, we made a forced run to RABAU. The enemy had started to land at TULAGI. We joined the CHOKAI (CA).
8 August	We made a night attack on TULAGI.
10 August	The KAKO (CA) was struck by torpedoes from an enemy submarine and sank. (30,500 metres out from MARWU Island at a bearing of 48°; at about 2°28' S., 152°11' E.)
17 August	Anchored in MELLE CHANNEL.
19 August	Left MELLE CHANNEL.
20 August	Anchored in REKATA BAY.
	Left REKATA BAY.

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21 August 1942 Joined the CHOKAI (CA).
 22 August Separated from the CHOKAI and the 2 DD's, anchoring at SHORTLAND for supplies. When finished here, left.
 24 August Spotted a convoy. Rejoined the CHOKAI and the 2 DD's.
 26 August Anchored at KIETA.
 27 August Left KIETA. Anchored temporarily at SHORTLAND.
 28 August Left SHORTLAND for the south.
 4 September Anchored at KIETA.
 5 September Left KIETA. Anchored temporarily at SHORTLAND. Left ship after supper and reported on board the NOWAKI (DD) for duty.
 6 September Left SHORTLAND. Headed for TRUK, escorting the TOA Maru (東亜丸) (XAO or AK?).
 9 September Anchored in TRUK Harbor at 1400. Was transferred aboard the MINEGUMO (DD) after supper.
 10 September Left TRUK for the south, escorting the KENTO Maru (健洋丸) (XAO).
 23 September Anchored at TRUK. Left the MINEGUMO and reported on board the ASAGUMO (DD) for duty.
 26 September Left TRUK for SHORTLAND (Apart from being in DesDiv 9, the ASAGUMO had also been made a part of the SOUTH SEAS Force (NANYO BUTAI)).
 29 September Anchored at SHORTLAND.
 2 October Took on board materiel to be landed at GUADALCANAL and left SHORTLAND. Began unloading at 2058, completed it successfully at 2230.
 3 October Returned to SHORTLAND for supplies.
 5 October Enemy carrier-based bombers attacked us (one bomb dropped very close: 200 metres on our port beam), but no damage. We repulsed them. Left SHORTLAND for the second time on the "ferry service" to GUADALCANAL. Were attacked by enemy planes. The NATSUGUMO (DD), MINEGUMO, and MURASAME turned back.

(Reinforcement Butai)

26 September The DesDiv 9 (TN: dg) was attached to the Outer South Seas Force and set out from TRUK.
 29 September Entered the harbor at SHORTLAND.
 2 October 0800 Departed from SHORTLAND on a southerly course. Our force was composed of the DesDiv 9 (TN: dg) and the DesDiv 2 (TN: dg) (minus the YUDACHI and the SAMIDARE). Had as passengers 250 soldiers who were to be put ashore; also carried provisions and 15 rear-cars which were to be put ashore.
 2048 Arrived at KAMIMBO and commenced unloading operations.
 2230 Work was completed.
 2246 Departed from KAMIMBO, following a southerly course.
 3 October 1036 Anchored at SHORTLAND.
 5 October 0630 Departed from SHORTLAND, following a southerly course. Our force was composed of the DesDivs 9 and 2 (TN: dg). Carried as passengers 650 soldiers who were to be put ashore. As cargo carried 2 mountain guns, telegraph apparatus, and tools for laborers, which were to be put ashore.
 1505 Were attacked by 10 enemy planes. The MINEGUMO (DD) was damaged by a near hit forward, sprang a leak and returned to SHORTLAND escorted by the NATSUGUMO (DD).
 1552 Were attacked by nine enemy planes. Our ship was attacked by 3 carrier-based bombers. Bombs landed 100° to starboard, distance 50 meters, 50 meters off the bow, and 150° to starboard, distance 100 meters. Sustained no damage.
 1705 The MURASAME (DD), having sprung a leak, because of a near hit by a bomb, returned to SHORTLAND.
 1924 Enemy planes on patrol dropped flares.
 2116 Arrived at TASSAFARONGA and commenced unloading operations.
 2254 Unloading completed.
 2257 Departed from TASSAFARONGA, following a central course.

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6 October 1019 Dropped anchor at SHORTLAND, having entered the harbor through the North Channel.

8 October 0551 Set out from SHORTLAND, heading down the "Slot". (TN: CHUO-KORO 中興丸). Our force was composed of the DesDiv 9 (minus the KINEGUMO) and the DesDiv 2 (minus the MURASAME and the SANIDARE). Carried as passengers 560 men who were to be put ashore. As cargo, carried 18 trench mortars. Also carried a MAIZURI 4th Special Naval Landing Force Communications Unit and Work Unit.

1607 Were attacked by 11 enemy planes and our escort planes joined battle with them.

2056 Reached TASSAFARONGA and commenced disembarking operations.

2219 Operations concluded.

2224 Departed from TASSAFARONGA proceeding along the "Slot".

9 October 0453 Were attacked by 11 enemy carrier-based bombers and our escort planes joined battle with them.

0506 The enemy's carrier-based bombers attacked us and bombs landed 90° to port, distance 50 meters, 110° to starboard, distance 100 meters, and 80° to starboard, distance 50 meters. Shot down one of the enemy planes.

1120 Dropped anchor at SHORTLAND.

11 October 0558 Departed from SHORTLAND. Our force was composed of the MISSHIN (CVS), CHITOSE (CVS), AKITSUKI (DD), the DesDiv 9 and the DesDiv 11 (TN: dg) (minus two destroyers). Carried as passengers 728 men who were to be put ashore. Also carried 4 15 cm. howitzers, 4 tractors, 2 field guns, 16 cases (?) of ammunition, 1 antiaircraft gun, 1 fixed radio (HOTEI-KUSEN). The above materials were aboard the MISSHIN and CHITOSE. The ASAGUMO (DD) and the DesDiv 11 (minus 2 destroyers) carried 1 regimental gun, 2 battalion guns, 2 rapid-fire guns, 1 trench mortar, and ten tons of provisions.

2023 Arrived at TASSAFARONGA and commenced disembarking operations.

2123 Operations completed.

2130 Departed from TASSAFARONGA.

2135 Sighted our forces engaged in battle with the enemy a little north of SAVO Island. (The losses sustained by our 6th Fleet were: FURUTAKA (CA), sunk; AOBA (CA), badly damaged, and FUBUKI (DD), sunk).

2236 Returned to our anchorage. The MISSHIN and CHITOSE had not completed the disembarkation of the materials she carried.

2304 Operations were completed, and we changed our course to the south.

12 October 0655 Joined the SENDAI (CL).

0850 The MURAKUMO was hit by bombs from enemy planes and was unable to proceed and the DesDiv 9 went to her assistance.

1105 Arrived at our destination where we were assigned to patrol duty. Tried to tow the SHIRAYUKI (DD).

1258 Sighted 2 enemy carrier-based bombers.

1323 Sighted the two planes again.

1343 Attacked by 11 carrier-based bombers and 8 fighters.

1348 The NATSUGUMO was damaged by a bomb and was unable to proceed, and gradually began to list.

1415 The MURAKUMO was struck by a torpedo which exploded.

1427 The NATSUGUMO sank but the crew was saved.

1445 Made our escape from this place.

1538 Joined the DesDiv 3 (sd).

1640 Proceeded to tow the MURAKUMO.

1850 Arrived at this place.

1850 The SHIRAYUKI was disposed of with torpedoes. (RAIGEKI SHOBUNSU).

1909 Started back.

0630 Put in at SHORTLAND.

13 October 0353 Set out from SHORTLAND via the North Channel.

14 October 2021 Arrived at TASSAFARONGA where we changed our anchorage and established patrols.

2350 The CHOKAI (CA) and the KINUGASA shelled the airfield.

15 October 0400 A transport fleet (SENDAI (CL), YURA (CL), and TATSUTA (CL),) completed disembarking operations.

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15 October 1942
(Continued) 0355 Started back, following a course north.
1604 Put in at SHORTLAND.

17 October 0316 Departed from SHORTLAND, following the northern route..
2029 Arrived at ESPERANCE where we commenced disembarking operations.
2205 Finished the operations.

18 October 2216 Departed from ESPERANCE going down the "Slot".
0446 The SENDAI was struck by a torpedo from an enemy submarine but sustained no damage. Three depth charges were dropped with unknown results.
0930 Put in at SHORTLAND where we were attached to the main Fleet (?) (TN: SHUTAI 主隊).

24 October 1616 Departed from SHORTLAND in order to carry out an all-out attack against GUADALCANAL.

25 October Though we occupied one corner of the airfield on GUADALCANAL, we did not seize the airfield. Our forces stood by to the west.

26 October 1325 Put in at SHORTLAND.

30 October 0100 Enemy planes dropped bombs and 3 landed 50 meters off the bow.
0123 Enemy planes dropped bombs and 6 landed 40° to port, distance, 30 meters. UCHIDA, Seaman, 3rd Class, was killed.

1 November 0800 The flag of the CinC of the DesRon 4 (4 sd) was run up on the ASAGUMO (DD).

2 November 2230 Set out from SHORTLAND, following the northern route.
2020 Left our companion ships and proceeded to the anchorage of a transport fleet. Maintained patrol outside (the anchorage).
2330 Stopped disembarkation work and started back, following a course north.

3 November 1540 Put in at SHORTLAND.

4 November 2330 Set out from SHORTLAND, following the northern route.
2357 Enemy planes dropped some bombs 90° to port, distance, about 1000 meters.

5 November 2010 Parted ways with the transport fleet and continued on to the anchorage where we took up patrol.
2101 The MURASAME sighted a torpedo-boat which it illuminated and shelled.
2227 Disembarking operations were finished and we started back. The SHIGURE (DD) sighted a periscope (proceeding along a central course) and dropped depth charges.

6 November 0941 Dropped anchor at SHORTLAND.

7 November 0800 The Command Flag was transferred to the TENRYU (CL) where it was run up.
2300 Departed from SHORTLAND, following the northern route.

8 November 1926 Separated and proceeded to our patrol station. Went to the anchorage of the transport fleet.

8 November 1937 The MOCHIZUKI (DD) sighted a torpedo-boat and illuminated it.
2220 The SHIGURE, YUGURE (DD), and MOCHIZUKI went on ahead, starting back.
2245 The transport fleet completed the disembarkation work and started back.

9 November 0554 Torpedoes were fired at us by an enemy submarine, which was proceeding along the "Slot". The SHIRATSUYU (DD) and YUDACHI proceeded to attack the submarine and sink it.
0850 Put in at SHORTLAND.
1500 The DesRon Flag of the CinC of the DesRon 4 (4 sd) was transferred to the ASAGUMO and run up.

11 November Returned to the DesRon 4, our original unit.

12 November 1520 Set out from SHORTLAND (departing by the North Channel).
1330 Joined the DesRon 10 and 11 and set off for the south where a battle developed off LUNGA.

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13 November 1942	0000 Torpedoes were fired from starboard but we continued on our way. We illuminated and shelled an enemy destroyer and inflicted great damage. 0052 The YUDACHI was hit by a bomb and was unable to keep under way. 0126 It withdrew. 0906 Met up with the KIRISHIMA (BB). 0935 Set out to do rescue work at the HIEI (BB). 1414 Stopped rescue work and tried to join the Main Force. 2010 Met up with the Advance Force. 0355 Were fueled by the HARUNA (BB). 1435 Three torpedoes passed underneath our ship. We dropped depth charges. A battle broke out off SAVO Island. 2200 Sighted 3 enemy battleships. A battle in which both torpedoes and guns were used broke out. 2205 Launched a torpedo with unknown results. Our main batteries were very effective. The KIRISHIMA was hit with bombs and was unable to keep under way. 2355 Put in alongside the KIRISHIMA. The entire crew abandoned ship (IN: the KIRISHIMA).
15 November	0123 The KIRISHIMA sank. 0233 Ceased rescue operations and withdrew. 1110 Joined the SENDAI (CL) and at 2100 joined the CruDiv 8 (SC).
16 November	0600 Were supplied (with fuel) by the NICHIEI (海城丸) Maru (XAO).
18 November	0719 Put in at TRUK, entering by the North Channel.
21 November	1000 The Command Flg was transferred to the NAGARA (CL) and run up.
26 November	0800 Entered the dock.
5 December	0730 Left the dock.
6 December	0630 Left the harbor and carried out patrol to the north.
7 December	1513 Entered the harbor.
8 December	0600 Departed from the harbor and carried out patrol while the SHIGURE had firing practice. 1540 Entered the harbor.
9 December	1706 Departed from the harbor and carried out patrol to the north.
13 December	1530 Departed by the north entrance and proceeded to escort the CHUYO (ACV).
15 December	1420 The CHUYO sighted the UZUKI (DD) off the bow. 1445 Caught up with her. She turned around and we proceeded on to TRUK.
17 December	2335 Sighted a submarine on the surface and dropped 6 depth charges but were unable to determine results.
18 December	0627 Put in at TRUK by the North Channel.
20 December	1200 Departed from the harbor to carry out maneuvers. 1908 Returned.
21 December	1015 Left the harbor, escorting the CHUYO and bound for YOKOSUKA.
26 December	0715 Sighted FUJIYAMA. 1415 Entered the harbor where we were given leave.
27 December	Went to TOKYO where I paid my respects to the Imperial Palace, and worshipped at the shrine of MEIJI, and YASU-KUNI-JINJA.
2 January 1943	1545 Departed from YOKOSUKA bound for TRUK escorting the CHUYO. 1700 Left TOKYO Bay.
8 January	0700 Arrived at TRUK via the North Channel.
11 January	Were attached to the Southeast Area Fleet and were placed under the CInC of the CarDiv 2.
15 January	1200 Departed from TRUK with a patrol unit for an air-craft carrier force, CarDiv 2 (minus the HIYO) in order to carry out "C" (HEI) transport operations.
17 January	1140 Proceeded to a place about 200 miles north of WENAK. 25 fighters and 6 attack-bombers took off from the JUNYO. We headed for TRUK.

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19 January 1943 0712 Put in at TRUK via the South Channel and our escort task was concluded. Set out to finish off an enemy submarine which a float reconnaissance plane from the TAKAO (CA) had sighted and attacked at a place 25 kilometres from the South Channel at a bearing of 155°.

20 January #6C (?) Convoy was attacked by a submarine 286 nautical miles (TN: " " denotes a nautical mile) from TRUK at a bearing of 145°. The SURABAYA Maru (スラバヤ丸) was sunk and the MEIU Maru (明海丸) severely damaged.

21 January 2323 Proceeded to the rescue.
1115 Arrived at our destination.
1915 The MEIU Maru sank. Then turned back for TRUK. Picked up, however, 13 Army officers (warrant and above) and 419 enlisted men; 146 members from the crews of the two ships; and two Navy men.

22 January 0840 Returned to TRUK.

25 January The KUNIKAWA Maru (勸業丸) had engine trouble and halted in her course 300 nautical miles from TRUK at a bearing of 132°.
0523 Left TRUK to stand by her.
2130 Contact was made with the ship and we took charge of escorting her.

26 January 1200 The repairs on the KUNIKAWA Maru having been completed, proceeded to return.

27 January 1200 Arrived at TRUK.

31 January 0642 We left TRUK, as the screening unit for the advance force (AdB) and main force which were to assist in the "ke" (ヶ) Campaign. (TN: "ku" Campaign seems to be a general Japanese term for an evacuation operation.)
Our ship has been assigned to the Reinforcing Force (ZDB) of the Outer South Seas Force (SNB). Consequently, we detached ourselves from the advance force (AdB).

1 February Our ship has been assigned to the Reinforcing Force (ZDB) of the Outer South Seas Force (SNB). Consequently, we detached ourselves from the advance force (AdB).

4 February 0700 Arrived at SHORTLAND.
1000 Left there (for our second transport duty at GUADALCANAL). Returned to SHORTLAND.

5 February Left SHORTLAND (for our third transport duty at GUADALCANAL).

7 February Returned to SHORTLAND. Campaign "ke" (ヶ) is finished. Left SHORTLAND to escort the SENDAI (CL).

8 February 0130 Joined the SENDAI and returned to SHORTLAND. Left there for PALAU (with the SAMIDARE of Des Div 10).

11 February 1814 Spotted an enemy submarine. Dropped depth charges but results were undetermined. Left the SAMIDARE and headed back to RABAUl to relieve our commander (SHIRIKI).

12 February 0900 Capt. KONISHI relieved our commander and assumed his new duties.
Capt. SATO left the ship.

13 February 1340 Left RABAUl for PALAU.

14 February 1400 Arrived at PALAU.

17 February 0900 Left PALAU for WEMAK, escorting the MIYOSUMI Maru (三浦丸), the AIKOKU Maru (愛国丸), and the GOKOKU Maru (国国丸), engaged in Operation #81.

19 February 1800 Entered WEMAK Anchorage. Kept a mobile guard.

22 February 0530 Unloading completed. Left the convoy and headed back to RABAUl.

23 February 1450 Arrived at RABAUl.

24 February 1250 Took on supplies (at KONOPO) for the Army.

27 February 2255 Left RABAUl (in a transport operation to LAE). Came in contact with enemy planes in the evening.

28 February 0630 Fought several enemy planes (PBV's and B-17's). The KOKUSEI Maru (国策丸) was so damaged by bombs that she sank. Rescued those aboard, however.

1 March 1420 Raided again by several B-17's. Together with the YUKIKAZE (DD) went on ahead to LAE. Supplies were unloaded for our troops.

2 March

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3 March 1943 Rejoined the convoy.
0700 Fought off a 100-odd enemy fighters, bombers, and torpedo bombers, 10 or so of our own planes came to our defense. The convoy was destroyed. Rescued survivors, but discontinued this at 1300 and withdrew, changing our course southward and scouting. Able to detect nothing, however.

4 March 1640 Arrived at KAVIENG. Came alongside the SENDAI and got some supplies.
2200 Left KAVIENG for RABAU.

5 March 0600 Arrived at RABAU.

7 March 1700 Left RABAU for SHORTLAND (with the YUKIKAZE, SHIKINAMI (DD), and URANAMI (DD)).

8 March 1043 Arrived at SHORTLAND.
1700 Left there through the south entrance (in the KOLOMBANGARA ferry service). Completed our unloading there and proceeded to return.

9 March We separated from the SHIKINAMI and URANAMI.
1642 Arrived at RABAU.

12 March 1700 Left RABAU for SHORTLAND (with the YUKIKAZE and MINATSUBI (DD)).

13 March 1700 Left SHORTLAND through the south entrance (in the KOLOMBANGARA ferry service). Completed our unloading there and proceeded to return.

14 March 0600 Arrived at SHORTLAND. Moved supplies, then left again.
1839 Arrived at RABAU.

30 March Left RABAU for SHORTLAND (with the SAMIDARE, YUGUMO (DD), KAZEGUMO (DD), and AKIGUMO (DD)).

31 March Arrived at SHORTLAND, then left through the south entrance (in the KOLOMBANGARA ferry service). Were in continual contact with enemy planes, making it difficult to unload. Abandoned all thought of unloading finally and proceeded to return.

1 April 1700 Left again through the south entrance (in the KOLOMBANGARA ferry service). Completed our unloading there and proceeded to return.

2 April Arrived SHORTLAND, leaving again for BUKA. Arrived at BUKA and picked up fuel.

3 April 0500 Left BUKA for SHORTLAND. Arrived there and found the KAZEGUMO and a merchantman damaged by a mine. (We suspect magnetic mines had been laid in the harbor.)

5 April 1700 Left through the south entrance (in the KOLOMBANGARA ferry service). Completed our unloading and proceeded to return.

6 April Returned to SHORTLAND, leaving again for TRUK. One B-25 attacked us, but its bombs went wide of their mark.

9 April 0800 Arrived at TRUK.

10 April 0600 Left TRUK for YOKOSUKA.

13 April 1000 Arrived there, mooring to Buoy Y-17.

20 April Received a furlough and returned to my home at 1030 (until the 24th).

26 April 1130 Left for the (ATAMI) Health Resort.

28 April 1000 Returned (to To YOKOSUKA). I was now to be stationed aboard the USUGUMO (DD).

29 April Left my old ship after lunch.

30 April 0954 Arrived at OMINATO (by train). Went aboard my new ship the USUGUMO.

12 May The situation in the northern area having changed suddenly, stopped our present work.
2345 Left OMINATO for PARAMUSHIRO.

15 May 0415 Arrived at the PARAMUSHIRO Straits.

20 May 0725 Moving through the north entrance to PARAMUSHIRO, we went on patrol duty.

21 May 0520 Returned to PARAMUSHIRO.

25 May 1630 Left PARAMUSHIRO for ATTU. (We were to attack the enemy fleet by surprise, transport urgently needed materiel, and pick up liaison men.)

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30 May 1943 0240 Ceased our operations and proceeded to return.
 31 May 0825 Returned to PARAMUSHIRO.
 2 June 0612 Left to clean out enemy subs operating south of
 ARAIDO Island.
 3 June 1100 Ceased this work and returned to PARAMUSHIRO.
 5 June Today was the occasion of the national funeral of
 YAMAMOTO, Admiral of the Fleet.
 0700 Observed his passing with a half-mast ceremony.
 7 June The SHIRAKUMO (DD) collided with the NUMAKAZE (DD) 12
 nautical miles off CAPE LOPATKA at a bearing of 122°.
 0115 Headed in that direction to lend assistance.
 0355 Joined the SHIRAKUMO.
 Returned to PARAMUSHIRO, escorting her.
 0950 Entered the harbor there.
 19 June 1125 Left to determine the calibration of our direction
 finder.
 1455 Having done this, returned again.
 23 June 0320 Left PARAMUSHIRO Harbor escorting the IKUSHIMA Maru ✓
 (いくしま丸).
 1530 Ceased escorting and left the other ship.
 2025 Joined the NITTEI Maru (のてい丸) ✓ and escorted it.
 24 June 0648 Ceased escorting and entered the harbor (いしづき
 MUSHIRO ?)
 1000 Came alongside the HAKKAI Maru (はっかい丸) ✓. Equipped
 her with counter-radar (GYAKUTAN) and loaded landing
 barges on her.
 26 June 1155 Left the side of the HAKKAI Maru.
 30 June 1700 Received warning to go on watch duty.
 1950 Weighed anchor and left port (headed for a spot 23
 nautical miles out of BETTOBU NUMA at a bearing of 350°
 where a submarine attack had been reported).
 1 July 0930 Entered PARAMUSHIRO Harbor.
 5 July 1930 Left (to participate in the "ke" Campaign at KISKA).
 10 July 0205 Planned to make a dash for KISKA, but the weather was
 not favorable for it, so at 2030 we changed our course
 and withdrew.
 11 July 0550 Joined the NIPPON Maru (XAO) ✓ and received oil.
 12 July 0735 Made a second attempt to dash into KISKA, but reversed
 our course again at 1520 because of unfavorable condi-
 tions.
 13 July 0240 Made our third attempt.
 1703 Gave up again.
 2145 Made our fourth attempt.
 14 July 0156 Gave up once more.
 1500 Tried for the fifth time.
 15 July 0430 Gave up again.
 0820 Ceased our operations and returned to PARAMUSHIRO.
 18 July 0830 Entered PARAMUSHIRO Harbor.
 19 July 0630 Received an air raid warning for the northern KURILES.
 0645 Five B-24's bombed us but there was no damage.
 22 July 2000 Left for the second phase of our participation in the
 "ke" Campaign.
 26 July 1750 The KUNIJIRI (CM) and the ABUKUMA (CL) collided (due to
 this, there was some confusion produced in the roar of
 the formation, and the WAKABA (DD), HATSUSHIMO (DD), and
 NAGANAWA (DD) also collided).
 29 July 1105 Sighted the outline of an island.
 1316 The ABUKUMA sighted the enemy and fired some torpedoes.
 It developed that we had mistaken LITTLE KISKA for the
 enemy.
 1321 The SHIMAKAZE fired its guns.
 1350 Dropped anchor in KISKA Harbor.
 1405 Had finished taking aboard the men.
 1420 The 2nd Transport Unit had finished.
 1427 Departed.
 31 July 0604 The weather cleared up.
 1530 We entered the harbor at PARAMUSHIRO.

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1 August 1943	1000 The 1st Transport Unit arrived.
3 August	1700 Departed from PARAMUSHIRO bound for OMINATO.
6 August	0600 Put in at OTARU.
7 August	0730 Went ashore at YOKOSUKA Naval Base.
8 August	1400 Arrived at YOKOSUKA having received orders to report to the Commandant of the Naval Torpedo School for duty. Started courses for torpedo-boat captain.
16 August	Concluding my courses.
15 September	Received orders assigning me to the YOKOSUKA Guard Unit (SHIBITAI) and placing me in command of the Number 10 Torpedo-Boat.
20 September	

AN ACCOUNT OF THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

7 December 1941 Imperial Rescript to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet:
"We, by ordering this despatch, delegate you to have the responsibility of commanding the Combined Fleet. The responsibilities of the Combined Fleet will be extremely heavy and success or failure of the matter concerns the fate of the country. You have made progress by urging the achievements of Fleet-drill for many years, and you must be determined to meet our expectations by exalting our force and authority throughout the world by annihilating the enemy."

Reply to the Emperor by the C-in-C of the Combined Fleet:
"I was overwhelmingly impressed by the gracious Imperial Rescript, at the outbreak of the war, and I shall carry out his great orders with reverence. The officers and men of the Combined Fleet have sworn to do their utmost and they will accomplish the aim of the despatch. They are determined to accept and carry out the Emperor's Commands."

Orders from the C-in-C to the Combined Fleet:
"The fate of our empire hangs on this war. Each man must do his utmost to fulfill his obligations."

8 December 1941 The Imperial Edict declaring war against the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND was issued.
Imperial Rescript to the Ministers of the Army and Navy was received.
Acceptance by the Minister of the Navy.
Orders to the Minister of the Navy and his department in general.
Success of the surprise attack on HAWAII by our striking force:

Surface Craft

Sunk:	4 BB's, 2 Cruisers, 1 Oiler
Seriously Damaged:	2 BB's, 2 Cruisers, 2 DD's.
Moderately Damaged:	2 BB's, 4 Cruisers.

Aircraft

Seriously Damaged:	157 Planes
Razed:	(some) Hangars
Our Losses:	39 Planes

At this time our southern forces started to make landings. Successful ones were made at KOTA BILIRU, SINGORA, BATAAN, BANGKOK, and ALBOINA. The wireless station and airfield at BASCO in the BATAAN Islands north of LUZON were occupied. At SHANGHAI, the British gunboat PENGUIN was sunk. The International Settlement was entered. At PEKING, the American Marines laid down their arms. SINGAPORE was bombed. MIDWAY and WAKE Islands were bombed. CLARK Field and IBA on LUZON were attacked. We have taken over British and American rights and privileges in the southern islands. GUAM was bombed. HONGKONG and DAVAO were bombed.

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- 9 December 1941 WAKE and GUAM were bombed. The American seaplane carrier LANGLEY was sunk (in DAVAO BAY). An enemy sub appeared off TAKAO Harbor.
- 10 December The results of our HAWAII Operation were the occasion for joy; an Imperial Rescript was presented to the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet. A THAI-JAPANESE offensive and defensive alliance has been signed. WAKE Island was attacked. The HAYATE (DD) and KISARAGI (DD) were shelled and sunk. Successful landings were made at VIGAN on LUZON; we suffered the loss of one sub-chaser. Occupation of GUAM completed. APARRI on LUZON also captured. MAKIN and TARAWA occupied. Minesweeper #19 wrecked off the mouth of the CAGAYAN River on LUZON. An English fleet was attacked off the MALAY coast, and two of the latest British battleships, the PRINCE OF WALES and the REPULSE, were sunk.
- Imperial Rescript:
"At the very outbreak of this war, our Combined Fleet has displayed a brilliant strategy and fought bravely. At HAWAII it has heavily crushed the enemy's fleet and air strength. We have received the report of this signal achievement ourselves. Moreover, we extend our deepest praise to our fighting forces, officers and men alike. If they should strive harder and harder, we foresee a magnificent future for our Empire."
- 11 December Establishment of the ROME-BERLIN-TOKYO Tri-partite Pact. Attack on WAKE. The results of the naval action off MALAYA were the occasion for joy; an Imperial Rescript was presented to the C-in-C, Combined Fleet.
"The Air Force of the Combined Fleet has crushed the main force of the English Asiatic Fleet in the SOUTH CHINA SEA and has enhanced our power and prestige throughout the area. We are deeply pleased."
Answer of C-in-C.
Declaration of war against AMERICA by ITALY and GERMANY.
Success of landing at LEGASPE.
- 15 December 1 Enemy Sub off TOKYO Bay
1 Enemy Sub in the BUNGO CHANNEL
3 Enemy Subs near CHICHIJIMA
- 16 December WAKE attacked.
10 Enemy subs near CHICHIJIMA
1 Enemy sub near TRUK
3 Enemy subs at SHIO SAKI (汐崎)
- 17 December The SHINONOME was lost 15 km north of BARAM POINT while on patrol off MIRI. The RO-66 collided with the RO-62 twenty-five miles west of WAKE and sank instantly. The RO-62 suffered practically no damage.
- 19 December WAKE bombed. A Dutch submarine near PALAU.
- 20 December PANAMA, COSTA RICA, NICARAGUA, HONDURAS, GUATEMALA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, CUBA, HAITI have declared war on JAPAN. MEXICO has broken off relations with JAPAN.
Enemy Submarines:
Near TOKYO Bay 2-4 BUNGO Channel 2-4
" KII 2-4 BONIN Islands 3-4
" MARCUS Islands 1-2 TAIWAN STRAIT 2-4
" HAINAN Island 2 PALAU 4-5
" MARIANA Islands 1-2
- 22 December Successfully landed at LINGAYEN.
- 23 December Complete occupation of WAKE. Striking Force arrived at HASHIRA SHIMA (near KURE).

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25 December 1941 Surrender of HONG KONG.
A successful surprise landing was made at JOLO on MINDANAO.
26 December The SAGIRI (DD) received a submarine torpedo attack north of KUCHING (SARAWAI) and sank. KUCHING occupied.
The #6 Minesweeper and the UNYO #2 Haruo (第二号丸) were sunk by air bombing.
The MURASAME (DD) collided with the #20 minesweeper at TAKAC.
-- December Air attack at MANILA.
1 DD, 2 SS, 10 merchant ships sunk.
The ASAKAZE sank 1 SS at LINGAYEN.
27 December The C-in-C of the American Army of the PHILIPPINES declared MANILA an open city. MANILA was heavily bombed.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF GUAM (OMIYAJIMA)

(12 December 1941)

Installations:

There are facilities for 1 Naval Station.
There is one land air-base. There is also a seaplane base and dredging facilities. There is a PAA flying boat base which is used as a seaplane base. Submarine base facilities are being expanded. There are shore batteries.
Naval Personnel - about 500 men.
Army Personnel - about 1600 men.

Supplies:

Coal - about 6,000 tons.
Heavy oil - there are 6 heavy oil tanks but their capacity is not known.
There are ammunition storerooms.
Fresh water and provisions - small quantities.

Others:

APRA Harbor is suitable for protection from the wind all year around.
8 or 9 large warships can put in here. There are no suitable anchorages for other vessels.

GUAM OCCUPATION FORCE BATTLE REPORT

The GUAM Island Occupation Forces protected the Southern Detachment (TN: NAN SHI TAI 南支隊) and began landing at 0500 on the tenth. While they continued mopping up activities and this force (TN: the GUAM Occupation Force) and the SNLF advanced to the important positions surrounding APRA Harbor (TN: 泊港) and occupied it completely. The enemy lost his fighting spirit because of the attacks of several days previous by our air forces.


Results of the Battle:

- A. We took prisoner the governor and many government employees, and about 200 Marines, including their commander.
- B. There was fighting in the streets of AGANA (TN: アガナ). 50 were killed.
- C. It was estimated that APRA Harbor would be cleared of mines and ships able to anchor within ten days. One oil tank, the gun batteries and powder magazines had been blown up, however, the oil was still burning after 3 days.
- D. A 3,000 ton merchantman was seized. 100 kilolitres of airplane fuel was taken, as was much construction material (steel, bombs, too).
- E. The wireless and cable stations were both severely damaged and unfit for use.

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SKETCH MAP OF HAHU SHIMA - 2 December 1941




Eleven transports were in the harbor (part of the GUAN Occupation Force)


HASHIRA SHIMA → HAHU SHIMA

CHICHI SHIMA

HAHA SHIMA



HAHU SHIMA → GUAN 800 miles



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Page 18My Opinions:

For about 6 months before it was attacked, construction was in progress on GUAM: plans had been made on a large scale to make the island a sub base. Looking at the condition of the project after our occupation, I would venture to say that by strengthening these installations, the enemy will be unable to avoid damage by our (TN: submarine) forces a few months later on.

I think the success of our occupation here was primarily due to the enemy's utterly deficient (defense), and then, too, the bold way in which we carried out our surprise attack. But I realize that, our next operation must, at all costs, be begun as soon as possible.

SUMMARY OF WAKE ISLAND

27 December 1941

Military Installations

There is a base for the Pan-American Airways flying boats. Planes draw up alongside docks. As a base for flying boats, its value is greater than that of MIDWAY. There is a wireless station.

Supplies

There are some facilities. On PEALE Island are the facilities of the Pan-American Airways. There is an air-craft beacon, a powerplant, a hotel, and a wireless station. It is on the supply line which runs to MIDWAY and HONOLULU and (going southwest) to GUAM.

Harbors

As a haven from wind and waves its value is greater than that of MIDWAY. Work had been proceeding on a channel which was to be 300 feet wide. At the entrance to the channel, the coral reef was to be cut to a depth of 35 feet and on the inner side, to a depth of 30 feet (TN: This refers to the channel under construction at the outbreak of the war. The outer channel was to be 35 feet deep, the turning basin 30 feet deep, and the width of the channel, 300 feet.)


There are no anchorages in the vicinity and vessels tie up to buoys.

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY OF THE WAKE ISLAND OCCUPATION

28 December 1941

1. Occupation scheduled for X / 4 day. (Occupation forces began operations after $\frac{N}{X}$.) (TN: Noon on X Day; X Day = December 23 ?).
2. Reconnaissance carried out 4 December ($\frac{4}{12}$) by 6 flying boats δ (from 22nd squadron (CHUTAI) headquarters) and 12 land-based aircraft ($f^u \times 12$).
3. 8 December 1000
30 land-attack planes (f^{10}) carried out a bombing attack. (2 land planes (f^u) out of 9 were probably destroyed, one tank at the seaplane base (f^2) was destroyed by fire; 3 fighter planes (fc) were sighted, but they did not engage our aircraft.) (Japanese casualties: 1 Petty Officer killed, several planes damaged by shell-fire.)
4. 9 December 0940
A bombing attack was carried out by 26 land attack aircraft (TN: f_{10}) (5 fighter planes were shot down, the north wing of the barracks was destroyed by fire, part of the airfield (f^2) was demolished, the seaplane base (f^2) radio station was bombed. No flying boats (fd) were sighted. Radio communications were disrupted from 1005 to 2145.) (Japanese casualties: 1 Air Warrant Officer killed, 1 man slightly wounded, 14 planes damaged by shell fire.)
5. 10 December 2230
A convoy of eleven merchant ships approached the south coast in a heavy swell. Landing operations were postponed, waiting for an improvement in weather conditions.

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RUOTTO → WAKE

- ⚔ - Long Range Field Gun in Position
- ☐ - W/T Station
- P - Patrol Boat
- (S) - First Attack (S) Second Attack
- 1 - Flng 29 Desdiv
- ↑ - IMG ?
- ☐ - 3 Gun Emplacement ?

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6. 11 December 0645 The WAKE radio began transmitting to PEARL HARBOR (TN: "NPM").
7. 11 December Jap casualties: The HAYAKAZE (DD) exploded and sank at 0452.
The KISABAGI (DD) exploded and sank at 0531.
The KONGO Maru (MCL) was damaged by a hold fire. Rough weather still prevailed in the afternoon and (the landing force) decided to withdraw to KAWAJALEIN to make further plans. At 0715, 11 December, 17 land attack planes (TN: f10) attacked the PEARL Island shore batteries and MG positions, and were engaged by fighters for 30 minutes. One fighter was shot down. (Japanese losses: 2 land planes destroyed, 1 reserve 1st Lieutenant, 9 petty officers, and 5 enlisted men killed, 11 aircraft damaged by shell-fire, 1 man slightly wounded.)
8. 11 December 2330 The positions of two naval craft were fixed by RDF in the vicinity of WAKE Island (the ships were thought to be patrol craft, seaplane tenders or oilers).
9. 11 December 2050 The 27 has withdrawn from the WAKE (attack) force and is joining the submarine force. Most of the submarine force is engaged in patrolling WAKE.
10. 11 December 1100 The TSUGARU (CM) and the MAIZURU 2nd SNLF are standing by for the occupation of WAKE. At 0900 12 December (the attack group) secured from readiness and the SNLF units returned.
11. 12 December The HOYO Maru (XAO) returned to RUOTTO for supplies.
12. 12 December 1000 CruDiv 6 (TN: 6S) is to return before 16 December to RUOTTO in order to aid in the operation of the area.
13. 12 December 0840 26 land planes (commanded by Lieut. Commander MATSUDA) bombed WAKE. (A warehouse and the western sector AA gun were demolished. Two fighter planes engaged the attack group.) (Japanese casualties: 1 plane exploded, 6 petty officers and 2 enlisted men killed, 4 planes damaged by shell-fire.)
14. An (American) naval vessel appearing at WAKE radioed COM 14th Naval District at 0552, 0721, and 0937, 12 December.
15. 12 December 1145 The position of the American naval vessel which was transmitting is — nautical miles from WAKE at a bearing of 1150 60'.
16. 13 December 0530 The WAKE occupation force has arrived at RUOTTO.
17. 12 December 0100 Fifteen land planes bombed WAKE with undetermined results. Two 5 place flying boats (TN: 2 f^d x 2/5) bombed the airfield (M). There was an air battle. (Japanese casualties: 1 flying boat failed to return.)
18. 13 December 0130 COM CruDiv 6 requested of Chief of Staff, 4th Fleet to include the MAIZURU 2nd SNLF and the KIYOKAWA Maru (APV) in the WAKE occupation force.
19. 13 December 1010 A fighter-reconnaissance plane attached to Airflot 24 (at 5000 meters altitude) observing through a hole in the clouds (reported the following): One or two fighter planes in the revetments at the west side of the runway; no flying boats; one merchant ship carrying out unloading operations.
20. 13 December 1800 Cooperated with Striking Force (TN: KB).
21. 13 December 2320 The gunboat (TN: C) group has been disbanded. The WAKE (occupation) force has been reinforced (TENYO Maru (APV), KIYOKAWA Maru (APV), one company of the MAIZURU SNLF, 2 DD of Des iv 24.)
22. 14 December Three 10 place flying boats (TN: f^d x 3/10) (under Lieut. Commander TASHIRO) at 0137 and 30 land-based planes at 0855 under Commander UCHINO bombed WAKE. (Direct hits were scored on the runway, revetments and one fighter plane set afire; the warehouse was set on fire. (Japanese casualties: 11 fighters damaged by shell-fire.)

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23. 15 December 1610 8 flying boats (under the command of Lieut. Commander KOIZUMI) effectively bombed the barracks area in the northern part of the main island.
24. 16 December 32 land-attack planes (commanded by Lieut. MATANABE) and one fighter (at 7000 altitude) (reported the following): About 20 AA mobile guns, and a number of high-speed torpedo boats have appeared. (A heavy oil tank, an ammunition magazine and a warehouse were set on fire, and the base on PEALE Island effectively bombed.) (Jap. casualties: 3 land-attack planes were damaged by shell-fire.)
25. 17 December 1555 8 flying boats bombed the southeast section of PEALE Island. (Causing explosions at the AA gun, the hotel, and wireless station.)
26. 18 December 0940 Land-attack bombers (Type I) carried out reconnaissance. The southeast channel was blocked up.
27. 19 December 0845 27 land-based attack bombers bombed the airfield [] on ILKES Island. 1 fighter engaged them. The anti-aircraft guns on the airfield on ILKES Island and one MG Unit were destroyed. (Japanese losses: One man killed aboard plane. 12 attack bombers (TN: here fld) were hit by shells.
28. 20 December 1330 A flight of enemy patrol planes arrived (TN: SHOKAIKI).

CONDITION OF THE ENEMY

(Based upon aerial reconnaissance and sundry intelligence reports)

1. Marines — 300
2. Civilians employed by the Military — 1000
3. Dual purpose guns — 12 (part with mobile emplacements).
4. Coast defense batteries, machine gun positions — a great number.
5. Fighters — several
6. Submarines and torpedo-boats are lurking in the vicinity

OUR FORCES

1. Air Forces of the South Seas Force are carrying out bombing attacks day after day.
2. A Submarine force (RO-60, 61, 62) — is carrying out patrols around the island.
3. Reinforcement Butai (SORYU and HIRYU) on the 20th cooperated in landing operations by sending their planes in to attack.
4. Attacking Force —
(Flagship) YUBARI (CL), SubRon 6 (6SS).
Landing Force — KONGO Maru, KINKYU Maru, Patrol Boats Nos. 32 and 33;
Combined SNLF.
SNLF Headquarters.
1st Company (Company commanded by UCHIDA, MAIZURU SNLF)
2nd Company (Company commanded by TAKANO, 6th Base Force)
3rd Company (Company commanded by ITAYA, MAIZURU SNLF)
5. Covering Force —
TERUYU (CL) and TATSUTA (CL).
6. Supporting Force —
Cru iv 6 (6S).

PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED SHOULD ENEMY (SHIP) BE ENCOUNTERED

1. The ships which sight the enemy shall expend every effort to conceal our force by laying smoke screens and by other means.
 2. In the event that enemy surface naval vessels approach, in accordance with orders, the KINKYU Maru and the patrol boats shall avail themselves of every opportunity to retire from the disputed area.
- The SubRon 6 (6SS) and the Cru iv 18 (18S) are to annihilate the enemy.

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MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY

1. Limited use of radio.
2. Light control
3. Localized use of lights for signalling at night and, as demanded by the situation, proper control of illuminating strength. May be used to determine bearing.
4. Throwing overboard things which will float in the water is strictly forbidden.
5. Disposal of bilge water which contains oily matter.

OPERATIONS OF THE SUPPORTING FORCE

1. On the 21st at 0800 the Force will leave WELU Channel. The landing force will carry out a landing at 0200 on the same day. The Force will proceed to a point about 50 miles to the east of WAKE Island and thereafter, shall act as the enemy situation may warrant.
 2. When the attack on WAKE gets under way, the Force shall proceed to a point about 50 miles to the southeast of the island and patrol in support (TN: of the attack).
- 23 December 1030 The occupation of WAKE Island has been completed.

SUMMARY OF THE BATTLE

1. Enemy prisoners: Lt.-Colonel and his command — 430
Skilled laborers — 1100
In addition to this, many were killed and we acquired many installations, gun emplacements, and ammunition.
2. Our Losses:
Killed — UCHIDA Company — 9
Seriously Wounded — 19 Men on Patrol Boat No. 32
Slightly Wounded — 34
In addition to these losses, 2 patrol boats were heavily damaged and 1 plane was shot down.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE BATTLE

1. When we think about the lessons that may be learned from a battle, we must view it with the eyes of a critic and to the end maintain the point of view of the other side.
2. Strive to the utmost to learn about the state of affairs of the enemy; though you may have exhausted every means to learn this, and you may believe that you know enough about it, you never know enough. However, after you have learned about the enemy and have made thorough preparations, there remains only the necessity for resolute action.
3. When it comes time to carry out the operation, look at the situation as the enemy does and try to discover his weak points.
4. Always take into account obstacles that may result from the weather (wind and waves, and range of vision).
5. Do not be defeated by a multiplicity of plans. Assemble similar plans into one whole.
6. In the light of the battle, it is foolish to refrain from delivering an all-out attack.
7. The distribution of military strength should be considered principally with regard to the main strategy. The decision as to the time of commencement of action must be made carefully.
8. It is essential in an operation that the various types of aircraft be brought together.
9. The fact that damage from accidental explosions (YUBAKU) of torpedoes and depth charges was very great should be borne in mind.
10. In war, the chances of success are three to seven. Out of 81 men 50 were killed. However, several hundred prisoners were taken and we captured the whole island. The side that fights well the last five minutes is the one that wins.
11. When battle is undertaken, the leadership of the commanding officers should be firm. By no means, may there be any faltering, or hesitation. When preparations have been made, action should follow.

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12. Though it is easy to throw away one's life by being impetuous, when once it is realized that death is pleasant, to live and do one's duty is difficult.
13. The idealist and the materialist are complimentary. The fallacy of AMERICA which worships materialism has been exposed.
14. Leadership in battle: Inform even the engine-room hands who cannot see the enemy of the situation. Exhaust all one's knowledge and ability when he is in a fatal position.
15. Acquisition of air supremacy is necessary. However, naval vessels still fulfill their peculiar purpose.
16. In glorious battle, the function of the supporting force is a thankless task.
17. Orders must be carefully considered. Once, however, they have been given, they should be carried out to the letter.
18. Inventiveness and originality. The most profitable use of new weapons is the responsibility of the strategist. (Believe earnestly in certain victory.)
19. Since the advancement of AA weapons is very slow we must fight planes with planes, and also we must destroy the base before the enemy can rise.
20. Importance of air bases (Bases for action). Planes must inevitably have bases.
21. The capture of the isolated island by occupation operations will be comparatively difficult as the whole island is a fortress; and, in addition to this, operating freely will be extremely difficult.
22. There are opportunities in battle. Seizing these opportunities wins victories; when one misses these opportunities he cannot win a victory no matter what he does.
23. Occupation operations and submarines. The enemy can only prove a threat by means of its submarines. It must be said that if the enemy were to conceal even one or two submarines in the vicinity of WAKE Island, they would be a great menace to our operations.
24. Operational Directions.
 - (A) Combined operations (KYODO S.KUSEN) are not feasible, as a rule. If there were a Naval Special Landing Force of 20,000 men, landing operations would be easy. In combined operations there are many occasions where opportunities are missed for striking at weak points with force. (JITSU TO MOTTE, KYO TO UTSU)
 - (B) Insufficient military strength causes unforeseen failure. It is said that the lion exhausts his entire strength even to catch one rabbit.
 - (C) A force without a central unit (SHUTAI) is not possible. There is a need for operational leaders to amass (information).

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Page 23THE BISMARCK SEA OPERATIONS
28 January, 1942

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BISMARCK SEA OPERATIONS:

1. POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE (FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC):

Foreign: In our war with ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES we are bringing to bear, as might have been expected, economic pressure and we are dispatching against ENGLAND in the Orient armies of deliverance. We shall deliver a fatal blow against AUSTRALIA and shall carry out such attacks as will uproot the foundations of the British Colonial Empire which even now is in the process of disintegration.

Domestic: In reading the history of the sea-girt Island Empire of JAPAN, as is natural, traces of those peerless men who ventured upon the seas and embarked upon adventures abroad are not lacking. Though it may be said that it was the WAKO (TN: A band of pirates who roamed the seas of CHINA and KOREA during the ASHIKAGA period) who revealed the spirit of the Japanese nation by hoisting the ancient flag inscribed "HACHIMAN, GREAT BODDHI-SATVA" (TN: HACHIMAN is the God of War in the Japanese pantology; BODDHI-SATVA is the BUDDHA-ELECT) and crossing the seas, the TOKUGAWA's closed the country for the long period of three hundred years (TN: 1638-1867) and the overseas expansion dissolved into nothingness like a dream. The delusion of national isolation was finally destroyed. Though it may be said that great strides forward were made during the period of MEIJI, it was a period of self-examination and development. During the TAISHO era we saw the nation carried away by the tide of international liberalism and effeminate ideals of peace. Retrenchment was a mistake.

The present invasion, however, will awaken a billion people. Our confidence is unshaken and we proceed with the conviction that we shall smash through the strong points of the enemy by this southern advance and that we shall bring the campaign to a most successful conclusion. We shall spare not the slightest effort.

2. ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE:

The resources of NEW GUINEA have not yet been exploited. The mining industry, especially in the production of gold, is well-known. There are fisheries. Being an intermediate trading place, its future possibilities as a relay base for transportation and communications are enormous.

3. MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE:

a. A stronghold from which aggressive offensives may be launched.

It cuts the most advantageous South Pacific line of the American offensive strategy against JAPAN—HAWAII, HOWLAND ISLAND, SAMOA, FIJI, SOLOMON ISLANDS, and BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

b. From the standpoint of defense, it is a buttress against invasion.

It presents a powerful defensive front against the south.

c. A base from which to carry out blockade:

The sea routes which bind AUSTRALIA to ASIA will lie within bombing range of our planes. The shipping lanes, bays and ports which lie beyond bombing range may be threatened by our submarines based in the BISMARCK SEA.

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STRENGTH OF THE ATTACKING FORCES:

1. NAVY:

a. Striking and Holding Fleet (TN: KAKUYO-KANTAI):

Main Units:

MineDiv 19 (OKINOSHIMA Flagship, TSUGARU, TENYO MARU,
MOGAMIGAWA MARU)✓

SubDiv 6 (YUBARI Flagship);

DesDiv 29 (OITE Flagship, ASANAGI and YUNAGI);

DesDiv 30 (MITSUKI Flagship, YAYOI and MOCHIZUKI);

KIYOKAWA (第11号艦), KONGO 第5戦隊, 5th Gun-
boat Squadron, 14th Minesweeper Squadron, and
Submarine-chaser Div 56.

Supporting Units:

CruDiv 18 (TEIRYU Flagship, TATSUTA);

DesDiv 23 (KINITSUKI Flagship, UZUKI and YUZUKI).

KINRYU (TN: 第10号艦)

MAIZURU 2nd SNLF

HIROSHIMA Naval Landing Force, one company.

b. Air Forces at TRUK:

YOKOHAMA Naval Air Group (14 flying boats);

CHITOSE Naval Air Group (9 fighters and 18 medium
attack bombers).

c. Indirect Guard Forces:

Supporting Force—6th Fleet;

TRUK Area Guard Force;

SAIPAN Area Guard Force;

Cooperating Forces:

CarDiv 1

~~CarDiv 3~~
CarDiv 3 (half)

2. ARMY:

Commander-in-Chief of South Seas Detachment: Major-General
SCHEI Tamiaro,

Infantry—144th Regiment;

Cavalry—3rd Company;

Mountain Gun Troops—1st Battalion;

Engineers—1st Company;

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Commissary-----2nd Company;

Mobile Field AA---1st Company;

(The above all from the 55th Infantry Division).

(TN: In the original, this to "Navy and Army", is ruled through and marked "not permissible".)

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY IN THE BISMARCK AREA:

1. Surface Vessels:

a. Australian Fleet;

2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, a few other ships.

Location not clearly known.

b. Anglo-/American Fleet;

5 battleships, 2 carriers, 4 heavy cruisers, unknown number of destroyers. It is not known whether or not they will engage in battle (TN: RAIKŌ 来攻).

2. Aircraft:

Several flying boats; several torpedo-bombers. Airfield.

Total planes, all types: about 50 (British and Australian).

Total flying boats: under 50 (American).

3. Submarines:

There is as yet no information concerning the situation of enemy submarines. There is a great possibility that American submarines have gradually made their way west. We assume, too, that British and Dutch submarines have made an appearance in the BISMARCK Sea Area.

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IMPORTANT POINTS ABOUT RABAU

29 January 1942

I. MILITARY AFFAIRS:

1. Air Fields (TN: ☒): RABAU and VUMAKANAU
2. Defenses: Volunteer Defense Army (1 rifle company;
1 MG platoon), Roving Patrols (JUNKEITAI
巡警隊) about 172.
Australian soldiers: About 500
Batteries: Under construction at
3 places.
3. Security: 20 miles outside the harbor guard by planes.
Outsiders forbidden to approach the air field
and at night the movements of the Japanese
are watched.

II. ESSENTIALS OF GOVERNMENT:

"Territory of NEW GUINEA" Government Offices, Customs House, Law Courts
Post Office, Wireless Station, Prison, Hospital.

III. POPULATION:

Urban Areas ----- about 4,000
If nearby villages are included: about 12,500

Of which are:

Natives	10,300 (majority MICRONESIAN)
Whites	1,000
Chinese	1,200
Japanese	25

IV. CONDITIONS OF THE HARBOR:

1. It is easy for a formation to enter the harbor.
2. The body of water which lies north of an east-west line drawn through DANAPLA Rocks has a length of approximately 2 miles and a maximum breadth of 1.5 miles. Mud bottom. Depth of the water is from 84.1 — 100 metres, but the northern half is 47 metres or less in depth. The anchorage for warships is, for the most part, between 10.9 and 31.5 metres in depth while the anchorage for merchant shipping is 36.5 metres deep.
3. Berthing capacity for the harbor is 5 CruDivs.
4. It affords excellent shelter.
5. Whenever there is a steady south-east wind blowing strongly, the southern half is bound to be rough.
6. Sea-defense is easy.

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METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE RABAU AREA

(31 January 1942)

1. GENERAL

Two periods are distinguished -- that of the northwest seasonal wind which extends from December to April and that of the southeast seasonal wind which extends from April to November.

In the winter, the northeast tradewinds of the northern hemisphere are constantly blowing, part of which cross the equator and penetrate into the southern hemisphere. When the northwest seasonal winds begin, the southeast seasonal wind gradually recedes with the fall of the southern hemispheric high pressure. It is believed that, about January, the area of variable winds at the ends of the north and south air fronts (IN: doldrum area) passes over the RABAU region. As a consequence, the weather in this area is generally uncertain.

2. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WEATHER

- (a) Land and sea breezes are conspicuous.
However, they rarely exceed an altitude of 500 metres and their area are generally restricted to about 10 miles including inland and sea.
- (b) Windless Nights.
It is said that this phenomenon is more conspicuous during clear weather than during cloudy weather.
- (c) Daily change of atmospheric pressure.
The atmospheric pressure, as in the case of the inner South Seas shows a regular daily change. Maximum highs are at 0900 and 2200 while maximum lows are at 0400 and 1600.
- (d) Amount of Rainfall.
January has the heaviest rainfall of the year. An average amount of over 400 mm. of rain fall.
- (e) Wind.
In January, southerly winds are slightly more numerous, 35% while northerly winds are somewhat fewer - 30%.
However, in February, the southerly winds are reduced to 20% while northerly winds are increased to 40%. Judging from this in January, the winds alternate north and south with this area as the center of the doldrums region while in February the doldrums line has moved south.

3. WEATHER FORECASTING

Judging from various conditions:

- (a) In the case of a northwesterly wind, heavy rains accompanying sudden squalls. Weather generally bad and continuing for several days.
- (b) In the case of a southeasterly wind:
Winds are generally light. Weather in this region probably good.
- (c) In the case of the doldrums line same as paragraph (a).
Weather bad and uncertain.

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RESULTS OF THE "R" CAMPAIGN

(At the beginning of the landings - 0000 on 23 January 1942)

- 0025 Succeeded in unloading at KAVIENG without mishap. Met no resistance.
- 0015 Occupied the airfield in the town. The city streets were razed by the fires the enemy had started. The telegraph office and all its installations were smashed. Completed sweeping the anchorage for mines.
- 1400 Occupied VANAK-NAU; enemy resistance there. Captured 17 foreigners at NEW HANOVER; many heavy and light machine guns, rifles, ammunition and weapons were also confiscated. No defense installations at G-SMATA. The mopping up on CRENNER Island is finished.
- 0050 Town of RABAUL has been completely occupied. There was a counter-attack by enemy planes. We have surrounded and are attacking the enemy in the WLAUR Sector. The inhabitants of (RABAUL) have all fled. Apparently all the Japanese residents there had been transported to SIDNEY on the 14th. 100 prisoners taken. 6000 bombs and 60 drums of plane fuel were also captured. Our losses were one carrier-based torpedo bomber and one carrier-based bomber; The Army lost 14 dead and 15 wounded.

OUTLINE OF THE S.N.L.F. LANDING

31 January 1942

at ISABEL PASSAGE

Flag signals from the commander (SHIREIKAN);

Clean out the area along the shore near the anchorage.

I. The objects of the operation.

- A. Hostile persons (deserters, recalcitrant white men, etc.)
- B. Enemy installations (wireless, gun, rifle installations, etc.)

II. Area to be cleaned out.

The North shore of NEW HANOVER Island is to be covered from 150°20' E. Long. eastward to 150°28' E. Long. in sectors of two minutes longitude each. Our ships are to cover these sectors in reverse numerical order.

III. The dispatched SNLF

Four platoons commanded by a company commander aboard each ship (1 WO or above, 10 rated and non-rated men in each platoon); one command platoon; total personnel, 60 or less.

IV. Landing Boats (HAKEMTEI)

They shall be armed, shall move along shore in pace with the progress of the SNLF, and shall stand ready to do signalling and any sudden mustering.

V. Dress

The usual SNLF battle outfit will be worn.

VI. Unless there are special orders to the contrary, the landing boats will leave their ships at 0700 on 1 February. They shall have returned by 1500.

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CONDITION OF THE SHORES AND ANCHORAGES OF ISABEL PASSAGE

4 February 1942

From what we saw with our glasses, the entire island (NEW HANOVER) was one large, dense jungle, upon which no axe had made its mark since time began. Here and there along the shore, however, were human habitations. The mode of living was not altogether strange; indeed, the general aspect was Occidental. I was surprised at the blackness of the natives. Only a piece of cloth was wrapped about their loins. In general, they were resting in an absent-minded fashion, as if they didn't know the meaning of work. There was one man among them scratching his head just like a monkey. They would crawl about when changing their positions. Their behavior approached that of an animal.

At TSOI KOTO we spotted about twenty natives gathered together. Two or three persons stood in the center, surrounded by the others. They all seemed to be discussing something. Or else they were surprised at our anchoring and had called a meeting.

Living things were everywhere. We saw only drooping trees spreading out their leafy branches. If we could have penetrated to the depths of the jungle, we would surely have seen many strange things.

At TSOI KOTO an Australian managed a plantation. He had a western-style house.

The natives used a "canoe" in moving about on the water.

The water's depth at our anchorage was about 15 metres. There was a shallow spot 10 metres deep, however. The bottom was sandy.

The island had yet to be exploited at all; but with the coming of our countrymen in the future, I believe it will be greatly developed.

SALANCA-LAE OPERATIONS:

10 February 1942

"LAE"

Although there is no place which can be called a natural harbor, buildings and air field installations have been set up; there are docks where sea-going vessels can tie up, and on calm days liners can put in there. Moreover, this harbor is equipped with 10-ton cranes and lighters with a capacity of 4000 tons and these transport and unload cargoes on ships which are bound for (TN: or are coming from) the SOLOMON Islands.

"SALANCA"

Because this harbor is the port of entry to MOROBE and "GOLDFIELD" (TN: ?) it is also called NEW GOLDFIELD HARBOR. As a result of the harbor construction of 1926 there is a good harbor which affords shelter of various depths of water. Ships anchor about 550 metres off-shore; although small-type vessels can approach the shore inside the harbor and drop anchor there is nothing of particular importance at present in the way of harbor facilities.

(TN: The next few lines were marked "Not Permitted" in original document.)

1. Forces occupying the SB Area:
Flag Destroyer 6; Destroyer 6; Minesweeper Division 14; KIYOKAWA Maru (XPL); TSUGARU (CM); TENYO Maru; KINRYU Maru (XEL); KONGO Maru (XCL); KOKAI Maru (黄海丸); 8th Base Force (TN: BG) SMLE.
2. Supporting Forces (SHIEN BUTAI)
Flag CruDiv 6; CruDiv 6; CruDiv 18; Destroyer 23; TONHO Maru (XAO).

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3. Submarine Forces
Flag SubRon 7; SubRon 7.
4. Land Based Air Forces
Flag Airflot 24; Airflot 24; OBORO
5. Carrier-based Air Forces
Captain, SHOKO (CV); SHOKO (CV); HOKAZE (DD).

Conditions of the Enemy:

1. The Volunteer Defence Forces of the enemy in this area consist of 2 rifle companies and 1 machine gun platoon.
2. The enemy air forces are based at LAE and SALAMOA and they are in close communication with PORT MORESBY and TOWNEVILLE while operating in the RABAUL Area (TN: "R" Area).
There are less than 10 planes for each base and their activity is not very lively; they fly in mobile deployment in each place, however, and it will be difficult to wipe them out.
3. We doubt that the American striking force will restore its operations in the SOUTH SEAS Area and there is only a possibility that they will strike in this area.

PORT MORESBY (TN: MO)

Operations and Disposition of Strength 15 May 1942

(TN: In the original document the following lines were crossed out and labeled "Not Permissible".)

Central Unit (SHUTAI)

Flag & Fleet KASHIMA (CL) TOKIWA (CM) YUNAGI (DD) SEISEN Maru (APV)

MORESBY Striking Force

Flag CruDiv 5 (TN: 5S) (Minus the NACHI). CarDiv 5 (Sf) DesDiv 27
DesDiv 7 (dg) (minus 1 DD) TOHO Maru (XAO or APV)

MO Occupation Forces:

Flag CruDiv 6; CruDiv 6; DesRon 6 (minus the 1 DD of DesDiv 23); SHOKO;
DesDiv 7 (only 1 DD); SubDiv 21; Minesweeper 20; CruDiv 18; TSUGARU
(CM); KANIKAWA Maru (XVS); KIYOKAWA Air Group; KOEI Maru (海軍丸);
AZUMASAN Maru (阿蘇丸); GOYO Maru (五右衛門丸); OSHIMA (OSR) (大島丸);
HOTO Maru (大島丸); IRO (大島丸);

TALAGI Occupation Operations

Flag MinDiv 19; MinDiv 19 (TSUGARU) and TOKIWA (CM); DesDiv 23 1 DD;
SHOEI Maru (船政丸).

Submarine Forces:

Flag SubRon 7; SubRon 7 (minus SubDiv 21).
Surface Escort Unit 2 (TAI).
Flag Escort Unit 23 Surface Escort Unit (TAI) 2.

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Conditions of the Enemy:

1. American Air Forces in the Australian Area — presumably 200 planes (1st line).
2. It appears that considerable strength is concentrated in the PORT DARWIN and TOWNSVILLE sectors.
3. There is no information about the American Striking Force since (TN: their arrival), but there is a great possibility that they are becoming stronger in this area.
4. Moreover it appears that the British Navy has dispatched a force composed of 2-3 cruisers and some destroyers with a battleship as main strength to the Australian area.
5. Although submarine activities have not been very lively, submarines still exist in the RABAU area.
6. Transportation of materiel for AUSTRALIA. Transportation by plane is becoming gradually more active.
7. Since the activity of enemy reconnaissance planes has increased, it has become difficult to conceal our plans from them; security precautions are particularly important.
8. It has become necessary to take especially strict AA precautions.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORAL SEA BATTLE

Outline of Battle of 4th Fleet.

On 4 May information concerning the enemy striking force (TN: KB) which had attacked TULAGI was not very clear. On 6 May at 0830 a YOKOHAMA Air Group (TN: HAMAKU) search plane discovered an enemy force composed of 1 CV, 1 BB, 2 cruisers and 5 DD at S15° 55' E158° 35' proceeding south. This was outside our radius of attack and about 0900 contact with the enemy was lost. As a result while the MORESBY (MO) Striking Force (KB) was preparing for enemy operations, the MORESBY (MO) Occupation Force acted in accordance with established plans (A shipping group left RABAU (RR) at 1600 on 4 May).

On 7 May at 0600 5 enemy carrier-based planes and at 0622 35 carrier-based planes, attacked in the area assigned to the MORESBY occupation force. Reconnaissance planes of the CruDiv 6 at 0640 sighted 1 BB, 1 CV, 2 cruisers and 7 DD proceeding north at a point S12° 15' E154° 30'. Later, at 0830 it was announced that there were 2 CV. At 0558 patrol-attack planes of the MORESBY Striking Force sighted a force which included a ship resembling an aircraft carrier at a point S15° 55' E157° 50'. The planes went to destroy the enemy force with its entire strength. However, a tanker was recognized to the right (this ship was bombed by part of the planes; heavily damaged and sunk). The MORESBY Striking Force (MOKB) hurried toward the enemy in the west.

0700: The MORESBY Occupation Force (TN: "MO" - KORYAKU BUTAI) has withdrawn its shipping group (TN: SLEIDAN) to the northwest and it is continuing strict AA precautionary measures.

0920: 52 miles bearing 59° from DEBOYNE approximately 60 enemy carrier-based bombers and fighters attacked us. They concentrated a torpedo and bombing attack on the SHOKO (CV). CruDiv 6 (6S) mustered all available force and tried to protect the SHOKO but she had been hit by more than 3 torpedoes and 6 bombs. She fought bravely until the very last and at 0935 she sank.

The Occupation Forces prepared for a second attack by the enemy and withdrew to the north for a while. The main force (TN: SHUTAI) retired to the north to avoid an air attack.

1500: The SAZANAMI (DD) while preparing for a counter attack at night picked up survivors of the SHOKO.

1244: Land-based attack-planes from the Base Air Force attacked the enemy Striking Force (TN: Enemy "KB"), sank 1 battleship, and heavily damaged 1 battleship.

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The MORESBY Striking Force planned to attack at dusk and at 1420 15 carrier based attack and bombing planes were sent out, but we did not locate the enemy because of a sudden squall over the target area. While searching for the enemy in that vicinity we were attacked by enemy carrier-based fighters which came from the clouds and we engaged in an air battle with them. On the way back (TN: to the base) one group (ICHI BU) of carrier-based bombers discovered the enemy Striking Force (TN: "KB") in a squall at 13° South 154° 14' East at 1700, but it could not attack them on account of the squall and darkness. At 2010 the planes returned and landed. 7 planes failed to return. At about 1800 tracking planes lost contact with the enemy and the enemy's movements became unknown to us. The distance between us and the enemy was about 300 miles and the night battle stopped. At dawn on the 8th the attack was resumed and the day for the occupation of PORT MORESBY was postponed until I plus 2 days.

CruDiv 6 (TN: 6S) and 2 DD (TN: 2 D) were added to the MORESBY Striking Force.

On the 8th at 0622 reconnaissance planes from the SHOKAKU (CV) sighted an enemy striking force composed of 1 battleship, 2 carriers, 3 cruisers, and 6 destroyers at 14° 30' South 154° 40' East. The MORESBY Striking Force dispatched an attack unit at 0730. At this time CruDiv 6 (TN: 6S) 100 nautical miles southwest of SHORLAND Islands, was attempting to refuel from the IRO (AO) when patrol planes of the 11 Air Fleet (TN: 11 AF) reported that their and our striking forces were fighting. The ships stopped refuelling immediately and were ordered to join the CruDiv 18 and the Destroyer 6 (TN: 6 Sd) and advance southward at full speed in order to cooperate with our striking force (TN: KB).

At 0930 we attacked the enemy carriers of the SARATOGA Class and YORKTOWN Class. We hit the SARATOGA Class ship with more than 9 torpedoes and 10 bombs and we hit the YORKTOWN Class ship with more than 3 torpedoes and 8 bombs. Definitely sunk. In addition we scored torpedo hits on 1 battleship.

From 0856 to 1020 more than 60 enemy carrier-based planes attacked the MORESBY Striking Unit 3 times. They scored 3 bomb hits on the SHOKAKU (CV) and 8 near misses. It was impossible to take off or land because fires broke out. It left the battle area.

At 0830 land-based search-attack planes sighted 1 BB, 2 cruisers and 4 DD of the enemy at 13° South and 149° East. Although we contacted them we could not dispatch an attack unit with the Base Air Force because of rain the the WAKANAMU Area.

At this point we had to take into consideration the condition of the enemy surface forces and the difficulties of protecting transport groups with carriers against enemy land-based planes. We have postponed the occupation of PORT MORESBY. The group (TN: transport group) will return to RABAU.

Moreover, in consideration of the fuel situation, etc., the Striking Force was ordered at 1300 to stop the attack and to go north. The MORESBY main force (SHUTAI) also reversed its course and went to fuel. Thus, while the MORESBY operational force (SAKUSEN BUTAI) was preparing for the enemy striking force (KB) the order was issued to fall into position to help the occupation of the NAURU and OCEAN Areas. At 2045 the C-in-C of the Combined Fleet issued an order to strike to the utmost to annihilate remaining units of the enemy force.

The MORESBY Striking Force (MOKB), the CruDiv 6, 1 DD, Destroyer 6, and the sea-plane scouting squadron (SUITEITAI) were ordered to expedite fueling and to make attack preparations.

On the 9th most of the float reconnaissance planes from the DEBOYNE base, acting in concert with the Base Air Force in reconnoitering the enemy searched in the region to the south. The MORESBY Occupation Force also set out to search for and pursue the remaining enemy forces but was unable to follow the movements of the enemy.

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1. Enemy Strength
 - (a) 2 BB, 2 cruisers, 4 DD
 - (b) 1 BB, 2 CV, 3 cruisers, 6 DD
 - (c) 1 AO, 1 DD
2. Sunk and Damaged
 - 7 May: 1 large type tanker (about 20000 tons), 1 DD sunk almost certainly.
 - 8 May: 1 CV, SARATOGA Class. Sinking confirmed.
1 CV, YORKTOWN Class. Sinking confirmed.
1 BB (Class not certain). Set afire and made to release heavy oil by a torpedo.
1 Cruiser (Class not certain). After receiving a torpedo from a carrier-based attack plane, exploded, caught afire and listed.
(The above results were obtained by CarDiv 5 and an air group (fg).
7 May: 1 BB of CALIFORNIA Class sunk.
1 BB of WARSPITE Class. Heavily damaged.
1 CA of CANBERRA Class. Heavily damaged.
(The above results were obtained by the Base Air Force.)
3. Planes Shot Down (7 May - 8 May)

Ship-board fighters - 58 planes
Type unknown - 8
Shipboard bombers and attack planes - 32
TOTAL - 98 (10 not positive)
4. Remaining Strength
 - (a) 1 BB (heavily damaged); 2 Cruisers (1 heavily damaged); 4 DD.
 - (b) 1 BB (medium damage); 3 Cruisers (1 medium damage); 6 DD.

COMBAT LESSONS FROM THE WAR FOR GREATER EAST ASIA

SECTION I - AN OUTLINE OF IMPORTANT BATTLES

CHAPTER I. First Sea Battle of the SOLOMON Islands.

1. (A) Forces which participated:

Flagship (TN: P): CHOKAI (CA); CarDiv 6
(Flagship (TN: P): AOKA (CA), KAKO (CA), MINUGASA (CA), FURUTAKA (CA)
Flagship (TN: P): TENRYU (CL), YUBARI (CL), YUKAZE (DD).

(B) Enemy Forces:

9 CA; 1 CL (TN: CXL); 8 DD's.
2. Developments:
 - (A) On the 7th at 0435 the TULAGI Communications Base reported that an enemy striking force accompanied by an occupation force had begun landing operations at TULAGI and at GUADALCANAL. Our forces have therefore decided to penetrate their anchorage and annihilate them.
 - (B) On the 8th at 2100 a search-attack plane with flares took off from the ships.
 - (C) 2120: Commanding Officer formed a single column with his ship at the head and moved to the attack.
 - (D) At 2246 and at 2250: Sighted enemy destroyers sailing individual courses away from us but in order to conceal our plans we avoided being seen by the enemy and so passed them without action.

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- (E) 2331: "All forces, Attack", was ordered; Course 120°, Speed: 26 knots.
- (F) 2337: Sighted ACHILLES type enemy ship to the Northeast. CHOKAI fired torpedoes.
- (G) Thereafter, each ship made a surprise torpedo attack on the enemy ships which were making a rendezvous. By 2350 we had blown up and sunk (or attacked and sunk) 3 cruisers (TN: CX 3) and 1 destroyer.
- (H) After the FURUTAKA torpedoed and sank a large type enemy destroyer at 2346 she was dangerously close to colliding with a large damaged enemy cruiser but she changed her course by porting her rudder and torpedoed and sank said large cruiser. She became separated from the ship next ahead and proceeded with the YUBARI and the TENRYU.
- (I) After we split to the East and West the CHOKAI (CA) and CruDiv 6 (minus the FURUTAKA), which made up the Eastern Unit, shelled and torpedoed the enemy 4 cruisers and 5 DD's newly sighted to the North. The FURUTAKA, TENRYU, and YUBARI, which made up the Western Unit, shelled the enemy. The two groups, cooperating, attacked from both sides and by 0012 they had completely destroyed the enemy.
- (J) YUNAGI (DD) torpedoed and sank an enemy cruiser at 2355. Considering the movements of the YUBARI she executed a turn at a very great angle. Because she was exceptionally far removed from the main force she reversed (TN: made a complete turn), and continuing to battle with one enemy destroyer, withdrew by herself.
- (K) On the 9th at 0200: In order to withdraw from the sphere of enemy bombing, the whole force received orders to withdraw.

3. Results of the Battle:

Blown up and sunk: 2 CA, 1 CL (TN: LCxl), 1 DD.
 Attacked and sunk: 1 CA (by torpedo), 2 CA (by torpedo and gunfire),
 2 CA, 6 DD.
 Damaged: 1 CA (by torpedo), 2 DD.

CHAPTER II. 12 November. The Third (sic) Sea Battle of the SOLOMONS Islands.

1. Forces which participated:

1 BatDiv (TN: "11S") (Flagship (TN: 11S) HIBI (BB) and the KIRISHIMA (BB) bombarded the airfield on GUADALCANAL.
 CruDiv 10 (TN: "10S") (TN: written a second time and crossed out) (Flagship (TN: P) NAGARA, DesDiv 61 (TN: 61 dg) (TERUTSUKI) DesDiv 16 (TN: 16 dg) Divisional Command (TN: P ?) YUKIKAZE and the AMATSUKAZE
 DesDiv 6 (TN: 6 dg) (AKATSUKI, IKAZUCHI and the INAZUMA) screened the firing units (SHAKETAI).

DesDiv 4 (TN: 4 dg) DesDiv 9 (TN: 9 dg) (Flagship: [TN: P] ASAGUMO)
 DesDiv 2 (TN: 2 dg) Divisional Command (TN: P ?) MURUSAME, SAMIDARE, YUDACHI, PARUSAME.

Minesweeping and protection for the advance.
 DesDiv 27 (TN: 27 dg) (Division Command (TN: P) SHIGURE, SHIRATSUYU, and the YUGURE.) Protecting GUADALCANAL and the RUSSELL Islands.

Enemy forces:

LUNGA Area: 4 CA
 2 CL
 7 DD
 6 Torpedo Boats (TN: Txp).
 TULAGI Area: 3 CA
 2 DD
 1 Torpedo Boat (TN: GYORATEI X 1)

2. Developments:

- (A) 0830. A B-17 flying from the south came in contact with BatDiv 11 but was driven off by fighters of CarDiv 2 (TN: fc).
 2st

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- (B) At about sunset a Type Zero float reconnaissance plane from the HIEI (BB) sighted some 10 enemy vessels anchored at GUADALCANAL.
- (C) 2312: Unable to find the enemy even by taking a firing course of 130°.
- (D) 2343: The YUDACHI and the HIEI sighted the silhouettes of several enemy ships and charged with full force and began to battle.
- (E) The Screening Force (CHOKUEI TAI) and the Firing Force (SHAGEKI TAI) fired guns and torpedoes at the enemy from his west flank. The YUDACHI (DD) conformed with this and doubled the attack from the east and one after another we blew up and sank the enemy. On account of this the enemy gradually retreated to the north; part of the Screening Force (CHOKUEI TAI) and the Firing Force (SHAGEKI TAI) swept the enemy from the seas firing torpedoes and guns in succession.
- (F) The mopping-up unit, before going ahead, fell behind (KORAKU) when the main force had maneuvered to retire to the north of SAVO Island. It came up almost abreast with the main force but passed astern of the main force at the south side of SAVO Island and went to the north side of the island. It cooperated with the Screening Force and part of the Firing Force causing the annihilation of the enemy forces remaining.
- (G) From 2350 to 0034 we destroyed the major part of the enemy power in the area and we then withdrew to the North.

3. Results of the Battle:

Sunk (by torpedoes): 3 Heavy Cruisers (TN: Ca x 3)
1 Light Cruiser (TN: Ca x 1)

Sunk (by gunfire): 2 Heavy Cruisers (TN: Ca x 2)
1 Light Cruiser (TN: Ca x 1)
3 Destroyers (TN: d x 3)

Severely Damaged: 2 Heavy Cruisers (TN: Ca x 2)
5 Destroyers (TN: d x 5) (sank later)
1 Torpedo Boat (TN: t x 1) (sank later)

Medium Damage: 2 Destroyers (TN: d x 2) (sank later)
1 Destroyer (TN: d x 1)

CHAPTER III. 14 November. The Third Sea Battle of the SOLOMON Islands.

1. Forces which participated:

CruDiv 4 (TN: 4S) (Flagship (TN: P) ATAGO, TAKAO, KIRISHIMA, bombarded the airfield on GUADALCANAL.

CruDiv 10 (Flagship (TN: P) NAGARA and the Squadron Command (?) (TN: P) SHIRAYUKI, HATSUYUKI, SAMIDARE, INAZUMA.

DesRon 4 (Flagship and Squadron Command (TN: P) the ASAGUMO.

DesDiv 64 (TN: 61 dg) (division command (TN: P) TERUTSUKI, Protection (TN: screen) for the Firing Forces.

DesRon 3 (TN: 3 sd): (Flagship (TN: P) SENDAI (CL))

DesDiv 19 (TN: 19 dg) Division Command (TN: P) the URANAMI, the ATANAMI and the SHIKINAMI. Clearing the course for other ships.

Enemy Strength:

4 BB, 2 CA; and 4 DD.

2. Developments:

- (A) According to various intelligence reports from the planes of the SANYO Maru (XCVS) and other sources we expected to encounter a strong enemy force. At 1940 we withdrew our screen (CHOKUEI WO TESSURU) and moved it forward on the course ahead. At 2010 all forces were ordered to annihilate the enemy.

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- (B) At 2010 the Mopping-Up Unit sighted silhouettes of ships to the northeast of SAVO Island and gave chase. At about 2116 they engaged in battle. The AYANAMI was ordered to separate (from the main force) and to proceed to the LUNGA Point Area via the south side of SAVO Island. While proceeding there she blew up and sank one enemy cruiser which she met at the south side of SAVO Island.
- (C) The Mopping-up Unit (minus the ASAGUMO and the TERUTSUKI) went ahead of the main force at 2120 and sailed 6-7 kilometres astern of the AYANAMI. While proceeding, it met 1 enemy cruiser and 3 enemy destroyers. It destroyed these and then at 2145 it sighted 2 battleships northwest of ESPERANCE. While reporting this to the entire force it tried to attack them, but the destroyers did not have their guns loaded in time to fire (JIN.TSU SOTEN MANIAWAZU). After that the enemy withdrew to the south and we pursued them with all our effort. At about 2340 we overtook them and carried out our second attack on them.
- (D) Just before 2200 CmsDiv 4 (TN: 4S), KIRISHIMA, ASAGUMO, TERUTSUKI sighted 4 Battleships in succession and attacked and sank 2 of them by torpedo and gunfire.
- (E) At 2325 the C-in-C of the Second Fleet (TN: $\frac{P}{2}$) took into consideration the present situation, their and our condition and the time of day and ordered our withdrawal to the north after carrying out an attack on enemy forces which had been contacted.

3. Results of the Battle:

2 BB's attacked and sunk; 1 BB considerably damaged; 2 CA's blown up and sunk.
 1 DD blown up and sunk.
 3 DD's attacked and sunk.

(End of Extracts)

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ACCOUNT OF THE NORTHERN CAMPAIGN (May-August 1943)

I. CHRONOLOGICAL DIVISIONS

1. ATTU Campaign.
From 25 May to 1 June; campaign ("ke") against ATTU.
2. KISKA Campaign.
From 2 June to 26 June; first part of campaign ("ke") against KISKA (by submarine).
From 27 June to 18 July; first phase in second part of campaign ("ke") against KISKA (by destroyer forces).
From 19 July to 1 August; second phase in second part of campaign ("ke") against KISKA (by destroyer forces).

II. SITUATION AT ATTU BEFORE THE ENEMY ATTACK

On 8 May the enemy issued an official communique on AKCHITKA (monitored by the radio of the 51st Communications Unit (Cg)). In view of this intelligence, therefore, we were certain that the American army and navy had completed an air base and other installations there. On the 9th BIGEYATTO Island in the MALOELAP Group was bombarded at 1615, PAGAN Island (in the MARIANAS) at 1910, and HOROBETSU Village, 15 kilometres northeast of MUHORAN, at 2350. Were these bombardments meant to be made in concert with the TUNISIAN Campaign as propaganda for an aggressive American offensive in the PACIFIC? Or, they might have been judged as the heralding of a campaign in the NORTH or SOUTH (PACIFIC) . Be that as it may, it should have been considered in connection with the recent prominence given to an enemy offensive in the PACIFIC, particularly in the ALEUTIANS; and our forces should have been very much on guard against an enemy counter-attack. Hence, at 2335 on the 10th, there was the following order from the (HQ), Combined Fleet (CF):-

- "(1) In view of communications intelligence (from 6th Communications Unit?) and the appearance of enemy submarines, there is suspicion of an operation by an enemy task force.
- (2) Maintain a vigilant watch for an enemy occupation (force) and air attack."

At this time the airfield installations on ATTU were expected to be almost finished by the end of May. But the air-raid tranches, fuel storehouses, shell and powder magazines, and other projects had yet to be started, while their completion had been scheduled for the first of June. Furthermore, DesRon 1 (CL KISO, DD SHIRAKUMO, DD TAKABA) convoyed the KIMIKAWA Maru (XCV) bringing float planes for ATTU. The ships left PEARLUSHIRO at 1200 on the 11th. Meanwhile, the KAGI (CA) and the HATSUCHIKO (DD) had left YOKOSUKA at 0014 on the 11th, bound for PEARLUSHIRO. Both groups were at sea then, when the American attack was made. Each of the Submarines I-31, I-34, and I-35 was engaged in transporting material for KISKA.

III. SITUATION AT ATTU FOLLOWING THE ENEMY ATTACK

At 0449 on the 12th the 51st Communications Unit detected the call signal "BOU", making its first appearance on a frequency of 4385 K.C.; reception was extremely good. In the KISKA Area, enemy planes delivered a hour-long attack at about 0700. Enemy reconnaissance planes were also very active. From 0200 until 0900 attacking enemy planes invaded the mists of ATTU, soaring over the island ceaselessly, relentlessly, as they strafed and bombed it. At this time absurd leaflets urging surrender were dropped in the CHICHAGOF Harbor sector. At 1600 the observation crew at HOLTZ Point spotted enemy boats headed for WEST ARM Point. The Shipping Engineers were sent out immediately to investigate from the sea. From them it was confirmed that the enemy was landing at WEST ARM Point and along the northwest coast. The forces in this sector at once entered upon Condition One as they determined to prevent the enemy landing even a part of his forces. At 1030 another enemy landing was announced in MASSACHE Bay. The enemy strength here was about 2000 men; but it seemed as if there were many more in reserve. In the meantime, enemy ships bombarded our forces with a threatening fire. At the report of an attack by a large enemy force, the ATTU Dispatched Force immediately set about burning all its documents save those in Cipher B (OTSU).

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The strength of the attacking forces remained unknown because of the poor visibility at the time. However, judging from the noise of the guns, it was thought that there was a support force composed of several cruisers and smaller ships, and having seen the attacks delivered by carrier-based planes, the presence of carriers in the vicinity was suspected. By 1520 the following was known about the strength of the enemy force: There were 29 ships in HOLTZ Bay and at WEST ARM Point, 27 in MASSACRE Bay, and 6 in WEST ARM Bay. Furthermore, more troops were continuing to land, and poor visibility prevented our forces from determining their number. According to communications intelligence at the time, a strong enemy force was operating in the southern ALEUTIANS.

IV. ORDERS OF THE 5TH FLEET AND STATE OF OUR FORCES FOLLOWING THE ENEMY ATTACK

- (1) Submarines I-31, I-34, and I-35 will cease their transport activities, and proceed at once to ATTU to attack the enemy transports.
 - (2) The USUGUMO (DD) will cease its work and hasten to PARAMUSHIRO to supply our forces.
 - (3) The commander of the escort force will attack enemy shipping in the MASSACRE Bay Area with planes from the KILIKATA Maru.
 - (4) The ASAKA Maru (秋風丸) will sail to AOMORI and pick up for transport to PARAMUSHIRO some army reinforcements.
 - (5) The ATATA Maru (粟田丸) will stand ready at YOKOSUKA (to transport naval reinforcements).
- The Commander-in-Chief of the 5th Fleet, commanding the MAYA (CA), left PARAMUSHIRO to join the escort force.

At this time, the TAMA (CL) (at KAIJURU) also stopped its work and was able to leave on the 20th; the ASAGUMO (DD) (at YOKOSUKA) was able to leave on the 21st. The ASUKUMA (CL) (at OASEDO), however, was able to set out on the 16th.

Thus, the strength with which we could counterattack the enemy's assault was merely one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, and three destroyers. Moreover, an air force was ordered to go to PARAMUSHIRO; but was delayed because of unfavorable weather.

Summary of the Operations of the Combined Fleet:

- A. Northern Forces
 1. Submarines concentrated in the ATTU Area to destroy enemy shipping.
 2. Land-based air forces carried out patrols and attacks.
 3. Surface units awaited a favorable opportunity to destroy enemy fleet units in the ATTU Area.
 4. As it proceeded, our task force kept patrols on the enemy task force (by observation craft, fishing boats, submarines, and float reconnaissance planes).
 5. An army of reinforcements was being transported to ATTU.
- B. Task Force.

Proceeded from YOKOSUKA on the 22nd. Went through the waters east of the KURILES during the last of the month. Its purpose was to crush enemy fleet units and task forces and to assist our Northern Forces.
- C. Combined Fleet.

Left TRUK on the 17th for YOKOSUKA.

V. EVENTS UNTIL THE FALL OF ATTU

The composition of the enemy fleet as seen from the land on the 13th was as follows:

In HOLTZ Bay - One CV (no bridge), one CHICAGO class Cruiser, one OMAHA Class cruiser, three DD's.

In MASSACRE Bay - One BB, two cruisers, five DD's, ten transports.

About 1318 our submarines attacked the enemy fleet, causing the main body to withdraw eastward temporarily. About 1900 lights were lit on ships anchored in MASSACRE Bay, apparently for something important which had happened. A destroyer ran aground near shore.

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The enemy forces that had landed by 1300 on the 14th totalled not less than a division. Before long the enemy had put his carriers and battleships out to sea. However, the destroyers audaciously dropped anchor in the bay despite the attacks of our submarines, and observed us. (Thus, the enemy knew the weakness of our forces from previous reconnaissance.)

An enemy battleship was greatly damaged in an attack by our submarines on the 14th. In general, however, our ships were checked by the enemy destroyers. By the 24th they had only inflicted severe damage on a cruiser and some damage on two unidentified warships.

19 Medium Bombers (CHUKO) made the first attack by our planes on the 14th. They returned because of unfavorable weather, however. Thereafter, on consecutive days, our planes were unable to attack due to unfavorable weather. Finally, on the 23rd, they attacked, destroying a cruiser and a destroyer, and setting fire to another ship. But on the following day, the enemy fleet had generally withdrawn an hour before our attack force arrived. Hence, no results could be gained at sea, and our planes had to confine themselves to bombing land targets. At this time, the destroyer force which had at last completed the assembling of a force planned to evacuate our forces on ATTU Island, but though it put out from PARAMUSHIRO on the 25th, its efforts were of no avail because of continuous bad weather. In the meantime the Guard Unit on ATTU Island, although out-numbered, valiantly withstood the fierce attacks of the enemy, even at times carrying out night attacks on other operations which were doomed from the start. They waged bitter battle but, in the end, having received no reinforcements and having exhausted every last artifice (to the last man), they met their deaths calmly. Finally, on the 29th ATTU Island fell in honor.

VI. FIRST PART OF KISKA CAMPAIGN

KISKA, of course, was placed in a helpless position by the fall of ATTU. Therefore, it was decided to evacuate the island. We were entrusted with the task of evacuating the troops from the island by means of 10 submarines running back and forth. Since there were over 7000 men to evacuate and submarines have very limited capacity, it was not known how long it would take to finish the evacuation. In addition to this, the patrols around KISKA had finally become most strict and damage to our ship had increased. Finally, the I-7 was lost. No matter how enshrouded by the fog we would be, we would instantly be bombarded, for the efficiency of the enemy's radar was far superior to what we had expected.

VII. FIRST PHASE OF SECOND PART OF KISKA CAMPAIGN

To meet this situation, as a last resort we carried out "ko" (TN:4) plan of operations by which we employed a force of destroyer forces (SUJIRAI BUTAI). In order to do this we installed as quickly as possible, on the destroyers counter-radar equipment (TEKI-DENTAN NI TAISURU GYAKUTAN) and equipment to take aboard the landing barges to be used in the evacuation. On 6 July this work was, for the most part, completed. Because, however, there was uncertainty about the frequency of the enemy's radar there was some uneasiness about our counter-radar.

On 7 July at 1930 we set out from PARAMUSHIRO. Our force was composed of 2 cruisers and 10 destroyers. At that time the state of affairs, as seen by the Grand Fleet (TN: GP), was as follows:

"Regarding the situation, it may be said that the possibility of the enemy attacking us in the vicinity of KISKA is great."

But, on the other hand, it was felt that though the enemy had isolated KISKA he was hoping to starve out the garrison. Only patrols around the island were strictly maintained. It was felt that an aggressive offensive and landing were not to be expected. According to intelligence reports up to the 7th, about the 26th a fleet of transports had departed from the west coast of NORTH AMERICA and about the 3rd had reached the DUTCH HARBOR Area. Still more, we had received intelligence reports that transports had arrived at ATTU frequently during June. Furthermore, there was information that a powerful force had set out from DUTCH HARBOR on 1 July and had arrived at AMCHITKA on the 4th. The enemy's northern submarine force had been making preparations for battle since the 14th, or so, and having completed these preparations about the 30th, had assembled at DUTCH HARBOR.

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A squadron (TAI) of submarines, reinforcements for the Submarine Force, had reached DUTCH HARBOR from the American mainland about June 20th. Again there was intelligence that at the end of June, transports had arrived at ADAK and ATTU several times. On the 21st the air strength at AMCHITKA had been somewhat increased and the base for land planes at ATTU was nearing completion. Atmospheric conditions in the KISKA Area up to the time we set out were as follows:

On the 2nd and 3rd visibility was good, from 30 to 40 kilometres; on the 4th and 5th visibility was bad, from 2 to 3 kilometres. On the 6th it was about 30 kilometres.

In the meantime, a number of enemy planes -- B-17's, B-24's, B-25's, PBX's, and others, in formations, singly, or in pairs were carrying out day after day bombing and reconnaissance missions. Patrol about the island was maintained by a number of cruisers and destroyers.

On the 7th, the destroyer force (SUIRAI BUTAI) set out as scheduled. After they had set out, a thick fog rolled up and discovery and destruction by enemy submarines was rendered improbable. Thereafter, until we returned to PARAMUSHIRO the percentage of fog was constantly about .85. On the 7th, visibility around KISKA was about 7 kilometres. Enemy planes, (each time a reconnaissance plane), approached at 0350, 0724, and 0835, and at 1140.

6 cruisers and 4 destroyers bearing from the NW approached to a point 15 miles south of GERTRUDE COVE and shelled it. At 1455 3 enemy ships were sighted about 30 kilometres from SHIROZAKI (TN: ~~2~~ 4).

The above ships, judging from shell splinters, duds, and shell holes, were PENNSACOLA class, 1 ship, HONOLULU class, 2 ships, a new class, 1 ship, and 4 Destroyers. On the 8th, there was a thick fog from the morning on and during the day visibility was from 1 to 3 kilometres; in the evening about 6 kilometres. On this day no enemy planes came.

On the 9th, visibility to the SE was from 30 to 40 kilometres and from the afternoon on clouds covered the entire sky without a break. Though the clouds were 200 metres high and a thick fog hung upon the sea, visibility was from 8 to 10 kilometres. One enemy warship was sighted at 0833 forty kilometres, 220°, from SOUTH HEAD. At 1057 a ship was sighted at 340° off TAKAZAKI (TN: ~~1~~ 4). From 2050 to 2230 GERTRUDE COVE was shelled by destroyers on patrol with guns of about 12cm.

On the 10th at 0205 we speeded along our course and though we proceeded along our way until 2030, the fog was thin enough to allow airplane flights and since this was to our disadvantage, we turned back. The weather forecast from the Headquarters of the Division 1 was as follows:

"On the 12th there will be fog rolling up from the SE at 8 metres per second with occasional breaks. On the 13th there will be prevailingly east winds flowing from 8 to 12 metres per second and thick fog."

We prepared to make a dash for it on the 13th. Today (10th) there was fog around KISKA at the end of the day and visibility was from 1 to 2 kilometres. Enemy planes and also 2 single planes (TN: ~~1~~ 4 TANKI) came two or three times on reconnaissance flights.

11 July: About 0200 visibility was about 20 kilometres and though the sky was covered with clouds, the fog was light. Generally, visibility was from 8 to 10 kilometres. At 2006 GERTRUDE COVE and at 2217 LITTLE KISKA were bombarded. Moreover, according to intelligence reports, the Army Air Base on ATTU and the airfield for Army heavy bombers at AMCHITKA and AGATTU were almost completed. Our observation boats (KANSHI-TEI) based at PARAMUSHIRO had discovered that patrols by the enemy to the west were becoming stricter and they were certain that along with the near completion of the land-plane base on ATTU patrols by the enemy carried out by aircraft, naval vessels, and submarines would be even stricter.

12 July: At 0735 we sped along our course but the fog was light and at 1520 we turned back. We expect to dash forward on the 14th. Today in the morning visibility around KISKA was from 6 to 8 kilometres, and though about noon it was 15 kilometres, the barometer fell. From 1800 on there was thick fog. Enemy planes, P-40's, B-25's, PBX's, all on reconnaissance missions came during the morning and about 1245 a small type naval vessel was sighted about 20 kilometres off TAKAZAKI at 330°.

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13 July: Having taken in consideration weather around KISKA, at 0240 we hastened along our course. Patrol planes could not take off because of bad weather at AMCHITKA and ATTU. No enemy planes were seen around the island. Only a small type naval vessel was carrying out patrol. However, because the visibility in the morning was from 8 to 10 kilometres we broke off our course and at 1703 turned back. Though we made the dash again at 2145, we turned back at 0156 on the 14th. The following is the weather forecast given out by headquarters on the 13th:

- "1. Tomorrow the weather around KISKA will not differ much from today. There will be a light fog and it is expected that visibility will be fair.
2. The high atmospheric pressure which prevails in these waters is slowly shifting to NE or ENE. Thus, should we proceed along our course, there is a possibility that the present state of weather and visibility will prevail as far as KISKA in the same general direction as the aforementioned high atmospheric pressure.
3. At the same time as this high atmospheric pressure progresses, the possibility of flights from ADK is great.
4. We may conclude from the above that the possibility of success in our advance is extremely slight and that we shall have to turn back and wait. We may look forward to proceeding on our mission on the day after tomorrow."

(Insert)

According to the communications intelligence report of 13 July now call signals appeared on the 9th from the places we had presumed to be naval air bases; these were presumed to be at ~~THE~~ the island neighboring. Now call signals also appeared from the places we had presumed to be army air bases; we had figured two to be on ATTU and one in the neighboring islands. On the 11th, 6 army planes flew to ATTU. The total number of army and navy planes permanently based in the ALEUTIANS has grown rapidly since the 9th; 173 planes were in the ALEUTIANS by the 10th.

Enemy planes have been active on the 9th and 10th. Our patrols in the PARAMUSHIRO Area are vigilant. And we have great numbers of powerful fleet units operating in the CENTRAL PACIFIC.

According to the communications intelligence report of 15 July, a powerful enemy force has been under radio silence for several days. The number of enemy ships operating around KISKA is very large. According to the communications intelligence report of 16 July, one part of the enemy fleet is apparently operating in the ALEUTIAN Area. Liaison activities between AMCHITKA and KULUK Bay have been great. The enemy seems to be concentrating all his efforts in equipping and strengthening AMCHITKA.

14 July: In the morning the weather changed for the worse. The velocity of the wind was 14 metres per second; atmospheric pressure was 757mm. Visibility was about 6 kilometres. In the afternoon conditions improved and the wind velocity was from 5 to 8 metres per second and visibility was 5 kilometres. Today 3 or 4 enemy naval vessels were patrolling around the island. At 1500 we started out but there was a statement from headquarters:

"The weather in the vicinity of KISKA and along the course we shall follow has had a change for the better. For the present, there is no prospect of meeting a favorable fog from the sea. We shall turn back now and return to PARAMUSHIRO where we shall plan a second operation."

15 July: At 0430 we turned back. Today visibility around KISKA was 10 kilometres and in the morning reconnaissance was carried out by a B-25, a P-38, and a PB4; and a formation of 7 B-24's and 5 B-25's bombed (KISKA). At 2202 enemy warships shelled GERTRUDE COVE.

16 July: Visibility -- 10 to 15 kilometres.

17 July: There was thick fog in the morning and visibility was 1.5 kilometres. In the afternoon it was 8 kilometres at times. Enemy planes were carrying out reconnaissance and naval vessels were maintaining patrols.

18 July: At 0830 we entered the harbor at PARAMUSHIRO.

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VIII. SECOND PHASE OF SECOND PART OF KISKA CAMPAIGN

At 2000 on the 22nd we entered upon the second phase.

On the 19th and 20th the visibility in the KISKA Area was 15 to 20 kilometres; on the 21st, it was 3 to 4 kilometres. To generalize the enemy's plans to the situation: There have been seven days out of 21 on which the enemy did not come over. Since the 9th enemy ships had bombarded KISKA five times.

Our sorties recently have been an hour later than planned because of the thick fog. Moreover, it has been difficult to maintain our formation. In our first change (of position) the relative positions were totally unknown. Communication by telephone is poor. On the 24th, while it was clear and only slightly misty, we looked about and adjusted our formation. The TAMA, NIPPON Maru (IAO), and KUNIJIRI (CM) were not to be seen. (The Commander-in-Chief 5th Fleet, was aboard the TAMA.)

At 0800 on the 24th, a patrol plane made a forced landing in Sector #10 on the ATTU patrol line, and dispatched a special urgent operational message. Indeed, there were several urgent messages to that effect. A dispatch from the 51st communications unit had arrived, saying that it was doubtful that the aviator had been located by the destroyer force. For 30 minutes after 0945 on the 23rd enemy ships bombarded from the northeast and south. And, as the skies were clear, formations of enemy planes strafed and bombed several times. The number of participating planes was over 96. The enemy employed delayed action bombs, incendiary bombs, and parachute bombs. The delayed action bombs were set at 30 minutes, one hour, 15 hours, 24 hours, etc.

On the 25th, it was clear, and formations of from three to nine P-40's raided KISKA seven times from AMCHITKA; all formations bombed only the landing field. The enemy bombers at AMCHITKA and KULUK Bay on ADAK, 51 all told, stood ready, their operating wave-frequencies lengths adjusted. The activity of enemy patrol planes at both bases was great.

About 1700 the KAZEGIMO (DD) detected an enemy submarine transmitting a message.

In view of our poor radio interception control, it is doubtful whether the sub was located.

About 1500 on the 26th we made contact with all the ships save the KUNIJIRI, and the locations to which our formation had been adjusted again were visible.

Suddenly, at 1750 the KUNIJIRI collided into the starboard side of the ABUKUMI. Damage to both ships was slight, but because of the accident some confusion was produced in the rear units. The WAKABA, HATSUSHIMO, and NAGANAMI (DD) collided, the latter receiving only slight damage. However, the WAKABA and NAGANAMI were now handicapped for operational cruising. The WAKABA returned to PARAMUSHIRO; the HATSUSHIMO entered the Naval Supply Unit.

On the 27th we set our course south and tried to pick up the lost trail of an enemy submarine.

We decided to make a dash for KISKA on the 28th. Conditions there had been (none too good) up to now.

The visibility had been excellent on the 26th and hence a handicap to our operating units; for a total of 46 planes raided KUKA that day. On the 25th a similar formation of P-40's had attacked seven times. Enemy bombers were generally in readiness at every base, their operating wave-frequencies lengths adjusted.

Patrol planes were active, and a vigilant watch was kept in the north.

Several enemy ships were operating in the waters south and west of KISKA.

At 1925 there was a night bombing.

On the 27th, it was clear in the morning; visibility 20-30 kilometres, cloud ceiling at 3000 metres. But the fog appeared around 1800. On this day a total of 87 planes attacked. 8 B-24's bombed twice; afterwards, KISKA was subjected to reconnaissance for about three hours. At night single planes bombarded three times; afterwards they dropped flares, which seemed strange and purposeless.

The barometer fell gradually during the morning of the 28th; the mist thickened, and the visibility was only 8-10 kilometres. Perhaps because the weather changed for the worse enemy planes did not fly over KISKA after 0340. By afternoon the fog had taken in the whole sky; the visibility was 6-8 kilometres.

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On the 29th, too, a heavy fog hung over our route. We pressed forward to KISKA, plotting our course from its radio waves. We only awaited the grace and aid of our gods. At 1105, while it cleared, for a bit, we recognized the outline of the island. Then the inevitable fog again. We sailed around to the north of KISKA, but saw no sign of enemy ships. At 1316 the ABUKUMA sighted an enemy vessel and launched several torpedoes, but it had mistaken LITTLE KISKA Island for the enemy.

Again, at 1321, the SHIMAKAZE (DD) mistook the island for the enemy and opened fire with her guns. At 1325 we set our course to enter the harbor. Only within the bay, strangely enough, was the mist completely absent, and the visibility was extremely good. The clouds were at about 100 metres, and dense. We anchored at 1350. Immediately the landing barges which had been in readiness came alongside our ship and loaded the men aboard; in two trips, they had completed their work. The 500-odd men that came aboard did so in an orderly fashion and in fine spirits. By 1420 each of the ships in the 2nd Transport Unit (YUSOTAI) had completed its loading. We left then at once. The 1st Transport Unit left the harbor a little later. After that the mist gradually became thicker in the bay. Thereafter, the 2nd Transport Unit did not see anything whatsoever of the enemy. We left and went on ahead at a speed of 30 knots. The 1st Transport Unit, with the ABUKUMA, spotted a periscope, northeast of KISKA, but the submarine immediately disappeared beneath the waves and thereafter wasn't seen again.

At 0600 on the 31st the mist had completely cleared, and at 1530 we entered PARAMUSHIRO Harbor. It seemed that the heavens were celebrating our success (in returning safely). At 1000 on the 1st of August the 1st Transport Unit entered the harbor; they had not lost a man. The evacuation of the defense force at KISKA, over 5,000 men, had been a success. The enemy apparently had not discovered the evacuation of our troops at all. Thereafter, for day after day, they bombed and bombarded KISKA, and on August 15, the landing of American and Canadian troops on the island was announced.

Truly the height of the ridiculous.

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OFFICERS' REGISTER FOR THE KAKO (16 November 1941)

Commanding Officer:	Capt. TAKAHASHI, YUJI (高橋雄次)
Executive Officer:	Cmdr. TANARA, Yasuedao (倭安岐夫)
First Lieutenant (UNTŌCHŌ) and 8th Division Officer:	Lt Cmdr AKUTAGAWA, Tadatarō (芥河唯太郎)
Gunnery Officer:	Lt Cmdr NISHIMURA, Haruyoshi (西村春芳)
Navigating Officer and 7th Division Officer:	Lt Cmdr YAMAGUCHI, Tokio (山口晴男)
Torpedo Officer and 5th Division Officer:	Lt. YONEI, Tsuneo (米井恒雄)
Communications Officer and 6th Division Officer:	Lt. KONDO, Nobuichi (近藤信一)
Aviation Officer and 9th Division Officer:	Lt. SAITŌ, Yasukuni (斎藤寅邦)
2nd Division Officer and Officer of the Guard:	Lt. KAGA, Makoto (加賀誠)
1st Division Officer:	S.D. Lt.(jg) MATSUNAGA, Isuke (松永実助)
3rd and 4th Division Officer:	Lt. (jg) OCHIAI, Otoichi (落合乙市)
Deputy Gunnery Officer (SHŌHŌCHŌ):	S.D. Lt.(jg) MIZUNO, Tōru (水野享)
Junior Officer, 1st Division:	S.D. Ens. ŌMURA, Sōtarō (大村惣太郎)
Assistant Navigating Officer (KŌKAISHI) and Junior Officer 4th Division:	Ens. KIKUCHI, Giichi (菊地義一)
Junior Officer, 2nd Division:	S.D. Ens. DATE, Jirō (伊達二郎)
Assistant Gunnery Officer and Junior Officer 3rd Division:	Ens. ŌMURA, Masao (大村正雄)
Assistant Communications Officer and Junior Officer, 6th Division:	Ens. ISHIKAWA, Takatoshi (石川恭壽)

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FACTS ABOUT THE KAKO (17 November 1941)

I. TYPE: Heavy (first-class) cruiser.

Where built:	At the KATASAKI Dockyard in KÖBE
Keel laid:	17 November 1922
Launched:	10 April 1925
Completed:	20 July 1926
Modification completed:	28 December 1937

II. PRINCIPAL MEASUREMENTS:

A. Overall length:	185.2 metres
B. Length between perpendiculars:	176.8 metres
C. Maximum beam:	16.9 metres
D. Draft:	4.8 metres
E. Displacement:	7,100 tons
F. Tonnage displaced per cm. of draft:	23.3 tons
G. Moment required to change the trim 1 cm.:	246 metric tons
H. Shaft horsepower:	103,300 H.P.
I. Speed:	33 knots
J. Fuel carried:	1,842 tons
K. Fresh water carried:	156 tons
Drinking and all-purpose water:	66 tons
Water, in drums:	90 tons
L. Water evaporated in a day:	244 tons

III. ARMAMENT:

- A. Guns:
1. 6 20cm 50 cal. twin-mount guns, 3 year type, Model 2
 2. 4 12cm 40 cal. dual-purpose guns, 10 year type
 3. MG's: 4 13mm Hotchkiss MG's.
2 7.7mm Lewis MG's
8 25mm twin-mount MG's, Type 96
 4. 179 Rifles, Type 38
 5. 43 pistols, Army type
- B. Torpedoes:
1. 2 mounts of Type 92 quadruple torpedo tubes each
 2. 6 depth bombs
 3. 1 set of paravanes
- C. Searchlights:
1. 3 110cm searchlights, Type 92
 2. 2 40cm searchlights, Type "SUM"
- D. Range Finders:
- 2 6-metre range finders, Type 14
 - 2 type 6-metre range finders
 - 2 type 4.5-metre range finders for dual purpose guns
 - 2 type 1.5-metre range finders
 - 2 type 3.5-metre range finders (for torpedo work)
- E. Planes:
- Float reconnaissance planes: 1 in use (1 in reserve)
- F. Wireless Equipment:
- a. Transmitters:
 - 1 500-watt transmitter, Type 91 Mark 4 (Special) Modification 1
 - 1 500-watt transmitter, Type 92 Mark 4 Modification 1
 - 1 1000-watt short-wave transmitter, Type 95 Mark 3
 - 1 500-watt transmitter, Type 95 Mark 4
 - 1 350-watt transmitter, Type 95 Mark 5
 - b. Receivers:
 - 3 receivers, Type 91, Model 1
 - 3 short-wave receivers, Type 91
 - 16 special receivers, Type 92 Modification 3

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- c. Wireless telephones:
 1 ultra short-wave wireless telephone, Type 93
 1 ultra short-wave wireless telephone, Type 90, Modification 2
 1 ultra short-wave wireless telephone, Type 90, Modification 4
 2 wireless telephone microphones, Mark 2, Modification 3
- d. Signal strength indicators (SOKUHAI) and Cathode-ray Tube Screens (KANSUKI)
 1 Type 92 Electric Wave Cathode-ray Tube Screen, Modification I
 1 Type 92 Short Wave Cathode-ray Tube Screen, Modification I
 1 Type 92 Short Wave Signal Strength Indicator, Modification I
 2 Type 15 No. 2 Cathode-ray Tube Screen, Modification I
- e. Wireless:
 1 Type TM Light Wireless, Modification I
- f. Radio Direction Finders:
 1 Type 93 Mark I, Radio Direction Finder

IV. ENGINES:

- (1) Main engines "BURANKACHISU" Type Turbine - 4
 (screw propellers - 4)
 (cog-wheel speed reduction gear installed)
- (2) R.P.M. of screw-propellers - (Maximum 360)
- (3) Boilers: Fleet Type - Mark "RO" crude-oil fired boilers exclusively - 0
- (4) Auxiliary Engine and Electric Engines
- (5) Lewis Type refrigeration machine
- (6) SEGAR (G-o-) double-effect (FUKKO) type carbonic acid gas type ice machine - 1
- (7) Type "MU" (TH: 3) 8 Watt Type Air Compressing Pump - 3
- (8) 4 6-pole, compound-wound generators with interpole
 4 compound-wound, D.C. electric motors with megapole and interpole:
 2 300-K.W., 2 - 135 K.W.

V. BOATS:

Type	Weight	Length	Beam	Draft	Men Carried
Motor Boats (2)	4.4 Tons	11 Metres	2.7 Metres	.6 Metres	30
Launch (1)	3. "	9 "	2.5 "	.6 "	35
Cutters (4)	1.5 "	9 "	2.45 "	.4 "	45
Dinghy (1)	.6 "	6 "	1.5 "	.2 "	10

VI. LOCATION, TYPE, AND WEIGHT OF ANCHORS:

Bower anchors (2)	Stockless bow; both sides each 4.8 tons	
Stream anchor (1)	With removable stock (?) stern; starboard	1.4 tons
Kedge anchor (1)	Navy-type stern; port	.5 ton

VII. ANCHOR CABLES:

Bower anchor cables (2); 57mm. diameter; 15 shots on starboard side for 340.5 metres; 16 shots on port side for 351.4 metres; each cable shot is 22.7 metres

Stream anchor cable (1): 35mm. diameter; 182.9 metres long; of steel wire

Kedge anchor cable (1): 48 mm. diameter; 182.9 metres long; of Manila rope

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HEADQUARTERS STAFF, 6TH FLEET (1 December 1941)

Rear-Admiral GOTO, Zonchi (五 存 知); Commanding
Engineer Captain ONUKI, Jisaku (大 賀 治 作); Fleet Engineering Officer
Commander KISHIMA, Kikutoku (吉 島 勘 徳); Staff Officer
Lt. Comdr. MINAMI, Iwao (南 永 夫); Staff Officer
Lt. Comdr. SEKINO, Hideo (関 野 英 夫); Staff Officer
Eng. Lt. Comdr. ISHISAKA, Harukichi (石 坂 治 吉); Staff Officer
Warrant Officer IZUMI, Iwao (泉 岩 雄); Attached to Hdq. Staff

OFFICERS OF THE AOKI

Captain HISAHUNE, Yonejiro (久 米 次 郎) Captain
Commander NAKAMURA, Kenji (中 村 謙 治) Executive Officer
Eng. Comdr. MINO, Kiroku (本 殿 六) Engineering Officer
Lt. Comdr. NISHIKORI, Yuji (西 郡 雄 次) Navigator
Lt. Comdr. DOI, Yasumi (土 井 泰 三) Gunnery Officer
Lt. Comdr. (M.C.) MIURA, Ontaro (三 浦 温 太 郎) Medical Officer
Lt. Comdr. MIYAZAKI, Isamu (宮 崎 勇) Torpedo Officer
Lieutenant (sg) IMAMURA, Hashi (今 村 端) Aviation Officer
Lieutenant (sg) IGETA, Hirokuni (出 田 博 國) 1st Lieutenant
Lieutenant (sg) TAKUBO, Tatsuo (田 久 保 龍 雄) 2nd Division Officer
Lieutenant (sg) HOSHINO, Seisaburo (星 野 清 三 郎) Communications Officer
Eng. Lt. SHIBATA, Yoshinori (柴 田 義 則) 10th Division Officer
Lt. (sg) (SC) MATSUNAGA, Seiryu (松 永 世 隆) Supply Officer
Special Duty Lt. (jg) KAJITA, Yoshisaburo (梶 田 芳 三 郎) 1st Division Officer
Special Duty Eng. Lt. (jg) IKEDA, Tadatsuna (池 田 忠 正) 12th Division Officer
Eng. Lt. (jg) NAKAJIMA, Riichi (中 島 利 一) Division Officer
Lt. (jg) YOSHIMURA, Goro (吉 村 五 郎) Division Officer
Eng. Lt. (jg) NACASE, Takeshi (長 瀬 武) Division Officer
Lt. (jg) (M.C.) HOSOKI, Daisaburo (細 木 大 三 郎) Ship's Company
Lt. (jg) NONOBU, Sadasuke (野 々 部 定 祐) Ship's Company
Special Duty Ens. HASHIOKA, Gihachi (橋 岡 儀 八) Ship's Company
Ens. (S.C.) KITAYA, Yoshikichi (北 谷 由 吉) Ship's Company
S.D. Ens. YAMABAYASHI, Tokuji (山 林 得 次) Ship's Company
Eng. Ens. HAMAYA, Haruo (濱 谷 春 雄) Ship's Company

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Ens. MAEGATA, Shinichi (前川 信一) Ship's Company
 Res. Enr. Ens. OSHIMA, Magane (小島 真金) Ship's Company
 Ens. SATO, Tadaishi (佐藤 正) Ship's Company
 Ens. ODERA, Shunsaburo (大寺 俊三郎) Ship's Company
 Eng. Ens. KOIZUMI, Yasutaro (小泉 保太郎) Ship's Company
 Ens. (S.C.) WADA, Isamu (和田 勇) Ship's Company

FACTS ABOUT THE AOBA

I. TYPE: Heavy (first-class) cruiser

Where built: HITSUBISHI Dockyard at NAGASAKI
 Keel laid: 4 February 1924
 Launched: 25 September 1926
 Completed: 20 September 1927
 Modifications finished: 30 October 1940

II. PRINCIPAL MEASUREMENTS:

A. Overall length: 181.36 metres
 B. Maximum beam: 15.47 metres
 C. Length between perpendiculars: 176.78 metres
 D. Draft: 5.66 metres
 E. Displacement: 11,660. tons (sic)
 F. Tonnage displaced per cm. of draft: 23.6 kgs. (sic) (TP:tons?)
 G. Moment required to change trim 1 cm: 246.2 kgs. (sic) (TK:tons?)
 H. Shaft horsepower: 103,000. S.H.P.
 I. Speed: 33. knots
 J. Fuel oil carried: 20,400.
 K. Fresh water carried:
 Drinking water: 31.04 tons
 All-purpose water: 43.23 tons
 Water in drums: 127. tons
 Water evaporated in a day: 200. tons

III. ARMAMENT, ETC. (same as the KAKO)

FACTS ABOUT GOING ASHORE AT ROI (RUOTTO) (12-15-41)

Flag Signal for the AOBA.

1. While anchored at ROI and up until the 29th, all hands are permitted to go ashore and stroll about for three hours.
2. Extent of our liberty ashore; islands in the vicinity, swimming in the surf, and the wanton picking of fruit are prohibited.
3. For alarms, the AOBA will shoot two flares off in succession, in addition to its use of the regulation signals.
 - (1) Liberty ashore every day from 0600 to 0900, and from 1100 to 1400.
 - (2) Complement — about 120.
 - (3) Small boats in use: 1 lighter holding 90-100 men
1 cutter holding 25-30 men
 - (4) Place — EDGIGEN Island (uninhabited island)

Warnings when going ashore.

1. This island is a breeding place for dengue fever, and the mosquitoes are extremely numerous here. When stripping or when you step into a thicket you must not be bitten by any mosquitoes.
2. You must not be naked at any time while ashore. Further, swimming is strictly prohibited.
3. The wanton picking of fruit is forbidden. Nor is it permissible to bring aboard ship fruit that is unnecessary.
4. You must be assembled on the beach 20 minutes before it is time to return to the ship.

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5. Concerning Alarms:

All hands will always be mindful of their ship, and must be able to assemble together when the alarm is sounded. Therefore, at an alarm two flares will be fired in succession three times or more times from our ship. You must take care so that in this eventuality the conduct of our defense is not imperiled.

A2

THE REEFS AT TRUK HARBOR (as observed from a motorboat)
(TN: To accompany #11)

I. Time and Place

12 December 1941, 1430 (one hour before sunset).

Off the south shore of DUBLON Island in the TRUK Island Group.

II. Weather; Sea Conditions.

Clear weather. South wind, velocity of approximately 6 meters (TN: per second).

III. Summary of Activities.

We were unable to transport the official messenger to the Government Branch Office jetty, and the 15 Supply Department workers to the Munitions Section jetty at NEGERAI, but had accompany us the nine midshipmen on a hydrographic survey. We were familiar with the Government Branch Office jetty from our morning's experience. We were not familiar at all, however, with the location of the Munitions Section jetty. Even the charts we brought with us were not detailed. At the Branch Office jetty we asked people (for details, but without result), and although uneasy, we set out. We proceeded along, seeing marker posts A & B on our right. Then we passed two or three moored large flying boats. From point B we proceeded directly towards an object resembling a jetty. Because of our lack of self-confidence through this channel and of our uneasiness over the depths, we went along at slow speed. When we reached Point C, a rasping sound suddenly rent the air and our boat was jolted. The engine, of course, stopped at once. The boat, too, stopped, its bottom grating on the reef for a while. We felt that the boat was barely being supported near its center. This was 300 meters from the shore (to the right). The wind direction was on the starboard beam. The sun's angle of elevation was 15°.

IV. Measures Taken.

As stated above in describing the position of the bottom of the boat, it was aground on the reef at the center of the boat and to the left, the water was rather deep and the bow of the boat was slowly being rocked to the right by the wind.

Accordingly, I ordered the passengers to draw back onto the stern as far as possible and had four men rock the starboard bow to the right, and, at the same time, the motor was placed in reverse. When they had rocked the boat two or three times, we easily drew away from the reef. After that, we continued in reverse and when we went some distance from the reef, we inspected the engine and gunwale and saw that no damage had been sustained. At that time we received a message by semaphore from the shore which said: "Do not go there".


I immediately asked for the channel used by boats navigating in that area. Then we were stranded on the reef and I thought about the impact I believed for sure that we must have sustained some damage. However, when I was told that there was no damage, in answer to my inquiry, we proceeded ahead.

V. Causes and Lessons.

1. First of all, the foremost cause of this incident is the fact that we set out without knowing clearly our mission and without knowing where we were going.
2. The charts which we had taken along were not clear at all and should not have been used.
3. It will not suffice to guess at the depth of the water by advancing in the direction of the sun and, moreover, one must not fail to keep a sharp lookout at all moments and to pay attention to the large flying boats moored in the vicinity.
4. We did not take soundings.

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VI. Measures Taken After Our Return to the Ship.

I reported to the Executive Officer and to the Officer of the Day. As it was sunset I had the launch hoisted aboard. Thus, I was present when the launch was hoisted aboard and when the bottom of the boat was inspected, aside from the fact that the keel plates had separated more or less, the boat was the same as ever. When the coxswain and I inspected the boat two or three times, we could discover no damage. Accordingly, I made a report to that effect to the Executive Officer, the Officer of the Day, and to the Officer-in-Charge of the Division and thereby committed a grave error. By this I mean that when we inspected the boat the following morning there was a concavity of about 100 square centimeters in area on the starboard keel in the center and the bottom of the boat was full of water. The damage, however, had already been repaired with copper plates by the boat's crew. I immediately notified the Executive Officer, the Officer of the Day, and the Division Officer.

VII. Observations.

1. When in command of a boat, take full responsibility for matters affecting the boat, and do not listen to the opinions of others with regard to measures to be taken when stranded on a reef. I should have relied upon my own opinions.
2. Lookouts should have been most strictly posted.
3. When I did not know how deep the water was, I should have proceeded at a reduced speed.
4. The examination of the damaged place should have been done more thoroughly.
"To caution add care".
5. I should have been quick to get in touch with this ship.

(End of narrative)

#10

FACTS ABOUT TRUK (12-13-41)

A. Waters Suitable for Anchorage.

On the west side of MOEN Island (and in the waters between the north side and RUC).

In the vicinity of TRUK Harbor (i.e., in the waters south of UMAN Island and extending to OTTA Island and FANAN Island).

B. Shelter from Wind and Waves..

Depending on the selection of an anchorage, shelter can be afforded, no matter which direction the wind may come from.

C. Passes.

Northeast Pass.

1. In the center of the pass are reefs 7.1 meters under water. They are floating, crimson, circular markers here.
2. When there is a strong northeasterly wind, there are great swells at the entrance to the pass.
3. Tidal current is 2 knots.

North Pass.

1. Fair sailing with northeast winds.
2. The coconut grove to the northeast makes a good landmark.
3. Channel is sinuous.

South Pass.

1. Navigable by large ships.
2. There is rather deep water at the end of the reefs on both sides of the pass. You cannot, however, distinguish the change in the color of the water.
3. Maintaining your distance abeam of FALEU Island, it is easy to pass through the narrows.

EVERETT (EBARITTE) Pass.

1. Free of obstacles. Navigable by large ships.

D. Supply.

Coal may be had at the naval coaling station on the south shore of DUBLON Island.

Fuel oil (JUYU) may also be had here.

Fresh water is to be had in containers of 260 and 160 tons (one each).


Daily water allowance is 200 tons.

Fresh provisions include egg-plants, small melons, sweet potatoes, taro, all kinds of fish, beef, and pork.

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VARIOUS INFORMATION CONCERNING SAILING AND ANCHORAGES IN THE MANDATES

I. INFORMATION FOR NAVIGATION

1. The use of charts showing swept and sounded areas (SOKAI-SOKURYO-KAIZU). These island groups are mainly composed of coral atolls. Since the bottom of the sea is very undulating, sweeping and sounding must be carried out even when comparatively detailed sounding charts are available in order to avoid uncharted sunken reefs.

2. The carrying out of soundings.

When in the open sea and among several atolls, even though you may be carrying out to the best of your ability, sounding of the deep waters and soundings for hidden reefs, when you have not navigated throughout the entire area, it is necessary to continue sounding navigation (SOKUSHIANKO) most strictly.

3. Post strict look-outs.

A good part of the sea in these parts has not yet been sounded and in order to learn about changes in depths, it is necessary to post strict lookouts when navigating around these island groups.

(Note) Though recognition of shallow reefs depends, in the main, upon changes in the color of the water, great care is necessary since conditions of light, climate, and the nature of the sea bottom vary.

	Depth of Water
1. Dark purple-indigo	70 metres & more
2. Purple-indigo	40 to 70 metres
3. Purplish blue	About 30 metres
4. Blue	About 20 metres
5. Pale blue	About 15 metres
6. Bluish green	About 10 metres
7. Bluish yellow	2 to 5 metres
8. Brownish green	Under 2 metres

4. The southern part of these island groups is the region of equatorial counter currents, generally from the east. However, around both the RALIK and RATAK chains the northern equatorial current (from the west) and the equatorial counter current (from the east) run longitudinally south and north. Hence, the tidal currents and the winds interact with an extreme complexity, and particular caution must be taken in navigation.

II. CAUTIONS WHEN ENTERING AND LEAVING THE PASSES TO LAGOONS

1. When there are large waves on the sea outside the lagoon, and when their direction coincides with that of the pass to the lagoon, the waves at the entrance to the pass will be remarkably high. But you must allow for a sufficient margin in your estimate of depths.
2. In general, the tidal currents running through the passes are strong. You may make it a general rule to head inward at flood tide and outward at ebb tide, but you should also maintain a careful watch in steering your ship, as the tides may be irregular, depending on the topography of the ocean floor.
3. When you are about to enter or leave a long and narrow pass, you must keep a sharp eye on the weather lest a squall, proceeding inward, engulf you. Furthermore, in the event you are beset by a squall, you must have a plan of action ready beforehand.
4. As the markers are, on the whole, inconspicuous, it is necessary that you do take soundings as you enter the pass, so that you may ascertain the positions of the marker and your ship with room to spare.
5. If you should use small scale charts, you must bear in mind that the notations on sweeping and depths have been omitted.

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III. CAUTIONS IN DECIDING UPON AN ANCHORAGE

1. Throughout the year northeasterly to easterly winds prevail; the former are generally strong. Aside from the period July to October, when the winds are calmest, you should be careful in the selection of your anchorage.
2. Within an atoll there are several reef spots (TENSHO). Hence, in determining upon an anchorage, you should seek a place with an even depth and conspicuous markers nearby. You should also drop your anchor to determine the depth.
3. In selecting an anchorage for fueling, especial consideration must be paid to wind, waves, and tides.

About 1315 on 21 January 1942, a large enemy flying boat was sighted closing in upon us at 2°55' S. Lat., 149°40' E. Long. Immediately we notified the task force by radio. Three Zero fighters left the task force in our direction, but they turned around at our instruction and headed for the enemy plane. Within a few minutes a trail of smoke was seen in the direction they had flown. Then we saw the three fighters circling at low altitude. It was certain now that the enemy plane had been shot down. We changed our course at once and proceeded in the direction of the fight. Shortly we saw the fighters flying toward us. We waved our caps in greeting, whereupon they returned our salute by dipping their wings. When we reached the vicinity of the place where we supposed the plane to have been shot down, sure enough, there was a large oil slick on the sea. We also sighted five of the plane's crew drifting about; we took them aboard as prisoners. Three of the flying boat's regular complement of eight had perished. Of the five we rescued, two were officers and the others rated men.

THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

(23 January 1942)

From Lt. HOSHINO

I. LAWS ON THE SUBJECT

- A. Regulations for the Treatment of Naval Prisoners of War
- B. Laws for Aerial Warfare (Clauses #36 to #38)
- C. Laws for Land Warfare
- D. Applicable Precedents

II. WHO SHALL BE A PRISONER OF WAR

- A. Combatants, non-combatants (personnel in the Medical Corps are not considered POW's)
- B. Those in active service at the front (personnel with the Signal Corps in the field, etc.)
- C. Rulers (SHUKENSHA) and similar persons.
- D. Responsible government officials, diplomatic envoys, etc.
- E. Civilians employed by the military (GUNZOKU).
- F. Natives who shall have defended themselves against their captors.
- G. The sick and wounded in the military service.
- H. Crews of captured ships and aircraft.

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III. TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

A. A General Approach

It is of course essential that prisoners of war not be mistreated. The idea that aside from necessary restrictions, they should be treated as military men who have been taken prisoner, is widely accepted. Even though they are enemy officers and men, if it is considered that they were all doing necessary service, and that they were sacrificing their lives for their country, one must feel respect and sympathy for them.

Such springs from a common essence found in our so-called "BUCHIDO" (TM: "The Way of the Warrior"). However the handling of prisoners of war during the first World War was quite harsh and there were many cases of it not being effected in accordance with previously existing rules.

Our "BUCHIDO" has as its basis the principle "respect for honor", and the belief that giving a prisoner the opportunity to kill himself is noble treatment.

Respect for the enemy on the field of battle rises above the spirit of combat in response to the enemy's bravery. It is based on the belief that the warrior who views the battlefield as an exercise ground is pleased to have taken an enemy, regarding him as an opponent of exercise ground practice. In order to utilize this general conception concerning prisoners, it is basic that one's attitude should not embrace any individual admiration for the prisoner. It is thought that the differences in Western and Occidental schools of thought regarding "I have done my duty" (TM: In English in original) gives rise to dissimilarities in the concept of prisoners of war.

- B. Prisoners of war should be committed to the authority of the Government of the country which has taken them prisoner and they should be treated humanely. The prisoner may keep anything belonging to him other than implements of war, horses, or military documents. Therefore, the prisoner of war must be given suitable treatment by us. (It is necessary to act according to the various articles and provisions in question.)

Almost all confiscated documents and articles will be returned to these persons in view of the fact that they are personal articles.

C. Excerpts from Measures for Treatment of Naval Prisoners of War

1. When you have captured a person who shall be a prisoner of war, immediately inspect the articles he carries with him.
Confiscate weapons, ammunition, and other military articles (catalogue the articles). If he has any other possessions (it is necessary to catalogue the articles) they should be carried by this person if convenient.
2. Only when it is necessary to recognize the dignity of an officer prisoner, can the naval officer-in-charge wear his sword. (The circumstances and the officer's names are to be reported to the Minister of the Navy).
3. A daily account, a list of names, and a catalogue of belongings should be made concerning the prisoner, including the POW's age, social position, rank, residence, Naval District to which attached (SHOZOKU KANSENCHO) place wounded.
4. Officer prisoners and non-combatant officer prisoners should be distinguished from petty officers and men and they should be treated in accordance with their social position and rank. Make exceptions for infringements of the law or insincerity in answering questions of name and rank.
5. When POW's are disobedient or have plans to escape, etc., the necessary measures for imprisonment or punishment can be carried out. There will be no objection to the use of armed force.
6. In connection with a POW's attempts to escape or misdemeanors apply the Naval Disciplinary Regulations. The disciplinary authority is a senior naval guard officer (GUNEI) who actually takes in the prisoners.

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7. The Naval officer in charge shall surrender the POW accompanied by his various documents and articles to the following:
 - (a) He shall surrender him to the Guard District of the Naval Base.
 - (b) In unavoidable circumstances he may surrender him to another Guard Officer(TN: GUNEI)
 - (c) When he finds it advantageous he may confer with the Army or the Line of Communication (TN: HEITAN) Transportation and Communications Officer and he can surrender the prisoners of war to them. (In such instances, the officers, non-combatant officers (SOTOKAN 特別兵), and men shall be segregated and their number reported quickly to the Minister.)
8. When the POW's are picked up, a custodian will be appointed who shall look after the prisoners under the supervision of a naval officer.
9. Telegrams and letters will be censored by the supervising officer. Only the harmless ones will be let through. The franking privilege shall apply. (You must consult the POW's last P.O. first, however.)
10. A POW may be permitted to purchase daily necessities or other articles he may like with his own money, only when the supervising officer sees no reason why he should not.
11. When a POW dies, a funeral service befitting his station and rank in life shall be held.
12. The Last Will and Testament of a POW shall be handled as if it were from a member of the Imperial Japanese Navy.
- D. Extracts from the General Rules for the Treatment of POW's (as established in the Laws for Land Warfare).
 1. POW's are obligated not to leave a certain area and may be detained in a fixed place. POW's may be imprisoned as long as it is necessary, as a measure to preserve the peace of the community, which must come first.
 2. The capturing nation may utilize the POW's as laborers, according to their rank and ability. Officers may not be employed. The POW's duties shall not be excessive. The labor shall have no relation whatsoever with the military strategy and actions of the capturing nation. (This is very inexplicit, so that in such matters the capturing nation enjoys a freedom of interpretation and may exercise its discretion.) If worked, the POW must be granted a remuneration commensurate with that given Army personnel of his rank in the capturing nation. They say that in this present war GERMANY grants its POW laborers a remuneration 60% of what they are entitled.
 3. The government of the capturing nation is obligated to feed and clothe every POW. When there is no special agreement between two warring nations, the capturing state shall treat matters of food, bedding, and clothing on an equal footing with its own troops.
 4. The POW shall submit to the rules in force. If he does not, the supervising officer may take stringent measures. If a POW shall escape and be caught again before he has reached his objective, he shall be punished. However, if he shall have reached his objective, but become a prisoner again at a later date, he shall not be punished in the least for the former escape.
 5. The capturing nation may permit a POW to take a prescribed oath and set him free; but it may not force the POW to take this oath. Moreover, the government of the capturing nation need not accede to the request of a POW to take the oath and be set free.
 6. At the commencement of hostilities between belligerents, a neutral country shall establish a Prisoner of War Information Bureau, to be in operation the moment the first enemy nationals are rounded up on alien soil.
 7. POW mail shall be exempted from the local postage regulations; presents and relief society boxes addressed to POW's shall be free of import duties and railroad freight charges.

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8. Officer POW's shall receive the same pay that is granted officers of identical rank in the detaining country. This pay shall then be redeemed by the POW's government.
9. With the single stipulation that he shall abide by the rules governing order and discipline, as prescribed by the Army authorities, the POW is granted religious freedom.
10. After peace is restored, the POW shall be returned to his country as rapidly as possible.

IV. MY OWN VIEWS (CONCERNING THE INTERROGATION OF POW'S)

Throughout the above stipulations, the freedom to interrogate POW's to further the operations of the capturing nation has not been granted. However, I believe that when there are POW's, as between any warring states, it should properly be the conventional thing to interrogate them for information on their fighting forces. Therefore, I conclude that there is no need to adhere to the rules of international law and to hesitate in conducting interrogations. However, if the POW's feelings are not given consideration, results either cannot be gained from the interrogation or will be meagre indeed.

That is to say:

- A. Insofar as possible, POW's should be picked up separately.
- B. Conversation and communication between POW's should be restricted.
- C. To help elicit testimony from POW's material recognized to be of value (documents, messages, etc.) should be gathered and arranged to the best of one's ability. The principal function of interrogation then, should be the further interpretation of this material.
- D. In interrogating, coercion should be the principle. Since in cases when the POW's native language differs from one's own, it is difficult to take advantage of any slip of his tongue, to practice detailed examination or to use indirect questioning (especially at times when one lacks confidence in one's vocabulary), it is easier (TN: for the interrogator) to adopt the formalities of a consultation.
The feeling that the victor is superior, the loser inferior should pervade the interrogation. If necessary, you should demand that questions and answers be made in writing.
- E. Until the object of the interrogation has been attained, the POW should be made to feel anxious about his fate, should become haggard physically. Consideration should be given to the POW's quarters, sustenance, surveillance, etc.

INTERNATIONAL LAW IN WARTIME

From Lt. HOSHINO

- I. The UNITED STATES declared MANILA an open city (TN: "undefended town" written in English). In answer, our imperial forces continued to bomb it. Finally, on 3 January they entered the city. How shall our action be explained in the light of international law?

We had to consider MANILA a defended city (TN: this term rendered in English), and hence our attacks were lawful.
(Reference Material:)

- A. The meaning of an "open city".

The question of what military installations and troops constitute a city's defense is one of a technical or fact; (in practice, the question is whether or not the city is defended). However, there is no explicit authority on the subject.

In general, the following cities are recognized as "defended cities":

1. A city surrounded by fortifications.
2. A city in whose vicinity gun batteries and other positions have been erected.
3. A city in which troops are located and attempt to prevent the entrance of the enemy. (If there be a small number of troops, but recognized to have no "ability to resist", the city shall not be treated as a "defended city".)

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4. A city where the waters at the entrance to the harbor have been laid with (automatic) contact mines.
 - B. What shall be selected as attack objectives?
There is some difference of opinion because of the divergence of operational methods employed in naval, land, and air warfare.
 1. Targets in a "defended city":
There is no necessity to limit the objectives in this instance to fortifications and other defensive installations for troops.
In air warfare (bombing) the objectives shall be the same as those listed, in the next section.
 2. Targets in an "open city":
 - a. Naval vessels (all ships used by the military services)
 - b. Troops (if there are many troops located in the city, it shall be considered a defended city).
 - c. Constructions with military possibilities:
 - (1) Airfields (those which are privately owned but may be given over to military use in the future must be included).
 - (2) Forts, trenches, obstructions.
 - d. Military, naval, (and airforce) installations (barracks, hangars, arsenals, etc.).
 - e. Storage points for arms and other materiel.
 - f. Factories and other installations that may be put to military use. (Privately owned plants which will be definitely turned over to the military are included. However, accessory and sub-contract factories are exceptions.)
 3. "An "open city" not responding to levies on its populace (There are regulations to meet this situation in naval warfare only. However, the same rules should apply in land warfare. In air warfare, the application of such rules would be impossible.)
 - a. Should a naval force order a city to supply it with the necessary provisions and stores for its immediate needs in a formal demand and the city resist: (For details, the execution of a levy, consult levying orders and the "Regulations for Levying".)
A levy should correspond to the resources of the place upon which it is made, and must have the approval of the commander of the naval force.
Unrestricted levying by a SNLF., etc., and levying done by each ship is wrong.
 - b. Should the city officials fail to submit to our orders
It is permissible to assess all people in the city form of tax, but an "open city" cannot be bombarded because this levy has not been collected.
 4. When cities, towns, and villages may be bombed in air warfare as objectives (this included "open cities").
 - a. If a large force is in an area immediate to the operation of the opposing land force (including a SNLF) and is concentrating at the city, town, or village in question.
 - b. (Civilians may be in danger, but that cannot be avoided. However, in such instances all possible steps shall be taken to reduce the danger to them.)
 - c. (Bombing which has as its object the intimidation of civilians, the injury of non-combatants, and the destruction of non-military things is illegal.)
- However, there is no objection to destroying individual targets even if the city as a whole may not be made an objective.

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C. Targets which may not be attacked (common to land, naval, and air warfare).

1. Religious buildings
2. Buildings used in the learning of arts and crafts
3. Buildings used by charity organizations
4. Historical monuments
5. Hospitals, collection stations for the sick and wounded, and hospital ships.

But if it had been assumed that these things would not be put to military use, and the enemy violated this assumption, there could not be the slightest objection to an attack. However in such an instance, the existence or non-existence of the breach must be made clear and attacks kept to the minimum necessitated.

D. Is an attack without warning lawful? (a step taken at the outset of an attack).

In general, the city officials should be notified beforehand, regardless of whether the city is defended or not.

The method of notification is left to the discretion of the attacker. The scattering of leaflets advising evacuation is one way. Especially should an attack on objects within an "open city" be announced, giving its residents a considerable period of grace. (The length of this period will depend on circumstances.)

If the situation is urgent, it is not necessary to warn the city. It will suffice if as much consideration as possible is given to the reduction of inconvenience to the city's inhabitants.

When an assault, surprise attack, etc., is an unavoidable military necessity, an attack without warning is not unlawful. And in air attacks, too, it is not necessary to warn the city beforehand, be it defended or not.

However, an attack provoked by resistance to a levy must be preceded without fail by notification.

E. Is it necessary that non-combatants be allowed to seek refuge outside the attack sectors when the city is being surrounded?

This may be readily refused, for favors based on pity need not be carried to excess.

II. There is evidence that the PHILIPPINE Government employees withdrew from MANILA on a hospital ship. Was there anything to prevent us from subjecting this ship to a visit and search and seizing it?

As necessary, it is possible to take charge of a ship, conduct a visit and search, and then set it on an isolated course or detain it.

However, a hospital ship may not be molested as long as it does not commit an act against the enemy.

(Reference Material:)

A. Definition of a hospital ship

1. A public vessel, private vessel, or ship of neutral registry which is employed with the single purpose of succouring the sick, wounded, and ship-wrecked.

2. Types and markings:

A flag bearing a red cross on a white field flown with the national flag is accepted identification.

a. Naval hospital ships

Painted white with a lateral green stripe of about one metre in width. Built and outfitted in the country using it.

b. Privately owned hospital ships

Painted white with a lateral red stripe of about one metre in width. Equipped by a private individual or corporation, and operated under orders from the belligerent state.

c. Hospital ships of neutral registry

Painted white with a lateral red stripe of about one metre in width. Equipped by a private individual or corporation in the neutral state, and must have the previous sanction of the government of registry and belligerent state.

In each case, the status in conflict with the said belligerent must be notified if too use those line in advance.

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B. The Rights and Obligations of a Hospital Ship:

1. No matter what nationality a ship may be, it may rescue from the sea the sick and wounded of belligerent powers.
2. Hospital ships may not be used for military purposes.
3. Hospital ships may not interfere with the transport of combatant troops.

Accordingly, the warships of belligerent powers may direct a hospital ship on an isolated course. If necessary, the warships can exercise the right of search and detention.

4. Hospital ships operate at their own risk:

If the symbol of the hospital ship is not recognized and it is attacked, the responsibility lies wholly with the hospital ship.

- C. In cases where a hospital ship engages in forbidden activities by taking advantage of its special rights as a hospital ship, such as engaging in the transportation of personnel other than the sick, wounded, and survivors of shipwreck or when it makes available information or engages in any other such military function, it forfeits its special rights and may be considered subject to the treatment afforded ordinary ships. (According to British opinion, it is not permissible for a hospital ship to return to the functions of a merchantman). When we consider, however, those rights which international law permits for the special handling of cases even in sick bays aboard warships we note that the hospital ship goes beyond its allotted powers when it takes aboard (from a warship) sick and wounded. Although it is permissible to open fire immediately upon it, except in absolutely unavoidable cases, it is allowed to get away.

III. How would you, if you were Commander of the WAKE Island Occupation Force, have dealt with the bearer of a white flag?

Though the situation is handled according to the decisions of the Commander of the Occupation Force and according to the principles established for land warfare, those articles which treat of the situation in international law are given below:

A. What is meant by the bearer of a flag (TN: in English):

1. He is acting under the orders of one of the belligerent parties (which indicates that he is representing one of the belligerent parties).
His Duty: To negotiate on behalf of one of the belligerent parties.

His Identification: He bears a white flag.

2. The bearer of the flag and the interpreter, drummer, and bugler who accompany him possess certain inviolable rights.

B. Treatment of the Flag Bearer:

1. The question of whether or not to acknowledge the flag bearer who has been sent out is left to the discretion of the Force Commander and he is not always obliged to receive him.

(However, in the above case, a declaration that the flag bearer will not be received is customary.)

2. If the flag bearer takes advantage of his position to determine the state of affairs on our side, the Force Commander in order to prevent this may use what ever means he finds necessary.
3. If the enemy has abused the privilege of sending a flag bearer, he can be detained for a while.

C. Circumstances in Which the Flag Bearer Loses his Inviolable Rights:

1. When he incites treachery or when he takes advantage of his special right to further his own interests.
When he does either of the above acts, he immediately forfeits his special rights. (There should be no discussion about treating him as an enemy).
2. The flag bearer who has been denied reception shall immediately withdraw but because of this, he doesn't lose his special rights. That is to say, because reception has been denied it is not permissible to perform immediately a hostile act against the flag bearer.

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SPECIFICATIONS OF THE NO. 10 TYPE MTB

1. HULL:

Length Overall	32.400 metres
Length at Waterline (official)	31.770 metres
Beam	5.000 metres
Depth	2.800 metres
Displacement (official)	84.600 tons
" (fully loaded)	89.381 tons
" (light condition)	68.277 tons
Draft forward	1.104 metres
Draft aft	1.116 metres
Mean draft	1.111 metres
Fuel capacity	17.000 liters
Cruising Range (official)	Speed of 28 Knots for 410 Miles
" " (under special conditions)	Speed of 16 Knots for 1200 Miles
Maximum Speed	30 Knots

2. ARMAMENT:

Type 96 25mm dual-mount machine guns, Model 1, Modification 1	1
Provisionally termed 40 kilogram smoke laying gear (TN: HATSUEN-KYO 特殊煙霧機)	4
Type 99 7.7mm rifles	5
Pistols	5
Type 97 Gas Masks	18
Steel Helmets	15
Ammunition (25mm)	1200 rounds
" (rifle)	1400 rounds
" (pistol)	360 rounds

3. TORPEDO EQUIPMENT:

Torpedoes Type 44 (Type 97)	4
Slide Dropping Gear, Model 2	4
Director, Type 14, Model 2	1
Type 95 Depth Charge (when torpedoes aboard, 10)	18
Depth Charge Hand Launches, Model 2	6
Air Reservoirs	2

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4. NAVIGATING EQUIPMENT:

Type 90 Magnetic Compass, Model 2, Modification 1	1
Compass for Small Boats, Model 2	1

5. OPTICAL EQUIPMENT:

Manoeuvrable Range-Finder	1
7 Power Prism Binoculars (NOVA, Model 1)	4
Type 96 Sextant, Modification 1	1

6. ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT:

Primary Source of Power:

Gasoline powered 6 K/ 105 V DC Generators (for steering power and cooking use)	2
---	---

Secondary Source of Power:

Storage Batteries, Model 3 (for use in starting and illumination)	1
Navigation Light	1
Illuminating Equipment (including 300W working lights)	1
Communication Apparatus	1

7. RADIO EQUIPMENT:

Type 96 Mark 4 Air (TN: KÜ 空) Wireless, sending (and receiving)	1
Secondary Power Equipment	1
Hydrophones (furnished by special orders)	1

8. ENGINES:

Main Engines - Mark 71 Model 6 internal combustion engines - 950 HP

Gasoline Engines (VULCAN (74 7/8) speed reduction equipment installed)	4
--	---

Shafts and Screws	2
-------------------	---

Auxiliary Engines, Steering Engines (MHS Model 2 Steering Equipment)	1
---	---

9. CREW:

Officers and Warrant Officers	3
Enlisted Men	15

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10. PRINCIPAL STORES:

Anchor	100 kilograms	1
Anchor cable - diameter 15mm		1
Hand-operated Windlass		1
Fire extinguishing equipment, carbon dioxide type ventilators (electrically operated)		1
Training port (SENKAI50) (electrically operated)		3

11. RUDDER:

Balanced Rudder

REFUELLING IN TOW

1 February 1942

1. ESSENTIALS:


To execute refuelling safely and swiftly at any time and place desired, maintaining the desired mobile strength and preparations for immediate response to the enemy.

2. PRECAUTIONS:

Since refuelling is an operation requiring cooperation between the fuelling and refuelling ships, careful preparation and investigation are necessary before the fact in order to insure close intercommunication. Arrangements made beforehand; unity of planning.


3. METHODS:

Refue ling alongside: mainly done with cruisers and destroyers; suited to a pitching motion; large-scale refue ling possible; simple to perform.
Refue ling in tandem: possible for ships unsuited to refue ling alongside;
Diagonal refue ling.



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
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JICPOA Item #4906
Page 625. REFUELING ALONGSIDE - DIAGRAM:

(See Enclosure)

6. REFUELING RECORD:

- A. Refueling method: alongside
- B. Date: 24 January 1942, 0600
- C. Place: (150° E. Long. on the equator)
- D. Course: 0° Course intersection angle:
- E. Shaft Speed: 8 knots (dangerous at 10-12 knots) Speed thru water: 6.6 knots.
- F. Rudder compensation: 5° outboard
- G. Wind direction: 340° Wind force: 3.5 metres per second
- H. Roll: port 1.5°, starboard 2°
- I. Barometric pressure: 758.4 mm Temperature: 25° C.
- J. Distance between ships: 30 metres
- K. Pressure of oil pumped: 3 kilograms (TN: per sq. cm. ?)
- L. Oil pumped: 240 tons per hour
- M. Weights: 1.5 tons each Weight line: 24mm S.W. (steel wire)
- N. Forward rope: 48mm S.W. Mooring Rope: 48 mm S.W.

7. HOW TO CALCULATE SHORT DISTANCES:

As is shown by the chart, puncture a piece of cardboard in two places with large match sticks and then hold the cardboard in a perpendicular position. Align the points where the sticks are visible so that the two points and the waterline of the fueling ship will be in the same plane. The bearing on which the distance being calculated lies in on the beam.

8. PROPER POSITIONS FOR THE SHIPS:

Port to Starboard - Ships should be about 35 metres apart.
Fore and Aft - The number flag flying aboard the fueling ship should be slightly forward of the bridge on the refueling ship.
When the ships are out of line, the proper position for each will be shown by numbers indicated on the side of the fueling ship.

9. STANDARD SIGNALS:

When the refueling ship hoists a white flag "The forward lines have been secured. No hindrance to putting out the weight."
When the refueling ship hoists a red flag "The inboard line has been secured. No hindrance to running out the weight."
When the refueling ship hoists a blue flag "The hoses have been connected. Begin to pump oil."
When the fueling ship hoists a blue flag "Have started to pump oil."
After the fueling ship has started to pump oil, when it hoists a blue flag "Have ceased pumping oil. Cast off the hose."
When the refueling ship hoists a blue flag "Flow of oil has ceased. Hoses cast off."

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Completion of the Operation:

When the fueling ship hoists a red flag "Cast off inboard line."
 When the fueling ship hoists a white flag "Cast off forward line."

(For additional communication during the operation, write the message on a small black board and hold it up (so it may be seen).)

10. CAUTIONS TO BE OBSERVED WHEN MANEUVERING THE SHIPS INTO POSITION:

- (1) There must be close coordination between the turn and the compass. When both ships draw near, there should be proper orientation of the magnetic compass. When the ships are maneuvering into position, changes in distances shall be made by the fueling ship and because of the deviations caused by prevalent currents, waves, and other elements, in the adjustment of positions, allowances shall be made for these variable influences.
- (2) When the angle of intersection of the courses of the ships is too great, since this has a direct relationship to the process of suction between the ships, it is dangerous for them to approach too rapidly.
- (3) When there is a variation in speed because of the displacement of the refueling ship, weather, and other reasons, this variation may be decreased when high speeds are involved by means of a standard rule:

Cruisers Decrease from 0 - 1/4 knots.

Destroyers Decrease from 1/4 - 1/3 knots. If the differences in speed are too great, great strain will be placed upon the forward line and upon the inboard line.

- (4) The angle of intersection of the course which the refueling ship should maintain with respect to the fueling ship should be fixed by considering the type of the ships, speed, weight, distance between the ships, influence of wind and waves, etc. Generally, 1° - 2° will be suitable.

If the angle of intersection is great, there is open space between the ships and if there is not much strain upon the forward and inboard lines, there is a tendency for the ships to mutually draw together.

DRY-DOCKING OF THE KAKO


(19 November 1941; KURE)

I. THE SUBORDINATE WATCH OFFICER'S DUTIES

- A. Hereafter he shall manage the docking operations
- B. We plan to dock at 1030. Stand easy until then.
- C. He shall supervise the deck crew in the changing of the anchor cables and wire-rope for hawsers fore and aft.
- D. He shall prepare to cast both anchors.
- E. Using a cutter, he shall change the wire-rope in the stern for a hawser. When finished, he shall supervise the hauling up of the bow cables.
- F. Afterwards, the cutter shall be sent ashore.
- G. He shall then supervise the securing of the gangway and boom by the division assigned to the task.
- H. Davits shall then be turned inboard.
- I. After the men from the Harbor Master's Office have come aboard, the starboard gangway shall be raised.
- J. After 0930 the use of the head is prohibited.
- K. After docking, he shall immediately put into effect the port fire bill. Each division shall make its preparations.
- L. Otherwise, he shall do such work as is prescribed in the port bill (SHUTSUNYUKO BUSHO).
- M. Attention! Carry on work at hand!

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II. (Enclosed a sketch).



III. DOCKING ESSENTIALS

First, the wire rope aft shall be taken in and replaced by a hawser. While paying this out, the wire-rope forward shall be taken in and replaced by a hawser. Then haul in the anchor cable.

One (150 ton) tug-boat forward and one on each side amidships and aft. While paying out the forward hawser take in the ones aft and let go the one forward. The forward buoy will be changed to the starboard by the tug. When the tug turns at "A" (TN: see sketch) this ship will aid in turning about by steering of the ship and then proceed directly to the dock. Forward there are 2 clearly visible markers. The officers-in-charge of the work party are 1 Harbor Master on "top" (TN: r . . .) and 1 officer-in-charge forward on the forecastle.

There will be hand-flag communication between the forward and aft masts.

Just a little before (TN: reaching) the dock the tug-boat changes course by turning to starboard, and lines are passed from the shore to both sides of the ship. As the stern approaches the entrance the tugs let go and lines are passed to both sides of the stern. Then while the starboard and port lines are being hauled the bow is pointed toward the two markers and the ship proceeds only by this power. (TN: i.e. by hauling on lines).

When dry-docking is completed, close the rear gates and begin drainage.

(End)

CONCERNING DRY-DOCKING

STANDARDS OF DRY-DOCKING (Regulations for Construction and Repair of Vessels, Item 61).

Combined Fleet:

1. Battleships and Carriers (those officially designated as being over 30,000 tons displacement).
and Special Duty Vessels — Once a year.
2. Warships: (Battleships, Carriers (as above) excluded) —
Twice a year.
Destroyers, Submarines
Torpedo Boats and Mine-Sweepers
3. Special Duty Boats As necessary.

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DAILY ROUTINE WHILE DOCKED

0530	All hands turn to; calisthenics (outside the dock); swabbing outer decks.
0645	Breakfast
0730	Daily routine; Inspection
0845	Lay to duties
1130	Secure from duties
1145	Lunch
1305	Calisthenics
1315	Commence instruction
1600	Secure from instruction
1615	Begin leisure time
1700	End of leisure time
1715	Supper
1745	Fire detail secures

INSTRUCTIONS WHILE IN DRY-DOCK

1. There must be no running about on board ship.
2. Beware of what lies under foot. Take care that you don't fall down onto the dock.
3. A WO or above should be present when any heavy things are being moved or transported.
4. The safety rope must be used without fail whenever work is being done on the sides of the ship.
5. Secrecy shall be maintained. Be especially careful of the movement of laborers.
6. Fires are strictly prohibited. Do any work on the reverse side of a piece of oil-cloth.
7. The fire bill in dock must be thoroughly carried out.
8. The ship shall be fumigated upon entering and leaving the dock.

WHEN THE KAKO LEAVES DRY-DOCK

Preparations for Leaving the Dock (25 November 1941)

1. Hereafter (the subordinate watch officer) shall conduct the preparations for leaving the dock.
2. We expect to leave the dock at 1315. Afterwards we shall moor to buoy #4.
3. The fore deck crew shall prepare to moor the forward part of the ship.
4. The anchor crew shall prepare to cast both anchors.
5. The division assigned shall prepare to get out both gangways, swinging booms and propeller booms.
6. The 1st and 2nd Divisions shall prepare to take aboard ammunition.
7. All small boats shall proceed to the mooring place.
8. All hands away from their ship shall return by 1300.
9. Men performing work away from their ship will make certain of their life net
10. Set about preparing to leave the dock.

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Ships and shore stations spotting these signals shall indicate that they have received and understood them by hoisting the UNCLE flag or by transmitting the U (or cancel-U) code signal.

B)

ADDRESS BY OUR CAPTAIN UPON MY BOARDING SHIP

by Capt. TAKAHASHI, Yuji (Captain, KAKO)

16 November 1941

"For three years you have studied your duties diligently. And now I believe that as you stand here, at the battle front, your emotions have been heightened, as you sense impending action.

When you reflect upon it, this is no training squadron; you have been assigned directly to the front. Officers in charge of your guidance and their assistants have been selected; but the fact of the matter is that each and every one of them has his battle station and shall not be able to devote his whole-hearted attention to your instruction. You appreciate, I am sure, the present situation, and will not depend on others too heavily. You must undertake your duties assiduously, with a healthy spirit of initiative. Moreover, at this time special emphasis should be given to the caution, 'Always be at your station!'. It is extremely important that line officers always be on the upper deck, and that they observe everything. When they are on the upper deck, they are able to master anything that comes along.

In short, the present situation is certainly nearing its climax; indeed, it is in its most pregnant stage. I earnestly desire from you an uncommon amount of determination and effort."

ADDRESS ON NEW YEAR'S DAY, 1942

by Capt. HISAMUNE, Yonejiro (Captain, AOBA)

"If we put aside our merriment and stop to consider, we find that we have greeted this New Year's Day, in the 2602nd year of our Empire on the scene of battle. First, however, we should offer congratulations on the long life of our Emperor and Supreme Commander. I feel that it is not only a great honor for military men to greet the New Year on the battlefield, but that we shall long remember partaking of 'ZONI' (TH: a traditional Japanese New Year's Day dish of rice cake boiled with vegetables and meat), clad in our hot-weather gear.

"However, our foe is of great strength, too. In particular, it has been judged that a large American force of cruisers, in conjunction with carriers, has designs on the SOUTH SEA Islands. This force, which is charged with the heavy duty of protecting the SOUTH SEAS, must not relax its vigilance for one second. We have whetted our swords ten years for this one battle. 1942 shall be the year in which we will exalt our military might before the world, and in which we will achieve the object of our sacred war. Let each man strive his hardest."

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ADDRESS NO. 4 TO THE COMBINED FLEETS

(2003, 23 May 1943)

By the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets

On this occasion we pay our respects to the memory of a leader of the Combined Fleet, to a man whom we still remember. YAMAMOTO, the late Commander-in-Chief, died at the front. If we annihilate our stubborn enemy even at the cost of our lives, we will know that his spirit lives on.

During the past year and a half of this struggle, we have smashed the power of our great enemy and though we have, in the main, carried out our basic strategy, our enemy is striving for ultimate victory by expanding his preparations for offensive action and by devising plans for the strategic application of new weapons. Furthermore, taking advantage of the tide of the war in EUROPE, he is concentrating his main power in the GREAT EAST ASIA Area and is preparing to launch a counter-offensive. No matter how many times the enemy may advance against us, we shall always welcome combat with him and in exterminating him and securing for ourselves the ultimate victory, we shall by united effort and perseverance forge for ourselves a greater and greater military power. At the same time that we manifest a relentless spirit of attack, we shall be prepared to meet the changing conditions of warfare with new strategies and new weapons, always keeping one step ahead of the enemy.

The war is now at its peak. We defend what is ours and the task of meeting and striking the enemy must be the prerogative of the Imperial Navy. We shall defend ourselves to the last breath and shall totally destroy the enemy. Should we cross paths with the enemy upon the seas, that will be fine. We shall in our traditional way close in upon him and deliver fierce attacks. We look forward confidently to seeing our enemy vanquished.

If in accordance with this desire we devote ourselves wholeheartedly to the utter destruction of the enemy, being animated by the spirit of the late Commander-in-Chief YAMAMOTO, we shall be united, first of all, with the brave soul of the Admiral of the Fleet and then with those many others now in Heaven, and shall be able to look forward to the crushing of the enemy and the fulfillment of the great responsibility of the defense of our fatherland.

Let each and every one ponder well upon this task; let us all, by exerting our efforts look forward to the realization of the Imperial wishes by carrying to its conclusion this responsibility.

(END)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #10

(INTERROGATION OF JAPANESE PRISONER OF WAR
CAPTURED FROM THE JAPANESE SUBMARINE I-1
WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

ENTITLED

"KUBOAKI, TAKEO, SUPERIOR CLASS ENGINEER PETTY OFFICER,
INTERROGATION OF"

USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

A16-2(4) 1-537

AS/(25)

**SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE
OF THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER**

AS-2/EF37
BDH/rw

Serial" 0351

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 2 1942

From: The Commander South Pacific Area and
South Pacific Force.
To: Distribution List.
Subject: KUBOAKI, TAKEO, Superior Class Engineer
Petty Officer, interrogation of.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Interrogation.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for information and use.

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M. R. DEWING
Chief of Staff.


H. D. MOULTON,
Flag Secretary.

**COMBAT INTELLIGENCE CENTER
SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE**

CONFIDENTIAL

February 26, 1943.

IDENTIFICATION OF: KUROAKI, TAKAO, SUPERIOR CLASS ENGINEER P. O.

(Interrogator: Lt. Col. H. D. Harris, U.S.M.C.)
(Interpreter: Capt. J. R. Shively, U.S.M.C.R.)

Personal History:

POW was captured from the I-1 after having spent 24 hours in the water. He was suffering from shark bites on the right heel and left forearm. POW had completed 9 years service in Nip Navy; was 28 years old; and had attended high school. The POW had a course at the Mechanics School and then finished the submarine school and had returned to Mechanics School for an additional course. POW served aboard I-4 for 1 year. POW had been on the I-1 for 28 months; previously to that he was on the KATORI from November 1939 to October 1940. The POW was on duty with the diesel engines on both the KATORI and the I-1.

Identifications:

The POW said that the commander of the 6th Fleet was Vice Admiral KIMATSU. Vice Admiral SHIMIZU formerly commanded the 6th Fleet.

The POW gave the following names for the officers of the I-1:

Commanding Officer	-	SAKAMOTO, Lt. Comdr.
Engineer Officer	-	BUTO, Hisao, Lt.
Gunnery Officer	-	OIKAWA, Ensign
Asst. Eng. Officer	-	FUJII, Warrant Officer
Electrical Officer	-	IMAI, Warrant Officer
Torpedo Officer	-	was a warrant officer - name unknown
Navigator	-	was a Lt. (jg) - name unknown

Situational Information:

Following represents a chronological record of I-1 operations obtained from POW:

1. December, 1941 - operated in Pearl Harbor area, firing several torpedoes at transport - no hits. I-1 was attacked on 2 or 3 occasions without effect.

2. January 13, 1942 - returned to Japan via Marshalls where I-1 refueled. Torpedo supply replenished in Japan.

3. February 2, 1942 - departed Japan and proceeded to Indian Ocean remaining there 2 months. One merchant ship was attacked and sunk (probably Australian). The I-1 developed engine trouble (broken shaft).

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4. April 2, 1942 - returned to Japan for overhaul, remaining there 3 months. The after gun was removed and ship rigged to carry one large motor landing craft (DAIKATSU). Ship's complement was supplemented by 3 additional men to man landing boat.

5. During July the I-1 was in Aleutian waters on a cruise which lasted about 50 days, during which no U.S. ships or planes were sighted.

6. September 10, 1942 - departed Japan for Rabaul, operating in Solomons area without incident until end of October.

7. November 1, 1942 - returned to Truk.

8. November 10, 1942 - departed for Japan.

9. November 20, 1942 - arrived Japan, remaining there until end of December.

10. January 3, 1943 - departed Yokosuka, Japan, for Truk in company with I-17. The KUSASHI and YAMATO were observed at Truk. The HAYATAKA left a day or two later.

11. January 10, 1943 - proceeded to Rabaul (ship repainted; engine trouble developed (clutch)). Proceeded to Guadalcanal.

12. January 29, 1943 - I-1 was attacked and destroyed January 29, 1943, while transporting stores and supplies to Guadalcanal.

Technical Information:

1. The I-1 carried 53 centimeter torpedoes - the speed of which was estimated to be 50 knots. Air pressure was 200 kg. per sq. cm.

2. The KATORI is powered with turbines, main engines, supplemented with diesel auxiliaries. Speed under diesel is 14 knots; diesel and turbines combined is 18 knots (carries one plane).

3. The I-17 is equipped with a monoplane (silver color) which when submerged is housed forward of conning tower.

4. Class "I" submarines carrying planes are the:

7, 8, 9, 15, 17, 19, 21 and 23 (planes were recently removed as battle gear from the I-5 and I-6).

CONFIDENTIAL

5. "RO" subs, which are smaller than the "I" class, do not carry planes.

6. The "I" class submarines carrying midget-submarines are:

16, 18, 20, 22, 24.

7. The MURASHI and YAMATO (RBs) are apparently the same size with 3 turrets of 3 guns each believed to be very large.

8. The I-1 required about one minute and 30 seconds to submerge completely and did not change course while submerging.

Miscellaneous:

1. Submarine sinkings developed were on the approximate dates as follows:

I-63 - prior to December 7, 1941.
I-124 - January, 1942.
I-123 - September, 1942.
I-15 - October, 1942.
I-4 - about December 15, 1942.
I-3 - December 15, 1942.
I-28 - no date.
I-1 - January 29, 1943.

2. Temperature rises to 40° centigrade aboard larger subs.

3. The following submarine divisions (SENSUITAI) are reputed to be based at Yokosuka:

1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9.

4. Four submarines are reported to be under construction at Yokosuka (interval of construction 3 to 4 months, output - 1 sub per month). No information on rate of production at other yards could be given by POW.

5. Air attack alarms used at Rabaul are:

- (a) Siren during day.
- (b) Red rockets at night.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. An airfield is known to be on Truk (Island of TAKESHIMA). Service personnel at Truk is principally navy (5,000), practically no army. Recreational facilities are provided.

7. There is a base hospital at Truk, possibly on NATSU ISLAND.

8. Following comments were also made by POW:

(a) While in Rabaul (January, 1943), he did not get ashore much. However, sake was to be had aboard.

(b) Believed sub sinkings in general principally caused by depth charges.

(c) Preference of duty is aboard "I" class of subs. However, has had no experience with "RO" class.

(d) Doesn't consider submarines are particularly good protection against enemy submarines (however, POW has never encountered enemy submarines).

9. POW had heard that HOGHO (CV) was sunk and saw the SHOKAKU under repair at Yokosuka in December.

10. Repair capacities at Rabaul are limited to the facilities carried on the one repair ship stationed there.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #11

(INTERROGATION OF JAPANESE PRISONER OF WAR
WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
AS A MEMBER OF THE CREW OF THE (CV) KAGA)

ENTITLED

"PRISONER OF WAR YOKOTA, SHIGEKI"

USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE

"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"

(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460)

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

CONFIDENTIAL - BRITISH SECRET

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

SERIAL NO. 230

16 Aug '43

INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 148, YOKOTA, S.

1. Attached is a Report on information gained from Japanese PW YOKOTA, Shigeki.
2. All information contained in this Report has been extracted this PW source only. Its value should be assessed and its distribution restricted accordingly.

Examiner 7

CIS/ATE/SCW/1


 SIDNEY F. MASHEIR,
 Colonel, S.O.,
 Co-ordinator.

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CG US FISPA	3
NEPIS	1
USLIFE	1
C S F W	1
CENTRAL BUREAU	1
NAV FOR TIS	1
ATIS SWPA	14

Official PW No. JA (USA) 100037

INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 146
(Further report to follow)

PW's Name: YOKOTA, Shigeaki
 Rank: 3rd Cl Seaman
 Unit: TSUKIOKA BUTAI SASEBO No. 5 SNIP
 Where Captured: GOODENOUGH Is.
 By Whom Captured: Natives
 How Captured: In native hut
 When Captured: 7 Jul '43
 Height: 5'6"
 Weight: 125 lbs
 Age: 23
 Present Address: KOGI KEN, TAKENOKA GUN, KAWAUCHI MURA, 1989.
 Education: 6 yrs Primary, 2 yrs Higher Primary.
 Civil Occupation: Farmer

1. PREAMBLE

PW is of average intelligence and appears to have a very good memory, especially for names. He answers all questions readily and appears to have no idea of security. His knowledge is limited due to his small service experience.

2. IDENTIFICATIONS

1. Operations. Attack on PEARL HARBOR, Dec '41. (All dates given by PW are approximate). PW was in (CV) KAGA.

(1) Composition of Task Force

- (1B) HIRAI
- (1E) KIRISUBA
- (1F) AKOF (Flagship)
- (1G) KAGA
- (1H) HIRIN
- (1J) SUGI
- (1K) ZAKKAN
- (1L) SHIRAN
- (1M) 1. 1st Bellows TONS Class
- (1N) 2. 2nd and class unknown.
- (1O) 3. 1st Class
- (1P) 4. 1st Class or numbers
- (1Q) Supply Ship. Resembled (AO) SHIRETOKO.

(11) Assembly of Task Force. Task Force assembled at TANKAN (indicated as being SHIRAPU-SEN), ITOYOTSU Is. in MURILES, middle of Nov '41, under command of CHIEF (Vice-Adm) MATSUO, Chudachi.

(BBs) MIYBI, KIRISHIMA, (CVs) AKAGI, HIRYU, 1 CA (possibly TONE) and 2 DDs arrived TANKAN before 20 Nov '41.

(CV) KAGA left SASEBO 7 Nov '41, proceeded South of KYUSHU, off East coast of J.P.N., arriving TANKAN 15 Nov '41.

Three AO's (Oilers) and 1 TMS (Supply Ship) arrived 16 Nov '41.

(CV) SORTU arrived 16 Nov '41.

(CVs) ZUIKANU and SHOKAKU arrived 17 Nov '41.

Three SSs joined Task Force on leaving TANKAN 22 Nov '41.

Units anchored as in following tracing of sketch drawn by PW:-



(T.N. Area with // shown as red on original)

(T.N. Exact tracing from the original document)

Tracing of Sketch Drawn by PW, showing Task Force Anchorage at TANKAN, Nov '41.

(iii) Events at TANKAN. (For further particulars of TANKAN, see Sec 17).

PW saw no J/C or Patrol Vessels while at TANKAN, except 6 Torpedo Boats which anchored South-West of entrance for about one day.

Provisions were embarked in KASK 19 Nov. PW thought she oiled, but was not certain.

No shore leave was granted. An order was given, however, that no rubbish was to be thrown overboard, but was to be collected and burnt ashore by pier near South-Western side of entrance. PW landed once, 20 Nov, for this duty. Officer in charge of working party gave orders that no one was to leave immediate vicinity of pier. PW saw, but did not speak to, about 3 fishermen who lived in 3 houses nearby; he saw no Army or Naval shore personnel, nor staff of W/T station further inland.

(iv) Outward Passage. Task Force sailed 1400, 22 Nov '41, being joined by 3 SS on leaving. Formation on leaving and on passage was as follows:

SOKU

AFAGI

TUI/SHOFAU

KAGA

3 (CA)

SHO/SHOFAU

HIRYU

SS TONE

BB

BB

Class

TK

AC

NO

AO

All ships marked
TK = original

Task Force proceeded East until 4 Dec, when course was altered to South. It did not zigzag. Speed 13 knots. J.P.N. time was kept throughout.

No A/C were flown, nor A/C patrols carried out, during outwards passage.

From 25 Nov A/A look-outs were posted; 3 men in each of 7 A/A MG positions either side. Tricks were 2 hours. No binoculars were issued to look-outs.

On 28 Nov KAGA assumed DAI NI HAIJI (No. 2 State of Readiness); gun crew were closed up in 2 watches. Ships were darkened from now on.

On 2 Dec, CO of KAGA, TATSU (Capt) OKADA, Jienku, addressed ship's company. He announced that C in C Combined Fleet had been succeeded by the Emperor, who informed him that war would be declared against AMERICA on 8 Dec; that KAGA was now proceeding towards HAWAII; that at 1 a.m. on Saturday (sic), A/C would be flown off to attack PEARL HARBOR. PW stated that he was a little frightened on hearing this, but as a Japanese, he took war for granted.

KAGA called 27 Nov, and again 1 Dec. PW did not know when other ships of Task Force sailed. Oilers and Supply Ship left Task Force during night of 4 Dec and PW did not see them again.

Task Force altered course to South on 4 Dec.

(v) The attack. During night 7/8 Dec, the 3 SS proceeded on independent patrols in vicinity of Task Force. They were not seen again by PW.

The same night, Task Force increased to full speed, 26 knots, and commenced zigzagging. Ship's company of KAGA went to action stations and remained closed up all day. PW was at a 20 cm gun and saw nothing further. He thought Task Force remained in formation throughout 8 Dec and did not scatter and that BBs were stationed one on either beam of leading ships.

A/C were flown off at 0100, 8 Dec '41 (JAPAN time), and returned about 0500 or 0600. About 30 A/C failed to return, 15 of which belonged to KAGA. PW attributed high proportion of losses from KAGA to Task Force A/C were last to take off.

(vi) Return Passage. On completion of attack, Task Force proceeded in general direction of TRUK, weather becoming very hot. Full speed of 26 knots was maintained until 10 Dec, when it was reduced to 15 knots. Zigzagging was carried out in vicinity of BOKAI, when reports of 2 enemy SS were received, off BOKAI Is, and on approaching JAPAN.

KAGA Is was bombed by A/C from carriers in passing, but PW knew no details except that nothing exceptional occurred. Before reaching TRUK, plans were suddenly changed, and Task Force altered course to Northward, proceeding direct to JAPAN without calling at any port. It arriving KURE 27 Dec '41.

During return passage, continuous single A/C patrols were maintained until shortly before reaching Japanese waters. One A/C from each carrier in turn carried out patrol lasting about 3 hours. KAGA remained in DAI NI HAIJI (No. 2 State of Readiness) during day and DAI SAN HAIJI (No. 3 State of Readiness, with gun crew in 3 watches) at night. Special A/A look-outs

ATTN SERIAL 220 - Page 4

were not posted, this duty being carried out by A/A MC crews. Task Force did not fuel while on return passage.

(vii) Rehearsal and prior knowledge of Operations. Before leaving SASERO, 7 Nov '41, ship's company of KAGA were instructed to settle all their bills. (All important documents, photograph albums, musical instruments, and all other unnecessary items were put ashore. - M-Room Source). This gave them the impression that they were about to go on some operation.


After leaving SASERO, the Executive Officer addressed them and informed them that they were going to an area South of TOKYO BAY. When they found they were proceeding further North, they were very surprised, and presumed they were going on a military operation, possibly against CHINA.

P1 did not admit that he had any idea of their real destination, stating that he was a very junior rating, knew very little and did not think much about the matter.

17. LOCALITIES

TANKAN, STOROFU IS., JAPAN. P1 indicated on a map that TANKAN was HITOKAPPU BAY on South coast of STOROFU IS. He knew no names of places in vicinity, but his general description agreed with that of HITOKAPPU BAY given in available publications. He stated that he did not know correct Chinese characters for TANKAN, but thought they might be 潭 田. Task Force assembled at TANKAN Nov '41 before leaving for attack on PEARL HARBOR (See Sec 5).

(1) General Description (See tracing of P1's sketch below).



Bay was surrounded by hills, highest peak being behind centre and about 500 metres high. South-west coast was low lying, with rocky foreshore as far as centre of bay. Low cliffs began here, rising to a maximum of about 200 metres at North-Eastern side of entrance. Hills were covered with low

land, not higher than 2 or 3 feet, and no trees could be seen. Ground was covered with snow, but there was no ice in bay or ashore. PW saw no signs of lakes, rivers or swamps. The coastal area appeared to be uninhabited except by fishermen who lived in 3 houses near pier. It was, however, impossible to see details of centre or North-Eastern side of bay from KAGA, and view beyond pier was obscured by low hills and an embankment.

PW estimated width of bay to be 6,000 metres and distance between entrance and opposite shore to be 2,000 metres. He thought there was a large rock close inshore near centre of bay. Bay was "deeper than most harbours", but he did not know exact depth. There was deep water right up to foreshore.

Wind was from North-West.

(iii) Pier and Vicinity. There was only one pier, situated at South-Western side of bay. It was constructed of concrete and stones, about 15 metres long, 4 metres wide, 2 to 3 metres high, and had steps cut at the end. Its height was difficult to estimate as waves were fairly high alongside. There was no crane or structure on it. Depth of water at steps was about 5 metres. PW had landed at pier on one occasion to burn rubbish, but was not allowed to leave its immediate vicinity or to speak with any local fishermen. It was high tide when he landed.

Ground inshore of pier was stony with short grass showing above snow.

There were 3 fishermen's houses inshore and a little to South of pier. They were not visible from KAGA's anchorage, but could be seen from pier. Behind houses earth embankment had been constructed, about 1 JO (10 ft.) high. Nothing could be seen beyond embankment except 3 W/T masts (See Sub-Sec (iv)). PW could not see whether there was a village in vicinity, but stated there was no work or other signs of habitation.

Between houses and embankment there was a narrow and very rough road, which could perhaps be used by cars. PW did not know where road led. He saw no cars. There were no fishing boats to be seen.

(iii) Landing Places. Landing would be difficult between pier and South-Western side of entrance, as there were a number of rocks offshore, height above water about 2 ft. Fishing stakes were placed among these rocks. PW saw no sand or beach in this area.

PW considered that landing from MLC would be easy between pier and centre of bay. There were few rocks offshore, and height of foreshore above water did not exceed about 1 metre. Water appeared to be deep up to shore, but PW saw no beaches in immediate vicinity of pier.

From centre of bay to North-Eastern side of entrance landing would be impossible because of cliffs. PW saw no beaches in this area, but was unable to observe details from KAGA's anchorage.

(iv) W/T Station. Situated behind embankment near pier, but no details of buildings were visible. Three W/T masts could be seen, but PW could not estimate height or arrangement as they were partly obscured by embankment. He knew none of its personnel, but thought it was a Naval W/T Station. He did not know any details of its organization, or number of personnel.

(v) Defences. PW saw no defences, guns, or torpedo tubes mounted ashore. There was no evidence of A/Suh nets or Boom Defence. There were no indications of minefields, either across entrance or outside, and no bouys which might mark channels. There were no buildings visible at either side of entrance.

He saw no A/C while at TANKA, and did not know of existence of any airfields or S/P b sea. He could not tell from KAGA's anchorage, or from pier, whether there were any suitable sites for airfields; ground near South-western side of entrance was, however, low lying.

(vi) General. There were no lighthouses or shore lights visible. He thought, but was uncertain, that Storm Signals were displayed in vicinity of W/T station.

COE END 800.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #12

(A NAVY STUDY OF JAPANESE ESPIONAGE IN HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
CONSISTING OF

(A)

COML4 LETTER TO CNO SERIAL 0004 WITH ENCLOSURE 14ND SERIAL 234

(B)

CINCPAC-CINCPQA LETTER TO CNO SERIAL 000742

(C)

COMFIFTH FLEET LETTER TO COMINCH US PACFLEET SERIAL 000179

(D)

COMDEN HQ 5th PHIBCORPS LETTER TO COMFIFTH FLEET SERIAL 000374B
withENCLOSURE HQ 5th MARINE DIVISION 496 CIC DETACH, SASEBO, KYUSHU,
13 OCT 45, MEMO FOR THE AC OF S, G-2,WITH ACCOMPANYING MAP AND SKETCH OF KAUAI AND OAHU ISLANDS
SHOWING THE LOCATIONS OF ATTACKING JAPANESE
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, AIRPLANES AND SUBMARINES)

ENTITLED

"PRE-WAR ESPIONAGE IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
REPORT ON PRE-WAR HONOLULU COMMERCIAL BROADCASTS CONTAINING
CODED INFORMATION FOR THE JAPANESE FLEET"

USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE

"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460)

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

TOP SECRET

Serial: 0004

TOP SECRET

10 November, 1945.

3rd ENDORSEMENT on HQ VPhibCorps
Top Secret Ltr. 091/130, Serial
000374B dated 14 October 1945.

From: Commandant FOURTEENTH Naval District.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Pre-War Espionage in Hawaiian Islands.

Enclosure: (A) Top Secret Memo for DIO LAND from Lt. R.H.
Peterson, USNR, dated 7 Nov. 1945, Subject:
Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Contain-
ing Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet;
Report of.

1. Forwarded.
2. Enclosure (A) is submitted in accordance with paragraph two of second endorsement on basic letter.

S.A. TAFFINDER.

Copy to:
Com 5th Flt (3rd End. & Encl (A)).
ComGenVPhibCorps (3rd End. & Encl (A)).
CinCPac/POA (3rd End. & Encl (A)).

2055
16 1945
TOP SECRET

District Intelligence Officer
Fourth Naval District
5th Floor, Young Hotel,
Honolulu, Hawaii

14ND/AS-3

Serial 224

TOP SECRET

NDP/vps

TOP SECRET

7 November 1945

MEMO FOR: The District Intelligence Officer.

Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

Reference: (a) HQ, Fifth Marine Division, 495th GIC Detachment
TOP SECRET Memorandum for the AG of S, G-2,
dated 13 Oct. 1945, subject: Pre-War Espionage
in the Hawaiian Islands.

1. Reference (a) discloses that Yoshio SHIGA, Lt. Comdr., IJN, aviator who participated in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, made the following statements, in substance, on 9 October 1945 to Robert M. Tait, Special Agent, GIC, at Oahu, Kyushu, Japan:

- (a) That he believed quite strongly that information concerning all movements of ships into and out of Pearl Harbor was transmitted to the fleet through coded messages broadcast over a Honolulu commercial broadcasting station;
- (b) That, in his opinion, the codes were many and varied but that if, for example, it was broadcast that the German attaché lost one dog, it might mean that a carrier left Pearl Harbor, and that if, for another example, the German attaché wanted a cook or a houseboy, it might mean that a battleship or cruiser had entered the harbor;
- (c) That the (foregoing) information had been given to him by Lt. Comdr. Shigeharu MURATA, IJN, Chief of the Air Squadron aboard the flagship AKAGI, on their return to Japan;
- (d) That the (foregoing) information was conveyed on radio programs just following the news broadcasts, which (SHIGA stated) were at 0630, 1200, 1900;
- (e) That the time following the 1900 broadcast was probably used, since the Japanese agents would then have had an opportunity to convey information con-

TOP SECRET

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Serial 234

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing
Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

cerning a whole day's activities;

- (f) That, on the first Saturday the force was at sea, reports were received that there were only one or two carriers in Pearl Harbor;
- (g) That, on 6 December 1941, sometime between 2000 and 2100 (Hawaiian time) news came to him regarding numbers of ships in Pearl Harbor;
other
- (h) That he could offer no leads concerning the espionage conducted for the attack than that of the Honolulu Broadcasting Station;
- (i) That, on 6 December 1941, the force was 800 miles due north of Hawaii, and that they then received, from the Japanese Navy Department, a wireless message "Olimb Mt. Niitaka", which was the signal for the attack.

2. On 30 October 1945, FBI-Honolulu and G-2(CID) Honolulu were furnished one copy each of reference (a) by the Acting District Intelligence Officer, 14ND. FBI-Honolulu, G-2(CID) Honolulu and DIO-14ND conducted checks of their respective files with negative results in locating transcriptions, continuity scripts, or outlines of programs which had emanated from stations KGMB and KGU for the period of 27 November through 6 December 1941.

3. On 31 October and 1 November, 1945, reporting officer interviewed J. Howard MORRAL, Manager of Station KGMB, Honolulu, who stated substantially as follows after checking the files and transcription library of KGMB:

There are no pre-war transcriptions, continuity scripts, or station logs for news, want-ads, or other local programs, including those which were given in the Japanese language, in our files or library. Transcriptions of the Japanese programs were made for many weeks prior to the war right up to 7 December 1941. All of these, with the exception of those for about 1 through 6 December, were cleaned out of our files and destroyed about two years ago following a discussion I had with either the Army Intelligence or the FBI. I recall that it was

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Serial 234

TOP SECRET

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Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing
Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

conceded, I think by the FBI, that there was no reason why we should continue to keep old material in our library when we needed the space so badly. All of that material which the Army wanted had been picked up, and the portion that was left, consisting of transcriptions of the Japanese programs, had been censored before it went out over the air. To my knowledge there was never any correspondence on the subject of cleaning out our files. We have kept no station logs over two years old; the FCC requires that we keep logs about two years before destroying them.

The transcriptions of Japanese programs for about 1 through 8 December 1941 were turned over to Major Henry C. Putnam of Army Intelligence a short while after the war started. I recall that Hugh Lyttel (phonetic) and (fau) Albright (phonetic) of Army Intelligence were frequently up here early in the war assisting or working with Major Putnam.

George FUJITA (George Masuzo FUJITA) was in charge of the Japanese programs and HAYASHIDA (Akiyoshi HAYASHIDA) went over the transcriptions prior to their being put on the air to make sure they contained nothing subversive or objectionable. HAYASHIDA was recommended to us by Mr. Shivers of FBI as being entirely responsible and trustworthy. Material gathered for the Japanese program as well as the Want-Ads program had no direct connection with newspaper ads; ads which went out over the radio could have appeared in the newspapers although radio time was bought separately from newspaper space.

Our librarian prior to and during the early part of the war was Alan LISSER, in my opinion entirely reliable, trustworthy and loyal. LISSER is presently working in San Francisco for station KFRC and would probably recall the details of what we had and didn't have in the library during that period.

As a rule, no transcriptions were made of local news or Want-Ads programs; such broadcasts were prepared in note or continuity form and given direct to the "mike" by the

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announcer.

Our Nile station, KHBC, was under a similar arrangement with respect to programs given in Japanese. A young woman, Miss Kazuko HIGUCHI, an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, supervised and censored all such programs before they went out over the air; she was also recommended to us by Mr. Shivers.

4. On 31 October 1945, reporting officer interviewed M. A. MULLOY, Manager of Station KGU, Honolulu, who stated substantially as follows after checking his files:

I am sure that we do not have the continuity scripts or program outlines you are looking for. No transcriptions were made of programs given in Japanese during the pre-war period. We did make up continuity scripts for those programs during that period. Copies of these scripts were furnished to DIO-14ND, FBI-Honolulu, and Army Intelligence; the copies were translated and sent back, with comments, before the programs went on the air. As I recall, all of the scripts in our files were picked up shortly after the war started by Army Intelligence. I have the idea that some were sent to Washington; none were ever returned to KGU. I don't recall what person or persons picked up the scripts.

Up until several months before the war, FURUKAWA (Shigeo FURUKAWA) was in charge of the Japanese Sunday program; he was dishonest in his dealings with KGU. After he left this work, GOTO (Richard Misashi GOTO) was in charge; Jack NAWATANI (Jack Iwasaburo NAWATANI) did the announcing on week days. Material gathered for the Japanese Sunday program came from subscribers contacted by FURUKAWA and GOTO; the material didn't come from the newspapers. Few, if any, of the programs originating locally, including news and Want-Ads, were transcribed before being put on the air. NAWATANI gathered material for the daily programs.

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5. On 31 October 1945, reporting officer interviewed L. R. DAWSON, Supervisor of Federal Communications Commission, Honolulu, who stated substantially as follows:

FCC made no transcriptions of programs originating from Honolulu Broadcasting stations prior to the war, except for the period of one week in July, 1941. At that time, local programs given in foreign languages over KGMB and KGU were transcribed at the specific request of FCC in Washington and were forwarded to Washington without being translated locally.

Commercial broadcasting stations are required to keep station logs for one year before destroying them.

Amateur radio stations continued operating right up to 7 December 1941. Except for specific cases which were checked by our monitors, there were no records or transcriptions made of amateurs' transmissions in T.H. Pre-war reports of specific cases checked by our monitors were forwarded long ago to FCC in Washington.

6. On 1 November 1945, reporting officer interviewed Lt. Col. Wilson GADDIS, AUS, Public Relations Office, G2, Fort Shafter, Oahu, who stated substantially as follows:

I worked very closely with Major Henry C. Putnam in the Public Relations Office, G2, in the early part of the war. I do not recall that Major Putnam ever picked up transcriptions of any Japanese programs from KGMB following the war. If he had, they would probably be in the files here or at G-2(CID) Honolulu. I feel certain that he has none of the transcriptions or continuity scripts with him at the present time.

After checking thoroughly in the files here, I can state that no such transcriptions or continuity scripts are here.

Major Putnam's present address is Mid-Pacific Liaison Officer, Bureau of Public Relations, War Department, Washington 25, D. C. Major Putnam will be back at Fort Shafter, Oahu, about 1 December 1945.

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**Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing
Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.**

7. On 31 October, 2 and 3 November 1945, files of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, the Honolulu Advertiser, and the Archives of Hawaii were checked for information pertinent to code mentioned in reference (a). Nothing was found under Want-Ads and other sections in either newspaper for the period of 27 November through 6 December 1941 regarding the German attache losing one dog or the German attache wanting a cook or houseboy.

8. Files of the Archives of Hawaii, Honolulu, checked on 3 November 1945, disclosed the following information relative to lines of news, want-ads, Japanese programs, and other programs immediately following on stations KGNB and KGU for 5, 6, and (scheduled for) 7 December 1941:

KGNB - Friday, 5 December 1941; this schedule representative
of other week days:

0715 News
0730 Wake Up and Live
0830 News
0856 Listen Ladies
0945 News and Want-Ads Program (Mrs. Wita BENEDICT)
1000 Around the Town With Gene Sawyer
1215 News
1225 Stock Quotations
1245 Japanese Program
1415 Columbia's School of the Air (CBS)
1500 News
1505 Plantation Melodies
1735 News
1740 Show Parade
1930 News
1945 John Nesbit's Passing Parade
2055 Streamlined Headlines
2100 Amos 'n' Andy
2125 News (CBS)
2130 Here's Morgan
2200 News
2215 Swing Serenade

14ND/AS-2
Serial 234

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing
Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

Schedule for Saturday, 6 December 1941, same as
the foregoing except for the following:

1415 Saturday News (following Japanese Program)
1420 Football Game Broadcast
1945 20th Century Serenade
2130 South American Way

Schedule for Sunday, 7 December 1941:

0600 to 0830 - Japanese Program
0930 News
0945 Sports Reporter
1900 News
1915 Charioteers
2200 News
2215 Serenade in the Night

KOH - Friday, 8 December 1941; this schedule
representative for other week days:

0600 Japanese Community Program
0645 Easy Tunes and Topics
0700 Shell Transradio News
0710 Persian's Footwear Parade
0800 Shoppers' Guide
0810 Sunshine Program (E. Dropman & Co.)
0815 Bulletin Board
0830 Shoppe Serenade
0845 Waikiki on the Air
0950 Shell Transradio News
1000 Music School
1045 Japanese Program
1130 We The Abbotts
1215 Shell Transradio News
1225 Oddities in the News
1900 Shell Transradio News
1915 Parker Family (NBC)
2255 Shell Transradio News
2300 Ending 6967th Day of Broadcast

14ND/AS-2
Serial 234

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing
Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

Schedule for Saturday, 6 December 1941, same as
foregoing except for the following:

1000 Morning Matinee
1225 Interlude
1715 Beyond the News
1730 Ranch House Roundup
1915 Band Concert from A. & N. YMCA.

Schedule for Sunday, 7 December 1941:

1300-1430 Japanese Program
1930 Shell Transradio News
1945 Red Skelton & Company

9. There is no record of transcriptions or continuity scripts of Japanese and other programs broadcast by stations KHBC, Hilo, Hawaii, and KTOH, Lihue, Kauai, during the period of 27 November through 6 December 1941 in the files of the three Honolulu investigative agencies or at stations KGMB and KGU.

10. While files of DIO-14ND do not contain transcriptions, continuity scripts, or outlines of programs of broadcasts on KGMB and KGU for the period of 27 November through 6 December 1941, there is considerable highly classified information in the files pertinent to this general subject, as follows in substance:

- (a) Japanese programs on stations KGMB and KGU during the period of one to two weeks prior to 8 December 1941 were monitored by Lt. Comdr. Yale Maxon, USNR, and Comdr. Denzel Carr, USNR, of DIO-14ND. The cryptic phrases listened for by these officers were never heard on KGMB or KGU. Monitoring was accomplished by listening direct to the broadcasts; no transcriptions were made of said broadcasts.
- (b) One of the cryptic phrases listened for did appear several times during the course of a Tokyo broadcast some hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor took place. The cryptic phrase in question came over

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~~TOP SECRET~~Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing
Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

station JZI program (from Tokyo), at some time later than 1145 8 December 1941, Japan time, frequency 9535 kcs.

- (c) For many months prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, up through 6 December 1941, Nagao KITA, Japanese Consul-General, Honolulu, kept the Japanese Foreign Office supplied with detailed information concerning movements of U.S. Naval vessels by means of coded dispatches sent through commercial telegraph channels. Of particular note is the message from KITA to Tokyo via R.C.A., under date of 6 December 1941, which gives disposition of ships, etc., in Pearl Harbor as of the evening of 6 December 1941.
- (d) Bernard Julius Otto KUEHN, with aliases, espionage agent, submitted a plan to the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, on or about 2 December 1941, involving use of a code on the KQMS Want-Ads morning program (0945), as follows:
 - (1) A Chinese rug, etc., for sale- apply Post Office Box 1476; indicates 3 or 6
 - (2) A complete chicken farm for sale; indicates 4 or 7
 - (3) Beauty parlor operator wanted; indicates 6 or 8.

Under date of 3 December 1941 (Honolulu time), this simplified code system was transmitted by KITA to the Foreign Minister, Tokyo. A duplicate message was also addressed to Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff, signed FUJII. Under date of 3 December 1941 (Japan time), Foreign Minister TOGO telegraphed to KITA that he wanted KITA to hold onto the list of code words (presumably an older, complicated code system), including those intended for use on the radio broadcast, right up until the last minute; further, that when the "break" came, KITA

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Serial 234

100-220000

Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing
Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

was to burn the code immediately and wire TOSO
that he had done so.

- (c) FBI agents conducted an investigation to determine whether or not there had been any advertisements regarding the Chinese rug, beauty operator, or chicken farm, etc. over radio station KGMW Want-Ads program subsequent to 1 December 1941; newspaper ads were also checked for the same information. Records of the KGMW Want-Ads morning programs (0945) for the period of 24 November to 8 December 1941 were examined. No information was found, in the radio programs or newspapers, regarding the broadcast code system in question.

REMARKS

11. Negative results were obtained in locating transcriptions, continuity scripts, or outlines of programs which emanated from radio stations KGMW and KGU for the period of 27 November through 8 December 1941; therefore it has not been possible to verify or refute statements of Yoshio MUKAI, Lt. Comdr., JN, as contained in reference (a).

12. Japanese language programs on KGMW and KGU during the period of one to two weeks prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor were monitored by DIO-14ND. Although the purpose of this monitoring was to listen for certain phrases (which were not heard on KGMW or KGU), it does not appear likely that any phrases regarding the German attache would have been missed by the DIO-14ND monitors. There was a German Consul in Honolulu prior to 7 December 1941, but no attache; in the event, however, that the word "attache" were correctly used, the implication is that the commercial broadcast emanated from Japan.

13. The KGMW Want-Ads morning programs for 24 November to 8 December 1941 were checked by FBI-Honolulu with negative results in locating any coded phrases regarding a Chinese

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rug, chicken farm, or beauty parlor operator. It appears unlikely that phrases regarding the German attache, had they appeared on this program during the period in question, would have gone unnoticed by the agency conducting that investigation.

14. It is pointed out that the Japanese Consulate-General successfully furnished detailed military information to the Japanese Foreign Office up to and including the 6th of December 1941 by means of coded dispatches sent through commercial telegraphic channels.

15. Inasmuch as SHIGA's information was reportedly given to him by another officer aboard the AKAGI following the attack, its accuracy is subject to some doubt.

16. The accuracy of the statement of J. Howard WORRELL, manager of KOMB, regarding transcriptions of Japanese programs for about 1 through 6 December 1941 being turned over to Major Putnam, is doubted in view of Lt. Col. Gaddis' statement, his search of the files at Fort Shafter, and G-2(CID) Honolulu's search of their files.

R. W. PETERSON
Lieutenant, USNR

Cover File

AS-5

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Serial: 000571

6 NOV 1945

~~2nd ENDORSEMENT~~ on
HQ VPhibCorps Top
Secret Ltr. 091/130,
Ser. 000374B dated
14 October 1945.

TOP SECRET~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
and Pacific Ocean Areas.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: Commandant FOURTEENTH Naval District.
Subject: Pre-War Espionage in Hawaiian Islands.

1. Forwarded.
2. Comment is requested from Commandant FOURTEENTH Naval District concerning broadcasts related in basic correspondence and on other material considered pertinent.



C. H. McMORRIS
Chief of Staff

Copy to:
Com 5th Flt (2nd End only)
ComDenVPhibCorps (2nd End only)

TOP SECRET

7329
02931

A8-2(2)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 000179

TOP SECRET

24 OCT 1945

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
Hq. V PhibCorps Top
Secret ltr. 091/130,
ser. 000374B dated
14 October 1945.

From: Commander FIFTH Fleet.
To : Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Pre-war Espionage in Hawaiian Islands.
1. Forwarded.

D. C. Ramsey
D. C. RAMSEY,
Chief of Staff.

TOP SECRET

091/130
Ser.000374B

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

14 October, 1945.

TOP SECRET

From: The Commanding General.
To : The Commander, Fifth Fleet.
Subject: Pre-war Espionage in Hawaiian Islands.
Enclosures: (A) 2 copies subject publication.

1. The attached progress report from the 496th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment is forwarded in duplicate for your information.

2. Additional progress reports of the subject will be forwarded you as they become available to this Headquarters.

[Signature]
R. YANCEY,
By direction.

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HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH MARINE DIVISION
496th CIC DETACHMENT
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

TOP SECRET

Sasebo, Kyushu
13 October 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE AC OF S, G-2:

SUBJECT: PRE-WAR ESPIONAGE IN HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

RE : Interview with Yoshio SHIGA,
Lt Cmdr, IJN

On 9 October 1945, this agent interviewed Yoshio SHIGA, Lt Cmdr, IJN, at the Kinkiso Tea House, OMURA, Kyushu. Although difficult, this interview was conducted without an interpreter as SHIGA speaks some English. Informant is an aviator and participated in the Japanese attack on PEARL HARBOR on 7 December 1941. He lives at Itoyone, YAMAGUCHI CITY, Yamaguchi-Ken, Honshu. On about 15 October 1945, he is scheduled to fly a Japanese plane (escorted) from OMURA TO YOKOSUKA. Following this he plans to return to OMURA, by train, where he expects to be discharged from the Navy.

On about 1 April 1941, SHIGA said that he was directed to leave his assignment as instructor of pilots at OITA and report to SASEBO. Upon arrival he noted that the aircraft carrier "KAGA" was in port. Upon reporting at the base he was ordered, by Teigi YAMADA, Captain of the "KAGA", to go to YOKOSUKA with 23 other pilots and learn to fly "O's". From about 5 April until 19 April the group practiced flying these planes. On 20 April 1941 they went to SUZUKA, Honshu, and received new "O" planes.

The group practiced with these planes until the last of April when they were ordered to fly to KONOYE, Kyushu. En-route SHIGA noted that the carrier "KAGA" was anchored off KAGOSHIMA CITY. Following their arrival at KONOYE the group was ordered to practice landings aboard the "KAGA" as it steamed in and out of the bay. They did this until about 1 July 1941.

About 1 July, the carriers AKAGI, SORYU, and HIRYU arrived at SHIBUSHI BAY, a short distance from where the KAGA was anchored. All of the pilots from the carriers then went to KAGOSHIMA CITY. In practice the carriers alternated, three at SHIBUSHI BAY and one in KAGOSHIMA BAY. The fliers practiced carrier landings and dog-fighting. Team work was the essential of this training period. Two planes fought three planes, then three against six, and then six against nine. The objective of 9 against 18 was not reached, however.

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On about 8 August 1941, all of the carriers were ordered to YOKOSUKA. On about 10 August, the carriers SORYU and HIRYU were suddenly ordered to SAIGON, Indo-China. SHIGA, along with the rest of the pilots, was ordered aboard the HIRYU. The Japanese Army met no opposition at SAIGON. After the carriers were there for about a week they left for Japan and arrived at SASEBO about 5 September 1941.

After two or three days the two carriers were ordered to SAHEKI, Ryushu. Upon arrival SHIGA noted the carriers SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU and the battleship YAMATO were in the harbor. He stated that he then became suspicious that "something big was going to happen". While there the pilots practiced navigation, dog-fighting, and carrier landings.

"On 5 October 1941, a meeting was called of all officer pilots of the carriers, aboard the ARAGI in SHIBUSHI BAY, by the Chief of Staff of the carriers, Rear Admiral Ryosuke FUSATA. About 100 attended. They were told, very secretly, that on 8 December 1941 (Japan Time), a Japanese Naval air force would strike the American Fleet at HAWAII. Grand Admiral of the Japanese Navy, Isoroku YAMAMOTO, also addressed the group saying that although Japan never wanted to fight the United States they were forced to because they would be defeated regardless, if the United States continued its aid to China and its oil embargo. The U. S. fleet, he said, was Japan's strongest enemy, so if they could strike it unexpectedly at HAWAII it would be two or three months before it could maneuver. By that time occupation of BORNEO, the PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, JAVA, and SUMATRA would be complete."

SHIGA stated that the consensus of the pilots following this startling news was, that to get to HAWAII secretly, was impossible. Hence it was a suicide attack. Also that it would be best for the Japanese Navy to fight the American Navy at sea without this attack. All of the carrier pilots were then granted a 7 day leave. On their return they went to SAHEKI and again practiced until 17 November 1941. On that date the KAGA, with 24 fighter planes, 36 torpedo planes, and 24 hell divers went to HITOKAPPU HARBOR.

Upon arrival at HITOKAPPU HARBOR, SHIGA noted the carriers ARAGI, SORYU, SUGAWARA, ZUIKAKU, battleships KONGO, Hiei, heavy cruisers KUMANO, MUKOMA, SUGITA, plus one other, about 16 destroyers, and four or more large submarines were in that port. He believed that these submarines had midget submarines aboard. In the carrier force there were about 300 planes plus 9 seaplanes aboard the battleships and cruisers.

Prior to departure for HAWAII SHIGA said that they were briefed that PEARL HARBOR anchorages were: battleships on the east side of FORD ISLAND, carriers on the west side, destroyers were anchored in northeastern corner, and heavy cruisers on the HICKAM FIELD side. They were also told that the U. S.

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carriers were usually around LAHAINA ROADS, MAUI, during week days and entered PEARL HARBOR on Saturdays, where they stayed until Monday mornings. SHIGA said that Rear Admiral OKADA, Captain of the KAGA, visited the flagship AKAGI daily. Just prior to departure OKADA told him that there were 6 carriers in Hawaiian waters, that the SARATOGA was on the U. S. west coast, and that the ENTERPRISE was two or three days out of Hawaiian waters, en-route from the PHILIPPINES.

Subject believes the force left HITOKAPU HARBOR between the 27 and 30 November and at cruising speed headed for HAWAII. They knew, he said, that U. S. air patrols went 800 miles south of DUTCH HARBOR and 400 miles north of MIDWAY. Their course was right between the patrolled areas during which time, he said, the weather was foggy. They were 800 miles due north of HAWAII on 6 December. They then received, from the Japanese Navy Department, a wireless message, "CLIMB MT. NIITABA". (This information corresponds with that received from a Japanese Navy Yeoman captured during the SAIPAN operation). This was the signal for the attack and at 24 knots they sped southward to within 250 miles of OAHU. There the planes took off.

A Japanese ship pilot has reported his belief
SHIGA stated that he believed quite strongly that information concerning all movements of ships into and out of PEARL HARBOR was transmitted to the fleet through coded messages broadcast over a HONOLULU Commercial Broadcasting Station. He was certain that there was a Hawaiian Nisei, who was a Japanese Naval Officer, aboard the flagship AKAGI, whose specific job was listening to these broadcasts and decoding them. SHIGA said that in his opinion the codes were many and varied but that if, for example, it was broadcast that the German attache lost one dog, it might mean that a carrier left PEARL HARBOR. If the German attache wanted a cook or a houseboy, it might mean that a battleship or cruiser had entered the harbor.

SHIGA said that this information was given to him by Lt Cmdr MURATA, Shigeharu, Chief of the Air Squadron aboard the flagship AKAGI, on their return to Japan when SHIGA inquired of him "who was the heroic person responsible for getting the information concerning the ships in PEARL HARBOR".

SHIGA believes
SHIGA believes that the information was conveyed on radio programs just following the news broadcasts, which he stated were at 6:30 AM, 12 Noon, and 7 PM. He was prone to think that time following the 7 PM broadcast was used since the Japanese agents would then have had an opportunity to convey information concerning a whole day's activities.

On the first Saturday when the force was at sea, (which means it had to leave prior to 29 November), SHIGA said that they received reports that there was only one or two carriers in PEARL HARBOR. Because of this the pilots were disappointed.

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SHIGA said that on 6 December 1941, some time between about 8 and 9 PM (Hawaiian Time) news filtered to him that there were no carriers in PEARL HARBOR, but that 8 battleships, and 15 cruisers were in the harbor. No report was received concerning destroyers. There was no set way of his receiving news of this type so it was impossible to determine at what time the AKAGI might have relayed it to the Captain of the KAGA.

At the briefing, prior to the operation, each pilot was furnished with a photograph of a map of PEARL HARBOR. The names of the ships in PEARL HARBOR were not known and each pilot just made rough entries of courses and anchorage areas or missions.

Since it was felt that more could be gained if a person versed in the technical phases of aviation interrogated SHIGA, he was turned over to Lt. W. H. PEDRICK, S-2, Marine Air Group 22, stationed at OAHUA, to fully develop the attack phase. A copy of his report, however, will be forwarded to this headquarters.

The rough sketch map concerning the attack, accompanying this report, is preliminary, resulting from the first interview with SHIGA by this agent.

Concerning the espionage conducted for the attack, which is of great interest to the CIC, SHIGA could offer no other leads than that of the HONOLULU Broadcasting Station. He said that at no time, to his knowledge, were visual land signals used from HAWAII. *WA*

The only person he could recall being alive from the AKAGI, who had participated in the PEARL HARBOR attack, was its commanding officer, Rear Admiral Ryunosuke KOSAKA. He is presently Chief Liaison Officer at the KINOE Naval Base.

This agent is presently under orders and awaiting transportation to KINOE where he will interview KOSAKA in an effort to obtain additional information.

Robert N. Tait
ROBERT N. TAIT
Special Agent, CIC

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Lead, CIC, USA

*1 cont.
- maximum*

(There is a map accompanying the above report of ROBERT N. TAIT, Special Agent, CIC, which portrays by rough sketch the islands of Oahu and Kauai and the Kauai Channel, and has noted thereon information obtained with reference to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and other installations on 7 December 1941 as set forth in the report. This map is reproduced as Item No. 19 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #13

(A NAVY STUDY)

ENTITLED

"SORTIES BY ENEMY SUB-CARRIED PLANES
and

SUB CARRIER IDENTIFICATION"

USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE

"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

ENEMY LOSS SORTIES BY SUB-CARRIED PLANES (List)

New information on the enemy's use of submarine-borne aircraft for reconnaissance is furnished by a captured document (CINCPAC-CINCPHA Item No. 12,212), which lists a series of sorties covering nearly a year in time and extending from ZANZIBAR east to OREGON.

During that period, the plane-carrying subs lost 24% of the aircraft which took off--most of them in landing and recovery accidents.

All sorties listed were flown from ten subs of the "I" class--the I-7, I-8, I-9, I-10, I-19, I-21, I-25, I-29, I-30 and I-31. A total of 38 sorties were flown between 30 November 1941, and 11 November 1942. This was the most active period for enemy sub-borne aircraft. (Hence, no mention is made of the Jap sub which reportedly reconnoitered PEARL HARBOR in October 1943.

Many of the subs employed have probably been lost during the past two years. The only identifiable loss among the group listed above, however, is the I-7, sunk at TWIN ROCKS, KISKA on 21 June 1943. This was confirmed by salvage operations.

The first listed flight, flown eight days before the attack on PEARL HARBOR, was a night sortie over SUVA BAY. The document states succinctly that the plane "did not return". Also noted are flights over PEARL HARBOR on 17 December 1941, 5 January 1942, and 24 February 1942, and over the OREGON coast on the nights of 9 and 29 August 1942.

The complete list:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>Name of Sub</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Time</u>
30 Nov. '41	I-10	SUVA BAY	Night
17 Dec. '41	I-7	PEARL HARBOR	Dawn
5 Jan. '41	I-19	PEARL HARBOR	Night
7 Feb. '42	I-25	SYDNEY	Dawn
24 Feb. '42	I-9	PEARL HARBOR	Night
26 Feb. '42	I-26	MELBOURNE	Dawn
1 Mar. '42	I-25	HOBART	Day
8 Mar. '42	I-25	WELLINGTON	Pre-dawn
15 Mar. '42	I-25	AUCKLAND	Pre-dawn
19 Mar. '42	I-25	SUVA	Dawn
Not known	I-10	DABAN(Comment: There is a DABANU on WOODLARK or MURUA IS., between Eastern NEW GUINEA and NEW GEORGIA IS.)	
7 May. '42	I-30	ADEN	Dawn
8 May '42	I-30	JIBOUTI	Dawn
19 May '42	I-30	ZANZIBAR	Dawn
19 May '42	I-30	DAR-ES-SALAAM	Dawn
19 May '42	I-21	SUVA BAY	Dawn
23 May '42	I-29	SYDNEY	Dawn
24 May '42	I-21	AUCKLAND	Dawn
25 May '42	I-9	KISKA, ANCHITKA	
26 May '42	I-9	KISKA	
27 May '42	I-19	"While making preparations for a night flight on the Northern side of BOGORLOF ISLAND (Comments: Probably BOGOSLOF IS. IN the ALEUTIANS) an enemy destroyed was recognized and we submerged, badly damaging our plane."	
27 May '42	I-25	KODIAK	Day
29 May '42	I-21	SYDNEY	Dawn
30 May '42	I-10	DIEGO SUAREZ	Night
31 May '42	I-10	DIEGO SUAREZ	
1 June '42	I-10	Plane search off coast of DIEGO SUAREZ	Night
9 Aug. '42)	I-25	OREGON (State)	Night
29 Aug. '42)			Night
19 Aug. '42	I-29	SEYCHELLES IS.(SEISERU SHOTO)	Day
30 Aug. '42	I-19	SUDEKO TO	
13 Oct. '42	I-7	ESPIRITU SANTO IS.	Dawn
19 Oct. '42	I-19	NOUMEA	
30 Oct. '42	I-9	NOUMEA	Dawn
2 Nov. '42	I-8	EFATE IS.	"Moonlight from 0000 0030"
4 Nov. '42	I-31	SUVA	0100
4 Nov. '42	I-9	NOUMEA	Dawn
11 Nov. '42	I-7	VANIKORO IS.	Dawn
11 Nov. '42	I-21	NOUMEA	Dawn
11 Nov. '42	I-9	ESPIRITU SANTO	Dusk

Comment: No mention was made in the document of the I-17. When sunk off NEW CALEDONIA in August 1943, prisoners from this sub claimed that it had reconnoitered west coast areas by plane in February 1942.

JAP CARRIER IDENTIFICATION

A recently captured order (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12, 253) presumed to have been issued by a Squadron CO of the 121st Air Group, describes identification markings which appear on flight decks of combatant carriers. The captured order indicates that markings are to consist of either the first two or the first and last Kana syllables of the ships' names. The Kana syllables "ZU HO" were already noted in a photograph of the CVL SUHO, sunk on 25 October (see "Weekly Intelligence, Vol. 1, No. 18).

The order states that large white Kana symbols are to appear on the starboard side toward the stern. The first Kana is to be eight meters (26½ feet) square, the second four meters square.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #11

ENTITLED

"JAPANESE BATTLE LESSONS ON SUPPLY IN THE GREATER EAST ASIA WAR
SUPPLY BATTLE LESSON NO. 1"

USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE

"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

This is a translation parallel to the
translation stated in Source Document
#15 post of the same captured Japanese
Document.

C-C TRAN: & INT "YOU"

#10,678

43

SUPPLY BASES AND FUELING FLEET UNITS AT SEA
dated 10 June 1943, captured on SAIPAN.

EDITOR'S NOTE

This document comprises extracts taken from an official study of problems relating to supply compiled 10 June 1943. Recommendations are included for the enlargement of supply bases and depots at BAKO, MIKAWA WAN and KURE. Examples are cited showing the difficulties experienced in fueling fleet units at sea during the first year and a half of the war; recommendations call for the installation of stern refueling gear on all ships, an increase in the rate of supply per hour, and the strengthening of hoses used in fueling. It is stated that the maintenance of supply lines calls for the construction of two naval storeships of the IRAKO type. It is possible that keels for IRAKO type ships were laid before their usefulness as contemplated in this document was ~~neutralized~~ neutralized by the Allied advance.

#10,678

Military - Very Secret (GUNGOKURI)

Committee on Investigation of
Battle Lessons, Supply Section
(SUNKAKAI)

10 June 1943

BATTLE LESSONS ON SUPPLY IN THE GREATER EAST ASIA WAR

SUPPLY BATTLE LESSON No. 1

Table of Contents

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I. ~~Number~~ Enlargement of Facilities at Supply BasesII. ~~Position~~

Fueling of Fleet Units at Sea.

III. Capacity, Performance, and Number of Supply Ships

CONFIDENTIAL

10,678

~~1. Types of Improvements from Japan~~
 I. Enlargement of Facilities at Supply Bases
 A. ~~Battle Lesson (Revised)~~

1. There has been a sudden increase in the operating efficiency of customs-houses, piers, and government buildings being used by the YOKOSUKA Naval District in YOKOHAMA. (YOKOSUKA Civil Engr Dept).

2. Facilities at Fuel Depot #3 must be enlarged to permit the mooring of two or three 10,000 ton AKs. (3rd Fuel Depot).

3. Loading and supply facilities at BAKO must be expanded. The capacity to supply fuel oil must be increased to 10,000 tons per 24 hours. (2nd Fleet).

4. Supply installations at MIKAWA WAN are insufficient and require enlargement. (1st Fleet).

5. The supply ~~quay~~^{to be} of the KURE Replacement Shop must be enlarged. It is frequently found ^{to be} too narrow for supply loading work and ^{causes} delay ⁱⁿ ~~results~~. (11th Air Depot).

6. Planes completed at the 11th Air Depot are operating on flights and as air transport after being transported by surface to the IWAKUNI Air Group; the loss in labor and time required for this is great. At least one runway of the KURE Airfield must be lengthened and widened. (11th Air Depot).

7. There ~~are~~^{have been} numerous instances ~~where~~^{when} the capacities of local Stores Departments have been insufficient and ~~could not~~^{was unable to} meet the demands of operating forces. It is essential to ~~expand~~ installations and place experienced persons in charge so as to keep on hand large amounts of stores and insure a rapid supply. (All depts concerned with naval stores).

10, 6, 10

8. In order to expedite supply to the various forces in the farflung combat areas, and also in consideration of such things as air raids, it is necessary to establish branch offices of the local stores departments or branch supply depots with each front line force. (All Stores Depts).

9. Because of insufficient supply installations at local ~~stores~~ ^{stores} Departments, heavy equipment such as DP guns and generators cannot be unloaded, and some things cannot be installed. The handling of torpedoes and mines is also very difficult. Not only is there a great possibility of damage to delicate equipment but there are many instances when it is not suited to rapid supply. The installations ^{of} of piers, cranes, cranes on cargo lighters, and trucks is absolutely necessary. (All Stores Depts).

10. Acceleration in fitting out Specially Established Naval Stores Departments is earnestly desired. The 4th Naval Stores Department legally is tactically assigned to the 4th Fleet; however, it has a great deal of importance as a front line supply base even for ships of the Combined Fleet. Therefore it is necessary to attempt the speedy completion of installations as already planned and to equip them with an eye toward our persistent drive to the south. (2nd Fleet).

11. At RABAU there is not a single sound pier installation, while great labor is being expended entirely on loading and unloading. No matter what other sacrifices are made, piers must be installed immediately. (108th Air Depot).

~~Conclusion Reached~~ In order that deficiency in supply installations will have no great effect on naval operations, it is necessary to determine at the central /activity/ the urgency of actual conditions in all areas and to formulate remedial measures.

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~~It is necessary to increase the rate of refueling to 300 metric tons per hour.~~
 II. Fueling of Fl at Units at Sea.

~~As a Battle Lesson (Lesson)~~

There are many times in operational waters when fuel oil cannot be supplied unless refueling from astern is used.

The rate of oil received by ships per hour and the rate of supply to small ships from large ships is insufficient. (All Ships).

It is necessary in all cases to increase the rate of refueling to 300 metric tons per hour. (BatDiv 3).

The number of times refuelled and results during the year since BatDiv 3 commenced operations:

	KOMOO	HARUNA	Average Amount
From AO (2 hoses astern)	8 times	5 times	160 m tons per hr
from HD (from alongside)	17 times	22 times	110 m tons per hr

 The ZUIKAKU (CV) similarly loaded at 160 metric tons per hour, taking on 1942 m tons from the NICHITYO MARU in 12 hours. An increase to 300 or 400 tons is necessary. (ZUIKAKU (CV)).

Conclusion (10-14-41) It is urgently necessary from a military standpoint to put into effect the following measures for the supply of fuel oil at sea:

1. The installation of stern refueling gear on all ships.
2. A great increase in the rate of supply per hour in order to shorten the total time required.

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IV. IMPROVEMENT OF NAVAL STORES FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SUPPLY OPERATIONSBattle Lesson (Lesson)

1. More than ten hoses broke during maneuvers on the MANAYI Operation, and during the INDIAN OCEAN Operation the hoses of an oil tanker were damaged and supply was greatly delayed. (CatDiv 2).

2. Losses from cutting and leakage during towing and refueling are likely to occur. Also, since the hoses stretch about 10%, the part which bends is likely to become constricted and greatly reduced the capacity for supplying oil. The number of times accidents happened to hoses from the beginning of the war up to the end of 1942 is shown below: (BatDiv 3).

	KONDO (BB)		HARUNA (BB)	
	Times Encountered	Times Damaged	Times Encountered	Times Damaged
Astern from AO	8	9 (TN: sic)	5	3
Alongside from BO	17	3	22	1

3. If the inner surface of the hose breaks, the filter is likely to get clogged up. (KENTO MARU, ZUHO (CVL)).

4. If the weak points of the 12 meter cellophane (SEROFUAN) hose were improved upon, it would be suitable for use on naval vessels. Ten hoses might be made standard equipment for BBs, reducing the number of 4.5 meter hoses now in use by half.

Conclusion (SEROFUAN) Cellophane (SEROFUAN) hoses must be made tougher.

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V. IMPROVEMENT OF SHIPS' HULLS, MACHINERY, FITTINGS AND EQUIPMENT
FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SUPPLY OPERATIONS

Battle Lesson (BB)

XXXXXXXX

1. It is necessary to install equipment for refueling from astern.
(All ships).
2. In the case of tankers which supply from both sides, if supply cannot be carried out from both sides at the same time, the transfer of fuel cannot be initiated. Improvements are necessary so that separate supplying can be carried out. (AKEBONO MARU, Deck 4).
3. There are instances in which extraneous matter becomes mixed with the oil when refueling is being carried out from tankers. Refueling speed is reduced about one-third and inconvenience in loading results. It is necessary to equip tankers with changeable filters. (ISE (BB))
4. In view of the many instances in which hoses are burst ^{increasing the} ~~due to~~ extreme pressure caused by faulty operation of the intake valves, it is necessary to install equipment which will prevent great pressure, such as automatic cut-off valves. (TOHO MARU).
5. Oil intake funnels should be installed on all fuel tanks. (MYOKO (CA)).

Conditions on the MYOKO

No of funnels	No of auxiliary lines from each funnel	No of tank connection valves from each line	No of tanks
12	1	0	12
2	1	2	4
8	2	0	16
2	2	4	8
6	3	0	18
2	3	4	10
2	4	0	8
4	5	0	20

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6. The great length of the air outlet pipe on fuel tanks makes necessary the enlargement of the pipe line to facilitate the outlet of air.

Unless there is considerable pressure on the intake valve, loading is impossible. (CHOKAI (CA)), MYOKO (CA)).

7. From the standpoint of rapid supply, it is necessary to reduce the number of fuel tanks and increase the capacity. (CHOKAI (CA)).

8. It is necessary to place the containers for the fuel intake valve, the intake gauge pipe and the hose in places convenient for loading operations. (CHOKAI (CA)),

9. When the YUBARI (CL) is about half filled with oil, the upper tanks cannot be filled unless the hatch is removed and the hose directly led in. Since capacity fueling from astern is difficult, and inconvenient from an operational standpoint, it is necessary to equip each tank with a main intake pipe. Moreover, since funnel fueling of lower tanks requires time, it is necessary to convert to pressure fueling. (YUBARI (CL)).

10. Often, large amounts of oil collect in the tanker's hoses at the time of refueling and the result is delay in the work of connecting the hose (5 large buckets of oil have been collected from one hose (about 0.3 ton)). (HAMAKAZE (DD)).

11. By reason of the hindrance to rapid fueling occasioned by the length of time required to drain (1.5 hours), it is necessary to increase from 40 tons to 80 tons the capacity of the ~~seawater~~ drainage ejector in the compensating oil tank. (MAKIGUMO (DD)).

12. It is necessary to equip tankers with oil heating equipment throughout, in case of low temperatures, the effect on the speed of refueling is great. (BatDiv 3)

13. It is necessary to install equipment so that oil may be supplied at night. (KENYŌ MARU).

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III. Capacity, Performance, and Number of Supply Ships

~~THE CAPABILITY OF THE JAPANESE SUPPLY SHIPS TO ACCOMPANY THE FLEET~~

~~A Battle Lesson (Kure)~~

Signal flags by which the type of supply ship can be recognized at a glance must be adopted. Ammunition ships have been mistaken for storeships.

~~A Battle Lesson (Kure)~~

It is necessary to equip AKs with 40 ton derricks fore and aft to make possible the loading of lighters, large landing barges and other heavy objects. (YOKOSUKA Regional Transportation Dept).

Conclusion ~~(Kure)~~ It is necessary to have a large number of AKs which are equipped with heavy derricks.

2. It is generally very profitable to use small, high-speed ships in southern areas. (MinelayerDiv 18, etc).

3. When accompanying a fleet, the present speed of 15 knots is difficult; a speed of 20 knots is necessary for fully loaded oil tanker. (KENTO MARD).

Conclusion ~~(Kure)~~ Good, fast ships must be chosen as supply ships to accompany the fleet.

~~B Battle Lesson (Kure)~~

1. Armament is weak; it must be strengthened. (MinelayerDiv 18).

2. Communications equipment is very deficient; it is inconvenient in directing maneuvers. (2nd Fleet).

3. It is necessary to add 2 MG. (Have at present one 7.7mm MG and 7 rifles). ^{1 pair} 2 pairs of 12cm binoculars are required. (Have at present 8cm). (KENTO MARD)

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4. It is necessary to increase rifles by two DP guns and MD by 22 12mm or 25mm MGs. (KURE Navy Yard).

5. Three 8cm binoculars, ^{gun} twin mount 11 mm MD, and DP gun are required. Still another secondary frequency for radio transmission is required. (NICHIO MARU).

6. There are numerous instances when requisitioned ships are attacked from the side opposite the gun. In view of actual circumstances they should be equipped with one gun forward and one aft. Shells must be increased from 20 to over 50 rounds per gun, and depth charges from 4 to 6. (YOKOSUKA Regional Transportation Dept).

Conclusion (Chikita)

1. In view of the fact that there are many times when skill in lookout and evasive action determine the fate of a ship, it is profitable to develop these capabilities to the utmost.

2. Although AA, ASW, and communications equipment have been greatly increased, we believe that the present standard is inadequate.

Battle Lesson (Bastard)

In spite of the fact that there have been numerous opportunities for using converted airplane lighters, their number has been insufficient, as has been the number of large landing barges. (11th Air Fleet).

Conclusion (Bastard) Two converted airplane lighters must be assigned each air fleet and they must be equipped with 4 large landing barges.

Battle Lesson (Bastard)

1. Conditions are such that supply of fuel and lubricating oil in local

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area is impossible and the torpedoes supplied cannot be prepared for firing. This is gradually being taken care of by transferring small amounts from the supply of other ships. Since this is a great inconvenience, it must be made possible to get oil from ammunition ships or from oil tankers. (KINUGASA (CA))

2. The torpedoes supplied, once adjusted, go several months without examination and readjustment; there are many that are defective from having been in ~~the~~ storage a long time. If we were to participate in an operation ~~immediately~~ immediately after the delivery of these torpedoes, not only would we find them not completely ready for firing, but we would have some uneasiness regarding their accuracy. (KINUGASA (CA)).

Conclusion (Chikashi)

1. Fuel oil and lubricating oil must be included with torpedoes supplied from ammunition ships. (This has been done).

2. Torpedoes supplied must be inspected at suitable intervals and imperfect ones readjusted.

Battle Lesson (Kikashi)

At present, conditions are such that with every possible use of the NAMITA (AP), and the IRAKO (AP), supply is barely being carried ~~on~~ on.

It is feared that in the event of an accident to these, supply lines would be thrown into disorder and the effect on morale and on operations would be great. Two naval storeships of the IRAKO type must be constructed and put into operation immediately /in order to supply fresh provisions/. (2nd Fleet).

At least two APs for storeships must be constructed (including one for the 1st Fleet and one for the 2nd Fleet) and be attached to the 2nd Fleet. (2nd Fleet)

Conclusion. The number of naval storeships for fresh provisions must be increased.

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~~Little known (Mitsubishi)~~

1. Fuel oil is generally supplied every eight days, but fresh provisions are sometimes needed for as long as twenty days. (Section 2).

2. Oil tankers must be equipped with refrigerators and thus be enabled to supply fresh provisions at sea at the same time that they supply oil. (2nd Fleet).

~~Conclusion (Mitsubishi)~~ It would be well to plan for small craft such as EEs to be supplied with fresh provisions at the same time and place that they are supplied with fuel oil.

(End)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #15

ENTITLED

"JAPANESE BATTLE LESSONS ON SUPPLY IN THE GREATER EAST ASIA WAR
SUPPLY BATTLE LESSON NO. 1"

USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE

"NAVI SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

This is a translation parallel to
the translation stated in SOURCE
DOCUMENT #14, supra of the same
captured Japanese Document.

CINCPAC-CINCPACIA ITEM #10,278
Page 1

ALLIANT-VERY SECRET (GUMGUMORI)

10 June 1943

SUPPLY BATTLE LESSON #1

#410 of 400

BATTLE LESSONS ON SUPPLY IN THE GREATER EAST ASIA WAR - FIRST EDITION

Committee on Investigation of Battle Lessons, Supply Branch

Section (GUMGUMORI)

Method of Disposal: When no longer of value, burn and report.

Distribution

Naval General Staff	10	Naval Hospitals	30 each
Army Ministry	10	Offices of Supplies and Accounts	10 each
Naval Technical Dept	10	Civil Engineering Depts (KOKUSAN)	10 each
Naval Air Bq	5	Combined Air Training Command	2
Civil Engineering Bq	5	Air Groups	10 each
Naval Transportation Bq	5	Naval Submarine Dept	1
Hydrographic Office	2	Submarine Base Units	10 each
Technical Research Laboratory	2	Base Forces	10 each
YAMAGUCHI Naval Dist	4	Special Base Forces	10 each
KANAGAWA, SAGAMI, MIYAZAKI		Schools	10 each
Naval Districts	2 each	Fleet Bq	10 each
Second Districts	2 each	Division Bq (SEITAI SHIREIHO)	10 each
Defense Construction	2 each	Battle Lessons Section	10 each
Army Lands	5 each	Publication Office File	
Army Technical Dept	4		
USMC (USMC)			
Naval Air Depots	2 each		
Post Depots	2 each		
Warrior Master's Offices	1 each		
Transportation Depts	10		
Stores Depts	50		

CINCPAC-CINCPAC Item 1

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These Battle Lessons are compiled from proposals forwarded from the beginning of the war to May 1943 by the sub-committees designated below as "C", and from opinions of supply personnel in the forward areas. The sub-committees designated "A" are at present compiling material at their respective offices.

Name of Sub-committee	Duties	Disseminating Activity in Charge (WH)
⑤ General Affairs	1. Consideration and summarization of research and proposals on battle lessons. 2. Matters not under the jurisdiction of other sub-committees.	Machinists School
① #1	Matters concerning equipment related to the Technical Dept	YOKOSUKA Naval Stores Dept
△ #2	Matters concerning equipment related to Naval Air Hq	2nd Naval Air Depot
③ #3	Matters concerning ships stores, documents and records.	YOKOSUKA Stores Dept
△ #4	Matters concerning fuel, fresh water and articles expendable in operations	YOKOSUKA Stores Dept
△ #5	Matters concerning clothing, food, canteen supplies, etc., soldier relief goods and special wartime supplies	YOKOSUKA Stores Dept
③ #6	Matters concerning medical stores	YOKOSUKA Naval Hospital
△ #7	Matters concerning harbor supplies	YOKOSUKA Harbor Master's Office
△ #8	Matters concerning repair materials	C and R School
③ #9	Matters concerning construction materials	YOKOSUKA Civil Engineering Dept (KENGCHAURO)
③ #10	Items relating to Army and Navy transportation not under the jurisdiction of other committees (including General Affairs Committee)	YOKOSUKA ^{Regional} Army Transportation Dept

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- I. General General Regulations
- II. Supply of Provisions from JAPAN
Local Areas
- III. Supply of Provisions in the Area Concerned
- IV. Supply by ^{Forward} Forward Forces (HOKYU BUTAI) Attached to Fleets and Supply Between Ships

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Table of Contents (cont.)

VI. ~~Supply and Capacity of Supply Ships and Transportation~~ *and Performance and Efficiency*

VII. Air Transportation

VIII. Improvement of Military Stores from the Standpoint of Supply Operations

IX. Improvement of Ship's Halls, Machinery, Fittings and Equipment from the Standpoint of Supply Operations

Opinion of the Committee Chairman

Although methods are continually being devised, in the light of past battle lessons, for increased efficiency in the transport of supplies, one frequently hears the opinion that a great many improvements are ^{still} needed in the strengthening of related ^{aspects} machinery, increase in the efficiency of loading and unloading, and so forth. However, as will be seen in these battle lessons, the customary lack of concrete plans is deplorable. It is recognized that there has been a lack of consideration and research in the past in regard to supply in general, and that the reason for this lies in the fact that throughout the Central Area, the machinery for it is still insufficient. Therefore, it will be recognized that the most urgent matter at hand is to effect a break in the present difficult situation by making a fundamental re-examination of this machinery, by improving and strengthening it, and by then by applying it everywhere.

Committee on Investigation of Battle
LessonsSUGUKI Hironaka, Chairman,
~~Subcommittee on Supply Section~~

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Number	Battle Lessons (Reasons)	Conclusions (Opinion)
	1). In order to quickly establish bases in areas where enemy planes may appear, a basic re-organization of methods of rapid unloading is necessary in light of the fact that rapid unloading is fundamental to military operations. (Hawley Report 18)	with special consideration given to the order of loading and unloading in port. (Note) The subject of longshoremen and warehousemen going to ports in the southern "A" areas is governed by Military Preparations
2.	4). Since the transporting of supplies between advance bases (HAWLEY REPORT) and advance positions (HAWLEY REPORT) is controlled by the transportation staff in the area concerned, and because only those materials materials related to the planning of operations merit expeditious handling, there is almost almost no surplus space which can be utilized. Consequently, the transporting to of advance bases of advance material, essential repair materials, and of materials to be returned to be returned to storage is regulated. (Hawley Report 18) (100th Air Depot)	ORDER 322 of 9 September 1942.
	5). In the past, the supplying of bases in the later South Sea Area, even when regulations were made by radio, ordinarily required a minimum of one month. Supply via written requisition took up to three months. In extreme cases, six months elapsed without a reply. Since there are a great many cases requiring rapid replacement of aviation materials, it is necessary to regulate transportation units so as to give priority to surface transportation. (100th Air Depot)	

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Number	Article Subject (Reason)	Conclusion (Opinion)
	It is necessary to increase shipping by the following means: efficiency and volume	In order to increase shipping efficiency, it is necessary to
	1. By portering simultaneously with take some sorting of cargo so as to utilize the ship's full capacity, the utilization of lighters to transfer cargo from free ship to shore, and so forth.	reduce the number of days at anchor.
	2. By establishing pilotage in all military naval ports for chartered vessels and by speeding up the time of tying up and cast- ing off.	
	3. By completing repair work during loading in so far as possible. By <i>Yokohama</i> <i>Each</i> to launch every ship with one nation loading barge for communications work.	
	<i>Yokohama</i> (<i>Regional</i> TOYOKUNI Area Transportation Dept)	
	There are numerous instances in which more logical shipping assignments are needed.	It is necessary to assign the right ship to the right place, taking into consideration facili- ties for fuel storage, water stor- age, and depending on the goods to be shipped (personnel material, special material, personnel and material shipped at the same time), and the rel- ative length of the voyage.

Number	Battle Lessons (Summary)	Conclusion (Opinion)
6.	The central transportation agency must constantly investigate the capacity for supply and conditions existent in all supply areas and must carefully discuss supply vessels in accordance with the size of the area. Because a shipment scheduled to go from Naval Base a subsidiary to the theater of operations was changed to go from HONOLULU to the theater of operations, difficulties arose in the supply of food and explosives for the supply ships. (HONOLULU Storage Dept, HONOLULU Branch)	It is essential to make absolutely dependable surveys of the capacity for supply and of conditions existent in all supply areas and at the same time to make possible the supply of essential goods to supply ships.
7.	1). Converted vessels can in many cases be used for transport purposes in addition to their original function. (Regional AA Transportation Dept) 2). At times, converted vessels, primarily used in attachment and AA operations, have few opportunities to carry out their original duties and consequently are used solely for transport work (KINGMAN). Because the hatches are covered and many of the crew are in charge of the military equipment, there is no chance for damage to the cargo. It is recognized as profitable to use these fast ships as transports. (Albuquerque Div 16)	It is absolutely essential to utilize shipping space in converted vessels for transport purposes as the need arises.

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Subject	Battle Lessons (Lesson)	Conclusion (Spoken)
	Units in JAPAN are trying to handle requests for supplies from advance battalions everywhere as they arise. They complete the packing of urgently needed supplies and forward transportation requests to the Transportation Dept. But because there is a lack of co-operation, the result is the present unavoidable situation in which supplies are left as they are piled up for rather long periods of time, three months from requisition to receipt of goods; sometimes as much as six months). XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX) Obstacles to medical treatment for those who had requested /the supplies/ inevitably have a demoralizing effect on the morale of supply personnel. (All hospitals)	It is necessary to utilize ship movements and as much cargo space as possible and to plan for an increasing number of trips in order to facilitate the supply of medical materials between bases of operations and the places supplied.
	The use of construction materials in ships is indicated in Section 3, Bureau of Military Affairs MEMO # 126 of 6 July 1939. However, since the beginning of the war there has developed a marked tendency to depend so solely on ship outfitting materials, there is also the prevalent tendency to depend upon Naval Stores Depts	The classification of supply of construction materials to be used for operational purposes by land and forces must be clarified.

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Number	Details (Reasons)	Conclusion (Opinion)
9. (cont.)	for the supply of materials to be used by land in ^{by} forces. It is necessary to effect such supply from many ^{the} parts and from the Civil Engineering Dept (ENGINEERS) also. (The Samples omitted as irrelevant). (All Stores Depts)	
(B-12054)	The detailed experience of the eight months since the transfer of the Library to the Naval Stores Dept shows that for the following reasons it is necessary to make a further change at the present time, to put the Library under independent jurisdiction and to re-organize it so that it may become stronger. 1). Classified documents such as code books possess the highest degree of secrecy. In the handling of these, there are many cases when errors, delay and the like have caused a tremendous immediate effect on military operations. 2). Since classified documents have the afore-mentioned special characteristics, they cannot be handled like military equipment such as Navy stores and are not suited to the "department store" technique used by the Naval Stores Depts. 3). Errors and delays are apt to occur in the handling of classified documents if the office system and chain of command do not go through the regular channels between the central departments and ^{departments and} Districts, and the various other offices.	It is necessary to reform and expand the Library system and to give it a single, independent jurisdiction.

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Number	Bottle Lesson (Message)	Continuation (Message)
	A). The great increase in naval forces since the beginning of the war, the change frequency of alteration of orders, the sudden increase in the volume of account classified documents handled and the pressure upon libraries has no parallel with former days. (All Stores Depts.)	
10. (cont.)	(All Stores Depts.) Since the opening of the Greater East Asia War, library duties have undergone a very sudden pressure of business and because manpower has not kept pace, there has been a pronounced delay in supply (of classified documents). Because charts and documents assigned to libraries, with the exception of Naval General Staff documents, are principally considered military stores, co-ordination of registration in accordance with accounting regulations for military stores, as well as their entry in the master registry for ledgers showing custody, receipt and issuance is absolutely necessary. The complexity of accounting work is causing increasing delay in re-organization. It is recognized as very essential to exempt the above-mentioned classified documents and charts from military stores (documents published by the Naval General Staff and ones of similar nature), to simplify work and to concentrate on the master registry and supply work. (All Stores Depts.)	It is necessary to combine classified documents, classified military training documents, classified ID charts and classified air charts from the accounting regulations for military stores, and to co-ordinate management of their registration.
11.		

Number	Battle Lessons (Reason)	Conclusion (Opinion)
12.	There is room for further research on the materials carried by specially established forces at the time of their departure for combat areas. When one considers that even the landing of essential gear at forward areas has not been as desired and when one considers the labor involved in unloading in these areas, it must be recognized that bayonet and fencing gear of forces going off for the first time must be kept at a minimum and sent later as secondary goods. Therefore, it is essential to indicate the classifications primary and secondary in tables showing regulation amounts of materials in order to indicate standards for the time of departure and for later shipment. (All Stores Depts)	Materials carried by specially established forces at the time of their departure for combat areas are also the concern of transportation. It is essential to limit them to the necessary minimum.
13.	It is recognized that it is essential to expedite matters by formulating at once regulations for equipment accounting to conform to the characteristics of aviation equipment, to simplify their arrangement and further, to simplify equipment records. (11th Air Depot) It is necessary to eliminate the need for obtaining the Navy Minister's approval for the transfer of even one plane to another ship, so that this can be done with the approval of the CinC. (1st Air Fleet)	It is necessary to amend those parts of accounting regulations for military stores which ^{do not} are not ^{apply to} are not suitable ^{for} for aviation equipment and to simplify equipment records.

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It is necessary to eliminate the need for getting the Navy Minister's approval for the transfer of even one plane to one other ship, so that this can be done with the approval of the CinC.

(1st Air Fleet)

When spare parts are scarce as at present, we believe that under one head if they are ordered, ~~and~~ all as either material or equipment, ~~the~~ ^{among} ~~petition~~ ~~the~~ various depots will be eliminated. Moreover, if ~~it~~ ^{they} ~~is~~ ^{are} ordered as material it will not be necessary to transfer it ~~to~~ ^{from} equipment (as much as 70% has been transferred to material); matters can thus be expedited and receipt of goods facilitated.

(11th Air Depot)

~~aircraft engine parts~~
the supply of
Orders for aircraft engine parts must be centrally controlled.

It must be clearly indicated that ~~XXXX~~ ^{XXXX} canteen goods necessary for all troop organizations in wartime are to be handled as naval stores.

~~However~~ ^{However} ~~Observe~~ ^{Observe}, we believe that articles difficult to obtain or to supply, once lumped under one head, should be treated so that they may be delivered as battle supplies ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~handled~~ ^{handled} (military stores ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~handled~~ ^{handled} and, when necessary,

The handling of canteen goods ~~which~~ ^{which} are indispensable to life in ~~combat~~ ^{forward} areas must be improved so that supply is always maintained and so that security is not endangered, and ~~such~~ ^{such} a loading standard for ~~ships~~ ^{ships} must be established.

a part of them may be sold
to the canteens.

Because canteen goods are
under the jurisdiction of the Navy
Relief they are likely to be treated
as of secondary importance in their
transport and supply. From the point
of view of security too, this is a
serious matter.

expedite
~~the~~ In order to ~~expedite~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~
supply of canteen goods, ~~smooth and~~
~~expedite~~ we believe that the best
method is to establish a single
section (Canteen Goods Section) in
the Navy Stores Dept to handle them
exclusively. There are instances
unplanned
of overloading ~~with material~~ which *have*
has given rise to obstacles in emer-
gency work for military operations.

Tentative plans have been made
~~establishing~~
toward a standard for loading canteen
goods in 2nd Fleet #31-9 of 1 Oct
1942.

(2nd Fleet)

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#10675

SUPPLY OF PROVISIONS FROM JAPAN

SUBJECT: SUPPLY OF PROVISIONS FROM JAPAN

Bottle Lesson (Reason)	Conclusion (Opinion)
1. There has been sudden increase in ^{photo-fuel} increase in the efficiency ^{being used} of the customs-houses, piers, and guest buildings ^{being used} by the YOKOSUKA Naval District in YOKOSUKA. (YOKOSUKA Civil Reg Dept) (2) Facilities at Fuel Depot #3 must be enlarged to permit the mooring of ^{two} 10,000 ton ^{AKs} ships. (Fuel Depot #3) (3rd Fleet Fuel Depot) (3) Loading and supply facilities at BAKO must be expanded. The capacity to supply ^{fuel} oil must be increased to 10,000 tons per 24 hours. (2nd Fleet)	In order that deficiency in supply installations have no great effect on at naval operations, it is necessary to determine the ^{adequacy} of central ^{actual} conditions in the in all areas and to implement ^{formulate} remedial measures.
(4) Supply installations at MIKAWA are insufficient and require enlargement. (1st Fleet)	
(5) The supply quay of the KURE Replacement Shop must be ^{enlarged} expanded. It is frequently found too narrow for supply loading work and delay results. (11th Air Depot)	
(6) Plants completed at the 11th Air Depot are operating ^{as} on flight ^{as} on and air transport after being transported by surface to the INAKUNI Air Group, ^{and} the loss in ^{the} labor and time required for this is great. At least one runway of the KURE airfield must be lengthened and widened. (11th Air Depot)	

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(7) There are numerous instances where the capabilities of local Army Stores Departments have been insufficient and could not meet the demands of operating ^{units} ~~units~~. It is ~~most~~ essential to expand installations and place experienced persons in charge so as to keep on hand ~~stores~~ ^{large amounts of supplies} and insure a rapid supply.

(All ~~Stores~~ ^{units} concerned with Naval stores)

(8) In order to ~~supply the various forces in the far-flung combat areas, and also in consideration of such things as air raids, it is necessary to establish Branch Offices of local the Stores Department near each Branch Supply~~ ^{front line force} ~~units~~ with each ~~forward element~~.

(All Stores Dept's)

(9) Because of insufficient ~~supply~~ ^{adequate} supply installations at local Stores Departments, heavy equipment such as DP guns and generators cannot be unloaded, and some things cannot be installed. The handling of torpedoes and mines is also very difficult. Not only is there a great ~~amount~~ ^{possibility} possibility of damage to delicate equipment but there are many instances when it is not ^{at all} suitable to rapid supply. The installation of ^{light} ~~light~~ ^{planes, cranes, cranes on cargo ships,} and trucks is absolutely necessary.

(All Stores Dept's)

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(10) ~~Acceleration of the work~~ ^{in fitting out}
 ing of Specially Established Naval Stores
 Departments is earnestly desired. The 4th
 Naval Stores Department legally ^{is factually}
^{assigned} to the 4th Fleet; however, it has a
 great deal of importance as ^{a transit base}
^{even} ~~base~~ supply base for ships of the Com-
 bined Fleet. Therefore it is necessary
 to attempt the speedy completion of
 installations as already planned and
 to equip ^{them} ~~it~~ with an eye toward our
 persistent drive to the south.

(2nd Fleet)

(11) At Rabaul there is not a single
 sound pier installation, while great labor
 is being ^{expended} entirely on loading and
 unloading. No matter what other sacri-
 fices are made, piers must be installed
 immediately. (106th Air Depot)

2 (1) It is very unprofitable to have
 an aircraft ^{tender (ROKAN)} ~~return~~ return to JAPAN
 for ~~aircraft~~ the supply of aircraft
 equipment. All air depots must be
 outfitted with equipment and be made
 able to receive ^{tenders} ~~aircraft~~.

(1st, 11th, and 4th Air Flts. and
~~the~~ CruDiv 7)

(2) ^{At TRUK} ~~At TRUK~~, ^{at present} the condi-
 tions are such that it is impossible
 to renovate planes or to test large
 or medium types. ^{Their supply} ~~Supply~~ from JAPAN
 is also difficult and thus ~~operation~~
~~there~~ there is great anxiety
 over operational flights.

(BatDiv 3)

Aircraft equipment must be kept
 on hand in so far as possible at the
 local Air Depots.

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3 (1) In addition to the Naval Hospitals and Pharmacy Departments in ~~Combat~~ areas, ~~Pharmacy~~ ^{Combat} ~~Department~~ ^{Branch} ~~(Provisional)~~ designation) must be established where there are ~~base~~ ^{base} forces. The number of days required for supplies from JAPAN (now 1 to 3 months) must be reduced. and It must be made possible to get supplies through the movements of Naval Forces.

(All Naval Hospitals)

(2) Since these movements are frequent it would be excellent if there were some means of making it ^{to front has been by this means} possible to get supplies ~~when~~ transport is difficult or urgent.

(KATORI (CL); DesDiv 5; SOYA (AK); 18th Construction Battalion; SSI-7; KAMOI (CVS); LYONS MARU; HIRIJO MARU; 6th Base Force; 6th Submarine Base Unit; 6th Communications Unit; 62nd Guard Unit; 54th Guard Unit; 14th Air Group; 64th Guard Unit; MAIZURU Naval Hospital; SHINKO MARU; Gunboat (Escort) ~~Kanagawa~~ ^{Shin} Div 2; ISHIGAKI MARU; SHIN^{YO} MARU; MUROTO (AK); MAIZURU NLF; NAGARA (CL); SubChasDiv 54; 65th Guard Unit; MUTSU (BB); HIE MARU; HAKKAISAN MARU; 582nd Air Group)

(3) It is anticipated that arrangements will be made whereby sufficient supplies in the required amounts can be given all ~~(certain)~~ ^{submarine} tenders and all submarine Base Units.

SS
(Submarine I-7)

The supply machinery for medical stores at all bases, submarine bases, etc. must be strengthened.

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(4) Although it is necessary to ~~receive~~ ^{obtain} medical supplies from converted hospital ships, it is regrettably difficult to supply the required amount in the required period of time because of the movements of both parties concerned. Hereafter a large amount of medical supplies must be distributed to ~~the~~ ^{these} hospitals in the most advanced bases, so as to be able to supply ships whenever they enter port. (TAKED (CA))

When having material required, tests made, or containers manufactured, much time is required and service is unsatisfactory.

For your information, the numbers of general repair jobs and the numbers of instances of a major nature at the YOKOSUKA Naval Hospital during the last year are as follows.

(a) Number of general repair jobs for year 1942

Medical two-tonnet equipment

2,753

General material

762

(b) Major items

Sterilizer pump

333

Stretchers

222

Sterilizers

75

Beds

117

(c) Production of containers

26,000

(All Naval Hospitals)

It is essential that hospitals in JAPAN be equipped for repair of material used in medical treatment, that repairs be effected quickly, and that supplies be adequate.

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III. SUPPLY OF PROVISIONS IN LOCAL AREA

SUBJECT MATTER: LOCAL SUPPLY

number	Matter Lesson (Reason)	Conclusion (Opinion)
1	Considerable efforts are being made toward local self-sufficiency in fresh provisions. However, the MISSAN Forestry and Agriculture (森日屋農林) and the BORNEO Fisheries (森打日水産) which are working to supply the navy with fresh provisions at TAWAKAN, under authorization of being authorized by Stores Dept Secret Provisioning #120, both have their bases and producing areas in the former British area north of TANAU and have therefore run into difficulties. For example: In June of last year the SHIMAZU MARU (船丸) (from the OKINAWA Fishing Corp.) (漁業会社), a fishing vessel assigned to the BORNEO Fisheries Branch Office, was prohibited from fishing in the former British possession (the north coast of BORNEO). It is necessary to get permission to take fresh vegetables from the NISSAN Farms at TANAU and since even fresh provisions assigned the Navy are bartered for, supply is difficult. (101st Fuel Depot, TAWAKAN Branch)	A central agreement between the Army and Navy regarding the policy of local self-sufficiency in fresh provisions must be made and the local authorities must be made to comply.

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Even if ~~at~~ TAWAU or this place /TARAKAN/ were to attempt self-sufficiency, there would not be enough fresh provisions ^{for the} ~~in this~~ area. Fresh meat and green vegetables especially must be supplied from some place like JAVA, but at present a storeship makes only one or two trips every two months from the 102nd Naval Stores Dept (SOERABAJA). The number of storeships for local Stores Dept's must be increased; at least two or three trips a month must be made.

For your information, the amounts ^{percentage} needed here and the ~~ratio~~ of self-supply are given in the following tables:

	Amount needed by all govt offices & forces here (kg per day)	Percentage of self-supply	Shortage	Remarks
Fresh fish	200,000	(5 days ration) 68%	3,200	3 mo average starting Nov 1943
Fresh meat	160,000	(10 days ration) 33%	1,030	
Fresh vegetables	600,000	54.8%	8,130	

(101st Fuel Depot, TARAKAN Branch)

A greater number of storeships is needed for the local supply of locally raised provisions.

3

Supply for personnel of the ^{Southern} ~~Force~~ in the South (during the first phase of the war totalling 100,000) is insufficient with the storeships used at present.

(2nd Fleet)

Machinery for the preservation of local products must be established ~~in order to compensate for~~ ~~and the~~ shortage of storeships ~~must be made up for~~.

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Because of imperfect packing, a large amount of the sweets, tobacco, etc. supplied from JAPAN has been damaged in transit. The usual oil or had spoiled in storage. ~~However~~ care must be taken in packing goods as supplied from JAPAN and storage facilities in the field must be perfected. But since these articles are things which could be produced locally in sufficient quantities, confectioners should be dispatched to important points; something should be done to supply the deficient materials from JAPAN, and the local sources of supply should be augmented as much as possible.

(1st Fuel Depot, McHAR Beach Depot)

It is necessary to suggest the sources of supply of certain goods (sweets, tobacco, beer, soft drinks, soap, etc.) which can be ^{supplied} ~~produced~~ locally.

ATTACHMENT TO
MEMORANDUM: STATUS OF SUPPLY LINES
AND SUPPLY SYSTEMS SHIPS

Number	Battle Lesson (Reason)	Conclusion (Opinion)
1	(1) There are many times in operational waters when oil cannot be supplied unless refueling is used ^{refueling is used}. (2) The rate of oil received by ships per hour and the rate of supply to small ships from large ships is insufficient. (All ships) It is necessary in all cases to increase the rate of refueling to 200 metric tons per hour. (Batt Div 3) The number of times refueled and results during the past since Batt Div 3 commenced operations.	It is extremely necessary from a military standpoint to put into effect the following measures for the supply of oil at sea: (1) The installation of oil ^{oil} supply ^{supply} lines ^{lines} to ^{to} small ^{small} ships ^{ships}. (2) A great increase in the rate of supply per hour in order to shorten the total time required.

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	KONGO	HATULU	Average amount
From AD (2 boxes per hr)	8 times	5 times	160 m tons per hr
From BD (2 boxes per hr)	17	22	110 m tons per hr

The ZUIKAKU (CV) similarly loaded at 160 metric tons per hour, taking on 1342 m tons from the NICHIO MARU in 12 hours. An increase to 300 or 400 tons is necessary. (ZUIKAKU (CV))

Specialty Hospital
(1) Hospital Ships and Naval Hospitals

at base of operations are being used for the replacement of medical supplies. ~~There are several disadvantages to this.~~ There are many occasions when it is difficult for naval vessels, because of their movements, to receive supplies from hospital ships. ~~Moreover~~ these hospital ships, besides receiving and treating patients as their principal function, return them to JAPAN for discharging; because of their equipment, hospital ships have limited storage space and cannot take on a sufficient amount of supplies.

(All Naval Hospitals)

(2) Hospital ships, because of their duties, are confined in their movements to more important places and they very seldom go to the most forward areas where small ~~auxiliary~~ craft such as subchasers and converted gunboats are active. Consequently, converted supply ships must be given the job of supplying these areas with medical

Some
A part of the converted Naval Supply Ships must be made an supply agency for the transport of medical materials. ~~supply~~ *store*

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	Stores materials. (5th Fleet, MAIZURU Naval Hospital, MIOTO Naval Hospital, 5th Guard Unit (Misaki)) (3) The movements of hospital ships are very limited; they rarely go into areas where small craft are operating. However, provision ^{provisions} ships (as provision ^{provisions} ships) make trips once or twice a month and therefore their medical officers must be made responsible for the supply of medical materials between ships. (TAMA, ^(H) TOKOSUKA 6th SNLF)	
3	When ships are going to an area ^{proceeding} here they are reasonably certain of obtaining the chances of getting ^{chances of getting} supplies are good, by transferring as much of their supplies as possible to ships remaining ^{naval forces} remaining behind, they may serve as an aid in offsetting the scarcity of transport bottoms ^{cargo space}. (BatDiv 3)	The transfer between ships of clothing, provisions, canteen goods, navy relief goods, and special wartime kits must be regulated at Fleet Hq in order to insure smoothness and efficiency.
NUMBER FIVE: TRANSPORTATION AND THE CAPACITY, PERFORMANCE, AND NUMBER OF SUPPLY SHIPS AND TRANSPORTATION		
Number	Battle Lesson(Reason)	Conclusion (Opinion)
1	Signal flags by which the type of supply ship can be recognized at a glance must be adopted. Ammunition ships have been mistaken for storeships, and thereby opportunities to load supplies have been lost. (DesRon 2)	Signal flags which indicate the type of supply ship should be used ^{raised} at appropriate times.
2	(1) High-speed, medium type ships must be used in moving in bases ^{in bases}. (2nd Fleet) etc.) (2) It is generally very profitable to use small, high-speed ships in southern Minchayer ^{Minchayer} areas. (Sawaf 15, etc.) (3) In a fleet of 15 knots ^{when accompanying a fleet} the present speed of 15 knots is normal circumstances is difficult. A	Good; fast ships must be chosen as the supply ships to accompany the fleet.

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speed of 10 knots is required of a
fully loaded oil tanker. (KENTO MARU)

(1) Armament is weak, it must be
strengthened. (Shimada 18)

(2) Communications equipment is
deficient; it is inconvenient in

(1) In view of the fact that
many
there are times when skill in
lookout and evasive movement de-
termine the fate of a ship,

(3) It is necessary to add 2 MG. (to
present 1 7.7mm MG and 7 rifles.)

2 pairs of 12cm high caliber guns re-
quired (to present 8cm.)

(KENTO MARU)

Speed 10 knots is required.

Shimada 18

Communications equipment is

(NICHITO MARU)

increased from 20 to over 50 rounds per
gun, and depth charges from 4 to 6.

(YOKOSUKA Regional Transportation
Dept)

In spite of the fact that there
have been numerous opportunities for
using converted airplane lighters,
their number has been insufficient,
as has been the number of large
landing barges. (11th Air Fleet)

converted
Two airplane lighters must be
assigned each air fleet and they
must be equipped with 4 large
landing barges.

(1) Conditions are such that supply
of fuel and lubricating oil in ^{local} ~~this~~ areas
is impossible and torpedoes supplied
cannot be prepared for firing. This is
usually being taken care of by trans-
ferring small amounts from the supply of

(1) Fuel oil and lubricating
oil must be included with torpe-
does supplied ^{to} ~~be~~ ^{on} ~~ammunition~~ ships.
(This has been done.)

(2) Torpedoes supplied must
be inspected at suitable intervals

✓ other ships. Since this is a great inconvenience, it must be made possible to get oil from ammunition ships or from oil tankers. (KINUGASA (CA))

(2) The torpedoes supplied, once adjusted, go several months without examination and readjustment, and there are many that are ~~defective~~ ^{defective} from having been in storage a long time. If we were to participate in an operation immediately after ~~the~~ ^{the} delivery of these torpedoes, not only would we find them not completely ready for firing, but ~~they~~ ^{we} would ~~be~~ ^{have} some uneasiness regarding their accuracy. (KINUGASA (CA))

and imperfect ones readjusted.

6 (1) Personnel wounded in the ILOILO operation were temporarily put aboard a battleship and taken as far as HASHIRA SHIMA. Thereafter they were transferred to a hospital ship.

(2) Casualties in the 3rd Battle of the SOLOMONS (TH: 12-14 Nov 1942) ^{were} ~~transported to a hospital ship~~ ^{caused there was no hospital ship at TRUK.}

3. There are few opportunities for sailing at a naval base and it is difficult to wait for a hospital ship for a supply of medical materials. Torpedo boats and launches are unsuitable when a number of seriously wounded are to be ~~transported~~ ^{transported}. After both the ILOILO operation and the 3rd battle of the SOLOMONS, cargo lighters were borrowed for transporting casualties.

(1) The number of hospital ships must be increased and the evacuation of the sick and wounded and the supply of medical materials facilitated.

(2) The capacity of hospital ships for supplying medical materials must be increased.

(3) Cargo lighters to be used to transfer patients must be loaded aboard hospital ships.

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At present, conditions are such that with every possible use of the NAMITA (AF) and the IRAND (AF), supply is barely being carried on.

It is feared that in the event of an accident to these, supply lines would be thrown into disorder and the effect on morale and on operations would be great. Two naval stores ^{of the IR-MD type} must be constructed and put into operation immediately ^{in order to supply fresh provisions} (2nd Fleet).

naval
The number of storeships for fresh provisions must be increased.

Operational maneuvers in remote places last three months or more and the rapid supply of large quantities of storage goods to forward areas is impossible. Moreover, storage facilities for provisions at forward supply bases are poor and conditions are such that ^{naval} forces stationed in these areas are ^{only with difficulty} supplied. Also, because other equipment, ammunition, and miscellaneous goods have been loaded indiscriminately on supply ships of the Transportation Department system and the movements of these ships have not been under the direct supervision of the Combined Fleet, the status of transport from JAPA has been such that the ^{of first line} rapid, large-scale supply ^{is} operational forces, ^{which is} coordinated with their varying movements, is impossible.

Supply facilities for storing provisions in forward areas must be augmented and, when necessary, (naval) ^{AKS} ~~storeships~~ ^{for storage} provisions must be attached to the Combined Fleet.

AKS
At least ^{no} ~~no~~ ^{no} transports for storage provisions (including canteen goods and

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battle supplies) must be attached
to the Combined Fleet.
(2nd Fleet)

✓ 9 (1) ^{Fuel} ~~many~~ oil is generally supplied
every eight days but fresh provisions
are sometimes needed for as long as twenty
days. (DesRon 2)

(2) Oiltankers must be equipped
with refrigerators and thus be enabled
to supply fresh provisions ^{at sea} at the same
time that they supply oil. (2nd Fleet)

It would be well to plan to
attach small craft such as ^{DD} ~~dam~~
to be supplied with fresh pro-
visions at the same time and
place that they are supplied with

fuel oil.

AIR TRANSPORT

Number	Battle Lesson (Reason)	Conclusion (Opinion)
0	(1) Since it is believed to be very profitable both in the supply and transfer of urgently needed spare parts, ^{carried} freight transport planes should be detailed to all air depots for their exclusive use. (11th Air Depot, 18th Air Depot)	Further regulating and strengthening is needed in air transportation ^{must be further} regulated and strengthened
1	(2) Fleets or Stores Depots ^{local} in oper- ational areas must be provided transport planes and every effort must be made to provide a rapid supply of highly expend- able light equipment. Naval (YOKOSUKA NAVY Stores Dept)	
	(3) In view of the great amount of medi- cal supplies requiring care in preservation, and urgent goods such as blood vaccine and X-ray film, it is necessary to meet the de- mand by increasing air facilities. (KURE Navy Yard, Sub-Base 3) ^{5th Sub Base} (Unit)	
	(4) Since it is difficult to supply operational centers by surface, ambulance	

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planes (PROCESSED) provisioned
 (temporary design-
 nation) must be used to fly periodically
 urgently needed medical materials (serums,
 surgical dressings, etc.) out and patients
 back. (NAIYUBU Naval Hospital)

MEMORANDUM: THE IMPROVEMENT OF NAVAL STORES FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SUPPLY OPERATIONS

Battle Lansen (Reason)

Conclusion (Opinion)

(セロファン)

Cellophane (the hoses)

hoses must be made tougher.

(1) Hoses from the hoses break during the
operations in the HAWAII Operation and
during the INDIAN OCEAN Operation the
hoses of an oil tanker were damaged and
supply was greatly delayed. (Card 122)

(2) Hoses from cutting and leakage
during towing and refueling are likely to
occur. Also, since the hoses stretch about
10%, the part which bends is likely to be-
come constricted and greatly reduces the
capacity for supplying oil. The number of
times accidents happened to hoses from the
beginning of the war up to the end of 1942
is shown below:

(BatDiv 3)

	YONAGO (BB)	HATUNA (BB)	
times ex-	times	times ex-	times
cuted	damaged	cuted	damaged
Return from from HQ	8	9 (TH: sic)	5
Alongside lost from	17	3	22
			1

(3) If the under surface of the hose

wears, the filter is likely to be

(KENYO HARU, ZUIHO (CVL))

(4) If the wear points of the hose

(L 2 7 7 7)

cells, hose were approved

for use on naval

vessels, on hoses might be made standard

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Number	Battle Lessons (Reason)	Conclusion (Opinion)
1. (cont.)	equipment for BBs, reducing the number of 4.5 meter boxes now in use by half.	
2.	Wheels and the like cannot be lifted manually, and it is necessary, at the time of manufacture, to supply hooks to be used in lifting heavy articles which are shipped as they are. There are many instances in which accessories have been damaged in transit. (106th Air Depot)	Heavy goods should be fitted with metal attachments for convenience in carrying and the weight of the goods should be plainly marked.
3.	Generally, the size and weight of the packages must be limited as much as possible. Mixing articles of varying sizes and weights in a large box simply increases the rate of damage. Furthermore, since packing boxes are stacked out of doors for a fairly long time in combat areas, it is important to make clear the necessity for care in handling and preserving the contents. (106th Air Depot)	To prevent damage, it is essential to pack articles varying in weight and size in the same box. The weight and size of the box must suit the article /packed/. Precautions must be noted clearly on the outside of the box.
4.	Because of the weakness and inferior materials in bomb boxes now in use, there is not only damage to bombs, which damage easily, but the inconvenience in handling is keenly felt. (11th Air Depot, 106th Air Depot)	It is necessary to construct a framework for convenience in handling bomb containers and for putting in and taking out bombs.
5.	1). There are many examples of deterioration and decreased efficiency which occur with expansion of combat areas and because of conditions of temperature and climate which make special articles necessary.	In keeping with the expansion of combat areas, it is necessary to consider the temperature and climate in each area and to make studies concerning improvement

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Number	Battle Lesson (Reason)	Conclusion (Opinion)
0	Various studies in this regard are being conducted. Research has already been carried out concerning heat-proof dry batteries and packing for the prevention of self discharge thereof during transportation or storage. There is also a gradual improvement in barracks equipment. These problems should be studied in peace time so that varied circumstances may be coped with. It is necessary to set up vigorous research agencies. (YOKOSUKA Stores Dept) 2). Humidity is high in ^{Typhoon}terrid zones, and in these areas, many sweets supplied from JAPAN are unworkable when received. It goes without saying that the preservation of these items is difficult. (101st Fuel Depot, TARAKAN Branch) 3). Dry plate photographic papers ^{negative} paper kept in storage in ^{Typhoon}terrid zones for three months becomes mouldy and cannot be used. (108th Air Depot) 4). In RABAU, the humidity ^{humidity} sulphurization is great due to the mountains in the area. As a result, the illuminated dials of measuring instruments corrode and the internal mechanism and coils are broken or damaged. (108th Air Depot)	and selection of military stores appropriate to the area and concerning protection in packing.

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No.	Battle Lesson (Reason)	Conclusion (Opinion)
0	1). Defective parts are frequently found in storage as being in good shape. (YOKOSUKA Stores Dept)	Equipment forwarded from to local areas and equipment transferred from Stores Depts for supply purposes
6	2). Many articles have been sent to an area immediately after being taken from storage. and inspection after arrival has revealed many defects. It is recognized that many cases due to the ^{the} transporting. the ^{the} is in the transporting. (YOKOSUKA Stores Dept)	should be sent only after re-inspection and adjustment.
7	It is not ^{not} advisable to use ships within the department for the delivery of classified documents. In anticipation of difficulty due to ship's movements, it is necessary to pack them in heavy paper or bind them with strips of cloth. Furthermore, in accordance with Military Affairs SECRET Order #650, Section 1, dealing with methods of disposal of classified documents when no longer of use, the cover bearing the name of the document (in drawings, these parts which bear the classification number and place names) must be returned for filing, thus preventing the spread of information and contributing to the ^{the} security. (YOKOSUKA Stores Dept)	When classified material is sent, additional attention and study must be devoted to the packing.
8	Agencies for the distribution of supply of spare parts used in a great many types of cars are being setup by area, such as HISSAN in "A" area and TOYOTA in "B" area, standardized as much as possible. When units are transferred from one area to another, it is necessary to exchange the parts supplied in the ^{the original} area so that a duplication of parts will not result.	In order to simplify articles used spare parts for a great many types of cars, the parts ^{parts} should be standardized as much as possible. (YOKOSUKA Stores Dept)

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Number	Battle Lesson (Reason)	Conclusion (Opinion)
9	When specially established forces depart for forward areas, furniture requires the most space and packing; a great deal of labor, time and freight space is expended in its transportation. It is usually damaged in transit and from the standpoint of supply, it is a burden. (TOKOSUKA Stores Dept)	Stores for land-based units in combat areas should be kept as simple as possible. In furniture, collapsible and knock-down styles should be used.

VIII. THE IMPROVEMENT OF SHIPS' HULLS, MACHINERY, FITTINGS AND EQUIPMENT FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SUPPLY OPERATIONS.

- 1). It is necessary to install equipment for refueling from astern.
(All ships)
It is necessary to reexamine plans for the supply facilities of vessels so that supply capacities may be increased to the utmost.
- 2). In the case of tankers which supply from both sides, if supply cannot be carried out from both sides at the same time, the transfer of fuel cannot be initiated.

Improvements are necessary so that separate supplying can be carried out.

(AKEBONO MARU, DecRon 4)

- 3). There are instances in which extraneous matter becomes mixed with the oil when refueling is being carried out from tankers. Refueling speed is reduced about one-third and inconvenience in loading results. It is necessary to equip tankers with changeable filters.

(IRE(BB 22W))

- 4). In view of the many instances in which the hoses are burst due to faulty operation extreme pressure caused by faulty operation

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No.	Battle Lesson (Reason)	Conclusion (Opinion)																																				
	of the intake valves, it is necessary to install equipment which will prevent great pressure, such as automatic cut-off valves. (TŌNŌ MARU)																																					
	5). Oil intake funnels should be installed on all fuel tanks. (MYŌKO (CA))																																					
	Conditions on the MYŌKO																																					
	<table><tr><th>No. of funnels</th><th>No. of auxiliary lines from each funnel</th><th>No. of tank connection valves from each line</th><th>No. of tanks</th></tr><tr><td>12</td><td>1</td><td>0</td><td>12</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>1</td><td>2</td><td>4</td></tr><tr><td>8</td><td>2</td><td>0</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>2</td><td>4</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>6</td><td>3</td><td>0</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>4</td><td>0</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>5</td><td>0</td><td>20</td></tr></table>	No. of funnels	No. of auxiliary lines from each funnel	No. of tank connection valves from each line	No. of tanks	12	1	0	12	2	1	2	4	8	2	0	16	2	2	4	8	6	3	0	18	2	3	4	10	2	4	0	8	4	5	0	20	
No. of funnels	No. of auxiliary lines from each funnel	No. of tank connection valves from each line	No. of tanks																																			
12	1	0	12																																			
2	1	2	4																																			
8	2	0	16																																			
2	2	4	8																																			
6	3	0	18																																			
2	3	4	10																																			
2	4	0	8																																			
4	5	0	20																																			
	6). The great length of the air outlet pipe on fuel tanks makes necessary the enlargement of the pipe line to facilitate the outlet of air. Unless there is considerable pressure on the intake valve, loading is impossible. (CHŌKAI (CA), MYŌKO (CA))																																					
	7). From the standpoint of rapid supply, it is necessary to reduce the number of fuel tanks and increase the capacity. (CHŌKAI (CA))																																					
	8). It is necessary to place the containers for the fuel intake valve, the intake gauge pipe and the hose in places convenient for loading operations. (CHŌKAI (CA))																																					

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No.	Battle Lesson (Reason)	Conclusion (Opinion)
9)	When the TUBARI (CL) is about half filled with oil, the upper tanks cannot be filled unless the hatch is removed and the hose directly led in. Since capacity fueling from astern is difficult and inconvenient from an operational standpoint, it is necessary to equip each tank with a main intake pipe. Moreover, since funnel fueling of lower tanks requires time, it is necessary to convert to pressure fueling. (TUBARI (CL))	
10)	Often, large amounts of oil collect in the tanker's hoses at the time of refueling and the result is delay in the work of connecting the hose (5 large laundry buckets of oil have been collected in one hose (about 0.3 ton)). (HAMAKAZE (DD))	
11)	By reason of the hindrance to rapid fueling occasioned by the length of time required to drain (1.5 hours), it is necessary to increase from 40 tons to 80 tons the capacity of the seawater drainage ejector in the compensating oil tank. (MAKIBUMO (DD))	
12)	It is necessary to equip tankers with oil heating equipment throughout. In case of low temperatures, the effect on the speed of refueling is great. (BatDiv 3)	

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Battle Lesson (Reason)	Conclusion (Opinion)
13). It is necessary to install equipment so that oil may be supplied at night.	
(KENNY MARU)	
14). It is helpful if the telephone can be used by both parties as a means of communication during refueling operations. For reasons of security, flare signals should not be used during refueling operations at night.	
(KENNY C MARU)	
15). It is necessary to provide aviation gas supply ships with supply hoses (about 50m.)	
When wind and tide are high, it is dangerous to refuel alongside a carrier.	
(Kashio)	
16). AKs must be fitted out with hatches and derricks and the crews must be well instructed in their use.	
Minckley Div 13 (32000-10-1)	
17). Sometimes, two hours are necessary for the launching of large landing barges. There are converted chartered vessels whose hatches are inconveniently placed for loading and unloading.	
(108th Air Depot)	
17). There are examples in which cargo spoilage has run as high as 50% due to improper refrigeration equipment (small refrigerators, weak refrigeration, imperfect packing) aboard storeships.	
(CRUSH 27)	

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Battle Lesson (Reason)	Conclusion (Opinion)
18). Converted AKs are inconvenient for supplying lubricating oil. (MISSEHO MARU) Attention to ship's equipment is essential. (MISSEHO MARU)	
2. It is necessary to equip AKs with 40 ton derricks fore and aft to make possible the loading of lighters, large landing barges and other heavy objects. (YOKOSUKA Regime) Transportation Dept)	It is necessary to have a large number of AKs which are equiped with heavy derricks,
	(End)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #16
(U S NAVY WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
VOLUME 1 No. 22, 8 DECEMBER 1944)
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USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

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
Vol. I No. 22

8 DEC. 1944

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

WEEKLY

INTELLIGENCE



U.S.S. NEVADA AFIRE ON 7 DECEMBER 1941
(see story of *PEARL HARBOR* on page 1)

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PEARL HARBOR: THE PLANNING STAGE

When Jap planes struck clustered U.S. warships and aircraft at PEARL HARBOR on 7 December 1941, the enemy was carrying into effect pin-pointed plans conceived months in advance and long cloaked in secrecy. Until recently, little has been known of the planning stage prior to the sneak raid on HAWAII.

The first concrete intimations of early enemy intentions are revealed in the interrogation of a Japanese Chief Yeoman who worked closely with top-ranking Jap Navy personnel during critical months in mid-1941. The prisoner, who was captured on SAIPAN, had access to highly confidential documents as well as behind-the-scenes rumors while plans for PEARL HARBOR were being perfected.

The prisoner appears both exceptionally intelligent and cooperative. Testimony capable of confirmation from other sources checked closely. Tactical information (as contained in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, Nos. 2 and 3) proved reliable.

Most remarkable of the POW's assets is his memory of details, as indicated in his reconstruction of the historic Combined Fleet Secret OpOrder #1, of 1 November 1941. This document, reproduced entirely by memory, is believed to be fairly accurately transcribed, and will be printed in full later in this article.

As a yeoman attached to the Staff of CinC Combined Fleet (Admiral YAMAMOTO), the prisoner became familiar with Jap war games. Staffs of the various Japanese Fleets worked these out on a large game board. Games were held frequently, sometimes as often as twice a month.

Prior to late August (1941), war games were held at such anchorages as SUKUMO, SAEKI, KAGOSHIMA, and KANOYA. Close attention was devoted to current experimental data, which was incorporated in tactics employed. Although the prisoner insists that enemy countries were not specifically designated during these games, the identity of possible Jap foes could scarcely have been obscure.

During this period, the prisoner added, there was a constant interchange of personnel between CinC Combined Fleet and the Naval General Staff. Men on these staffs were reportedly "definitely much keener" than members of other Fleet staffs.

Final planning stages were presaged late in August, when CinC Combined Fleet ordered all Fleet Commanders and their key Staff members to TOKYO for further war games. Offices at the Naval General Staff at JAPAN's capital were found inadequate, and the games were thereafter held in the Naval War College. The POW claimed that security measures at the War College were woefully inadequate. Classes at the College continued as usual; "any man with a half-official air could easily have walked in".

On 2 September the final all-important "games" got underway, with an introductory speech to all officers taking part. Rooms were assigned to the "H" Team, the "A" Team, and the "E" Team (Japan, America, and England) and to the umpires. The teams, composed of virtually every top-notch Jap Naval officer, were made up

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708 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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as follows:

UMPIRES

NAVAL GENERAL STAFF

NAGANO, Osami
FUKUTOME, Shigeru

UOZUMI, Jisaku
YAMAMOTO, Chikao
MAYUZUMI, Harue
TAMURA, Saburo
SANAGI, Tsuyoshi
UOZUMI, Yoriichi

RANK
Admiral
Rear Admiral

Captain
Captain
Commander
Commander
Commander
Commander

OFFICIAL DUTIES

Head of First Section (War Planes
and Operations).
Member First Section.
Head of Sub-Section, First Sect.
Member " " " " "
" " " " "
" " " " "

NAVY MINISTRY

TAKATA, Toshitane
SHIKI, Tsuneco
TOIBATA, Kurie
FUJII, Shigeru

Captain
Commander
Commander
Commander

Member of Military Affairs Bureau.
" " " " "
" " Office of Military Supply
Private Secretary to Navy
Minister (Admiral SHIMADA,
Shigetaro).

N-TEAM

COMBINED FLEET

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku
ITO, Seiichi
KUROJIMA, Kameto
GOTO, Shigeru
ISOBE, Taro
SUGI, Tama
SASAKI, Akira
WADA, Yushiro
NAGATA, Shigeru
WATANABE, Yasuji
ARIMA, Takayasu
SEIMI, Ichiyoshi
OTA, Kanai

Admiral
Rear Admiral
Captain
Commander
Commander
Commander
Commander
Commander
Commander
Commander
Commander
Commander
Commander

CinC Combined Fleet.
Chief of Staff.
Deputy Chief of Staff.
Staff Adjutant.
Staff Engineering Officer.
Staff Gunnery Officer.
Staff Air Officer.
Staff Communication Officer.
Staff Navigation Officer.
Staff Operations and Plans Officer
Staff Torpedo Officer.
Staff Supply Officer.
Meteorologist attached to Staff.

1st COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (RADIO INTELLIGENCE)

KAKIMOTO, Gonichiro
ARISAWA, Naosada

Rear Admiral
Commander

Commander.
Deputy Chief of Staff.

E-TEAM

SECOND FLEET

KONDO, Nobutake

Admiral

Commander.

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YAMAGIZAWA, Euranosuke OISHI, Tamotsu	Captain Commander	Deputy Chief of Staff. Staff Navigation Officer.
--	----------------------	---

FOURTH FLEET

INOUE, Semi	Vice Admiral	Commander.
-------------	--------------	------------

FIFTH FLEET

HOSOGAYA, Boshiro	Vice Admiral	Commander.
-------------------	--------------	------------

ELEVENTH AIR FLEET

TSUKAHARA, Nishiso	Vice Admiral	Commander.
KUSAKA, Jinichi	Rear Admiral	Chief of Staff.

A-TEAM

THIRD FLEET (Amphibious Forces for Southern invasions)

TAKANASHI, Ibo	Vice Admiral	Commander.
ISHIHARA, Hajime	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff.

SIXTH FLEET

SHIMIZU, Mitsumi	Vice Admiral	Commander.
KANOAKA, Tomojiro	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff.

FIRST AIR FLEET (Carrier Fleet)

NAGUMO, Chuichi	Vice Admiral	Commander.
KUSAKA, Ryunosuke	Rear Admiral	Chief of Staff.
GENDA, Minoru	Commander	Deputy Chief of Staff.

On 3 September, officers involved studied classified material. POW was assigned to "N" Team (CinC Combined Fleet). That afternoon, Commander WATANABE - Admiral YAMAMOTO's hard-working, fact-finding Plans and Operations Officer - handed the POW an outline of conditions under which the games were to be held, and requested fifty copies. These terms, which set forth a working basis for the games, contained the heart of the forthcoming 1 November OpOrder #1. Extensive preliminary planning was indicated. The prisoner believed that these plans must have been under development for several months. This was the first time that the POW realized that something of unusual significance was in the air.

On 5 September, the POW was attached directly to Commander SASAKI, CinC Combined Fleet's Staff Air Officer. When he entered the smoke-filled room at about 1000, he found PEARL HARBOR plans under discussion. The Japs apparently expected to catch all major U.S. Fleet units in the Pacific in PEARL HARBOR as well as units believed recently transferred from the Atlantic. The prisoner was surprised to overhear that "N" Team expected to lose one-third of the units participating in the attack on HAWAII; one AKAGI Class CV and one SORYU Class CV were estimated as

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sunk.

On 6 and 7 September, the conference of "W" Team debated the best means of assaulting PEARL HARBOR. (The POW, who was adept at the abacus - calculating board - was often used during these sessions to estimate fuel used by Fleet units at varying speeds). It was during this stage of planning that Captain KUROJIMA (Deputy Chief of Staff) and Rear Admiral ITO (Chief of Staff) differed as to the practicability of conducting an amphibious assault on HAWAII. The cool and precise ITO was (surprisingly) in favor of an early landing, and YAMAMOTO was inclined to agree, but the intuitive, temperamental KUROJIMA won the discussion by pointing out insuperable logistics problems. The POW believes that ITO's plan was a last-minute, improvised idea, and that - when KUROJIMA's argument succeeded - the basic plan continued as originally intended.

These early sessions, the POW said, seemed confined primarily to two general problems: first, the details for a successful surprise raid on PEARL HARBOR; and second, a carefully worked-out schedule for occupying MALAYA, BURMA, D.E.I., the PHILIPPINES, the SOLOMONS, and Central Pacific Islands - including (ultimately) HAWAII. Neither AUSTRALIA nor NEW ZEALAND was apparently considered as immediate military objectives; the Japs intended simply to cut them off from outside help. The POW heard INDIA mentioned only once, when some senior officer remarked "that's where friction with GERMANY will begin".

The conferences (and "games") were ended about 13 September. The prisoner helped carry the notes to KURE, and thence by launch to the NAGATO, YAMAMOTO's Flagship, which was anchored at HASHIRAJIMA. About half of the Staff were already on board.

On 15 September, all the Staff with four yeomen (not including POW) journeyed to the IWAKUNI Air Group to confer with the Army. The POW remembers TERAUCHI mentioned, but cannot recall other names. He insists, however, that TOJO - then still War Minister - was not present. It was widely rumored (but never confirmed by other evidence) that the Army conferees at this meeting had not previously learned of plans to attack PEARL HARBOR.

The NAGATO remained at HASHIRAJIMA for about six more days. At the end of September, the main body of the Jap Fleet moved to SAEKI. There were four revisions of Combined Fleet OpOrder #1 while the Flagship was at SAEKI, though no major changes were made.

On 1 November, the final printing of the order was started, requiring almost three days to complete. Two copies were sent to the Army. Staff officers of other Fleet units at SAEKI called for copies in person. In all, 300 copies were distributed. OpOrders #2 and #3, designating Y-Day and X-Day, were issued on 5 and 10 November, respectively.

(Comment: The enemy naturally uses East Longitude Time in his OpOrder - i.e., the date of 8 December for the PEARL HARBOR attack is correct E.L.T.)

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The prisoner once knew the OpOrder intimately. Over a period of weeks, he has labored to reproduce on paper as much of the Order as he could remember. This version is obviously incomplete and not to be compared with the original document, but in main outline is believed to be substantially as printed. Notes in parentheses were added by the editor.

Flagship NAGATO, SAEKI WAN
1 November 1941

COMBINED FLEET SECRET OPORD #1

The Japanese Empire will declare war on the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS.

War will be declared on X-Day.

This order will become effective on Y-Day.

GENERAL SITUATION

(a) Policy toward the UNITED STATES.

In spite of the fact that the Empire has always maintained a friendly attitude toward the UNITED STATES, the UNITED STATES has interfered in all the measures which we have taken in self protection for the preservation of our interests in East ASIA. Recently, she has blocked our speedy settlement of the CHINA Incident by aiding the government of CHIANG Kai-shek and has even resorted to the final outrage of breaking off economic relations. While senselessly prolonging Japanese-American negotiations, she has continued to strengthen her military preparations. She offers a threat to us in the form of a concentration of her Fleet in the PACIFIC OCEAN, thus attempting to exert on us both economic and military pressure.

(b) Policy toward GREAT BRITAIN.

BRITAIN is siding the government of CHIANG Kai-shek and, acting in concert with her Allies and the UNITED STATES, in interfering with our program of construction in East ASIA. Recently she has been steadily building up the defenses of her bases in East ASIA in an attempt to threaten us.

(c) Policy toward the NETHERLANDS INDIES.

Although economic negotiations of a peaceful nature have been underway with us for a number of months, the NETHERLANDS INDIES has been led by BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES to reject flatly the continuance of mutually beneficial economic relations. Recently she has threatened the fortunes of Japanese which have been built up as a result of persevering work through long years.

(d) The ports and the vast fertile regions of the coast of CHINA have been occupied by us and most of her great cities captured. CHINA, however,

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supported by BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, has not yet awakened from the deluding dream of "Fight the War and Save the Country" and is attempting total resistance to JAPAN in the form of a "scorched earth" policy for all CHINA.

While organized resistance is gradually becoming weaker, the prevalence of guerilla warfare has obliged us to commit large numbers of troops to permanent garrison duty there. If we are to secure decisive victory, BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, the powers behind CHINA, must be destroyed.

(e) Policy toward the SOVIET UNION.

The strength of Soviet forces on the Soviet-Manchukuan border is formidable.

The USSR is maintaining a vigilant alert, awaiting developments. However, if the Empire does not attack the SOVIET UNION, it is believed that the SOVIET UNION will not commence hostilities.

OUR SITUATION

The Fourth Fleet has largely completed preparation in the Mandated Islands, as has the Eleventh Air Fleet (Naval shore-based air) at essential bases in CHINA, FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND. The state of repair of our ships and planes is generally excellent and the efficiency of their personnel has markedly improved.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

To drive BRITAIN and AMERICA from Greater East ASIA, and to hasten the settlement of the CHINA Incident. In addition, it is expected that when BRITAIN and AMERICA have been driven from the NETHERLANDS INDIES and the PHILIPPINES, an independent self-supporting economic entity may be firmly established. The vast and far-reaching fundamental principle, the spiritual guide of our nation, (the "Eight Corners of the World Under One Roof - HAKKO ICHIU"), may be demonstrated to the world. To this end we will use all the military strength necessary.

STRATEGY

The strategy to be adopted against BRITAIN, the UNITED STATES and the NETHERLANDS will be as directed in the Annexed Volume. X-Day and Y-Day will be announced later.

If before Y-Day the enemy is believed to have been able to ascertain our plans, the execution of X-Day will be made the subject of a special order.

If before X-Day we should be attacked by the enemy, his attack will be crushed with all available strength. All commanding officers will act in conformance with "Strategy to be Adopted in the Case of an Enemy Attack".

In the case of the SOVIET UNION, every effort will be made to avoid provoking hostilities. At the same time, every effort will be made to insure the secrecy

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of our plans. If the enemy should ascertain our plans, military operations will immediately be begun in accordance with "Measures to be Taken in the Case of an Attack by the SOVIET UNION".

Circulation of this order is limited to Fleet and Force Commanders. These Commanders will take every possible measure to prevent leakage of these plans prior to their being carried out.

Precaution: Disposal of this order.

This order must be burned when no longer of use. If there is any danger of its falling into enemy hands as the result of a ship sinking or some other untoward occurrence, the responsible Commander shall personally make immediate disposal of it.

Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #1

ANNEXED VOLUME

1. Joint Army-Navy operations will be carried out in accordance with the "Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement".
2. A Striking Force (Carrier Task Force), having the 1st Air Fleet (Carriers and Escorts) as its main element, will depart its naval bases or operating areas about X-16 Day, and will set course, by way of TANAKA BAY (HITOKAPPU BAY, ETROPFU ISLAND, KURILES) for PEARL HARBOR, the base of the American PACIFIC Fleet, where it will deliver a surprise attack.

X-Day is expected to be during the early or middle part of December.

3. Targets for attack are airfields; aircraft carriers; battleships, cruisers and other warships; merchant shipping; port facilities; and land installations, in that order.
4. From the time set by the Force Commander for the Striking Force to leave port in JAPAN, strict radio silence will be observed. Communications will be via ordinary broadcast system. The code book to be used will be "(not certain)". The following communications abbreviations will be in effect:

"Many warships in PEARL HARBOR". - "The fate of the Empire".

"No warships in PEARL HARBOR". - "The cherry-blossoms are in all their glory".

"The weather is clear and visibility good in the region. Suitable for an attack". - "Climb MT FUJI".

"The time to commence the attack is 0520". - "The depth of the moat of HONNOJI Temple is 0520".

"All forces attack". - "Climb MT NIITAKA!".

etc.
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5. The course and the disposition of the attacking units will be determined by the Striking Force commander.

The Commander of the Striking Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he determines on the course and disposition of the attacking units. Care must be taken to avoid ordinary merchant shipping routes and to keep the plans from disclosure under any circumstances whatever.

6. Procedure to be followed in case of discovery before the attack either by a ship of the nation against which war is to be declared, or by a ship of a neutral nation (including the SOVIET UNION).
 - (a) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a nation against which war is to be declared, make immediate preparation to attack and sink it.
 - (b) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a neutral nation, the ship should immediately be detained until it can do us no actual harm; strict surveillance should be kept of its radio transmission. In case it should make any transmissions which might prove harmful to us or give us reason to fear that our plans might be revealed, the ship will be seized by a destroyer which will make immediate attack preparations.
 - (c) In case of discovery by a foreign ship more than 600 miles from the objective, the ship will be detained and radio transmission forbidden. However, if it seems highly probable that our general intentions have been guessed, an attack should be made immediately, if between X-5 Day and X-Day. If before X-5 Day, the Striking Force commander will decide the disposition of the ship, depending on the circumstances. In the case of detention of an enemy ship, "B" method will be followed.
7. The Commander of the Surprise Attack Force (Submarine Force), having the 6th Fleet (Submarine Fleet) as its main element, will have most of the submarines leave the western part of the INLAND SEA on X-20 Day to attack PEARL HARBOR. Its entire strength will be disposed so as to command the harbor mouth. It will attack any enemy warship which may have escaped from the harbor. It will also carry out reconnaissance before the attack, and if the opportunity presents itself, will carry out surprise attacks on enemy warships with midget submarines. The time for such attacks will be after the flights of planes have attacked OAHU. Every possible means for recovery of midget submarines should be considered.
8. Joint Army-Navy operations should be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Central Headquarters Agreement. The disposition of forces will be determined by the Commander of the Advance Force (principally Second Fleet cruisers and destroyers). The Commander of the Advance Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he decides on the course and disposition of the attacking units.

The point of departure for the ships of the MALAY and FRENCH INDO-CHINA Forces will be BAKO and the point of departure for the PHILIPPINES Occupa-

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tion Force will probably be PALAU.

9. The capture of English and American troops and ships in CHINA will be arranged by the Commander-in-Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet. The occupation of HONG KONG will conform to the provisions of the Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement and is the responsibility of the Commander, 2nd CHINA Expeditionary Fleet.

10. English and American merchant ships which are in ports under Japanese sovereignty at the time of the outbreak of the war or which are in ports which may be taken are to be captured if possible.

SOVIET shipping is to be kept under surveillance after undergoing a rigid inspection.

It should be so planned that none of our shipping will be in foreign ports when the war breaks out.

11. Beginning on Y-Day the Commander of the 1st Combined Communication Unit will send false messages to give the impression that the main strength of the fleet is in the western part of the INLAND SEA.

After Y-Day has been determined, the NYK passenger vessel TATSUTA MARU, which is scheduled to proceed to the west coast of AMERICA, will sail; arrangements will be made to have her return while en route. (This was done, and Allied passengers were interned; the same procedure would have been followed with any trans-Pacific liner scheduled to sail in this period).

When Y-Day has been determined, the Commandant of the YOKOSUKA Naval District will allow as many men of his command as possible to go ashore so that the number of men on liberty in TOKYO and YOKOHAMA will give a false impression. (Another POW confirms this).

12. The Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Fleet (Mandates Fleet) will expedite the attack and occupation of British, American and Dutch bases in the North and South PACIFIC, acting in close cooperation with forces of the 11th Air Fleet in the South PACIFIC. Enemy air power within our sphere of operations will be checked and communication between AUSTRALIA and the mainland of the UNITED STATES will finally be cut.

It is expected that in this manner AUSTRALIA will be isolated and dominated completely. The natural resources of all kinds which the east continent of AUSTRALIA boasts will then fall to us.

(The dates for execution of assault and occupation of various British, U.S., Netherlands bases were then listed in this paragraph - a few of which follow:)

- | | |
|----------|-----------------|
| (1) GUAM | about X plus 2. |
| (2) WAKE | about X plus 7. |

CONTINUED

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- (3) (The dates for the invasions of RABAU, and the islands from the SOLOMONS to the FIJIS, SAMOA, and SANTA CRUZ groups were all entered.)

13. The date for the seizure of MIDWAY is set as late Spring of 1942. The date for the occupation of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS is scheduled for October 1942.

Herewith are two of the above referenced documents

THE ARMY-NAVY CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.

The object of Imperial Headquarters, Army Department and Imperial Headquarters, Navy Department in setting forth clearly the division of duties and command in joint operations was to promote a maximum display of efficiency. (According to POW, it was issued at the end of October 1941. A resume of the contents follows:)

1. The highest ranking Army officer for SUMATRA, BORNEO, the MALAY Peninsula, CELEBES, and the PHILIPPINES (including FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND) will be Field Marshal TERAUCHI, Hiseichi. His command will be called the Southern Army and its headquarters will be in SAIGON.
2. Plans for escorting large Army convoys and the place, time and date for landings.
3. Agreements on Aerial Warfare Agreements on the places to be attacked by both Army and Navy planes and on the places, dates and times of attacks by Army or Navy planes acting independently. Agreements on the airfields to be used, such as "XX Airfield will be used primarily by the Army and secondarily by the Navy."
4. Supply Plans.

Plans for the supply of Army landing forces to be effected by Army shipping and for the Navy's support of same.
5. Communications Plans.
6. Agreement on occupied territories, cities, and resources such as, "The BANDJERMASIN Oil Refinery will be controlled by the Navy".

MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF A SOVIET ATTACK.

(POW does not remember the date exactly, but it was the end of October - and stated in effect:)

"It is believed likely that we shall not be attacked by the SOVIET UNION unless we attack first, but in case JAPAN is attacked first, the 5th Fleet (Northern Force) will counterattack with all its strength and maintain local supremacy."

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku
Commanding, Combined Fleet

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Flagship AKAGI, SANKI WAN
10 November 1941

STRIKING FORCE OPORD #1

1. All ships will complete battle preparations by 20 November.
2. The fleet will rendezvous at TANKAN WAN. (HITOKAPPU BAY, KUROFU Is. KURILES).
3. Inasmuch as the plans for the coming operation must be kept absolutely secret, strict security will be maintained in regard to them, up to the time they are explained to the crew after port of departure in JAPAN has been cleared.
4. Break-down of attack plane units.

The AKAGI 1st Attack Plane Unit
Unit Commander: Lt. Comdr XX
1st Carrier Attack Unit
Etc. (details not recalled by POW).
5. Fleet cruising formation
(Including retiring formations)
6. All transmission of messages is strictly forbidden.

Transmission and reception will both use the TOKYO #1 broadcast communications system.

NAOMURO Chuichi
Commanding
Striking Force

Verbal explanation by the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet of ambiguities in Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #1.

(Printed version of an explanation of details not covered in the order delivered to the High Commanders in an informal talk.)

1. That the coming declaration of war against ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES will usher in a great war of survival with the two leading naval powers of the world.

That this war is really one in which our existence is in question, one in which we have no choice but to strike with our military power.

2. That our Navy, in engaging a worthy enemy, is about to realize an ambition which dates back to the foundation of the Imperial Navy many years ago.

CONTINUED

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718 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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3. That the alliance with GERMANY was not desired by the Navy, but was a project favored by the Army which thought it would hold the SOVIET UNION in check. (!)
4. That the campaigns in the NETHERLAND INDIES and in the PHILIPPINES will be preceded by the securing of advanced bases in THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA. It is believed that these operations will come off in extremely smooth order.

The Navy will be able to secure sources of oil supply swiftly by means of these campaigns.

5. In connection with the attack on PEARL HARBOR, reports indicate that a gigantic fleet, which includes the ATLANTIC Fleet, has massed in PEARL HARBOR.

This Fleet will be utterly crushed with one blow at the very beginning of hostilities. It is planned to shift the balance of power and thereby confuse the enemy at the outset and deprive him of his fighting spirit.

Our objective, however, lies more than three thousand miles away. In attacking this large fleet concentration it is to be expected that countless difficulties will be encountered in preserving the absolute security of the plans. If these plans should fail at any stage, our Navy will suffer the wretched fate of never being able to rise again. The success of our surprise attack on PEARL HARBOR will prove to be the "WATERLOO" of the war to follow. For this reason the Imperial Navy is massing the cream of its strength in ships and planes to assure success.

All of the planes of CarDiv 1, CarDiv 2, and CarDiv 5 will be concentrated in the attack on OAHU. If there are any ships which escape, almost the entire submarine strength of the 6th Fleet will be in command of the harbor mouth and will concentrate torpedo attacks on them. In addition to these, the destroyer strength of (DesRon 1) will be deployed in a screen (mainly for night attacks) and the fast battleships of BatDiv 3 deployed in a fourth echelon. If the main force of the enemy fleet should escape from PEARL HARBOR and make for the open sea, it will be waylaid by the Main Body of our fleet.

6. The midget submarine unit has been studying and training at the KURE Navy Yard with the CHIYODA for a year and a half, but it is still too much to hope that it has reached a stage of perfection. In any case, the crew members are supremely confident. The 6th Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks within the harbor.
7. It is clear that even if AMERICA's enormous heavy industry productive power is immediately converted to the manufacture of ships, planes and other war materials, it will take at least several months

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for her manpower to be mobilised against us. If we insure our strategic supremacy at the very outset of the conflict by attacking and seizing all key points at one blow while AMERICA is still unprepared, we can swing the scales of later operations in our favor.

8. Heaven will bear witness to the righteousness of our struggle. It is hoped that every man will exert his full efforts toward the realization of the objectives of this holy war by determinedly carrying out our original purpose, in the full realization of the unparalleled opportunity which this war offers.

Communications Plans.

(POW does not know about these; no details.)

Supply Plans. (outline)

The Naval bases of YOKOSUKA, KURE and SASEBO will be rear supply bases. BAKO, PALAU, TRUK and OMINATO will be forward supply bases. In addition to these, supply ships will be attached to each fleet.

5 November

Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #2

Y-Day will be 23 November.

10 November

Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #3

X-Day will be 8 December.

During the actual attack on PEARL HARBOR, the prisoner remained aboard the NAGATO in the Empire with the Flag of CinC Combined Fleet. Details of the Carrier Task Force which conducted the raid are known from other prisoners and from documents. See, for example, the chart of 1st Air Fleet movements as reproduced elsewhere in this issue.

The TF sortied from ETOHOFU TO, in the KURILES, on or about 27 November (ELT), and headed eastward under a heavy front before turning south to the attack. The composition of the Force, which was commanded by the late Vice Admiral NAGUMO (CinC 1st Air Fleet) is fairly well established. The enemy had six carriers: KAGA, AKAGI (CarDiv 1) SORYU, HIRYU (CarDiv 2) SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (CarDiv 5 less HOSHIO); two BBs: MIYEL, KIRISHIMA (BatDiv 3, less KONGO and HARUNA); three cruisers: TONE, CHIKUMA (CruDiv 8), plus ABUKUMA; elements of DesRon 1; and about twenty subs.

CONTINUED

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(Comment: It is of interest to note that all six carriers and both battleships participating are now identified as sunk, plus the CA CHIKUMA; the majority of other units involved are also believed sunk or severely damaged, although definite identification is not yet possible).

One of the Japs' chief headaches during the sortie was the fueling problem. One well informed prisoner who was a CPO on fueling detail described emergency measures required to keep the speedy SORYU and HIRYU in fuel. These two ships were fueled daily, and drums carried as supercargo were unloaded by bucket-brigade when the fast dash to the plane-launching point was begun. At that, the SORYU arrived back at KURE with only 95 tons of oil in her tanks. AOs coming alongside the TF to fuel units had considerable trouble, and visibility was so bad that "towing spars" for position keeping were almost constantly in use.

At the time of the raid, considerable information was derived from documents taken from crashed planes and a beached midget sub.

Reproduced on the following page is a proposed track chart of a midget sub which had planned to transit PEARL HARBOR but apparently failed. This sub beached itself the following day on the opposite side of OAHU, and one of the two crew members was taken prisoner. Little was learned from the POW, but it is believed that the sub was damaged on a reef near the entrance of PEARL HARBOR, putting sound gear out of commission and forcing retirement. Subsequent examination of this sub's torpedo tubes indicated that an attempt had been made to fire torpedoes, but launching gear fouled.

The original chart, too frayed for reproduction, was evidently a U.S. Navy H.O. chart, with detailed navigational data carefully translated into Japanese. Rough notes were scribbled on the chart, in some cases too illegible to translate. On the reverse side were further notes on navigation, etc. The sub also carried a rough profile of the PEARL HARBOR skyline. The mission of the sub was both attack and reconnaissance. The KANA code as shown on the chart is similar to codes recovered from aircraft.

At least three Jap midget subs were lost by our counter-actions at this time. One sub actually entered the harbor; it suffered a direct five-inch shell hit, and was thereafter rammed and depth-charged beyond recognition. The Japs admitted the loss of five of these undersize subs.




Midget sub beached on OAHU.

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敵艦沈没監視用無線 A



敵艦沈没監視用無線 B



Photostat of a document from a crashed Jap plane after the PEARL HARBOR raid. Above, code designations are applied to ship anchorages near FORD ISLAND. Below, sectors from LAHAINA (on MAUI, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS) are indicated in code. Codes were presumably to be used for either voice or radio transmission.

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广播时间表			
台名	周波数	发射时刻	功率
KGMB	590	1/10 以后连续放送	
KGU	760	1/10 以后连续放送	5

Novel aid for Jap PEARL HARBOR raiders. Captured fragment above gives name, frequency, time of transmission and signal strength of two chief HONOLULU radio stations.





Chart of torpedo runs, recovered from crashed Jap plane. Broken lines indicate aircraft from CV KAGA. Solid lines denote planes from other carriers.

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1975年、原爆資料一巻のたぐい

Captured Japanese photograph of USS ARIZONA under attack on 7 December 1941. A VAL has just scored a near miss.

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Above photograph is captioned in Japanese "the pitiful American Capital Fleet".

CONTINUED

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Photographs of the PEARL HARBOR raid were widely distributed among Jap personnel for morale purposes. Captured souvenir albums of Jap sailors often contain a set of these photos along with several equally dramatic shots of the PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE sinking off SINGAPORE. Above photograph shows WHEELER FIELD during raid.

MARINE

01 28 - D

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
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SUBMARINE SITUATION

NOV. 28 - DEC. 4

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- ▲ - SIGHTING
 ⊙ - SOUND CONTACT
 ⊗ - R D/F FIX



One enemy submarine was definitely sunk near the Empire on the 29th.

Absence of sighting and contact reports between HAWAII and the Mainland indicate the probable return of that sub to the Empire.

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JAP SHIPS SUNK IN MANILA HARBOR, THROUGH 14 NOVEMBER 1944


It is estimated that more than 160,000 gross tons of Japanese merchant shipping have been sunk in MANILA Harbor as a result of air attacks by the Third Fleet. This estimated tonnage refers only to MANILA Harbor proper and does not include tonnage sunk in adjacent areas.

The 31 merchant ships noted to have been sunk consisted of two tankers, four of the new 6500 gross ton engine-aft cargo ships (see "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 21), and 25 freighters or freighter-transports ranging from 2000 to 9000 gross tons. Ships of less than 1800 gross tons were not considered in the above estimate.

In addition to the above merchant ships, two warships were sunk in MANILA Harbor and have been identified as a light cruiser of the KUMA Class and a destroyer of either the TAKANAMI or new KIYOSHIMA Classes.

The sketch on the opposite page shows the approximate locations of the sunken ships, the names if identified, the tonnage and type. The symbol used to mark the location of each sunken ship also indicates the date of the photograph in which the ship was first observed to have been sunk.


Of particular interest in MANILA Harbor is a ship of the HOEISAN Maru Class, indicated by an arrow. The ship has a minimum of 10 gun positions and extra deck houses. The excessive AA plus the fact that the ship has remained in the same position throughout all photographic coverages suggest that it may be a flak ship.




MANILA Harbor photographed on 5 November by TICONDERAGA aircraft. Note concentration of destroyers.

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

MANILA STRIKE RESULTS




Results of Third Fleet aircraft strike on MANILA Harbor 11-14 November 1944. Ship in foreground is a new type 6500 ton freighter, Sagar Baker (a), described in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 21.




Two freighters on the bottom near the breakwater give testimony to the effectiveness of the strike.



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Burning ships and
shore installations at
MANILA Harbor.



Pier Seven and other in-
stallations showing damage from
Third Fleet bombs, 11-14 Nov-
ember 1944.




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PROBABLE CONVERSION OF JAP HOSPITAL SHIP


Photographed below in MANILA on 21 September is a ship apparently identical to the BAIKAL MARU, an AH. Still officially listed as a hospital ship, this vessel has no known sister ship. It was not painted with the prescribed markings for hospital ships and has apparently been reconverted to a merchantman to ease the current severe Jap shipping shortage. Two gun platforms are noted forward and one aft.

Although positive identification of this vessel as the BAIKAL MARU must await further confirmation, it is logical to expect the enemy to reconvert his AHs for more practical if less humane purposes. More than 20 sizeable Japanese vessels are still officially on the books as hospital ships - a disproportionate allotment in view of his general shipping situation.



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**INCREASED AA ARMAMENT ON
JAP FREIGHTER-TRANSPORT**

Photographed by planes of the 13th Bomber Command on 11 November in ORmoc Bay, the Japanese freighter-transport seen above is more heavily armed with AA than any other ship of this type previously observed.

The unusually large AA platform in the bow mounts four three-inch AA guns. In addition, there is one 25-mm in the gun tub forward, and six additional light AA - probably single-mount 25-mm - mounted three on each end of the bridge. This armament is in sharp contrast to the standard one or two AA guns usually observed on such vessels.

The enemy may be expected to bolster his AA defense aboard all types of merchantmen when armament is available, in a further move to counter increasingly heavy Allied shipping strikes.

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MANILA, PHILIP



This striking photograph of MANILA Harbor and environs was taken by planes from the USS HANCOCK on 25 November. Most of the ships seen, including a KUMA Class light cruiser, are resting on the bottom.

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PINE ISLANDS

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The white governmental buildings are seen in the right foreground. The largest pier (number Seven) has a sunken freighter alongside. The PASIG River winds through the city and enters the sea just outside the breakwater.

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KUMA-NATORI CLASS CL

Effectiveness of Allied aircraft against Jap warships has prompted a continuous increase in AA armament. Recent photographs of KUMA-NATORI Class light cruisers offer added documentation of this trend.

On the facing page are reproduced revised measured drawings. The refitted cruisers are now believed armed as follows:

- Two 5-inch AA in twin shielded mounts (these replace the No. 7 5.5-inch guns of the original armament).
- Five 5.5-inch guns of the original armament.
- Four 25-mm single mount guns.
- Ten 25-mm in dual mounts.
- Three 25-mm in a triple mount.
- Two 13-mm in a dual mount.

Available photographs do not offer a clear view of the wall aft of the bridge, and it is not possible to determine whether the two twin torpedo tubes mounted there have been removed to make room for additional AA. Although possible, this change is believed unlikely.

The catapult and the crane on the mainmast have been removed. A raised AA platform now occupying the former catapult base is believed to contain a triple-mount AA gun.

The old 5.5-inch No. 5 gun has been removed, and twin 25-mm added on each side of its former location.


A launch and whaleboat are now carried athwartship of the No. 1 and 2 stacks.

LONG DELAY BOMB FUSE

A captured document, (CINCPAC-CINCPMA Item No. 8309) disclosed that the Japanese have developed a new long delay bomb fuse. It is designated as Experimental Type 1 Special Nose Fuse, and is to be used in the Model 3 No. 6 Mark 23 bomb, Model 1. This bomb is the Japanese 132-lb. delay-type generally used against airfields.

Nothing is known of the time delay incorporated in this new fuse, but the only other Japanese time delay fuse known has three settings, 5, 36 or 72 hours. In construction this new fuse is an improvement over the old one.

ERRATUM: In "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 17, it was erroneously stated both in the text and on the charts of the Second Battle of the PHILIPPINES Sea that Third Fleet BBs sank a crippled cruiser on the afternoon of 25 October. Actually, U.S. light cruisers sank this Jap warship.



KUMA - NATORI CL
ESTIMATE OF REVISED ARMAMENT

BASED ON PHOTOGRAPHS OF 26 OCTOBER 1944, SULO SEA.
 TAKEN BY 23rd B 3rd BOMBING SQUADRONS OF 5th BOMBARDMENT GROUP

CINCPAC - CINCPAC
 RESTRICTED

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FLOATING MINES IN THE JAPAN SEA

Data on the chart on the opposite page was taken from a recently recovered enemy document (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,410). Although dated well over a year ago, the information plotted offers a revealing glimpse of the extensive Japanese mining activity in the strategic waters of the JAPAN Sea. Floating mines reported to Jap hydrographers along the southwest coast of HONSHU were very possibly brought north by ocean currents from the heavily-mined CHOSEN Strait. The cluster of mines reported south of VLADIVOSTOK reflects the use of mines by RUSSIA to protect her greatest Pacific port area. The total number of mines reported during the brief two-month period indicates one of the strongest threats to U.S. subs operating in these Jap-controlled waters.



NEW JAP RIFLE GRENADE

A new type of Japanese high explosive rifle grenade, embodying several features not previously encountered, was captured during a recent operation. This grenade is designed to be fired by a wooden bullet from the Type 38 and Type 99 rifles. Since these rifles are standard combat issue, it is believed this grenade was produced for universal use.


Carrying a main charge of three ounces of cast TNT and an instantaneous fuse, this grenade has four fins of light metal attached to the stabilizer to guide it in flight.

Upon impact, an inertia block is forced into the fuse body, breaking a brass shear wire and driving the steel striker into the percussion cap. The cap ignites a black powder relay which sets off a cyclonite primer. Then, in succession, the tetryl booster and the main TNT charge are ignited.


The heavy construction of the inertia weight shear pin indicates that contact with a soft object might not be sufficient to fire the fuse. However, a notation attached to the captured grenade warns against dropping or striking the nose of the projectile. A safety fork, which must be removed before firing, supposedly prevents accidental detonation.

A complete round of this new grenade has been examined by Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit #4, but its effectiveness has not been determined. The explosive charge was reported comparable to the KISKA-type hand grenade.

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


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
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GENYO CLASS TANKER VICTIM OF PB4Y



On 31 October, a PB4Y of the 115th Bombing Squadron observed and photographed a 10,000-ton GENYO Class Jap tanker off KUDAT airdrome in MARUDU Bay (North BORNEO). The Allied plane attacked and apparently sank the AO with a single 250-pound GP hit, which ripped an eight-foot hole in the starboard bow. A 4-5-second delay fuse was used. Photo below shows the victim on the next day.

On 1 November another PB4Y observed the same ship lying on its side in this same location. On the following day it was observed on the bottom in 10-15 fathoms.



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JAP AERIAL ANTI-SUB DOCTRINE

A detailed explanation of the Japanese Navy's aerial anti-submarine doctrine is contained in an unusually lucid and analytical captured document.

This document was somewhat mutilated and its date of publication and issuing authority are missing. Its relatively recent origin, however, is established by the fact that episodes as late as February 1944 are mentioned, and its general tone indicates that it may be one of the series of tactical research studies published by the authoritative YOKOSUKA Naval Air Group.

Of special interest are notations referring to the use of radar and magnetic detectors. The tactical doctrine for these devices appears to be still in a state of development, but their use may be expected to grow. Previous documentary evidence has established the installation of magnetic detectors on JALRs early last summer and it is probable that other planes may be so equipped now.

The document, which will be published in full as (CINCPAC-CINCPAC Item No. 9279), shows a full appreciation of the alertness and perseverance necessary in effective aerial anti-submarine warfare. It contains many combat examples which are not reproduced in this article.

Aerial anti-sub tactics, says the document in its introduction, must be based on the rapid employment of large numbers of aircraft, even if it is necessary to make some sacrifice in quality.

"The commanding officer must stand at the head of his troops", it states.

"The present combat conditions, if compared to land warfare, represent not a battle of confrontation with the commander back of the center, but a final charge led by the commander. In forces having detachments, the commander should shift frequently to the various detachments, and direct activities on the spot.

"Patrol duty requires especial attention to promotion of morale because of the tediousness of the topography. A patrol which has been lacking in alertness is nothing but throwing away fuel."

Aggressiveness is stressed.

"It is necessary to attach importance to persistent and thorough sweep attacks. If we concentrate on defense alone in combat, the enemy gradually counters with increased threats. When we strike a strong blow against them, they immediately cease their pressure. This is shown by the fact that after the CAMRANH Bay Force (BUTAI), KUSHIMOTO Force (BUTAI), and TATEYAMA Air Group YAMADA Detachment had achieved considerable success in combat, the enemy subs in that area lay low for a while."

Patience and imagination are essential.

"Even though our efforts are not rewarded and success in battle is not attained,

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we must not become impatient and do anything rash.

"Such things as new tactics should be tried out as much as conditions permit. In anti-submarine patrol nothing as yet exists which can be called fixed rules. This is especially true under conditions where definite superiority cannot be determined."

In regard to night operations.

"Night training in many cases is not carried out due to the pressure of work or liberty or the like. However, there is great need for an increase of ability in night operations, and it is essential to carry this out strictly because of its special need in reference to the use of radar."

Lack of proper preparation may spoil an attack.

"In the fall of 1943 the CHUTO, about 300 nautical miles southeast of SUMOSAKI was hit by a torpedo and sank, but a medium attack plane of the TATAYAMA Air Group patrolling in the area immediately after this sighted a surfaced enemy submarine and headed for it. The plane was shortly picked up by the radar and when it reached the spot, only the wake was to be seen. A bombing attack was made and the first bomb fell with a right-left deviation of 0, seventy meters ahead of the target, but the second bomb of the run did not drop because of failure of the release. Although they attacked again after repairing this, the bomb fell short and no results were obtained. If the second bomb had dropped on the first run, success would have been assured, but because of poor preparations the opportunity was missed and they could get no revenge."

Planes must be ready for instant operations.

"It is necessary to send out attack units immediately after receiving warning reports. The sea area requiring patrol increases proportionately to the square of the time elapsed from the sighting of the enemy to the arrival on the scene of the attack units. However, since the arrival on the spot of attacking vessels is usually markedly late, it is essential that the air forces consider this matter so as to remedy the deficiency."

Bad weather must be turned to account.

"At such times there are chances for catching the enemy. When the visibility on the surface is bad, it is generally the plane that makes the sighting before the submarine does. Instrument flying training should be carried out so that it is at least possible to fly with safety in bad weather. If necessary it should be carried out while on patrol at times when vigilance may be relaxed, even if it means sacrificing observation by the pilot. However, assigning unreasonable operations to untrained personnel and suffering useless losses is condemned. Hence, in weather in which the ability of the flying crew is not to be trusted, it is best to return to base without loss of time."

U.S. submarine tactics.

"By always carefully observing the condition of the enemy and knowing his

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present tactics, strike the first blow, and realizing that the tactics in present use will finally become historical old tactics, prepare for future combat."

"At present the enemy makes the utmost use of radar and sonar to catch his prey, and then carries out accurate firing by exposing the periscopes. However, a shift to completely submerged firing is being planned for the near future. Counter-measures must be studied.

"Surfaced submarines sometimes use camouflage and deceptive measures. When a strange boat has been sighted, she must be reconnoitered in detail. These subs change their appearance to that of a fishing boat by the use of sails or nets, or put up false smokestacks, and the like, and disguise themselves as boats of other types.

Tactics for anti-sub patrol.

"When there are large and small planes at the same base, the large planes will chiefly carry out day and night long range patrols around convoy routes and make it impossible for enemy submarines to operate on the surface. In addition to making it difficult for them to approach our strategic places and convoys, these planes will carry out surprise attacks, taking advantage of the relaxing of the enemy's guard. The small type planes will have as their chief duty the thorough patrolling of areas near strategic points and direct escort of convoys. The large type planes, even though slow of movement, can still obtain favorable combat results.

"Patrol must be maintained day and night with as many planes as possible.

"Continuous neutralizing sweeps only show results when there is no let-up during the night. No matter how severely subs may be suppressed during the day, if there are weak points at night it is very easy for enemy subs to flee on the surface."

Tactics for planes directly escorting convoys.

"When direct escort planes sight torpedoes, they will bomb the spot from which the torpedo tracks originate and strafe the torpedoes. Depending on conditions (distance from the ships, number of bombs carried, etc.), the torpedoes may be bombed and a report of this made to the unit under direct escort (escorting vessels).

Patrol altitudes and security.

"Determine the altitude, considering foremost ease in sighting, and secondarily the ease of carrying out bombing and/the possibility of complications.

"(1). When primarily for visual contact.

"a. Usually 400-600 meters will be suitable.

"b. In darkness it is best to fly at/about 200 meters.

"c. For confirming/sightings, etc./it is best to fly at about 300 meters.

"(2). When using magnetic detector

"Daytime - under 80 meters is best.

CONTINUED

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"Night time - 80-100 meters is best.

"When an important escorted convoy is passing it is necessary to report its movements to the forces responsible for the next sector and make sure that there are no gaps in the escort protection.

"In carrying this out, care must be taken that the enemy is not informed of the movements of the convoy.

The lookout.

"The first step which determines the success or failure of attacks on enemy subs is the lookout.

"It is necessary that before boarding/the plane/the sectors of responsibility be determined, and that there be the will to sight the enemy without fail within the field of visibility by an alert lookout at all times.

"Enemy submarines do not give up just because of the presence of a plane overhead. If there is neglect in the lookout, aimless flying or the like, serious results will certainly follow. In all the combat examples relating to the sighting of enemy submarines, one cannot but wonder whether the flight crews put forth serious efforts.

"It is necessary to maintain a strict visual lookout even when using radar, magnetic detectors and the like.

"The magnetic detector is employed especially in cases when the potential submarine area is small, as in the early stages after a sighting, and the like, and the radar is employed especially at night in search of surfaced enemy submarines.

"When it is feared that an enemy submarine has gotten away, it is necessary to intensify direct escort in the area in which it is most probable that the sub is operating or lying submerged, and the area must also be swept. Generally when patrol, direct escort, and attack are incompatible, put emphasis on the attack; and when afraid the enemy has been lost, the emphasis must be shifted to direct escort without loss of time.

Principles of the attack.

"When an enemy sub has been sighted, take care that it is not bombed inaccurately in confusion, and make it a principle not to have to make a second try. When the aim is found correct, all bombs must be dropped in one pass. If they are not, the second attack generally has lost its target due to the sub's diving or there may be no results on single dropping due to fuse failure. When it is clearly recognized that there has been no result, a second attack must be planned.

"However, if circumstances warrant, it may be all right to drop single bombs as signals.

"The results of submarine attacks, even when the bomb lands well, being uncertain

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due to frequently having a bad underwater trajectory or exploding at the wrong depth, it is necessary to attack with as many bombs as possible. The underwater trajectory of a bomb is generally uniform to a depth of about 20 meters, but beyond that varies greatly. When there is any suspicion of an enemy sub, unless there is fear of attacking friendly forces, attack and do not spare the bombs.

"Intimidation attacks should be made when the positional error of the enemy sub is within 6000 meters and there is necessity for preventing its raising its periscope and making another attack.

Guiding other planes to the attack.

"The plane which has sighted an enemy submarine will drop target marker bombs so that it does not lose track of it, and guiding other planes by radio, it points the direction of the enemy sub with a small blue flag after bringing them to the position of the enemy sub. Moreover, if necessary, it drops more target marker bombs and carries out bombing operations. It flies, banking toward the true bearing of the enemy sub's position from the bombing splashes and target markers, or reports the bearing and distance by radio.

"The planes being guided will focus their attention on the direction indicated. When the position of enemy sighting or the point of the said direction and distance is an unknown distance, they will bomb a point 50 meters in that direction. If the planes being led do know the position of the enemy sub, when necessary they will approach the guide plane, show a small blue flag and bank.

"When two or more planes have gone into bombing runs at the same time, the one having the higher altitude will give way and begin over again. When the altitude is the same, the one having the companion plane on its right will break off and make a second run.


Cooperation of magnetic detector planes.

To cooperate with magnetic detector planes, the bomber should follow the vectoring bombless plane - but at the same time, the bomber should keep a close visual lookout. (Comment: sic!)

Method of dropping target bombs.

Number next to circles indicate the order of dropping.

White are dropped according to detector signal.
Green are dropped when the (X) area is reached.



CONTINUED

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"When the position of an enemy sub is deduced, drop a smoke bomb as near as possible to that point. Especially are these always to be used when guiding surface craft.

"The attacking planes will watch the above conditions, infer the movements of the enemy, and attack.

Cooperation with surface craft.

"The secret of cooperation is based on mutual understanding. Therefore, we must work for perfection of communications, both visual and wireless, since they are a most important means of establishing understanding.

"In establishing a thorough-going, unobstructed understanding, radio communications must by all means be put to practical use. Even under present conditions, this is never impossible; and, as the actual experience of the YOKOSUKA Air Group clearly shows, if both parties have the proper determination, the desired understanding can be realized.

"Still, when the nature of the present surface craft anti-submarine staff is considered, present development primarily is awaiting vigorous leadership from the aircraft section.

In directing surface craft, remember that they are often not furnished with sonic gear, that their sighting level is restrictive, and that they are slow. Treat them as if blind.

Ordnance and equipment.

"New weapons should be quickly mastered. Before new equipment is received, as much research as possible should be carried out beforehand. Radar, in particular, has revolutionized warfare, and as it is said of old, "Without a rifle, no infantry", so without radar, no war planes. In this our country, since it is in the unfortunate position of having started late in this field, requires the utmost endeavor.

"The No. 6 (132 lb.) bomb has little power, and so if it does not hit directly, it can not cause great damage to the enemy. It is best to use the No. 25 (550 lb.) bomb as much as possible.

"The fuse must be set properly. The depth of explosion of anti-submarine bombs is better deeper, rather than shallower than the enemy's depth. Depending on transparency of the water in the patrol area, the type bomb used, and so on, a suitable fuse timing must be used. Usually the first bomb will be set shallow, and the second and succeeding ones should be set for a deep depth to cope with evasive tactics."

(Comment: The Japanese use time, rather than hydrostatic fuses for anti-sub bombs.)

"Aggressive use of machine guns must be planned, fitting it to the conditions at the time. Although the results of strafing submarines cannot be expected to be

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outstanding, by casualties to the officers and other annoyances it can make diving impossible. And it can make the submarine show its position by oil leakage, so the aggressive use of strafing must be kept in mind.

Maintenance.

"The maintenance of aircraft, due to the inadequacies in the supply of material, depends in great part on the efforts of the Air Group maintenance crews. For this reason the diligent endeavors of maintenance squad leaders are required."

Confirmation evidence.

"The confirmation of combat results is extremely important for the planning of future attacks.

"Furthermore, since it is not easy because of the peculiar characteristics of submarines and additionally because enemy subs are pulling various sorts of deceptive tricks/confirmation/is becoming more and more difficult.

"Usually, either because the pilot is personally satisfied of the results or dislikes the trouble of continuing, the attack is broken off prematurely. It is easy to let the enemy slip away in the last five minutes so care is necessary.

"When the following phenomena have been noted, consider the sinking confirmed.

- "1. Large amounts of oil leakage and leakage of air bubbles for over 10 minutes, or, although the period of leakage of air is short, when a large amount of air is released due to the damage to the inner shell of the hull.
 - "2. When oil leakage continues over a fortnight.
 - "3. When parts which are inside the inner shell of the enemy sub which has been destroyed, come to the surface."
-

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LONG-SHAFTED ENGINE USED ON JACK


The smoothly streamlined cowling of the new Jap Navy interceptor, JACK, is made possible by the installation of an unusually constructed engine, the long-shafted Kasei 23.

Information on the appearance of this new powerplant is gained from a recently recovered document (CINCPAC-CINCPAC Item No. 12,608). Data on its performance has appeared in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 4 and in other publications. Maximum horsepower is 1820 at takeoff.

The extended, Farman-type reduction gearing permits the installation of a highly streamlined cowling and results in a relatively small frontal area. The cooling problem is overcome by the addition of an auxiliary fan, geared to the propeller shaft and turning in the same direction at an increase ratio of 3.18 to 1.

The Kasei 23 engine is the 20-series parallel of the older Kasei 13, which also has a Farman transmission and is similar in appearance but lacking the fan. The 13 does not appear on any currently operational plane, but served its purpose as an experimental fore-runner of the 23.

The Kasei 23 displays several features of German design influence. The cooling fan is similar to that employed on the FW190; in place of a carburetor, it has a wobble-plate fuel injection system with individual injectors for each of its



Kasei 23 engine, used in JACK. Photo from captured document.

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14 cylinders, a development similar to that used on the German BMW 801. The same device is used on the Ha 112, Model 2 engine installed in DINAH 3.

This type of fuel system plus the fact that the engine uses 91 octane aviation gas as well as water methanol makes its performance different from that of the Kael 21. The dry weight of the engine, fully equipped, is 1895.95 lbs.

Of special interest is the duraluminum cooling fan which is mounted on a splined sleeve on the propeller shaft. The fan gearing consists of a set of planets mounted on a plate which is splined to the propeller shaft. These planets mesh with a fixed internal spur gear and rotate the sun gear which turns the cooling fan in the same direction as the propeller.

The sun gear rotates on a sleeve around the propeller shaft in a lead-bronze bearing. It is lubricated by oil under pressure from the propeller shaft. This oil is thrown out from the sun gear and lubricates the entire assembly. The propeller shaft has been lengthened 13.78 inches and the extended reduction gear housing is constructed of a lightweight magnesium alloy.

NEW ARMY AIR DIVISION


The existence of an 11th Army Air Division is revealed in a Jap address book taken from an Army twin-engined bomber SALLY shot down over SAIPAN on 3 November (CINCPAC-CINCPAC Item No. 12,300). The location of this unit is given as OSAKA, which is also the headquarters of the Central District Army. This association might indicate that the 11th Air Division has been established to control the air defense of the industrial KOBE-OSAKA-MAGOYA area. The date of organization of the 11th Air Division is not given, although the 10th is known from transfer lists to have been organized in JAPAN last March.

An Air Division in the Japanese Army Air Force is a high tactical and administrative command, subordinate only to an Air Army. The 11th Air Division therefore is presumably subordinate to the 1st Air Army at TOKYO, which is the top Army Air Command for the Empire. An Air Division theoretically commands at least two Air Brigades of three Air Regiments each, or about 200 airplanes. However, in practice the strength of Air Divisions has varied widely.

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JAP AIRFIELD CAMOUFLAGE

Jap use of trees and shrubbery to camouflage planes on the ground is illustrated by photographs of LIPA WEST FIELD on LUZON. Methods used are regarded as fairly successful, since planes are not easily visible from medium altitudes. Note that, contrary to usual Jap practice, netting is not used.



LIPA WEST FIELD's paved runway and trunk taxiways are not successfully toned down and stand out clearly. Smaller loop taxiways, extending 650 yards from the runway, are dirt surfaced and do not stand out as sharply. Revetments, also made of earth, have shrubs growing on them and some have trees within their walls. This prevents sharp contrasts in color or tone in the dispersal areas.

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Planes in this and the preceding photo are camouflaged by hiding under trees and by tying palm fronds and other foliage to the wings and foliage. In most instances the tail assembly of the plane has been placed between two palms and the plane has been pushed under as far as possible. Protruding engines and noses are well covered with foliage. In a few cases one or two palms have been removed, leaving enough space to push the plane clear under cover. Even when this is done, foliage has been thrown over the plane to prevent its disclosure by outline or reflection.

Planes camouflaged in this way are necessarily located within one plane-length of the edge of the taxiway. In some cases, the best indication of a hidden plane is the shadow of revetment walls showing between the trees.

There are no dummy planes on the field, but dud planes are left in plain view even where they partially block taxiways. No damaged planes appear to be camouflaged, but several apparently operational planes are left in treeless areas, both with and without foliage covering.

(Photographs and interpretation by Second Carrier Task Force).

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THUMBNAIL BIOGRAPHIES OF JAPANESE AIRCRAFT

HELEN


(Fourteenth in a series outlining the background of important Japanese Aircraft).

HELEN, the Japanese Army's Type 100 Bomber, has failed to prove in combat the extravagant claims which were made for it at the time of its introduction, but new developments may make it much more formidable.

This aircraft, made by Nakajima, is known to the Japanese as "The Dragon", and was hailed at one time as the plane which would bring the Pacific war to a quick end. However, it has not appeared in substantial quantities and its performance to date has not been outstanding, even though it is among the most heavily armed and armored of Jap bombers.

The original HELEN, Model 1, was powered with 1250 h.p. engines. It was replaced in mid-1943 by a Model 2, with engines of 1450 h.p. Both models are similar in appearance, being distinguished by a built-up wing section between fuselage and nacelles similar to that of the British Mosquito.

There are indications that a Model 3, equipped with engines of more than 2000 h.p. and with greatly improved performance, is under development, but this version has not been definitely identified.



Heavily camouflaged HELEN, under Allied strafing attacks. Photo from AAF, SWPA.

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PROVISIONAL SKETCH OF GEORGE

Reproduced below are provisional sketches of GEORGE, new Jap Navy interceptor.

This drawing has been synthesised from documentary evidence, POW statements and sketches, and two rough and incomplete drawings found in a captured mimeographed manual.

No positively identifiable pictures of GEORGE are available, and no specimen has been examined in the field. The accompanying sketch is provisional and will be superseded when better information is at hand.


Characteristics on which available information agrees and which are believed quite reliable include the squarish wing and tail tips, blister canopy, airscoop at five o'clock and large spinner.

Both reported variations of armament and wing position are shown.

INTERIM DRAWING (Provisional)

GEORGE

JAP NAVY FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR



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SIDELIGHT ON SUICIDES

A JUDY pilot interrogated by Third Fleet after being shot down in an attack off the PHILIPPINES provides a sidelight on the nature of the so-called "KAMIKAZE Special Assault Force" of suicide divers.

This pilot was a member of 502 Naval Air Group, which he said had been joined with several other groups for operations in the PHILIPPINES. His information is open to question, but he appeared reliable on matters which could be checked.

Quoting the interrogation report:

"POW stated that his unit had become a "suicide" squadron on the 27th of October. The designation as a suicide squad came as a result of the group's commanding officer's request for such designation having been granted by higher authority. The prisoner stated that pilots and other personnel of the group were not questioned as to their desire to become members of a suicide squad.

"He felt that the order to dive on carriers to one's self-destruction was absurd (Bakamashii), but since it was an order he fully intended to carry it out. He did feel that there had been a needless expenditure of life with very little visible success to date. The pilot claimed that he had been given no instruction on the best way to carry out suicidal attacks on carriers; however, he did feel that he would attempt to hit an elevator in that elevators on a carrier were "weak points". At the time he left MARALACAT (his base) there were still 50 members of the suicide squadron alive but very few flyable aircraft were available. (Subsequent strikes on LUZON by our carriers may have cut down this number).

"POW was of the opinion that his unit was the only dive-bomber squadron in the Japanese Navy that had been designated as a suicide squadron; however, he felt that in the event of carrier attacks being launched on JAPAN proper, suicidal attacks in large numbers should be anticipated. POW did not believe green and yellow silk flight clothing reported as having been recovered from the body of a Jap pilot who had made a suicide attack on a U.S. carrier had any special significance.

"POW stated that the lack of aviation gasoline had caused the Japs to cut down on the extent of training, but he had heard of no instances in which offensive missions could not be flown as a result of a lack of AvGas."

POW's belief that his unit was the only one designated as a whole for suicide work coincides with other available evidence. From recent Japanese propaganda broadcasts, it appears that most of the so-called "KAMIKAZE" units are made up more or less extemporaneously of volunteers from various groups acting independently. The "KAMIKAZE" designation appears to be a special mark of distinction applied to any such volunteers, rather than the name of a formal organization.

If true, however, the designation of an entire air group as a suicide unit may mark a significant change in the development of this tactic.

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
JAPS DEVELOP INDO-CHINA

The strategic importance of INDO-CHINA to JAPAN has increased as the position of JAPAN in the PHILIPPINES and her supply line to the EAST INDIES have become more precarious. The limited railroad facilities of the country are being utilized to their fullest extent in an endeavor to find safe supply lines. Her ports, particularly SAIGON and CAM RANH BAY are used for the protection of convoys and as staging points for military operations. As JAPAN's sources of supply on the periphery of her empire are cut off it is to be anticipated that the resources of INDO-CHINA will be increasingly developed.

It is estimated that there are at present no more than 35,000 ground troops permanently stationed in the country, plus approximately 2,000 special Navy Landing Force troops.


There are 64 airfields, ranging from emergency fighter strips to major airports capable of handling Jap bombers. The larger fields, such as those at SAIGON, CAPE ST. JACQUES, TOURANE, CAI BAI and HAIPHONG, function not only as combat and transport plane bases, but also as training centers.

Of the ten seaplane anchorages, the best equipped ones are in the HAIPHONG-HON GAY area, at TOURANE, CAM RANH BAY, and CAPE ST. JACQUES. The air force in INDO-CHINA is believed to consist mainly of float planes and flying boats for convoy coverage and anti-submarine patrol.



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CAT BAI AIRFIELD



CAT BAI A/F, located 3 miles SE of HAIPHONG, has two intersecting hard surfaced runways and is reported to be a first-class military installation. Included in the facilities are a radio station, repair shops and AA positions. Revetment areas are being extended and an attempt is being made to camouflage the taxiways.

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HON GAY



HON GAY - the chief coaling port of FRENCH INDO-CHINA, located on the north shore of the Gulf of TONKIN. Facilities include a coal treating plant with steam and electric loading devices, concrete piers and extensive railroad yards.

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CAM RANH BAY



CAM RANH BAY - one of the finest fleet anchorages in the ORIENT. Affording complete typhoon protection, it was a staging point for Jap troops enroute for the conquest of MALAYA and NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.

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JAP ORDNANCE VS ALLIED AIRCRAFT

Improvisation in Japanese ordnance to combat strafing Allied planes continues. The latest development - the use of implanted bombs - is described in a report from the Central Pacific dated 23 September 1944 and forwarded by BuOrd.

Selecting the logical paths of approach of low-flying Allied planes on strafing missions, the Japanese had buried the bombs in definite patterns on all sides of the air strip. Particular attention was given to the approaches of revetments and the main parking areas on the field.

Examination of the bombs revealed they were rigged in the following manner.

- a). The nose cavity of each bomb was filled with either Composition C or dynamite. About one fourth of the bomb noses were filled with the plastic explosive and the remaining three fourths were filled with dynamite.
- b). The explosive was tamped into the nose cavity and electric blasting caps inserted into the explosive.
- c). The electric blasting caps were wired in series and had 2' leads running to a dugout. The observer, hidden in the dugout, could detonate the bombs when the strafing planes were immediately over the mined area. Each of the five areas had lead wires running to a separate dugout. The bombs were buried and well concealed with either sod or coconut leaves and would not be visible from the air.

It is interesting to note that the Japs employed no particular type or size bomb for this purpose. Over 150 bombs rigged with electrical detonators and ranging in size from 32 kg. to 250 kg. were rendered safe.

Other instances of Japanese ingenuity in organizing and planning defenses against low-flying aircraft are reported in Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 40, Air Command, Southeast Asia. A brief resume of unorthodox and impromptu defenses encountered by airmen in this theatre includes small arms fire by ground troops, multi-barrelled MG's mounted on trucks and anti-aircraft guns mounted on freight cars.

Among the more ingenious devices employed in the Southwestern Pacific area, was a BEITY (medium bomber) conveniently parked at the end of a runway offering an unusually easy target. Unfortunately machine gun pits containing 20 mm guns had been dug in the shadow of the wings. The attacking fighters received a very warm reception. In other cases of this type, trucks, tanks, huts and barges have been substituted for the BEITY as bait.

Another type of defense against strafing is the use of wires, strung across narrow valleys, between large trees and between small hills on either side of the river. Bridges, railroads and landing strips have been reported as having possible trip-wires either over them or guarding the open approaches.



CONTINUED

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Other areas have reported the use of a type of 70-mm mortar. The projectile is reported to burst between 1500 and 2000 feet, ejecting 7 canisters which in turn release parachute-suspended bomb tubes. These take two or three minutes to float to the ground and constitute a definite hazard as they are difficult to see. If contact is made with one of the suspending cords, it causes the bomb to explode with a detonation described as about twice that of a 20-mm shell.

JAP ANTI-SUBMARINE BOMB

The enemy is having trouble because his anti-submarine bombs ricochet. In the case of their 300-kg. bomb (Type 1, No. 25 bomb, Mark 2, Model 1, Modification 1) the Japs have attempted to correct this with an anti-ricochet nose attachment. Photographs of an altered bomb captured on GUAM and examined by MEIU No. 4 show the steel cylinder which is secured to the nose of the bomb by welding. This type of alteration should prove reasonably effective.



UNRELT COVERAGE REPORT

Flares received at GlasPar-GlasPar
during period from 24 November 1944
to and including 1 December 1944

- FRIENDS ONLY MEETING
- BOOTHES SUPERIMPOSED

[illegible]

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V	24"	30,000'	Z179-48221 (Canton, White Clay & Tombigbee A/Bs)	9493-277	3/1300
V	24"	30,000'	Z179-48271 (Shawnee Basin)	9494-278	3/1300
V	24"	30,000'	Z179-48221 (Lawson and Shawnee)	9495-279	3/1300

SEVEN SEVEN - Seven Stars

Slide	Slide	Good vertical and oblique partial coverage showing best sample.
V	34°	17,000° 0-410-2400-6-11-65 9402-384 11/23
V	34°	17,000° 0-410-2400-11-65 9402-384 11/23
V	32°	17,000° 0-402-2400-11-65 9402-384 11/23
V	32°	18,000° 0-474-2400-00-71 9404-187 11/24
V	32°	18,000° 0-474-2400-00-71 9404-187 11/24
V	30°	19,450° 0-617-1900-00-71 9405-189 11/26
V	6 1/2°	200° 0-644-1200 9407-390 11/26
V	6 1/2°	200° 0-644-1200 9407-390 11/26
V	6 1/2°	200° 0-527-4800 9408-391 11/27
V	34°	18,000° 0-126-0100-00-71 9434-191 11/27
V	34°	17,000° 0-476-4100-00-71 9434-191 11/27
V	17°	200° 0-567-4100-00-71 9434-191 11/27
V	34°	18,000° 0-477-3800-11-65-70C 9435-195 11/28
V	32°	17,000° 0-476-3800-11-65-70C 9435-195 11/28
V	17°	200° 0-561-4800-11-65-70C 9435-195 11/28
V	32°	200° 0-616-1700-11-65 9435-198 11/29
V	32°	20,000° 799-10 9437-390 11/29
V	40°	20,000° 799-10 9437-390 11/29
V	40°	20,000° 799-30 9438-391 11/29
V	40°	20,000° 799-30 9438-391 11/29
V	34°	20,000° 799-30 9438-391 11/29
V	34°	20,000° 799-30 9438-391 11/29

Thin film: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage showing hump
growth.

12"	11, 720'	A-94A-YM88-0000-55	9189-71	11/90
12"	12, 720'	A-912-YM88-0000-68C	9286-72	11/90
24"	12, 720'	B-921-YM88-0000-68C	9189-71	11/90
24"	13, 000'	A-113-YM88-0000-72	9286-72	11/90
24"	14, 300'	A-641-YM88-0000-53	9287-73	11/90
6, 300'			9189-71	11/90
12"	200'	G-114-YM88-0000-11-64	9189-71	11/90
12"	14, 300'	B-22-YM88-0000-11-64	9287-73	11/90
24"	14, 300'	B-641-YM88-0000-72	9286-72	11/90
24"	14, 000'	G-114-YM88-0000-11-64	9189-71	11/90
24"	20, 000'	Y88-5	9189-71	11/90
24"	20, 000'	Y88-2	9189-71	11/90

Noting (Ning): Distort oblique partial coverage.

6 3/4 Var WOOD-18 9214-4 11/7/92

MAIL ORDER - Range Rovers

Year	Good vertical partial coverage of island in color.	
2000	20,000	9829-261 11/20
2001	20,000	9829-262 11/20
2002	20,000	9829-263 11/20
2003	20,000	9829-264 11/20

◆ Large Photo - Good complete vertical coverage.

24"	17,000'	A-680-2085	9209-26	11/7/00
18"	13,000'	A-770-7700-0270-22	9209-37	11/7/00
24"	18,000'	A-614-9200-700	9209-38	11/7

MASSIVE ZEPHYRUS

Good Whelan's partial coverage.				
6'	13,200'	Steno-131 (T)	9213-03	9/23/00
		Steno-131 (D)	9214-03	
		Steno-131 (B)	9215-03	

Good tri-nitrogen partial coverage.

13,900# Reams-151 (7) 9212-65 9/23/60
 Reams-151 (7) 9211-65
 Reams-151 (5) 9212-65

Good split-vertical and oblique coverage of areas indicated.

24"	Var	CP-26-32 (Smith)	CP-26-32	11/90
		CP-26-32	CP-26-32	
6 3/8"	Var <td>Time-3 (Smith)</td> <td>CP-26-32</td> <td>11/90</td>	Time-3 (Smith)	CP-26-32	11/90
6 3/8"	Var <td>Time-4 (Smith)</td> <td>CP-26-32</td> <td>11/90</td>	Time-4 (Smith)	CP-26-32	11/90
6 3/8"	Var <td>Time-5 (Smith)</td> <td>CP-26-32</td> <td>11/90</td>	Time-5 (Smith)	CP-26-32	11/90
6 3/8"	Var <td>Time-6 (Smith)</td> <td>CP-26-32</td> <td>11/90</td>	Time-6 (Smith)	CP-26-32	11/90
6 3/8"	Var <td>Time-7 (Smith)</td> <td>CP-26-32</td> <td>11/90</td>	Time-7 (Smith)	CP-26-32	11/90
6 3/8"	Var <td>Time-8 (Smith)</td> <td>CP-26-32</td> <td>11/90</td>	Time-8 (Smith)	CP-26-32	11/90
6 3/8"	Var <td>Time-9 (Smith)</td> <td>CP-26-32</td> <td>11/90</td>	Time-9 (Smith)	CP-26-32	11/90
6 3/8"	Var <td>Time-10 (Smith)</td> <td>CP-26-32</td> <td>11/90</td>	Time-10 (Smith)	CP-26-32	11/90
6 3/8"	Var <td>Time-11 (Smith)</td> <td>CP-26-32</td> <td>11/90</td>	Time-11 (Smith)	CP-26-32	11/90
6 3/8"	Var <td>Time-12 (Smith)</td> <td>CP-26-32</td> <td>11/90</td>	Time-12 (Smith)	CP-26-32	11/90
6 3/8"	Var <td>Time-13 (Smith)</td> <td>CP-26-32</td> <td>11/90</td>	Time-13 (Smith)	CP-26-32	11/90
6 3/8"	Var <td>Time-14 (Smith)</td> <td>CP-26-32</td> <td>11/90</td>	Time-14 (Smith)	CP-26-32	11/90
6 3/8"	Var <td>Time-15 (Smith)</td> <td>CP-26-32</td> <td>11/90</td>	Time-15 (Smith)	CP-26-32	11/90
6 3/8"	Var <td>Time-16 (Smith)</td> <td>CP-26-32</td> <td>11/90</td>	Time-16 (Smith)	CP-26-32	11/90
6 3/8"	Var <td>Time-17 (Smith)</td> <td>CP-26-32</td> <td>11/90</td>	Time-17 (Smith)	CP-26-32	11/90

6	3/9/	Var	OT1-175	(North Trip)	9280-143	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-121	(North Trip)	9281-166	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-11	(North Trip)	9282-147	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-112	(North Trip)	9283-144	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-126	(North Trip)	9284-149	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-123	(North Trip)	9285-130	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-107	(North Trip)	9286-151	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-112	(North Trip)	9287-152	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	French-141	(South Bag)	9288-153	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-181	(North Trip)	9289-154	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-176	(North Trip)	9290-155	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-178	(North Trip)	9291-156	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-177	(North Trip)	9292-157	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-179	(North Trip)	9293-158	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-179	(North Trip)	9294-159	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-180	(North Trip)	9295-160	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-181	(North Trip)	9296-161	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-182	(North Trip)	9297-162	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-183	(North Trip)	9298-163	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-184	(North Trip)	9299-164	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-185	(North Trip)	9300-165	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-186	(North Trip)	9301-166	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-187	(North Trip)	9302-167	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-188	(North Trip)	9303-168	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-189	(North Trip)	9304-169	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-190	(North Trip)	9305-170	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-191	(North Trip)	9306-171	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-192	(North Trip)	9307-172	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-193	(North Trip)	9308-173	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-194	(North Trip)	9309-174	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-195	(North Trip)	9310-175	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-196	(North Trip)	9311-176	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-197	(North Trip)	9312-177	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-198	(North Trip)	9313-178	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-199	(North Trip)	9314-179	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-200	(North Trip)	9315-180	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-201	(North Trip)	9316-181	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-202	(North Trip)	9317-182	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-203	(North Trip)	9318-183	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-204	(North Trip)	9319-184	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-205	(North Trip)	9320-185	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-206	(North Trip)	9321-186	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-207	(North Trip)	9322-187	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-208	(North Trip)	9323-188	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-209	(North Trip)	9324-189	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-210	(North Trip)	9325-190	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-211	(North Trip)	9326-191	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-212	(North Trip)	9327-192	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-213	(North Trip)	9328-193	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-214	(North Trip)	9329-194	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-215	(North Trip)	9330-195	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-216	(North Trip)	9331-196	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-217	(North Trip)	9332-197	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-218	(North Trip)	9333-198	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-219	(North Trip)	9334-199	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-220	(North Trip)	9335-200	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-221	(North Trip)	9336-201	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-222	(North Trip)	9337-202	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-223	(North Trip)	9338-203	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-224	(North Trip)	9339-204	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-225	(North Trip)	9340-205	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-226	(North Trip)	9341-206	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-227	(North Trip)	9342-207	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-228	(North Trip)	9343-208	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-229	(North Trip)	9344-209	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-230	(North Trip)	9345-210	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-231	(North Trip)	9346-211	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-232	(North Trip)	9347-212	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-233	(North Trip)	9348-213	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-234	(North Trip)	9349-214	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-235	(North Trip)	9350-215	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-236	(North Trip)	9351-216	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-237	(North Trip)	9352-217	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-238	(North Trip)	9353-218	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-239	(North Trip)	9354-219	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-240	(North Trip)	9355-220	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-241	(North Trip)	9356-221	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-242	(North Trip)	9357-222	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-243	(North Trip)	9358-223	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-244	(North Trip)	9359-224	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-245	(North Trip)	9360-225	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-246	(North Trip)	9361-226	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-247	(North Trip)	9362-227	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-248	(North Trip)	9363-228	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-249	(North Trip)	9364-229	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-250	(North Trip)	9365-230	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-251	(North Trip)	9366-231	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-252	(North Trip)	9367-232	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-253	(North Trip)	9368-233	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-254	(North Trip)	9369-234	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-255	(North Trip)	9370-235	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-256	(North Trip)	9371-236	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-257	(North Trip)	9372-237	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-258	(North Trip)	9373-238	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-259	(North Trip)	9374-239	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-260	(North Trip)	9375-240	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-261	(North Trip)	9376-241	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-262	(North Trip)	9377-242	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-263	(North Trip)	9378-243	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-264	(North Trip)	9379-244	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-265	(North Trip)	9380-245	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-266	(North Trip)	9381-246	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-267	(North Trip)	9382-247	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-268	(North Trip)	9383-248	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-269	(North Trip)	9384-249	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-270	(North Trip)	9385-250	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-271	(North Trip)	9386-251	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-272	(North Trip)	9387-252	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-273	(North Trip)	9388-253	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-274	(North Trip)	9389-254	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-275	(North Trip)	9390-255	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-276	(North Trip)	9391-256	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-277	(North Trip)	9392-257	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-278	(North Trip)	9393-258	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-279	(North Trip)	9394-259	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-280	(North Trip)	9395-260	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-281	(North Trip)	9396-261	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-282	(North Trip)	9397-262	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-283	(North Trip)	9398-263	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-284	(North Trip)	9399-264	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-285	(North Trip)	9400-265	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-286	(North Trip)	9401-266	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-287	(North Trip)	9402-267	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-288	(North Trip)	9403-268	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-289	(North Trip)	9404-269	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-290	(North Trip)	9405-270	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-291	(North Trip)	9406-271	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-292	(North Trip)	9407-272	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-293	(North Trip)	9408-273	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-294	(North Trip)	9409-274	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-295	(North Trip)	9410-275	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-296	(North Trip)	9411-276	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-297	(North Trip)	9412-277	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-298	(North Trip)	9413-278	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-299	(North Trip)	9414-279	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-300	(North Trip)	9415-280	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-301	(North Trip)	9416-281	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-302	(North Trip)	9417-282	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-303	(North Trip)	9418-283	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-304	(North Trip)	9419-284	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-305	(North Trip)	9420-285	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-306	(North Trip)	9421-286	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-307	(North Trip)	9422-287	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-308	(North Trip)	9423-288	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-309	(North Trip)	9424-289	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-310	(North Trip)	9425-290	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-311	(North Trip)	9426-291	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-312	(North Trip)	9427-292	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-313	(North Trip)	9428-293	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-314	(North Trip)	9429-294	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-315	(North Trip)	9430-295	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-316	(North Trip)	9431-296	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-317	(North Trip)	9432-297	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-318	(North Trip)	9433-298	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-319	(North Trip)	9434-299	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-320	(North Trip)	9435-300	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-321	(North Trip)	9436-301	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-322	(North Trip)	9437-302	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-323	(North Trip)	9438-303	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-324	(North Trip)	9439-304	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-325	(North Trip)	9440-305	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-326	(North Trip)	9441-306	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-327	(North Trip)	9442-307	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-328	(North Trip)	9443-308	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-329	(North Trip)	9444-309	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-330	(North Trip)	9445-310	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-331	(North Trip)	9446-311	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-332	(North Trip)	9447-312	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-333	(North Trip)	9448-313	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-334	(North Trip)	9449-314	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-335	(North Trip)	9450-315	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-336	(North Trip)	9451-316	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-337	(North Trip)	9452-317	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-338	(North Trip)	9453-318	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-339	(North Trip)	9454-319	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-340	(North Trip)	9455-320	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-341	(North Trip)	9456-321	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-342	(North Trip)	9457-322	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-343	(North Trip)	9458-323	10/26/00
6	3/9/	Var	OT1-344			

REMARKS: Good split-vertical coverage of areas indicated.

Split Vert.	24°	30,000'	21°30'-42°36' (Tolmie & Rothen)	9243-139 9244-139	9/23--
Split Vert.	24°	29,800'	21°30'-42°36' (Stilwell & A/P)	9245-140 9246-140	9/23--
Split Vert.	24°	29,500'	21°30'-42°36' (Tolmie & A/P)	9247-141 9248-141	9/23--

RAJAH STATION: Good vertical coverage of Singapore.

24 ^o	22, 070	((AABCB)) ((AB15)) ((AAA-AC392))	93A6-3	11/2000
21 ^o 1 st	22, 070	((AABCB)) ((AB15)) ((AAB-AC675))	93A1-3	11/2000
1 st	22, 000	((AABCB)) ((AB15)) ((AAA-AC675))	93A4-4	11/2000
1 st	21, 000	((AABCB)) ((AB15)) ((AAA-AC641))	93A3-5	11/2000
24 ^o	22, 000	((AABCB)) ((AB15)) ((AAA-AC6986))	93A4-6	11/2000
24 ^o	22, 300	((AABCB)) ((AB15)) ((AAA-AC648))	93A5-7	11/2000
24 ^o	21, 300	((AABCB)) ((AB15)) ((AAA-AC648))	93A5-8	11/2000
24 ^o	21, 300	((AABCB)) ((AB15)) ((AAA-AC392))	93A5-9	11/2000
24 ^o	21, 300	((AABCB)) ((AB15)) ((AAA-AC392))	93A5-10	11/2000

Remarks: Good vertical coverage of areas indicated.

			(Range)	
24"	24,000'		(A42C) (A48L1) (A42-A48-182)	7364-3
			(A42C) (A48L1) (A42-A48-190)	9364-4
			(A42C) (A48L1) (A42-A48-198)	7364-5
	21,600'		(A42C) (A48L1) (A42-A48-198)	7364-6
	23,900		(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-194)	9370-7
			(A42C) (A48L1) (A42-A48-175)	9364-8
	23,500'		(A42C) (A48L1) (A42-A48-175)	9377-9
	22,000'		(A48C) (A48L1) (A42-A48-164)	9377-10
			(A42C) (A48L1) (A42-A48-168)	9377-11
	22,000'		(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-168)	9377-12
	22,000'		(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-13
	22,000'		(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-14
	22,000'		(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-15
	22,000'		(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-16
	21,600'		(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-17
	21,600'		(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-18
	21,600'		(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-19
	21,600'		(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-20
	21,000'		(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-21
	21,000'		(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-22
	20,000'		(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-23
	20,000'		(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-24
	20,000'		(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-25
	16,500'		(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-26
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-27
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-28
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-29
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-30
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-31
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-32
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-33
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-34
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-35
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-36
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-37
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-38
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-39
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-40
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-41
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-42
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-43
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-44
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-45
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-46
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-47
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-48
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-49
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-50
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-51
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-52
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-53
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-54
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-55
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-56
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-57
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-58
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-59
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-60
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-61
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-62
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-63
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-64
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-65
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-66
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-67
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-68
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-69
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-70
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-71
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-72
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-73
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-74
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-75
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-76
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-77
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-78
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-79
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			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-81
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-82
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-83
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-84
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-85
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-86
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-87
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-88
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-89
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-90
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-91
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-92
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-93
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-94
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-95
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-96
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-97
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-98
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-99
			(A48L2) (A48L3) (A42-A48-189)	9377-100

REMARKS: Good vertical coverage of area indicated

V	24 th	21,300'	{44480}(44815)(444-46980) {Pangalan Breeding}	9588-4	11/9-00
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CAROLINE DELANEY

Exposure: Good vertical and oblique coverage of areas indicated

[illegible]

Summary: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage.

0	6 1/8"	1,200	MAC22-250-122-8	9311-996	11/22
0	6 1/8"	1,000	MAC22-84-8-8	9312-997	11/22
0	6 1/8"	15,000	MAC22-250-113-8	9313-998	11/22
V	20"	10,000	MAC22-7	9444-999	11/22

Page 58

Data Area:		Seed vertical partial coverage.		
V	40°	5,000	283670-7-3	9294 10/9
Random:		Seed vertical and oblique partial coverage.		
V	40°	5,000	283670-7-3	9295 10/9
O	20°	50	283670-7-3	9294 10/9
Seed:		Seed vertical and oblique partial coverage showing best change in vertical cross.		
V	15°	25,000	A-734-7288-4038-70	9430-700 11/9
V	20°	26,000	A-735-7288-4038-70	9431-700 11/9
V	25°	27,000	A-736-7288-4038-70	9432-700 11/9
O	6 3/4°	16,000	A-737-7288-4038-70	9433-700 11/9
V	30°	17,000	A-738-7288-4038-70	9434-700 11/9
V	35°	18,000	A-739-7288-4038-70	9435-700 11/9
V	40°	19,000	A-740-7288-4038-70	9436-700 11/9
V	45°	20,000	A-741-7288-4038-70	9437-700 11/9
V	50°	21,000	A-742-7288-4038-70	9438-700 11/9
V	55°	22,000	A-743-7288-4038-70	9439-700 11/9
V	60°	23,000	A-744-7288-4038-70	9440-700 11/9
V	65°	24,000	A-745-7288-4038-70	9441-700 11/9
V	70°	25,000	A-746-7288-4038-70	9442-700 11/9
V	75°	26,000	A-747-7288-4038-70	9443-700 11/9
V	80°	27,000	A-748-7288-4038-70	9444-700 11/9
V	85°	28,000	A-749-7288-4038-70	9445-700 11/9
V	90°	29,000	A-750-7288-4038-70	9446-700 11/9

DATE:

Asylum Good oblique partial coverage.

6 1/2 100 100 1017-03 1016-70 11/19

Similar to Nashville: good complete vertical coverage.

11-10-68 11/

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

11/27

10

~~Range:~~ Good oblique partial coverage.

• 6 2/3" Var 1017-224

Find: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage.

1,000' 2074AC207-1
2074AC207-1

120 79 20700000-1

Barium: Good oblique partial coverage.

• 1/4" Wx 117-22 924-6 11/4

Estimated Date: Good oblique dist.

0 6 300 100 00117-300

CONFIDENTIAL

LUZON AIRFIELDS

These photos, taken by carrier-based planes, are representative of the Jap-held airfields encountered by our aircraft on recent strikes against LUZON.



An example of the concentration of Jap fields in the vicinity of MANILA. Five of the six CLARK landing grounds are visible; the sixth is hidden by the cloud in upper right. Center - the four ANGELES airfields.

CONFIDENTIAL



GRACE PARK Airfield, located in the northern part of MANILA, is a fighter field. The new runway is concrete, however, the old runways outlined above are not paved and are believed unserviceable.

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CONFIDENTIAL



LEGASPI Airfield, situated $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles north of LEGASPI Town, is a medium bomber field with an improved runway. Note bomb crater, fallen trees and debris in foreground - the result of one of our recent strikes.

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CONFIDENTIAL



Fort STOTSENBURG, former American Army Headquarters, now believed to be a Japanese Garrison Headquarters at least partly responsible for the defense of the many airfields in this area.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #17
(PHOTOSTATIC COPY OF ORIGINAL JAPANESE DOCUMENT
CAPTURED BY U S MARINES
AT SAIPAN DURING JUNE 1944

CONTAINING

MATERIAL PERTINENT TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
CONSISTING OF

NOTES ON FUELING AT SEA

(FUELING AT SEA OF PEARL HARBOR STRIKING FORCE)

ENTITLED


"BATTLE LESSONS ON SUPPLY IN THE GREATER EAST ASIA WAR"

USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE

"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

The pertinent material in this SOURCE DOCUMENT is
embraced in the translations stated in SOURCE
DOCUMENTS Nos. 14 and 15 (supra), which were used
by the Navy in compiling said Navy Summary of
the "Japanese Plan for the Attack on Pearl Harbor."




		配				布				先	
警備府	吳、佐、舞鎮	橫須賀鎮守府	技術研究所	水路部	海軍運輸本部	施設本部	航空本部	艦政本部	海軍省	軍令部	
各一	各二	四	一	二	五	五	五	一〇	一〇	一〇	
建築部	經理部	海軍病院	軍需部	運輸部	港務部	燃料廠	航空廠	航空技術廠	工廠	防備戰隊	
各一	各一	各二	各五	各一	各一	各二	各二	四	各五	各一	
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
CINCPAC-GINCPAC Item #

10678


2

第一 一般統制
 第二 財政制度
 第三 稅收制度
 第四 關稅制度
 第五 銀行制度
 第六 保險制度
 第七 公債制度
 第八 貨幣制度
 第九 度量衡制度
 第十 統計制度
 第十一 度量衡制度
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5
 人員及貨物同時輸送、並
 輸送、長距離、依り、燃料、清水、
 運送、設備、有、意、を、通、給、
 通、給、に、依、り、要、を、

(横地運)

6
 各種輸送、於、七、補、給、能、力、並
 運、送、等、の、調査、を、爲、す、期、を、
 一、七、補、給、に、所、要、物、品、を、補、
 給、し、七、同、時、に、可、能、な、ラ、ン、ス、ル、要、を、

運輸中、其、間、に、常、に、各、調、達、地、
 の、補、給、能、力、を、考、察、等、の、調査、を、
 其、大、小、に、依、り、補、給、に、依、り、配、給、を、
 萬、全、に、期、を、す、要、を、
 軍、港、に、り、戰、地、に、手、定、の、要、を、
 市、に、り、戰、地、に、手、定、の、要、を、
 補、給、に、行、動、用、消、耗、品、及、糧、食、
 等、の、補、給、に、因、難、を、

(横地運)

七、補、給、に、依、り、要、を、
 七、補、給、に、依、り、要、を、
 七、補、給、に、依、り、要、を、
 七、補、給、に、依、り、要、を、



兵運花田敷ノ増加ヲ圖ルヲ
喜ム

檢上新隊作戰用器材トシテ工作
材料供給區分ヲ明確ナラシムル
ヲ要ス

願追々想ラケ半少年ヲ安スル
 ナラニ放遣ノ止ムヲ現狀ニシ
 ラ請求有則、必存上意ボス
 陣害ハ分命補給作業員ノ
 士氣ニ影響スル處大ナル付

(一各病)

明治二十五年七月六日軍務
 三藏森等一三八號ヲ以テ指示セリ
 上ルニ閣下裁後從營高品ニ依
 存スル傾向並ニ顯著トナレリ特ニ
 陸上部隊隊用器材ニ関シテハ
 大小トナク軍需部ニ依存スル傾
 向顯著ナリ工廠建築部等ヨ
 リニ供給ニ得ル様ナスト共ニ供給
 遂分ニ明確ナラズルハ要アリ
 振需ニ於テハ一例

文庫ヲ軍需部ニ歸入シテ漸ク八月ノ經驗ニ徴スルニ左記理由ニ依リコノ際再轉シ文庫ヲ独立一行轉トナシ一應強力ナルモノニ編輯スルヲ要ス	(一) 土警ヨリ防諜用ニシテ各防空隊ヨリ電報アリ (二) 各防空隊ヨリ電報用ノ電線ニ至警ヨリ砲艇升揚用ノ電線ニ至 種長廿四米ノ燈丸太三ノ米要求 ノ電報アリ (四) 防空隊高角砲陸揚機ヲ用スルニ至米六寸長サ三間ノ杉丸太三ノ米要求アリ 以上ノ諸需ニ於テ上述ヨリ保鑣兵ニ融通ヲ受ケ要求ニ應ジタリ (各 需)


文庫制度、刷新増強之所
 轉ニテ往々之ニムルヲ要ス



(1) 時號書等、秘密圖書類、最
 高度之機密ヲ有シ之。取扱上、
 銷毀遲滯等ハ直ニ作戦ニ至
 大ノ影響ヲ及ボス。故ニ
 (2) 秘密圖書類、前記述ノ如キ
 特實ヲ有スルヲ以テ之ヲ取扱ハ
 常品等ノ如キ他ノ兵備品ト同一
 視ニテバ、ト式ニ軍需部ニ於
 テハ、適當ナラス

(3) 秘密圖書類、取扱ハ指揮系統
 事務系統等々中失各都局
 駐、鎮守府其、他各廳ト直通
 直送トセシムル銷毀遲滯ヲ生
 シ易シ

(4) 開戦後陸海軍、増大ト暗
 號書等、改編ノ頻繁ニ伴ヒ之
 等秘密圖書類、取扱數量、

[illegible]





一、燃料及土產之利用、作業能率
 之改善等
 二、燃料之節約、輸送船二乃至三
 隻、燃料可能ナル如ク擴張施設
 之、燃料必要ナルヲ認ム
 (三) 燃料
 三、燃料之節約、輸送船二乃至三
 隻、燃料可能ナル如ク擴張施設
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 (五) 燃料
 五、燃料之節約、輸送船二乃至三
 隻、燃料可能ナル如ク擴張施設
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 (六) 燃料
 六、燃料之節約、輸送船二乃至三
 隻、燃料可能ナル如ク擴張施設
 之、燃料必要ナルヲ認ム
 (七) 燃料
 七、燃料之節約、輸送船二乃至三
 隻、燃料可能ナル如ク擴張施設
 之、燃料必要ナルヲ認ム
 (八) 燃料
 八、燃料之節約、輸送船二乃至三
 隻、燃料可能ナル如ク擴張施設
 之、燃料必要ナルヲ認ム
 (九) 燃料
 九、燃料之節約、輸送船二乃至三
 隻、燃料可能ナル如ク擴張施設
 之、燃料必要ナルヲ認ム
 (十) 燃料
 十、燃料之節約、輸送船二乃至三
 隻、燃料可能ナル如ク擴張施設
 之、燃料必要ナルヲ認ム

機體險ニテ作業遅延ス

(十一空廠)

十一空廠ノ完成後ハ若空ニ海上
輸送ノ上飛行及空輸ヲ實施シ
ソ、アリテ之ニ要スル勞力、時間ノ
損失甚大ナリ、且空飛行場ノ滑
走路一本ニテ之延長施設ノ要アリ

(十一空廠)

現地軍需部ノ能力、不十分ニ

シテ實施部隊ノ要望ニ即應

ジ得サル者、少カクテ、補給軍

需品及大量物資有キルニ置キ、急

遽補給ノ遺憾ヲ有シ、此如ク現

在ノ施設並ニ有經驗者ノ充實ヲ

要ス

(各需品部各部)

補給施設、關シ其ノ不備、各作戦
中、大ニ影響ヲ及ボスコト、點々據
點、於テ各地ノ實情ニ就テ復
査アリ、是ノ対策ヲ講グルヲ要ス

24

為空襲等々、併し、右意、前
從部派、通津、シテ、一、現、陸軍
需部、支那、又、補給支所、増
設、必要アリ

(各 需)

現、陸軍需部、補給施設不備
、為高射砲、發電機等重量
大ナル兵器、陸揚出、不、裝備不
可能ナルモノアリ、又、魚雷機雷、
荷役、極メ、困難ニシテ、精巧ナ
ル兵器、毀損、ナル懼大ナル、
ラ、又、急速補給、間、合、ナル資
例、少カラズ、我、橋、起重機、運貨
、起重機、附貨物自動車等、
整備、ハ、絶対必要アリ

(各 需)

特設軍需部、整備促進實行
ヲ切望ス、四需、機械、構、的、六、四、所

属ナルGF艦船ニ對シテモ前線
補給基地タルヘキ重要性ヲ有
スルヲ以テ既定計畫施設ヲ特
急竣工ヲ圖リ持久的對南作
戰開始ヲ目途トシテ整備スル
ヲ要ス

(一) 亞

山ニホリルニ於ケル我機施設ニ就
テ全ナルモノ一ツモナク專ラ奇襲
ニ多大ノ努力カラ資シツ、アリ地
ノ如何ナル様性ヲ辨ヒテ之ニ至
急機橋施設ヲ實現セシムル
ヲ要ス

(一) 八空廠

航空機補給ノ為母機ヲ内
地ニ面航セシムルハ極大ノ不利アリ
各空廠ニ對シテ、軍需ノ受入

2 現地航空隊に極力航空機材を準備し置スヲ要ス	
(各病) 移動頻繁ナルヲ以テ輸送困難	可能トスルヲ要アリ (IAF IAF 4P 7S) 現在トラックニ於テハ飛行機更新大中検査共不可能ニシテ内地ヨリ供給モ容易ナラザル現狀ニシテ作戰任務飛行等ニ不安大ナリ (3S) 戦地ニ於ケル海軍病院藥劑部ノ外ニ根據地改所在地等ニ藥劑部支那(假称)ヲ設置シ内地補給ヨリ所要日數(一ヶ月ヲ要ス)ノ減少ヲ圖ルト同時ニ陸海軍部隊移動ニヨリ受領不能ヲ防止スルヲ要アリ

27


3.
各根據地潜水艦基地等ニ於テ
治療品、補給戰機ヲ強化ス
ルヲ要ス

緊急ノ際前線基地ニ於テ受込
得ル様何等ノ設備アリハ好
都合ナリ

(香取、五郎、宗谷、十八設營、伊大
潛、神威、リオン丸、平壤丸、六
根、六潛基、六通、五十四警、六十三
警、十四空、六十四警、疾病、新興
丸、二砲、艦隊、石垣、神津丸、室
戸、舞持、辰良、五十四砲、潜水
六十五警、陸奥、日枝丸、八海山丸
五八二空)


(四) 母艦及各潜水艦基地隊ニテ所要
量ヲ充弁補給シ得ル如ク整備セ
ラレシコトヲ希望ス(伊号七潜)
特設病院艦等ヨリ受タルニ必要
ナレド相互ノ行動ノ都合上所要
ノ時期ニ所要ノ治療品ヲ補給


	4. 原品廠支廠ヲ現地適當ナル地ニ設クルヲ要ス	
基地病院ニ多量ノ治療品ヲ配備シ極船入港ノ都度補給シ得ル如クナルヲ要ス (馬 雄)	現地ニ至ラザル應急用品治療品並ニ各種血清ワクチン等ヲ航空便ヲ以テ請長アルモ一時ニ多量輸送困難ナルヲ以テ補給即應ノ状態ニアラシムルヲ要スルニ付 (各 病)	備品ノ修理致作及入附箱ノ製作ヲ部外ニ行ハシムル時ハ長時日ヲ要シ以テ給付遺憾アリ 為念横病院一ノ年間ノ總修理件數又ソノ主要ナルモノ、件數九ノ通



第三
五
現地調達品
補給
ニ関スルコト

31





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第四 艦隊隨伴補給部隊，補給艦與船相互間，補給

海軍

給

給

(所見)

戦

訓

(理由)


重油ノ洋上補給ニ関シ作戦上至
急充託對策ヲ講ズルヲ要ス
縱使補給施設ヲ各艦船ニ装
備スルコト
補給所要時間ヲ短縮スル為
極力毎時ノ補給能力ヲ増ス
コト

作戦海面ノ状況縱使ニ依ラ
サレバ重油ノ補給不可能ナレ
場合多シ
艦船ノ毎時重油受入能力及
大艦ヨリ小艦船ニ對スル重油
供給能力不充分ナリ

何レモ三ノ五ノ時程度増大スルヲ
要ス
(各艦)
(35)

35間戦以來約一ノ年間ノ補給
回数及補給実績

給油艦(一) 巡洋艦	全則	補給名	補給量
八回	八回	五回	三回
巡洋艦(二) 潜水艦	一七回	二回	三回
補給艦(三) 同族一六回	二回	二回	三回
一ノ四ニ起リ搭載スルニ一ノ二時間ヲ要			



3 被服糧食 通保物品 他兵品 戰時 特別給與品等ノ艦船相互ノ讓渡 又國清有効ニ實施スル為メ 艦隊司令部ニテ統制スルヲ要ス	
艦船ノ補給ノ見込十分ナル地ニ 回航スル場合ハ出來得ル限リ殘 留艦船部隊ニ讓渡シ補給船 糧食不足ヲ補フ一助トスルヲ可ト (多摩、横六特)	稀ニシテ候ハ特設運送船ヲミテ後 方面ノ治療品補給ニ當ラシムル 必要アリ (伊豫、若室、戸病、五警) 病後船ノ行動ニ阻メテ浪走セラ レ小艦隊ノ活動スル方面ヘノ行動 ハ稀ナリ 然ルニ糧食船(又、糧食艦)ハ每月 二三回宛行動スルヲ以テ當該軍医 長ヲシテ治療品ノ艦船相互間補 給ニ任セシムル要アリ

第五
補給艦船性能補給能力、隻數及運航
ニ関スルコト

主眼	主眼	論 (所見)	要 則 (理由)
1	補給船ハ、種類ヲ明示セル標識 ノ適時掲揚スルヲ要トス		一見ニテ補給船ノ種類ヲ判知スル 標識ヲ定メ付スルヲ要ス 給油船ヲ 給糧船ト誤リ搭載機倉ヲ逸セ ルコトアリ (25d)
2	艦隊随伴ノ場合ニ於テ補給船 トシテハ力メテ優速船ヲ掲グル 要アリ		(1) 航空基地移動用ニ高速中型 船ヲ用フルヲ要アリ (2F) (2) 一般南方海面ニ於テハ小型優速船 ノ利用價值極大ナリ (18S 正、他) (3) 艦隊随伴ノ現状ノ十五節ニ困難 ナリ 給油船ノ実速滿載時二十節ヲ 要ス (健洋丸) (4) 兵装糧食ヲ食弱ナルヲ以テ強化スルヲ 要ス (18S) (5) 通信装置極メテ不備ニテ行動 指示上不便ナリ (2F)

3

先從上面遊運動、巧拙、船之安
危、左右、一戰會多、其狀二
値、ノ、能力、極力高、ル、有
利トナ
割空對指兵器及通信兵器多
、登舟、可、ト、雖標準、便
新、裝備、ス、ト、適當ト認ム

（四）平射砲：高角砲一種銃十二號
又二十五號二種強之此二種又

八難教眼望遠鏡
士德二龍裝鐵鏡
其角

一歲傳給。清曉。反封側。リ攻
 擊。ト多ク。資情。鑑。前
 後。都。三。門。苑。苑。テ。恭。備。テ。セ。テ。要
 人。拜。九。二。十。幾。一。門。五。十。幾
 主。謀。而。不。須。六。個。總。攝。尤。要。
 (恒。地。運)



1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 26

卷之五

25

道清汝水女子作賦行必哀

以上と見て前條と各先づ野燐石

急通大聖神醫不可久矣

卷之三

六十年來中國之政治

平峯峭壁得此余味

10

3

就述經等、小磁板、重油補給
 際、同時又、同地、於、生
 種品、之、補給、上、得、之、樣、計、畫、
 之、可、ト、ス、

急、速、大、補、給、之、不、可、能、ナ、リ、
 即、此、種、品、酒、洋、物、品、戰、艦、品、
 倉、上、輸、送、結、二、隻、獲、度、配、属、ノ
 事、ナ、リ、

(2F)

重油、概、計、八、日、要、之、補、給、セ、ル、生
 糧、品、二、十、日、間、一、日、欠、乏、セ、ル、ト
 ナ、リ、

(25d)

給、油、船、一、台、藏、庫、ノ、設、備、一、台
 油、上、同、時、二、生、糧、品、ノ、洋、上、補、給
 可、能、ナ、ラ、セ、ル、ト、要、ス、

(2F)

45

第一航空輸送機関

46

三

九

論

(并)

見)

載

判

(理)

由)

航空輸送ニ関シテハ更ニ統制
強化ノ要アリ

(一) 緊急ナル要スル部品類ノ補給並
ニ補給上極テ有利ト認ムルニ付
貨物輸送機ヲ各航空廠ニ專屬
セシムル要アリ

(二) 航空廠ニハ空庫

(一) 艦隊又ハ現地軍需部ニ輸送機ヲ
備ヘ消耗大ナル輕兵器ヲ急速補
給ニ遺憾無カラシムルヲ要ス

(二) 横 需)

(一) 血精ワヲ子ノ類 エツクス録ファイル
等要急品且保存ニ考慮ヲ要ス
此等物品多數アリニ付航空便ヲ
増シ要望ニ即應セシムルヲ要アリ


(二) 兵廠ニ付基)

(一) 作戦中心地ニ海上便ニ依ル補給
困難ナルニ付患者輸送機(艦隊)

47

ヲ運航シ徑路ニ至トシテ急ヲ要
スル治療品（血精、炭創材等）ヲ
復路ニ患者ヲ輸送スルヲ要ス
（葬、病）

48



This image shows a blank, aged, cream-colored page, likely an endpaper or flyleaf of a book. The paper has a slightly textured appearance with some minor discoloration and faint smudges, characteristic of old paper. A vertical strip of dark material, possibly a binding or cover, is visible along the right edge. A small, dark, rectangular mark is visible near the bottom center of the page.

4.

爆彈箱、取扱、及爆彈、出入
ト便、上組、式、如、模、造、ト、ス
ル、要、ス

爆彈、取扱、ノ、手、段、明、確、ニ、ス
ル、要、ス

爆彈、取扱、ノ、手、段、明、確、ニ、ス
ル、要、ス

爆彈、取扱、ノ、手、段、明、確、ニ、ス
ル、要、ス

爆彈、取扱、ノ、手、段、明、確、ニ、ス
ル、要、ス



4

此上之說，皆以爲然。然則，
爲人之道，其大者三：曰孝，
曰弟，曰忠。此三者，皆以
爲人之道。然則，爲人之道，
其大者三：曰孝，曰弟，曰
忠。此三者，皆以爲人之道。

復置之也。上曰。卿當長治。

(上) 盧 (成)

及、他、此流、依、是、資、能、力、
 件、必要、迫、レ、タル、實、例、多、
 之、針、策、就、テ、種、々、研、究、セ、テ、
 輸、送、乃、至、保、管、中、日、已、故、電、
 防、止、タ、メ、ニ、包、装、又、ハ、石、炭、用、需、
 品、ニ、對、シ、テ、有、テ、改、善、セ、テ、ア、レ、

5

戦域ノ擴大ニ應ジ各地域ノ氣温
湿度其ノ他状況ヲ考慮シソノ地
ニ適應スル需品等ノ改善選定ヲ
至急裝防護等ニ關シ研究ニ要
アリ
(最近研究改善セラレツ、アリ)

此等ノ事弊キリ各機關ニ
應ジ得ル様時前ニ研究セシムベキ
相當強力ナル研究機關ヲ設置
スルヲ必要トス

(糧 食)

熱帶ニシテ濕氣多ク當地ニ
於テハ内地ヨリ補給ノ甘味品等
ハ受込時既ニ使用ニ堪ヘサルモノ
多ク況ヤコレガ保存至難ナリ

(二) 然ラカン食糧

乾板印重飯類ハ熱帶地ニ於
テ保存ニテ片ヲ出スレテカブリ
シ生ジ使用不能トナルモノ極メ
テ多シ

(二) 八空廠

四 ラボール附近ハ火山ノ關係ニテ硫
化作用大ナリ計器ノ目盛板
(夜光塗料)ノ腐蝕内藏ノ破

外他處工部除用常品外
 如新舊大乃至組之式
 經乃簡易化之要了


於故部除進步外其餘
 具類之新品中最大之
 安之輪送其行送等之
 具日數其輪送之消費
 破損亦不太多之輪送
 症十


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入

補給實施、先地ヨリスル船体、機関
機、裝品施設等、改善事項

57





一、油類
 二、燃料
 三、彈藥
 四、糧食
 五、被服
 六、醫藥
 七、器材
 八、其他
 九、總計
 十、備註
 十一、說明
 十二、附屬
 十三、其他
 十四、總計
 十五、備註
 十六、說明
 十七、附屬
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 九十九、總計
 一百、備註

① 表備せしムルヲ要ス
 低減ノ場合補給速度ニ影響有ス
 (夜間重油補給可能ナル諸施設
 ② 能ク要ス (使洋丸)
 ③ 輕便ナル有線電話ヲ以テ補給中
 兩者間通信シ得ハ至便ナリ
 ④ 夜間補給ノ場合等發光信
 号等ヲ用フル要ナク警戒上安
 全ナリ (使洋丸)
 ⑤ 航空揮發油補給船ニ補給用
 蛇管(約五〇米)ヲ準備スルヲ
 要ス
 ⑥ 潮水ナル場合保安上母艦ノ横
 付給油ニ危険ナリ
 (附)
 ⑦ 輸送船ハ各ハルチ「デリッ」ヲ

金福海用一得此知

125

大發子漫水大仁三時同ノ要元
七ノアリ一ツノ年ノ荷役ノ不
復丁山如ノ改造トモ後腐趾下リ

(一) 空夜

藏庫山冷沫能力不充分色素不良））為松或五、六種或昔之連多事也

75

新校運送在二丁欄外池外計
餘程若干不便上之丁丁

卷九

成裝上面意ヲ要ス

(日章元)

2

太力量ノ運リヲシテ裝備ハル輸送
船ヲ相當敷整頓シ置ノ要ス

貯船大段其ノ他重量物ノ格
載ヲ可能ナラシムル爲輸送船ノ
前後部ニ四十噸ノクレーンヲ裝
備スル要アリ (横地運)

(終)


DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #18
(PHOTOSTATIC COPY OF ORIGINAL JAPANESE DOCUMENT
CAPTURED BY U S NAVY
AT MANILA FROM THE JAPANESE CRUISER NACHI ON 1 APRIL 1945
CONTAINING ON PAGES 2-1 THROUGH 2-152 ONLY
MATERIAL PERTINENT (OTHER PAGES NOT BEING PERTINENT)
TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
CONSISTING OF
PLANS AND ORDERS FOR COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES
ENTITLED
"TOP SECRET COMBINED FLEET OPERATION ORDER #1
and
TOP SECRET COMBINED FLEET OPERATION ORDER #2"

USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

The material in this SOURCE DOCUMENT is embraced in the translations stated in SOURCE DOCUMENTS Nos. 1 and 2 (supra), which were used by the Navy in compiling said Navy Summary of the "Japanese Plan for the Attack on Pearl Harbor."





TOP SECRET

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NO. 2

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DOCUMENT NO. 2





聯合艦隊命令作第一號別冊

對不英蘭戰爭ニ於ケル聯合艦隊ノ作戰

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第一編 對支戰中不國、英國及蘭國ノ時

戰タル場合ノ聯合艦隊ノ作戰

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第二章 開戰準備ノ要綱

第一節 開戰準備

第二節 開戰及開戰時ノ武力行使

第三章 第一段作戰

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第二節 對A艦隊作戰要領

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第九章 海陸軍，協定(別冊)

第二 (續) 父之愛子，子之愛父，國之愛國，國之愛國，

第六、综合训练

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第一部 金銀守府要部部隊，作戰

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第三節 雜

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第三章 航政意識

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- 一 東方ニ對シ、日本國艦隊ヲ擊破シ且東洋ニ對スル米國ノ作戰線及補給線ヲ遮斷ス
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- 三 在東洋敵兵力ヲ擊滅シ其ノ作戰線ヲ奪フト共ニ資源地ヲ獲得ス
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態勢ヲ確保ス

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第一節 開戦準備

- 一 帝國、米國英國及蘭國ニ對シ開戦ヲ豫期シ諸般ノ作戰準備ヲ完成スルニ決シタル場合、開戦ノ概定期日ヲ日ト共ニ第一開戦準備ヲ下令ス各部隊ハ左ニ依リ行動ス
- ハ 各艦隊部隊ハ特令ヲ受テ第一段作戰第一

2-8

現作戦兵力の調査、依り編制、... 戦備、
整へ各軍の指揮官決定、依り、適時、
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第三項 開戦及開戦前、武力行使
 一 開戦時機之令、永し開戦日(又日)(数日前
 之令、(要請))、以て示ス
 二 日。... 開戦後、... 之、... 開戦、...
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2-12

1. The first of these is the fact that the
2. committee has not yet received the
3. report of the subcommittee on the
4. subject of the proposed amendment to
5. the constitution of the United States
6. which would give the President the
7. power to remove and appoint judges
8. of the Supreme Court.

2. The second of these is the fact that
the committee has not yet received the
report of the subcommittee on the
subject of the proposed amendment to
the constitution of the United States
which would give the President the
power to remove and appoint judges
of the Supreme Court.

3. The third of these is the fact that
the committee has not yet received the
report of the subcommittee on the
subject of the proposed amendment to
the constitution of the United States
which would give the President the
power to remove and appoint judges
of the Supreme Court.

4. The fourth of these is the fact that
the committee has not yet received the
report of the subcommittee on the
subject of the proposed amendment to
the constitution of the United States
which would give the President the
power to remove and appoint judges
of the Supreme Court.

2-3

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(四) 前項求戰、或里ヲ奪テ陸軍攻略兵團
ノ主力ヲ菲律賓次ニテ馬來ニ上陸セシメ
速ニ菲律賓及支領馬來ヲ攻略ス

(四) 作戰初期、已ニ次ニテ蘭領北ボルネオ南
部「スマタラ」を以テ之ノ見テ「モルワ」諸
島「マニラ」島ノ要地ヲ占領シ所要ノ航空
基地ヲ整備ス

2-15

(四) 前項ノ航空基地整備次第ニ逐次航空部隊
ヲ推進シテ爪哇方面敵航空兵力ヲ制圧
シ之ヲ殲滅シ、次ニ陸軍攻略兵團、上ク

爪哇ニ上陸セシメ同島ヲ攻略ス

(四) 新嘉坡攻略後北部「スマタラ」ノ要域ヲ占
領シ又敵ノ對支補給路遮斷ノ目的ヲ以
テ適時緬甸ニ對シ作戰ス

三 米國駐守兵ニ對シ場合ニテ南方作戰次第
ニ應ジテ自造艦隊ヲ以テ之ヲ襲撃シ決戦
兵力ノ大ナル數艦ヲ以テ襲撃ス

四 聯合艦隊、即チ太平洋及印度洋
方面ニ於ケル敵海上交通ヲ破壞ス

2-16

五 泰國及緬甸印度支那ニ對シテ極力彼ノ敵

意ヲ挑発セザル如クシ我作戦ニ随意セシムルニ
努ムルニ具ノ敵對行動ヲ認メタル場合、武力
ヲ以テ作戦ノ障害ヲ排除ス

第一節 對本國艦隊作戦要領

對本國艦隊作戦理、及作戦要領左ノ通定ム

各部隊、指示作戦種別ニ應ズル如ク作戦ス

戦時	對本國艦隊
先遣部隊	先遣部隊、本國艦隊ヲ監視、奇襲攻撃ス 情況依リ機雷ノ兵力ヲ以テ、クラント、
機雷部隊	一、イ、イ、イ、イ等ノ航空基地攻撃ス 二、機雷部隊、本國艦隊備フ
本國艦隊	一、先遣部隊機雷部隊南方部隊北方部隊 本國機雷部隊、新ニ偵察ス 二、主力部隊、所要應ニ之ヲ支援ス 三、情況依リ、第一航空艦隊一部ヲ一時東方 ニ転用スルコトアリ
進攻スル場合	一、選撃部隊、より先遣部隊機雷部隊南 洋部隊北方部隊主力部隊、本國艦隊 對ニ作戦ニ南方部隊中、決戦兵力、選 選撃作戦、加入ス 二、南方作戦、第三艦隊南遣艦隊、第一航 空艦隊、戦間機等、以テ之ヲ補助ス

第二節 南方作戦要領

2-17

2-18

南方作戰ハ作戰方針及聯合總隊司令長官南方軍總司令官間協定ニ基キ特令スルヲ除ク
ノ外南方部隊指揮官之ヲ實施ス

第四節 作戰期別

第一段作戰ヲ左ノ通區分シ其ノ變換ハ特令ス

一 第一期作戰

開戰ヨリ概ネ菲律賓攻略陸軍主力上陸完了迄ノ作戰

二 第二期作戰

第一期作戰後ヨリ概ネ英領馬來攻略陸

軍主力上陸完了迄ノ作戰

三 第三期作戰

第三期作戰後ヨリ荷印攻略作戰一段落迄ノ作戰

第五節 兵力部署

第一段作戰ニ兵力部署左ノ通定ム

一 第一期作戰兵力部署 別表第一

二 第二期作戰兵力部署 別表第二

三 第三期作戰兵力部署 別表第三

四 連年作戰兵力部署 別表第四

第四章 第二段 作戰

第一節 作戰方針

- 一 米國及英國艦隊ニ對シ先遣部隊等ヲ以テ監視警戒ヲ續行シ好機基地航空部隊母艦航空部隊等ヲ以テ攻撃ス
- 二 米國及英國ノ東洋ニ對スル作戰線及補給線ヲ確保シ過斷シ要地ノ防備ヲ強化ス
- 三 管轄海區内敵兵力及攻略要地ノ殘敵ヲ掃滅シ資源ヲ確保シ海上交通ヲ保護ス
- 四 米國及英國艦隊來攻ニ内線ノ利ヲ占メ各

2-21

海ニ撃破ス

- 三 對米國、英國海上交通破壞作戰ヲ強化ス

第二節 占領地域中防備スベキ重要

地點及前進根據地

- 一 占領地域中防備スベキ重要地点左ノ通譯定ス
馬尼刺「マニラ」、新嘉坡「シンガポ」スラバヤ「スラバヤ」
「ラカ」バタビヤ「バタビヤ」マニラ「マニラ」
「アムボ」ベナン「ベナン」ラバウル「ラバウル」
- 二 占領地域ニ於テル前進根據地左ノ通譯定ス
馬尼刺、新嘉坡「スラバヤ」

2-22

2-24

第一節 珍珠港之防禦
珍珠港之防禦，係由海軍部與陸軍部共同負責。海軍部負責海空防禦，陸軍部負責陸地防禦。珍珠港之防禦，係由海軍部與陸軍部共同負責。海軍部負責海空防禦，陸軍部負責陸地防禦。

2-26

第二節 珍珠港之襲擊
珍珠港之襲擊，係由日本海軍發動。日本海軍於1941年12月7日，對珍珠港發動襲擊。襲擊結果，美國海軍損失多艘戰艦，並造成大量人員傷亡。襲擊後，美國對日本宣戰，第二次世界大戰正式爆發。

2-26

第三節 珍珠港之襲擊

1. 關於本會之組織及職權範圍，業經本會第一次會員大會通過，並經呈請內政部備案在案。茲為適應業務需要，特擬具本會組織規程，呈請呈請內政部備案，以資改進。

2. 關於本會之經費，業經本會第一次會員大會通過，並經呈請內政部備案在案。茲為適應業務需要，特擬具本會經費收支管理辦法，呈請呈請內政部備案，以資改進。

3. 關於本會之人事，業經本會第一次會員大會通過，並經呈請內政部備案在案。茲為適應業務需要，特擬具本會人事管理辦法，呈請呈請內政部備案，以資改進。

4. 關於本會之業務，業經本會第一次會員大會通過，並經呈請內政部備案在案。茲為適應業務需要，特擬具本會業務管理辦法，呈請呈請內政部備案，以資改進。

— 13 —

5. 關於本會之財產，業經本會第一次會員大會通過，並經呈請內政部備案在案。茲為適應業務需要，特擬具本會財產管理辦法，呈請呈請內政部備案，以資改進。

6. 關於本會之印章，業經本會第一次會員大會通過，並經呈請內政部備案在案。茲為適應業務需要，特擬具本會印章管理辦法，呈請呈請內政部備案，以資改進。

7. 關於本會之其他事項，業經本會第一次會員大會通過，並經呈請內政部備案在案。茲為適應業務需要，特擬具本會其他事項管理辦法，呈請呈請內政部備案，以資改進。

3-27

3-28

Phyllanthus

2-31

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一、文字、图形、

2-32

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2-94

三、第一校第三期作戲，八九月以後

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
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
2-43

7th - 2

一、張氏別腹內真意、故遠ヲ主用ス
故、張氏、道建既實ノ刻、一種ノ場合又特
ニ王母真ニ、一種ノ道建確認ノ果ニ、場合


一、以信爲生信之。二、信乃政事之本信，
此能通信第一等之要。三、信令。其能通
信亦入。
建國時給八事兵，他作戰上緊急之要。
一、通信：年々不通信來求。
但已戰新部隊通商，求水若特別江路，
爲通距離，行動，不部隊，得戰位置進火，
以保未通，打平，一將之通信來入。

[illegible]



2-47

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一 偽電字號之偽電區分法

偽電字號之偽電區分法 (聯合總司令部電報所)

二 偽電字號之偽電區分法

偽電字號之偽電區分法 (聯合總司令部電報所)

三 地點表示法

時	詞	法	略	通	用
第一地點表示法	十八	海軍省軍務部第一二七號	海軍省軍務部第一二七號	緊急	海軍省軍務部第一二七號
第二地點表示法	十八	海軍省軍務部第一二七號	海軍省軍務部第一二七號	緊急	海軍省軍務部第一二七號
第三地點表示法	十八	海軍省軍務部第一二七號	海軍省軍務部第一二七號	緊急	海軍省軍務部第一二七號
第四地點表示法	十八	海軍省軍務部第一二七號	海軍省軍務部第一二七號	緊急	海軍省軍務部第一二七號

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第五地點表示法	十八	海軍省軍務部第一二七號	海軍省軍務部第一二七號	緊急	海軍省軍務部第一二七號
第六地點表示法	十八	海軍省軍務部第一二七號	海軍省軍務部第一二七號	緊急	海軍省軍務部第一二七號
第七地點表示法	十八	海軍省軍務部第一二七號	海軍省軍務部第一二七號	緊急	海軍省軍務部第一二七號
第八地點表示法	十八	海軍省軍務部第一二七號	海軍省軍務部第一二七號	緊急	海軍省軍務部第一二七號
第九地點表示法	十八	海軍省軍務部第一二七號	海軍省軍務部第一二七號	緊急	海軍省軍務部第一二七號

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[illegible]

子行

李自華之策：「以 德 治 民，以 信 治 士，以 義 治 民，以 禮 治 士。」

卷之六

區別	法則
A	前數(一)百(一)十五進
B	前數(一)百(一)十五進
C	前數(一)百(一)十五進
D	前數(一)百(一)十五進
E	前數(一)百(一)十五進

第二章 敵情利用、妨害

下教德州用

(一) 各艦隊 屬不敵班 (當該艦隊司令長官所)

定三休，敦信，利用，行，

(三) 通車後所屬戰備班之休，較佳利用，任不

通信隊名	第	編
東京員像	上、ニク本、本國艦隊、航空機、動 作、知、行、ト、キ、ヲ、ノ、動、兵、分 、動、解、ノ、知、ト、 詳、別、事、一、部、八、使、隊、隊、司、令、官、所、定、	
	主、ト、テ、極、東、ノ、ミ、米、兵、隊、艦 艇、凡、空、機、動、解、ノ、知、ト、	

2-55

2-56

1. The first exhibit is a copy of a letterhead memorandum dated 10/1/54, from the Department of Defense to the Department of State, regarding the proposed sale of arms to the Government of Cuba. The memorandum is signed by the Secretary of Defense and is addressed to the Secretary of State.

2. The second exhibit is a copy of a letterhead memorandum dated 10/1/54, from the Department of Defense to the Department of State, regarding the proposed sale of arms to the Government of Cuba. The memorandum is signed by the Secretary of Defense and is addressed to the Secretary of State.

3. The third exhibit is a copy of a letterhead memorandum dated 10/1/54, from the Department of Defense to the Department of State, regarding the proposed sale of arms to the Government of Cuba. The memorandum is signed by the Secretary of Defense and is addressed to the Secretary of State.

4. The fourth exhibit is a copy of a letterhead memorandum dated 10/1/54, from the Department of Defense to the Department of State, regarding the proposed sale of arms to the Government of Cuba. The memorandum is signed by the Secretary of Defense and is addressed to the Secretary of State.

5. The fifth exhibit is a copy of a letterhead memorandum dated 10/1/54, from the Department of Defense to the Department of State, regarding the proposed sale of arms to the Government of Cuba. The memorandum is signed by the Secretary of Defense and is addressed to the Secretary of State.

2-57

6. The sixth exhibit is a copy of a letterhead memorandum dated 10/1/54, from the Department of Defense to the Department of State, regarding the proposed sale of arms to the Government of Cuba. The memorandum is signed by the Secretary of Defense and is addressed to the Secretary of State.

7. The seventh exhibit is a copy of a letterhead memorandum dated 10/1/54, from the Department of Defense to the Department of State, regarding the proposed sale of arms to the Government of Cuba. The memorandum is signed by the Secretary of Defense and is addressed to the Secretary of State.

8. The eighth exhibit is a copy of a letterhead memorandum dated 10/1/54, from the Department of Defense to the Department of State, regarding the proposed sale of arms to the Government of Cuba. The memorandum is signed by the Secretary of Defense and is addressed to the Secretary of State.

9. The ninth exhibit is a copy of a letterhead memorandum dated 10/1/54, from the Department of Defense to the Department of State, regarding the proposed sale of arms to the Government of Cuba. The memorandum is signed by the Secretary of Defense and is addressed to the Secretary of State.


10. The tenth exhibit is a copy of a letterhead memorandum dated 10/1/54, from the Department of Defense to the Department of State, regarding the proposed sale of arms to the Government of Cuba. The memorandum is signed by the Secretary of Defense and is addressed to the Secretary of State.

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方	備	說明
5122500	一、	...
5122501	二、	...
5122502	三、	...
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5122504	五、	...
5122505	六、	...
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5122508	九、	...
5122509	十、	...
5122510	十一、	...
5122511	十二、	...
5122512	十三、	...
5122513	十四、	...
5122514	十五、	...
5122515	十六、	...
5122516	十七、	...
5122517	十八、	...
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5122536	三十七、	...
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5122538	三十九、	...
5122539	四十、	...
5122540	四十一、	...
5122541	四十二、	...
5122542	四十三、	...
5122543	四十四、	...
5122544	四十五、	...
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5122546	四十七、	...
5122547	四十八、	...
5122548	四十九、	...
5122549	五十、	...
5122550	五十一、	...
5122551	五十二、	...
5122552	五十三、	...
5122553	五十四、	...
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5122556	五十七、	...
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5122595	九十六、	...
5122596	九十七、	...
5122597	九十八、	...
5122598	九十九、	...
5122599	一百、	...

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1. The first of the exhibits is a copy of the letterhead memorandum dated January 1, 1964, from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to the President, regarding the activities of the Soviet Union in the United States.

2. The second exhibit is a copy of the letterhead memorandum dated January 1, 1964, from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to the President, regarding the activities of the Soviet Union in the United States.

3. The third exhibit is a copy of the letterhead memorandum dated January 1, 1964, from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to the President, regarding the activities of the Soviet Union in the United States.

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10. The tenth exhibit is a copy of the letterhead memorandum dated January 1, 1964, from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to the President, regarding the activities of the Soviet Union in the United States.

11. The eleventh exhibit is a copy of the letterhead memorandum dated January 1, 1964, from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to the President, regarding the activities of the Soviet Union in the United States.

12. The twelfth exhibit is a copy of the letterhead memorandum dated January 1, 1964, from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to the President, regarding the activities of the Soviet Union in the United States.

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一、各部隊之補給，應由各該部隊之補給所負責，其補給所之組織，應由各該部隊之指揮官，根據本會之規定，自行編定，並由各該部隊之指揮官，負責監督之。

第三章 補給之交接

一、各部隊之補給，應由各該部隊之補給所負責，其補給所之組織，應由各該部隊之指揮官，根據本會之規定，自行編定，並由各該部隊之指揮官，負責監督之。

二、各部隊之補給，應由各該部隊之補給所負責，其補給所之組織，應由各該部隊之指揮官，根據本會之規定，自行編定，並由各該部隊之指揮官，負責監督之。

三、各部隊之補給，應由各該部隊之補給所負責，其補給所之組織，應由各該部隊之指揮官，根據本會之規定，自行編定，並由各該部隊之指揮官，負責監督之。

四、各部隊之補給，應由各該部隊之補給所負責，其補給所之組織，應由各該部隊之指揮官，根據本會之規定，自行編定，並由各該部隊之指揮官，負責監督之。

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1. The first of these is the fact that the
2. committee has not yet received any information
3. from the Department of Justice regarding the
4. results of its investigation of the activities
5. of the various groups and individuals who are
6. known to be active in the field of
7. international relations. It is therefore
8. impossible for the committee to make any
9. definite statement as to the results of its
10. investigation at this time.

11. The second of these is the fact that the
12. committee has not yet received any information
13. from the Department of Justice regarding the
14. results of its investigation of the activities
15. of the various groups and individuals who are
16. known to be active in the field of
17. international relations. It is therefore
18. impossible for the committee to make any
19. definite statement as to the results of its
20. investigation at this time.

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1. 凡在本行存款，利息按日计算，按月结息。
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1. The first step in the process of the investigation is the identification of the problem. This is done by the investigator who is responsible for the study. The investigator must first identify the problem that is being investigated. This is done by the investigator who is responsible for the study. The investigator must first identify the problem that is being investigated.

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第八章 聯合艦隊以外，作戰

第一節 本鎮守府主要部隊，作戰

一 各艦艇應成兩支，以敵，嚴密之海上交通，保護
二 各艦艇應成兩支，作戰，聯合艦隊及是部
方面艦隊，協力。

三 航空部隊，應所部兵力，情況，應之，所要，
地點，移動，進出，同一方面，作戰，聯合艦隊，
彈官，各法方面，艦艇，又，要，連，部，保，
樣，官，編，隊，受，之。

第二節 支那方面艦隊，作戰

一 觀察現勢，以，支那，對，之，作戰，續，行，三，
二 陸上兵力，增，強，擊，滅，之，兵，權，益，是，理，
三 開，我，初，頭，第二，支，艦，隊，展，示，之，部隊，以，陸
軍，協，同，之，兵，隊，沒，略，之，兵，隊，所，在，故，兵，力，特
為，擊，滅。

四 佔領地，防，備，兵，隊，嚴，密，之，支，那，沿，岸，海，上，交
通，保護，之，兵，隊，嚴，密，之，支，那，沿，岸，海，上，交
通，保護，之，兵，隊，嚴，密，之，支，那，沿，岸，海，上，交

利用，祖，國，之，兵，隊，
四 陸軍，海上，輸送，兵，隊，入，集，合，隊，防，備，之，二，所，要
應，之，聯合，艦，隊，及，自，有，軍，隊，作戰，協力。

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第二章 兵力部署

列表詳述（表略）

第三章 關於進攻以外作戰

第一節 關於防禦以外作戰

一、機動隊在太平洋方面，各軍官有以之為根據地，
 旅團，主要應以非正式，將之及國籍水戰艦三艘，
 對之進攻，旅團應在王項附近，及旅團之中心，
 設。

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小隊進攻時，應以實地之命令，航空部隊，
 並用各軍官，有要地，移動集中，再作戰，防務。

第二章 又關於方面艦隊，作戰

主上之第一，是艦隊之第三，連之艦隊，展齊，之部隊，
 之，中之方面，之，場中之艦隊，艦隊，艦隊，
 中，之，艦隊，之，之，艦隊，艦隊，艦隊。

第三節 附 則

第一章 使用表

中火村早時，之。

第二章 使用表圖

使用表圖（其要點如圖）（左）依。

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 大業通寶
 千五百
 行禮

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第二章 風味方劑

口味方微別，爾食惟飲，康所定，依外左，依心。

海軍艦艇 日本船舶(輸送船及陸軍所屬船舶) (金)


凡陸軍、海軍、空軍、炮兵、步兵、各一團，共計六團，分駐各要隘。

將同展船冰方撤別信即規程，二低一

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別表第四

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陸軍部	海軍部	陸軍部	海軍部	陸軍部	海軍部
陸軍部	海軍部	陸軍部	海軍部	陸軍部	海軍部
1908	1908	1908	1908	1908	1908
1909	1909	1909	1909	1909	1909
1910	1910	1910	1910	1910	1910

	備考
補給 知照	通車 終丁
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別本藏


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聯合艦隊司令部
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第一	第二	第三	第四	第五	第六	第七	第八	第九	第十	第十一	第十二	第十三	第十四	第十五	第十六	第十七	第十八	第十九	第二十	第二十一	第二十二	第二十三	第二十四	第二十五	第二十六	第二十七	第二十八	第二十九	第三十	第三十一	第三十二	第三十三	第三十四	第三十五	第三十六	第三十七	第三十八	第三十九	第四十	第四十一	第四十二	第四十三	第四十四	第四十五	第四十六	第四十七	第四十八	第四十九	第五十	第五十一	第五十二	第五十三	第五十四	第五十五	第五十六	第五十七	第五十八	第五十九	第六十	第六十一	第六十二	第六十三	第六十四	第六十五	第六十六	第六十七	第六十八	第六十九	第七十	第七十一	第七十二	第七十三	第七十四	第七十五	第七十六	第七十七	第七十八	第七十九	第八十	第八十一	第八十二	第八十三	第八十四	第八十五	第八十六	第八十七	第八十八	第八十九	第九十	第九十一	第九十二	第九十三	第九十四	第九十五	第九十六	第九十七	第九十八	第九十九	第一百
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第一章 总论

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四 補缺吳興縣知事王德馨奏為 懇請補缺 事查補
缺二員在案竊查 吳興縣下屬昭輝宮父聯
金壇縣司金壇縣丞
五 各州縣指撥等情前來臣查該州縣初度充實
順慶慶豐等縣之缺乃屬今之尤本學父聯金壇

1. 日本對華之經濟關係
 2. 日本對華之政治關係
 3. 日本對華之軍事關係
 4. 日本對華之文化關係
 5. 日本對華之宗教關係
 6. 日本對華之社會關係
 7. 日本對華之法律關係
 8. 日本對華之教育關係
 9. 日本對華之衛生關係
 10. 日本對華之體育關係
 11. 日本對華之藝術關係
 12. 日本對華之科學關係
 13. 日本對華之技術關係
 14. 日本對華之交通關係
 15. 日本對華之郵政關係
 16. 日本對華之電信關係
 17. 日本對華之新聞關係
 18. 日本對華之出版關係
 19. 日本對華之印刷關係
 20. 日本對華之攝影關係
 21. 日本對華之電影關係
 22. 日本對華之戲劇關係
 23. 日本對華之音樂關係
 24. 日本對華之舞蹈關係
 25. 日本對華之體育關係
 26. 日本對華之衛生關係
 27. 日本對華之法律關係
 28. 日本對華之教育關係
 29. 日本對華之社會關係
 30. 日本對華之文化關係
 31. 日本對華之宗教關係
 32. 日本對華之政治關係
 33. 日本對華之經濟關係

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1. 日本對華之經濟關係
 2. 日本對華之政治關係
 3. 日本對華之軍事關係
 4. 日本對華之文化關係
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 6. 日本對華之社會關係
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 8. 日本對華之教育關係
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 31. 日本對華之宗教關係
 32. 日本對華之政治關係
 33. 日本對華之經濟關係

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1. The first of these is the fact that the
2. committee has not yet received any information
3. from the State Department regarding the
4. activities of the various groups and
5. individuals who are active in the
6. field of civil liberties and human rights.
7. The second fact is that the committee
8. has not yet received any information
9. from the various groups and individuals
10. who are active in the field of civil liberties
11. and human rights regarding the activities
12. of the various groups and individuals who are
13. active in the field of civil liberties and
14. human rights.

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1. The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions, including sales, purchases, and expenses. It emphasizes the need for consistency and transparency in financial reporting.

2. The second part of the document outlines the various methods used to collect and analyze data, including surveys, interviews, and focus groups. It highlights the importance of selecting appropriate samples and ensuring the reliability of the data collected.

3. The third part of the document describes the process of identifying and measuring the impact of different factors on the outcome of interest. It discusses the use of statistical models to estimate the magnitude and direction of these effects.

4. The fourth part of the document discusses the importance of interpreting the results of the analysis in the context of the research question and the existing literature. It emphasizes the need for critical thinking and the ability to draw meaningful conclusions from the data.

5. The fifth part of the document discusses the importance of communicating the findings of the research to a wider audience. It highlights the need for clear and concise reporting, as well as the use of appropriate visual aids to enhance the presentation of the data.

6. The sixth part of the document discusses the importance of ensuring the ethical integrity of the research process. It highlights the need for informed consent, confidentiality, and the avoidance of conflicts of interest.

7. The seventh part of the document discusses the importance of ongoing evaluation and improvement of the research process. It highlights the need for regular monitoring and assessment of the quality of the data and the effectiveness of the methods used.

8. The eighth part of the document discusses the importance of sharing the results of the research with the broader community. It highlights the need for open access to the data and the publication of the findings in peer-reviewed journals.

9. The ninth part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining the integrity of the research process. It highlights the need for transparency in the reporting of the results and the avoidance of any form of manipulation or distortion of the data.

10. The tenth part of the document discusses the importance of ensuring the long-term sustainability of the research process. It highlights the need for ongoing funding and support, as well as the involvement of the community in the research process.

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The image shows a document page that is severely degraded. It appears to be a ledger or a table with multiple columns and rows. The text is mostly illegible due to the high contrast and noise. A large, dark, irregular shape is visible on the right side, suggesting a significant tear or damage to the paper. The overall appearance is that of a very poor quality scan of an old document.

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THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATION OF THE
ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATION OF THE
ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATION OF THE
ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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機密聯合艦隊命令第二號 600

昭和十六年十二月七日佐田實長門

聯合艦隊司令長官山本五十六

軍機

聯合艦隊命令

第一開戰準備

Y日十二月八日

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(79th Congress)

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 14

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 9 THROUGH 43

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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PART 14

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 9 THROUGH 43

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



**JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK**

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, *Chairman*
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, *Vice Chairman*
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia **JOHN W. MURPHY**, Representative from
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine **BERTRAND W. GEARHART**, Representa-
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California
gan **FRANK B. KEEFE**, Representative from
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin
North Carolina

COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel*
GERHARD A. GEBELL, *Chief Assistant Counsel*
JULE M. HANNAFORD, *Assistant Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*

(After January 14, 1946)

SETH W. RICHARDSON, *General Counsel*
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, *Associate General Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*
EDWARD P. MORGAN, *Assistant Counsel*
LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*

HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Pages	Transcript pages	Hearings
1	1- 399	1- 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Exhibits Nos.
12	1 through 6.
13	7 and 8.
14	9 through 43.
15	44 through 87.
16	88 through 110.
17	111 through 128.
18	129 through 156.
19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments.

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Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
1-----	23 11-15-45	1	Selection of intercepted diplomatic messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between July 1 and Dec. 8, 1941.
2-----	24 11-15-45	254	Selection of intercepted messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between Dec. 2, 1940, and Dec. 8, 1941, concerning military installations, ships movements, espionage reports, etc.
3-----	87 11-16-45	317	Navy Department dispatch No. 252203 dated Nov. 25, 1941, directing the routing of trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits.
4-----	142 11-16-45	318	Chart showing plotting record of early plane flights Dec. 7, 1941, obtained by Opana Radar Detector Station.
5-----	153 11-16-45	318	Army compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Opana Radar Detector Station.
6-----	153 11-16-45	337	Navy compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Colonel Thielen as illustrating his narrative statement.
7-----	172 11-17-45	391	Photostatic copy of Opana Radar Detector Station plot, submitted by Senator Ferguson, identified by Admiral Inglis, previously marked "Exhibit 3-B in evidence" in proceedings before Army Pearl Harbor Board.
8-----	233 11-19-45	391	Material obtained by Army and Navy primarily from Japanese sources, relating to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
8-A-----	1792 12-18-45	413	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8-B-----	1792 12-18-45	415	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8-C-----	1792 12-18-45	424	Report dated Dec. 4, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
8-D	2480 1-5-46	425	Report dated Dec. 13, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
9	256 11-19-45	923	Selection of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral J. O. Richardson, from Jan. 18, 1940, to Feb. 10, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
10	279 11-20-45	1000	Letter dated Jan. 24, 1941, from Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War regarding defenses of Pearl Harbor, and reply by Secretary of War, dated Feb. 7, 1941; letter from Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated Feb. 7, 1941, transmitting the above letters with instructions and receipt therefor.
11	319 11-21-45	1006	Memorandum dated Oct. 16, 1940, from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Hart, concerning a proposed blockade of Japan in the event of aggressive action over the reopening of the Burma Road.
12	363 11-21-45	1013	Letters from War Department and Navy Department with enclosures, dated Nov. 7, 1945, and Nov. 14, 1945, respectively, to Congressman Frank B. Keefe, concerning data on amounts requested by the services, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and contract authorizations for the years 1932 through 1941.
13	387 11-21-45	1019	Study of the air situation in Hawaii dated Aug. 20, 1941, by Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, for Commanding General, Army Air Forces, through Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
14	397 11-21-45	1040	Letter dated Apr. 14, 1941, from Assistant Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department to the Adjutant General, entitled "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor" in reply to letter of Feb. 7, 1941, on this subject (see exhibit No. 10), enclosing Annex No. 7 to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Joint Estimate Hawaiian Air Force, and Patrol Wing 2 (Naval Base Defense Air Force), and Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security).
15	401 11-23-45	1042	Dispatches from Ambassador Joseph E. Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State, dated Jan. 27, 1941, Nov. 3, 1941, and Nov. 17, 1941; memorandum dated Feb. 1, 1941 from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, advising him of contents of above message dated Jan. 27, 1941, which reported Japan would make surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in event of trouble with United States.

16	401 11-23-45	1061	(a) Memorandum "Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation", dated Nov. 5, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark; (b) Minutes of The Joint Board for Nov. 3, 1941; (c) Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 3, 1941, for General Marshall by General Gerow.
16-A	3839 2-6-46	1077	Undated note from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, attached to letter dated Oct. 30, 1941, from Secretary Morgenthau to the President, transmitting a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
16-B	4341 2-13-46	1081	Message dated Nov. 7, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, delivered through the Department of State.
17	402 11-23-45	1083	Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 27, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.
18	402 11-23-45	1084	Documents relating to proposed " <i>Modus Vivendi</i> ," including Secretary Hull's recommendation dated Nov. 26, 1941, to President Roosevelt. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit).
19	402 11-23-45	1201	Memorandum dated Nov. 29, 1941, by Secretary Hull for the President, and attached draft of a proposed message from the President to Congress, and proposed message from President to Emperor of Japan.
20	402 11-23-45	1226	Message dated Dec. 6, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Emperor of Japan, and related documents, including draft of proposed message dated Oct. 17, 1941.
21	402 11-23-45	1246	Two dispatches dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, London, to State Department; memorandum of conversation dated Nov. 30, 1941, between Secretary Hull and British Ambassador, with attached memorandum; memorandum handed to Mr. Hornbeck by Netherlands Minister on Nov. 21, 1941; dispatch from Secretary of State to United States Consul, Manila, P. I., dated Nov. 29, 1941. All documents concern intelligence information relating to Japanese military and naval units in the Far East.
22	458 11-23-45	1252	(a) British draft, dated Aug. 10, 1941, of proposed parallel communications to Japanese Government; (b) Two messages from the President (at Atlantic Conference) to Secretary Hull, Nos. 121645 and 160115; (c) Draft, dated Aug. 15, 1941 (not used), of proposed communication to the Japanese Ambassador brought to State Department by Sumner Welles following (Atlantic) conference between the President and British Prime Minister.
22-A	1694 12-15-45 2066 12-31-45	1262	Revised draft (not used), dated Aug. 16, 1941, of draft dated Aug. 15, 1941 ((c) above), of proposed statement to the Japanese Ambassador, prepared by Sumner Welles. (See p. 556, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 29, for text of statement made to Japanese Ambassador by the President on Aug. 17, 1941.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
22-B	1783 12-18-45	1269	Memorandum, dated Aug. 10, 1941, prepared by Sumner Wells of his conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning proposed parallel action with reference to Japan.
22-C	1783 12-18-45	1275	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, prepared by Sumner Wells, of conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, attended by Welles, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Harry Hopkins concerning "British-American Cooperation".
22-D	1783 12-18-45	1292	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, of conversation between Sumner Wells and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning "British-American Cooperation" at the Atlantic Conference, and Welles' subsequent conversation with the President.
23	476 11-24-45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
24	476 11-24-45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 30, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
25	574 11-26-45	1301	Dispatch, dated Dec. 1, 1941, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, reporting reaction in Japan to the Secretary's proposal of Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note). See pp. 766 to 770, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, for proposal dated Nov. 26, 1941, to the Japanese Government.
26	634 11-27-45	1303	Dispatch, dated Sept. 24, 1940, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State concerning general policy toward Japan (so-called "green light" dispatch).
27	670 11-27-45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Introduction (pamphlet edition, 1942), Department of State Publication 1853.
28	670 11-27-45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Introduction and Documents (cloth edition, 1943), Department of State Publication 1883.
29	670 11-27-45	1315	"Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941", vols. I and II (1943). Department of State Publication 2008.
30	670 11-27-45	1315	"Ten Years in Japan", by Joseph C. Grew, Simon and Schuster (1944).

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31	737 11-28-45	1316	Six dispatches bearing various dates from April 4 to Dec. 2, 1941, from United States diplomatic officials in foreign countries reporting to the Department of State inquiries and comments of Japanese representatives in those countries concerning possible break in United States-Japanese relations.
32	778 11-29-45	1326	Selection of messages between War Department and Hawaiian Department from July 8 to Dec. 7, 1941. Included are certain messages sent by the War Department to the Western Defense Command, to General MacArthur in the Philippines, and to Commanding General, Panama, as well as their replies. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33	778 11-29-45	1334	Selection of Military Intelligence Estimates prepared by G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., covering period July 7 to Dec. 6, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33-A	2092 12-31-45	1385	Secretary of War's copy of memorandum, dated Oct. 2, 1941, from Col. Hayes A. Kroner to the Chief of Staff, concerning "Japanese-American Relations", bearing note in handwriting of Secretary Stimson.
34	825 11-30-45	1389	Memorandum, dated Oct. 18, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for Chief of Staff, concerning "Resignation of Japanese Cabinet" and proposed message to Army outpost commanders.
35	828 11-30-45	1390	Memorandum, dated Jan. 31, 1942, prepared by Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, concerning "Warnings Sent to Hawaii Prior to Dec. 7, 1941", with enclosures.
36	830 11-30-45	1393	Photostatic copy of draft of General Marshall's message of Nov. 27, 1941, to General Short, containing phrase "hostile action possible at any moment", which draft contains a sentence that did not appear in the message as transmitted to General Short. (See Exhibit No. 32 for message sent.)
37	839 11-30-45	1395	Selection of dispatches sent and received by the Navy Department entitled "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
38	841 11-30-45	1409	Paraphrase of message, dated Dec. 3, 1941, from General Miles to Military Attaché, Tokyo, concerning the handling of his codes and secret documents.
39	928 12-4-45	1409	Memoranda for the record on events of Dec. 7, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff; Col. W. B. Smith, Secretary, General Staff; Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Col. J. R. Deane, Secretary, General Staff.
40	954 12-4-45	1412	Dispatch, dated Dec. 7, 1941, from CinCAF to OPNAV (976645) concerning report of promised armed support to British under certain conditions.
41	988 12-5-45	1413	Information from documentary evidence on interception, decoding, and translating of Japanese messages Nos. 901, 902, 907, 910 (so-called pilot message, 14 part message, 1 o'clock delivery message, and code destruction message).

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51.	1053 12-6-45	1585	Report entitled "Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2" (ABC-22).
52.	1053 12-6-45	1593	Compilation of communications between the War Department and General Herron at Hawaii, concerning 1940 alert of Hawaiian Department. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
53.	1063 12-6-45	1600	Compilation of correspondence between General Marshall and General Short from Feb. 7 to Oct. 28, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
54.	1067 12-6-45	1627	"Notes on General Council Meeting", Feb. 19, 1941, concerning "Defense Objectives" (revised Feb. 13, 1941).
55.	1067 12-6-45	1628	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff", on Feb. 25, 1941, at which air defense of Pearl Harbor was discussed.
56.	1076 12-6-45	1630	Memorandum, dated May 13, 1941, concerning "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department" by Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony, for the Chief of Staff.
57.	1077 12-6-45	1631	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Secretary of War, May 19, 1941", concerning use of planes in proposed expedition against Martinique, referring to supply of B-17 bombers that were not dispatched to Hawaii.
58.	1088 12-6-45	1632	List of President's appointments with military representatives from Oct. 1 to Dec. 7, 1941; telephone calls through White House switchboard on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941; White House dinner guests on Dec. 6, 1941; list of President's appointments on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
59.	1092 12-6-45	1635	General Marshall's aide memoire to the President concerning "Defense of Hawaii".
60.	1094 12-6-45	1636	General Marshall's memorandum for the President concerning "Ground Forces".
61.	1112 12-7-45	1640	Photostatic copy of Dec. 7, 1941, warning sent by General Marshall to theater commanders.
62.	1284 12-10-45	1641	Minutes of The Joint Board meeting, Nov. 26, 1941, at which the situation in the Pacific was discussed
63.	1245 12-11-45	1644	Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General in connection therewith.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
64	1544 12-13-45	1645	Tentative draft of Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, 1941.
65	1541 12-13-45	1677	Memorandum, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to Special Navy and Army Observers, London, instructing them to advise British that United States disapproves A. D. B. Report for reasons stated.
66	1642 12-15-45	1680	Dispatch, dated Dec. 6, 1941 (#61255), from CinCAF to OPNAV, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, by R. E. Schuirmann, for the State Department, relating contents of the dispatch which reported the sighting of Japanese convoys in Far Eastern waters.
67	1642 12-15-45	1682	Intercepted messages, dated Aug. 17, 1941, from Japanese Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, repeating the material handed him that date by President Roosevelt after the President's return from the Atlantic Conference (so-called "parallel action message").
68	1675 12-15-45	1689	Log of U. S. S. <i>Boise</i> for period Nov. 25 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and map showing position of the ship on certain dates.
69	1677 12-15-45	1715	Table showing scheduled inspections of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November and December 1941.
70	1695 12-15-45	1716	Message, dated Aug. 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, concerning the President's statements to the Japanese Ambassador on Aug. 17, 1941.
71	1696 12-15-45	1719	Message, dated Aug. 25, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, quoting an extract from radio address of Prime Minister Churchill on Aug. 24, 1941. The extract refers to Japanese policies.
72	1696 12-15-45	1721	Dispatch dated Aug. 1, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, and the Ambassador's reply dated Aug. 2, 1941; both concerning the report of Japanese aggression against Thailand; digest of Secretary of State's news conference on Aug. 6, 1941, when he was questioned concerning reports of Japanese aggression against Thailand.
73	1700 12-15-45	1727	Three State Department drafts, all dated Oct. 16, 1941, of a proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan, and a memorandum expressing views of officers in the Far Eastern Division of State Department on the matter. No message was sent to the Emperor at that time (fall of the Konoye cabinet in Japan).

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74	1703 12-15-45	1735	Three messages from State Department to Far Eastern offices, advising American citizens to leave the Orient, dated Oct. 6, 1940, Feb. 11, 1941, and Nov. 19, 1941.
74-A	2768 1-19-46	1741	Memorandum, dated Dec. 4, 1941, from Far Eastern Affairs Division officers to the Secretary of State concerning British suggestion on exchange of nationals with Japanese Government in event of hostilities.
75	1705 12-15-45	1744	Three messages, all dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, explaining the delivery of the so-called "Ten Point Note" on that date to the Japanese Ambassadors and their oral comments upon its receipt, and furnishing Ambassador Grew with the text of the note.
76	1709 11-15-45	1754	Translation of notes regarding discussion between Adolf Hitler, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, State Minister Meissner, and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin, Apr. 4, 1941, as introduced at the Nuremberg trials on Nov. 23, 1945.
77	1712 12-15-45	1757	Message, dated Aug. 31, 1940, from United States Embassy, Peiping, China, to State Department presenting summary of situation in Japan and Manchuria as prepared by A. T. Steele, correspondent for Chicago Daily News, which summary is referred to in Ambassador Grew's message dated Sept. 12, 1940 (Joint Committee Exhibit No. 26), his so-called "green light" dispatch.
78	1724 12-17-45	1768	Navy dispatches concerning "Kra Peninsula Alert (1941)". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
79	1724 12-17-45	1770	Navy dispatches concerning Netherlands East Indies Alert (1941). (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
80	1724 12-17-45	1774	Office of Naval Intelligence "Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations" dated Nov. 1, Nov. 15, and Dec. 1, 1941.
81	1724 12-17-45	1837	Selection of Office of Naval Intelligence periodic estimates and memoranda dated from Apr. 17 to Dec. 6, 1941.
82	1728 12-17-45	1864	Navy Regulations concerning Duties of Intelligence Division (OP-16).
83	1754 12-17-45	1866	Message, dated Dec. 3, 1941 (831850), from OPNAV to CinCAF, CinPAC, COM 14, and COM 16, advising them of instructions Japanese sent on Dec. 2, 1941, to certain consular and diplomatic posts to destroy most of their codes and secret documents.
84	1775 12-17-45	1867	Transcript of telephone call on Dec. 3, 1941, between Japanese citizen in Honolulu and person in Tokyo (so-called "Mori telephone call").

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
85-----	1799 12-18-45	1870	Selection of Navy Department memoranda reporting Japanese fleet locations during period Nov. 4 through Dec. 3, 1941.
86-----	1825 12-18-45	1901	Tabulation showing Naval combatant strength of the Axis and Allied Powers as of May 1, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941, in both Atlantic and Pacific Ocean areas.
87-----	1889 12-19-45	1907	Memorandum, dated Dec. 15, 1945, prepared by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, concerning "Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on June 17, 1940", with attached documents referred to therein.
88-----	1912 12-19-45	1937	Sections of document "Organization of the Office of Naval Operations, Oct. 23, 1940", concerning duties of "War Plans Division (OP-12)".
89-----	1938 12-20-45	1937	Memorandum prepared by Gen. L. T. Gerow, regarding the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy "For Defense Against Air Attack in Hawaii".
90-----	2066 12-31-45	1941	Dispatch dated Dec. 18, 1941, from the State Department to the American Legation, Bern, Switzerland, concerning Swiss Government's offer to represent American interest in Japanese-occupied territories, and instructions for closing of diplomatic stations under certain emergencies.
91-----	2067 12-31-45	1950	Dispatches dated Dec. 15, 1941 (2), Feb. 16, 1942, and Mar. 25, 1942, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State Department, relating action taken in Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers, and confidential papers and records after outbreak of hostilities.
92-----	2068 12-31-45	1960	Photostatic copy of pp. 591 to 618, vol. 377, Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, containing statement by Prime Minister Churchill before the House of Commons on Jan. 27, 1942.
93-----	2075 12-31-45	1974	Photostatic copy of p. 2, G-2 Record Section Register of Incoming Cables on Dec. 5, 1941.
94-----	2078 12-31-45	1975	3 intercepted messages dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, transmitting the so-called "Ten Point Note" which was handed to the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull on that date.
95-----	2091 12-31-45	1987	Memoranda dated July 12, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, concerning his conversation with Admiral J. O. Richardson on July 11, 1940, and a handwritten note by Admiral H. R. Stark.

96	2091 12-31-45	1989	Memorandum dated July 16, 1940, and study "Reflections on Certain Features of the Far Eastern Situation and certain problems of United States Far Eastern Policy, July 4, 1940", attributed to Stanley K. Hornbeck.
97	2091 12-31-45	2007	Memorandum dated Sept. 21, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, for Under Secretary Sumner Welles, concerning a Navy proposal for execution of a fleet problem involving simulated attack on the Panama Canal during January 1941, and three related memoranda.
98	2093 12-31-45	2014	Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, by Secretary Stimson for the President concerning "Japanese Convoy Movement Toward Ildo-China".
99	2094 12-31-45	2015	Memorandum dated Sept. 26, 1944, prepared by J. W. Ballantine and M. M. Hamilton, relating their recollection of the delivery of intercepted Japanese messages to Secretary Hull's office by Lieutenant Commander Kramer on the morning of Dec. 7, 1941.
100	2095 12-31-45	2016	Transcript of Interrogation on Dec. 8, 1941, of (Japanese) Prisoner of War No. 1, by Naval Intelligence officers at Honolulu, statement by the prisoner, and memorandum concerning "Investigation of Japanese Submarine Aground in Waimanalo Bay".
101	2095 12-31-45	2023	Log of U. S. S. <i>Enterprise</i> from Nov. 24 to Dec. 16, 1941, inclusive.
102	2095 12-31-45	2107	Log of U. S. S. <i>Lexington</i> from Dec. 5 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
103	2095 12-31-45	2118	"Report of Action With Japanese Air Force at Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941", by Commander. <i>Enterprise</i> Air Group to his Commanding Officer, dated Dec. 15, 1941.
104	2095 12-31-45	2122	"U. S. S. <i>Lexington</i> War Diary" for period Dec. 7 to Dec. 25, 1941, inclusive.
105	2096 12-31-45	2140	Certain estimates of Japanese Situation and Intentions as made by British agencies and relayed to this Government during period from Oct. 21, to Nov. 22, 1941.
106	2096 12-31-45	2144	Compilation of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral H. E. Kimmel from Jan. 13 to Dec. 12, 1941.
107	2349 1-4-46	2258	"Appendix to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Pearl Harbor Investigations", prepared by Navy Department. It contains endorsements by Secretary James Forrestal, Judge Advocate General, Admiral T. L. Gatch, and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, to the Hewitt Report, and endorsements by the same officials to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry's Findings of Fact.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
107-A	2479 1-5-46	2393	"The Findings, Conclusions and Action by the Secretary of the Navy", including the Fourth Endorsement by Secretary Forrestal to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry, and a summary of an offer by the Navy Department of a General Court Martial for Rear Adm. H. E. Kimmel.
108	2364 1-4-46	2432	Memorandum, dated Nov. 2, 1944, by Stanley K. Hornbeck attached to his memorandum of Feb. 28, 1944, which related to an attached third memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck dated Nov. 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of situation and certain probabilities", described by him as "a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been leaks and misrepresentation".
109	2476 1-5-46	2444	Guide to Symbols, and series of maps submitted by Admiral R. N. Turner, showing the location of ships Dec. 1 to 6, inclusive, 1941.
110	2477 1-5-46	2444	Compilation of letters from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral T. C. Hart, from Feb. 9, 1940, to Nov. 8, 1941.
111	2495 1-15-46	2457	Letter dated Dec. 5, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Mr. Wendell Willkie, concerning proposal from Australian Minister for Mr. Willkie to make a trip to Australia, together with related correspondence and memoranda.
112	2496 1-15-46	2458	Dispatches and other material referred to in footnotes to Admiral Kimmel's prepared statement before the Joint Committee. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
113	2558 1-16-46	2502	Letter, dated Aug. 13, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Task Force Commanders, concerning Employment Schedules, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942, and attached Employment Schedules for Task Forces 1, 2, and 3.
113-A	2807 1-19-46	2532	Letter, dated Feb. 21, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Commanders, concerning "Battle Organization and Condition Watches".
113-B	2807 1-19-46	2534	Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, dated Oct. 31, 1941, concerning "Task Forces—Organization and Missions".
113-C	3449 1-31-46	2538	(a) Revised Employment Schedules of Task Force 9, submitted pursuant to Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, together with documents which approve same; (b) Watch and Duty Schedules for Patrol Wing 2 (December 1941).

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114	2558 1-16-46	2568	WPPac-46, and letters from Admiral Kimmel to his commanders, dated July 21 and July 25, 1941, promulgating WPPac-46, which is U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow 5).
115	2558 1-16-46	2601	Communications Intelligence Summaries concerning location of Japanese Fleet Units: (a) Fourteenth Naval District Summaries, dated Nov. 1 to Dec. 6, 1941; (b) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer Reports dated Oct. 27 to Dec. 2, 1941; (c) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Memorandum dated Dec. 1, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
115-A	3449 1-31-46	2672	Fourteenth Naval District "Communication Intelligence Summaries of Dec. 9 and 10, 1941, showing assumed Composition of Japanese Striking Force".
115-B	3450 1-31-46	2677	Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, dated Nov. 27, 1941.
116	2558 1-16-46	2700	Selection of correspondence of Admiral H. R. Stark, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, and others from Feb. 11, 1941, to Oct. 3, 1941, concerning anti-torpedo baffles for protection of ships in harbor against torpedo plane attacks.
117	2559 1-16-46	2707	Selection of Army and Navy correspondence from Jan. 16, to Feb. 14, 1941, concerning the air defenses of the Hawaiian Islands.
117-A	5015 2-20-46	2713	Letter dated Feb. 17, 1941, concerning "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," from Gen. W. C. Short to his Commanders.
118	2559 1-16-46	2714	Memoranda, dated Nov. 30 and Dec. 5, 1941, of Admiral Kimmel, entitled "Steps to be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War within Next Twenty-Four Hours".
119	2559 1-16-46	2716	Radio Log of Bishop's Point Radio Station, Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
120	2559 1-16-46	2721	(a) Memorandum dated Dec. 19, 1941, by Admiral Bellinger for Admiral Kimmel concerning "Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of Dec. 7, 1941"; (b) Compilation of dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid drills were held during 1941; (c) Report of Army-Navy Board dated Oct. 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas, Hawaiian area.
121	2561 1-16-46	2727	Statement by Admiral H. E. Kimmel and copies of correspondence submitted by him, concerning the circumstances of his retirement by the Navy Department, and related matters.
122	2588 1-16-46	2735	Selected correspondence in June and August 1941 of Admiral H. E. Kimmel, Admiral C. C. Bloch, and Gen. W. C. Short concerning aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
123-----	2588 1-16-46	2736	Selection of correspondence, memoranda, and dispatches concerning the proposed construction of a combined operating center for Army and Navy in Hawaii from Oct. 29, 1941, to Jan. 7, 1942.
123-A	5015 2-20-46	2743	Additional selection of correspondence and memoranda concerning Joint Operations Centers for Army and Navy from Oct. 17, 1941, to Jan. 10, 1942. (See also Exhibit No. 123.)
124-----	2674 1-17-46	2749	Intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages between Washington and Tokyo, dated Aug. 18 to Aug. 29, 1941, inclusive, concerning United States-Japanese negotiations and the United States note to Japan dated Aug. 17, 1941. These intercepted messages are additional to those published in Joint Committee Exhibit No. 1.
125-----	2678 1-17-46	2801	Log of the <i>U. S. S. Wright</i> from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and chart of locations of the ship on Nov. 27 and Dec. 7, 1941.
126-----	2767 1-19-46	2832	(a) Navy Department General Order No. 143, dated Feb. 3, 1941, entitled "Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States"; (b) excerpts from Navy Regulations, setting forth the general duties of a Commander in Chief; (c) Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions (1941), dated July 14, 1941.
127-----	2768 1-19-46	2867	Correspondence, memoranda and dispatches concerning the aircraft situation in Hawaii after Dec. 7, 1941. (See also Exhibit No. 112, p. 77, for letter dated Jan. 7, 1942, by Admiral Nimitz on same subject.)
128-----	2768 1-19-46	2870	Selected correspondence relating to the proposed prosecution of Japanese consular agents in Hawaii, recommended by United States Attorney in Hawaii by letter dated June 4, 1941.
129-----	2842 1-19-46	2875	Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46), and letter dated May 26, 1941, from Admiral H. R. Stark promulgating the plan.
130-----	2879 1-21-46	2941	Selection of memoranda and dispatches contained in files of State Department concerning Japanese and United States air reconnaissance in Pacific prior to Dec. 7, 1941, including dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to State Department forwarding note from Japanese Government protesting reported flight of United States planes over Tiawan Nov. 20, 1941, and State Department's reply to Ambassador Grew.
131-----	2892 1-21-46	2943	Testimony of Admiral H. E. Kimmel before the Roberts Commission, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Army Pearl Harbor Board.

(a) Navy Department General Order No. 143, dated Feb. 3, 1941, entitled "Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States"; (b) excerpts from Navy Regulations, setting forth the general duties of a Commander in Chief; (c) Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions (1941), dated July 14, 1941.

(a) Navy Department General Order No. 143, dated Feb. 3, 1941, entitled "Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States"; (b) excerpts from Navy Regulations, setting forth the general duties of a Commander in Chief; (c) Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions (1941), dated July 14, 1941.

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132	2917 1-21-46	2943	Selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 7874-7877, Joint Committee Transcript): (a) Memorandum "Report on Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the American Ambassador," 7:30 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (b) Memorandum "Gist of Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the British Ambassador, 8:00 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (c) Memorandum written by one Matsumoto, Head of Treaty Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "On the Declaration of War against the United States and Great Britain—Meeting of Privy Council, Dec. 8, 1941."
132-A	5137 2-20-46	2946	Additional selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 13662-13665 Joint Committee Transcript): (a) Diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington which had not been completely intercepted, being Washington to Tokyo Nos. 881, 941, and Tokyo Circular Nos. 2288, 2313 and 2193; (b) Memoranda of three conversations on Aug. 19, 29 and 30, 1941, between German Ambassador Ott and Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda and Vice-Minister Aman; (c) Memoranda dated Sept. 6 and 13, 1941, concerning basic conditions for a peace settlement between Japan and China; (d) Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, summary of the progress of Japanese-American negotiations.
133	2965 1-23-46	2953	Statement by Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attacks Dec. 7, 1941, introduced at his request. Identical with exhibit he introduced before Roberts Commission and Army Pearl Harbor Board.
134	2965 1-23-46	3124	Dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from War Department to Gen. W. C. Short, concerning reinforcement of advance Pacific bases, and five charts and Bureau of the Census publication on the Population characteristics of Hawaii used by General Short in his prepared statement before the Joint Committee.
135	2965 1-23-46	3171	Compiled summary of evidence concerning time of sending and receipt of War Department warning messages of Nov. 27-28, 1941, and replies thereto, together with photostatic copies of the messages.
136	2966 1-23-46	3187	Memorandum dated Nov. 14, 1941, by Lt. Col. C. A. Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, concerning operation of radar equipment during recent military exercises, and attached transmitting memorandum for Special Assistant to Secretary of War.
137	2966 1-23-46	3187	Four original reports concerning training and operations time schedules of radar stations, Hawaiian Department, from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and related material.
138	2976 1-23-46	3195	Photostatic copy of memorandum bearing approval of Gen. W. C. Short of report prepared by Gen. F. L. Martin dated Aug. 20, 1941, entitled "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii". (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 13.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
139	3006 1-23-46	3196	Two reports dated Oct. 17 and 25, 1941, entitled "C-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation" by Lt. Col. G. W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department.
140	3188 1-26-46	3203	Selection of memoranda by the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Judge Advocate General, including proposed charges against Maj. Gen. W. C. Short, retired, prepared by the office of the Judge Advocate General, and related material.
141	3311 1-28-46	3254	File of Capt. E. M. Zacharias, U. S. Navy, entitled "Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading Up to It".
142	3324 1-29-46	3302	Compilation of Material Relating to so-called "Winds" code. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
142-A	3324 1-29-46	3318	(a) Memorandum dated Dec. 5, 1941, concerning interception by Portland F. C. C. station of Japanese Weather Broadcast; (b) Federal Communications Commission, Radio Intelligence Division, Night Watch Log for Nov. 24 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
142-B	3674 2-4-46	3321	Additional material concerning translation of Circular No. 2494, from Tokyo, dated Dec. 7, 1941 (see p. 251, Exhibit No. 1), subsequent to the original translation.
142-C	3741 2-5-46	3322	Letter dated Feb. 4, 1946, from State Department to Committee Counsel enclosing paraphrases of three messages, two from London dated Dec. 15, 1945 and Jan. 31, 1946, and one from The Hague, dated Jan. 26, 1946, regarding the so-called "winds" messages, indicating no interception by the British or Dutch Governments of a "winds execute" message prior to Dec. 8, 1941.
142-D	3780 2-6-46	3323	Material from Hawaiian office, Federal Communications Commission, concerning the so-called "winds" code.
143	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Roberts Commission appointed Dec. 18, 1942, by the President. (See Parts Nos. 22 through 25.)
144	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Inquiry conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, retired, pursuant to precept dated Feb. 12, 1944, of the Secretary of the Navy. (See Part No. 26.)
145	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened by the Secretary of War pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 27 through 31.)

146	3329 2-7-46	3382	Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, convened by the Secretary of the Navy pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 32 and 33.)
147	3329 2-7-47	3383	Proceedings of Investigation conducted by Col. Carter W. Clarke, U. S. Army, Sept. 14, 15, and 16, 1944, and continued from July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945. (See Part No. 34.)
148	3329 2-7-46	3382	Report of Investigation during the period Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945, conducted by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, A. U. S., for the Secretary of War, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. (See Part No. 35.)
149	3929 2-7-46	3382	Proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., pursuant to precept dated May 2, 1945, of the Secretary of the Navy, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (See Parts Nos. 36 through 38.)
150	4063 2-8-46	3383	Letter dated Mar. 18, 1944, from Admiral H. E. Kimmel, retired, to Admiral W. E. Halsey, suggesting questions for Comdr. A. D. Kramer concerning the so-called "winds" message.
151	4421 2-13-46	3385	Six memoranda prepared by Capt. L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, during May, June, and July, 1945 in connection with the inquiry conducted by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, concerning intercepted Japanese messages. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
152	4794 2-18-46	3351	Memorandum dated Dec. 23, 1941, "General Observations of Damage by Projectiles in the City of Honolulu on Dec. 7, 1941", prepared by employees of the Honolulu Board of Water Supply, and a map of the city of Honolulu, T. H., showing points struck by projectiles, Dec. 7, 1941.
153	5009 2-19-46	3353	Prepared statement dated Dec. 1, 1945 entitled "The War Record of Civilian and Industrial Hawaii", with attached Exhibits, submitted to the Joint Committee by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.
154	5013 2-20-46	3430	Compilation of selected correspondence between Gen. H. H. Arnold and Gen. F. L. Martin from Aug. 15 to Nov. 27, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
155	5068 2-20-46	3435	Original Radar Plot of Detector Station OPANA, Dec. 7, 1941.
156	5122 2-20-46	3436	Memorandum dated June 21, 1941 prepared by Col. Moses W. Pettigrew concerning "Final Recommendations Far Eastern Intelligence Organization".
157	5201 4-11-46	3441	Reports, findings, and conclusions of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements. (See Part No. 39.)

Exhibit No.	Exhibits page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
158	5201 4-11-46	3441	Compilation of selected documents obtained from State Department files relating to United States-British Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
159	5201 4-11-46	3488	Compilation of selected material obtained from State Department files relating to United States-Chinese Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
160	5240 4-11-46	3502	Transcript of remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 8:30 (p. m.) and continuing at 9 o'clock with legislative leaders, on Dec. 7, 1941.
161	5241 4-11-46	3508	Drafts of Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson of a proposed message for the President to deliver to Congress on the state of relations with the Japanese Government. (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 19 for final draft by Secretary Hull.)
161-A	5464 5-23-46	3520	Draft of a proposed message to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains suggestions made in the memoranda by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, as shown in exhibit No. 161.
162	5269 4-11-46	3534	Log of the Watch Officer, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, from 1145, Dec. 6, 1941, to 2000, Dec. 7, 1941.
162-A	5464 5-23-46	3543	Naval communications referred to by serial numbers in Log of the Watch Officer, as shown in exhibit No. 162.
163	5292 4-11-46	3557	Log of the U. S. S. <i>Helena</i> from Nov. 26 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive.
164	5292 4-11-46	3593	Reports made by Gen. W. C. Short and his subordinate officers to the War Department concerning the attack on Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
165	5292 4-11-46	3643	Copy of a partial translation of a document relating to a Feb. 23, 1941, conference between German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima.
166	5468 5-23-46	3648	State Department dispatch No. 5682 dated Dec. 5, 1941, to the American Embassy in London. (This dispatch is mentioned in American Embassy, London, dispatch No. 5923 dated Dec. 6, 1941, to State Department, which appears in exhibit No. 21.)

167	5468 5-23-46	3652	(a) State Department file copy of document handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassador on Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note); (b) State Department statement to the press on Nov. 26, 1941, relating to the delivery of (a); (c) State Department Press Release No. 585, dated Dec. 7, 1941, concerning the delivery and text of (a); and (d) memorandum dated Dec. 2, 1941, concerning President Roosevelt's remarks at his press conference that date, relating to delivery of (a) and general Far East matters.
168	5468 5-23-46	3666	Compilation of documents from State Department files which are dated in November and December 1941, concerning a proposed <i>modus vivendi</i> , which documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 18. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
169	5469 5-23-46	3696	Compilation of documents relating to conversations between State Department officials and representatives of the Thailand Government, between Aug. 6 and Dec. 8, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
170	5469 5-23-46	3789	Compilation of documents from War Department files concerning the retirement of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) These documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 140.
171	5469 5-23-46	3942	Compilation of documents from Navy Department files concerning the retirement of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
172	5469 5-23-46	3978	Compilations made by War and Navy Departments of data concerning airplanes and antiaircraft guns produced and their distribution from Feb. 1 to Nov. 30, 1941.
173	5469 5-23-46	3985	Memoirs of Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister of Japan, and related documents.
174	5469 5-23-46	4030	Compilation of miscellaneous documents from State Department files. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
175	5470 5-23-46	4115	Memorandum from Secretary of Navy dated Dec. 5, 1941 and letter from Secretary of War dated Dec. 6, 1941, submitting estimates concerning Japanese forces in Indochina and adjacent areas, to the Secretary of State for delivery to the President, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Secretary of State for the President.
176	5470 5-23-46	4121	Compilation of location of United States naval forces in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East, also foreign naval forces in the Pacific and Far East, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
177	5470 5-23-46	4132	Compilation of State Department documents dated in 1939, concerning a proposal made by former Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma for United States-Japanese understanding. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
178	5470 5-23-46	4209	Compilation of documents from Ambassador Joseph C. Grew to the President and the State Department, and attached memoranda. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
179	5470 5-23-46	4241	Miscellaneous documents from the files of the late President F. D. Roosevelt, as furnished to the Committee, concerning Far East matters.
180	5471 5-23-46	4551	Organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington, D. C., and Hawaii, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
181	5520 5-23-46	4565	The United States News, extra number, Sept. 1, 1945, publishing reports of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry, and related documents.
182	5537 5-23-46	4702	Compilation of military intelligence estimates, prepared by G-2, War Department, for period Jan. 1 to July 1, 1941.
183	5468 5-23-46	4766	Material compiled at request of Senator Ferguson by letter dated May 20, 1946, to Committee counsel (p. 5464), including data concerning the test bombing of the <i>Utah</i> by the Army Air Corps in 1937, and data concerning the program of the Army Air Corps for 1940-45 production of B-17 4-engine bombers.

EXHIBIT NO. 9

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Selected Letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral J. O. Richardson

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5. 11 March 1940 to Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
6. 15 March 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
7. 8 April 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
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9. 13 May 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
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13. 22 June 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
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20. 12 November 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson (with enclosures)
21. 22 November 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
22. 28 November 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
23. 17 December 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
24. 23 December 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson (with enclosures)
25. 30 December 1940 from Admiral Bloch via Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
26. 7 January 1941 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
27. 25 January 1941 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
28. 10 February 1941 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson

18 JANUARY 1940.

DEAR JOE: As of possible interest to you I am enclosing the General Board's report on organization of the Navy Department. Will be glad to get your comments if and when you get time.

I will drop entirely the question of Captain Smith coming to the PENNSYLVANIA for the purpose of acquiring CincC background on war plans.

Before he starts East I will ask him to ask you for an appointment so that you may send back any general thoughts you may wish to of a confidential nature which would be useful to all of us. In this connection I have a letter from Tommy Hart, just received, in which he thinks the situation in the Far East is very serious and that this year may prove to be a crucial and critical one. As I have written Bloch, and as you undoubtedly know, I have continually asked him to bear in mind what is going on to the Westward which in this particular period in this old world's history may be far more important to us than the troubles in Europe, especially if something should break and break quickly and without warning. It is something, in my humble opinion, for which you should be mentally prepared. Anything in this wide world I can do to help, of course I will; that is my only reason for existing here. Incidentally by officer messenger or otherwise, I would be glad to know what your thoughts are in that connection so that I may be in harmony and may be able to transmit them to higher authority if they should be asked.

Hope the Army Maneuvers have been greatly beneficial. The President is intensely interested in our working closely with them in all ways, and the pull-together here in the Department is very close.

Best wishes to you all as ever

Sincerely,

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "Pennsylvania."

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
UNITED STATES FLEET
J. B. PENNSYLVANIA
FLAGSHIP

26 Jan. 1940.

Dear Betty:-

The remarks in your letter of 18 Jan. about the situation in the Far East, the possibility of something breaking without warning and my need to be mentally prepared are somewhat disquieting.

When the China incident started and on every opportunity until after I left the job as Asst. CNO I used to say to Bill Leahy "Be sure to impress on the boys that we do not want to draw into this unless we have allies so bound to us that they can not leave us in the lurch."

There is a possibility that this constant repetition had something to do with the trip of Ingersoll.

When this understanding was reached it had some value but under present conditions it has little value as it affords us the use of a base in exchange for an obligation to protect about $2\frac{1}{2}$ continents.

I strongly feel that you should repeatedly impress on the boys that an Orange war would probably last some years and cost much money, my guess is 5 to 10 years 35 to 70 billion dollars.

I have always thought that our Orange plan was chiefly useless as evidence in War Planning, to train officers in War Planning and to serve as a basis for asking for 16

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. B. PENNSYLVANIA
FLAGSHIP

appropriations and as a guide for developing our Navy and its shore facilities be to actually securing the O-1 plan. I hope we will never be called on to do that unless the Administration fully realizes the probable cost and duration of such a war and unless our people are prepared to support an expensive war of long duration.

Even if we could take Truk. What would we have a secure anchorage, nothing else, almost thousand miles from our nearest drydock and adequate repair facilities and still hundred of miles from the enemy country. If course it could not be taken without some underwater damage. In actually put on real pressure we would have to have a real base that would take many years and much money. We ought not to go into a thing like this unless we expected to see it through.

I hesitate to write you because the matter word is so easily misunderstood, also I do not know what you understand, what you are telling the force, what is the meaning of our diplomatic moves, or our Senate talks, or our neutrality pact. But you are the principal and only Naval address to the force and he should know that our Fleet ^{Mr. Jones} can not just sail away like troops and be back at home in a year or so. Also the probable cost of any war should be compared the probable value of winning the war.

When we commissioned the San Diego DD's we used the facilities of San Diego, Base, Active DD Tenders, etc.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. PENNSYLVANIA
FLORISSIP

working farther from active DDOs and their tenders and
Mane Island apart. I think that an excellent job
was done but if it had been a real Mobilization,
all of these activities would have been fully covered.
How long would it have taken Sen. Jeps to have
done this and its other investigation work without
any outside assistance? A war plan if it is to be
executed should be based on realities.

All of this letter may be needless but I think that
if you do not tell the boss what you really know
and feel about the probable cost and duration of
an Orange War Nobody will

I would hate to see our leaders make a move from which
they could not gracefully withdraw, and which would inevitably force us
into a war, half heartily supported by our country. In other words
before this Nation takes a step I hope we will carefully examine
the direction we are heading, where we will inevitably go and be
prepared to resolutely pursue the course whatever the cost.

I will finish this letter after I see Alex. I hope and
send it to you by him.

17 Feb.

I have seen Sharp and he has told me about
his work on this trip.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. PENNSYLVANIA
FLAGSHIP

The Minor Joint Services and Critique have been completed. There was no evidence of any friction or discord. The service certainly led the Army to believe that the Navy is highly efficient.

There is danger that many erroneous conclusions will be drawn from this service. If called in actual war we could not have done any thing like using all boats from BB, CB, & CA, for landing. The boats would not have been on board and ships could not have come in shore and supported for 25 men while towing boats. There was no sea, no surf and nothing but ideal weather.

If we ever do anything like this again I hope we have adequate warning, plenty of time, and super preparation.

we are sending this by bond boats.

Sincerely

-- J. O. Richardson

. 23 Feb

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

C.N.O.

I have not answered
this -
Muntz - had a letter
from Andrews and wrote
him the substance of my
letter to Taffinder -

Then later sent him a
copy of my letter to
Taffinder -

In my opinion further
reply is not necessary
unless to say that
Muntz has written to
Andrews -

R. L. G.

CnC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

*ODmr
f*

AIRMAIL
PERSONAL
CONFIDENTIAL

San Pedro, California
16 February 1940

Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Betty:

Today I received a despatch from Andrews, a copy of which is enclosed, urging that the information in regard to the change of home ports of vessels of the Hawaiian Detachment be released for publication. This is requested in order that the maximum number of unoccupied houses and apartments at Honolulu may be overhauled and made available for occupancy. I felt constrained to reply negative.

The delicacy with which you must handle this matter is fully appreciated; and the reasons for your negative reply to my previous despatch requesting that the security classification of the despatch changing the home ports of these ships (Opnav 031811 of February 1940) be lowered are fully understood.

It seems to me, however, that the provision of acceptable living accommodations will be highly conducive to contentment and morale. Therefore, I request that the restriction on publicity be eliminated as early as you deem it advisable, and that Andrews and I be informed by despatch.

It may be of interest to you to know that the fact that the home ports of these vessels have been changed appeared in the Los Angeles Times of 4 February under a Honolulu date line, and was subsequently copied in Long Beach and San Diego papers as shown by the enclosure.

It appears that this matter is widely known now, but in view of the restrictions on publicity Andrews probably feels that he can not officially urge private interests in Honolulu to prepare houses for the occupancy of Naval personnel.

With kindest regards and best wishes.

Sincerely,


J. O. RICHARDSON

[1]

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

SAN PEDRO, CALIFORNIA, 8 March 1940.

*Personal**Confidential*

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,

Chief of Naval Operations,

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR BETTY: I am forwarding today, by air mail, my recommendation regarding a relief for the U. S. S. AUGUSTA. I find, in making this recommendation, that I am in a position in which I frequently find myself, in that I do not know all the points that should be considered in reaching a decision. For example:

(a) I do not know what considerations led to the assignment of Commander Scouting Force to command the Hawaiian Detachment, but if there were reasons controlling at that time there probably has been no change.

(b) I do not know why we have a Hawaiian Detachment, but if it has any relation to existing plans as stated in my official letter I think it should be commanded by Commander Cruisers.

(c) I do not know how much weight is attached to the necessity of having a cruiser available for the President, and I do not know whether he insists on having the HOUSTON so available, or whether another ship would be equally acceptable.

Andrews recommended that Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force, shift to the HOUSTON and remain in command of Cruiser Division FOUR with the Hawaiian Detachment, and that the present Commander Cruiser Division FOUR shift to the LOUISVILLE or CHESTER in command of Cruiser Division FIVE, and return to the West Coast with that division, and that the AUGUSTA be assigned to Crudiv FIVE.

It does not seem logical to me to have both Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force, and Commander Scouting Force, in the Hawaiian Detachment. As things now exist, Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, frequently sends recommendations to me in order [2] to save time, with copies to Commander Scouting Force, and Commander Scouting Force frequently makes recommendations affecting the cruisers without having the recommendations of Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force.

Any number of solutions could be suggested and any one that you select will be acceptable to me because I have made what appeared to me to be a logical recommendation, but I have no personal pride in it, and any solution will work. However, the easiest one that would not disturb existing conditions would be to send the HOUSTON out as temporary relief of the AUGUSTA, and have the AUGUSTA return to China after her overhaul.

In any event, there will be no heavy cruiser with the Fleet for several months this summer while Cruiser Division FIVE is undergoing overhaul, and I know that both Bloch and I feel that there should be two divisions of heavy cruisers with the Fleet.

I do not know why Cruiser Division SEVEN is retained with the Atlantic Squadron. Consequently, I have made no recommendations or requests that that division rejoin the Fleet. Neither have I recommended that one of the divisions now in the Hawaiian Detachment return with the Fleet.

With kindest regards and best wishes.

Very sincerely yours,

/S/ J. O. RICHARDSON.

CNO File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FlagshipPERSONAL
CONFIDENTIALSan Pedro, California
11 March 1940

Dear Betty:

In going over the memorandum you enclosed with your letter of 12 February (Subject: Defense of the Fleet against attack by aircraft), my first reaction was somewhat similar to Admiral Bloch's, that is, no harm can come from letting the General Board consider the comprehensive agenda contemplated - although at the same time there arose in my mind a question as to how much good might result from such an undertaking. In justice to the serious thought that has gone into the preparation of the memorandum and its enclosure, I have given the matter detailed study and my general conclusions are as follows:

(a) The General Board is well within its intended scope in studying all matters relating to improvements in armament. I believe that it has generally been understood that the General Board would deal principally with major characteristics, although it is understandable that full treatment of major characteristics may require varying degrees of consideration of details of batteries and fire control equipment.

(b) In my opinion the General Board would be stepping outside its intended scope if it were to consider matters immediately connected with details of training and operation of existing personnel, ships, and equipment. I say this with the realization that article 402 of the Navy Regulations uses the very words "organization, maintenance, training, and operation", which might be invoked to refute my opinion. However, I choose to believe that the terms "system of principles" and "general terms" used in the same article do not contemplate treatment of all of the phases and details included in the proposed agenda.

Applying these general conclusions to the several sub-heads of the proposed agenda, I consider items to be matters appropriate or otherwise for the General Board's specific consideration and recommendation, as follows:

The Fleet.

Treatment of none of these items by the General Board is either necessary or desirable. All are actively under consideration within the Fleet. As you will know, the re-

-1-

¹Subsequent pages of this letter, upon investigation, appear not to be in existence.

Confidential

15 MARCH 1940.

DEAR J. O.: I am somewhat at a loss as to just how to answer your questions (a), (b) and (c) in your letter of 8 March.

I do not know whether Bloch left his personal file of correspondence between him and me, for you to read over or whether he talked it over with you. The background for sending the Hawaiian Detachment was for the most part contained in this personal correspondence.

One of the first questions which was brought to me after I took over this job was the possible reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet which had been requested by Admiral Hart. This reinforcement was to be preferably, according to Hart's request, a division of heavy cruisers. His second choice was a division of light cruisers. The situation in the Shanghai Settlement in regard to control of that area was tense. The situation in Tientsin, especially in regard to British Japanese relations, was critical. The war in Europe was breaking. We wanted to do what we could for Hart, strengthen the State Department's hands, and at the same time not weaken our own position.

I looked into the question of our War Plans, especially as to the Commander-in-Chief's Operating Plan for an Orange campaign. This seemed to meet a strategic situation in the Pacific in a manner by which Hart would be supported by naval deployment, and the Commander-in-Chief would still have close control over all units of the Fleet.

The result was that on 8 September I wrote to Bloch and made the suggestion of sending a detachment to Hawaii, but only after I had talked it over with the President and the okayed it one hundred percent; as did the State Department.

There were several despatches back and forth (Opnav 0022-1815, 0024-1225, CinCUS 0023-1255, all of September), and also one or two telephone calls. Bloch recommended that Andrews be in command; he also recommended that my first suggestion of moving the submarines to Hawaii be held up; I concurred in both recommendations. Admiral Bloch was opposed to sending any more cruisers to the Asiatic. They were not sent.

We did reinforce the Asiatic by one tender, one squadron of patrol planes and six new submarines. The Hawaiian Detachment fits in with the Commander-in-Chief's Operating Plan Orange.

When the time came for the Hawaiian Detachment to go, a proposed press release as drawn up showing the reason to be "For the purpose of facilitating training operations." The President finally said: "Do not release it to the press."

Hardly had the Detachment arrived in Hawaii when the question of rotation came up. After a good deal of correspondence back and forth we took the bull by the horns and sent out our directive in regard to this question (CNO Serial 938 or 4 January 1940). Of course the question of home ports and transportation of dependents was a big item in arriving at the final decision.

My original ideas in regard to the Hawaiian Detachment were that possibly, in fact probably, the Commander of this Detachment would be able to carry out the regular schedule of gunnery firings and for training would be able to visit the various island possessions in the Mid-Pacific area to familiarize himself with these possessions and their potential uses in time of war.

I still think that the decision to send the Detachment to Hawaii under present world conditions is sound. No one can measure how much effect its presence there may have on the Orange foreign policy. The State Department is strong for the present setup and considers it beneficial; they were in on all discussions, press releases, etc.

I find that in the above I have more or less covered your paragraphs (a) and (b). I cannot help but feel that a Vice Admiral should be in command of the Hawaiian Detachment. He would probably command the above force prescribed in War Plans. Administration may be difficult but it will be more difficult in war and means should be developed to offset this difficulty.

In regard to your question (c), of course I don't know whether the President will go to the Coast before his term of office expires or not, but I think the chances are that he very probably will; in fact he intended to go last October and couldn't. At that time he told the people in San Francisco that he would try and come at a later date. My guess is that if world conditions will permit his leaving Washington you will see him sometime before Winter on the West Coast with the desire for a fishing trip, or more possibly a desire to go to Alaska which he has so often expressed. A cruiser force flagship or its equal will be required, because the President will doubtless want to take someone with him. When he went to the

Canal Zone in the TUSCALOOSA he was comfortable but he had cut down his entourage to the minimum.

In regard to the relief of the AUGUSTA, I have received your official letter and we are now making a careful study of it from all angles and hope to find a solution which will be satisfactory in the main to both ends.

The decision to retain one division of CAS in the Atlantic was made after considerable discussion with the President. Some would have two divisions. I held one division is enough, supplemented as it is by a couple of CLs. With the general requirement of two cruisers in the Caribbean and two on the North Atlantic Coast, we cannot well do with less. For the time being at least we will have to retain one division of CAS on this side.

I will be glad to get your reply to my letter on the CL Force Flagship. Personally I do not see it—but I am prepared to do what you want.

Every good wish as always and best of luck.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "Pennsylvania,"
San Pedro, California.

P. S.—Mr. Edison expects to leave Washington on 26 March and join the Fleet 1 April; leave Hawaii in NASHVILLE 15 April, arrive San Francisco 20 April; inspect San Diego about 24 April and return to Washington about 28 April. I do hope you can acquaint him with the Navy on this trip. Deyo will take up the details on his arrival in the West, etc. and you will be acquainted with them later.

8 APRIL 1940.

DEAR JO: I have just been glancing over your letter of 8 February to Admiral Nimitz to check my memory on one of your questions as follows: I did it because of some information which came in this morning.

(a) Is "CinCus facing trouble in the Western Pacific" so surely as to warrant giving that consideration greater weight in the preparation of the flag slate than the usual peacetime considerations of training flag officers for higher command: If so, the best should be kept at, or ordered to sea.

I believe Nimitz answered your letter but was not able to answer the above question. I want now to answer that question with an emphatic affirmative. I believe the situation in the Far East is continually deteriorating so far as our relations with Japan are concerned. I may be unduly pessimistic but I do want to communicate my thoughts for what they are worth and I might add they are backed by some pretty concrete evidence. I think you should continually keep uppermost in your mind the possibility of trouble in the Orient, and the means to meet it.

The President has been troubled with a bad cold and we are about two weeks overdue in an appointment with him; however, we are hoping we will have it within the next few days and after he has agreed to the topside slate we will send you his desires for your further recommendations lower down.

I am also in hearty accord with the last paragraph of your letter and to save you the trouble of checking I am quoting it:

"If the eminence of trouble does not outweigh other considerations, I think that the most promising material for high command should be given adequate sea experience at the expense of the less promising, and that a long range plan should be prepared with a view to having the best possible available with recent Fleet experience and with adequate time to serve when those now in high position in the Fleet step out of the picture."

Here's hoping the Maneuvers are highly beneficial from every standpoint.

Every good wish as always,

/s/ BETTY.

[Copy of Mr. Edison's letter of 5/7 enclosed]

Confidential

Mailed 5/8/40 to catch clipper of 5/14
7 MAY 1940.

DEAR J. O.: Just hung up the telephone after talking with the President and by the time this reaches you you will have received word to remain in Hawaiian waters for a couple of weeks.

When the Fleet returns to the Coast (and I trust the delay will not be over two weeks, but I cannot tell) the President has asked that the Fleet schedule be so arranged that on extremely short notice the Fleet be able to return concentrated to Hawaii Waters. This will present somewhat of a problem in lugging around more oil with you perhaps than usual and keeping more provisions on board because if action is wanted it will be wanted quickly. As far as I can see, your proposed schedule meets this requirement and unless you hear to the contrary you may assume it okay.

I am glad you want to run East to have a talk in the Department. Had you not suggested it, I would have myself. We have been making some close examinations into the War Plans recently and I remarked at the time I wished you could have been present. I trust your arrival here will not be delayed over about two weeks, beyond what it normally would have been.

Of course you know the thought behind the above and that is that the Italian situation is extremely delicate, the two weeks ahead regarded as critical; then - - - - - ???? nobody can answer the riddle just now.

I am still hopeful that our Expansion Bill will go through. The Appropriation Bill has also to be acted on. Other than these two items nothing of particular interest that I can think of for the moment from the Fleet standpoint.

I hope to get money for elevation of the NEW YORK, TEXAS and ARKANSAS guns. My feeling is that these ships are of little use as is, and that even if they have to be out of the Fleet under overhaul at a critical time, we should go ahead with them. Do you concur?

Am also looking into the question of one or two more flag officers in Atron which I believe you desire.

Am delighted you are able to give War Plans your personal attention. Personally I think it is one of our most important jobs.

I don't know how you feel about it, but I have always felt that CincUS was loaded up with too much in the way of material matters and administration; and that in general material matters should not go beyond type commanders, at least as far as routine items are concerned. For example if Combatfor wants to find out something about his destroyers, he can send for Comdesbatfor tell him, or better still, let Comdesbatfor write him or see him frequently enough to keep him in general touch. It seems to me force commanders should not have to sign or even think about the thousand and one material details which must detract from their more important duties; let the type commanders do this.*

I know you have a tough job in submitting the names of six rear admirals from among whom three may be earmarked for furlough. I have got to do the same myself. If you and Peck agree it will automatically make it easier. I just mentioned to the President the advisability of appointing the three of us to constitute a board to actually meet and make this recommendation. This would take away any political repercussions so far as the President is concerned. However, he didn't take to this idea and said all he wanted was to be told verbally the names.

With best wishes as always

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "Pennsylvania," Pearl Harbor, T. H.

*This is just thinking out loud—but I would like to talk this over with you when you are here.

CnC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. & PENNSYLVANIA, FlagshipDown
fPearl Harbor, T. H.
May 13, 1940

Dear Betty:

When Hill was detached last January he took with him to Washington some ideas, largely Bloch's, as to what might be acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, (under the assumptions then made, to serve as a start from which Op-12 would develop basic assumptions to be officially transmitted, within a few weeks, to the Commander-in-Chief for use in making plans.

During a recent conference in the Twelfth Naval District it was brought out that we were woefully short of 5"-38 caliber ammunition at Mare Island.

I am unable to grasp the meaning of Opnav dispatch 112130 sent at 1630 last Saturday, but we are guessing that the Department has tentatively approved, with minor exceptions, the contents of the memorandum prepared for me by Hill, and that the Department will correct the ammunition situation at Mare Island.

bring
take
care
2

The assumptions under which the Hill memorandum was drawn up and under which all other operations in the Western Pacific have previously been considered, are today all different. Previous assumptions and estimates of the situation no longer hold.

It seems that, under present world conditions, the paramount thing for us is the security of the Western Hemisphere. This, in my opinion, transcends everything -- anything certainly in the Far East, our own or other interests.

South America is the greatest prize yet remaining to be grabbed. Until the outcome in Europe can be more clearly seen, security in the Western Hemisphere seems to be the most important consideration for us.

re

CmC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

I feel that any move west means hostilities. I feel that at this time it would be a grave mistake to become involved in the West where our interests, although important, are not vital, and thereby reduce our ability to maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere which is vital.


If the Fleet is to go west it can only start, properly prepared, from the West Coast where it can be docked, manned, stocked and stripped, and a suitable train assembled.

Rest assured that although I am entirely without information I realize your position, and I want you to know that if the situation becomes such that higher authority decides we should go West, all of us are ready to give all we have.

These are some of the things I wanted to talk to you about, and since I can not see you, I feel that I am duty bound to write you.

With kindest regards and best wishes,

Very sincerely yours,



Please acknowledge receipt by despatch.

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy
The Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

ChC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

P.S. On 9 April I sent Andrews with a detachment in to simulate a raiding force against Pearl Harbor, to serve as an object for attack by our patrol planes and Army bombers. Andrews reported sighting Navy patrol planes, but he did not see any Army bombers.

Today we were picked up by our patrol planes about 0630, but we did not see any Army bombers. However, our submarines made several successful attacks from fairly short ranges. We had a heavy swell with white caps so that it was difficult to see the submarines.

While the Secretary was on board, one of the SARA-TOGA'S fighting planes had a forced landing close aboard. The plane sank, but the Reserve Ensign was recovered without his even getting his feet wet.

Today one of the LEXINGTON bombing planes (SEU) had a forced landing. The plane sank, but the pilot and passenger were recovered with slight injuries.

The PENNSYLVANIA should anchor in Lahaina about 1700.



H. R. S.

Serial 013212
Secret

22 MAY 1940.

DEAR JOE: When we sent our dispatch it looked as if Italy were coming in almost immediately and that a serious situation might develop in the East Indies, and that there was a possibility of our being involved. However, the recent "blitzkrieg" events in Europe have certainly altered the picture for the time being. Personally I think it has made more remote (for the moment at least) the question of a westward movement of the fleet. I agree with the tenor of your letter and you will be glad to know I had already so expressed myself. I also realize events may change this picture and possibly over night.

With regard to the specific questions raised in your letter of 13 May, the Joint Plan for Rainbow Two is about complete, and a copy of it, including the studies upon which it is based, will go to you shortly by officer messenger. This Joint Plan embraces in general all the basic assumptions listed in the memorandum Hill brought East. The joint tasks of this plan will require the operation of the Fleet in general with the fleet tasks set up in Hill's memorandum.

I think these assumptions are about the best upon which a basic plan of this nature can be promised, although in any preliminary operating plan which you may prepare at present, I think you should assume the present strength and disposition of the Fleet, in order to develop the problem from a practical basis.

As you get time in these strenuous days, I believe it would be advisable for you to go ahead with the preparation of a tentative Fleet Operating Plan for Rainbow Two, as we are most anxious to have the benefit of your detailed study of the difficulties involved, and the logistic and other requirements.

I wish you would keep constantly in mind the possibility of a complete collapse of the Allies, including the loss of their fleets. A very probable development of such a catastrophe is visualized in the Rainbow One Plan. Should the Allied fleets pass into the hands of the Germans, however, an entirely different, and far more serious situation would exist. I would appreciate your views regarding the best disposition of fleet forces in such an event.

Regarding the 5 inch 38 caliber ammunition we have realized the deficiency, and, as you probably know, Ordnance has now arranged for shipment of 20,000 rounds on the PYRO. We understand that this will complete the first increment of the mobilization supply on board and will give some room for target practice ammunition. It is my understanding that there will still be enough on shore on the West Coast and in Hawaii to meet mobilization requirements. I would be glad if you would confirm this.

I find that the 6 inch 47 caliber reserve supply on the West Coast is not what it should be. There are 6,000 shells out there and I have requested the Bureau of Ordnance to send a like quantity of powder by rail.

We are taking up the question of another Flag Officer in ATRON which you suggested. We hope to put this in effect in the near future; the idea being to assign this officer as Commander Destroyers Atlantic Squadron. Present plan is to rig up something on the DENEbola for him to use as an Administrative Flag Ship and then assign ad interim one of the new 1500 ton destroyers as a Tactical Flag Ship with the idea of recalling from the Fleet the SAMPSON (which seems most logical choice) or another 1850 destroyer to take the place of this new 1500 tonner tentatively assigned. On account of the antiaircraft armament on the 1500 tonners I feel that the 1500 tonner would be more valuable to you than the SAMPSON, and at the same time the SAMPSON would give a little more room for Flag Quarters and Operating Staff accommodations. I do not want to tie up another cruiser as a separate Flag Ship. I sometimes feel there has been too much of this already. This seems to be the best solution for the problem, unless you can suggest a better one.

In regard to the disposition of cruisers I feel that the ST. LOUIS and HELENA should join the Fleet as soon as they are out of the Yard. They should get Fleet Training. They are valuable units to you. If we take them out of the Atlantic and send them to the Pacific I must replace them. Under the present situation the reduction in cruiser strength as it is, should, if anything, be augmented. There are two possible solutions: one, to assign Rowcliff and Cruiser Division FIVE to the Atlantic. This would give two heavy cruiser Divisions in the Hawaiian Detachment and two in the Atlantic. The other is to send Fletcher's Division, Cruiser Division THREE, to the Atlantic which would give one heavy Cruiser Division and one light Cruiser Division in the Atlantic, but would reduce

your Light Cruiser strength by one Division and would give you a total of three heavy cruiser divisions in the Pacific. Of course as soon as the TRENTON comes home from Europe we will have her overhauled and she will be available for duty where most needed in the Atlantic or Pacific in case either Cruiser Division THREE or FIVE is sent to the Atlantic. Please let me have your perfectly frank reaction to the above by dispatch (supplemented by air mail if you so desire).

You may draw back at the thought of reducing your cruiser strength at this time in the Pacific. This I can believe might well be your inclination,—as it would be mine. But, as I indicated above, the changing situation may push the decision one way or the other. In fact the picture may change by the time you get this letter to the extent that it may be necessary to send a real component of the Fleet to the Atlantic much as we would hate to do so and thus divide our forces.

The ST. LOUIS is due to be completed in Norfolk 15 July. The HELENA in New York, 9 July.

Th situation in some of the Southe American countries gives real cause for concern—and I say this advisedly. If Germany should win—then *what*????

Wish I could see you—and if the pressure here—day and night ever lets up—I hope to fly out.

Keep cheerful.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "Pennsylvania," Pearl Harbor, T. H.

P. S. Please acknowledge by dispatch.

Have literally lived on the Hill—State Dept.— & White House for last several days. Thank God yesterday I finally swung support for 170,000 men and 34,000 marines. Lots still in the mill—but I hope coming.

I hope to commission the remaining 35 DDs, 3 AOs & 3d SS—another personnel nightmare for the fleet—but I simply couldn't do it before.

Here's hopin.

BETTY.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Lahaina Roads, T. H.
22 May 1940

Open

As you no doubt well appreciate, I now must plan the Fleet schedule and employment for the next few months. To do this intelligently, however, it is necessary to know more than I know now about why we are here and how long we will probably stay. I realize that the answer to the second question is largely dependent upon the first, and probably also upon further developments, but nonetheless I should have something to go on. For instance, carrying out even a curtailed gunnery schedule will require wholesale movements of targets, tugs, utility planes, etc., from the Coast. The following are pertinent questions:

- (a) Are we here primarily to influence the actions of other nations by our presence, and if so, what effect would the carrying out of normal training (insofar as we can under the limitations on anchorages, air fields, facilities and services) have on this purpose? The effect of the emergency docking program and the consequent absence of task forces during the training period must also be considered. *None*
- (b) Are we here as a stepping off place for belligerent activity? If so, we should devote all of our time and energies to preparing for war. This could more effectively and expeditiously be accomplished by an immediate return to the West Coast, with "freezing" of personnel, filling up complements, docking and all the rest of it. We could return here upon completion. *None*

As it is now, to try and do both (a) and (b) from here and at the same time is a diversification of effort and purpose that can only result in the accomplishment of neither.

If we are here to develop this area as a peacetime operating base, consideration should be given to the certain decrease in the efficiency of the Fleet and the lowering of morale that may ensue, due to inadequate anchorages, air fields, facilities, services, recreation conditions, for so large a Fleet. If only peacetime training is involved should the Bureau of Navigation and I not be advised so we may remove restrictions on officer details?

CmC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. & PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CONFIDENTIAL

✓ The answer to your proposal to retain the ENTERPRISE at San Diego is dependent upon the answer to the above questions.

I am returning to Pearl Harbor with the Fleet on 24 May to remain until 10 June for upkeep. During the first week of this period, on the assumption that we are here for normal peacetime training, I will complete a survey of what is available and what are the minimum additional requirements in the way of:

Auxiliary air fields	Airplane services
Targets	Athletic fields and facilities
Tugs	Provisions
Utility planes	Fuel

Upon completion of this survey I may recommend a reduction in the number of carriers to be maintained in this area and I will probably request the allocation of funds for immediate work on auxiliary air fields and athletic fields and facilities.

Based on this survey and additional information from you, I may modify my orders regarding the shifting of tugs, tenders, targets, and utility planes from San Diego to Pearl Harbor.

At present the following are under orders to proceed to Pearl Harbor leaving the West Coast in June (except UTAH, BOGGS, and LAMBERTON, which are to come upon completion of overhaul in July or August):

- (a) Entire utility wing, including drone squadron, less Atron units and less minimum base units for continued overhaul, and for acceptance of new units (chiefly new drones). This amounts to approximately 40 planes and 300 personnel. The sufficiency of present facilities for repair and operation of these is questionable. However, without practically all the utility wing present in this area it is certain that the gunnery schedule of the Fleet will be seriously curtailed.
- (b) Three battle towing targets and four series 60 high speed sleds, and a number of series 40 high speed sleds, are to be towed or carried to the Hawaiian area by Base Force tugs and other Base Force vessels noted in (c) and (d).
- (c) MEDUSA, MELVILLE, WHITNEY, DORSEY, ELLIOT, and UTAH, BOGGS, and LAMBERTON, on completion of overhaul.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FlagshipCONFIDENTIAL

(d) One oil barge and one garbage lighter, and five tugs.

If the Fleet is to remain here and carry out normal peacetime training it will be conducive to efficiency of administration, to the carrying out of employment schedules and to the most effective use of services and operating areas if the ships and services of the Hawaiian Detachment are incorporated under their normal type commanders. Unless advised to the contrary by you before 30 May, this will be done.

In any event and whatever the future holds, we seriously need additional enlisted personnel. We should no longer be content to operate with any vacancies in peacetime allowance materially below our needs and our complement. With so many ships building and other ships to be recommissioned, we must have many additional trained men. It will take a long time to train them. I urge that all training stations be operated to full capacity. Trained men are fully as important as additional material and equipment.

If we are in the preliminary stage of preparation for belligerent action our ships should be fully manned by the most competent available officer personnel. Peacetime shifting of officer personnel should cease. With my lack of knowledge of the Department's purposes and intentions, I feel that we may work at cross purposes, and the whole matter of officer personnel changes may become most confused.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely yours,


J. O. RICHARDSON

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

BC

Secret

27 MAY 1940.

DEAR JO: Yours of the 22nd just received. I shall endeavor to answer it paragraph by paragraph. First, however, I would like to say that I know exactly what you are up against, and to tell you, that here in the Department we are up against the same thing.

Why are you in the Hawaiian Area?

Answer: You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies. In previous letters I have hooked this up with the Italians going into the war. The connection is that with Italy in, it is thought the Japs might feel just that much freer to take independent action. We believe both the Germans and the Italians have told the Japs that so far as they are concerned she, Japan, has a free hand in the Dutch East Indies.

Your natural question may follow—well, how about Italy and the war? I can state that we have had Italy going into the war on 24 hours notice on several different occasions during the last two weeks from sources of information which looked authentic. Others have stated that it would occur within the next ten days. I have stated personally that cold logic would dictate her not going in for some time. It is anybody's guess. It may be decided by the time this reaches you. Events are moving fast in Northern France.

The above in itself shows you how indefinite the situation is.

Along the same line as the first question presented you would naturally ask—suppose the Japs do go into the East Indies? What are we going to do about it? My answer is that is, I don't know and I think there is nobody on God's green earth who can tell you. I do know my own arguments with regard to this, both in the White House and in the State Department, are in line with the thoughts contained in your recent letter.

I would point out one thing and that is that even if the decision here were for the U. S. to take no decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the Dutch East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as by so doing we would completely nullify the reason for your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just remember that the Japs don't know what we are going to do and so long as they don't know they may hesitate, or be deterred. These thoughts I have kept very secret here.

[2] The above I think will answer the question "why you are there". It does not answer the question as to how long you will probably stay. Rest assured that the minute I get this information I will communicate it to you. Nobody can answer it just now. Like you, I have asked the question, and also—like you—I have been unable to get the answer.

I realize what you are up against in even a curtailed gunnery schedule. I may say that so far as the Department is concerned you are at liberty to play with the gunnery schedule in any way you see fit, eliminating some practices for the time being and substituting others which you may consider important and which you have the means at hand to accomplish. Specifically if you want to cut short range battle practice and proceed with long range practices or division practices or experimental or anything else, including anti-air, etc., etc., which you think will be to the advantage of the Fleet in its present uncertain status—go ahead. Just keep us informed.

We have told you what we are doing about ammunition; we will attempt to meet any changes you may desire.

We have given you a free hand in recommending ships to come back to the Coast for docking, etc.

You ask whether you are there as a stepping off place for belligerent activity? Answer: obviously it might become so under certain conditions but a definite answer cannot be given as you have already gathered from the foregoing.

I realize what you say about the advantages of returning to the West Coast for the purpose of preparation at this time is out of the question. If you did return it might nullify the principle reasons for your being in Hawaii. This very question has been brought up here. As a compromise, however, you have authority for returning ships to the Coast for docking, taking ammunition, stores, etc., and this should help in any case.

As to the freezing of personnel:—Nimitz has put the personnel problem before you. I will touch on it only to the extent that I have been moving Heaven and Earth to get our figure boosted to 170,000 enlisted men (or even possibly 172,300) and 34,000 marines. If we get these authorized I believe you will be comfortable as regards numbers of men for this coming year. I know the convulsion the Fleet had to go through to commission the 64 destroyers and some other ships recently.

I am thankful that convulsion is over. I hope the succeeding one may be as light as possible and you may rest assured that Navigation will do everything it can to lessen this unavoidable burden on the Forces Afloat.

I had hoped your time in the Hawaiian area would have some indirect or incidental results regardless of anything else, such as—

- (a) Solving the logistic problems involved, including not only supplies from the U. S. but their handling and storage at Pearl Harbor.
- (b) Training, such as you might do under war conditions.
- [3] (c) Familiarity of Task Forces with the Midway, Aleutian, Palmyra, Johnston, Samoa general area, in so far as may be practicable.
- (d) Closer liaison with the Army and the common defense of the Hawaiian area than has ever previously existed between Army and Navy.
- (e) Solving of communication problems involved by joint action between Army and Navy and particularly stressing the air communications.
- (f) Security of the Fleet at anchor.
- (g) Accentuating the realization that the Hawaiian group consists of considerably more than just Oahu.

You were not detained in Hawaii to develop the area as a peacetime operating base but this will naturally flow to a considerable extent from what you are up against.

As to the decrease in the efficiency of the Fleet and the lowering of morale due to inadequate anchorages, air fields, facilities, service, recreation conditions, for so large a Fleet;*

I wish I could help you. I spent some of my first years out of the Naval Academy in the West Indies,—I remember the last port I was in after a 22 month stay and where we didn't move for 6 months; and there was not even one white person in the place. The great antidote I know is WORK and homemade recreation such as sailing, fishing, athletics, smokers, etc. You can also move Task Forces around a good deal for seagoing and diversion; just so you be ready for concentrations should such become necessary. We will solve the oil situation for you for all the cruising you feel necessary.

In my letter of May 22nd I mentioned the possibility of moving some units of the Fleet to the Atlantic. This might be a small movement, or it might grow to a modified Rainbow No. 1,—modified as to assumptions and as to the distribution of the forces. In other words, a situation that we might be confronted with would be one in which the Italian and German Fleets would not be free to act, but might be free to send a cruiser or so to the South Atlantic. In such a case there would be no need to send very extensive forces to the Atlantic, and the continuance of the Fleet in the Pacific would maintain its stabilizing influence.

Units that might be called to the Atlantic, under such a modified Rainbow situation, to provide for conditions that *now* appear possible, would be a division of cruisers, a carrier, a squadron of destroyers, possibly a light mine layer division possibly Patrol Wing One, and possibly, but more unlikely, a division of submarines with a tender.

If you desire to have task groups visit the Aleutians, and the islands in the mid-Pacific and south Pacific somewhat distant [4] from Hawaii, the possibility of such a call being made,—for the detachment of such a force to the Atlantic—should be borne in mind.

Also, it should be borne in mind, in connection with any movements of Navy units to the southward that a situation might arise which would call for visits to French or British possessions in these areas. We will strive to keep you informed on these points as the situation changes or develops.

I believe we have taken care of your auxiliary air fields by granting authority for leases and I may add that we are asking for authority to do something permanent in this connection in bills which we now have pending before the Congress and which should be acted upon within the next two weeks.

Fleet Training has recently sent you a letter with regard to targets and target practice facilities in general. We will do everything we can to assist you in this situation and I trust that something permanent will come out of it so that in future situations of this kind the 14th District will be much better off.

Regarding the carrier situation, we are prepared to go along with you on whatever you decide is best after you complete your survey.

Regarding splitting the Hawaiian Detachment back into its normal type commands:—We will naturally leave this matter entirely in your hands. If a part of the Fleet is brought to the Atlantic Coast, or if the main part of the Fleet is

recalled to the West Coast, it may well, in any case, be necessary to formulate a task force for retention in Hawaii different from the composition of the present Hawaiian Detachment.

This letter is rather rambling and practically thinking out loud as I have read yours. Incidentally it should be read in connection with my letter to you of 22 May wherein was outlined the possibilities of having to send some ships to the Atlantic; and which you had not received when you wrote.

I would be glad if you would show Admiral Bloch this and also my last letter—as I want to keep him informed.

Rest assured that just as soon as I can give you anything more specific I will. Meanwhile keep cheerful and with every good wish as ever

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "PENNSYLVANIA," Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

P. S. The European situation is extremely critical. Italy may act by 5 June which seems to be another deadline drawn on information which once again looks authentic. However, it still is a guess.

Secret

JUNE 22, 1940.

DEAR JO: Your trip to Washington was held in abeyance because of uncertainty as to the movements of the fleet in the immediate future. Tentatively decision has been made for the fleet to remain for the present where it is. This decision may be changed at any time. It rests partly upon the question as to what happens to the French fleet. On this last there is no definite and final information as yet.

So all I can say is that the fleet must stay in a condition of complete readiness. By now you will have received my last letter, in which in reply to your question I stated I thought it would be best for you to concentrate your planning energies on a distribution of task forces to provide for the problems of Rainbow 1 modified by those set up in Rainbow 4. This picture is as yet unchanged.

The floating dry dock from New Orleans has recently completed the transit of the Panama Canal, and is being reassembled for towing on to Pearl Harbor as originally planned. A few days ago the question was brought up as to whether or not this plan would be carried out. After giving it some reconsideration, we decided to go ahead and take the dock on to Honolulu as it would be needed there to care for the forces that must be maintained in the Honolulu area in any case.

Guantanamo is receiving considerable development. In addition to air fields on both sides of the Bay, we are increasing the gun defenses by four 6" guns and four 3" antiaircraft guns. In the near future we will send about 105 additional Marines, and somewhat later, when its training has been completed, we will send down a Marine Defense Battalion of about 750 men.

I am also endeavoring to get two transports ready for the use of the Marines in the immediate future, one for the Atlantic (probably Caribbean) and one for the Pacific. We plan to load these transports with combat units of the Fleet Marine Force so that they will be strategically ready for immediate use,—such a transport full of Marines and equipment can be dispatched to a needed task in the same manner as we now dispatch a cruiser.

We recently, as you read in the papers, introduced a bill expanding the Navy sufficiently to provide for major tasks simultaneously in both oceans, and of a strength that will permit us at all times to have strong forces in each ocean. It is not our intention to have a permanent Atlantic fleet somewhat disassociated from the permanent Pacific fleet. However, there will necessarily be some decentralization in fleet command. We can talk this over when you come East.

Another subject to take up with you is the question of basing the fleet units that might be brought to the Atlantic—using Caribbean bases, primarily—Cristobal, Guantanamo and others.

This is the first of an attempt to write you a weekly letter. Hope they may prove to be of some use to you.

All good wishes,
Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON. U. S. N.
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
U.S.S. "Pennsylvania," c/o Postmaster,
San Francisco, California.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
UNITED STATES FLEET
U S S PENNSYLVANIA
P. 1000000

Lahaina Roads, T.H.
22 June 1940

Dear Betty:

The enclosures are self-explanatory, and caused me to send confidential despatch 220603.

To clarify the situation, I flew to Pearl yesterday and held a conference with Andrews, Bloch, and General Herron, commanding the Hawaiian Department. Briefly, on 17 June, due to the "Alert" from the War Department, the Army issued live ammunition to all posts including A.A. batteries, etc., and established a patrol and guard over all critical areas, which are considered by them to be, all landing beaches, land areas (bridges, roads, etc.) and Pearl Harbor (Marines). Their directive included a proviso that all despatches were to be sent in code via cable to the Chief of Staff and that the public in Honolulu were not to be excited, hence no Army was stationed at waterworks, electric light plant, gas or telephone companies, but extra precautions were taken by these latter.

The navy increased their distant plane patrol from 180 miles to 300 miles and enlarged the sector being covered to include from 180° to 360°, as well as establishing a 30 mile inner patrol.

Two days later, the Army received word to "ease up on the Alert", but to maintain guard on all critical areas on a semi-permanent basis. We did not know about this, until General Herron mentioned it at the conference in reply to my query as to how long the Alert would continue. General Herron stated that he might, on the 24th, further modify his present interpretation of the "modified alert".

As a matter of interest, Herron said he had been asked if he could store crude rubber and tin to the extent of 600,000 cubic feet (his figures) and further that no such storage space was available.

15c

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
UNITED STATES FLEET
U S S PENNSYLVANIA
Flagship

Admiral Stark - 2

The Army "Alert" and action taken caused me some concern though I felt positive that any Army intelligence bearing on the above would be available to and evaluated by the Navy, with information to me. Of course, anything of this character tends to aggravate the tenseness of the situation and to interrupt training, as the Fleet is operating from Lahaina and Pearl by single ships and groups and without the full screening and scouting which a more serious situation would necessitate.

✓
As a similar situation may again arise, I believe a remedy would be to insure that where possible, when joint action is involved, even in drills, that the Commanders of the Army and Navy be jointly informed, with definite information to me as to whether the alarm is real or simulated for purposes of training.

With best regards,



J. O. RICHARDSON

Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S.N.
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

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"COPY"

SECRET

U. S. S. INDIANAPOLIS,
 Pearl Harbor, T. H.
 Tuesday, 18 June 1940.

Memo. for Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Rear Admiral Bloch visited me yesterday stating that he had just been informed by General Herron, in secret, that he (Herron) had just received orders from the War Department placing Army in this area on the "Alert". This was done with special emphasis on possible carrier and plane attacks. He asked Bloch for a distant air patrol and inner air patrol.


I explained to Bloch your present patrol plan and informed him that I would establish immediately an inner patrol which I did at 1300 yesterday and am continuing same. General Herron desires that a VP patrol be established covering western semi-circle with Oahu as center instead of present VP patrol from Lahaina which as you know covers from 220 to 335 distance 180 miles.

I agree with Herron and I have VP to establish such a patrol which must begin at dawn each day.

I have discussed this matter with Fitch who is ready to start when you give the order.

I have also informed Rear Admiral Calhoun in secret.

If you desire this patrol established in lieu of present patrol I suggest that you send Combasefor a message "Affirm patrol" and this new patrol will be started tomorrow. Such a patrol is pictured as below:



Sector to be searched daily - Western semi-circle. The Army will cover night patrol, leaving us day patrol only.

Calhoun and I are awaiting instructions.

Respectfully,

I sent "Affirm patrol" to Andrews and receipt of this *Ad*

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AT 2200 (LOCAL TIME) ON 18 JUNE, 1940, SENT THE FOLLOWING
TO COMMANDANT, 14TH NAVAL DISTRICT: .

SECRET

"WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER REQUEST OF COMMANDING GENERAL
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT FOR ADDITIONAL AIR PATROL IS A PART OF
ARMY EXERCISE OR IS IT BASED UPON INFORMATION FROM THE WAR
DEPARTMENT"

AT 0945 (LOCAL TIME) ON 19 JUNE, 1940, THE FOLLOWING
REPLY WAS RECEIVED:

CONFIDENTIAL

"REQUEST OF COMMANDING GENERAL WAS BASED UPON A DIRECTIVE
FROM THE WAR DEPARTMENT X HE HAS NO INFORMATION AS TO
WHETHER OR NOT IT IS AN EXERCISE"

182

"COPY"

**SECRET and
PERSONAL****COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
PEARL HARBOR, T.H.**

20 June 1940

Dear Richardson:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 20 June, received by plane this morning; I note the contents thereof and will carry out your wishes expressed therein.

General Herron received a dispatch from the War Department the other day which stated in substance: "Alert your forces against hostile overseas raid. This must be done in such a way as to prevent newspaper publicity or notice of foreign intelligence agents. Department suggests that you do this on a maneuver basis in order to accomplish the above." General Herron brought this dispatch down to me and told me he was taking the necessary action and hoped that the Navy could see its way clear to have an off-shore patrol each day and do anything else in its power. I consulted Andrews and an off-shore and in-shore patrol around Pearl Harbor has been arranged concerning which you have been advised by Calhoun. I have no idea of how long this situation will exist, nor as to the gravity thereof; for two days I had out the Fleet Marine Force and their anti-aircraft guns with ammunition. I called them in yesterday inasmuch as it was necessary to keep their ammunition under tarpaulins in the vicinity of the guns and this did not look like a very safe practice inasmuch as they were deployed in the heart of the navy yard. My idea is, if something more definite is not heard by Monday, I will probably put them out again on Monday and on a distant station somewhere near the Army guns.

I have many things of relative importance and unimportance to discuss with you. Everything goes along smoothly and busily. I took the liberty of telling Eddy that I thought he should go back with Rucker in the plane today without giving him any reasons.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ C. C. BLOCH.

Admiral J. O. Richardson, U.S.N.,
Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet,
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship.

CCB:kt

MC

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship
At Sea,
12 September, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY:

1. The following notes are submitted on the points which we discussed in my effort to meet your wishes to know officers, learn about ships and find out how you could assist the Fleet's preparation for war.

2. PERSONNEL(A) Officers.

- (a) Promotion by selection best method yet devised.
- (b) Members should be allowed to serve on two successive boards if circumstances render it advisable (requires change by Congress).
- (c) Sea duty assignments should be based on ability; the most promising officers should be given preference. This would tend to create a division of officers into two classes, the most promising and the least promising, or an A and B list.
- (d) The abuses of retirement for physical disability and the retention on active duty and delayed retirement of the physically unfit should be corrected.

(B) Enlisted Personnel.

- (a) While the enlisted strength increased 11,549 between 23 May and 15 August, the Fleet in the Pacific made a net gain of only about 600. Our enormous expenditures for material may prove futile unless there is a prompt and commensurate personnel expansion.
- (b) The bottleneck of the training stations, limiting the rate of acceptance of new men, should be eliminated at once and emergency expansion should begin now without awaiting deficiency appropriations. We have not waited for specific appropriations in providing material expansion, and it is difficult to understand or explain to the Fleet why we are unable or unwilling to meet even more vital problems of personnel (involving the imperative necessity of making ready what we already have as well as training men for new construction) with equally direct and effective action. I estimate

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UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship

the time necessary to make a modern man-of-war's-man at 4 years. You can see the necessity of getting started on this training right away.

(C) Separate Air Corps.

- (a) Unquestionably a higher degree of cooperation will exist between our Naval air arm and other Naval arms if all of them continue to be intimately bound together in one Navy.
- (b) With a separate air corps there is bound to develop a loyalty to the Corps rather than to the Navy, a jealousy between the Corps and the rest of the Navy, many perplexing problems of supply, personnel, administration, and above all a serious loss in effectiveness.
- (c) I know of no advantage to the Navy or the Nation that would accrue from the creation of a Naval Air Corps.

3. MATERIAL(A) Surface ships.

- (a) I believe new construction is being expedited as much as possible. Minelayers are needed for Atlantic Coast. *(initials)*

(B) Aircraft.

- (a) A tremendous expansion in this field complicated by foreign orders as well as by our demands. Airplanes, either for sale or for training, should not be obtained at the expense of the active Fleet. Fleet planes must be replaced as rapidly as possible, with new planes, but old planes cannot be taken off until new ones are on hand. *Y/W
No*

(C) Ammunition.

- (a) Build up the maximum reserve possible of anti-aircraft ammunition. *✓*

4. OPERATIONS(A) Retention of the fleet in the Hawaiian Area.

- (a) From a purely Naval point of view there are many disadvantages attached to basing the fleet in this area, some of which are: *Y/W
No*

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- (1) Difficulty, delay and cost of transporting men, munitions, and supplies.
- (2) Inadequacy of Lahaina as operating anchorage due to lack of security.
- (3) Inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as operating anchorage due to difficulties of entry, berthing and departure of large ships.
- (4) Congested and restricted operating areas, in the air and on the surface.
- (5) Inadequate facilities for fleet services, training, recreation and housing.
- (6) Prolonged absences from mainland of officers and men in time of peace adversely affects morale.

- Yes & No*
check this
- (7) In case of war, necessary for Fleet to return to mobilization ports on West Coast or accept partial and unorganized mobilization measures resulting in confusion and a net loss of time.

- Yes & No*
in preparation
- (b) If the disposition of the Fleet were determined solely by Naval considerations the major portion of the Fleet should return to its normal Pacific Coast bases because such basing would facilitate its training and its preparation for war.

- What about*
and ?
- (c) If factors other than purely Naval ones are to influence the decision as to where the Fleet should be based at this time, the Naval factors should be fully presented and carefully considered, as well as the probable effect of the decision on the readiness of the Fleet. In other words, is it more important to lend strength to diplomatic representations in the Pacific by basing the Fleet in the Hawaiian Area, than to facilitate its preparation for active service in any area by basing the major part of it on normal Pacific Coast bases?

- (d) In case our relations with another Pacific Nation deteriorate, what is the State Department's conception of our next move? Does it believe that the Fleet is now mobilized and that it could embark on a campaign directly from Hawaii or safely conduct necessary train-

we should work
toward that end.
check

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UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship

ing from the insecure anchorage at Lahaina which is 8000 miles nearer enemy submarine bases than our normal Pacific Coast bases?

5. SHORE ESTABLISHMENT

- (a) I hope you will be constantly on guard not to have the position and purpose of the Shore Establishment over-emphasized. It has only one purpose - the support, maintenance and augmentation of the fighting Fleet. It cannot, of itself, damage an enemy. It is only human that some of those in Washington and long removed from the active Fleet, (predominantly staff corps) frequently fail to visualize the correct priority of objectives. ✓

6. NAVY PUBLICITY *Yes & No - per - done*

Practically all Navy Publicity, hearings before committees, speeches in Congress and handouts from the Navy Department have stressed one or more of the following ideas: *still*

- (a) The Navy is built for defense. *drop*
- (b) A so-called adequate Navy will keep us out of war. *and worth being on guard*
- (c) With an adequate Navy we can impose our will upon the Nations of the earth with little danger of becoming involved in war.
- (d) In the unhappy event of war the Fleet is a kind of mobile Maginot Line behind which the people can reside in peace with no obligation to their Country except to promise that their descendants will some day pay for the Navy.
- (e) The Fleet is fully manned, fully trained and ready to fight at the drop of a hat.
- (f) The comparative strength of navies is measured solely by material things.
- (g) Aviation is a cheap means of defense and that large numbers of planes and pilots will render the nation secure.
- (h) Outlying Naval bases and air fields, in themselves are weapons of defense.

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The type of publicity mentioned above is wrong in that it tends to lull the public into a false sense of security. It tends to weaken their moral fibre and to create an unhealthy national morale in a country which may be drawn into war on very short notice. For a people, who may actually be involved in war in a comparatively short time, to be told that they can risk war without danger or wage war without risk, may be fatally detrimental to the determined prosecution of the very war towards which such conceptions inevitably lead. At the beginning of the present war, the French and British had just these ideas, with the present result.

7. COOPERATION BETWEEN EXECUTIVE, STATE, WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS.

(a) Whether justified or not, I can not escape the feeling that the coordination and mutual understanding between the above departments of the government is not as close as is necessary for effective action.

(b) Before reaching a decision as to the disposition and movements of the Fleet, or units thereof, is the Navy Department consulted, are its views frankly and forcibly presented, and are its representations thoroughly understood and considered?

(c) Present policy appears to be headed towards forcing our will upon another Pacific Nation by diplomatic representations supported by economic measures, a large material Navy in process of construction, and the disposition of an inadequately manned Fleet in being. Can this be done and are we prepared to face war or the inevitable loss of prestige if it cannot? Have the objectives of such a war been formulated, and its costs considered and compared with the value of victory? Can such a war be won by defensive measures or by a people trained to believe that the Navy is for defensive purposes only, and that their whole obligation to their country can be met by the payment of taxes?

(d) The Commander-in-Chief has no responsibility for the formulation of National policy, but he has a definite responsibility for the efficiency of one arm upon which the government relies to enforce National policy, when its aims can not be secured by diplomatic means. He must be concerned over the question as to whether the strength and efficiency of the Fleet are commensurate with the aggressive policy of the administration in the Pacific. Especially so if there is a possibility that this

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policy will require implementation.

(e) Are objectives being formulated and plans made for our active participation in the European war? We cannot long remain half in and half out of such a war. We should decide now on definite objectives and plans and should not assume that we will fight this one like we did the last, i.e., by sending aviation and light forces for active participation and utilizing our heavy ships, in secure home bases, largely as training ships. Such a course would immobilize our heavy ships, which are most certainly going to be needed either in the Atlantic or the Pacific, depending on the progress of the war.

✓
correct
and
better

Lo Richardson

H. L. H. k
0308

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Important items to be discussed in the Department.

1. Mediterranean Study. Joint Board, (Admiral Stark)
2. Defenses and developments for new bases. Atlantic. Underground storage, auxiliary landing fields, etc. Will defense be entire responsibility of Navy or will Army be involved? (Admiral Stark.)
3. Personnel increase. (President, after discussion with Admiral Stark, Admiral Nimitz.)
4. Fleet Training. Present training too elementary and cautious. What steps to make more advanced? (Admiral Stark)
5. Greater target practice, ammunition allowance and more drone practice. Ships with war ammunition allowance cannot carry sufficient target practice ammunition. Additional ammunition ships urgently and constantly needed. (Admiral Stark.)
6. Great weakness in fast auxiliaries. What steps for early procurement of fast and adequate numbers of auxiliaries to cover all probable Fleet employment? (Admiral Stark - Admiral Robinson)
7. Mine laying by airplanes. What is contemplated? (Admiral Towers - Admiral Stark)

24 SEPTEMBER 1940.

DEAR JO: I am working on a letter for you but will send you a copy of my letter to Peck; it is self-explanatory.

I meant simply to mention Faulkner but got into something a little more serious.

Frankly, I do not like the look of things any too well. Spent over three hours in the State Department yesterday—something over two in the morning with Mr. Hull, Welles and Hornbeck, and then again in the afternoon over an hour with Mr. Welles. I believe had you been present you would have been in agreement with what I did and I pushed my thoughts home just as hard as I could. I may say that the same general picture so far as our attitude is concerned still holds, although I would not be surprised, confidentially between you and me, to see an embargo on scrap but this too would be along the lines State has been working on.

I strongly opposed, and I believe carried my point, an embargo on fuel oil for reasons which are obvious to you and with which I may say I think the State Department is in concurrence. I believe Mr. Hull brought it up to get a thorough discussion of the subject and Mr. Welles said he was in complete agreement with me.

Hope to get a letter off in the next day or two with a coverage of some of the thoughts that I have been playing with and, as you know, my mind is completely open to you, almost to simply thinking out loud.

With every good wish as always

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN.

Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,

USS "New Mexico," Long Beach, California.

P. S. Just received yours with regard to your coming East and will take it up with the Secretary. Unless there is something you feel you want to talk about or that crops up after your arrival on the Coast, I will tell the Secretary I see no need of your coming East, at least for the moment.

I am sorry the message was not sent to the Fleet. I have felt that was an Aide's job. When with the Secretary I always sent them; in the last case when I visited Hawaii I sent them for the Secretary not only to the Navy and to the Army but to the Governor as well. I will tell Mort Deyo to be on guard against these slips hereafter.

Perhaps a letter from the Secretary now would be helpful. I will talk to him about it.

25 SEPTEMBER 1940.

P. S. to my letter of yesterday.

After my note to you of yesterday I spoke to Mort Deyo about telegrams back to the Fleet or other activities after the Secretary's visits.

Mort told me that the Secretary was preparing letters himself as a result of his visit out there so you may expect to hear from him.

My feeling is that a letter sometime after a visit can never take the place of an appreciative despatch and I have so told Mort. Of course in the last analysis the Secretary is the Boss but I have given Mort the thought—here's hopin'.

Until you wrote I had not seen the sheet which placed officer and enlisted personnel under the Assistant Secretary or at least that particular item escaped my attention. It was not in the original suggestions I made to the Secretary. I immediately took it up with the Secretary and it has been changed; personnel now coming directly under the Secretary which is the same as it has been. Of course you know that BuNav and OpNav usually settle these things pretty much themselves.

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. C. RICHARDSON, USN.

1 OCTOBER 1940.

DEAR J. O.: I hated to send you the despatch last night that the house would be full when you got here. Kit had not intended to return until two weeks from next Sunday when Harold Gillespie from Honolulu expected to be with us. However he has been again delayed; will not be here when planned, and as the only reason for Kit remaining at the Lake was for his coming, and his coming now being indefinite, they decided to come down this week. By they I mean Kit and Kewpie (our daughter) and her two children and nurse girl which will fill the house to about 100 percent complement.

The Secretary wants very much to see you. I told him of your letter. However, one of the things he wanted to talk to you about is the possibility of sending a detachment to the Far East; it is being urged here by some. I have opposed it and so has Ingersoll. Your thoughts are likely to be determinative.

The question of where to hold the Fleet Problem will also be on the agenda.

In addition the Secretary says he would just like to talk to you anyway; so there you are.

I more or less took the bull by the horns with regard to getting more men aboard ship quickly and while we had written you about it the Secretary took it up with the President before we had time to get your reply, that is, with regard to cutting the training period to three weeks. I felt I was on fairly sound ground in bringing this up as my feeling is that it is in accord with your wishes. I would prefer to get twice the number of men in a given period and get them quickly rather than have them spend an additional five weeks or so at the Training Station.

Frankly I do not like the trend of things and I would not be surprised at anything happening any day. Your statement that we can not stay half in this war and half out sizes up the thing pretty well and I have long felt that it is only a matter of time until we get in.

I am writing the District Commanders a letter pointing out the gravity of the situation as I see it and will send you a copy. In this letter I made no attempt to go into much detail—my objective being that they get the spirit of the situation as I see it which would leave no stone unturned towards our immediate readiness. God knows I hope I am wrong because I realize what a little additional time would mean to us but sometimes things get out of hand either from the other fellow's action or our own.

Personally, I am looking forward as always to seeing you. I will keep the decks clear and will arrange our evenings according to your desires. The feminine part of my family are good soldiers on retiring upstairs and turning over the downstairs to stag get-togethers which I find are so beneficial these days.

For next Tuesday, 8 October, I am tentatively slating the following for dinner: The Secretary, Comdr. Murphy, Admirals Sexton, Robinson, Nimitz, Ingersoll, Towers, Furlong, Moreell and General Holcomb.

I am sorry that you will not be putting up with us as our quiet, late evening talks helped me so much when you were last here.

With every good wish as always.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "New Mexico," San Pedro, California.

P. S. I see no reason in the world for any secrecy with regard to your coming to Washington.

JOE/clp

Confidential

9 OCTOBER 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Points covered in talk with the President

1. Go ahead with assembly of Train.
2. Have we fuel oil in Samoa adequate to fill four (4) old light cruisers?
3. Give me a chart showing British and French Bases or possible bases for surface ships, submarines or airplanes in Islands in the Pacific, east of the International Date Line.
4. The British Ambassador stated that Ghormley was busy transmitting to the Department information regarding technical materials, and the British Admiralty felt that they should have officers prepared for staff conferences.
5. The British believe the Germans will attempt to occupy Dakar from Spain over land through Africa.
6. I (F. D. R.) can be convinced of the desirability of retaining the battleships on the West Coast if I can be given a good statement which will convince the American people, and the Japanese Government, that in bringing the battleships to the West Coast we are not stepping backward.
7. The President indicated that he might approve sending a Division of old Light Cruisers to visit Mindinao as a gesture. He did not appear favorably disposed toward sending a stronger force.

/s/ J. O. RICHARDSON.

CNC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

ALA/01708

U. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940

From: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

1. Since the return of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, from his recent conference in Washington, and in view of the conversations that took place there, additional thought and study have been given to the status and readiness of the U. S. Fleet for war operations. As a result of this study, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, feels it to be his solemn duty to present, for the consideration of the Chief of Naval Operations, certain facts and conclusions in order that there may be no doubt in the minds of higher authority as to his convictions in regard to the present situation, especially in the Pacific.

2. In order to bring out more clearly all the aspects of this situation, it is necessary to review certain factors affecting it and to discuss them in the light of present events.

3. On the occasion of his first visit to Washington, in July, and in personal letters to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief stressed his firm conviction that neither the Navy nor the country was prepared for war with Japan. He pointed out that such an eventuality could only result in a long drawn out, costly war, with doubtful prospects of ultimate success. He left Washington with three distinct impressions:

First. That the Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area solely to support diplomatic representations and as a deterrent to Japanese aggressive action;

Second. That there was no intention of embarking on actual hostilities against Japan;

Copy on attached.

*Signature of
Captain Wm
Gibbs, USN*

Ex R7 29C
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CnC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

Oct 22/40

ALB/01705

U. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

Third. That the immediate mission of the Fleet was accelerated training and absorption of new personnel and the attainment of a maximum condition of material and personnel readiness consistent with its retention in the Hawaiian area.

4. On the occasion of his second visit to Washington, in October, 1940, an entirely different impression was obtained. It is true that the international situation, between the two visits, had materially changed, principally in that the danger of invasion of the British Isles was considerably less imminent, with consequent reduced chances of the loss or compromise of the British Fleet; in that the United States had more closely identified itself with Great Britain; in that Japanese aggression had progressed to the domination of Indo-China and gave signs of further progress toward the Dutch East Indies; and, in the open alliances between Germany, Italy and Japan, reportedly aimed at the United States.

5. As a result of these changes, it now appears that more active, open steps aimed at Japan are in serious contemplation and that these steps, if taken now, may lead to active hostilities. It is in connection with this eventuality that the Commander-in-Chief is constrained to present his present views.

6. The present O-1 Plan (ORANGE), WUSF 44 and WUSF 45, in the light of the present international situation, is believed beyond the present strength of the U. S. Fleet and beyond the present resources of the U. S. Navy. This is believed true for the following reasons:

- (a) The present strength of the U. S. Fleet is not sufficient to establish, at the earliest practicable date, the United States Joint Asiatic Force in the Marshall-Caroline Islands are: in strength superior

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CNC 7th Fl.
ALA/CLTOS

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

src/10

U. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 28, 1940

SECRET

Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

to that of CHANCE and ready for further
advance to the Western Pacific in condi-
tion to operate offensively in that area."

While recognizing the qualifying
phrase "at the earliest practicable date,"
it is firmly believed that we cannot, at
this time, even with Great Britain as-
suming responsibility for our Atlantic
interests, demand that ocean of sufficient
forces to protect our coastal trade and to
safeguard our more vital interests in
South America. Nor can we neglect the
protection of our own and the interdiction
of Japanese trade in the Southeastern
Pacific. With these commitments adequately
cared for, our remaining force is barely
superior to CHANCE at the beginning of our
westward campaign. It will undoubtedly be
subject to attrition losses en route.

- (b) The Army is not now prepared and will not,
in the immediate future, be prepared to
support our western advance. The Fleet
Marine Force is not sufficient to support
the necessary operations alone.
- (c) The capture of BASE ONE is a major military
operation requiring detailed knowledge of
the area, detailed planning based on such
knowledge, and the taking over, conversion,
manning, training and organization of a
large number of merchant ships. The estab-
lishment of the BASE, after its occupation,
requires: (a), the transport of large
quantities of material; (b), the organiza-
tion, transport and maintenance of construc-
tion units capable of accomplishing the

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CNC File No.
A14/01708

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

U. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940

Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

necessary development; and (c), the
defense and supply of the base during
the construction period. The Plan
requires the completion of this BASE
forty-five days after the arrival of
the first material at the site.

We do not, at present, have the
detailed knowledge of the area requi-
site for proper planning of these
manifold activities. It is true that
some knowledge, possibly sufficient
for initiation of operations and
general planning for the attack, may
be obtained by reconnaissance after
hostilities have commenced, and the
Plan provides for such operations.
However, it is not now known, nor can
it be determined, until after actual
occupation, whether or not the hydro-
graphy of the area permits the estab-
lishment of a fleet anchorage, what
construction is possible on the land
areas under consideration and whether
or not adequate defensive installa-
tions, particularly air fields for
land-based aircraft, can be established.
Granting that the base seized offers
possibilities for the establishment of
these facilities, it appears certain
that the assembly of material and the
organization for construction must
await the actual occupation. To the
knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief,
no material has as yet been assembled
for this purpose, nor have any but the
vague ideas for the ultimate accom-
plishment of this objective been
advanced.

OAC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

A16/01708

U. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

Present Fleet plans, due chiefly to lack of sufficient knowledge as a basis, and partly to the preoccupation of staffs of forces afloat with routine matters of administration and training, have been most general in nature and have extended chiefly to the assignment of tasks and forces. Only tentative ideas, (based largely on unsupported assumptions) for the actual accomplishment of the objectives, have been advanced.

- (a) The time element, in the present Plan, is believed greatly out of proportion to the tasks to be accomplished. While a definite time limit does not actually appear (except for the forty-five day limit mentioned above), it is strongly implied in the tables in Appendix II of WPL 14 and throughout the O-1 Plan itself, that the operations visualized up to the establishment of BASE ONE can be accomplished in a period of some sixty to ninety days after mobilization.

It is the firm belief of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, that even if energetic, single-purpose steps toward the first objective (BASE ONE) of the Plan were initiated promptly, a period of some six months to one year would be required for its accomplishment. With the knowledge now available, the time required for subsequent operations can not even be guessed at. It is believed to be of the order of years rather than months.

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CmC File No.

A16/01708

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, FlagshipU. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940

Subject:

War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

(e) I know of no flag officer who wholeheartedly endorses the present ORANGE Plan. It is the general conception that the Plan has its inception primarily in the desirability of having a guiding directive for the development of the Naval Establishment to meet any international situation that might be thrust upon it. It is my belief that the impracticabilities of the ORANGE Plan, in the absence of a better one, have been periodically overlooked in order that the Department might have for budget purposes and presentation to Congress the maximum justification for the necessary enlargement of the Navy. In my opinion, the development of the Naval Establishment has not yet proceeded to the point essential to the successful prosecution of the Plan.

7. In addition to the ORANGE Plan, the Commander-in-Chief has available to him an approved Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. I, and a tentative draft, not as yet approved, of a Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. II. The assumptions of neither of these Plans are applicable to the present situation, nor, to the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief, is the assistance from allies visualized in the tentative draft of Rainbow No. II a likely possibility.

8. The foregoing considerations are set forth in some length in order to focus attention upon the fact that the Commander-in-Chief finds himself, in what he is led to believe may suddenly become a critical situation, without an applicable directive. He cannot, in the absence of a clear

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OpC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. & NEW MEXICO, Flagship

10/16

A16/01708

U. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

picture of national policy, national commitments and national objectives, formulate his own plans other than for obvious measures of security and defense and for accelerated preparation for further eventualities. He is of the firm belief that successful operations in war can rest only on sound plans, careful specific preparation and vigorous prosecution based upon confidence in the success of the course being pursued.

9. There is no intention or desire on the part of the Commander-in-Chief to evade his legitimate responsibilities nor is it desired that anything in this letter be so construed. It is fully realized that no plan can foresee or provide for every possible situation, and that adjustments and re-estimates must be made to fit the actual situation presented. At the same time, it is most strongly believed that the Commander-in-Chief must be better informed than he is now as to the Department's plans and intentions if he is to perform his full duty.

10. The foregoing is briefly summarized as follows:

- (a) Unsuitability of ORANGE Plan in present situation and present development of Naval Establishment;
- (b) Inapplicability of other Plans available to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet (Rainbow Nos. I and II);
- (c) Vital necessity for (1) new directive (possibly Rainbow No. III) based on present realities, national objectives and commitments as far as these are known or can be predicted at the present time; (2) coordination of plans developed with National Policy and steps to be taken to implement that policy;

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CmC File No.

ALB/01708

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, FlagshipU. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.(a) In the light of information now available
to him, the Commander-in-Chief is of the
conviction that the elements of a realistic
plan should embody:

- (1) Security and defense measures of
the Western Hemisphere;
- (2) Long-range interdiction of enemy
commerce;
- (3) Threats and raids against the
enemy;
- (4) Extension of operations as the
relative strength of the Naval
Establishment (may be influenced
by allied strength and freedom
of action) is built up to sup-
port them.

11. Please acknowledge receipt of this letter by
despatch.12. It is hereby certified that the originator con-
siders it to be impracticable to phrase this document in
such a manner as will permit a classification other than
secret.13. The exigency of delivery of this document is
such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the
next available officer courier. The originator, therefore,
authorizes the transmission of this document by registered
mail within the continental limits of the United States.

J. C. RICHMOND

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[1] Secret

12 NOVEMBER 1940.

DEAR J. O.: You may think I have been unusually silent for the last couple of weeks,—and so I have. Truth of the matter is that a great part of this time was spent in making up an estimate of the international situation, together with a number of officers in Naval Operations and two from the General Board. As a start on this I sat down one early morning and drew up a twelve page rough estimate, working on up till two o'clock the next morning, this in the effort to clear my own mind, as I sometimes do by drawing up a paper. After I finished the rough notes, I then got together Ingersoll, Turner, Savvy, Charlie Wellborn, Forrest Sherman, Hill, Sexton, Moore and Oscar Badger and we went to it, day and night, Saturdays and Sundays, for about ten consecutive days. The product which no one claims is perfect is now in the hands of the President. I am hoping he will give some definite pronouncement on it in order that I may send you something more authoritative than I otherwise could do.

You know that we have no definite commitments. Perhaps none can be made. The direction which things finally take may be forced upon us.

For example, as you stated in a recent letter:—Upon your first visit here you found us of the opinion that in the event of war, we should not become involved in the Pacific and that any major effort, we might make would be in what we considered the most vital theater, namely, in the Atlantic. I have never changed my viewpoint on that and I may say that so far as I know, neither has the State Department. I believe the Secretary of the Navy also holds this view. But no appeasement.

Nevertheless, we can not afford to neglect the possibility of hostilities in the Pacific and that is why in so many of my letters I always mention keeping a weather eye to the Westward.

I think the study which was made when you were here, has been highly beneficial; studies of this sort always are, whether or not they are implemented.

I had hoped before this to get to you the Navy end of RAINBOW III as a more thoroughly considered directive to meet the possibilities of the present situation in the Pacific. This RAINBOW III plan is nearing completion now and I expect to send it to you in a few days. I trust that you will find the tasks assigned to you are [2] within your power. We will await your comment.

We are pushing District preparation and degaussing work with all the speed we can command and if by any chance I could have until 1 April on this I would give a good deal. One January should see degaussing well along; one April much essential work accomplished in the Districts. Please do not construe that statement to mean that we might get into the war tomorrow, as I have nothing but my own thoughts on this. Nevertheless, you know I have felt right along that it is only a matter of time before we do get in (though I can not say this out loud). The chief question that concerns us is *where* we get in, and *whom* we will fight—and "tomorrow" or perhaps "today" is what I am working towards.

You have received the despatch directing the sending of submarines to Manila. There are no plans at present to send anything more in that direction. But present conditions are far from static, the Japanese appear to be making preparation for a definite move of some kind, and the answer we will give, if any, to the steps they may take in the future can not be predicted at this time.

Your letter regarding the retention of a part of the Fleet on the Coast beyond the date of its intended departure, and also holding another part in Hawaii, arrived at a time when the election prevented my presenting this question promptly to the President. Since the scheduled departure of the units from Hawaii was the day following my receipt of your letter, there was nothing for me to do other than to radio you to carry out the approved schedule. As you know, the matter of withdrawing the Fleet from Hawaii is delicate, and could hardly be accomplished without a certain amount of preparation in Washington. It does not now appear that we can withdraw it without some good pretext.

Regarding this Winter's exercises there is no question as to the desirability of training both the Fleet and the troops in expeditionary operations which will simulate war as closely as possible. Therefore, I believe we should go ahead with the essential features of such a plan. As I understand the plan, you propose to assemble in Pearl Harbor an Expeditionary Force comprising most of the Fleet, plus transports in which are combat-loaded the west contingent of the Fleet Marine Force, plus tankers and supply ships. This expeditionary Force will then set out from Hawaii and will simulate the actual capture of an island, using Christmas Island or some other, perhaps San Clements for example—I have not received a copy of exactly what you plan to do and therefore this conception may be at fault.

We have all been greatly pleased over Churchill's statement of recent British action against the Italian Fleet. Also we are more than pleased over the success of the Greeks,—even though it may prove in the end to be temporary. We have nothing more official to date on this than newspaper reports.

[3] Regarding the German claim that they had sunk every ship in the 30-ship convoy in approximately longitude 32, latitude 58:- all but 6 of these ships have safely reached port.

Am expecting King to relieve Ellis shortly after the middle of December.

Hope the enclosed to Tommy Hart and Ghormley will be of some interest to you.

Best wishes as always.

Sincerely,

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "New Mexico," c/o Postmaster,
Long Beach, California.

[1] Secret

12 NOVEMBER 1940.

DEAR TOMMY: We are pushing ahead as rapidly as possible on the preparation of material and personnel for any eventualities. While there is much still to be done (a condition that will continue to exist for years) I can not say that matters are unsatisfactory, so far as concerns things under my control. But we do not yet know the direction which affairs may take.

For the past three weeks I have been spending many hours, together with a group of officers particularly concerned, in developing a broad estimate of the material situation as it affects possible naval war operations. This estimate, or study, is now in the hands of the President. I do not expect any immediate decision, but do hope that it will serve to clarify matters so that, at least, those in authority will be fully aware of the implications of any particular policy that may be adopted with respect to the war.

Ghormley tells me the British expected us to be in the war within a few days after the reelection of the President—which is merely another evidence of their slack ways of thought, and of their non-realistic views of international political conditions, and of our own political system. They have been talking, in a large way, about the defense of the Malay Barrier, with an alliance between themselves, us, and the Dutch, without much thought as to what the effect would be in Europe. But we have no idea as to whether they would at once begin to fight were the Dutch alone, or were we alone, to be attacked by the Japanese. Then again, the copy of the British Far Eastern War Plan which Thomas obtained at Singapore, shows much evidence of their usual wishful thinking. Furthermore, though I believe the Dutch colonial authorities will resist an attempt to capture their islands, I question whether they would fight if only the Philippines, or only Singapore, were attacked.

The Navy can, of course, make no political commitments. Therefore, we can make no specific military plans for an allied war. However, as I told you in my despatch, you can perform a useful service by laying, with the British and possibly the Dutch, a framework for a future plan of cooperation, should we be forced into the war. I rather doubt, however, that the Dutch will talk freely with you. If they do my idea would be that you would explore [2] the fields of:

Command arrangements,

General objectives,

General plan of cooperative action, including the approximate naval and military deployment.

You are, of course, committed to assist the Army in the defense of Luzon. But with allied bases to fall back on, your direct support of the Army might well fall short, in degree, of the support you would afford were we alone to fight Japan.

I do not believe Japan will attack us if she can avoid doing so. In fact, I believe she will go far to avoid hostilities with the United States. It is even doubtful if she wishes, at this time to fight the British or the Dutch. It seems more likely that she would prefer, while maintaining a position in readiness, to consolidate Indo-China with her positions further north, and to begin a more or less gradual economic penetration of the Netherlands East Indies and Siam. Should we refrain from imposing additional economic sanctions, present conditions, including the recent 1,800,000 ton oil contract, might be stabilized over a considerable period of the future. Our State Department, as you may know, had a hand in the execution of that contract.

But we never can tell. Should a war develop between Japan and an alliance of British, Dutch and Americans, I believe that Japan will plan to:

- (a) Occupy Guam, and reenforce the Mandates with troops, submarines, and some air;
- (b) Establish naval control of Philippine waters by destroying our naval and air forces, basing her main fleet in the Pescadores and a strong, fast detachment in Halmahera;
- (c) Capture Luzon with troops now based in Formosa and Hainan;
- (d) Capture Borneo, to be followed by a campaign against the Dutch directed from East to West.

I believe that the allied objective should be to reduce Japan's offensive power through economic starvation; the success of the blockade would surely depend upon allied ability to hold the major portion of the Malay Barrier. Your own action would, of course, be based upon your view as to the most effective method of contributing to the attainment of the ultimate objective.

One thing (and this is for your ears alone) you can depend upon is that we would support you, probably by sending a naval reenforcement to you at Soerabaja or Singapore, and by other means. I would be glad to get your views as to the size and composition of such a reenforcement; but in making your recommendation I trust you will keep in mind that our Navy must hold in the Mid-Pacific, that we may also be in the war against the other two Axis Powers, and that the collapse of Britain would force us to a major re-orientation toward the Atlantic.

You may will appreciate that I do not welcome such a war (British Collapse).

The naval part of the War Plan, Rainbow III, for this possible war is about completed, and will be on its way to you within a short time. We are hoping to send naval attache's to Singapore, Batavia, Soerabaja, Balikpapan, and Ceylon; possibly one of these officers may bring this plan to you via air transportation.

We are all delighted to be able to put over the dependent thing for you. The State Department strongly supported us. I can appreciate the coals that must have been heaped upon you when it was learned that, while we were forcing our dependents home, the Army was sending dependents out.

You know how glad I always am for any opportunity to assist any or all of the Little Harts, as well as the Big Hart, in any way in which I can.

Keep cheerful,

Sincerely,

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral T. C. HART, *U. S. Navy*,

Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

P. S. Am sixty today. Here's hoping! The first three score are the hardest!

18 NOVEMBER 1940.

ADMIRAL HART:

P. S. Admiral Brownson's name is being submitted to the President on the list going over to him for consideration in connection with the new destroyer. Here's hoping.

[1] Confidential

NOVEMBER 22, 1940.

DEAR JO: While you were here in early October we sent a despatch to Comfourteen to ascertain from Admiral Bloch whether or not the protection being afforded to the vital elements of the Naval Establishment in Hawaii was satisfactory, this in order that, if required, we could make representations to the War Department to direct more thorough protection on the part of its Hawaiian Department.

Admiral Bloch's answers to this despatch and to a second despatch on the same subject were not very definite, and did not provide basis for further action by the Department.

Since the Taranto incident my concern for the safety of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, already great, has become even greater. This concern has to do both with possible activities on the part of Japanese residents of Hawaii and with the possibilities of attack coming from overseas. By far the most profitable object of sudden attack in Hawaiian waters would be the Fleet units based in that area. Without question the safety of these units is paramount and imposes on the Commander-in-Chief and the forces afloat a responsibility in which he must receive the complete support of Commandant Fourteen, and of the Army. I realize most fully that you are giving this problem comprehensive thought. My

object in writing you is to find out what steps the Navy Department and the War Department should be taking to provide additional equipment and additional protective measures.

For instance, it is desirable to place torpedo nets within the harbor itself? I will appreciate your comments and those of Comfourteen on this question.

Antiaircraft protection can be provided first by units of the Fleet actually in Pearl Harbor with guns ready at all times; by stationing about the Navy Yard of Army A. A. defense measures including mobile batteries; and possibly by utilization of Marine Defense Battalion Antiaircraft Units now available in the Pearl Harbor areas, or that could be made available. Also by keeping carrier fighters squadrons alerted and ready to go.

[2] Another aspect of local security which prompted the Department's original despatch was the security of the oil tanks against attack from the road passing near by.

I would like to have you take up the whole question upon your return to Hawaii with Comfourteen and with the Army, and let me know of any deficiencies which will require remedial action here in Washington.

Much is being done by the Army, and by the Navy in support of the Army, to maintain security of the Panama Canal. Of at least equal importance is the security of our Fleet against sudden destructive attack. And the Fleet is, as usually must be the case, in a more exposed situation.

I have been in somewhat of a quandry whether to write this letter to you or to write one on similar lines to Admiral Bloch to take up with you and Army. It really is immaterial so long as we get the answer—but after all the Fleet—your command—is the subject. I am sending Admiral Bloch a copy.

My best to you both and to "all your works"—

Sincerely,

H. R. S.

Op-12-VED
Serial O60312 (SC) A16/FF1

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, FlagshipLong Beach, California
November 28, 1940

Dear Betty:

Your last two letters, touching on the security of the Fleet while operating in the Hawaiian area and the prospective operations of the Second Brigade of the Fleet Marine Force with the Fleet during the third quarter have been received.

With regard to the first of these matters, I will take this up with Bloch on my arrival back in Hawaii. This feature of the problem does not give me a great deal of concern and, I think, can be easily provided for. I think torpedo nets within the harbor are neither necessary nor practicable. The area is too restricted and ships, at present, are not moored within torpedo range of the entrance.

The security of the units while carrying out routine operations gives me greater concern, because to provide a reasonable degree of security calls for employment of a great number of Fleet units for security alone, which will consume both time and effort that could, otherwise, be well directed toward training and indoctrination. I feel that the Fleet must operate on either of two assumptions, i.e., (a) that we are at peace and no security measures are required; or (b) that war time measures of security must be carried out. Heretofore, we have carried out limited security measures largely as a basis for training and on the assumption that no foreign power would choose to bring on a war by an attack on the Fleet, but that some misdirected or fanatical nationals might undertake individual and irresponsible attack on Fleet units. Now, however, in the light of your concern over these matters and in view of your better information and position to evaluate the possibilities, I have come to the conclusion that I must operate on the basis of (b) above. I enclose a tentative draft of a directive which I plan to issue upon arrival at Pearl Harbor. It is bound to result in the curtailment of badly needed basic training of new personnel, particularly in destroyers and planes, and some degree of extra discomfort, but under the assumption, this will have to be accepted.

CmC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

In regard to the operations with the Second Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, we had originally planned on a tentative date of January 20. This was based on the readiness of the transports by January 1 and the Department's desire, as I understood it (See Cooke's memorandum to you of October 10) to fit these exercises into the international and diplomatic picture. I do not, of course, know to what extent the picture has been altered or how these exercises now fit in. As you will see later, this makes a great difference in their conception.

According to our information, the last of the "CITY" transports will not be completed, at the yard, until January 23, with a fitting-out period of seven days at a navy yard on top of that. This, with the other four "CITY" class and the EXOCHORDA, will give us six transports by February 1, if the dates now set are met. Allowing for an indoctrination and shakedown period, it does not appear possible to embark the Marines prior to about March 1, with the exercise actually starting in the Hawaiian area around March 10. By that time, the Marines inform me, they will have about 12,000 men, which would, if we took the whole Force, require at least six more transports. This brings up the question of the objectives of the exercise. As I originally understood them, they were to be a full dress rehearsal of an island attack, with the possibility that they might turn into the "real thing." Under this conception, we would, of course, want to carry the entire Force and all their equipment, including organic transportation and ground unit support for their aircraft.

If, however, they are to be largely training exercises, with definitely limited objectives, we can accomplish much needed training for marines, transports and supporting forces by limiting the numbers of men and the quantity of equipment to the facilities provided by the six transports, organizing the units into more or less complete combat teams -- one on each transport. We could, under this assumption, start the exercises much earlier (that is, earlier than waiting for six more transports) and perhaps follow the first ones with a second series applying the lessons learned the first time but utilizing the remaining troops.

Until a decision is reached on the foregoing, I can do little except study the problem and general planning.

CmC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. & NEW MEXICO, Flagship

Preliminary discussion along this line brings out the following:

- (a) The Marines will have only two squadrons of planes. These can be embarked on carriers, but, depending on the scope of the operations, a separate ship or ships (probably a cargo vessel) may be needed to accommodate the ground troops and equipment. *note*
- (b) If the scope of the exercises includes readiness for further eventualities, at least one and probably two, extra cargo ships will be required to carry organic transportation, 90 days' ammunition, and supplies.
- (c) In any concept, something will have to be done about landing boats. I assume that all transports will carry the boats listed in your conversion letter. These will provide, roughly, about 500 boat spaces per ship, whereas 1100 are required per combat team. The remaining 600 boat spaces per transport must either be provided from the supporting ships (manifestly undesirable) or be carried into the transport area by special cargo vessels or boat carriers. *See*
I believe we should convert a special boat carrier for this purpose, similar to ones used at Shanghai by the Japanese.
- (d) Transport crews should be ample to provide boat crews for boats carried, boat officers, and organized beach parties. A boat carrier, if provided, should carry the necessary boat crews as part of its complement.
- (e) Transport equipment should include either special tanks for fresh water capable of being carried ashore in boats or sufficient drums to carry water for troops transported.
- (f) If further eventualities are to be provided for, I would want the AMERICAN SEAMAN (Maritime Commission training ship, especially equipped as distilling ship) taken over and made available.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. & NEW MEXICO, Flagship

- (g) The Marines' ammunition situation is critical. I feel sure this is known at Marine Corps headquarters, but it cannot be over-emphasized. They also need pack howitzers, to replace their present heavy and unwieldy guns. *12/1/41*
- (h) An able, energetic Transport Group Commander must be assigned as soon as possible. This is a man-sized job, requiring ability to work with the Marines. There are many details which can be worked out only by close cooperation. It is my present intention to operate the transports, as soon as each is ready, in the San Diego area, training in loading, embarking, debarking and landing exercises. *12/1/41*
- (i) To be ready for real service we will have to have bombardment ammunition, preferably at Oahu, where it can be interchanged with service ammunition if found necessary. The only such ammunition now on the West Coast, to my knowledge, is 14"/50, 6"/53 and 5"/51, which would limit the gunfire support to BB's and CL's (7500), whereas CA's, CL's (10,000) and DD's are indicated for this type work. *12/1/41*

I have told the Marines, as a basis for their present planning, that we will take only so much of the Brigade as can be combat loaded on the six transports, and that these should go prepared with what can be carried, ready for any operations that might be possible East of the 160° East Longitude. *12/1/41*

We have no reply, as yet, to our letter of October 31, relative to diplomatic arrangements for reconnaissance of CHRISTMAS and MAKIN Islands. Of course, decision as to the suitability of CHRISTMAS must await reconnaissance, and special diplomatic arrangements will have to be made if the landing is to be held there. General Upshur rather favors an exercise on Oahu or similar large island, where opportunity will be afforded for maneuvers after landing. This question, however, cannot be settled now. *12/1/41*

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

979

CNC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

As I see it, the possibilities as to locale include:

Christmas Island -- if found suitable
Palmyra Island -- probably will limit force
that can be employed to
less than that available
in six transports.

One of Hawaiian
Islands

Please let me know as soon as possible your decision
as to the concept and scope of the exercises. I would also
appreciate being informed as to the progress made in the con-
version of the transports, the provision of landing boats,
boat carriers, etc.

With best regards,


Sincerely,

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy
The Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

y,

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, Dec. 17, 1940.

Secret

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: War Plans—Status and Readiness of in View of Current International Situation.

Reference: (a) Cinc's Secret Letter A16/01705 of October 22, 1940.

1. In reply to your recommendation in the above letter that a new war plan be issued, you are informed that Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 3 (W. P. L. 44) has recently been completed. Four advance copies have been forwarded to you by officer messenger. The finished copies of this plan, plus such revisions of WPL-42, Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 1, as have been found desirable for making parts of that plan usable with Rainbow No. 3, will be distributed as soon as practicable through the Registered Publication Section.

2. War Plan Rainbow No. 3 is designed to provide against the most imminent and difficult war situation which may confront the United States in the near future. It is, therefore requested that the Commander in Chief prepare as soon as practicable the operating plans for a war envisaged by Rainbow No. 3.

3. The Chief of Naval Operations has, in the past, kept the Commander in Chief advised as to all matters within his own knowledge which related to current national policy and pending national decisions. This past practice will be continued in the future. However, the Commander in Chief is doubtless aware that the changing world military situation will continue to affect policy, and thus will influence plans for the war operation of the naval forces. It is, of course, impracticable to draw up and to issue new Navy Basic War Plans when merely minor changes in policy occur. The Chief of Naval Operations considers that Rainbow No. 3 is, in its major aspects, suitable for all probable situations which may arise in the near future where the principal portion of the national effort is directed westward. Under study now by the naval and army officials are plans based on assumptions requiring the exertion of the principal portion of the national effort to the eastward (Rainbow No. 5), and also a plan, somewhat similar to Rainbow No. 1, involving the defense of the entire Western Hemisphere against attack from both the east and the west (Rainbow No. 4). So far as now can be foreseen, these three basic plans should be adequate to guide mobilization, initial deployment, and initial operations under all contingencies which are foreseeable at present.

4. In view of the above, it is believed unnecessary to comment on the present applicability of the Orange War Plan, as that Plan was drawn up to guide the prosecution of a war under circumstances which do not now exist.

5. The urgency of this document is such that it will not reach the addressees in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

/s/ H. R. STARK.

[1] Op-12A-fhg

Secret

23 DECEMBER 1940.

DEAR JO: Your personal letter of November 28th, headed Long Beach, California, arrived here on the 14th of December. While Murphy was here he spoke of this letter as having been prepared before his visit to Washington, but we were unable to locate it. Apparently it was not actually mailed until after the arrival of the NEW MEXICO in Honolulu.

In the meantime undoubtedly Murphy has given you oral answers to some of the questions brought up. However, I have had prepared a memo covering some of the points set forth in your letter, from which I will quote later on.

First, in regard to security, I endeavored to outline to Murphy my idea as to the extent security measures should be prosecuted, namely, that while the extent of security measures required is increasing, it has not yet reached the demands of full war time security. As I discussed with Murphy, there will be an advantage in making occasional sweeps by aircraft and surface craft but it is not yet necessary to make these continuous. I agree with you that the wear and tear on equipment and the detrimental effects on training, of full security measures should be given due weight.

In regard to the objective of the training exercises, the picture, of course, may change at any time. At present the main objective is the purely training aspect. I feel that it is desirable to conduct the exercises in an area sufficiently distant

from bases, such that the difficulties of the problem are concretely and unavoidably present. It is also desirable that the exercises be conducted on beaches where our probable problems are most closely paralleled. In addition, the islands utilized should provide sufficient area for the maneuvering of the land forces involved.

We desire, of course, to avoid conducting maneuvers which would appear unduly provocative to our friends across the way. On the other hand we also wish to avoid any change in our dispositions which would indicate a walking back of our position in the Pacific. Taking these various factors in mind, I think the use of San Clemente for the final full scale exercises would not be so desirable. One solution that suggests itself is conducting some of the exercises on the island of Lanai, and other part on Christmas or Palmyra, depending upon the results of your reconnaissance of Christmas.

Due to the delays in the transport program it appears necessary to carry out these exercises during the fourth quarter. We have encountered much difficulty in getting transports. The only ships that we have been able to acquire are very old ships—ships with machinery not in the best [2] condition, and in which conversions bring to light structural corrosion and defects which necessitate additional work in effecting satisfactory conversion. Consequently, completions in all cases have been delayed except in the case of the EXOCHORDA, the present HARRY LEE, which was the only fairly new ship. The following table shows the estimated readiness-for-sea dates of the transports now under conversion. (This includes a two-week period for fitting out after the completion of overhaul):

Name	Readiness for sea	at Navy Yard
GEORGE F. ELLIOT	24 January	Norfolk.
HARRY LEE	3 January	New York.
HEYWOOD	15 February	Puget Sound.
ANTHONY P. BIDDLE	15 February	Mare Island.
FULLER	1 March	Puget Sound.
NEVILLE	28 February	Puget Sound.
HARRIS	31 May	Puget Sound.
ZEILIN	31 May	Puget Sound.

Six APD's will be ready for sea on 3 January. The MANLEY, MCKEE and STRINGHAM are scheduled to depart Norfolk, on January 6, and the Canal Zone on January 15, and will then report to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, for duty in the Base Force.

It appears that the HARRIS and ZEILIN will not be ready, even for exercises in the fourth quarter.

Referring to the various points in your letter designated by letters, the situation is about as follows: (I quote from memorandum giving me data in some instances):

(a) Problems involved in having the Second Marine Aircraft Group participate have undergone some change in view of the pending transfer of the group from San Diego to Pearl Harbor. By the end of the third quarter all three combatant squadrons of Group 2 should be available at Pearl Harbor with effective types of aircraft. It seems practicable to distribute their combatant aircraft among the carriers that will be available. VMJ-2 will also be in Hawaii.

The memorandum submitted on this question states "It is estimated that if planes are carried on CV's there will be 61 officers and 180 enlisted men on board the latter, and that there will be 9 commissioned, 6 warrant officers and 456 enlisted men to be transported by other means. The material required, exclusive of aviation gasoline and oil, will be 460 tons (22,925 cubic feet) of general cargo, and 268 tons (7,320 cubic feet) of high explosives."

(3) In regard to additional ships to carry ground crews and equipment, and to meet the requirements set forth in your paragraph (b), we may have a few cargo ships available for employment during the latter part of March, which may fit in for use in these exercises. It seems, at present, that the ammunition ship recently taken over will not be available before June, because it will be hauling ammunition from the East Coast to the West Coast.

(c) *Availability of boats.*—It now appears probable that all transports will be equipped with landing boats at the time the ships are ready for sea, although it may be necessary initially to substitute 30' boats for 36' boats. In any event, it is anticipated that the boats will be delivered by 1 March. Tank lighters, however, will probably not be delivered before the middle of March. It is expected, however, that Artillery lighters (non-self-propelled) will be completed at Puget

Sound Navy Yard in January, and that these can be substituted for tank lighters until the latter are delivered.

(d) *Ships to act as boat carriers.*—There are no ships at present available to carry excess landing boats.

The question of a special boat carrier was discussed with Murphy during his last visit. Such a vessel, or such vessels, would be useful. However, we continue to encounter the usual difficulty of obtaining funds for the acquisition of auxiliaries of any kind.

(e) Quoting from memorandum: "*Fresh Water Facilities for Marines.* The Second Marine Brigade has adequate facilities for getting water from ship to shore storing and distributing to troops.

This includes:

For movement ship to shore: Tank and artillery lighters, double bottoms
5 gal. water cans.

For storage ashore: 14 canvas tanks—3000 gal. capacity.

For distribution to troops: 10 water carts, 5 gal. water cans.

The Brigade also has the necessary pumps, hose fittings, etc., for handling this water.

Also—they have one water purification unit for purifying water found ashore, if any.

[4] In addition, the Marine Corps has on order, four evaporating sets for experimental use—with the capacities as follows:

1—5000 gal. per day.

1—1000 gal. per day.

2—smaller, exact capacity not yet determined.

If satisfactory this equipment will be made standard and provided to Marine Brigades."

In addition to the above there are being procured and placed in storage, with other advanced base equipment, well-digging equipment and 13 sets of evaporator and water purifying apparatuses distributed as follows:

5 at San Francisco.

4 at Charleston.

4 at Panama.

This information can undoubtedly be obtained in the detail desired from the Fleet Marine Force at San Diego, California.

(f) *Use of the "American Seaman" as a distilling ship.*—The ship is at present at St. Petersburg, Florida, and is currently engaged in training personnel for the Maritime Commission. A sister ship, the AMERICAN SAILOR, will be completed about the middle of February 1941. Although these ships are suitable as distilling ships it is not desired to divert them from their present use in training merchantseamen unless a major emergency develops.

(g) Your statements about the Marine ammunition situation are well founded. We have been making strenuous efforts to remedy the Small Arms Ammunition situation, not only for the Marines but also for other Naval Small Arms, aircraft and ship, for many months. The situation has been brought to the attention of the Secretary many times. No satisfactory remedial action in the near future appears possible, but we will pry out of the Army all we can.

It is estimated that there are now between 5 and 10 units of fire of various calibers available on the West Coast.

The organization of the Second Marine Brigade calls for 12—Pack Howitzers or (75 m/m guns) for each of the two battalions. They have

12—Pack Howitzers.

12—8" (75 m/m) guns.

There is some shortage of fire control equipment, but the units can operate without it.

[5] (h) Captain Braisted has been designated by the Bureau of Navigation for duty in command of the Transports in the Pacific. He is due to report about January 3.

(i) The Bureau of Ordnance has been requested to provide in OAHU at the earliest date practicable, the following bombardment ammunition:

14"—500 rounds, loaded and fused.

8"—All available rounds of the 1000 now on order.

6"—1000 rounds, loaded and fused.

5"—5000 rounds, loaded and fused.

4"—5000 rounds, loaded, fused, and assembled.

The 14" ammunition is now on order and it is expected to be available about May or June.

The 8" ammunition is also on order, but delivery is not expected before the latter part of calendar year 1941.—In connection with bombardment however, you have available quite a bit of 8" ammunition still fitted with instantaneous fuses. The situation in this respect is as follows:

Ship or station:	No. of 8" projectiles fitted with instantaneous fuses
ASTORIA-----	110
INDIANAPOLIS-----	68
NEW ORLEANS-----	110
NORTH HAMPTON-----	128
PENSACOLA-----	105
MARE ISLAND (Note: Some fuses may have been changed)-----	324
OAHU-----	999
HINGHAM-----	1,000

NOTE—These projectiles can be used in either the long chamber or short chamber.

The 6", 5", and 4" ammunition will be shipped to OAHU by the NITRO or the LASSEN in February or March.

The present estimated availability of bombardment ammunition is as follows:

14"—307 East Coast; 151 Mare Island.

8"—1000 rounds on order—Delivery from 6 to 10 mos.

6"/53—2857 East Coast; 300 Mare Island; 379 Puget Sound; 1989 Cavite.

5"/51—36,000 East Coast; 2000 Mare Island; 1300 Puget Sound; 167 Pearl Harbor; 777 Cavite.

It should be noted that the 5"/25 and 38 caliber service ammunition is considered to be suitable for use as bombardment ammunition.

[6] In regard to CHRISTMAS or MAKIN Islands—The State Department did not wish to ask permission to visit Christmas Island for fear of jeopardizing our claim but suggested that we proceed with the visit without permission and they would bear the brunt of any repercussions. However, we decided as a matter of courtesy to inform the British Naval Attache. The British Government replied by note to State saying the visit was agreeable but that it would in no way reflect on their claim which was unassailable. You therefore have permission to make a reconnaissance of Christmas Island. In the event that your reconnaissance indicated the suitability of Christmas Island for landing exercises, decision can be made later as to whether it is advisable to use Christmas Island and as to just what steps should be taken in advising with the British authorities.

Permission was obtained for reconnaissance flight over Makin on about November 15. However, we questioned the advisability of taking such an open step—a step that might indicate our future intentions. Therefore we did not communicate this permission to you. We postponed answering the letter because of the protracted correspondence regarding Christmas. There is, of course, a certain amount of information available in the Naval Air Pilot, H. O. No. 184, and in charts 2179 (consecutive 1632), and No. 121 (1631) which have been furnished you.

Murphy's visit was extremely profitable to all hands. I trust that on his return he was able to give answer to many of the questions that have arisen in your mind.

If there is anything which you have asked for and which is not included in this letter or supplied by Murphy—other than the answer to the Pye memorandum concerning which you will receive an answer in the near future—please let me know, and I will supply the answer if I can. We are continuing daily bulletins to you and have received the first semi-monthly summary.

There is little that I can add which is not repetition, but I shall repeat just the same that every 24 hours past is just one day nearer to actual hostilities and that your flag officers and captains should be completely in the frame of mind that we will be in the fighting business most any time, and purely as a guess on my own part, I would say at any time after the next 90 days. Our heads and our hearts and every ounce of energy that we have should be devoted exclusively to the business of war and keeping fit—and I don't mean maybe.

It may come anytime. All good wishes.

/s/ BETTY.

P. S. Referring to your recent dispatch on the subject, it does not appear on its face that the Captain of the destroyer concerned followed up his contact to the nth degree or even asked for additional help to locate. However, we will reserve all judgment on this episode until we hear further from you.

[1] Op-12A-drc

Secret

23 DECEMBER 1940.

Admiral THOMAS C. HART,

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet,

U. S. S. "Houston," Flagship, Manila, P. I.

DEAR TOMMY: Your letter of December 4 containing Purnell's report of his conference with the British arrived a day or two after McCrea's departure, en route for Honolulu and Manila. McCrea will be able to give you the answers to some of the questions raised in your letter. However, I will refer to them herein even though I may be duplicating.

I agree with the two big points in the situation that you outline. The location of the "command post" would, however, depend, in my opinion, very much on the conditions obtaining.

Purnell's report gives me an interesting and valuable atmospheric background for the consideration of the situation in that area.

To follow your letter on down, the Department realizes very acutely the limited capacity of the obsolete equipment at Cavite. Measures are under way to improve the situation by giving you better equipment, and perhaps more equipment.

The planners in the War Plans Division, and in the Districts Division are giving very close scrutiny to the problem of laying an anti-motor boat boom in 25 fathoms of rough water, and are looking into the question of supplying the large amount of material that will be required for nets, etc. [2] It is apparent that not only will it be a job to get the material to you, but also you will be confronted with a job of getting it put together and laid down.

The mine plan from Manila Bay has been recently received here and in the War Department, and is under study. In reaching an answer the planners will undoubtedly be guided by your requirements for ingress and egress of ships through the entrance.

In regard to your next paragraph, I am completely with you and have sought at every turn to improve the security of Manila Bay and the Philippines. I might say in this connection that opinion in general, in regard to how far we should go in maintaining our position in the Philippines seems to be changing upward. While such a change is going on, it is not always practicable to be definitely final on questions that arise. In the mean time we will send you all of the material you ask for to the extent it can be made available and can be shipped.—Incidentally, send me a sample of your "britches". I'll send you a bale of cloth for their enlargement. More power to you!

We have already requested your advice as to sending out division of birdboat mine sweepers. The division will be fitted out for magnetic mine sweeping in late January or perhaps in February.

In regard to your various recommendations on air matters, I will say that I perhaps in at least some of the instances would have made recommendations similar to yours had I been in your place, with the knowledge then available to you and your staff. However, the recommendations from the ASIATIC must be considered in the light of our expanding aviation program as well as that of foreign countries, and in the light of our plans not only for Manila and the Philippines, but also for the rest of the naval establishment. For some time we had had it in our minds to increase the submarine force in the ASIATIC and to make this force more effective by adding to the patrol plane strength. An additional requisite, of course, has been an increase in the fighter strength of the Army. Only recently has the Army gone along with us on this [3] point. I might add, parenthetically, that as we have increased the patrol plane strength, we have decreased the amount of overhead per plane. Altogether, I hope that we have made available to you a substantial increase in your power to carry out possible war tasks.

I can thoroughly appreciate your difficulties in regard to the movement of dependents; and if the pressure on you gets too heavy just pass the responsibility for it on my shoulders. I could even with the babes yet unborn were on their way home.

I presume this letter will reach you before McCrea's departure. His orders indicate his remaining with you for nine days. However, you and he may find it desirable for him to remain sometimes longer, in which case I will of course be glad to have him extend his visit.

/s/ BETTY.

O-ALB-3/A7-2/ND14
(629)OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
AND
NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

30 DEC 1940

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the
Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet
Surprise Attacks.

References: (a) Oynav dispatch 092135 of October 1940.
(b) Oynav dispatch 182135 of October 1940.
(c) Chief of Naval Operations' personal letter addressed
to CINCLANT dated 22 November 1940 (copy sent to Com
14).
(d) Com 14 dispatch 150055 of October 1940.
(e) Com 14 dispatch 220230 of October 1940.

1. In view of the inquiries contained in references (a),
(b) and (c), I consider it desirable to write this letter to set forth
the present ability of the Fourteenth Naval District to meet surprise
hostile attacks of an enemy with the equipment and forces at hand.

2. AIRCRAFT RAIDS.

Aircraft attacking the base at Pearl Harbor will undoubtedly
be brought by carriers. Therefore, there are two ways of repelling
attack. First, by locating and destroying the carrier prior to launching
planes. Second, by driving off attacking bombers with anti-aircraft
guns and fighters. The Navy component of the local defense forces has
no planes for distant reconnaissance with which to locate enemy carriers
and the only planes belonging to the local defense forces to attack
carriers when located would be the Army bombers. The Army has in the
Hawaiian area fifty-nine B-18 bombers. All of these are classified as
being obsolete. The model is six years old and the planes themselves
are five years old. Therefore, it is my opinion that neither numbers
nor types are satisfactory for the purposes intended. New bombing
planes are expected sometime in the future. However, not before July
1941. For distant reconnaissance, requisition would have to be made on
the forces afloat for such as could be spared by the Fleet.

To drive off bombing planes after they have been launched
will require both fighting planes and anti-aircraft guns. The Army has
in the Hawaiian area thirty-six pursuit planes, all of which are classi-
fied as obsolete. Some of them are six years old and some of them are
four years old. In numbers and models, there is a serious deficiency
existing. New fighters are expected when the P-40 is in production to

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OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
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30 DEC 1940

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Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

the extent that the 125 projected for Hawaii can be delivered. This does not appear to be probable before the end of 1941; this number does not appear adequate.

The Army is charged with the protection of the Pearl Harbor base by anti-aircraft guns. There are in Hawaii twenty-six fixed 3-inch guns and forty-four mobile 3-inch guns. There are projected twenty-four more, to be delivered in 1941. There are no 37-millimeter and only 100 .50 caliber out of the projected 150 37-millimeter and 300 .50 caliber machine guns. The Army plans to place the greater part of the 3-inch guns around Pearl Harbor and only a few near other military objectives. In my opinion, it will be necessary to increase the number of guns around Pearl Harbor greatly to have any semblance of anti-aircraft defense. Furthermore, I express my doubt as to the efficiency of a 3-inch gun with a 21-second fuse for driving off high altitude bombers. The Army has made no plans for the anti-aircraft defense of Lualaba or Kaneohe; furthermore, it will be necessary to have a considerable concentration of anti-aircraft guns to defend the shipping terminals and harbor of Honolulu in order that lines of communication may be kept open. With a limited knowledge of the density of anti-aircraft barrages abroad, I am of the opinion that at least 500 guns of adequate size and range will be required for the efficient defense of the Hawaiian area. This number is in addition to 37-millimeter and .50 caliber machine guns.

In addition to the above, the Army has planned an aircraft warning service which will consist of eight Radar stations. Three of these stations are fixed and five are mobile. When completed at an indefinite time in the future, this warning net should be adequate.

3. DEFENSE AGAINST SUBMARINES.

The ideal defense against submarines would be conducted by patrol vessels and aircraft working in conjunction. The district has no aircraft for this purpose. Recently, there have arrived here three vessels of Destroyer Division EIGHTY which is assigned to the local defense forces. These vessels have listening gear and, when repaired and ready for service, will be a valuable contribution for anti-submarine and escort work. A large number of patrol vessels will be required for anti-submarine work in the vicinity of Oahu and the other

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306-0-000

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

islands. At present, the district has none and request would have to be made on the Fleet for such vessels and planes as could be spared for this most important work. No anti-submarine nets are planned, nor are any considered desirable. Anti-torpedo nets are projected for the entrances of Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. They will probably be delivered about 1 March 1941. The net depot will be completed somewhat later.

4. DEFENSE AGAINST MINES.

The district has recently built and equipped one sweep barge and three tugs are being equipped for towing and anchoring the coil. This barge can probably look out for Honolulu and Pearl Harbor until such time as it is seriously injured. The district has no vessels available for use as sweeps for anchored mines. A number of mine sweepers are being built or purchased, but their delivery dates here are uncertain. A large number of sweepers will be required in order to keep the harbors of Pearl Harbor, Honolulu and Kaneohe clear and, in addition, the harbors of Maui, Kahului and Lahaina on Maui, and Port Allen and Nawiliwili on Kauai. With the delivery of sweepers now being built or purchased, the general situation will be improved immeasurably.

5. DEFENSE AGAINST BOMBARDMENT.

The coast defenses of the Army are considered adequate except that Kaneohe receives very little protection from the batteries.

6. SAFETY.

There are two tank farms, the upper and the lower. The lower is entirely contained in the government reservation and, by the use of roving patrols, is considered reasonably secure. The upper farm is adjacent to a public highway. The farm is surrounded by an unclimbable fence and each tank with an earth berm. Its chief exposure is along the highway. To counteract this, three elevated sentry stations have been erected, each equipped with searchlights. This enables sentries to keep a continuous lookout over the entire fence line day and night; the upper farm is considered fairly secure.

7. WATER AND FLOODING PROTECT.

Recently, a guard house has been erected and an arrangement

6-216-1/47-2/1024

(65)

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

CONFIDENTIAL (NOT FOR PUBLICATION, EXCEPT BY AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY)

30 DEC 1940

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the
Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet
Surprise Attacks.

has been made, the Marines alternating with the Army, for constant guard on the water supply.

A constant guard is kept on the electric supply lines through which outside power is received.

8. An elaborate system of photographic passes, search and examination is in effect. There are over 8,000 Civil Service employees who come into the yard each day. In addition, there are about 8,000 employees of civilian contractors and several thousand enlisted men. In addition to the above, there is a constant stream of trucks and vehicles of all descriptions carrying supplies, stores, et cetera. It is impossible to maintain absolute security without disruption of the work of the yard. However, surprise searches and periodic stops, et cetera, are in effect in order that the alert may be emphasized. The main gate has been strengthened to prevent rushing; there have been two drills for the purpose of giving surprise training to the yard garrison in the event of a surprise riot in the yard. In addition to the above, a survey has been made not only of the yard but of all of the outlying stations, and every effort is being made to close holes and stop gaps. While the Commandant is not satisfied, he feels that the precautions taken are reasonably effective but that they are susceptible to improvement, which will be made as occasion warrants.

9. It should be borne in mind that until comparatively recently none of us in this country had very much conception of what measures were necessary and what provisions were desirable in order to effect any measure of protection against aircraft, against submarines, against mines and against subversive elements. The officers and men of this command have been alert, zealous and vigilant in executing all measures under their control in order to properly prepare the district for any exigencies.

10. It should be assumed that the War Department is fully aware of the situation here and that they are proceeding vigorously with a view to overcoming deficiencies. It may be that they have failed to recognize the necessity for large numbers of anti-aircraft guns and pursuit planes. I suggest that the Chief of Naval Operations make inquiry from the War Department as to what their plans are and on what dates they predict that they will be accomplished and then, if the

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FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
AND
NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.**CONFIDENTIAL**

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Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the
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Surprise Attacks.

Numbers and dates are not satisfactory, these features may be discussed
at length.

11. It is considered highly undesirable from my point of view
that the War Department should in any way come to believe that there
is lack of agreement between the Army authorities and Navy authorities
here, or that the officials of the Fourteenth Naval District are press-
ing the Navy Department to do something in regard to Army matters.

C. C. HLOCH

Added 8 is a line 477 (file 11-77 in 11-11-11)

11-11-11

- 3 -

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A16/

UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

Serial 022.

Pearl Harbor, T.H.,
January 8, 1942.CONFIDENTIALFIRST ENCLOSURE to
Com 14 Conf. Ltr.
C-A16-1/A7-2/ND14
(629) of 30 Dec. 1940.From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet
and the Present Ability of the Local Defense
Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

1. Forwarded. The Commander-in-Chief has conferred with the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. As a result of the conference with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and an inspection in company with him, information was furnished the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District who prepared the basic letter. The Commander-in-Chief concurs with the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District in the opinion that the present Army Pursuit Squadrons and antiaircraft batteries are inadequate to protect the Fleet and Pearl Harbor against air attack. When established the proposed pursuit strength will be adequate. The proposed total of 68 mobile three-inch guns for this area is not considered adequate. With the almost continuous high ceiling prevailing in this area a materially greater number of larger and longer range antiaircraft guns are necessary to counter high altitude bombing attacks on Pearl Harbor.

2. As neither the increased antiaircraft batteries nor the augmented pursuit squadrons will be available for an extended period the defense of Fleet units within Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet which may be in Pearl Harbor in event of attack by hostile aircraft. Plans for co-operation with the local defense forces are being made. At present the continuous readiness of carrier fighter squadrons or antiaircraft batteries is not contemplated. The improbability of such an attack under present conditions does not, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, warrant interrupting entirely the training required by Fleet Air Units which would have to be largely curtailed if constant readiness of a fighter squadron were required.

*Copies attached
- 1 to Commander
- 1 to Chief of Naval
- 1 to Judge Advocate*

Enclosed 2.6 x 4.5 in. 1 file copy in original
 ENCLOSURE
 Chief of Naval Operations

EX 7820

Ala/

**UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship**

Serial 082.

CONFIDENTIAL

**Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet
and the Present Ability of the Local Defense
Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.**

3. There does not appear to be any practicable way of placing torpedo baffles or nets within the harbor to protect the ships moored therein against torpedo plane attack without greatly limiting the activities within the harbor, particularly the movements of large ships and the landing and take-off of patrol squadrons. Inasmuch as Pearl Harbor is the only operating base available to the Fleet in this area any passive defense measures that will further restrict the use of the base as such should be avoided. Considering this and the improbability of such an attack under present conditions and the unlikelihood of an enemy being able to advance carriers sufficiently near in wartime in the face of active Fleet operations, it is not considered necessary to lay such nets.

4. The defense against submarines and mines are considered adequate under present peace time conditions, but early installation of underwater sound-submarine detection system should be made. Also the delivery of the required ships to the Fourteenth Naval District Defense Forces should be expedited, particularly ships for sweeping magnetic and anchored mines.

5. In this connection, it is urgently recommended that Local Defense Forces, adequate for the protection of naval installations at Pearl Harbor and the Fleet units based thereon, be provided the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District. In order to provide freedom of action for the United States Fleet, and further, to avoid the necessity for detailing important Fleet units (because no other ships are available) to tasks requiring only part of their full capabilities, it is considered that the forces provided should be sufficient for full protection and should be independent of the presence or absence of ships of the U.S. Fleet. It is further considered that the provision of adequate

certified to the true copy of file copy in transcript
R. E. [Signature]
RESEIGN H. E. [Signature], USN
Naval Mail Officer

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UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

Serial 022.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet
and the Present Ability of the Local Defense
Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

Local Defense Forces for the Fourteenth Naval District should
be given higher priority than continental Naval Districts, where
both the possibilities of, and objectives for, attack are much
less. *g*

J. O. RICHARDSON,

Copy to:
Com FOURTEEN

certified to be a true copy of file copy in envelope

RECEIVED
11 MAR 1944

(16)

446

CmC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. & PENNSYLVANIA, FlagshipSECRET

A16/0129

Pearl Harbor, T. H.
January 25, 1941

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG.
References: (a) Opnav secret despatch 212155 of
January, 1941.
(b) Opnav memorandum for Secnav Op-12-UTB
of November 12, 1940.

1. Reference (a) was received by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, one day prior to the arrival of Commander McCrea at Pearl Harbor en route to the Navy Department. It is considered desirable to take advantage of his return to inform the Chief of Naval Operations of the views of the Commander-in-Chief as to the new situation.

2. In view of reference (a) and some degree of urgency implied therein, it is considered that study of the new situation and the preparation of plans therefor should take priority over the preparation of plans for Rainbow No. 3. Unless advice to the contrary is received, this will be done.

3. The new situation, as visualized by the Commander-in-Chief, alters the assumptions and concepts of Rainbow No. 3, principally in that the major offensive effort of the United States is to be exerted in the Atlantic, rather than in the Pacific, and in that a "waiting attitude" will be taken in the Pacific, pending a determination of Japan's intentions. If Japan enters the war or commits an overt act against United States' interests or territory, our attitude in the Pacific will be primarily defensive, but opportunities will be seized to damage Japan as situations present themselves or can be created.

4. Under the foregoing general conception, it is deemed desirable to outline as briefly as possible, certain tentative assumptions, upon which the actions of the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will be predicated. These are:

- (a) The United States is at war with Germany and Italy.

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EXHIBIT 70 Ha

(79)

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FlagshipSECRET

A16/0129

Pearl Harbor, T. H.
January 25, 1941Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOC.

- (b) War with Japan is imminent.
- (c) Units of the Pacific Fleet may be detached to the Atlantic on short notice. The numbers and types of these units are at present unknown.
- (d) At least three German raiders are in the Pacific.
- (e) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take any form -- even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian flags or by submarines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be considered German or Italian.
- (f) Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying possessions or naval units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel, are possible.
- (g) Local sabotage is possible.

5. Under the foregoing assumptions, the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will assume the tasks listed below. Where deemed appropriate, measures to be taken under the tasks will be included.

Waiting Attitude

- (1) Take full security measures for the protection of Fleet units, at sea and in port.

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CNC File No.
A16/0129

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Pearl Harbor, T. H.,
January 25, 1941

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DCG.

In the performance of this task, the Fleet is severely handicapped by the existence of certain marked deficiencies in the existing local defense forces and equipment both Army and Navy. These deficiencies will be set forth in detail later, but are mentioned here in order that certain measures listed below may be more clearly understood.

At present, the following measures, among others, will be required to accomplish the above task:

- (a) Expand patrol plane search to the maximum, re-enforcing Patrol Wing Two with units from Patrol Wing One.
- (b) Establish inner air patrol over Pearl and Honolulu Harbor entrances and approaches, augmenting Army planes with naval and marine planes as necessary.
- (c) Arrange for alertness of a striking force of Army bombers and pursuit planes; supplemented by available Navy or Marine planes.
- (d) Augment Army A.A. defenses with A.A. batteries of Fleet units in Pearl Harbor.
- (2) Keep vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.
- (3) Assist in local defense of the Fourteenth Naval District.

This task will require augmentation of District forces by the assignment of Fleet units until suitable vessels, including those of the Coast Guard, become available to the Commandant. *q*

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CmC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FlagshipSECRET

A13/0129

Pearl Harbor, T. H.
January 25, 1941Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG.

- (4) Protect United States' shipping. This will require the following:
- (a) Provide escort for important ships.
 - (b) Route allied and United States' shipping in the Fleet Control Zone.
 - (c) Base cruisers on Samoa to cover shipping in the South Seas.
 - (d) Despatch the Southeastern Pacific Force.
 - (e) Establish escort and patrol group between Hawaii and the West Coast.
 - (f) Maintain striking group to operate against raiders (search for raiders might afford opportunity to reconnoiter the Marshall Islands without provoking Japan).
- (5) Protection of outlying islands. This will require the following:
- (a) Establish defense battalions at Midway and Samoa and smaller units at Johnston, Wake, Palmyra and Canton.
 - (b) Maintain submarine patrols at all the above-mentioned islands, except Samoa.
 - (c) Despatch two submarines, plus the ORTOLAN, for the defense of Unalaska.
- (6) Adjust U. S. Fleet training to war conditions.

CinC File No.
A16/0129

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

SECRET

Pearl Harbor, T. H.
January 25, 1941

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG.

Additional Measures if Japan enters war

- (7) Make initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and raiders in the Northern Pacific. *U*
- (8) Establish submarine patrols in the Marshall Islands, withdrawing them from own outlying islands as necessary.
- (9) Make early reconnaissance in force of the Marshall Islands. Thereafter conduct a general surveillance of that area and make raids on forces, material installations, and communications therein.
- (10) Make periodic sweeps toward the Marianas and Bonins.

N
6. It will, of course, be realized that the effectiveness with which the tasks set forth above can be prosecuted is dependent upon the forces available, especially after the withdrawal of the Atlantic reinforcements. If a carrier is to be included in the Atlantic reinforcement, one of the LEWINGTON class should be selected due to difficulties of handling in Pearl Harbor. There is, however, definite need for all four carriers under the tasks assigned this fleet.

7. In connection with the execution of the foregoing tasks, and with particular reference to the early initiation of offensive operations, it must be pointed out that the existing deficiencies in the defenses of Cahu and in the Local Defense forces of the Fourteenth Naval District impose a heavy burden on the fleet for purely defensive purposes. Ideally, a Fleet Base should afford refuge and rest for personnel as well as opportunity for maintenance and upkeep of material installations. When Fleet planes, Fleet guns and Fleet personnel are required to be constantly ready for defense of its own Base, the wear and tear on both men and material can not but result in impaired readiness for active operations at sea. The most outstanding deficiencies affecting this readiness of the fleet are:

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A16/0129

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

SECRET

Pearl Harbor, T. H.
January 25, 1941

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan JO'.

-
- (a) The critical inadequacy of A.A. guns available for the defense of Pearl Harbor, necessitating constant manning of ships' A.A. guns while in port.
 - (b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land-based aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet planes for local patrols.
 - (c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District, necessitating detail of Fleet units to this duty. The detail of Fleet units to this duty not only results in loss, to the Fleet, of the availability of important vessels, but also results in the forced employment of ships whose more valuable characteristics will be largely wasted due to the nature of their tasks. This is particularly true where destroyers must be diverted to local A/S patrol, off-shore patrol and local escort. These duties could better be performed by submarine chasers, converted gunboats and converted escort vessels.
 - (d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore.

8. It is considered imperative that immediate measures be undertaken to correct the critical deficiencies enumerated above. It is further believed that these measures should take priority over the needs of continental districts, the training program, and material aid to Great Britain. ~

CAC File No.
A16/0129

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. & PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

~~SECRET~~

Pearl Harbor, T. H.
January 23, 1941

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan HOG.

9. It is recommended that the Alaskan and Hawaiian reinforcements referred to in paragraph 2103(a)(5) of W.P.L. 44 (advance copy) be despatched as soon as possible in order that necessity for heavy escort may not embarrass the U. S. Pacific Fleet in its later operations.

10. This letter has been prepared in collaboration with the prospective Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N. It represents his, as well as my own, views.

J. O. RICHARDSON

Copy to:
Rear Admiral H.E. Kimmel

COPY

56C

1000 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Op-12-CTB(SC)A16(B-3) Serial 014412

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 10 February 1941.

Secret

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations Plan D.

References: (a) Cinc, U. S. Pacific Fleet, secret ltr. A16/0129 of January 23, 1941.

(b) SecNav secret ltr. to SecWar, Serial 09112 of January 24, 1941.

1. Receipt is acknowledged of reference (a).

2. Since the plans to be prepared under the directives of WPL-44 will be applicable to a large extent to the situation presented by Plan D, the Chief of Naval Operations desires that planning under WPL-44 continue to have the highest priority.

3. The general concept, the assumptions, and the tasks under a Plan D situation, outlined in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of reference (a), are in accord with the views of the Chief of Naval Operations.

4. In connection with the initial sweep for Japanese raiders in the Northern Pacific, mentioned in paragraph 5 (7), a suggestion may here be in order. The Chief of Naval Operations believes it possible that Japan for some time maintained a vessel about 500 miles north of Oahu. Indications are that some similar vessel is now stationed about 1,000 miles southwest of Oahu. In connection with reports of unidentified submarines near Oahu, Panama, the Mexican coast, and in the open sea, it may be surmised that the vessel mentioned above is a submarine tender, and that Japan may plan during war to base submarines on tenders in the open sea. It is considered most inadvisable that we indicate too much curiosity in this respect for the time being. It would be well, however, to keep track of such vessels, and to take immediate steps to sink them on the outbreak of war.

5. With reference to paragraph 7 of reference (a), the Chief of Naval Operations is cognizant of the condition of the defenses of Oahu, and, in view of the inadequacy of the Army defenses, the responsibility which must rest upon the fleet for its own protection while in Pearl Harbor. In this connection, your attention is invited to reference (b), a copy of which was furnished to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. The War Department is taking steps to remedy the situation, but the Commander-in-Chief should constantly press the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to make all the improvements that lie within his own power.

6. It is noted that no provision is made in the Naval local Defense Force plans of the Fourteenth Naval District for the employment of vessels as a part of an aircraft warning net in the waters to the northward and southward of Oahu. It is suggested that in coordinating the plans of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, this matter be given consideration. It is possible the large sampans equipped with radio might prove useful for this purpose during war.

7. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail.

/s/ H. R. Stark.
H. R. STARK.

EXHIBIT NO. 10

Op-12B-9-McC (SC)A7-2(2)/FF1

Serial 09112

Secret

JAN. 24, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be

initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

- (1) Air bombing attack.
- (2) Air torpedo plane attack.
- (3) Sabotage.
- (4) Submarine attack.
- (5) Mining.
- (6) Bombardment by gun fire.

Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance.

Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels.

[2] The counter measures to be considered are:

- (a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched;
- (b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives;
- (c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire;
- (d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;
- (e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.

The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war.

Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organization and equipping of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on visual observation and sound locators which are only effective up to four miles.

Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the standards of the war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26—3" fixed anti-aircraft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 56 mobile 3" guns, and 109 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft batteries are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the sea coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a gun bombardment, one or the other countering fires would suffer from lack of men. If the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the anti-aircraft guns might be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack.

By late summer the defenses will be considerably strengthened by additions in guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen additional 3" mobile, twenty-four 90 mm., and one hundred twenty 37 mm. guns will be on hand; the pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149; the new radio locators will have an effective range of 100 miles. Although the caliber of the guns will still be small for effective action against high altitude bombers, this augmentation will markedly improve the security of the Fleet. It does not, of course, affect the critical period immediately before us.

[3] The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be of the greatest value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated some usefulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground might prove most advantageous.

To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals:

- (1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii.
- (2) That the Army give consideration to the questions of balloon barrages, the employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defenses of Pearl Harbor.

1002 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

(3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against surprise aircraft raids.

(4) That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.

(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty continues to exist.

Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementing of the measures to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the security of the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Navy Department.

Sincerely yours,

Secretary of the Navy.

The Honorable The SECRETARY OF WAR.

Copies to: CINC, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Com 14

Op-22

Op-30

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

FEB 7. 1941

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.


3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns.

4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.

SECRET

5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured -- forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again.

6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective.


Secretary of War.

(2-8-41)

Op-12B-McC (SC) A7-2 (2)/FF1

Serial 015712

D-27446

Secret

Feb 11, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

Reference: (a) SecNav Secret Let. to SecWar, (SC) A7-2 (2)/FF1, Serial 09112 of January 24, 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of SecWar Secret Let. to SecNavy dated February 7, 1941 in reply to reference (a).

1. In connection with reference (a), a copy of which was forwarded to you, there is forwarded herewith as Enclosure (A), a copy of the reply of the Secretary of War to reference (a).

Copy to: Op-22

Op-30

Via Air Mail

FEBRUARY 7, 1941.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Attention is invited to the inclosed copy of letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War of January 24, 1941, relative to the above mentioned subject, together with copy of reply thereto from the Secretary of War, February 7, 1941.

2. It is desired that you cooperate with the local naval authorities in making effective the measures for joint defense, referred to in paragraph 6 of the reply to the Secretary of the Navy.

By order of the Secretary of War:

WM. W. DICK,
Adjutant General,
Reg. No. 900270, 2-8-41.

2 Inclosures—

Inc. 1—Copy, ltr. from Sec. of Navy to Sec. of War, 1-2-41.

Incl. 2—Copy, ltr. from Sec. of War to Sec. of Navy, 2-7-41.

13 Feb. 1941.

Subject: A. dse. o. ph. hwi.

Received of The Adjutant General, letter, February 7, 1941, subject as indicated above, together with two (2) inclosures noted therein.

(Signed) Carl Grosse,
CARL GROSSE,

Major, A. G. D., Assistant Adjutant General,
Office: Headquarters, Hawaiian Department.

[Stamped notation: 45 AGO Feb 24 1941 Received]

Note: Please accomplish promptly and return to The A. G. O.

EXHIBIT NO. 11

CinC File No.

A16/01687

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

10/10

Long Beach, California
October 16, 1940

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.
Subject: International situation - Reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet.
Enclosures: (A) Copy of assumptions.
(B) Copy of tentative operations.

1. During the recent visit of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, to Washington and on October 10, the Secretary told the Commander-in-Chief that the President was considering, in connection with possible retaliatory measures taken by Japan against Great Britain upon opening of the Burma Road, the following:

- (a) Reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet as a peace-time move.
- (b) Declaring a complete embargo on shipments to and from Japan.
- (c) Attempting to stop all trade between Japan and the Americas. To accomplish this latter measure, he (the President) proposed establishment of patrol lines of light forces from Honolulu westward to the Philippines and a second line roughly from Samoa to Singapore, "in support of" the first line. The impracticability of this and other suggestions was explained to the Secretary, and, after some further conversations dealing with eventualities and at the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, and his War Plans Officer in conjunction with the War Plans Division of the Chief of Naval Operations' office, submitted a memorandum (Enclosure A) of assumptions outlining the situation presented by the Secretary and a brief outline sketch of operations (Enclosure B) by the U. S. Fleet to meet the assumptions in a more practicable manner. This was submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations on October 11 for

CinC File No.
AL6/01687

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

Long Beach, California
October 16, 1940

Subject: International situation - Reinforcement of
the Asiatic Fleet.

submission to the Secretary and the President
as to what the Navy proposed to do if directed
to proceed on the proposed assumptions and
tentative decisions.

2. To date, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet,
has had no further word in regard to the memorandum re-
ferred to above, but received a despatch today from the
Chief of Naval Operations directing that a copy be for-
warded to you via the H-USTON. It is believed that
further study in the Department and in the Fleet will
result in some modifications in the operations proposed
for the fleet, particularly as regards distribution of
patrol planes and cruisers.

3. The further operations indicated in paragraph
9 of Enclosure (B) are measures for the reduction and oc-
cupation of the Marshall Islands, or a feint in the Mid-
Pacific which will be initiated when a train is assembled
and transports are ready. Due to the situation in the
Atlantic, the Department did not feel that our main Fleet
should get too far in the Pacific, as it might be neces-
sary to call it back on short notice. It was felt,
however, that active operations against ORANGE possessions
might have a deterrent effect on ORANGE full scale opera-
tions in the South China Sea and Dutch East Indies.

4. It will be noted that the above operations
parallel very closely the present ORANGE Plan, modified by
the despatch of an Advance Force to the Asiatic and
further modified by the restriction of main Fleet opera-
tions to the Mid-Pacific area.

5. I was further told, in the Department that no
Army forces would be available and that the British had
agreed to the United States' use of Singapore.

6. In the event that the assumptions are not
realized prior to about January 1, 1941, or decision is
not reached to despatch the Advance Detachment before that

1008 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CinC File No.

A16/01687

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, FlagshipLong Beach, California
October 16, 1940Subject: International situation - Reinforcement of
the Asiatic Fleet.

time, there was discussion of assembling a train and transports in West Coast ports and holding a full dress rehearsal of operations against an atoll, as a Fleet exercise, utilizing Christmas Island as a site. Steps are being taken for the acquisition and conversion of the necessary transports, etc., to be ready around that time. If this is done, the reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet may take place coincidentally with this exercise, the idea being that Japan will be impressed by this evidence of United States determination to protect its interests. I presume you will be further informed of this eventuality as plans are more fully developed.

7. My secret serial A16/01683 of this date, covering the composition and preparation of the tentative detachment slated for reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet, in case such a move is ordered, was forwarded to you by clipper locked box, a copy being sent on the HOUSTON with this letter.

8. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.

J. O. RICHARDSON

Copy to: (22 Airmail)

OpNAV (This copy cancelled
192000 of Oct 6.)

by OpNAV despatch

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Op-123-2-McC

10-11-40

in CaseMEASURES AND OPERATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE U.S. FLEET

1. Mobilize U.S. Fleet, in accordance with Orange Plan.
2. Redepose forces now in the Atlantic as follows:
 - a. Move 2 heavy cruisers and one division of 4 Old Destroyers to Southern Brazil - Uruguay, and Argentine ports, basing locally or on Falkland Islands in order to interdict ORANGE trade and protection of U.S. Shipping.
 - b. Move 2 heavy cruisers, one aircraft carrier, and 4 destroyers (from Pacific) to cover west coast ports of South America, basing locally or at Panama.
 - c. Move 18 Old Destroyers to Pacific for local defense and protection of U.S. Shipping as follows:-
 - 9 to Puget Sound and Alaska
 - 5 to San Francisco
 - 4 to Hawaii
 - d. Move one aircraft carrier, one light cruiser, two transports, one destroyer tender, all new destroyers, one Destroyer transport, plus 1st Marine Brigade (now at Guantanamo), and three new submarines, and three old submarines to West Coast.
 - e. Move Patroling 5 (___planes) with tenders to San Diego for local coastal defense (relieve Patrolings 1 and 4).

1010 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Op-128-2-usc

10-11-46

Attack

3. Take measures for defense of Alaska as follows:
 - A. Dispatch two submarines and small tender to Dutch Harbor.
 - B. Reinforce Marine garrison at Dutch Harbor by remainder of defense battalion, housing them in vessels chartered for the purpose.
 - C. Dispatch one squadron (6 planes) of Patrol Planes, plus tender, to Dutch Harbor, and one squadron (6 planes) and tender to Kodiak.
 - D. Prepare a detachment for possible dispatch to East Indies area, consisting of 4 CA, 1 CV, 4 DD, 4 AMD, (Destroyer 51), 1 AC, 1 AD. This force will reinforce U.S. Asiatic Fleet units which will have retired to this area, and will operate in conjunction with British and Dutch Naval Forces. Upon arrival Asiatic waters, this force will report to the Commander-in-Chief, ASIATIC FLEET. (SIC) If degaussing and other mobilization measures have not been completed prior to departure, this hazard will have to be accepted, and materials required will have to be forwarded at a later date. In addition, if sent prior to the completion of readiness measures for the operation of the main body in the ~~Mid-Pacific~~ Pacific, it must be realized that war may result with this valuable force exposed and unsupported. The same is true of the Asiatic Fleet.
5. Dispatch promptly from Hawaii a detachment consisting of carrier, cruisers, and destroyers to sweep North Pacific waters between Hawaii and Alutians for Japanese commerce, or Japanese raiders. To be fitted in with mobilization requirements.
6. Assemble transports and train and embark 2nd Reinforced Marine Brigade in West Coast ports.

-L2B-1-100

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7. Take measures for defense of Pacific Islands as follows: -
 - a. Reinforce MIDWAY with remainder of Defense Battalion, 2 Patrols, 4 OSS, 1 ASR.
 - b. Operate 2 SS for defense of WAKE.
 - c. Operate 2 SS and 1 Patrol with tender from JOHNSTON ISLAND, provide small Marine listening post.
 - d. Operate 6 VP, 1 AVP, and 2 AS for defense of CANTON ISLAND.
 - e. Dispatch 2 OSS for defense of SAMOA.
 - f. Dispatch 2 Patrols of Patroling ONE to HAWAII (24 Planes) after relief by Patroling FIVE.
8. Dispatch remainder of Subrons FOUR and SIX (Approximately 24 SS) to CAROLINES and MARSHALLS for preliminary reconnaissance operations.
9. Upon completion of mobilization preparations, assemble fleet in HAWAII prepared to initiate further measures as the situation requires.
10. Assist in defense of U.S. Shipping by the detail of certain Fleet Forces to Coastal Frontier forces. ~~W/~~ the Pacific this will be comprised: -

4 SS to HAWAII

3 OCL to Pacific Coastal Frontier.

SECRET

October 11, 1940

U.S. fleet dispositions and Operations to meet special situation in Western Pacific.

ASSUMPTIONS.

1. The Gravity of the situation existing today is intensified by the opening of the Burma Road by Great Britain.
2. The Japanese announce or indicate that the opening of the Burma Road is an act unfriendly to Japan.
3. The Japanese undertake retaliatory measures to enforce cooperation with Japan by Great Britain in the Far East.
4. Japan undertakes positive aggressive action to enforce full cooperation by the Dutch East Indies.
5. The United States proclaims complete embargo on shipments from the United States or United States possessions to Japan and non-intercourse with Japan.
6. The United States undertakes by diplomatic and naval action to prevent Japanese trade, in Japanese ships and in ships of other nations, with the Western Hemisphere.
7. The United States will support British forces in the Western Pacific, - in Australia and Singapore, - and Dutch Forces in the Dutch East Indies in stopping Japanese trade south of China Sea - Celebes Sea area.
8. The United States is prepared to accept war if the measures taken cause Japan to isolate war.
9. Great Britain will prevent any naval aggression in the Western Atlantic against the Western Hemisphere by the Axis Powers.
10. The situations and decisions by the United States assumed herein may arise 17 October, 1940.

EXHIBIT NO. 12

NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ENCLOSURE

14 November 1945

Mr. Frank B. Keefe,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Keefe:

I am enclosing a revised statement on naval estimates and appropriations for the years 1932 to 1941 inclusive to be substituted for the one enclosed with the Secretary of the Navy's letter sent you on yesterday.

This revised statement was prepared after collaboration between this office and the Bureau of the Budget in studying the records of the years in question, and the figures appearing thereon will agree with those furnished you by the Bureau of the Budget. While the records concerning the regular Naval Appropriation Bills for each year were complete, information concerning deficiency and supplemental estimates requested by the Navy Department was lacking in many cases and required extended search through the files for the years in question.

Sincerely yours,

E. G. Allen
E. G. ALLEN,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Director of Budget and Reports.

(Enclosure)

1014 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Appropriations, Navy Department, fiscal years 1932 to 1941, inclusive

Fiscal year	Appropriations requested by the Navy Department	Budget estimate of appropriations submitted to the Congress	Amounts made available by the Congress	
			Appropriations	Contract authority
1932				
Annual appropriation act.....	\$354,809,746	\$347,794,248	\$358,262,123	\$7,700,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	0	0	0	0
Total.....	354,809,746	347,794,248	358,262,123	7,700,000
1933				
Annual appropriation act.....	399,139,886	341,677,450	317,583,591	5,715,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	10,000,000	10,000,000	10,000,000	0
Total.....	409,139,886	351,677,450	327,583,591	5,715,000
1934				
Annual appropriation act.....	352,717,786	308,669,562	308,669,562	8,100,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	0	0	0	0
Total.....	352,717,786	308,669,562	308,669,562	8,100,000
1935				
Annual appropriation act.....	318,324,414	286,332,392	284,658,799	2,800,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	17,086,504	17,075,257	17,075,257	0
Total.....	335,410,918	303,407,649	301,734,056	2,800,000
1936				
Annual appropriation act.....	502,855,817	485,443,847	458,984,379	6,580,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	23,931,725	23,931,725	23,915,851	0
Total.....	526,787,542	509,375,572	482,900,230	6,580,000
1937				
Annual appropriation act.....	585,010,984	549,591,299	529,546,532	13,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	1,921,300	1,921,300	1,921,300	0
Total.....	586,932,284	551,512,599	528,467,832	13,000,000
1938				
Annual appropriation act.....	594,269,223	562,425,709	516,258,808	15,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	4,766,000	4,766,000	2,881,000	0
Total.....	599,035,223	567,191,709	519,139,808	15,000,000
1939				
Annual appropriation act.....	629,665,104	564,406,461	546,866,494	15,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	89,714,905	85,839,950	76,659,700	0
Total.....	719,380,009	650,246,411	623,526,194	15,000,000
1940				
Annual appropriation act.....	788,775,549	790,342,453	773,049,151	20,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	288,602,340	186,088,316	170,326,098	2,480,000
Total.....	1,077,377,889	976,430,769	943,375,249	22,480,000

Appropriations, Navy Department, fiscal years 1932 to 1941, inclusive—Continued

Fiscal Year	Appropriations Requested by the Navy Department	Budget Estimate of Appropriations submitted to the Congress	Amounts made available by the Congress	
			Appropriations	Contract Authority
1941				
Annual appropriation act.....	1,384,442,202	1,337,311,577	1,274,171,138	148,741,612
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	3,862,187,700	2,224,004,342	2,275,212,207	797,356,500
Total.....	5,236,629,902	3,561,405,919	3,549,383,345	946,098,112
Total asked.....	9,434,271,533	7,428,240,190	7,256,806,276	1,029,038,112
1934-1941 inclusive:			Total	
Budget cut requests.....	2,006,031,343		8,285,934,388	
Congress executed budget by.....	857,694,198			

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

November 7, 1945

Honorable Frank B. Keefe
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Keefe:

Attached is a statement which contains for the War Department Military Establishment, data on amounts requested of the Bureau of the Budget, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and funds and contract authorizations made available to the War Department for the fiscal years 1932 through 1941. These data were requested by you on October 19th for use as a member of the Pearl Harbor investigating committee.

Insofar as can be determined, there is no copy in the files of the War Department, of a speech delivered by the President of the Philippine Islands, Mr. Quezon, in Manila some time in November, 1941.

Sincerely yours,



ROBERT P. PATTERSON
Secretary of War

Incl.
Stat

Appropriations, War Department military establishment, fiscal years 1932 through 1941

Fiscal year	Requested by War Department		Requested by the Bureau of the Budget		Appropriated by the Congress	
	Appropriations	Contract authorizations	Appropriations	Contract authorizations	Appropriations	Contract authorizations
1932						
Annual appropriation act.....	\$347,856,137	\$3,000,000	\$339,725,859	\$3,000,000	\$335,475,965	\$3,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	3,448,157	0	3,444,951	0	4,291,679	0
Total.....	351,304,294	3,000,000	343,170,810	3,000,000	339,767,644	3,000,000
1933						
Annual appropriation act.....	316,079,255	0	301,030,642	0	289,500,024	0
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	15,164,468	0	15,164,468	0	15,461,468	0
Total.....	331,243,723	0	316,195,110	0	304,961,492	0
1934						
Annual appropriation act.....	320,884,513	0	277,730,841	3,000,000	277,050,381	3,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	16,000	0	16,000	0	16,000	0
Total.....	320,900,513	0	277,746,841	3,000,000	277,066,381	3,000,000
1935						
Annual appropriation act.....	279,913,374	0	260,624,208	3,000,000	255,526,147	3,000,000
Second and deficiency appropriation acts.....	25,357,947	0	25,335,947	0	25,335,947	0
Total.....	305,271,321	0	285,960,155	3,000,000	280,862,094	3,000,000
1936						
Annual appropriation act.....	346,723,362	0	317,459,277	0	341,348,204	7,686,753
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	14,627,792	0	14,340,000	0	14,190,000	0
Total.....	361,351,154	0	331,799,277	0	355,538,204	7,686,753
1937						
Annual appropriation act.....	458,193,897	0	375,025,510	8,000,000	383,104,859	10,669,786
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	8,829,018	0	8,040,000	0	5,140,000	3,000,000
Total.....	467,022,915	0	383,065,510	8,000,000	388,244,859	13,669,786

EXHIBIT NO. 13

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE

Office of the Air Force Commander

HICKAM FIELD, T. H.

(T-3)

In reply refer to:

20 August 1941

SUBJECT: Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii.

TO : Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

THRU : Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. In compliance with copy of corrected memorandum for the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, OCS 17234-25, from the Secretary, General Staff, dated July 17, 1941, "that a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii", there is attached for consideration of the War Department a plan for the employment of long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu. This plan clearly presents the air defense of the Hawaiian Islands. Attention is called to the recommendations therein.

2. No increase in personnel of the permanent air garrison of Hawaii is necessary to bring the actual heavy bombardment strength to one group. Under provisions of Table of Basic Allowances No. 1, War Department, dated December 1, 1940, fourteen additional heavy bombardment airplanes will be required to provide a total strength of one group of thirty-five B-17D type airplanes. This force is so small for the mission to be performed that it is considered entirely inadequate.

3. When the RDF installation is completed and the 15th Pursuit Group has its full complement of 80 fighters no further increase for pursuit aviation is considered necessary. Provision should be made to maintain at all times the 14th Pursuit Wing at full combat strength of 80 fighters and 105 interceptors. It is contemplated that pursuit aviation will perform its normal mission in the defense of these islands by intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft in the vicinity of or over the island of Oahu. This is considered an adequate force to perform the pursuit mission in the defense of these islands.

4. A combination medium bombardment-torpedo force is considered highly desirable in order that attack can be made under conditions of low visibility when horizontal bombing is not feasible and is therefore recommended as a component part of the Hawaiian Air Force. (See Study No. 2 in attached plan).

5. On the assumption that there is a possibility of enemy surface craft reaching the shore of Oahu, one squadron of dive bombers is

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Subject: Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii, cont 'd:

considered necessary to assist the ground forces in withstanding an invasion effort by concentrating on denying the enemy any opportunity to establish beach heads. The quick and accurate striking power of dive bombers makes them particularly effective for close-in support on the ground forces and this premise is borne out by information contained in intelligence reports received on the war in Europe. Dive bombers would also be employed against hostile surface craft and submarines which had penetrated close to the shores of Oahu.

6. With the addition of the force of medium bombardment-torpedo airplanes and one squadron of dive bombers no further increase in the number of light bombardment airplanes is required

7. One additional observation squadron should be assigned the Hawaiian Air Force to supplement the new ground organization of the Hawaiian Department which is being re-organized into two triangular divisions. The ground forces of the Hawaiian Department should be provided with three observation squadrons. At present there is assigned one observation squadron (C&D) and one light bombardment squadron which could be diverted to observation duty.

8. To increase the number of aircraft in the Hawaiian Air Force as outlined in this letter and in the attached plan it is estimated that approximately 3,871 additional men should be assigned. A minimum of 216 combat crews and 180 maintenance crews are necessary to operate 180 B-17D type airplanes. Sufficient personnel are now present in the Hawaiian Air Force to man 70 combat crews and 70 maintenance crews for heavy bombardment aircraft. Additional personnel equal to the difference above should be assigned to the Hawaiian Air Force to meet these requirements. Further personnel increases should be made to activate two medium combination bombardment-torpedo squadrons, one dive bomber squadron, one additional observation squadron and five air base squadrons. The five air base squadrons will be used to maintain the outlying fields tabulated below which will house heavy bombardment squadrons as indicated. The two Air Base Groups (S) are to be used to maintain Bellows Field and the site selected for the station of the 15th Pursuit Group.

Barking Sands2

Morse Field2

Hilo1

Lanai.....1

Parker Ranch1

9. The dive bomber squadron and three observation squadrons with allied services will become, in effect, air support command and will be stationed at Bellows Field.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii, Cont'd:

10. Tables of Organization prescribe five enlisted men for each heavy bombardment combat crew. For continuous daily operation a minimum of fourteen men will be necessary for each heavy maintenance crew. Using these figures as a basis, personnel requirements have been computed as shown in Inclosure No. 2.

11. There is at present available, under construction and awaiting approval of the War Department, housing for 12,888 enlisted men. This study will require housing for a total of 12,813 men to provide for all Air Corps and associated personnel. This leaves but 525 men to be cared for in a future project which will be submitted when this study has been approved. For detailed analysis of housing see Inclosure No. 3.

12. It is my conviction that by increasing the present strength of the Hawaiian Air Force by one observation squadron, a minimum of one dive bomber squadron, two squadrons of combination medium bombardment-torpedo airplanes and by increasing the strength of long-range bombardment to a total of 180 airplanes a positive defense of the Hawaiian Islands can be assured without any assistance whatever from the naval forces giving the Navy complete freedom of action.

F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incls-

Incl #1 - Plan for the Employment of Long-Range Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu.
(In triplicate).

Incl #2 - Personnel Requirement Recapitulation. (In triplicate).

Incl #3 - Air Force Housing Facilities.
(In triplicate).

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1022 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONFIDENTIAL

PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF BOMBARDMENT AVIATION IN THE DEFENSE OF OAHU

I. GENERAL:

1. The key to this plan is found in the provision for first, a complete and thorough search of the Hawaiian area daily during daylight; secondly, an attack force available on call to hit a known objective located as a result of the search and thirdly, if the objective is a carrier, to hit it the day before it could steam to a position offshore of Oahu where it could launch its planes for an attack.

2. The most difficult problem presents itself when it is necessary to search through 360°. This might occur daily and it is the only one considered in this study. It is possible, of course, that intelligence obtained from advanced naval bases and ships at sea might implement this plan and reduce the search area to 270°, 180° or even 90°. In this case, the striking force would be augmented by those planes not required for search.

3. All computations in connection with air operations under this plan are based on the B-17D airplane. This type of airplane is considered available for either a search mission or an attack mission and consequently no reference is made to reconnaissance or bombardment aviation as such but to the search or the attack forces. The combat crew training of both will be identical and search and attack missions will be rotated for the purpose of resting crews and maintaining aircraft.

II. THE PROBLEM:

1. To analyze the mission of heavy bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu with a view to promulgating a plan in accordance therewith.

III. FACTS BEARING ON THE CASE:

1. Facts:

a. The Army mission is: "To defend the Naval Base of Oahu".

b. The bombardment mission is:

(1) When Navy reconnaissance is adequate:

"To attack and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action."

(2) When Navy is absent or not present with equipment in Numbers or Quality:

"To search for, attack and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action."

c. *Capabilities of B-17D type airplanes are:

(1) Search at 45% Power at 5,000' Altitude
(No bombs-2500 gallons fuel)

One hour full throttle operations

Two hour fuel reserve

Climb

Cruise at 143 knots at 136 gal/hr

Radius of Action in nautical miles

Gal Fuel	Miles
used	flown
432	214
272	
30	10
1766	1310
2300	1800
	1000

CONFIDENTIAL

Plan for the Employment of Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu, cont'd:

	Gal Fuel used	Miles flown
(2) Search - Attack at 45% at 5,000'		
(4 - 6000' bombs - 2100 gallons fuel)		
One hour full throttle operation	432	214
Two hours fuel reserve	272	
Climb	30	10
Cruise at 143 knots at 136 gal/hr	1366	1485
	<u>2100</u>	<u>1709</u>
Radius of Action in nautical miles		<u>881</u>
(3) Attack at 65% Power - Return at 45% Power at 15,000'		
(4 - 6000' bombs - 2100 gallons fuel)		
One hour full throttle operation	432	236
Two hours fuel reserve at 45% power	272	
Climb	90	27
65% Power - 193 knots at 208 gal/hr	687	643
45% Power - 150 knots at 136 gal/hr	612	643
	<u>2091</u>	<u>1389</u>
Radius of Action in nautical miles		<u>775</u>
(4) Attack at 65% Power - Return at 45% Power at 15,000'		
(8 - 6000' bombs - 1700 gallons fuel)		
One hour full throttle operation	432	236
Two hours fuel reserve at 45% power	272	
Climb	90	27
65% Power - 193 knots at 208 gal/hr	485	450
45% Power - 150 knots at 136 gal/hr	408	450
	<u>1687</u>	<u>1163</u>
Radius of Action in nautical miles	<u>1700</u>	<u>581</u>

Note - The above capabilities were taken from curves in the B-17D handbook and checked by actual flight tests.

g. To perform its missions, the Fleet must have freedom of action without responsibility for the defense of its base.

h. If the solution to a problem is designed to meet the most adverse conditions, any less adverse condition will facilitate the solution.

i. Army Air Force units at present are not charged with the reconnaissance mission for the defense of Oahu.

j. The combatant force having the longer range weapon has a basic advantage, other factors being equal.

k. The bombardment airplane is the longest range weapon which the Department Commander has at his disposal.

2. Assumptions:

a. The following are the assumed or known maximum capabilities of enemy equipment:

(1) Some of his carriers can steam at 30 knots for at least 24 hours. (Best available intelligence indicates ORANGE has three carriers with this performance).

(2) His carrier bombing planes have 600 nautical miles range and cruise at 180 knots (based on perfor-

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Plan for the Employment of Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu, cont'd:

manoe data of the U. S. Navy carrier planes and no allowance is made for take-off, rally after attack, full throttle operation and landing).

b. The following are the assumed probable capabilities of enemy equipment;

- (1) His carriers steam at 27 knots for 24 hours. (28 knots is the mean top speed of his carriers; 1 knot reduction is made for four bottoms).
- (2) His carrier bombing planes have 400 nautical miles range and cruise at 180 knots (reduction in range from 600 to 400 nautical miles is made to allow for take-off, rally after attack, full throttle operation and landing).

Note: In the discussion that follows it is assumed that hostile carriers operating under conditions a and b above once committed to action will steam straight in to their launching radius. Any maneuvering by the enemy when within our search area will simplify our problem for it will give the search force more time in which to locate the enemy.

c. The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of hostile carriers in this vicinity before they approach within range of Oahu where they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or an attack on Oahu.

d. An enemy will not venture an attack against the Hawaiian Islands until control of sea lanes of communication is obtained. Then as the enemy fleet approaches these islands, raids by surface vessels, submarines and carrier-based aircraft, may be expected.

e. Our most likely enemy, ORANGE, can probably employ a maximum of 6 carriers against Oahu.

f. A 25-mile visibility is assumed. This assumption is based on standard U. S. Navy search and patrol methods employed in this area.

g. For the purpose of this problem the day is divided into 13 hours of daylight and 11 hours of darkness. These assumptions are based on the following computations:

(1) June 22, 20° N. Lat., Sunrise	0521
Sunset	1842
Hours of daylight	1321
Add: Morning Twilight	25
Evening Twilight	24
Total hours of daylight	1410
(2) December 21, 20° N. Lat., Sunrise	0630
Sunset	1750
Hours of daylight	1120
Add: Morning Twilight	24
Evening Twilight	24
Total hours daylight	1208
Average (1) and (2)	1309

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Plan for the Employment of Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu, cont'd:

IV. DISCUSSION:**Part 1: The Search:**

1. The only manner in which the Hawaiian area can be thoroughly searched for enemy surface craft, particularly aircraft carriers, in the event of a situation requiring such action, is to provide a sufficient number of aircraft to conduct a daily search of a desired area during daylight hours with 100% coverage through 360°. A method of searching 5° sectors through 360° to a radius of 833 nautical miles from Oahu employing 72 B-17D airplanes is indicated in Chart No. 1. It will be noted that the outside lines of visibility for the diverging tracks cross at the 600 nautical mile circle, the overlap area inside of that distance becoming a non-covered area beyond that distance. The width of the non-covered area increases as the distance increases beyond 600 nautical miles with the corollary that the probability of finding the target decreases as the search continues out. However, as can be seen on the chart, each search plane on the search back covers the area not covered between any two planes on the search out and, in addition, covers the area previously searched by the plane on its left on the search out but uncovered on the search back. 100% coverage of the area is, therefore, obtained on the search out and back.

2. In order to have available for ready reference a means of determining coverage and non-coverage of areas on the search out using 3°, 4° and 5° sectors, there is attached Chart No. 2. The method of constructing the curves thereon is indicated on the chart. It will be observed that, with the assumed visibility of 25 miles, 100% coverage on the search out is obtained to a radius of:

- a. 600 nautical miles with airplanes in 5° sectors.
- b. 750 nautical miles with airplanes in 4° sectors.
- c. 1000 nautical miles with airplanes in 3° sectors.

3. Under any given set of operating data for the search planes and enemy carrier, the radius of action of the search force is determined by:

- a. Rate of closure of the carrier and search planes.
- b. Minimum distance the carrier can be offshore and allow the search force to make interception and relay the information to the attack force.
- c. Minimum time required for the attack force to make interception beyond the radius of action of the carrier planes.

4. In developing this plan, all search aircraft take off at daylight. They might take off during darkness in order to be at a certain location at dawn if definite information as to the movements of enemy surface vessels is reported from some source such as our search of a previous day, friendly surface vessels or Navy patrol.

Part 2: This part of the discussions deals with the maximum capabilities of enemy equipment namely, his carriers steam at 30 knots and his bombing planes have 600 nautical miles range and cruise at 180 knots. See Chart No. 3.

1. Section No. 1:

- a. An enemy should be primarily interested in obtaining the maximum cover of darkness for his carrier approach. This section illus-

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Plan for the Employment of Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu, cont'd:

states four possible uses of darkness by an enemy to cover his approach. In each case the distance out for dusk and dawn is computed from the most distant aircraft launching circle, or 350 nautical miles. This figure is based on the fact that after launching, the carrier planes will be in the air 3:00 and during that time the carrier steams in 100 nautical miles to recover its planes.

b. LA shows the carrier launching its aircraft at midnight, attacking and recovering during darkness; LB shows the launching at dusk with the attack and recovery during darkness; LC shows the launching at noon with the attack and recovery during daylight; and LD shows the launching at dawn with the attack and recovery during daylight.

c. It will be noted that each time schedule has a daylight period within the radius of action of the attack force but that LD permits the least time interval for our forces to operate against an enemy and requires it to attack at the longest range. The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan of action open to the enemy.

d. It is the opinion of some individuals that a late afternoon attack is highly probable since it permits an enemy carrier to escape under cover of darkness. This presupposes that search operations are impracticable. This headquarters cannot subscribe to this opinion for the following reasons:

- (1) A minor surprise raid such as a single carrier is not a logical method of attack to reduce the defenses of Oahu.
- (2) It permits us to operate against him for a long period on D Day at close range.
- (3) The enemy will be more concerned with delivering a successful attack than he will be with escaping after the attack. He will have carefully considered the cost of the enterprise, will probably make a determined attack with maximum force and will willingly accept his losses if his attack is successful.

2. Section No. 2:

a. This section illustrates a routine daily search by the search force which will be made in order to prevent an enemy from making an undetected approach on Oahu.

b. Specifically, with the carrier approaching at 30 knots and the search force taking off at dawn, interception must be made no closer to Oahu than 435 nautical miles and no later than 3:03 after dawn on D Day. This permits 40 minutes to send a radio message to the home base and get the attack force in the air and 2:10 for it to intercept and deliver its attack before the carrier can launch its planes. The attack force will strike the carrier at its dawn plus 5:34, D Day, 359 nautical miles out.

c. On a time distance basis, dawn D Day for a carrier is 526 nautical miles from Oahu; dusk D Day-1 is 856 nautical miles out and dawn D Day-1 is 1246 nautical miles from Oahu. Solving the rate of closure problem for the two forces 1246 nautical miles apart, it is found that contact will be made at 1030 nautical miles from Oahu at carrier's dawn plus 7:12 on D Day-1.

d. It must be pointed out that this solution is the maximum radius of action for the search force, yet not necessarily the most difficult problem presented to our attack force. While a carrier arriving at

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Plan for the Employment of B-17 at Aviation in the Defense of Guam, cont'd:

the B-17 will be able to down planes 2100 ft. and below and to attack the carrier's position at his launching point. Under these circumstances it is able to launch his carrier before we intercept him and deliver an attack against him on D Day. Therefore, we must hit him D Day-1, or the day before he arrives at this position.

3. Section No. 3:

a. This section illustrates the most difficult position which the attacking force might live. It is the position which is illustrated in Section No. 4D. The critical point for the carrier's position at his launching point is shown. Under these circumstances it is able to launch his carrier before we intercept him and deliver an attack against him on D Day. Therefore, we must hit him D Day-1, or the day before he arrives at this position.

b. Specifically, if our B-17s position D Day-1 is 150 nautical miles from Gulu, his launching point D Day-1 is 150 nautical miles out and his down position D Day-1 must be 120 nautical miles out. If he makes good this schedule, interception by the attacking force will be made at 224 nautical miles out at his down plus still on D Day-1. Allowing 40 minutes to transmit a message and to get the attacking force in the air, the attacking force will strike the carrier at his down plus 1000 ft. D Day-1 at a distance of 244 nautical miles from Gulu and 1000 ft. out. During the previous 244 miles of flight, the carrier will be using up his energy. Therefore, the carrier will be subjected to attack by an attacking force during a period of 244 miles D Day-1.

4. Section No. 4: This section shows the radius of action of the B-17 type airplane with fuel load of 6000 and 17000 lbs. of fuel.

5. Effect of Visibility (See Chart No. 1):

a. To cover the required search area under the above conditions 120 airplanes, each covering a 30 degree wedge, would be required to fly to a distance of 100 nautical miles. This number of planes would give a 100% coverage of the entire area on the horizon.

b. Obviously any decrease in the number of planes employed will increase the danger to the carrier. The probability of finding the carrier will be reduced, however, with a lesser number of search planes. The danger to the carrier will be reduced upon the location of the carrier and the number of the day, night permit an attack to be made on D Day-1 or D Day.

Part 3: This part of the document deals with the limited probable capabilities of enemy equipment (See Chart No. 4). It is believed that the existing capabilities will be a factor in the search for Sections 1 to 4, inclusive, (Chart No. 4) by the attacking force.

1. His average carrier speed will be 12 knots. This statement is based upon the fact that the average speed of a B-17 is 12 knots, and the fact that in his carrier in the Pacific, the bottom will probably be the same as the B-17.

2. The cruising range of the carrier aircraft will be 100 nautical miles. He will need to be in the air for 100 nautical miles for the operation, for fuel reserves, and for time required to take off from the launch board, the carrier.

3. He will not have a limited search area for his attack.

4. He must avoid the attacking force at all times.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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Plan for the Employment of Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu, cont'd:

b. Any approach to Oahu which is made from east of the 158th meridian materially increases his cruising distance and the probability of detection by friendly surface vessels. It seems that his most probable avenue of approach is the hemisphere from 0° counter-clockwise to 180° around Oahu; the next most probable, the quadrant 180° counter-clockwise to 90°; the least probable, 90° to 0°.

c. The tactical search enunciated above is not the only source of information as to his movements. Office Naval Intelligence, surface scouting forces, command ships at sea, radio intercept and proposed advanced naval line patrol, will tend to disclose his general location and night, therefore, reduce the search area for our forces.

d. H. will want to take the shortest distance to his objective, although this will be of minor consideration if his range is sufficient to permit him the long approach.

4. Section No. 5:

3. This section has been drawn to show one possible plan of attack of the enemy under his assumed probable capabilities. Here consideration has been given to the factors enumerated in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 immediately above, with the result that his performance characteristics have been reduced to 27 knots speed for his carrier and to 400 nautical miles range for his airplanes. Under these conditions it will be necessary for the carrier to approach within 233 nautical miles of Oahu before it can launch its aircraft; recovery would be made at 167 nautical miles. Accordingly, the radius of search can be reduced to 833 nautical miles and still permit the search force to locate the carrier and the attack force make its attack before the carrier-based aircraft can be launched. These assumed characteristics can reduce the required search radius to 833 nautical miles and still permit the carrier being attacked before it reaches the position from which aircraft can be launched.

b. If on D Day-1 the carrier force is at a distance of 991 nautical miles steaming in at 27 knots and the search force takes off at dawn, interception will occur at the carrier's dawn plus 5:49, 833 nautical miles away, the maximum radius of search under these conditions. Allowing 40 minutes to order the attack force out and 3:42 for the flight, the carrier can be attacked at its dawn plus 10:11 D Day-1, 715 nautical miles out and can operate against it during the remaining 2:49 before dusk.

c. Further, should the carrier be missed on D Day-1 there still remains an opportunity to attack it on D Day. Interception must be made by the search force not nearer than carrier's dawn plus 2:02, 288 nautical miles out on D Day in order to make an attack prior to launching. This attack would occur at dawn plus 3:56, 237 nautical miles out.

5. Section No. 6: The problem here is the same as that shown in paragraph 3, Part 2 above, i.e., the most favorable plan of action open to an enemy. With the carrier making good its time schedule to arrive at its airplane launching position at daylight, interception by the search force will be made at dawn plus 5:11 of carrier's D Day-1. Allowing 40 minutes to transmit the message to the home base and for the attack force to take off, the attack force can reach the carrier at dawn plus 9:08 of carrier's D Day-1 and can operate against the carrier during the remaining 3:42 before dusk. Under the most probable plan of action of an enemy carrier, a B-17 attacking force can operate against the carrier for 3:42 of the day prior to his attack on Oahu.

6. Effect of Visibility:

a. In Section No. 5, a 50° search spread should give adequate coverage. The search time schedule is such that if interception is not made on the search out it can be made on the search back in time to transmit the information and to deliver an attack by the striking force before

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The Employment of Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu, cont'd.

dusk on D Day-1. There is 75% coverage at 800 nautical miles on the search out, but on the search out and back there is 100% coverage. 72 airplanes would be used for the search.

b. In Section No. 6, with 5° search sectors, the probability of finding the target at 740 nautical miles is 85% for the search out and as stated in a above, 100% for the search out and back. 72 airplanes would be sufficient for complete coverage in this case, for if interception is not made on the way out, it can be made on the search back in time to transmit information and deliver an attack.

V. CONCLUSION:

1. Action by enemy carrier-based bombing planes against Oahu should be figured on the basis of their having 400 nautical miles range and a speed of 180 knots.

2. a. The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and the action upon which we should base our plans of operation, is the early morning attack in which the enemy must make good the following time schedule:

- (1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day before the attack.
- (2) Cross circle 530 nautical miles from Oahu at dusk of the day before the attack.
- (3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the day of the attack.
- (4) Recover his planes 167 nautical miles from Oahu 2:30 after dawn the day of the attack.

b. Any variation from the above time schedule permits our attack force to strike the enemy during daylight of the day before his attack over a greater time interval and at a shorter range; or, permits our attack force to strike him during daylight of the day he attacks but before he is within his radius of action of Oahu. If an enemy carrier succeeded in slipping in undetected by our search force and launched an attack, we could and would, of course, attack as soon as possible in order to destroy or disable the carrier prior to, or during, the recovery of its planes.

3. The area between the circles with radii 530 nautical miles and 833 nautical miles from Oahu is the operating area for the solution of this problem under its most adverse condition.

4. a. With the Army Air Force responsible for its own reconnaissance, 72 B-17D airplanes will be required to search daily the area within the circle of 833 nautical miles radius from Oahu, each plane covering a 5° sector.

b. Based upon the assumption of visibility used in this study, 72 airplanes employed to search a 360° sector should result in 100% coverage with some overlap to 600 nautical miles, 85% coverage at 700 nautical miles and 75% coverage at 800 nautical miles in the search out. In every case, the search out and in would permit 100% coverage within the time interval which would allow the launching of the bombing attack prior to dusk on D Day-1.

5. If a similar search could be conducted from Dutch Harbor, Midway, Johnston or Palmyra the possibility of enemy surface ships approaching Hawaii and the west coast of the United States undetected would be practically non-existent.

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Plan for the Employment of Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu, cont'd:

6. Search must be conducted during daylight hours because of the extreme difficulty of locating what will be an unoriented objective proceeding under cover of darkness. The B-17D airplane is capable of searching for, and attacking, an enemy force the day prior to its arrival within its striking distance of Oahu.
7. With this plan in actual operation the defenses of these islands can be assured without assistance from the Navy. This will permit complete freedom of action of the Pacific Fleet.
8. The B-17D airplane is capable of operating beyond the combat range of any known enemy carrier-based aviation.
9. Attack must be conducted during daylight hours because it is considered impracticable to locate and bomb a maneuvering precision target during darkness.
10. Based on the worst situation that could arise, i.e., the employment of 6 enemy carriers against Oahu simultaneously each approaching on a different course, an attack force of 36 B-17D's would be required to disable or destroy the carriers. It is expected that 6 B-17D's with bomb loads of seven 500# bombs would be sufficient to accomplish the desired result (see Study No. 1). It is contemplated that this attack force will be augmented by 36 additional B-17D's of the maintenance and reserve force if in commission.
11. This attack force should be further augmented by a minimum of 36 long-range planes of the B-26 or similar type, capable of carrying torpedoes to be used as the striking force under conditions of low ceiling and visibility when high altitude level bombing technique is not practicable. (See Study No. 2).
12. A reserve of 72 planes will be needed to provide for maintenance, replacement and reserve for both the search and attack forces. As was stated in paragraph 10 above, 36 of this number may be employed as part of the attack force if in commission.
13. In order to operate the above number of B-17D's, a minimum of 216 combat crews will be needed as indicated in Chart No. 5.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. It is recommended that the War Department give immediate consideration to the allotment of 180 B-17D type airplanes or other four-engine bombers with equal or better performance and operating range and 36 long-range torpedo-carrying medium bombers to the Hawaiian Air Force for the performance of search and attack missions in an area bounded by a circle whose radius is 850 nautical miles and center is Oahu, as follows:

- 72 for daily search missions.
- 36 for attack missions (these airplanes will be in readiness daily, fully armed and loaded with bombs, for a mission).
- 72 for maintenance and reserve from which 36 may be used to augment the attack force.
- 180 total B-17D's.
- 36 torpedo-carrying medium bombers of the B-26 or other suitable type.

2. While this number of bombardment airplanes could not be accommodated at Hickam Field and there are no other suitable bases available on Oahu, it should be only a matter of time until projects submitted to the War Department for the construction of airbases on outlying islands of

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Plan for the Employment of Bombers at Aviation in the Defense of Oahu, cont'd:

the Hawaiian group are completed which, with Hickam Field, will be adequate for operations of the few number of planes. Existing plans for the disposition of the 18th Bombardment Wing (H) provide for units of one and two squadrons to operate from two or more airbases. Modification of the plan to apply to operations therefrom are anticipated and will be made.

3. It is further recommended that in making future allotments of officers and enlisted men to the Hawaiian Air Force consideration be given to providing a minimum of 116 B-17D combat crews and 36 medium bomber-torpedo combat crews. In this connection, see paragraph 3, basic letter.

4. Our leading officials and strategists here concur in the opinion that this plan will solve and defend the Hawaiian Islands and that to their knowledge it is the best and only means that can be devised to locate enemy carriers and make attacks thereon before said carriers can come within launching distance of Oahu. The real purpose of the existence of the military establishment on Oahu, ground and air, is for the defense of Oahu as an outlying naval base. The best defense is an aggressive and well-organized offense. The basis of this plan is offensive action. We have had clearly demonstrated to us in Europe the fallacy of depending upon passive measures of defense. We must not base our plans of action on the "Defense of Hawaii", but rather upon a vigorous offensive. We must ferret out the enemy and destroy him before he can take action to destroy us.

It has been said, and it is a popular belief, that Hawaii is the strongest outlying naval base in the world and could, in a force, withstand indefinitely attacks and attempted invasions. Plans based on such convictions are inherently weak and tend to create a false sense of security with the consequent unpreparedness for offensive action.

In order to initiate offensive action, the Hawaiian Air Force must have at its disposal combat well-organized, equipped and trained combat crews. It should be remembered that while reinforcements from the Mainland can be made available on short notice their expeditious presence here will not solve the problem. Upon their arrival they must be given an opportunity to undergo a sort of indispensable indoctrination and training in the plan of action of the Hawaiian Air Force. If this plan is to be effective the force recommended above must be made a reality and maintained in existence in Hawaii for combat at any time. With the United States living and working under a condition of unlimited National Emergency, Japan making its southward movement and the world in general in a complete state of turmoil we must be prepared for Day X at any time. Reinforcements, therefore, must be considered in the statement of replacements for losses only. Any delay in placing this plan in operation, such as would be necessary for the above reasons, would militate against its success.

It is believed that a force of 180 four-engine aircraft with 36 long-range torpedo squadrons is a small force when compared with the importance of this outpost. This force can be provided at less cost to the Government than the cost of one modern battleship. It is further believed that this force should be made available as soon as possible even at the expense of other units on the Mainland.

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STUDY OF THE BOMBS REQUIRED TO DISABLE AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER

1. It is assumed that two direct hits by 500 lb. or 600 lb. demolition bombs will be sufficient to disable an aircraft carrier.

2. From the tables of probability of direct hits by bombing, results obtained by units of the Hawaiian Air Force in bombing sleds towed by Navy surface craft and from previous experiences by bombardiers who have made attacks of this nature, it is determined that about 90% probability of two direct hits may be expected from 6 B-17D's or similar type airplanes attacking a maneuvering carrier from 15,000 feet, each dropping seven 600 lb. bombs in train. Bombardiers are assumed to be capable of at least a 20 mil accuracy.

3. In arriving at the number of bombs and airplanes required, several methods of attack are considered:

a. Attack by individual airplanes from different directions, attacking in close succession.

b. Formation attacks by three plane elements from different directions and in close succession.

c. Formation attack in a 6-plane flight.

In all cases bombs are assumed to have been dropped in train by each airplane with a spacing of 80 feet between bombs. The number of bombs (42) and airplanes (6) required to give a 90% probability of two effective hits was determined to be nearly the same for each type of attack.

STUDY NO. 1

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C O N F I D E N T I A LNEED FOR TORPEDO PLANES IN THE HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE

1. a. Any or all of the following factors could be expected to partially or wholly prevent the successful accomplishment of the bombardment mission:

- (1) Inability to find enemy force (navigation).
- (2) Lack of bombing accuracy.
- (3) Enemy fighter action.
- (4) Hostile anti-aircraft artillery fire.
- (5) Weather obscuring the objective.

b. Consideration of these factors:

- (1 and 2) Navigational and bombing accuracy are primarily matters of training and practice. Efficient standards can be and are being attained by the training of combat crews in the Hawaiian Air Force.
- (3) The critical altitude, high speed and defensive armament of the present heavy bombardment aircraft is such as to provide excellent defense against enemy fighters. It is not believed that carrier-based fighters will be very effective against the B-17D's at high altitudes.
- (4) Reports from abroad indicate that anti-aircraft fire will be only partially effective and will not prevent the accomplishment of the mission.
- (5) The weather of the Hawaiian Islands is probably the best in the world from a standpoint of flying conditions and yet a very definite percentage of bombing missions fail because of overcast conditions which obscure the objective. Heavy bombardment as such is useless against surface craft when low ceilings (200 - 1,000 feet) prevail, and it is doubtful if it could be used below 5,000 feet without prohibitive losses from anti-aircraft fire before reaching the bomb release line. Enemy surface craft may be expected to take full advantage of all cloudiness conditions and even to wait until such conditions occur before launching an attack. At present the Hawaiian Air Force has no weapon to effectively combat surface craft under such conditions.

2. The following is submitted as a solution to this problem:

a. The most effective action against surface craft under poor weather conditions is believed to be a torpedo attack from low flying aircraft. This is substantiated by results from abroad, i.e., Bismarck sinking, Taranto attack, etc.. A torpedo plane flying just off the water can operate under a very low ceiling and with guaranteed accuracy

- 1 -

C O N F I D E N T I A L

445 - 15

CONFIDENTIAL

W. J. for Major. Plans in the American Air Force, and:

against all surface craft. The type of plane should be land-based, if possible, fast, and capable of being accurately directed. It should operate in the air, and not in the water.

A. 2. The Navy has a plan that could be adapted to meet the requirements of the Navy. It is believed that this plan is a good one, and that it is a good one for the Navy to use.

B. 1. It is believed that the Navy has a plan that is a good one for the Navy to use. It is believed that this plan is a good one, and that it is a good one for the Navy to use.

C. 1. It is believed that the Navy has a plan that is a good one for the Navy to use. It is believed that this plan is a good one, and that it is a good one for the Navy to use.

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(In addition to the foregoing sections of the Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii dated 20 August 1941, Exhibit No. 13, there are included in the Exhibit the following charts:

Chart 1. A Method of Searching 5° Sectors Through 360° to a Radius of 833 Miles from Oahu Employing 72 B-17D Airplanes.

Chart 2. Relation of 25 Miles Visibility to Distance.

Chart 3. Radius of Action of B-17D Airplane Under Various Load Conditions in Relation to Possible Plans of Action of Carrier Group Attacking Oahu, Assuming Carrier Speed of 30 Knots and Carrier Planes Performance 600 Mile Range.

Chart 4. Radius of Action of B-17D Airplane Under Various Load Conditions in Relation to Possible Plans of Action of Carrier Group Attacking Oahu, Assuming Carrier Speed of 27 Knots and Carrier Planes Performance 400 Mile Range.

Chart 5. Schedule for B-17D Combat Crews.

The above five charts are reproduced as Items Nos. 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 respectively in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

STRENGTH OF HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE
(Air Corps Troops Only)

WICKHAM FIELD

Units	Auth	Actual	Over	Short
Hq Hawaiian Air Force				
Hq & Hq Sq Hawaiian Air Force	200	203	3	
10th Transport Sq	101	108		7
Tow Target Det	130	4		135
Total Hq Hawaiian Air Force	500	365	3	135
18th Bombardment Wing				
Hq & Hq Sq 18th Bomb Wing	158	154	36	
Hq & Hq Sq 5th Bomb Gp (H)	232	237	5	
23rd Bomb Sq (H)	200	219	13	
31st Bomb Sq (H)	200	217	11	
72nd Bomb Sq (H)	200	222	16	
4th Recon Sq (H)	137	130	7	
Hq & Hq Sq 11th Bomb Gp (H)	232	237	5	
14th Bomb Sq (H)	200	217	11	
20th Bomb Sq (H)	200	218	9	
42nd Bomb Sq (H)	200	213	17	
50th Recon Sq (H)	230	232		1
Hq & Hq Sq 17th AB Gp (H)	101	218	85	
10th AB Sq	149	269	114	
22nd Mat Sq	203	291	88	
23rd Mat Sq	203	304	101	
58th Bomb Sq (L)	152	213	31	
Air Corps Det., Weather	20	26	6	
Air Corps Det., Communications	20	25	3	
Total 18th Bombardment Wing	3305	3705	598	1
Total Wickham Field	3735	4100	561	139

WHEELER FIELD

14th Pursuit Wing				
Hq & Hq Sq 14th Pur Gp	156	142		16
Hq & Hq Sq 15th Pur Gp (F)	204	202		2
45th Pur Sq (F)	178	174		1
46th Pur Sq (F)	178	171		4
47th Pur Sq (F)	176	169		6

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24
30

1037

RECEIVED

Other than NY (C-5)	142	141	1
General Detachment		21	21
Total fellows (incl)	142	162	1

YTD AVERAGE CUMULATIVE

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 278: 1039-1044.

Journal of Management Education 30(6)p. 789-804
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- ARCADE GROUPS TO BE PAID
- ALL GROUPS
- IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK

2

ACIDENTAL

STATION AS OF 1941

216 combat crews (less 70 now present)	146	
180 maintenance crews (less 70 now present)	110	
146 combat crews @ 5 men each	730	
110 maintenance crews @ 14 men each	1540	
1 aviation bombardment-torpedo squadrons @ 217 men each	434	
5 air base squadrons @ 145 men each	725	
1 observation squadron	150	
1 dive bomber squadron	210	
1 transport squadron	175	
Total	4714	
Less present by reinforcement	331	
Net total requirement	4383	

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

1039

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 1950's

Base to provide for increased personnel	7,112
Increase in base facilities	5,071
Base to provide for increased personnel	1,500
Additional increase in personnel (11,000) 210	

Total 12,913

<u>REQUIREMENTS</u>	<u>COMMITMENT</u>	<u>REQUIREMENT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Wake Field	3,271	1,017	4,288
Guadalcanal Field	1,007	441	1,448
Howells Field		1,008	1,008
New Air Base 15th Air Force Group (Kipapa Gulch)	1,294		1,294
Other in field (other islands) now being constructed or projected.		3,218	3,218

Grand Total 12,268

(difference) Housing to be provided 625

Enclosure 23

25

EXHIBIT NO. 14

SECRET

SECRET

AUTH. CG. HAW. DEPT.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

DATE 14 APR 1941

In reply refer to:
AG 361/67a JDP

14 April 1941.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is invited to secret letter from The Adjutant General to Headquarters Hawaiian Department, above subject, dated 7 February 1941, file AG 361 (1-24-41)M. There are inclosed herewith for your information copies of the principle directives, orders, and estimates which have been issued, in cooperation with the local naval authorities, to provide for the joint defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and ships of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters against surprise raids or air attacks.

2. Inclosure 1, joint letter HHD - 14th ND, dated 14 February 1941, initiated the study by joint committees of Army and Navy officers of the joint problems of the defense which were mentioned in the correspondence between the Secretaries of War and Navy, inclosed in the letter referred to in paragraph 1 above, and also included study of additional problems which were raised by Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

3. Inclosure 2, Annex No. VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (HCF-39) is a new joint agreement with the local naval authorities which pertains to joint security measures. Attention is particularly invited to Section II of this document which relates to joint air operations. This joint agreement covers the major points which were studied by the joint committees organized in inclosure 1. Inclosure A to this Annex No. VII has not yet been completed, however tests are now being conducted to determine the most effective means of positive identification of friendly aircraft and insure its protection from antiaircraft artillery fire.

4. Inclosure 3, Joint Estimate Hawaiian Air Force and Patrol Wing TWO (Naval Base Defense Air Force) is self explanatory and will serve as the basis of joint air operations orders to be issued in the near future. These joint orders are required since it will be noted that, in the conduct of air operations, aircraft of one service passes to the tactical control of the other service.

SECRET

5. Inclosure 4, Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security) is a new operations order for this Department covering the measures which will be taken during an alert period and initially upon a sudden raid or air attack. This order has been coordinated with comparable security orders of the Pacific Fleet and the Naval Base Defense Force. This order is in addition to and does not replace the existing Field Orders No. 1 and No. 1 W which are contained in OHD-38.

16 AGO

For the Commanding General:

APR 18 1941

Received

4-Incl.

*Incls. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6
4 filed with
subjecting plans.
Incl 2 detached from 5*

Copy to Commandant 14th Naval District.

Carl Grosse
CARL GROSSE,
Major, A.G.O.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

APR 26 1941

From War Plans Division

To: The Adjutant General

For the file

REC'D - W.P.D. APR 23 1941 5672-1/

FILE APR 30 1941
done

SECRET

EXHIBIT NO. 15

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

Handwritten: A.C. 24, 1/27, 1941, [initials]

TO

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Tokyo

Dated January 27, 1941

Rec'd. 6:38 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

[Redacted box]

125, January 27, 6 p.m.

My Peruvian Colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from many sources including a Japanese source that the Japanese military forces planned, in the event of trouble with the United States, to attempt a surprise ~~base~~ attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their military facilities. He added that although the project seemed fantastic the fact that he had heard it from many sources prompted him to pass on the information.

GREW.

711.94/1935

RS/FF

6221229121

The following is the text of a telegram (no. 126) from the Japanese Minister to the American Embassy in Tokyo:

Although the Japanese Minister to the American Embassy in Tokyo is the Minister to Japan to be sent, the Japanese Minister reported it to a member of my staff. It was reported to him from so many different sources, including the Japanese informant. The report was that the Japanese Minister intended to make a "trouble" break out between Japan and the United States. The Japanese intended to make a surprise attack on the Harbor on Messae. They would bring in their entire military equipment.

1044 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Cnl6-P-2
(SC) 16-3/EF37
Serial No. 09710

Feb. 1, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

10465

From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
Subject: Rumored Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

1. The following is forwarded for your information. Under date of 27 January the American Ambassador at Tokyo telegraphed the State Department to the following effect:

"The Peruvian Minister has informed a member of my staff that he has heard from many sources, including a Japanese source, that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intend to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all of their strength and employing all of their equipment. The Peruvian Minister considered the rumors fantastic. Nevertheless he considered them of sufficient importance to convey this information to a member of my staff."

2. The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese naval and army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future.

Op-16-F

Jules James,
By direction

Op-16-F-2 Dictated Jan. 31, 1941

Typed by W.E. Morse by Lieut. Comdr. A.H. McCollum

CC - Com 14 10466

(SC) 16-3/EF37

*Paraphrase of the telegram in full
sent to Commander Kells, C.V.,
by telephone on Nov. 8, 1941.*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

BAS

Tokyo

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Dated November 3, 1941

FROM

Rec'd 6:06 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.


1736, November 3, 3 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND
UNDER SECRETARY ONLY.

One. I telegraphed textually on November 1
(please see Embassy's 1729, November 1, 4 p.m.)
a translation of the leading article in that morning's
NICHU NICHU which under the banner headline "Empire
approaches its greatest crisis" preceded a New York
despatch summarizing a statement reportedly given
to the NEW YORK TIMES by the Japanese Embassy at
Washington with regard to the need for putting a
stop to the economic war between the United States
and Japan. That article and the paper's editorial
also telegraphed textually (Embassy's 173, November
1, 7 p.m.) closely reflect the atmosphere now pre-
vailing in this country as we sense it.

Two. There is nothing to add to my analysis
as presented in the telegrams over the past several
months of the factors which affect Japan's policy;

nor do I



711.94/2406

PS/WHM

Confidential

APR 22 1943

-2- #1736, November 3, 3 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Tokyo.

nor do I see need for substantially revising them.

I believe that Japan's position can conclusively
be estimated by applying.

GREW

HSM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REV

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo

FROM Dated November 3, 1941
Rec'd 10:09 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1736, November 3, 3 p.m., (SECTION TWO)

to the situation which now seem to be shaping up
certain considerations as follows:

(a) Japan cannot dissociate either herself or
the China conflict from the European war and its
fluctuations.

(b) Unlike public opinion in the democracies
where there exists a homogeneous body of principles
directing or influencing foreign policies, all these
differences of opinion are more likely to arise
from conflicting interests rather than from
divergent public opinion. In Japan where public
opinion is more homogeneous, it is more likely
to be directed by a single principle, the only
principle of the Japanese government, the
interests of the Japanese people. The Japanese
government is not a democracy. It is a
monarchy. It is a government of the people,
by the people, and for the people. It is a
government of the people, by the people, and
for the people. It is a government of the
people, by the people, and for the people.

-2-

1736, November 3, 7 p. m., (SECTION 17), 1941

elements; the failure of Germany to launch an attack
thereby creating least concern for the safety of the
territory of Germany.

GREEN

RR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

1741, New York, N.Y., (C. 1741) (C. 1741)

was among the first to be...
 definite electric, which the...
 Russia, by appointing the...
 and...
 nation that there...
 axis alliance had misled the...

C. The efforts of Prince Kengo, in...
 efforts when the present...
 forward, to adjust relations with the...
 and thus to open up a way to...
 China, representing...
 error. If that attempt should fail, and if Ger-
 man arms should continue to be...
 to see a final and clear... of Japan
 with the Axis.

D. The theory put forward by many of our
 leading economists that depletion and eventual
 exhaustion of economic and financial resources

would

... ..

... ..

... ..

...

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

BAS

Tokyo

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (SC)

FROM Sent November 7, 1941

Rec'd 0:44 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

WDC, November 7, 1941. (SP-1000 FIVE)

states appeared to be futile and useless. After -
 viously pointed out, it was to be understood that
 policy of the United States was to be maintained,
 added to the fact that the United States was
 already at war, that brought the Japanese government
 to work out a settlement with the United States. Should
 these efforts fail, the Japanese government will
 all probability swing back over to the
 former side, or still farther back, to the
 point I have called "the all-out, no-holds-bar"
 effort to make Japan the greatest power in the
 world. The Japanese, ever since the war with
 China, have been working for this. It is
 of course to be understood that the United States
 from the beginning has been working to prevent
 such a development. The United States has
 been.

From: [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible]

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (SC)

Tokyo

Dated November 3, 1941

Rec'd 3:59 p.m.

FROM

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1736

November 3, 3 p.m. (SECTION SIX)

uncertain hypothesis upon which to base the considered policy and measures of the United States. Our own view is that such a course if taken would not (repeat not) avert war. Nevertheless both views are no more than opinion, and it is therefore our belief that it would be contrary to our national interests to postulate the correctness of either opinion and to erect thereon a definitive policy. To do so would be to put the cart before the horse. The primary point for decision would appear to involve the question as to whether our national policies and objectives justify war with Japan in the event that diplomacy, our first line of action, should fail, for only on the basis of such a decision could the administration follow a course dictated by the exigencies of the situation, speculative and uncertain as it may be. It is our belief that such a decision, when made, will be in favor of war.

FW 711.24/2406 (SECTION SIX) U.S. FOREIGN INFORMATION

is irretrievable, and already have fallen out of
the project, for the reasons or reasons listed.

FIVE. The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been granted the right to enter the grave and remove the body of the deceased from the grave with the administrative authority of the cemetery. It is requested that you inform the cemetery of the names of the persons who have been granted the right to enter the grave and remove the body of the deceased from the grave.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Tokyo

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone (SC)

FROM

Dated November 3, 1941

Rec'd 3:39 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1736

November 3, 3 p.m. (SECTION SIX)

uncertain hypothesis upon which to base the con-
sidered policy and measures of the United States.
Our own view is that such a course if taken would
not (repeat not) avert war. Nevertheless both
views are no more than opinion, and it is therefore
our belief that it would be contrary to our national
interests to postulate the correctness of either
opinion and to erect thereon a definitive policy.
To do so would be to put the cart before the horse.
The primary point for decision would appear to in-
volve the question as to whether our national policy,
principles and objectives justify war with Japan in
the event that diplomacy, our first line of action,
should fail, for only on the basis of
such decision could the administration follow
a course dictated by the reasonable and not by
emotion, speculation or uncertainty.
It is the view of the State Department, which is the
only body with the authority to make such a decision,

FM 711.24/2406 (SECTION SIX) U.S. DEPT. OF STATE

-P- \$1037, November 3, 3 p.m. From Tokyo

to be irreparable, to be already too far advanced
in the field, for the needs are regular.

NOTE. The committee that is...
...GRIVE...
...with the...
...the...
...the...

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

TO THE PRESIDENT, U. S. A. WASHINGTON, D. C.

As an alternative policy is being followed in Washington, it is especially far from a intention for a further course to be followed, so-called "appeasement" on the part of the United States, in that the Government should, in the effort to Japan, provide for the fundamental principles which it has followed on a basis for the adjustment and conduct of international relations including our relations with Japan. Methods may be flexible but with principles there should be no compromise. My purpose is only to ensure against my country's getting into war with Japan through any possible misdirection of the capacity of Japan to rush headlong into a suicidal conflict with the United States. National sanity would dictate against such an event, but Japanese sanity cannot be measured by our own standards of logic. We need not be over-concerned by the present bellicose tone and substance of the Japanese press which has attacked the United States. A recurrent waves of intensity during the past several years, but it would be shortsighted to underestimate Japan's obvious

preparations

-2- #1246, November 3, 1944. (SECTION SEVEN) from Tokyo

preparations for a program to be implemented if her alternative program for peace should fail. It would be similarly shortsighted to base our policy on the belief that these preparations are solely in the nature of sober retelling the exclusive purpose of giving moral support to Japan's high pressure diplomacy. Japan's resort to measures which might war with the United States inevitably may come with dramatic and dangerous suddenness.

(END OF MESSAGE)

GREW

CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

OF
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased by FROM
not being communicated
to anyone. (80)

Tokyo

Dated November 17, 1941

Rec'd 2:09 p.m.


Secretary of State,
Washington.

1814, November 17, 8 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND
UNDER SECRETARY ONLY.

Reference Embassy's 1736, November 3, 3 p.m.,
last sentence.

In emphasizing need for guarding against
sudden military or naval actions by Japan in
areas not at present involved in the China con-
flict, I am taking into account as a probability
that the Japanese would exploit all available
tactical advantages, including those of initia-
tive and surprise. It is important, however,
that our Government not (repeat not) place upon
us, including the military and naval attaches,
major responsibility for giving prior warning.
The control in Japan over military information,
both primary and secondary is extremely effective,
and we have no expectation that any advance in-
formation would be obtained either through the
press



24.54
7:07
7:40, 10:11 P.M.

PS/WHM
FILMED
NOV 25 1941
Confidential File

11-94/2447

1941, November 17, 8 p.m., from Tokyo

press or from personal contacts with Japanese; the few Americans left in Japan are mostly concentrated in Tokyo, Yokohama and Kobe, and are in no position to observe military movements; and the absence of American and other foreign vessels in adjacent waters almost assures to the Japanese the ability to despatch troop transports in various directions without foreign observation. Recent reports from our consuls at Taihoku and at Harbin point to Japanese troop concentrations in both Taiwan and Manchuria, and all other available indications are that since the general mobilization of July last, troop dispositions have been made to enable new operations to be carried out on the shortest possible notice in either Siberia or the southwest Pacific or in both.

We fully realize that possibly our most important duty at this time is to watch for ominous indications of military or naval operations which might be forthcoming against such areas, and we are taking every precaution to guard against surprise. However, our field

-3- #1614, November 17, 9 p.m., from Tokyo.

field of military and naval observation is almost literally restricted to what can be seen with our own eyes, which is negligible. We would, therefore, advise that our government, from abundance of caution, discount as far as possible the likelihood of our being able to give substantial warning.

CREW

LMS

EXHIBIT NO. 16

Secret
Serial 0130012

WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the President:

Subject: Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have reexamined the military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Magruder Mission, and the United States Naval Attache. These despatches have indicated it to be Chiang Kai-Shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming is imminent, and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude which this Government should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road.

There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that Government, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the "China incident". If use of the Burma Road is lost, United States and British Commonwealth aid to China will be seriously curtailed for some months. If resistance by the Chinese Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops in China will be reduced. These troops can then be employed elsewhere, after the lapse of time sufficient to permit their withdrawal.

Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated offensive, based in northern Indo-China, cannot be completed in less than about two months, although initial offensive operations might be undertaken before that time. The advance toward Kunming over nearly three hundred miles of rough country, with poor communications, will be extremely difficult. The maintenance of supply lines will not be easy. The Chinese, on favorable defense terrain, would have a good chance of defeating this offensive by the use of ground troops alone, provided those troops are adequate in quality and numbers.

The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, however well-disguised, would lead to war.

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing all¹ naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose the Battle of the Atlantic in the near future.

The only existing² plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being reinforced. The present combined naval, air, and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The U. S. Army air forces in the Philippines will have reached the projected strength by February or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general defensive strength of the entire southern area against possible Japanese operations will then have reached impressive proportions.

Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to Chiang Kai-Shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These measures are: continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying increas-

¹ Preceded by handwritten insertion "practically".

² Two preceding words struck out, and handwritten word "current" substituted.

ing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:

(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.

(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies;

(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100° East or South of 10° North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

(c) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; i. e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic position.

(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government.

(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

Specifically, they recommend:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent.

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

Chief of Staff.

Chief of Naval Operations.

THE JOINT BOARD

WASHINGTON

Secret

MINUTES OF MEETING, NOVEMBER 3, 1941

At the call of the Senior Member, the weekly meeting scheduled for November 5, 1941, was held today in Room 2008, Munitions Building. The meeting was called to order at 3:40 p. m.

Present: Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations, Presiding; General G. C. Marshall, U. S. A., Chief of Staff; Rear Admiral R. E. Ingersoll, U. S. N., Assistant Chief of Naval Operations; Major General William Bryden, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff; Major General H. H. Arnold, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff for Air; Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, U. S. N., Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics; Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, U. S. A., Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division; Captain O. M. Read, U. S. N., War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations, in absence of Rear Admiral R. K. Turner; and Colonel W. P. Scobey, U. S. A., Secretary.

Additional Officers Present: Major General R. C. Moore, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff; Colonel C. W. Bundy, U. S. A., War Plans Division, War Department General Staff; Captain R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. N., Office of Naval Operations; Commander F. P. Sherman, U. S. N., Office of Naval Operations; and Lieutenant Commander A. H. McCollum, U. S. N., Office of Naval Intelligence.

The Presiding Officer directed the minutes of the meeting of October 22, would stand approved unless there were objections. The minutes were approved.

The Secretary then announced the agenda for the meeting as follows:

Serial 693—Delivery of Aircraft to Great Britain.

Serial 732—Revision of Paragraph 109, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy." Communications between Ship and Shore.

Serial 665-11—Allocation of Mechanical Time Fuze M43A2 to the Army and the Navy.

Serial 725—Coordination of Local Defense Measures in Bermuda and the West Indian Islands where United States Bases are being Established.—Revision requested by the British.

Discussion—Action of the United States in the Far East in support of China.

Discussion—Alternate Route via Canton Island for movement of airplanes to the Far East.

Action taken on the several subjects was as follows:

Serial 693—Delivery of Aircraft to Great Britain. Following a discussion of this subject, during which General Arnold stated that the development of airplane ferrying facilities to the British Isles was provided for in Serials 683-1 and 723, the Board approved the Joint Planning Committee report of October 23, 1941, and directed that the subject be stricken from the calendar.

Serial 732—Revision of Paragraph 109, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy. The Joint Planning Committee report was approved.

Serial 665-11—Allocation of Mechanical Time Fuze M43A2 to the Army and the Navy. The Joint Planning Committee report recommendation of October 30, 1941, was accepted and the Committee of Experts' report was approved.

Serial 725—Coordination of Local Defense Measures in Bermuda and the West Indian Islands where United States Bases are being established. The Secretary announced that the Joint Planning Committee report before the Board, recommended certain revisions in the United States—United Kingdom initial agreement, which was approved by The Joint Board on September 19, 1941; and that the revisions now requested by the British had been accepted by the United States representatives. Following a properly seconded motion, the Board voted to approve the Joint Planning Committee report of October 29, 1941.

Action of the United States in the Far East in Support of China—At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action taken at the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, November 1, at which a discussion was held on the Far Eastern situation. Captain Schuirmann states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang Kai-Shek and General Magruder, urging the United States to warn Japan against making an attack on China through Yunnan and suggesting that the United States urge Great Britain to support more fully opposition to Japan. He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression. He further stated that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up, and he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department. A second meeting was held at the State Department on Sunday, November 2, at which time it was proposed that the British should send some planes to Thailand and that Japan should be warned against movement into Siberia.

Following Captain Schuirmann's presentation, Admiral Stark read a Navy Department estimate of the recent dispatches received from Chungking. Admiral Ingersoll, gave his personal review of the situation. A summary of this review was that:

a. The decision on the Far Eastern situation, made several months ago, is to make the major effort in the Atlantic, and if forced to fight in the Pacific, to engage in a limited offensive effort. This policy was stated in the U.S.-British Staff Conversations Report ABC-1.

b. A major war effort in the Pacific would require an enormous amount of shipping, which would have to come from the Atlantic and other essential areas.

c. A U. S. war in the Pacific would materially affect United States aid to England.

d. The requirements in tankers alone for support of a Pacific war would create a serious oil shortage in this country, and the United States fleet cannot be supported in the Pacific without auxiliary shipping and adequate supplies.

e. The shortest line of communication is flanked by Mandated Islands, and is vulnerable to Japanese attack. Two other routes are available for communications to the Far Eastern Theater: one via Australia; the other via Cape of Good Hope.

f. Assuming that the fleet could be moved to the Far East, no repair facilities are available at either Manila or Singapore; while there are docks, nevertheless the necessary machinery and facilities for making repairs are not present.

g. Manila is not as yet a secure base for the Fleet due to the lack of adequate antiaircraft protection for the anchorage.

This review pointed out that Japan is capable of launching an attack in five directions; viz., against Russia, the Philippines, into Yunnan, Thailand and against Malaya. Considering that Japan might initiate one or more of these five operations, United States' action should be: In case of Japanese attack against either the Philippines or British and Dutch positions the United States should resist the attack. In case of Japanese attack against Siberia, Thailand or China through Yunnan the United States should not declare war. The study concludes that the United States should defer offensive action in the Far East until the augmentation of United States military strength in the Philippines, particularly as to the increase in submarines and army forces, becomes available.

Discussing the situation Admiral Ingersoll pointed out that the fleet strength at the present time is seriously handicapped by the absence of certain naval units of major category which are in the repair yards, and it was felt that the present moment was not the opportune time to get brash. Explaining further the State Department conferences, Captain Schuirmann stated that the State Department did not feel that it was necessary for the United States to take immediate action, even if stern warnings should be issued. In this connection, he read Mr. Hornbeck's statement. Admiral Ingersoll felt that the State Department was under the impression that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks.

General Marshall felt that the main involvement in the Far East would be Naval and that under this assumption, due consideration should be given to the fact that the Navy was now fighting a battle in the Atlantic. It was his information that the Japanese authorities had not as yet determined the action to be taken under the present situation. The information which he had received indicated that the Japanese authorities might be expected to decide upon the national policy by November 5. He then read General Gerow's analysis of the strength of the United States forces in the Far East and emphasized the danger of moving Army Air Forces away from their present station in the Philippines. It was his belief that as long as the augmented Army Air Force remained in the Philippines, Japanese action against the Philippines or towards the south would be a very hazardous operation. It was his belief that by the middle of December, the Army Forces in the Philippines would be of impressive strength, and this in itself would have a deterrent effect on Japanese operations.

Admiral Ingersoll gave a summary of naval reinforcements scheduled for the Philippines. A stated number of submarine units en route to the Philippines were now in Guam. Other submarines scheduled for transfer to the Philippines were about to leave Hawaii. With reference to Japanese decision on National policy he felt that United States forces and shipping now being moved to the Philippines might be in danger if a decision adverse to United States interest should be made on November 5th. General Marshall emphasized the point that Japan could hardly take the risk of military operations with a powerful air and submarine force directly on the flank of their supply lines, and that when United States power is sufficiently developed in the Philippines, we would then have something to back up our statements. Until powerful United States forces had been built up in the Far East, it would take some very clever diplomacy to save the situation. It appeared that the basis of U. S. policy should be to make certain minor concessions which the Japanese could use in saving face. These concessions might be a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar trade restrictions.

Following these discussions the Board adopted the following proposal submitted by Admiral Ingersoll and amended by suggestions made by Admiral Stark and General Marshall:

War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments would prepare a memorandum for the President, as a reply to the State Department's proposed policy in the Far Eastern situation. The memorandum would take the following lines:

Oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan.

Oppose U. S. military action against Japan should she move into Yunnan.

Oppose the movement and employment of U. S. military forces in support of Chiang Kai-Shek.

Advocate State Department action to put off hostilities with Japan as long as possible.

Suggest agreements with Japan to tide the situation over for the next several months.

Point out the effect and cost a U. S.-Japanese war in the Far East would have on defense aid to Great Britain and other nations being aided by the U. S.

Emphasize the existing limitations on shipping and the inability of the U. S. to engage in a Far Eastern offensive operation without the transfer of the major portion of shipping facilities from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

On the question of gas and oil for the Philippines' Army Air Forces, General Arnold explained that the military authorities were building up reserves and were investigating reports that the Dutch East Indies were capable of supplying all United States and British requirements.

At this point, General Marshall presented a list of items of equipment considered necessary by the China Mission to enable China to maintain her war effort. He pointed out that the War Department was beset with many trials and difficulties in the allocation of Lend-Lease items as related to Great Britain, Russia, Dutch East Indies, China and other countries. In the case of Russia, a large amount of equipment allocated to that country would have to go via Archangel, Vladivostok or Basra. The shortage of shipping, the long lines of communications, and the difficult transport situation from the ports of debarkation might cause an inability to make prompt delivery of all equipment to its final destination. Under some conditions, this would mean piling up unused equipment at various localities, while at the same time other localities would suffer from shortage of equipment. The matter resolves itself into a question as to whom Lend-Lease material should be released. It was General Marshall's opinion that control of Lend-Lease distribution, and diversions incident thereto, is a strategic decision which should be made by The Joint Board. Since the matter of ocean tonnage is a critical feature in the delivery of Lend-Lease items and is related to the strategic situation, General Marshall felt that Admiral Land of the Maritime Commission should be called in to sit with The Joint Board in deciding matters of this nature. The Board agreed that Admiral Land should be asked to detail a member of his department to work with the Joint Planning Committee on reports involving the disposition of Lend-Lease materials. Navy members agreed to take the necessary steps to inform Admiral Land of this request.

Referring to the merchant shipping situation, Admiral Stark felt that merchant tonnage is so short and prospective requirements are so great that an effort should be made to get the 1942 merchant vessel construction program moved up to an A-1-a priority.

At the direction of Admiral Stark, Commander Sherman then read a report from War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations, to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the movement of airplanes to the Middle East for ultimate delivery to Russia. This report recommended that the *Normandie* be acquired to meet future requirements for transporting aircraft; that three additional sea trains also be acquired and placed in service without conversion; and that delivery of aircraft to the Middle East be effected by the use of these three sea trains plus the two sea trains U. S. S. Kitty Hawk and U. S. S. Hammondsport, already acquired and converted for Navy use. Copy of this report was furnished to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.

Alternate route via Canton Island for movement of airplanes.—Following a discussion of this subject the Board instructed that the following directive be given to the Joint Planning Committee:

It is directed that the Joint Planning Committee submit a report as to the action to be taken to complete the establishment of an additional landplane route between Hawaii and Australia, less vulnerable to hostile interference than is the existing route via Wake Island, and as to the defenses of additional airdromes and landing fields acquired.

W. P. SCOBEE,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Secretary.

NOVEMBER 3, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

I. Discussion.

1. A conference was held at the State Department during the morning of November 1, 1941. Present were Secretary Hull, Under Secretary Welles, Mr. Hornbeck, other lesser State Department officials and Captain Schulmann, U. S. N. The subject of discussion was the action which should be taken on the Magruder radiogram of October 28, 1941. Question arose as to the strength of U. S. forces in the Far East as affecting diplomatic pressure on Japan. Measures were discussed, such as sending U. S. Army Air Forces to China, which might lead to immediate involvement in war with Japan. Apparently, the statement of Chiang Kai-Shek, that an immediate Japanese attack on Kunming threatened and that this could be defeated only by the intervention of air forces, was accepted.

2. a. The War Department G-2 estimate (Tab A) does not support Chiang Kai-Shek's conclusions as to immediate initiation of a Japanese move toward Kunming. G-2 believes that: the movement if contemplated will not be initiated in less than two months; the movement will be very difficult over nearly 300 miles of roadless, broken country; the Chinese, in favorable defense terrain, can defeat this offensive by proper concentration and use of ground troops alone.

b. G-2 (Col. Bratton) agrees with the Magruder statement that with the fall of Kunming, Chinese resistance to Japan would be very seriously affected.

c. The G-2 estimate also covers the broader viewpoint of expected Japanese action.

3. An air estimate of the Far Eastern situation (Tab B) brings out the following: the most effective air aid to China can be given by units based in the Philippines; there are at present, many shortages in ammunition and gasoline supply which will militate against a sustained effort; logical difficulties, aside from general policy, make it undesirable to undertake operations of United States Army Air Force units in China.

4. The status of the Lend-Lease program for China is shown in Tab C.

5. The status of ground troops and defense reserves in the Philippine Department is shown in Tab D. The garrison has not reached the effective strength desired by General MacArthur. Deficiencies are being overcome by the dispatch of personnel and supplies from the United States and by accelerating the training and equipping of the Philippine Army. The present combined air and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. The dispatch of any considerable portion of the air garrison to China would leave Luzon open to serious risk of capture.

6. Informal contact with officers of the local British Staff Mission indicate that the British have incomplete air forces for the defense of Singapore, would refuse to allow units of the Royal Air Force to support Chinese troops in Yunnan, and are of the firm opinion that the British Chiefs of Staff would strongly disapprove any action in China which might bring on war with Japan.

7. War Plans Division is strongly of the opinion that:

a. The policies derived in the American-British Staff conversations remain sound, viz:

- (1) The primary objective is the defeat of Germany.
- (2) The principal objective in the Far East is to keep Japan out of the war.
- (3) Military counter-action against Japan should be considered only in case of any of the following actions by Japan:

(a) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the Territory or Mandated Territory of any of the Associated Powers. It is not possible to define accurately what would constitute "a direct act of war." It is possible for a minor incident to occur which, although technically an act of war, could be resolved by diplomatic action. It is recognized that the decision as to whether such an incident is an act of war must lie with the Government concerned.

(b) The movement of the Japanese forces into any part of Thailand to the west of 100° East or to the south of 10° North.

(c) The movement of a large number of Japanese warships, or of a convoy of merchant ships escorted by Japanese warships, which from its position and course was clearly directed upon the Philippine Islands, the East coast of the Isthmus of Kra or the East coast of Malaya, or had crossed the parallel of 6° North between Malaya and the Philippines, a line from the Gulf of Davao to Waigeo Island, or the Equator east of Waigeo.

(d) The movement of Japanese forces into Portuguese Timor.

(e) The movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands.

b. Germany must be defeated. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision is not reached. The means to defeat Japan (Army, Navy, and tonnage), must be withdrawn in quantity from the effort against Germany. To defeat Germany will require the utmost total effort.

c. It is desirable that large Japanese forces be kept involved in China. However, from the larger viewpoint, prospective Chinese defeat would not warrant involvement of the United States, at this time, in war with Japan.

d. Political and economic measures should be used wherever effective to deter Japanese action.

e. Most effective aid to China, as well as to the defense in Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies, is now being built up by the reinforcement of the Philippines. The safety of Luzon as an air and submarine base should soon be reasonably assured by the arrival of air and ground reinforcements. Strong diplomatic and economic pressure may be exerted from the military viewpoint at the earliest about the middle of December, 1941, when the Philippine Air Force will have become a positive threat to Japanese operations. It would be advantageous, if practicable, to delay severe diplomatic and economic pressure until February or March, 1942, when the Philippine Air Force will have reached its projected strength, and a safe air route, through Samoa, will be in operation.

f. Material aid to China should be accelerated consonant with the studied needs of Russia and Great Britain.

g. Aid to the Volunteer Air Force in China should be continued and accelerated as far as practicable.

II. Recommendations.

Substitution of the words "War Department" for "War Plans Division" in paragraph 7 above and approval of that paragraph as a statement of the War Department's position on the Far East situation at this time.

L. T. GENOW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

6 Incls.*

- #1—Tab A—G-2 Estimate
- #2—Tab B—Air Estimate
- #3—Tab C—Lend-Lease Program for China.
- #4—Tab D—Ground Troops & Def. Res. Phil. Dept.
- #5—Tab E—Ground Reinforcement, Phil. Dept.
- #6—Tab F—Rad, fr. Gen. Magruder (10-28-41)

*Tab A is included in Exhibit No. 33; other tabs not included.

December 7, 1941

Mr. C. V. Rusk, Secretary of War

Washington, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ADDRESS OFFICIAL, COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



13
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL

November 10, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached for your consideration a draft of a message from you to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in reply to his message to you of November 2 which was delivered on November 4 by the Chinese Ambassador. If this reply meets with your approval, it is suggested that you ask the Chinese Ambassador here to call and that you deliver the reply to the Ambassador with the request that he transmit it to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Hee

Enclosure:
Draft
message.

of the committee, and the committee has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the same.

Very respectfully,
J. H. HARRIS, Chairman.

The committee on the subject of the proposed amendment to the Harbor Act, and the committee on the subject of the proposed amendment to the Harbor Act, have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the same.

Very respectfully,
J. H. HARRIS, Chairman.

J. H. HARRIS

and

J. H. HARRIS

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

To Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt:

I have for some days had before me your message of November 2 which was delivered to me through your Ambassador here on November 4; also, your earlier message which was delivered to me through Dr. T. W. Soong on October 30.

We have had for some time very much in mind the situation created by the menace of a Japanese attack against Kunning from Indochina to which you call special attention. When I received the first of your messages under reference, officers of this Government, including high officers of the Department of State, the Army and the Navy, entered immediately into consultations in order to give renewed and urgent consideration to all aspects of the problems underlying that situation. It soon became our conclusion that, while it would be a grave error to underestimate the gravity of that situation, it did not appear that preparations by Japan for a land campaign against Kunning had advanced to a point which would indicate probable immediate imminence of an attack. Given the difficult character of the terrain

-2-

and the formidable resistance which your land forces would offer in Yunnan, an invasion of that province from Indochina by land forces calls for substantial preparation and extensive operations. At the same time we fully realize that it is important that your forces be adequately prepared, equipped and disposed in all branches. Under existing circumstances, taking into consideration the world situation in its political, military and economic aspects, we feel that the most effective contribution which we can make at this moment is along the line of speeding up the flow to China of our Lend-Lease materials and facilitating the building up of the American volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We are subjected at present, as you know, to demands from many quarters and in many connections. We are sending materials not only to China and Great Britain, but to the Dutch, the Soviet Union and some twenty other countries that are calling urgently for equipment for self-defense. In addition, our program for our own defense, especially the needs of our rapidly expanding Navy and Army, calls for equipment in large amount and with great promptness. Nevertheless, I shall do my utmost toward achieving expedition of increasing amounts of material for your use.

Meanwhile

-3-

Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard to the entire situation and the tremendous problems which are presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most practicable ways possible.

I believe that you will share my feeling that measures such as the foregoing, together with such as the British Government are considering, adopted and implemented closely and with your intensive efforts to strengthen the defenses of Hawaiian Islands are sound steps toward safeguarding against such threat of an attack upon Hawaii as may be hereafter. The United States Government is fully cognizant of the situation and is endeavoring to take all possible steps to strengthen the defenses of the Hawaiian Islands.

At present the United States Government is endeavoring to strengthen the defenses of the Hawaiian Islands by the construction of new defenses and the improvement of existing defenses. The United States Government is also endeavoring to strengthen the defenses of the Hawaiian Islands by the construction of new defenses and the improvement of existing defenses.

The United States Government is also endeavoring to strengthen the defenses of the Hawaiian Islands by the construction of new defenses and the improvement of existing defenses. The United States Government is also endeavoring to strengthen the defenses of the Hawaiian Islands by the construction of new defenses and the improvement of existing defenses.

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Figure 1

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EXHIBIT NO. 16A

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

C.H.

Can we do any thing
along these lines?
How about getting
a committee to look
into this matter?

79-1077-16A-3/4


THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

October 30, 1941


My dear Mr. President:

The enclosed message from General Chiang Kai-Shek has just been handed to me at 11:15 o'clock this morning by Mr. T. V. Soong.

Yours sincerely,



The President,
The White House.



ASURY

MESSAGE FROM GENERAL CHIANG KAI-SHEK RECEIVED TODAY,
OCTOBER 30.

DEFINITE INFORMATION REACHED RE JAPANESE DESIGN ATTACK
YUNNAN IN NOVEMBER (STOP) THIS MOVE MAY POSSIBLY BE
AVERTED IF AMERICA TAKES IMMEDIATE ACTION BY INFORMING
JAPAN THAT ATTACK YUNNAN THROUGH INDO-CHINA WOULD BE
VIEWED BY AMERICA AS DEFINITE STEP IN SOUTHWARD EXPANSION
AND THAT AMERICA CANNOT REMAIN INDIFFERENT (STOP)
SIMULTANEOUSLY MILITARY PREPARATIONS SHOULD BE MADE TO
MEET THIS EVENTUALITY (STOP) I MUST EMPHASIZE THE
CRITICAL NATURE OF THE YUNNAN SITUATION SINCE IF YUNNAN
IS LOST AND LAST LIFE LINE FOR MATERIALS FROM THE OUTSIDE
WORLD SEVERED THE CHINESE PEOPLE AND ARMY MATERIALLY
AND MORALLY WOULD BE UNABLE TO OFFER FURTHER ARMED
RESISTANCE (STOP) I AM CONFIDENT WITH FORCES IN YUNNAN
AND AVAILABLE NEARBY CHINESE ABLE TO HOLD THEIR OWN LAND
FIGHTING IF REINFORCED AIRWARD (STOP) COLONEL CHEN NAULT
HAS ONLY 49 PILOTS CONSEQUENTLY STRONG AIR REINFORCEMENT
ESSENTIAL (STOP) URGE AMERICA USE STRONG PRESSURE ON
PERTAIN TO SEND SINGAPORE AIR FORCE TO COOPERATE WITH
COLONEL CHEN NAULT IN ORDER SAVE DEMOCRATIC POSITION IN
FAR EAST (STOP) BRITAIN AND AMERICA EQUALLY CONCERNED

- 2 -

TO PREVENT LOSS OF YUNNAN AS CHINESE BECAUSE IF JAPANESE OCCUPY YUNNAN THEIR NEXT STOP WOULD INVOLVE ATTACK ON BRITISH FAR EAST COLONIAL POSSESSIONS AND PRECIPITATE WAR IN THE PACIFIC (STOP) IF IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN BY BRITAIN IN SENDING AIR REINFORCEMENT THESE POSSESSIONS WOULD BE SAVED AT A FRACTION OF THE COST THAT THEIR DEFENCE WOULD INVOLVE LATER ON AND PACIFIC PROBLEM WOULD THUS BE SOLVED (STOP) JAPANESE WILL CONCENTRATE LARGEST AIR FORCE IN INDO-CHINA AND IF DESTROYED COMBINED AIR FORCES THREAT TO FAR EAST FINALLY REMOVED.

EXHIBIT NO. 16B

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

November 7, 1941.

9 P.M.

AMERICAN EMBASSY,

LONDON.

5055

Your message, November 6, 8 P.M.

PERSONAL AND STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE PRIMER NAVAL PERSON.

Could we have very much in mind the situation to which China Kato-maki's appeal is addressed. While we feel that it will be a serious error to underestimate the gravity of the threat inherent in that situation, we doubt whether we are faced with a Japanese land campaign against Kiangsu. We have no reason to believe that the Japanese will advance to the Yangtze against Yunnan in the immediate future. In the meantime we shall do what we can to increase and expedite lend-lease aid to China and to facilitate the mobilization of the American military air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We are not, however, going to send pilots or other personnel to China.

We feel that we must stick to the Sovereign and to the people and to the lines we are

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.

19

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Collect { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to

Department of State

-2-

Washington.

\$ taking, together with continuing efforts to strengthen our defenses in the Philippine Islands, paralleled by similar efforts by you in the Singapore area, will tend to increase Japan's hesitation, whereas in Japan's present mood new formalized verbal warning or remonstrances might have, with at least even chance, an opposite effect.

This whole problem will have our continuing and earnest attention, study and effort.

I shall probably not repeat not make express reply to Chiang Kai-shek before the first of next week. Please keep within the confidence of your close official circle that I have said above. UNQUOTE.

Spence

FE:JWS:HMS

TE

TA/H

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.

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EXHIBIT NO. 17

NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack: the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces.

There is little probability of an immediate Japanese attack on the Maritime Provinces because of the strength of the Russian forces. Recent Japanese troop movements all seem to have been southward.

The magnitude of the effort required will militate against direct attack against Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies until the threat exercised by United States forces in Luzon is removed.

Attack on the Burma Road or Thailand offers Japanese objectives involving less risk of major conflict than the others named, and clearly within the means available, if unopposed by major powers. Attack on the Burma Road would, however, be difficult and might fail. If successful, the Chinese Nationalist Government might collapse. Occupation of Thailand gains a limited strategic advantage as a preliminary to operations against Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies, might relieve internal political pressure, and to a lesser extent, external economic pressure. Whether the offensive will be made against the Burma Road, Thailand, or the Philippines can not now be forecast.

The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to gain time. Considerable Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed to the Philippines but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The process of reinforcement is being continued. Of great and immediate concern is the safety of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine Corps' convoy just leaving Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000 are due to sail from the United States by December 8, 1941, and it is important that this troop reinforcement reach the Philippines before hostilities commence. Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy. The longer the delay, the more positive becomes the assurance of retention of these Islands as a naval and air base. Japanese action to the south of Formosa will be hindered and perhaps seriously blocked as long as we hold the Philippine Islands. War with Japan certainly will interrupt our transport of supplies to Siberia, and probably will interrupt the process of aiding China.

After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° East or south of 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

Japanese involvement in Yunnan or Thailand up to a certain extent is advantageous, since it leads to further dispersion, longer lines of communication, and an additional burden on communications. However, a Japanese advance to the west of 100° East or south of 10° North, immediately becomes a threat to Burma and Singapore. Until it is patent that Japan intends to advance beyond these lines, no action which might lead to immediate hostilities should be taken.

It is recommended that:

prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military, counteraction be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined;

in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken;

steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning.

/S/ G. C. MARSHALL

/S/ H. R. STARK

25-68854-200

EXHIBIT NO. 18

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Draft Suggestions (Nov. 11, 1941) to the Secretary of State prepared by Far Eastern Division concerning proposed "*Modus Vivendi*." No action was taken on these suggestions.
2. Memorandum dated Nov. 19, 1941 from Mr. Hamilton to the Secretary of State concerning an attached revision of a proposal by Secretary Morgenthau for an agreement between the United States and Japan.
3. Memorandum dated Nov. 24, 1941 by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow for the Chief of Staff concerning the "Far Eastern Situation."
4. Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1941 by Admiral H. R. Stark for the Secretary of the Navy concerning "Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan, of Nov. 19, 1941 (See Item No. 2, supra)."
5. Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1941 by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow for the Secretary of State concerning the "Far Eastern Situation."
6. Pencilled memorandum given by the President to the Secretary of State (Not dated but probably written shortly after Nov. 20, 1941).
7. Tentative draft (not used) dated Nov. 22, 1941 of a proposed oral statement an *Modus Vivendi* to be handed Japanese Ambassadors.
8. Tentative draft dated Nov. 22, 1941 of an "Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan."
9. Memorandum dated Nov. 22, 1941 of a conversation between Secretary Hull, British Ambassador, Australian Minister, Netherlands Minister and Chinese Ambassador concerning "Japanese Proposal for a *Modus Vivendi* and suggested reply."
10. Tentative draft (not used) dated Nov. 24, 1941 of a proposed *Modus Vivendi*.
11. Tentative draft dated November 24, 1941 of an "Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan."
12. Memorandum dated Nov. 24, 1941 by Secretary Hull for the President with an attached draft of message from the President to the British Prime Minister describing the Japanese proposal for a *Modus Vivendi* and a suggested alternate *Modus Vivendi* and closing sentences added by the President.
13. Memorandum dated Nov. 24, 1941 of a conversation between Secretary Hull, British Ambassador, Chinese Ambassador, Australian Minister and Netherlands Minister concerning "Proposed *Modus Vivendi* for Submission to Japanese Ambassador."
14. Tentative draft (not used) dated Nov. 25, 1941 of a proposed *Modus Vivendi* to be submitted to the Japanese Ambassador, and attached "Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan."
15. Message dated Nov. 25, 1941 from Owen Lattimore, Chungking, to Lauchlin Currie.
16. Copy of Message from General Chiang Kai-Shek transmitted to Secretary Stimson by Mr. T. V. Soong, under cover of a letter dated Nov. 25, 1941.
17. Memorandum dated Nov. 25, 1941 of conversation between Secretary Hull and British Ambassador concerning "Suggested Changes in *Modus Vivendi*," and an attached memorandum from the Ambassador commenting on the Japanese proposal (of Nov. 20, 1941).
18. Memorandum dated Nov. 25, 1941 of conversation between Secretary Hull and the Chinese Ambassador concerning the "Opposition of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to *Modus Vivendi*," with attached copy of telegram dated Nov. 24, 1941 from Minister Quo Tai-Chi, Chungking, to Ambassador Hu Shih.
19. Memorandum dated Nov. 25, 1941 of conversations between the Chinese Ambassador and the Netherlands Minister, and Stanley K. Hornbeck.
20. Memorandum for the President dated Nov. 26, 1941 from the Secretary of State suggesting withholding *Modus Vivendi*, and proposes handing Japanese Ambassador a copy of the comprehensive basic proposal for a general peaceful settlement."
21. Memorandum from the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, handed to Secretary Hull on Nov. 27, 1941.
22. Memorandum of Conversation dated Nov. 27, 1941 between the British Ambassador and Sumner Welles concerning "Japanese-American Relations."
23. Memorandum of Conversation dated Nov. 27, 1941 between Secretary Hull and the Australian Minister concerning "Proposed *Modus Vivendi*."
24. Message dated Nov. 27, 1941 from Secretary of State to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo.
25. Memorandum of Conversation dated Nov. 28, 1941 between British Minister and Stanley K. Hornbeck.
26. Message dated Nov. 28, 1941 from Secretary of State to United States Ambassador in Chungking, China.
27. Memorandum of Conversation dated Nov. 29, 1941 between Secretary Hull and British Ambassador concerning "United States-Japanese Conversations."
28. Memorandum handed to Secretary Hull by the Chinese Ambassador on Dec. 2, 1941

DRAFT SUGGESTIONS (NOVEMBER 11, 1941) TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE. NO ACTION WAS TAKEN ON THESE
SUGGESTIONS. PREPARED IN PE.

711.94/2540-5/36

Confidential File

JUN 28 1943

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

7/11/41

If, as seems almost certain, there is no possibility at the present time of reaching with Japan a comprehensive settlement covering the entire Pacific area, it is highly probable that after a certain point further efforts to reconcile differences on the essentials of such a comprehensive settlement will lead only to a rupture of the conversations followed by a further and perhaps sudden deterioration of relations. Such a prospect prompts the question whether it might not be possible to propose some tentative or transitional arrangement the very discussion of which might serve not only to continue the conversations pending the advent of a more favorable situation, even if the proposal is not eventually agreed to, but also to provide the entering wedge toward a comprehensive settlement of the nature sought providing the proposal is accepted by Japan and provided further that China is able to obtain satisfactory terms from Japan.

With these thoughts in mind, there is suggested for consideration a proposal along the lines of the attached draft.

It is probable that the Japanese will not agree to the attached proposal as it stands without considerable modification, and it is even more probable that negotiations between Japan and China under these circumstances will

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Confidential File

-2-

come to nothing. Nevertheless, it is hoped that a proposal along the suggested lines might offer a basis which might keep conversations going for sometime longer than otherwise, and if accepted by the Japanese might lead to an eventual comprehensive settlement of a nature compatible with our principles.

It is suggested that the foregoing proposal would have more chance of receiving consideration by the Japanese (and of thus gaining time) if it were presented to them before feelings had become further aroused over fruitless discussion of matters we assume will not be agreed upon.

In presenting the proposal to the Japanese we might say that we offer it with reluctance as we realize that it is of a patchwork nature and imperfect, but that we feel that under the circumstances it is better to have something on which we can hope to build in the future than to end with no agreement at all, as would seem to be otherwise inevitable in view of our present divergences of views on certain fundamentals.

If the Japanese should decline to consider such a proposal we should be no worse off than we otherwise would have been. At the same time, it is believed that by presenting a proposal of this sort, we should make

clear

-3-

clear on the record our effort to do everything possible to reach a settlement with Japan. If they do consider it, one point on which they would be most likely to seek modifications would be a provision which would enable them to obtain oil sooner than contemplated in the proposal that we offer them.

In regard to that point, it might be possible to work out an arrangement whereby we could allow them to have petroleum in amounts equivalent to amounts of petroleum products released in Japan for normal peacetime consumption. This would make possible the normal functioning in Japan of buses, commercial trucks, taxis and private automobiles as well as Japanese fishing launches and commercial boats and would emphasize to the Japanese public the advantages of conditions of peace.

(DRAFT)

I.

A. The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a mutual understanding and declaration of intention and policy for the resumption of traditional friendly relations.

B. Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

C. It is the earnest hope of both Governments that by cooperative effort, the United States and Japan may contribute effectively toward the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area.

D. Both Governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation between the peoples of both countries.

E. Both Governments further affirm that in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with

all

-2-

all other Governments are based:

- (1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations
- (2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
- (3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
- (4) The principle of non-disturbance of the status quo except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

F. Both Governments have agreed that in order to provide stable peace and to eliminate chronic political instability and recurrent economic collapse, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

- (1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
- (2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
- (3) The principle of nondiscriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.
- (4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations through international agreement regulating supply of commodities.
- (5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance that they lead aid to the economic enterprises and the continuous development of all countries, and they permit payments through processes of trade consistent with the welfare of all countries.

(In

-3-

(In drafting the abstract principles on which commitments are to be exchanged, an effort has been made to embody those principles to which it is believed the Japanese are readily willing to agree.)

II.

A. As initial steps toward the implementation and practical application of the fundamental principles agreed upon, both Governments have agreed to take the following measures:

(1) The Government of the United States will suggest to the Governments of China and of Japan that they immediately enter into direct amicable negotiation for a peaceful settlement of their differences.

(In offering to extend advice to the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they enter into direct negotiations for a settlement of their differences, we would not ask the Japanese to tell us their peace terms. We should, therefore, be in a position to tell the Chinese that our suggestion contains no implication of approval of terms which the Japanese might offer; that we intend to continue our policy of aid to countries which are victims of aggression; and that if the hostilities should be resumed after the armistice, we shall continue to extend to China all possible aid. In our approach to the Chinese we should make it clear that following a peaceful settlement with Japan, we should expect to extend in the fullest possible measure material and technical assistance to China during the period of reconstruction.)

(2) The Government of Japan will offer to the Government of China an armistice during the period of amicable negotiation.

(3) The Government of the United States during the course

-4-

course of amicable negotiations between China and Japan under an armistice will hold in abeyance shipment of supplies of a military character to China.

(4) The Government of Japan during the course of amicable negotiations between Japan and China under an armistice will refrain from further reenforcement of its expeditionary forces in China and French Indochina and will hold in abeyance shipment of supplies of a military character to those forces.

(5) The Government of the United States upon the conclusion of a peace settlement between Japan and China will immediately enter into negotiations with the Governments of Japan and of China for the resumption of normal trade relations with those Governments; and will undertake new negotiations with Japan for a resumption in trade and commerce in certain commodities and services other than those essential to warfare with a view to reconstruction of normal peacetime industry in Japan.

(6) The negotiations with Japan for the resumption of normal trade relations, following a peace settlement between Japan and China, would look to an arrangement whereby trade would be restored according to a graduated scale beginning with the evacuation of Japanese troops from China and from China and with the re-establishment of non-discriminatory trade in areas now under Japanese military occupation. For example, there might be provision that with the completion of Japanese evacuation of certain areas such as Indochina or China south of the Yangtze River or that Japan have certain quantities of raw materials such as oil and iron.

In the

-5-

In the negotiations for an immediate resumption of limited trade in commodities other than war supplies, we should have in mind the dual purpose of setting Japanese factories and shipping facilities to production and services which would aid in meeting our present needs, would assist the transition in Japan from a war to a peace economy, and which would suggest the natural popular reaction in favor of peaceful and profitable pursuits. Such a reaction might be expected once hostilities with China have ended and the threat of extended hostilities with the United States somewhat abated. A beginning in this direction might consist of arrangements for the exchange of such Japanese products such as camellia, camellia seed, menthol, camphor, pyrethrum flowers, plants for horticulture, tea and batteries for American products such as fertilizers, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, cotton and tobacco. Arrangements might also be made for the charter of Japanese vessels, if agreeable to Japan, and for the construction of vessels to American order in Japanese shipyards with steel and other material supplied from the United States.)

(c) The Governments of Japan and of the United States mutually guarantee that they will not undertake military offensive operations in any direction in the Pacific area.

FEINBERG/CMB:LSH
11-11-41.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

I. Commitments to be given mutually by the Governments of the United States and Japan.

(a) The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan subscribe to and actively support the following principles and the practical application thereof as the foundation upon which their relations with all other nations are based:

(1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.

(2) Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

(3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.

(4) Non-disturbance of the status quo except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

(b) The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States hereby mutually pledge themselves that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. In pursuance of this policy, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other

... toward the creation of conditions of international trade and international investment under which Japan and the United States will have a reasonable opportunity to secure through the trade process the means of acquiring these goods and commodities which each country needs for the safeguarding and the development of its economy. They furthermore agree to cooperate each with the other especially toward obtaining commercial access, on a non-discriminatory basis, by each of them to supplies of such basic commodities as oil, rubber, tin, nickel, and any other commodity the importation of which is essential to each country for the maintenance of its economic life.

(c) The Governments of the United States and Japan mutually believe that they will not seek in any part of the Pacific area political expansion in any direction or the acquisition of economic rights, advantages, or preferences by force.

II. Commitments on the part of the Japanese Government.

(a) The Japanese Government, following the cessation of hostilities between China and Japan, will withdraw all of its troops immediately from French Indochina.

(b) The Japanese Government will begin at once to put into effect a program for the rapid and progressive restoration

-3-

restoration of all of the normal activities of nationals of the United States in China and Manchuria and for the progressive relaxation and removal of all restrictions on the activities of nationals of the United States in China which have been imposed directly or indirectly as a result of Japanese military activities in China, and will complete this program as rapidly as possible in order to provide full implementation and practical application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial affairs.

III. Commitments on the part of the Government of the United States.

The Government of the United States will, pari passu with the removal or alterations of those conditions and situations in the Pacific area which gave rise to the taking by it of certain political and economic measures, alter or discontinue those political and economic measures.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 12, 1944.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Secretary:

There is attached a revision of the proposal which was sent to you by Mr. Hornum. (The proposal still of course needs further revision and elaboration.)

I think that the proposal is the most constructive one which I have yet seen. I have shown the proposal to all of the staff of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in this office.

I am sure that the proposal will be of great value to the Division. I have shown it to the staff of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in this office. I am sure that the proposal will be of great value to the Division. I have shown it to the staff of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in this office.

T.E.

B

711.341-20.0-1-6/8

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIALTENTATIVE
WITHOUT COMMITTEEOUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS
FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN**A**

On its part the Government of the United States proposes to take the following steps:

1. To reduce to a normal footing American naval forces now in Pacific waters, without of course limiting in any way the freedom of action and of decision of the Government of the United States with regard to the disposition of naval forces of the United States.

2. To negotiate a multilateral non-aggression pact with Japan, China, the British Empire, the Netherlands, Thailand and Soviet Russia.

3. To suggest to the Chinese Government and to the Japanese Government that those Governments enter into peaceful negotiations with regard to the future status of Manchuria.

4. To enter into negotiations with the British, Chinese, Dutch, Thai and Japanese Governments for the conclusion of an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be

-2-

deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories most-favored-nation treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

5. To give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to the International Settlements at Shanghai and Amoy, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

To endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British Government to give up British extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

To use its influence toward causing the British Government to cede Hong Kong to China. (This provision might take the form of an undertaking to use our influence with the British Government to cause the British Government to sell Hong Kong to China, the purchase price to be loaned China by the United States.)

6. To recommend to Congress enactment of legislation to amend the Immigration Act of 1924 so as to place all peoples of all races on a quota basis.

7. To negotiate a trade agreement with Japan, giving Japan (a) most-favored-nation treatment and (b) such concessions on Japanese imports into the United States

-3-

...be mutually satisfactorily arranged, including an agreement to bind raw silk on the free list.

To enter into a joint declaration between the United States and Japan with regard to commercial policy along the lines of the draft handed the Japanese Ambassador on November 15.

8. To extend to Japan a \$2,000,000,000 20-year credit at 2 percent interest, to be drawn upon at the rate not to exceed \$200,000,000 a year except with approval of the President of the United States.

(NOTE: The United States should be prepared to extend a similar credit to China.)

(NOTE: This provision presumably would require Congressional approval.)

9. To set up a \$500,000,000 stabilization fund half supplied by Japan and half by the United States, to be used for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate.

(NOTE: The United States should be prepared to act similarly in regard to China.)

(NOTE: This provision may require Congressional approval.)

10. To remove the freeing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States.

-4-

B

On its part the Government of Japan proposes to take the following steps:

1. To withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China (excluding Manchuria -- see separate provisions) and from Indochina.

2. To withdraw all support -- military, political, economic -- from any government or regime in China other than the Government of the National Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

3. To replace with yen currency at a rate to be agreed upon among the Treasuries of China, Japan, Great Britain and the United States all Japanese military scrip, yen and local reserve notes circulating in China.

4. To give up all extrajurisdictional rights in China, including rights in international settlements and concessions and rights under the Boxer Protocol.

5. To withdraw all Japanese troops from Manchuria except for a small garrison necessary for police force, and to place the remainder of the troops under the FBI control. The Japanese garrison in Manchuria is to be reduced to a minimum.

6. To withdraw all Japanese troops from Korea and to place the remainder of the troops under the FBI control. The Japanese garrison in Korea is to be reduced to a minimum.

7. To withdraw all Japanese troops from Formosa and to place the remainder of the troops under the FBI control. The Japanese garrison in Formosa is to be reduced to a minimum.

-4-

up to 50 percent of Japan's current output of shipping, including naval and merchant ships, on a cost-plus-percentage basis as the United States may select, it being understood that the United States will sell Japan such raw materials as it may be necessary for Japan to import for these purposes.

7. To negotiate a multilateral non-aggression pact with the United States, China, the British Empire, the Netherlands, Thailand and Soviet Russia.

8. To remove the freezing restrictions on American funds in Japan.

NOVEMBER 24, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

A conference was held in the State Department at 9:45 a. m., November 21, 1941. Present: Secretary Hull, Dr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, Admiral Stark and General Gerow. Secretary Hull requested the Army and Navy representatives to express their informal views from a military standpoint on a draft of a tentative outline of a basis for agreement with Japan. (Tab A). He explained that the outline was in a formative stage and had not been adopted by the State Department.

The various provisions were discussed. Both Admiral Stark and General Gerow were of the opinion that, in general; the document was satisfactory from a military viewpoint. They requested, however, an opportunity to make a more detailed study of its possible effect on the military situation. It was agreed that comments would be submitted early the same afternoon.

The comments of Admiral Stark (Tab B) and my own (Tab C) are attached. I informed Admiral Stark verbally that I regretted the reference to Army forces in the Navy comments on provision A 1. I feel that no restrictions should be placed on Army's preparations to make the Philippines secure.

I informed the Secretary of War and General Bryden verbally of the conference.

L. T. Gerow,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

8 Incls:

Tab A.

Tab B.

Tab C.

[Pencilled notation:] Enclosures not recd in Records Sec for recording. JRB.

[Pencilled notation in margin of first paragraph:] Gen. Marshall was out of town. (Initials illegible.)

SECRET

In reply refer to Encl. 1
and File
Op-10 Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

21 November 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Subject: Comment on "Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement between the United States and Japan, of November 19, 1941.

I respectfully submit the following. Reference is made to similarly numbered sections and paragraphs. Where paragraphs are not mentioned, concurrence is implied.

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Par. A-1. Further study of this paragraph confirms the feeling I expressed to you this morning that it is unacceptable. It commits the United States to naval restrictions without imposing compensating naval restrictions on Japan. I think under no circumstances the word "reduce" should be employed, since our naval forces in the Pacific are inadequate and should not have to undergo additional loss of strength. I again note that this paragraph makes no reference to land or air components; I assume this was intentional and of course I wish we could get away with it but I doubt it. If some such paragraph is necessary I suggest a wording approximately as follows:

"Not to increase United States combatant naval (and military) forces in the Philippines".

I included the (and military) in case they bring the point up and we have to acquiesce. I strongly hope that present plans for Army increases in planes, which will be largely carried out by 1 March, could be excluded from any limitation agreement but this too might have to be accepted.

SECRET

Par. A-5. As I mentioned this morning I just don't like the idea of our buying Hongkong from the British and giving it to China. If this is to be done I think the British at least ought to make this contribution to a cause more important for the British Commonwealth than for the United States. Portugal should likewise give up Macao.

Par. A-8 & 9. This is somewhat out of Navy province but I assume that in view of the present unfavorable financial status it has been considered these two paragraphs should be inserted. I can realize their great importance and the desire to have them form an integral part of any agreement that might be reached.

Par. B-1. Change the period to a comma and add the words "including Hainan, Macao and the islands of the China Sea to the southward of Formosa." This would include among others the highly important Spratley Islands.

Par. B-2. Suggest the following addition to this paragraph:

"To refrain from establishing or supporting any government or regime in Indo-China, other than the regularly established French Government."

This is to make clear our objection to any puppet regime, etc.

Par. B-5. I doubt the usefulness of this paragraph believing that it would prove unacceptable to both Russia and Japan. This morning I expressed it - "If I were a Russian I would not trust them." If good faith could be assured there might be something to it. I believe it might better be left out.

Par. B-6. I confirm my comment this morning. I do not believe Japan could accept it and certainly not with regard to their naval vessels; it would be a humiliating procedure from their standpoint; I would not mention it. There might be some chance of utilization of some of their present shipping if world conditions prevent their full utilization of it. However, this merchant shipping is an integral part of Japan's economic system and was built at great expense and difficulty. At the most the only proposal I would submit would be to buy a specific total of merchant ship tonnage; this might refer only to future construction if present construction could not be obtained. Chartering, as mentioned by some one this morning, might be considered.

General. Not in the paper. The provisions of the paper may be assumed to abrogate the tri-partite treaty on the part of Japan, but if it could be specifically so stated it would be helpful on this side of the water.

H. R. Smith

SECRET

BY AUTHORITY OF A. C. OFA, WFO


WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
WAR PLANS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

Date Initials

November 21, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.



War Plans Division has made a hasty study from a military viewpoint of your tentative "Outline of Proposed Bases for Agreement between the United States and Japan," and perceives no objection to its use as a basis for discussion. The adoption of its provisions would attain one of our present major objectives -- the avoidance of war with Japan. Even a temporary peace in the Pacific, would permit us to complete defensive preparations in the Philippines and at the same time insure continuance of material assistance to the British -- both of which are highly important.

The foregoing should not be construed as suggesting strict adherence to all the conditions outlined in the proposed agreement. War Plans Division wishes to emphasize it is of grave importance to the success of our war effort in Europe that we reach a modus vivendi with Japan.

War Plans Division suggests the deletion of Par. B. - 5. The proposal contained in that paragraph would probably be entirely unacceptable to Russia. The geographical lay-out in the Manchurian-Siberian area is such that military time and space factors are all in favor of Japan. Furthermore, it would be most difficult to reach an agreement as to what are "equivalent forces" and the measures to be taken to insure that no unauthorized increases are made in those forces. Such an arrangement would increase the vulnerability of the Russian position, particularly in the Maritime Provinces, and at the same time remove the very real threat to Japanese cities of the Russian Air based therein. From the U. S. viewpoint, it is greatly to our advantage to have the possibility of access to Siberian airfields securely guarded by a potential ally.

The paper has been considered as a whole. If major changes are made in its provisions, it is requested that the War Department be given an opportunity to consider the military aspects of such changes.

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F. J. KID

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The Chief of Staff is out of the city and consequently this paper has not been presented for his consideration. War Plans Division believes that he would concur in the views expressed above.

L. T. Snow

L. T. SNOW,
Major General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

PENCILLED MEMORANDUM GIVEN BY THE
PRESIDENT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
(NOT DATED BUT PROBABLY WRITTEN SHORTLY
AFTER NOVEMBER 20, 1941)

711.94/2640-23/35

FILED

Department of the Interior

- Later on Pacific agreements

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~EXCLUDED FROM PUBLIC RELEASE~~
~~REASONING~~

Not Used

November 22, 1941.

ORAL

The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of the questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

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On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador indicated that the Government of Japan is desirous of going ahead with such a program; that the domestic political situation within Japan is urgent; and that, in order to give the Japanese Government opportunity to develop and promote public sentiment in Japan in support of a comprehensive and liberal program of peace such as has been under discussion between our two Governments, it would be helpful if there could be taken some initial steps toward resumption of trade and normal intercourse between Japan and the United States. At that time the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to create an atmosphere favorable to pursuing the conversations which have been taking place. These proposals contain features which from the point of view of the Government of the United States present difficulties in reference to the broad-gauge principles the practical application of which represents the desires of both Governments as manifested in current conversations. In as much as the Government of
the

-3-

the United States desires to contribute to the peace of the Pacific area and to afford every opportunity to continue discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area, the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government suggestions as follows:

-4-

MODUS VIVENDI

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan, both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs therein. They undertake reciprocally not to make by force or threat of force, unless they are attacked, any advancement, from points at which they have military establishments, across any international border in the Pacific area.

2. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its armed forces now stationed in southern French Indochina, not to engage in any further military activities there, including the construction of military facilities, and to limit Japanese military forces in northern French Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941, which number in any case would not exceed 25,000 and which number would not be subject to replacement.

3. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to remove the freezing restrictions which were placed on Japanese assets in the United States on July 26 and the Japanese Government agrees simultaneously to remove the freezing measures which it imposed in regard to American assets in Japan. Exports from each country would thereafter remain subject to the respective export control

-5-

control measures which each country may have in effect for reasons of national defense.

4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to approach the British and the Dutch Governments with a view to those Governments' taking, on a basis of reciprocity with Japan, measures similar to those provided for in paragraph three above.

5. The Government of the United States would not look with disfavor upon the inauguration of conversations between the Government of China and the Government of Japan directed toward a peaceful settlement of their differences nor would the Government of the United States look with disfavor upon an armistice during the period of any such discussions. The fundamental interest of the Government of the United States in reference to any such discussions is simply that they be based upon and exemplify the fundamental principles of peace which constitute the central spirit of the current conversations between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States.

In case any such discussions are entered into between the Government of Japan and the Government of China, the Government of the United States is agreeable to such discussions taking place in the Philippine Islands, if so desired

-6-

desired by both China and Japan.

6. It is understood that this modus vivendi is of a temporary nature and shall not remain in effect for a period longer than three months unless renewed by common agreement.

November 22, 1941.

THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN

Section I

Joint Mutual Declaration of Policy

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

- (1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
- (2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
- (3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

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- (4) The principle of reliance upon international co-operation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

- (1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
- (2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
- (3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.
- (4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.
- (5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

-3-

Section II

Steps to be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan. Respectively

A

The Government of the United States proposes to take steps as follows:

1. To endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact with Japan, China, the British Empire, the Netherlands, Thailand and the Soviet Union.

2. To suggest to the Chinese Government and to the Japanese Government that those Governments enter into peaceful negotiations with regard to the future status of Manchuria.

3. To enter into negotiations with the British, Chinese, Dutch, Thai and Japanese Governments for the conclusion of an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question.

Such

-4-

Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

4. To give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to the International Settlements at Shanghai and Amoy, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

To endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

5. To enter into negotiations with Japan for the conclusion of a trade agreement between the two countries, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

6.

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6. To agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds up to \$500,000,000 for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

7. To remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States.

8. To take steps, upon the conclusion of this agreement and upon the signing of the multilateral non-aggression pact mentioned under item one above, directed toward termination of the Nine Power Treaty relating to Principles and Policies concerning China signed at Washington, February 8, 1922.

-6-

B

The Government of Japan proposes to take steps as follows:

1. To withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China (excluding Manchuria -- see separate provision A-2) and from Indochina.
2. To withdraw all support -- military, political, economic -- from any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.
3. To give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and concessions and rights under the Boxer Protocol.
4. To endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact with the United States, China, the British Empire, the Netherlands, Thailand and the Soviet Union.
5. To remove the freezing restrictions on American funds in Japan.
6. To agree that the provisions of the treaty concluded on September 27, 1940 among Japan, Germany and Italy shall not be interpreted by Japan in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: NOVEMBER 22, 1941

SUBJECT: JAPANESE PROPOSAL FOR A MODUS VIVENDI AND SUGGESTED REPLY

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY HULL, THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, LORD HALIFAX,
 THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTER, RICHARD G. CASEY, THE
 NETHERLANDS MINISTER, DR. A. LOUDON, AND THE
 CHINESE AMBASSADOR, DR. HU SHIH

COPIES TO:

The British Ambassador, the Australian Minister and the Netherlands Minister called at my request, the Chinese Ambassador joining us later on. I enumerated the high points in the conversations which I have been carrying on with the Japanese officials here since the spring of this year. They are fully set forth in records of my conversations during that time and need not be repeated here.

I concluded with an account of the Japanese proposal for a modus vivendi. I showed it to them to read, with the exception of the Chinese Ambassador who had not yet arrived, and then proceeded to outline my proposed reply in the nature of a substitute for the Japanese proposal. There seemed to be general agreement that a substitute

was

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PS/WHA

-2-

was more desirable than a specific reply to the Japanese proposal, section for section. The substitute reply was substantially what is contained in the present final draft, which I am considering handing to the Japanese. Each of the gentlemen present seemed to be well pleased with this preliminary report to them, except the Chinese Ambassador, who was somewhat disturbed, as he always is when any question concerning China arises not entirely to his way of thinking. This reaction on his part is very natural. He did not show serious concern in view of the provision in our proposed modus vivendi which would block a Japanese attack on China in order to destroy the Burma Road. He inquired whether this would commit the Japanese not to further invade China during the coming three months, to which I replied in the negative, adding that this was a question to be decided under the permanent agreement now receiving attention. I made it clear that this proposal was made by the Japanese and that there was probably not one chance in three that they would accept our reply even though it does provide that this proposed temporary arrangement constitutes a part of the general conversations looking toward a general agreement on the basic questions.

C.H.

S:CH:AR

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
INITIATIVE

Not used

November 24, 1941

The Department of the Army, in the United States and the Government of Japan, have been carrying on during the past several months in connection with the Department of the Army for the purpose of arriving at a final decision as to the conditions which will be required for the establishment of a permanent peace in the Pacific. The Department of the Army, in the United States and the Government of Japan, have been carrying on during the past several months in connection with the Department of the Army for the purpose of arriving at a final decision as to the conditions which will be required for the establishment of a permanent peace in the Pacific. The Department of the Army, in the United States and the Government of Japan, have been carrying on during the past several months in connection with the Department of the Army for the purpose of arriving at a final decision as to the conditions which will be required for the establishment of a permanent peace in the Pacific.

-3-

which have been taking place. These proposals contain nothing which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed.

The Government of the United States is earnestly desirous to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific area and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad range program of peace throughout the Pacific area. With these ends in view, the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government an alternative suggestion for a temporary modus vivendi, as follows:

-4-

MODUS VIVENDI

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan, both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs therein.

2. They undertake reciprocally not to make from regions in which they have military establishments any advance by force or threat of force into any areas in Southeastern or Northwestern Asia or in the southern or the northern Pacific area.

3. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its armed forces now stationed in southern French Indochina and not to replace those forces; to reduce the total of its forces in French Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941, which number in any case shall not exceed 25,000; and not to send additional forces to Indochina for replacements or otherwise.

4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to modify the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary to permit the following resumption of trade between the

United

-5-

United States and Japan in articles for the use and needs of their peoples:

(a) Imports from Japan to be freely permitted and the proceeds of the sale thereof to be paid into a clearing account to be used for the purchase of the exports from the United States listed below, and at Japan's option for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese obligations within the United States, provided that at least two-thirds in value of such imports per month consist of raw silk. It is understood that all American-owned goods now in Japan the movement of which in transit to the United States has been interrupted following the adoption of freezing measures shall be forwarded forthwith to the United States.

(b) Exports from the United States to Japan to be permitted as follows:

(1) Bunkers and supplies for vessels engaged in the trade here provided for and for such other vessels engaged in other trades as the two Governments may agree.

(11) Food and food products from the United States subject to such limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities

-6-

commodities in short supply in the United States.

(iii) Raw cotton from the United States to the extent of \$600,000 in value per month.

(iv) Medical and pharmaceutical supplies subject to such limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short supply in the United States.

(v) Petroleum. The United States will permit the export to Japan of petroleum upon a monthly basis for civilian needs, the proportionate amount of petroleum to be exported from the United States for such needs to be determined after consultation with the British and the Dutch Governments. It is understood that by civilian needs in Japan is meant such purposes as the operation of the fishing industry, the transport system, lighting, heating, industrial and agricultural uses, and other civilian uses.

(vi) The above stated amounts of exports may be increased and additional commodities added by agreement between the two Governments as it may appear to them that the operation of this agreement is furthering the peaceful and equitable solution.

-7-

solution of outstanding problems in the Pacific area.

5. The Government of Japan undertakes forthwith to modify the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary to permit the resumption of trade between Japan and the United States as provided for in paragraph four above.

6. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to approach the Austrellian, British and Dutch Governments with a view to those Governments' taking measures similar to those provided for in paragraph four above.

7. With reference to the current hostilities between Japan and China, the fundamental interest of the Government of the United States in reference to any discussions which may be entered into between the Japanese and the Chinese Governments is simply that these discussions and any settlement reached as a result thereof be based upon and exemplify the fundamental principles of peace, law, order and justice, which constitute the central spirit of the current conversations between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States and which are applicable uniformly throughout the Pacific area.

8. This modus vivendi shall remain in force for a period of three months with the understanding that the

two

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two parties shall confer at the instance of either to ascertain whether the prospects of reaching a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area justify an extension of the modus vivendi for a further period.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
REPRESENTATIVE AND WITHOUT
COMMITMENT

November 24, 1941

OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOR AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

Section I

Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

- (1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
- (2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

(3)

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(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

(4) The principle of reliance upon international co-operation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations:

1. The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

2. The principle of internationalization of commerce through abolition of barriers to trade and investment in extensive trade and investment.

3. The principle of non-discrimination in international investment and commercial relations.

4. The principle of internationalization of commerce through abolition of barriers to trade and investment in extensive trade and investment.

5. The principle of internationalization of commerce through abolition of barriers to trade and investment in extensive trade and investment.

6. The principle of internationalization of commerce through abolition of barriers to trade and investment in extensive trade and investment.

7. The principle of internationalization of commerce through abolition of barriers to trade and investment in extensive trade and investment.

-8-

Section II

Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan entered into the following agreement:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a bilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

2. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a bilateral agreement on a recent understanding of the territorial integrity of China, Japan, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States, in the event that there is a threat to the territorial integrity of any of these countries, the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will take immediate action to view to the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the countries concerned and to the maintenance of the peace in the region. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will also endeavor to conclude a bilateral agreement on the maintenance of the peace in the region and to the maintenance of the peace in the region.

1. The Government will endeavor to obtain the "free-
dom of information" law, which would allow to rise a
question to the Government, that the rights in
information, which is not in the possession of the
Government, is not in the possession of the
Government, is not in the possession of the

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6. The Government of the United States will suggest to the Chinese Government and to the Japanese Government that these Governments enter into peaceful negotiations with regard to the future status of Manchuria.

7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and removal of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to lift raw silk on the free list.

8. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the existing prohibitions on Japanese goods in the United States and on United States goods in Japan.

9. Both Governments will agree to suspend for 100 days all existing laws, orders, regulations, and decrees which are in effect for the purpose of restricting trade between the United States and Japan.

10. Both Governments will agree to suspend for 100 days all existing laws, orders, regulations, and decrees which are in effect for the purpose of restricting trade between the United States and Japan.

and a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of
this project, the design of the project is of course
independent of the project.

11. The Committee is also aware of the fact that
the design of the project is of course independent of the
project and the design of the project is of course independent
of the project.

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Department of State

Washington, November 24, 1941

AFRICAN EMBASSY,

LONDON (ENGLAND).

5392

SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

THE cable was sent to the British Government.
It should be made known to the British Government.
The cable was sent to the British Government.
The cable was sent to the British Government.

Quote On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to us proposals for a modus vivendi. He has represented that the conclusion of such a modus vivendi might give the Japanese Government opportunity to develop public sentiment in Japan in support of a liberal and comprehensive program of peace covering the Pacific area and that the domestic political situation in Japan was so acute as to render urgent some relief such as was envisaged in the proposal. The proposal calls for a commitment on the part of Japan to transfer to northern Indochina all the Japanese forces now stationed in southern Indochina pending the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of general peace in the Pacific area when Japan would withdraw all its troops from Indochina, commitments on the part of the United States to supply Japan a required quantity of petroleum products and to refrain from measures prejudicial to Japan's efforts to restore peace with China and mutual commitments to make no armed advancement in the southeastern Asiatic and southern Pacific areas (the example offered would apparently not exclude advancement into China from Indochina), to cooperate

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.

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711.94/2471

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PREPARING OFFICE
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Department of State

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Washington,

Charge to

3 toward obtaining goods required by either in the Netherlands East Indies and to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the adoption of freezing measures.

This Government proposes to inform the Japanese Government that in the opinion of this Government the Japanese proposals contain features not in harmony with the fundamental principles which underlie the proposed general settlement and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. It is also proposed to offer to the Japanese Government an alternative proposal for a modus vivendi which will contain mutual pledges of peaceful intent, a reciprocal undertaking not to make armed advancement into areas which would include northeastern Asia and the northern Pacific area, southeast Asia and the southern Pacific area, an undertaking by Japan to withdraw its forces from southern French Indochina, not to replace those forces, to limit the garrisons in northern Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941, whose number shall not be subject to replacement and shall not in any case exceed 15,000 and not to send additional troops to Indochina. This Government would undertake to abolish its freezing orders to the extent that they are not in conformity with the above proposals.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

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Washington.

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[illegible]

The British Ambassador has been informed and is informing your Foreign Minister.

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Send by operator

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

(A)

Add at close

This seems to me a fair proposition for the Japanese but its acceptance or rejection is really a matter of internal Japanese politics. I am not very hopeful ~~that~~ and we must all be prepared for that trouble, possibly soon

Roosevelt

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: NOVEMBER 04, 1941

SUBJECT P. HONOLULU, V. VAND. FOR INFORMATION TO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

[illegible]

COPIES TO

711,94/2476

PS/VHM

Mr. Milton Eisenhower, the United States Ambassador,
the Australian Minister and the Netherlands Minister
of Education, respectively, have each received a copy of
this document vivendi prepared by the Inter-Subsidi-
ary Committee on the Study of the Problem of the
United Nations. The Committee is now in the process of
preparing a report to the United Nations on the subject of
the study of the problem of the United Nations.

It is also suggested to more than a
 feeling of 2,000 Japanese troops is left in Indochina.

Hein stated that General Yamashita was a few minutes
before expressed to him his belief that 25,000 troops
would be enough to take the island in a few days and

-2-

not recognize the right of Japan to keep a single soldier in Indochina, we were striving to reach this proposed temporary agreement primarily because the heads of our Army and Navy often emphasize to me that time is the all-important question for them, and that it is necessary to be more fully prepared to deal effectively with the situation in the Pacific area in case of an outbreak by Japan. I also emphasized the point that, even if we agree that the chances of such an outbreak are not great, it must be admitted that there are real possibilities that such an outbreak may soon occur - any day after this week - unless a temporary arrangement is effected that will cause the agitated state of public opinion to become more quiet and thereby make it much more practicable to continue the conversations relative to the general agreement.

The Chinese Ambassador dwelt on the matter of retaining the proposed figure of 15,000 soldiers to remain in Indochina. I pointed out that each of the representatives understood the great advantage it would be to our five countries to have Japan committed to a withdrawal for three months and set forth the

advantages

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the modus vivendi proposal. I then indicated that I was not sure that I would present it to the Japanese Ambassador without knowing anything about the views and attitude of their Governments. The meeting broke up in this fashion.

There were other details discussed but they were not of major consequence nor did they constitute anything new in the record.

C.H.


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November 28, 1941

Final Draft



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The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been engaged during the past several months in formal and informal conversations for the purpose of arriving at an agreement in principle of questions relating to the relations which should be based upon the principles of peace, equality and mutual understanding among nations. These principles are: the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality in a matter of commercial or economic relations; the principle of reliance upon international law; the principle of consultation for the prevention of international disputes; the principle of cooperation for the maintenance of international peace and security.

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It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations leading to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing; and that it would be desirable that the modus vivendi include some of its provisions for initiation of a temporary cessation of racial and racial character in the promotion of trade and normal intercourse between the United States and Japan.

The Japanese Ambassador also stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations leading to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing; and that it would be desirable that the modus vivendi include some of its provisions for initiation of a temporary cessation of racial and racial character in the promotion of trade and normal intercourse between the United States and Japan.

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The enclosed are herewith transmitted. These documents contain information, in the opinion of the Government, which is of such a nature as to be of great value to the enemy and which it is in the interest of the United States to keep secret.

The Government of the United States is extremely desirous to contribute to the peace of the world and to the well-being of the human race by every opportunity that is afforded. It has, since the beginning of the war, been engaged in a most active and successful campaign against the forces of aggression and has, through its efforts, secured the freedom of the world. With this view, the Government of the United States offers the following information to the Government of the United Kingdom for their consideration and use as they may see fit.

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1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan, in their relations for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their political relations are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs thereon.

2. They undertake reciprocally not to make from regions in which they have military establishments any advance by force or threat of force into any area in Southeastern or Northeastern Asia or in the Eastern or the Northern Pacific area.

3. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its armed forces now stationed in southern French Indochina and not to replace these forces; to reduce the total of its forces in French Indochina to the number there on July 10, 1941; and not to send additional naval, land or air forces to Indochina for replacements or otherwise.

The provisions of the foregoing paragraph are without prejudice to the position of the Government of the United States with regard to the presence of foreign troops in that area.

4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to modify the application of its existing freedom of export

[illegible]

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commodities in short supply in the United States.

(iii) Raw cotton from the United States to the extent of \$600,000 in value per month.

(iv) Medical and pharmaceutical supplies, subject to such limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short supply in the United States.

(v) Petroleum. The United States will permit the export to Japan of petroleum, within the categories permitted general export, upon a monthly basis for civilian needs. The proportionate amount of petroleum to be exported from the United States for such needs will be determined after consultation with the British and the Dutch Governments. It is understood that by civilian needs in Japan is meant such purposes as the operation of the fishing industry, the transport system, lighting, heating, industrial and agricultural uses, and other civilian uses.

(vi) The above stated amounts of exports are a maximum and are subject to the limitation of the amount of petroleum available for export as determined by the Japanese Government. It is understood that the operation of the fishing industry in Japan is not to be affected by the above stated limitations.

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two parties shall confer at the instance of either to ascertain whether the prospects of reaching a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area justify an extension of the modus vivendi for a further period.

There is attached in tentative form a plan of a comprehensive peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of the kind of program which this Government has in mind to be worked out during the further conversations between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States while this modus vivendi would be in effect.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL,
TENTATIVE AND WITHOUT
COMMITMENT

November 25, 1941.

OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOR AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

Section I

Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

- (1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
- (2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

(3)

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- (3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.
- (4) The principle of reliance upon international co-operation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

- (1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
- (2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
- (3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.
- (4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.
- (5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

Section II

Steps to be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.
2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and

-4-

and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.

4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support -- militarily, politically, economically -- any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

6. The Government of the United States and the
Government

-5-

each of the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for and upon the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.

Lauchlin Currie.

Chungking, November 25, 1941.

After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any "Modus Vivendi" now arrived at with China would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. The Generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory.

Lattimore.

2004年12月29日 星期四
 2004年12月29日 星期四

7-20-68 1968 July 20 Friday 10:00 AM

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: NOVEMBER 25, 1941

SUBJECT: SUGGESTED CHANGES IN MODUS VIVENDI

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY HULL AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, LORD HALIFAX

COPIES TO:

The British Ambassador called at his request and handed me a memorandum, a copy of which is hereto attached. I commented briefly on the impossibility of not letting the Japanese have some oil for strictly civilian use, if we, in turn, are to secure the tremendously valuable commitment by the Japanese not to move on any aggressive course outside of China proper during the next three months. I pointed out to the Ambassador the advantages to China with respect to the Burma Road and its possible destruction and the removal of any menace to the South Sea area which would be of great interest and advantage to Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands East Indies and the United States as well.

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PS/WHA

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I emphasized that this proposed modus vivendi was really a part of what the Japanese claimed to be a continuance of the same conversations held heretofore relative to a permanent agreement on a peaceful settlement for the entire Pacific area. I also pointed out the utter impracticability of requesting a suspension of further military advances in China in addition to the preceding assurances.

The Ambassador referred to the provision in the proposed draft of a modus vivendi limiting the Japanese troops in Indochina to 25,000 and urged that that number be reduced in our draft. I said that we would do the best we could in the matter, that our Army and Navy experts feel that 25,000 in North Indochina would not be a menace to the Burma Road, and that even double that number would not be a serious menace.

C.H.

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Japanese proposal is clearly unacceptable and the only question appears to be whether:-

- (a) To reject it and (while making it clear that a limited agreement is not ruled out) to leave it to the Japanese to produce a better offer, or
- (b) to make a counter proposal.

We have complete confidence in Mr. Hull's handling of these negotiations and he is in the best position to judge which of these two courses is the better tactics. We feel sure that he fully understands that the Japanese will try to force a hurried decision by magnifying the dangers of delay. If having taken this into account he feels it best to put forward a counter proposal we will support this course.

The Japanese proposal should, we feel, be regarded as the first movement in a process of bargaining. It puts the price at a maximum and the demand at a minimum. If a counter proposal is to be made we suggest that this process should be reversed and that our demands should be pitched high and our price low.

The removal of merely "the bulk" of Japanese troops from Indo China would allow too wide a loophole. It is doubtful whether we should be justified in accepting this as satisfactory and still less in suggesting it. Apart from the desirability of pitching a counter proposal higher than we may obtain, it seems advisable from the Chinese angle so to frame it as to frustrate the possibility of any attack on Kuming during the currency of an interim agreement.

711.94/2477

PS/WHA

On this basis we would suggest for the consideration of the United States Government that any counter proposal should stipulate for the total withdrawal from Indo China not merely of the Japanese "troops" as in the Japanese proposal but of Japanese naval military and air forces with their equipment and for the suspension of further military advances in China in addition to satisfactory assurances regarding other areas in South East Asia, the Western Pacific and Russia; the said proposal better legitimate relaxation of existing economic measures so as to allow the export of limited quantities of goods to ensure the welfare of the Japanese civilian population, but excluding goods of direct importance to the war potential, in particular oil, of which we know the Japanese have no shortage except for military purposes. These relaxations would of course only become effective as and when withdrawal of Japanese armed forces took place, and we should expect in return to receive goods of similar nature from Japan if we required them.

Mr. Hull has of course made it perfectly clear to the Japanese that any interim arrangement is only a first step in a wider settlement which must be in conformity with basic principles acceptable to the United States. We feel that to prevent misrepresentation by Japan it will have to be made public that any interim agreement is purely provisional and is only concluded to facilitate negotiation of an ultimate agreement on more fundamental issues satisfactory to all parties concerned.

The above represents our immediate reaction, sent without consultation with the Dominion Governments who as in the case of the Netherlands and the Chinese Governments

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: NOVEMBER 25, 1941

SUBJECT: OPPOSITION OF GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK TO MODUS VIVENDI

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY HULL AND THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR, DR. HU SHIN

COPIES TO:

The Chinese Ambassador called at his request. He sought to make profuse preliminary explanations, stating among other things that the Foreign Minister of China understood very well the broad international aspects of the Japanese situation as it relates to several countries, including China and the United States, but that the Generalissimo was not so well acquainted with the situation, and hence his reported opposition to our modus vivendi. He then handed me a telegram, dated November 24, 1941, from his Foreign Minister, a copy of which is hereto attached.

I replied that in the first place the official heads of our Army and Navy for some weeks have been most earnestly urging that we not get into war with Japan until

-2-

until they have had an opportunity to increase further their plans and methods and means of defense in the Pacific area. In the second place, at the request of the more peaceful elements in Japan for conversations with this Government looking toward a broad peaceful settlement for the entire Pacific area, we have been carrying on conversations and making some progress thus far; and the Japanese are urging the continuance of these general conversations for the purpose of a broad Pacific area settlement. The situation, therefore, is that the proposed modus vivendi is really a part and parcel of the efforts to carry forward these general conversations for the reasons that have been fully stated from time to time, and recently to the Chinese Ambassador and to others.

I said that very recently the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek almost flooded Washington with strong and lengthy cables telling us how extremely dangerous the Japanese threat is to attack the Burma Road through Indochina and appealing loudly for aid, whereas practically the first thing this present proposal of mine and the President does is to require the Japanese troops to be taken out of Indochina and thereby to protect the Burma Road from what Chiang Kai-shek said was an imminent danger. Now, I added, Chiang Kai-shek ignores that

situation

-3-

situation which we have taken care of for him and inveighs loudly about another matter relating to the release of certain commodities to Japan corresponding to the progress made with our conversations concerning a general peace agreement. He also overlooks the fact that our proposal would relieve the menace of Japan in Indochina to the whole South Pacific area, including Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies, Australia and also the United States, with the Philippines and the rubber and tin trade routes. All of this relief from menace to each of the countries would continue for ninety days. One of our leading admirals stated to me recently that the limited amount of more or less inferior oil products that we might let Japan have during that period would not to any appreciable extent increase Japanese war and naval preparations. I said that, of course, we can cancel this proposal but it must be with the understanding that we are not to be charged with failure to send our fleet into the area near Indochina and into Japanese waters, if by any chance Japan makes a military drive southward.

The Ambassador was very insistent in the view that he would send back to his Government a fuller explanation which he hoped might relieve the situation more or less. Our conversation was, of course, in a friendly spirit.

C.H.

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TELEGRAM FROM MINISTER KOO TAI-CHI
TO WASHINGTON AT 11:11
CONTINUING, NOVEMBER 24, 1941.

Reference is made to your telegram of November 22.

After reading your telegram, the Generalissimo showed rather strong reaction. He got the impression that the United States Government has put aside the Chinese question in its conversation with Japan instead of seeking a solution, and is still inclined to appease Japan at the expense of China. I have explained to him that the Secretary of State has always had the greatest respect for the fundamental principles, and that I believe he has made no concession to Japan. The fact that he inquires of the possibility of a modus vivendi shows that he has not yet revealed anything to the Japanese. We are, however, firmly opposed to any measure which may have the effect of increasing China's difficulty in her war of resistance, or of strengthening Japan's power in her aggression against China.

Please inform the Secretary of State.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 25, 1941.

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Hu Shih, Chinese Ambassador
Mr. Stanley K. Hornbeck
Dr. A. Loudon, Netherlands Minister
Mr. Stanley K. Hornbeck

COPIES TO:

The Chinese Ambassador called on me last evening, at his request.

The Ambassador referred to the conference which had been held yesterday afternoon at which the Secretary of State had informed representatives of the B, C and D powers of the latest developments leading toward possible conclusion between the United States and Japan of a modus vivendi.

The Ambassador said that he had a very real appreciation of the seriousness and difficulty of the problem which confronts the American Government and concerns all the countries represented; and he expressed appreciation of the attitude of the Secretary of State and complete confidence that the American Government would yield nothing in the field of principles.

-2-

principles and pursue no course of "appeasement". He said the he wished, however, to repeat to me what he had said in the conference regarding articles II and III of the American draft proposal. Article II, he said, presumably does not apply in reference to the conflict between Japan and China: it presumably leaves Japan free to continue her operations against China; and, article III leaves Japan free to maintain as much as 25,000 troops in Indochina and to conduct operations against China from Indochina. He went on to say that in the conversations that were held on Saturday, the Secretary had spoken of permitting the Japanese to maintain in China "a few thousand" troops; and that in his report to his Government he had used that expression, and he understood that the other representatives had reported in the same terms to their Governments. Now, it seemed to him, a force of 25,000 Japanese troops in northern Indochina would constitute a menace to China. Suppose, he said, the Japanese should scrupulously live up to the letter of this provision--which, if they did, would be surprising--; and suppose they were to cause that number of troops to consist largely if not altogether of mechanics, engineers and aviation pilots, -- such a force could seriously menace the Burma Road and terrifically harass Chinese land forces in Yunnan. If the Japanese should choose to conduct land operations

On 1 June 1961, Yalman Spasovski outside the Imla camp
in the port of the "Prosveta" ship, with the ship's cargo
on board, in the Imla camp, there was a fire which destroyed the
ship's cargo, while the ship was from the port of
Imla. The ship's cargo was destroyed, he said, that
the ship's cargo was destroyed, that not only the
ship's cargo was destroyed.

It can be seen that they have lost the advantage for the
 work of a military force, and have lost the financial aid of
 the United States. The Chinese Government is the only one of
 the United States. It is the only one in which they have been. The
 Chinese Government is a reflection of the difficulty of
 the situation. It is a reflection that he will do the unnecessary
 thing. He said that the situation is not
 exactly the same. It is not every government, because
 the government views it from a different angle and in a
 different state here. The Chinese Government is, he said,
 not prepared and is not responsive about the Indochina situation.
 It is the lack of the right types of equipment for
 effective protection of its lifeline, the Burma Road, the
 for the aid of which is of vital importance to it and
 of great concern to the other powers, especially the
 United States, which are sending in aid via that Road. He
 said that he realized that it would be very helpful to keep

-4-

the Japanese in suspense for another three months, but he doubted whether that could be achieved. He concluded with an assurance that he would try to cause his Government to see the problem in the light in which the American Government sees it. He expressed hope that, if he did not succeed completely in that effort, we would realize that difficulties which confront China inevitably look somewhat different when viewed from Chungking than when viewed from Washington.

Later in the evening the Netherlands Minister dropped in on me. He made with regard to article III observations not dissimilar to those which the Chinese Ambassador had made, as regarding the question of the number of Japanese troops that might be left in Indochina. He also raised a question whether the matter of matériel might not be quite as important as or even more important than the question of the number of troops. He said that he had on Saturday made a long report to his Government, that he had received since then several telegrams, and that he expected to send to the Department today two or three memoranda.

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COPY OF MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
DATED NOVEMBER 28, 1941

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
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November 26, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to our two proposals prepared for submission to the Japanese Government, namely:

(1) A proposal in the way of a draft agreement for a broad basic peaceful settlement for the Pacific area, which is henceforth to be made a part of the general conversations now going on and to be carried on, if agreeable to both Governments, with a view to a general agreement on this subject.


(2) The second proposal is really closely connected with the conversations looking toward a general agreement, which is in the nature of a modus vivendi intended to make more feasible the continuance of the conversations.

In view of the opposition of the Chinese Government and either the half-hearted support or the actual opposition of the British, the Netherlands and the Australian Governments, and in view of the wide publicity of the opposition and of the additional opposition that will naturally follow through utter lack of an understanding of the vast importance and value otherwise of the

modus vivendi.

-2-

modus vivendi, without in any way departing from my views about the wisdom and the benefit of this step to all of the countries opposed to the aggressor nations who are interested in the Pacific area, I desire very earnestly to recommend that at this time I call in the Japanese Ambassadors and hand to them a copy of the comprehensive basic proposal for a general peaceful settlement, and at the same time withhold the modus vivendi proposal.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Cordell Hull". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style. The first letter "C" is large and loops around. The name "Hull" is written in a more compact, cursive script.

Handed to the Secretary, by
the Netherlands Minister,
November 27, 1941.



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RECEIVED PACIFIC DIVISION

RECEIVED
NOV 27 1941
PACIFIC DIVISION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: NOV. 27, 1941

SUBJECT: PROPOSED MODUS VIVENDI

PARTICIPANTS: AMBASSADOR OF GREAT BRITAIN AND THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTER,
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

COPIES TO:

The Minister of Australia called at his request. His purpose was to inquire whether the proposed modus vivendi had been abandoned permanently, to which I replied that I so considered it. He expressed great concern and desired to know more about the movements of Chiang Kai-shek and others intended to discourage the further consideration of the modus vivendi. I referred to copies of British communications on the subject, adding that Ambassador Halifax was strong for the proposal all the way and that I sympathized with his situation but I did not feel that the communications from Churchill and Eden, with qualifications such as were

-2-

were in them, would be very helpful in a bitter fight that would be projected by Chiang Kai-shek and carried forward by all of the malcontents in the United States, although I felt unreservedly that Churchill and Eden, like the British Ambassador here, would be for whatever we might do, even though not entirely to their liking in every way. The Minister inquired whether I thought it would be feasible to take up this matter further with the Chinese and I replied that I did not think so, so far as I am concerned. I thanked the Minister for his cooperation and that of his Government.

C.H.

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AMEMBASSY, TOKYO (JAPAN).			

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CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

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 In the light of the attitude of Admiral Nomura and Mr. Kurusu when they were handed on November 26 for consideration the document described in a separate telegram and of such indications as we have cumulatively had of the general attitude of the Japanese Government, it appears that the discussions up to the present time have not repeat not yet afforded any basis which gives much promise of a satisfactory comprehensive settlement. It is of course too early to adopt any definitive opinion whether the discussions will continue or will lapse, but the probability that they may lapse should not repeat not be lost sight of.

The existence of such probability makes it appear advisable that we give some advance consideration to various problems which may as a consequence arise in connection with our Foreign Service establishments in Japanese territory. As lapse of the conversations

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might result in withdrawal of our diplomatic and consular representation from Japan, it would seem to us that, without any intention of being alarmist or of too hastily envisaging serious contingencies, this question should be brought to your attention so that you may have it well in mind in case it should become necessary for the Department to consult you in regard to the making of arrangements for the packing of official and personal effects and the expeditious handling of other matters which would be involved in the closing of our Embassy and Consulates. It is, of course, desired that all phases of the matter be considered confidential and that discussion of it be kept to a minimum.



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1-1488 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 26, 1941.

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Sir Ronald Campbell, Minister of the British Embassy

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck.

COPIES TO:

Sir Ronald Campbell called on me at his request.

In the course of the conversation he stated that the British armed authorities have received a message from our naval authorities stating that in as much as the United States-Japan negotiations have "broken down", it now becomes necessary to issue certain instructions to the armed forces; and that the British Government wishes to inquire of us whether the negotiations have "broken down". I said in reply that so far as I am aware neither the American Government nor the Japanese Government has declared or indicated that the negotiations are terminated, but that I was not in a position to confirm or deny statements attributed to any American official agency that the negotiations have "broken down".

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

NO DISTRIBUTION

Washington

November 27, 1941

TO THE
 SECRETARY,
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
 WASHINGTON

CHUNGKING (CHINA).

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR ONLY.

On November 19 the Japanese presented a five-point
 proposal for a temporary agreement in substance as follows:

One. The United States to refrain from actions prejudicial to Japan's efforts to restore peace with China.

Two. Both countries to remove freezing restrictions and to restore commercial relations. The United States to permit Japan to resume payment of petroleum.

Three. Both countries to cooperate in obtaining necessary supplies from the Dutch East Indies.

Four. Both countries not repeat not to make any armed intervention into areas of southeastern Asia and the southern Pacific except Japanese-occupied French Indochina.

Five. Japan to withdraw its troops from Indochina following the attainment of peaceful settlement between Japan and China or establishment of world peace in the Pacific area. In the interim Japan to remove its troops from southern Indochina to northern Indochina upon conclusion of this arrangement which would later be a part of a final agreement.

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington.

Paying Telegram
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Charge Telegram

Foreign
Day Letter
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The Department gave consideration to the merits of alternate proposals and presented the results of its deliberations thereof which suggested a resolution to the Department for possible presentation to the Senate and House of Representatives. At one time the Department considered the possibility of presenting to the Senate a resolution, drafted by itself, the proposal which was actually introduced in the Senate. An alternate plan for a resolution was also drafted under the Department's name at that time. The resolution which was actually introduced in the Senate was drafted by the Senate and was a resolution covering the entire Pacific Ocean. At the end of the period of the term of the gods yigari before the Senate would at the present of other matters to be considered whether the extension of the gods yigari was justified by the interests of peace, a resolution of the sort sought.

The draft gods yigari was a resolution which contained certain clauses of the gods yigari and was a draft which was not to be presented to the Senate.

As to the draft gods yigari which was presented to the Senate.

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PREPARING OFFICE
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

-3-

Washington.

1. southern Pacific area, an undertaking by Japan to withdraw its forces from southern French Indochina, to limit those in northern Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941, which number should not be subject to replacement and Japan should not in any case send additional naval, military or air forces to Indochina. This Government would undertake to modify its freezing orders to the extent to permit exports from the United States to Japan of bunkers and ship supplies, food products and pharmaceuticals with certain qualifications, raw cotton up to \$500,000 monthly, a small amount of petroleum within categories now permitted general export on a monthly basis for civilian needs, the proportionate amount to be exported from this country to be determined after consultation with the British and Dutch Governments. The United States would permit imports in general provided that raw silk constitutes at least two thirds in value of such imports. The proceeds of such imports would be available for the purchase of the designated exports from the United States and for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese obligations within the United States. This Government would undertake to

Enclosed by

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M.

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TELEGRAM SENT
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: NOVEMBER 29, 1941

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES-JAPANESE CONVERSATIONS

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR,
LORD HALIFAX

COPIES TO:

711-94

The British Ambassador called at his request and I soon discovered that he had no special business except to check on the aftermath of the conversations between the President and myself and the Japanese with special reference to the question of the proposed modus vivendi. This caused me to remark in a preliminary way that the mechanics for the carrying on of diplomatic relations between the governments resisting aggressor nations are so complicated that it is nearly impossible to carry on such relations in a manner at all systematic and safe and sound. I referred to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek,

for

-3-

zeal as the Japanese and the Germans are displaying instead of weakening and telling the Chinese people that all of the friendly countries were now striving primarily to protect themselves and to force an agreement between China and Japan, every Chinese should understand from such a procedure that the best possible course was being pursued and that this calls for resolute fighting until the undertaking is consummated by peace negotiations which Japan in due course would be obliged to enter into with China.

I expressed the view that the diplomatic part of our relations with Japan was virtually over and that the matter will now go to the officials of the Army and the Navy with whom I have talked and to whom I have given my views for whatever they are worth. Speaking in great confidence, I said that it would be a serious mistake for our country and other countries interested in the Pacific situation to make plans of resistance without including the possibility that Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element of surprise and spread out over considerable areas and capture certain positions and ports before the peaceful countries interested in the Pacific would have time to confer and formulate plans to meet

next

Handed me by the Chinese Ambassador,
December 2, 1941.

In three telegrams dated November 27 and 28, Mr. Quo T'ai-chi and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek expressed their confidence in the President and the Secretary of State and in the fundamental principles of their foreign policy.

Both of them have studied my long telegram of November 24 reporting the discussions between the Secretary and the four envoys at the office of the Secretary, and also my report of the conversation between the Secretary and myself in his apartment on the evening of the 25th. Both the Generalissimo and the foreign minister were reassured by the sympathetic and helpful spirit underlying these conversations.

I now wished me to point out to the United States Government the following facts which, because of very great distance, might not have been fully appreciated on this side of the ocean:

(1) The almost incredibly great faith of the Chinese people in the efficacy of the economic pressure on our enemy which has been in force for the last four months is such that the mere rumor of any possibility of its relaxation has already begun to produce a truly panicky feeling throughout China.

(2) Such panicky feeling has been caused partly by Chinese propaganda which, during the past week (especially on November 21, 22, 23).

- 2 -

had broadcast reports of an approaching general relaxation of freezing and trade restrictions by the United States and Japanese governments on the understanding that each would undertake not to move southward and that the United States would not interfere with the war in China.

(3) The whole question is psychological and spiritual: It is a question of the morale of a whole people which has been fighting a very hard war for four years and a half, and which, in its hardship and long suffering, has pinned its great hope on the international situation turning in our favor and, in particular, on the economic sanctions that the democratic powers have been able to put into force during the last months. It is no exaggeration to say that this question fundamentally affects the spirit of our fighting forces and our people.

(4) In his telegram to me, the Foreign Minister tells me that the Government had information that a certain leader in the North (not specified by name) might be so shaken by a possible weakening of our international position as to make moves detrimental to the prosecution of our war of resistance.

- 3 -

Both Generalissimo Chiang and Mr. To want to convey to the Secretary of State their observation that Japan has been so weakened by the long war in China and by the economic pressure of the democratic powers that she cannot afford to risk a war with the great naval powers.

In a latest telegram to Mr. To, Mr. Ho expresses great gratification in the latest reply of the Secretary to the Japanese envoy, which, he understands, reaffirms the fundamental principles repeatedly enunciated by the United States Government.

EXHIBIT NO. 19



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 29, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached a draft of a proposed message to Congress, to which draft the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War made material contributions, and the officers of the Department made further contributions, which together comprise the draft of the proposed message.

In order to get this to you today it has not been possible carefully to go over this draft a second time. In fact, I myself have not had time to read it at all critically, but expect to do so over the week-end and give you the benefit of any further comment or suggestions.

I also enclose a draft by the Far Eastern officials of a possible message from you to the Emperor of Japan. My personal view continues as on yesterday to be that its sending will be of doubtful efficacy, except for the purpose of making a record. It might even cause such complications

China. It was then that the American Government took its stand on the principle of the "open door" and declared that it was its policy to "seek a solution which may bring about permanent peace to China ... protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire".

Since 1898, the American Government has been conducting in the Philippines the unprecedented experiment of acquainting an Asiatic people with the methods of personal freedom and national self-government that are practiced by our own Republic. Our constant aim has been to develop the Filipino people into a self-governing and independent commonwealth. At the same time, this farsighted experiment has been and is of far-reaching importance to us and to other peoples. It is important to the material welfare of the United States that there should exist in the western Pacific a nation friendly to us by virtue of close association and profitable relations with us. Our presence in the Philippines has helped make known to the peoples of the Orient the name, the culture, the commerce and the good repute of the United States. It has helped to establish and to stabilize our relations in general with those regions

-5-

and Far Eastern areas. Treaties and agreements, especially in character and contingent upon one another, were concluded. Especially important among these were the Five Power Pact which contained pledges to respect the sovereignty of China and the principle of equal opportunity for the development of industry of all nations throughout China; and the treaty (among the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan) on limitation of naval armaments.

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American vessels, bombed American hospitals and churches and schools, destroyed a great deal of American property, ruined much American business, greatly interfered with American trade, and, in general, shown utter disregard for our rights--in law and under treaties; all this over and above and in addition to the incalculable damage that they have done to China and the suffering which they have caused to the Chinese people; to say nothing of the injuries which they have done to other nations and to civilization and to the cause of peace and good will among men.

During the past decade the childlike credulity of the American Government, as evidenced in its record in the Far East, have been endangered by a world-wide scheme of world-wide conquest devised by the so-called Axis powers. In Europe, Germany and Italy have without provocation or excuse conquered and reduced to economic slavery some sixteen other countries. In the Far East the Government of Japan associated itself with Germany and Italy in 1936, and concluded with them a treaty of alliance avowedly aimed at the United States. The powers have been attempting to carry out their unlimited conquest. In first defiance of the

-101-

And while all this is going on, Japan, bound to Germany and Italy in a treaty wherein those three powers pledged one another that if any one of them is "attacked" by an outside power not already at war, the other allies will assist that one of their members by economic, political and military means; and Japan's militant leaders declare that they will interpret their obligations under this commitment in whatever manner they may deem best suited to their own needs and purposes.

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Simply stated, what we are confronted with in the Far East is a repetition of the tactics pursued by Hitler in Europe. The methods which Hitler has used with temporary success and which are being faithfully imitated by Japan, consist of a gradual expansion of power and control over neighboring peoples by a carefully planned and executed progressive infiltration, penetration and encirclement through which one nation after another is subdued and enslaved either by actual force or by threats of force.

After this fashion and pursuing this policy of conquest by force, Japan established herself in Korea; worked her way into and finally seized Manchuria; has sought for the past four and a half years to subjugate China; has, during the period of our negotiations with her, invaded Indochina; and now, threatens with imminent attack various neighboring areas including even the Philippines.

This situation, precipitated solely by Japanese aggression, holds unmistakable threats to our interests especially our interest in peace and in peaceful trade, and to our responsibility for the security of the Philippine Archipelago. The successful defense of the United States, in a military sense, is dependent upon
supplies

-12-

supplies of vital materials which we import in large quantities from this region of the world. To permit Japanese domination and control of the major sources of world supplies of tin and rubber and tungsten would jeopardize our safety in a manner and to an extent that cannot be tolerated. Along with this would go practical Japanese control of the Pacific.

Unless the present course of events in the Far East is halted and considerations of justice, humanity and fair dealing are restored, we will witness in that region of the world precisely what has already transpired throughout the continental limits of Europe where Hitler seeks dominion by ruthless force.

A program on the part of any country for subjugation and exploitation of a huge population and a vast portion of the world is of incalculable concern to every other nation.

Throughout the period in which Japan has been making it clear that such is her program, the Government of the United States had endeavored to persuade the Government of Japan that Japan's best interests lie in maintaining and cultivating friendly relations with the United States and with all other countries that believe in orderly and peaceful processes.

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For the past eight months, conversations have been carried on between the Secretary of State and the President, on behalf of the United States, and the Foreign Minister and Premier of Japan, for the purpose of arriving, if possible, at some understanding agreeable to both Governments.

Throughout this entire period, the Government of the United States has been steadfast in its support of basic principles which should govern international relations. The principles for which we have stood in these discussions may be summarized as follows:

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:--The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes. Basically these are the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations.

this country and Nazi Germany. Concisely stated, it is an issue of autocracy versus self-determination, an issue of master and slave relationship among the peoples of the earth versus independence of nations and freedom of peoples.

The whole world is presented with the issue whether Germany, Italy and Japan are to conquer and rule the earth or are to be dissuaded or prevented, by whatever processes may be necessary, from pursuit of policies of conquest.

The question immediately presented in our Far Eastern affairs is whether the United States is or is not to stand by while Japan goes forward with a program of conquest by force--in disregard of law, in disregard of treaties, in disregard of others' rights and interest, in disregard of any and all conventions or considerations of morality and of humanity--now in eastern Asia and the western Pacific, ultimately further afield. In our own councils there are a ~~discrepancy~~ ^{variety} and a composite of issues

There are issues between principles and opportunities between confidence and fear; between reality and illusion between clear understanding and confused misunderstanding between wisdom and folly; between being fascinated and

being shortsighted; between the concept of peace at any price and a concept of peace at a price commensurate with the value of peace; between accurate appraisal and inaccurate appraisal of our own strength; between full use and fractional use of our material and moral resources.

Japan's policy of conquest and exploitation which is now being carried out in China has already utterly destroyed in the portions of China occupied by Japan the peaceful and profitable commercial relations which the United States had previously enjoyed there. It has devastated a nation which for many centuries by its devotion to the arts of peace and commerce was the most stabilizing influence on the western side of the Pacific Ocean. It threatens to transform a peaceful continent into one dominated by the military and belated will of Japan and devoted to the practice of war.

The Japanese Government are of course bent on exploitation and domination of the Chinese mainland. It has taken the Chinese people and the Chinese Government by surprise and has taken away from them their rights and liberties. It will continue to take away from them their rights and liberties until it has completely destroyed the Chinese people and the Chinese Government. It will continue to take away from them their rights and liberties until it has completely destroyed the Chinese people and the Chinese Government.

-18-

of the Philippines now depends. It would ruin the lifelong efforts and investments of thousands of American citizens who have transferred their homes and business activities to the Philippines on the faith that American principles of freedom and American methods of government would continue in those Islands. It would forever terminate the prestige and influence of the United States which the American experiment in the Philippine Islands has been establishing throughout the Orient.

If the Japanese should carry out their now threatened attacks upon and were to succeed in conquering the regions which they are menacing in the southwestern Pacific, our commerce with the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya would be at their mercy and probably be cut off. Our imports from those regions are of vital importance to us. We need those imports in time of peace. With the spirit of exploitation and destruction of commerce which prevails among the partners in the Axis Alliance, and with our needs what they are now in this period of emergency, an interruption of our trade with that area would be catastrophic.

We do not want war with Japan, and Japan does not want war with this country. If, however, war should come, the fault and the responsibility will be those of Japan. The primary cause will have been pursuit by Japan of a policy

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policy of aggression--in the course of which Japan's militant militaristic leadership has disregarded law, violated treaties, impaired rights, destroyed property and lives of our nationals, inflicted horrible sufferings upon peoples who are our friends, interfered with our trade, ruined the legitimate business of many of our nationals, compelled us to make huge expenditures for defensive armament, made threats against us, put and kept many of our people in a constant state of anxiety, and, in general, made Japan a world nuisance and made of Japan a menace to our security and to the cause of peace, of freedom and of justice.

Our policy in relations with Japan should be and is influenced not by fear of what attacks Japan, acting unlawfully and with resort to force may make upon us but by determination on our part to give the utmost support of which we are reasonably capable to the fundamental principles of order and security and justice to which we have been and are committed, with confidence that it is within our capacity to withstand any attack which anyone may make upon us because of our pursuit of that course.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

November 29, 1941

**PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE
EMPEROR OF JAPAN**

Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending the offer of friendship of the people of the United States to the people of Japan. That offer was accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective nations through the virtues of their peoples, the sound character of their respective institutions and national structures, and the wisdom of their leaders and rulers -- especially in Japan your illustrious grandfather the Emperor Meiji -- have prospered and risen to a position of being able substantially to influence humanity.

Only in situations of extraordinary importance our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation.

Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity

-2-

humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain tragic possibilities.

The history of both our countries affords brilliant examples in which your and my predecessors have, at other times of great crisis, by their enlightened decisions and acts, arrested trends and directed national policies along new and better courses -- thereby bringing blessings to the peoples of both countries and to the peoples of other lands.

Feeling deeply concerned over the present trend of events, I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought to ways of dispelling the dark clouds which loom over the relations between our two countries and of restoring and maintaining the traditional state of amity wherein both our peoples may contribute to lasting peace and security throughout the Pacific area.

EXHIBIT NO. 20

COPY OF A MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT COVERING
A PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE
EMPEROR OF JAPAN. THIS MEMORANDUM WAS SENT TO
THE PRESIDENT ON OCTOBER 17, 1941. THE PROPOSED
MESSAGE WAS NOT SENT AND NO FURTHER ACTION WAS
TAKEN.

October 17, 1941.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached a redraft of your proposed message to the Emperor of Japan.

In view of (a) the attitude shown by the Japanese Minister here in a two-hour conversation last evening with Mr. Welles and myself, indicating that the Japanese Government desires to continue its exploratory conversations with us, coupled with the fact that the Japanese Minister is, at his request, coming to call again this afternoon for a further extended discussion, (b) the message received by Ambassador Grew from Prince Konoye (through Prince Konoye's private secretary) (reported in Mr. Grew's telegram/1646, October 17, 11 a.m.) that the new Japanese cabinet would be one sincerely desirous of improving relations with the United States and of continuing the exploratory conversations, and (c) the word we have that General Tojo, a Konoye adherent and a "moderate",

-2-

"moderate", has been designated by the Emperor to form a new cabinet, we incline to the view that it would be premature to send the proposed message to the Emperor pending further clarification of the situation in Japan and of the probable attitude of the new government.

Enclosure:
Redraft of
proposed
message.

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PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE
EMPEROR OF JAPAN

Only once and in person and on an emergency situation have I addressed Your Imperial Majesty on matters of state. I feel I should again address Your Majesty because of a deeper and more far-reaching emergency which appears to be in the process of formation. As Your Majesty knows, conversations have been in progress between representatives of our two Governments for many months for the purpose of preventing any extension of armed conflict in the Pacific area. That has been our great purpose as I think it has equally been the great purpose of Your Majesty.

I personally would have been happy even to travel thousands of miles to meet with your Prime Minister, if in advance one or two basic accords could have been realized so that the success of such a conference would have been assured. I hoped that these accords would be reached. The first related to the integrity of China and the second related to an assurance that neither Japan nor the United States would wage war in or adjacent to the Pacific area.

If persistent reports are true that the Japanese Government is considering armed attacks against the Soviet Union or against British or Dutch or independent territory

-2-

territory in the south, the obvious result would, of necessity, be an extension of the Atlantic and European and Near Eastern theaters of war to the whole of the Pacific area. Such attacks would necessarily involve American interests.

The United States opposes any procedure of conquest. It would like to see peace between Japan and China. It would like to see freedom of the seas maintained and trade conducted on a fair basis. If Japan could join with us to preserve peace in the Pacific we would be only too happy to resume normal commercial relations, with the sole exception of certain articles which we must keep at home for our own defense and that of all of the Americas against possible aggression from abroad.

If on the other hand Japan were to start new military operations, the United States, in accordance with her policy of peace, would be very seriously concerned and would have to seek, by taking any and all steps which it might deem necessary, to prevent any extension of such condition of war.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

December 6, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pursuant to your request, there is sent you herewith a draft of a message from you to the Emperor of Japan.

I understand that, prior to sending the message to the Emperor, you have in mind sending a message to Chiang Kai-shek in which you would, without quoting the text of the message to the Emperor, outline to him the substance of the "stand-still" arrangement which you contemplate proposing to Japan.

From point of view of ensuring the confidential nature of your message to Chiang Kai-shek, it is suggested that you might care to call in the Chinese Ambassador and Dr. Soong, to impress upon both of them the urgency and secrecy of the matter, and to ask the Ambassador to communicate to Chiang Kai-shek, by his most secret code, your message.

Enclosure:
Draft message to
the Emperor of Japan.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

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STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

December 8, 1941.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN

I feel I should address Your Majesty because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation in relations between our two countries. Conversations have been in progress between representatives of our two Governments for many months for the purpose of preventing any extension of armed conflict in the Pacific area. It has been my sincere hope that this would be achieved and I am sure that it has equally been the sincere hope of Your Majesty.

Developments are now occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and humanity of the beneficial influence of the long and unbroken peace which has been maintained between our two countries for almost a century. Those developments are suggestive of tragic possibilities.

In these circumstances, where continuance of present trends imperil the now tenuous threads which still hold our two countries in amicable relationship, I feel that no possibility should be overlooked which might

serve

-2-

serve to relieve the immediate situation and thus enable our two Governments to work out in a calmer atmosphere a more permanent solution. I am sure Your Majesty will share my feelings in this regard.

The history of both our countries affords brilliant examples in which your and my predecessors have, at other times of great crisis, by wise decisions and enlightened acts, arrested harmful trends and directed national policies along new and farsighted courses -- thereby bringing blessings to the peoples of both countries and to the peoples of other nations.

With the foregoing considerations in mind I propose now the conclusion of a temporary arrangement which would envisage cessation of hostilities for a period of ninety days between Japan and China and an undertaking by each of the Governments most concerned in the Pacific area to refrain from any movement or use of armed force against any of the other parties during the period of the temporary arrangement. If the Japanese Government is favorably disposed toward conclusion of such an arrangement I would be glad promptly to approach the other Governments concerned with a view to obtaining their assent and commitment.

In

In order to give those Governments an incentive to enter into this arrangement, I further propose that, toward relieving existing apprehensions, Japan reduce her armed forces in French Indochina to the number which Japan had there on July 26, 1941, and that Japan agree not to send new contingents of armed forces or materiel to that area during the ninety-day period of the temporary arrangement.

If the commitments above envisaged can be obtained, I would undertake as a further part of the general arrangement to suggest to the Government of Japan and to the Government of China that those Governments enter into direct negotiations looking to a peaceful settlement of the difficulties which exist between them. Such negotiations might take place in the Philippine Islands should the Japanese and the Chinese Governments so desire.

In as much as the Chinese Government has been cut off from its principal industrial areas, I believe it equitable that during the temporary period of the proposed arrangement the United States should continue sending material aid to China. I may add that the amount of material which China is able under present conditions to obtain is small in comparison with the

amount

-4-

amount of material that Japan would save through discontinuance of operations for a period of three months.

It is my thought that while this temporary arrangement would be in effect our two Governments could continue their conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area. The kind of solution I have had and continue to have in mind is one in which Japan, on the basis of application of the principle of equality, would be provided through constructive and peaceful methods opportunity for the freer access to raw materials and markets and general exchange of goods, for the interchange of ideas, and for the development of the talents of her people, and would thus be enabled to achieve those national aspirations which Japan's leaders have often proclaimed.

In making this proposal, I express to Your Majesty the fervent hope that our two Governments may find ways of dispelling the dark clouds which loom over the relations between our two countries and of restoring and maintaining the traditional condition of amity wherein both our peoples may contribute to lasting peace and security throughout the Pacific area.

Transmit the following

Department of State

10-10-41

Department of

THE WITNESSES

WITNESSES

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 way - save time -
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 mistake

Yours

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
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Amended

EXHIBIT NO. 21

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM



TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

RECEIVED

DECEMBER 7, 1941

Department of State
Washington, D.C.



TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

RECEIVED

WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

RECEIVED

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

740.0011 P. W./684

BS/WH
DEC 12 1941
Confidential

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

London

Dated December 6, 1941

TRB
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (80)

FROM:

Director's 3:05 p.m.
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DEC 8 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY AND MOST URGENT.

5923, December 6, 7 p.m.

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY.

By number 5910 December 6, 4 p.m.

Again from London. A final conference

action just forwarded, London attend 5.

The other uncertainties as to whether destination of

is known or Benstock. Letter would not be
sent before 10 p.m.

There is one more to be sent by air
to report on the day of the day, letter
at 10 p.m. On arrival time, 10 p.m. to 10 p.m.
10 p.m. London 10 p.m. Bell's office 10 p.m.

Bottom line is to be sent to the
to the 10 p.m. to 10 p.m. to 10 p.m.
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DEC 15 1941

FILED

740.0011 PACIFIC MAIL/7-2

C 10/11/41

113, Dec 10, 1941, from London.

London, December 10, 1941. The British
 Government has received information from
 the Japanese Government that the Japanese
 Government has decided to attack the
 United States. The Japanese Government
 has decided to attack the United States
 because it is a member of the Axis
 Powers. The Japanese Government has
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WILLIAM

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE

SUBJECT

PARTICIPANTS

COPIES TO:

The British Ambassador, Sir John Greville, arrived and outlined the background of the situation, which is self-explanatory. He was very definite of opinion that what the United States Government will do if the British should resist any Japanese overtures to establish a base on the Japanese Islands at the present time is returning tomorrow morning and that I would lay all phases of the situation before him on Monday noon. This I proceeded later to do and the President agreed to notify and see the Ambassador with respect to his inquiry. Previously the Ambassador had sent me a telegram (copy attached) received from his Berlin office on this

page

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CONFIDENTIAL

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WASHINGTON

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PS/ATB

* Mr. London stated that
the telegram contained the
affirmation.

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
BY TELEGRAPH
OR BY CABLE
OR BY AIR MAIL
OR BY REGISTERED MAIL
OR BY OTHER METHOD

Department of State

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U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXHIBIT NO. 22

(Seal of Prime Minister)

10, DOWNING STREET,
WHITEHALL.

DRAFT OF PARALLEL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

Declaration by U. S. Government that:

1. Any further encroachment by JAPAN in the South West Pacific would produce a situation in which the U. S. Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the U. S. and JAPAN.

2. If any Third Power becomes the object of aggression by JAPAN in consequence of such counter measures or of their support of them, the President would have the intention to seek authority from Congress to give aid to such Power.

Declaration by H. M. G.

Same as above, *mutatis mutandis*, the last phrase reading:—" * * * their support of them, H. M. G. would give all possible aid to such Power."

Declaration by Dutch Government.

Same as that by H. M. G.

Keep the Soviet Government informed. It will be for consideration whether they should be pressed to make a parallel declaration.

AUGUST 10, 1941.

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

N. C. S. 387

From: The President

To: OPNAV "169115"

SRS

RESTRICTED

For Secretary Hull X I land Saturday afternoon and hope to reach Washington Sunday morning. I suggest you come to White House about eleven or eleven thirty Sunday and that you ask Nomura to see us at White House about four thirty in afternoon. All well best regards

ROOSEVELT.

ATLANTIC FLEET

Outgoing

121645

Routine

Secret Secret

It seems highly desirable that you and I should see Nomura as soon as I get back X Please ask the Ambassador to be ready to come to the White House either Saturday or Sunday X I shall let you know the exact time as soon as possible X White Twenty X For Secretary of State from the President.

TOD:

From: AUGUSTA	Date Aug 12, 1941	Originated	Released
Action: OPNAV, Washington	Routine:..... Priority:.....	All Despatches considered DEFERRED Unless Originator Checks Higher Classification.	
Formation:			

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Draft of a
proposed communication
to the Japanese
Ambassador brought to
the Department by Mr. Welles following
conference between the President and
Mr. Winston ChurchillAN in no
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Draft of a proposed communication to
the Japanese Ambassador brought to
the Department by Mr. Welles following
conference between the President and
Mr. Winston Churchill

NOTE

This draft was not given to the Japanese
Ambassador. See communications given
by the President to the Japanese
Ambassador on August 17, 1941.

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August 10, 1941

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EXHIBIT NO. 22A

On July 24 last the President of the United States informed the Japanese Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington that he was willing to suggest to the Governments of Great Britain, of The Netherlands and of China that they make a binding and solemn declaration that they had no aggressive intentions with regard to Indochina and that they would agree that the products and raw materials of Indochina should be available to all powers on equal terms. The President stated further that he would be willing to suggest to the powers mentioned that they undertake this declaration, in which the United States would be willing to join, upon the understanding that the Government of Japan would be disposed to make a similar declaration and would be further disposed to withdraw its military and naval forces from Indochina.

Subsequently,

Subsequently, the President of the United States informed the Government of Japan that the proposal which he had made should be regarded as being made to include Thailand as well.

The President has now been informed that the British Government is fully disposed to support the proposal made by the President.

On August 6 the Japanese Government informed the Government of the United States through the Secretary of State of a proposal which it proffered as a reply to the suggestion made by the President on July 24.

The proposal of the Japanese Government states in its first paragraph that the Japanese Government undertakes, provided the Government of the United States undertakes various steps set forth in the said proposal, that the Government of Japan, "will not further station

-3-

its troops in the southwestern Pacific areas except French Indochina and that the Japanese troops now stationed in French Indochina will be withdrawn forthwith on the settlement of the China Incident".

During past months the Governments of the United States and of Japan, through the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, have engaged in protracted conversations. These conversations had envisaged the ultimate reaching of agreements based upon certain principles and policies. The principles and policies which formed the basis for the conversations under reference were altogether at variance with the adoption by either Government of any measures involving military expansion on the part of either power through the use of force or through the threat of force. Notwithstanding these facts, the Government of Japan has already

- 4 -

already occupied Indochina with its military, air and
naval forces.

Nevertheless, in view of the statement made on the
Secretary of State on August 6 by the Japanese Ambassador
in Washington, that the Japanese Government is desirous of
providing "a fresh basis for Japanese-American understanding
in which informal conversations have been carried on during
the past months", and, although the Government of the
United States finds it necessary to state clearly that
none of the suggestions contained in the proposal of the
Japanese Government of August 6 are totally unacceptable,
it will be prepared to undertake informal conversations in
the case of this proposal upon the receipt of satisfactory
assurances by the Government of Japan that Japan will
undertake no further moves in the nature of military
expansion or in the nature of an extension of commitments

- 5 -

by use of force or threats of force of Japanese control of areas outside of the Japanese Empire while such conversations are in progress.

The Government of the United States cannot again enter upon conversations of this character with the Government of Japan if the Japanese Government has in contemplation any further steps such as that which it has recently taken with regard to Indochina or if it intends to use the position which it has attained in Indochina in furtherance of hostile action against any neighboring area; and should such conversations again be entered upon, the Government of the United States would, in case the Japanese Government gave indication of a contrary intention, be compelled immediately to withdraw from the said conversations.

Assurances on these points by the Government of Japan are regarded by the Government of the United States as an indispensable prerequisite to entry upon any discussion of any new proposals which the Japanese Government may feel moved to make looking toward conclusion of an agreement for the

the improvement of relations between Japan and the United States.

The Government of the United States shares the desire expressed by the Japanese Government that there be provided a fresh basis for Japanese-American understanding. Its patience in seeking an acceptable basis for such understanding has been demonstrated time and time again during recent years and notably so during recent months. It believes that only complete candor on its part at this moment will tend to further the objective sought.

The Government of the United States, therefore, finds it necessary to state to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring areas in the Pacific, including the mainland of Asia, the Government of the United States will be forced to take immediately any and all steps of whatever character

- 7 -

character it may deem necessary in its own security.

EXHIBIT NO. 22B

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE:

Sunday, August 10, 1941
At sea.

SUBJECT: British-American Cooperation.

PARTICIPANTS: Sir Alexander Cadogan.
The Under Secretary of State.

COPIES TO:

I accompanied the President this morning to attend the religious services and the lunch which the Prime Minister was giving for the President on the PRINCE OF WALES. Sir Alexander Cadogan told me before lunch that in accordance with the conversation which was had between the President, the Prime Minister, Sir Alexander and myself at the President's dinner last night he had made two tentative drafts covering proposed parallel and simultaneous declarations by the United States and British Governments relating to Japanese policy in the Pacific and of a proposed joint declaration to be made by the President and the Prime Minister when their present meeting was terminated. The two drafts read

as

14007-2/5 Confidential File

PS/SF

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as follows:

"Draft of Parallel Communications to the
Japanese Government.

"Declaration by the United States Government
that:

"1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the
Southwestern Pacific would produce a situation in
which the United States Government would be compelled
to take counter measures even though these might
lead to war between the United States and Japan.

"2. If any third Power becomes the object
of aggression by Japan in consequence of such
counter measures or of their support of them, the
President would have the intention to seek authority
from Congress to give aid to such Power."

"Declaration by His Majesty's Government that:

"1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the
Southwestern Pacific would produce a situation in
which His Majesty's Government would be compelled
to take counter measures even though these might
lead to war between Great Britain and Japan.

"2. If any third Power becomes the object
of aggression by Japan in consequence of such
counter measures or of their support of them, His

Majesty's

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

-3-

Majesty's Government would give all possible aid to such Power."

"Declaration by the Netherlands Government:

"1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific would produce a situation in which Her Majesty's Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the Netherlands and Japan.

"2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter measures or of their support of them, Her Majesty's Government would give all possible aid to such Power."

Keep the Soviet Government informed. It will be for consideration whether they should be pressed to make a parallel declaration.

The draft of the proposed joint declaration reads as follows:

"The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together to resolve and concert the

means

-4-

means of providing for the safety of their respective countries in face of Nazi and German aggression and of the dangers to all peoples arising therefrom, deem it right to make known certain principles which they both accept for guidance in the framing of their policy and on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; they are only concerned to defend the rights of freedom of speech and of thought without which such choosing must be illusory;

Fourth, they will strive to bring about a fair and equitable distribution of essential produce not only within their territorial jurisdiction but between the nations of the world.

Fifth, they seek a peace which will not only cast down forever the Nazi tyranny but by effective international organization will afford to all States and peoples the means of dwelling in security within

-5-

within their own bounds and of traversing the seas and oceans without fear of lawless assault or need of getting burdensome armaments."

As I was leaving the ship to accompany the President back to his flagship, Mr. Churchill said to me that he had likewise given the President copies of these documents. He impressed upon me his belief that some declaration of the kind he had drafted with respect to Japan was in his opinion in the highest degree important, and that he did not think that there was much hope left unless the United States made such a clear-cut declaration of preventing Japan from expanding further to the south, in which event the prevention of war between Great Britain and Japan appeared to be hopeless. He said in the most emphatic manner that if war did break out between Great Britain and Japan, Japan immediately would be in a position through the use of her large number of cruisers to seize or to destroy all of the British merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific, and to cut the lifelines between the British Dominions and the British Isles unless the United States herself entered the war. He pled with me that a declaration of this character participated in by the United States, Great Britain, the Dominions, the Netherlands

and

-6-

and possibly the Soviet Union would definitely restrain Japan. If this were not done, the blow to the British Government might be almost decisive.

Sumner Welles

U.S.W. JAM

EXHIBIT NO. 22C

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE:

Monday, August 11, 1941
At sea.

SUBJECT: British-American Cooperation.

PARTICIPANTS: The President.
The British Prime Minister.
Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Under
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Honorable Harry Hopkins.
The Under Secretary of State.

COPIES TO:

The President received Mr. Churchill this morning on the AUGUSTA at 11:00 a.m. There were present at the meeting Sir Alexander Cadogan, Harry Hopkins and myself.

I

The conference commenced with the subject of Portugal. The President read to Mr. Churchill the letter addressed to the former by the Prime Minister of Portugal. It was agreed by both that the contents of the letter were highly satisfactory and made possible without any difficulty the carrying out of arrangements for the occupation of the Azores as a means of ~~assurances~~ that the islands would not be occupied by Germany.

Mr.

Mr. Churchill

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Mr. Churchill stated that a highly secret operation had been ~~attended~~ ^{decided} upon by the British Government, namely, the occupation of the Canary Islands during the days immediately after the September full moon. This date, as Mr. Churchill remembered it, would be about the 15th of September. The British Government were undertaking this operation with full knowledge that the islands had been recently heavily fortified and that a very large number of German officers were engaged there in the training and preparation of the Spanish troops. It was undertaken with the further realization that this step would almost inevitably involve a Spanish attack either in conjunction with or upon the instigation of German military forces and that such attack would render untenable by the British Navy the harbor of Gibraltar. The British Government, however, had decided upon the step in view of its belief that the situation in Spain from the British standpoint was going from bad to worse and that Hitler almost inevitably would undertake the occupation of Spain and Portugal with the subsequent penetration of North Africa if any collapse took place on the part of the Russian Army or even if a winter stalemate resulted. In that event Mr. Churchill stated Gibraltar would be isolated anyway and the occupation by Great Britain of the Canary Islands was of the utmost importance

- 3 -

importance in guarding a southern Atlantic convoy route into the British Isles.

In view of this operation, the British Government would not be in a position conveniently to carry out the commitment they had made to the Portuguese Government to assist in the defense of the Azores.

In view of the contents of Dr. Salazar's letter to the President, it was therefore agreed that the British Government immediately upon the return of Mr. Churchill to London would notify Dr. Salazar that the British Government could not conveniently undertake to assist in the defense of the Azores and would further inform Dr. Salazar that they therefore desired him to request the United States for such assistance. It was agreed on the part of the President that immediately upon the receipt of such notification from Dr. Salazar the United States would send the necessary forces of occupation to the Azores and that the Brazilian Government would be simultaneously requested to send at least a token force to take part in the expedition.

The President stated to Mr. Churchill that in view of our present military situation if the United States undertook to occupy the Azores it would not be in a position in the near future at least to undertake the protection

- 4 -

protection of the Cape Verde Islands. Mr. Churchill stated that the British Government would be in a position to occupy the Cape Verde Islands with the understanding that it would later turn over the protection of those islands to the United States at such time as the United States was in a position to take those measures. Mr. Churchill further stated that during the time that the United States was landing the necessary forces in the Azores, the British Navy would maintain a large force between the Azores and the mainland of Portugal in order to render impossible the sending of any German expeditionary forces should Portugal at that time be already occupied by Germany.

II

The Prime Minister then said that he desired to discuss the situation in the Far East. He had with him a copy of a draft memorandum, of which he had already given the President a copy and which suggested that the United States, British and Dutch Governments simultaneously warn Japan that further military expansion by Japan in the South Pacific would lead to the taking of counter measures by the countries named even though such counter measures might result in hostilities between them and Japan, and, second, provided that the United States declare to Japan that should Great Britain go to the assistance

- 5 -

assistance of the Netherlands East Indies as a result of aggression against the latter on the part of Japan the President would request from the Congress of the United States authority to assist the British and Dutch Governments in their defense against Japanese aggression.

The President gave Mr. Churchill to read copies of the two statements handed to Secretary Hull by the Japanese Ambassador on August 6.

The Prime Minister read them carefully and then remarked that the implication was that Japan, having already occupied Indochina, said that she would move no further provided the United States would abandon their economic and financial sanctions and take no further military or naval defensive measures and further agree to concessions to Japan, including the opportunity for Japan to strangle the Chinese Government, all of which were particularly unacceptable.

The President replied that that was about the picture as he saw it, that he felt very strongly that every effort should be made to prevent the outbreak of war with Japan. He stated that what he intended to do was to request Secretary Hull by radio to inform the Japanese Ambassador that the President would return to Washington next Saturday or Sunday and desired to see the Ambassador immediately upon his return. The

President

- 6 -

President stated that in that interview he was told by the Japanese Ambassador that provided the Japanese Government would give the commitment contained in the first paragraph of the proposal of the Japanese Government of August 6, namely, that the Japanese Government "will not further station its troops in the South Pacific areas, except French Indochina, and that Japanese troops now stationed in French Indochina be withdrawn", specifically and not contingently, the United States Government, while making it clear that the other conditions set forth by the Japanese Government were in general unacceptable, the United States would, nevertheless, in a friendly spirit seek to explore the possibilities inherent in the various proposals made by Japan for the reaching of a full understanding between the two Governments. The President would further state that should Japan reconsider this procedure and undertake further steps in the nature of military expansions, the President desired the Japanese Government to know that in his belief various steps would have to be taken by the United States notwithstanding the President's realization that the taking of such steps might result in war between the United States and Japan.

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Mr. Churchill immediately declared that the procedure suggested appeared to him to cover the situation very well. He said it had in it an element of "face-saving" for the Japanese and yet at the same time would constitute a flat United States warning to Japan of the consequences involved in a continuation by Japan of her present course.

There was then discussed the desirability of informing Russia of the steps which would be taken as above set forth and of possibly including in the warning to Japan a statement which would cover any aggressive steps by Japan against the Soviet Union.

I stated that in my judgment the real issue which was involved was the continuation by Japan of its present policy of conquest by force in the entire Pacific region and regardless whether such policy was directed against China, against the Soviet Union or against the British Dominions or British colonies, or the colonies of the Netherlands in the Southern Pacific area. I said it seemed to me that the statement which the President intended to make to the Japanese Government might more advantageously be based on the question of broad policy rather than be premised solely upon Japanese moves in the Southwestern Pacific area.

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- 8 -

The President and Mr. Churchill both agreed and it was decided that the step to be taken by the President would be taken in that sense.

The question then arose as to the desirability of the President's making reference in his presentation to the Japanese Ambassador to British intentions in the southern Pacific region and specifically to Thailand. The President said that he thought it would be advantageous for him to be in a position at that time to state that he had been informed by the British Government that Great Britain had no intentions whatever upon Thailand. Mr. Churchill stated that in this he heartily concurred.

I asked whether it would not be better for the President to be in a position to state not only that Great Britain had no intentions of an aggression with regard to Thailand, but also that the British Government had informed the United States that it supported wholeheartedly the Presidential proposal for the neutralization of Indochina.

Mr. Churchill stated that he agreed that it would be well to make an all-inclusive statement of British character with respect to British policy, and that the President would, therefore, inform the Japanese Ambassador that he had consulted the British Government on this matter.

- 3 -

and that the British Government was in complete accord with the neutralization proposal, and that it had likewise informed the President that it would in no event undertake any initiative in the occupation of Thailand.

It was agreed that Sir Alexander Cadogan, after further consultation with Mr. Churchill, would give me in writing a statement which the British Government was prepared to make with regard to this issue.

The President expressed the belief that by adopting this course any further move of aggression on the part of Japan which might result in war could be held off for at least thirty days. Mr. Churchill felt that if negotiations or conversations actually took place between the United States and Japan on the basis which had been formulated, there was a reasonable chance that Japanese policy might be modified and that a war in the Pacific might be averted.

III

Mr. Churchill then said that he desired to bring up for discussion the proposed joint declaration by the President and himself.

The President said that he believed the best solution of this problem was for an identical statement to be made in London and in the United States, probably on Thursday, August 14, to the effect that the Prime

Minister

- 10 -

Minister and the President had met at sea, accompanied by the various members of their respective staffs; that these members of the two Governments had discussed the question of aid under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act to nations resisting aggression, and that these military and naval conversations had in no way involved any future commitments between the two Governments, except as authorized under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act; that the Prime Minister and the President had between them discussed certain principles relating to a better future for the world and had agreed upon a joint declaration which would then be quoted verbatim.

Mr. Churchill dissented very strongly from the form in which the President had desired to make it clear that no future commitments had been entered into. The President stated that that portion of the proposed statement was of extreme importance from his standpoint inasmuch as a statement of that character would make it impossible for extreme isolationist leaders in the United States to allege that every kind of secret agreement had been entered into during the course of these conversations.

Mr. Churchill said that he understood that side of the question, but that he believed that any categorical statement of that character would prove deeply discouraging

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discouraging to the populations of the occupied countries and would have a very serious effect upon their morale. He likewise made it clear that a similar effect would be created by British public opinion. He asked if the statement could not be worded in such a way as to make it positive rather than negative, namely, that the members of the staffs of the Prime Minister and of the President had solely discussed questions relative to the furnishing of aid to the countries resisting aggression under the terms of the Lend-Lease Act. The President replied that he believed that the statement could be drawn up in that way and that if he then were queried in the United States he need merely reply that nothing had been discussed or agreed upon other than that which had already been indicated in his public statement.

I then gave the President, Mr. Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan copies of a redraft which I had made this morning of the proposed joint declaration before Mr. Churchill had arrived and had had an opportunity of going over it with the President, and the latter had approved it. Mr. Churchill then commenced to read it. He suggested that there be inserted in the text of the third point before the word "self-government" the words "sovereign rights and". This was agreed upon.

Mr.

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Mr. Churchill then read the fourth point which read as follows: "Fourth, they will endeavor to further the enjoyment by all peoples of access, without discrimination and on equal terms, to the markets and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity."

He immediately inquired whether this was meant to apply to the terms of the Ottawa agreements. I replied that, of course, it did, since the policy which the United States Government had been pursuing for the better part of nine years had been addressed primarily towards the removal of all of those artificial restrictions and controls upon international trade which had created such tragic havoc to world economy during the past generation. I said I understood fully the immediate difficulties which this occasioned him, but I pointed out that the phraseology was "they will endeavor to further" and that this naturally did not imply a formal and immediate contractual obligation on the part of his Government. The President stated that he believed the point was of very great importance as a measure of assurance to the German and Italian peoples that the British and the United States Governments desired to offer them, after the war, fair and equal opportunity of an economic character.

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The Prime Minister said that, of course, he was without any power himself to agree upon this point. He set forth in considerable detail the position of the United Kingdom vis-à-vis the Dominions and emphasized his inability, without the agreement of the Dominions, to enter into the proposed declaration insofar as this point was concerned. He said that insofar as he himself was concerned the issue was one with which his own personal life history was connected. He referred to the days at the outset of the century when Joseph Chamberlain first brought up the proposal for Empire preferences and the predominant part which this issue had played in the political history of Great Britain during the past forty years. He said that he felt that the proposal as now phrased would have the enthusiastic support of all the liberals everywhere. He said that he himself was heartily in accord with the proposal and that he himself had always been, as was well known, emphatically opposed to the Ottawa agreements. He said, however, that it would be at least a week before he could hope to obtain by telegraph the opinion of the Dominions with regard to this question.

Harry Hopkins then suggested that Sir Alexander Cadogan and I be requested to draft new phraseology which would take care of those difficulties and prevent the de-

lay

- 14 -

lay of which Mr. Churchill spoke. He said it was inconceivable that the issuance of the joint declaration should be held up by a matter of this kind.

I said that in my own judgment further modification of that article would destroy completely any value in that portion of the proposed declaration. I said that it was not a question of phraseology, that it was a question of a vital principle which was involved. I said that if the British and the United States Governments could not agree to do everything within their power to further, after the termination of the present war, a restoration of free and liberal trade policies, they might as well throw in the sponge and realize that one of the greatest factors in creating the present tragic situation in the world was going to be permitted to continue unchecked in the post-war world. I said that the trade policies of the British Empire during the latter portion of the nineteenth century had, I felt, contributed enormously to the same and prosperous condition of the world at that time, and that, of course, I realized that the tariff policies pursued by the United States and many other countries during that period had played an important part in the creation of the evils which had sprung up after the last war. I said, however, that it seemed to be imperative that we try to agree now upon the policy of constructive sanity in world

economics

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economics as a fundamental factor in the creation of a new and better world and that except through an agreement upon such a policy by our two governments there would be no hindrance whatever to a continuation later to the present German practices of utilizing their trade and financial policies in order to achieve political ends.

Mr. Churchill agreed very emphatically to this policy. He and Sir Alexander Cadogan both agreed that it was not a question of phraseology, but that they were up against a material obstacle which Mr. Churchill had already indicated. The Dominions would have to be consulted. It might well be that an agreement could not be had from the Dominions and that consequently the proposed joint declaration could only be issued some time after news of the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister had been given out. Mr. Churchill suggested that the inclusion before the phrase "they will endeavor to further" of the phrase which would read "with due regard for our present obligations" might ease the situation.

The President suggested, and Mr. Churchill agreed, that the latter would try and draft some phraseology which would make that situation easier, and it was arranged that I would call later in the afternoon upon the Prime Minister and Sir Alexander Cadogan to go over with them such redraft as they might have in mind.

Mr.

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Mr. Churchill was in entire accord with points five and six.

He then read point seven and after discussion at the meeting of this point it was agreed that the phrase "to use force" be replaced by the word "aggression" in the second sentence of the seventh point.

Mr. Churchill said that, of course, he was heartily and enthusiastically in favor of this point seven, which had been initiated by the President. He inquired, however, whether the President would not agree to support some kind of "effective international organization" as suggested by the Prime Minister in his original draft of the proposed joint declaration.

The President replied that he did not feel that he could agree to this because of the suspicions and opposition that such a statement on his part would create in the United States. He said that he himself would not be in favor of the creation of a new Assembly of the League of Nations, at least until after a period of time had transpired and during which an international police force composed of the United States and Great Britain had had an opportunity of functioning. Mr. Churchill said that he did not feel that he would be candid if he did not express to the President his feeling that point seven would create a great deal of

opposition

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opposition from the extreme internationalists. The President replied that he realized that, but that he felt that the time had come to be realistic and that in his judgment the main factor in the seventh point was complete realism. Mr. Churchill then remarked that of course he was wholeheartedly in favor of it and shared the President's view.

The meeting then broke up and I arranged with the President that I would drop by to see him after my conference later in the afternoon with the Prime Minister. The latter stated that he would not be able to leave until at least 5:00 p.m., tomorrow, August 12, and that as he felt it of importance to reach a complete meeting of minds with the President upon all of the issues involved, that he would be willing to spend an additional twenty-four hours should that be necessary.

Sumner Welles

U SW.GAL

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point four was far broader and more satisfactory than the minimum which the President had instructed me, after our conference of the morning, to accept, I raised no objection thereto, and with regard to the proposed change in point seven I stated that while it was completely satisfactory to me and entirely in accord with my own way of thinking I had no idea what the President's decision might be. I said that I would have to submit it to him.

Sir Alexander stated that the Prime Minister felt very strongly--perhaps exaggeratedly--the opposition which would be created on the part of a certain pro-League-of-Nations group in England to the contents of point seven declaring for the disarmament of nations which undertook aggression outside of their frontiers. He went on to say that while he believed there would not be the amount of opposition which the Prime Minister anticipated he nevertheless thought that it would be a tragic thing to concentrate solely upon the transition period after the war was ended when some kind of joint police power would have to be exercised by the British and by the United States Governments and omit any reference to the need of the creation of some effective and practicable international organization which would function after the transition period was concluded. I said that as

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I had already indicated while I was in full agreement with his own views the matter would have to be determined by the President.

We discussed the desirability of informing the Chinese Government of the steps which the United States Government in the person of the President was taking with regard to Japan. I said that while I felt very definitely that every effort should be made to keep China closely informed of what was being done in her interest by Great Britain and by the United States I wondered whether telling China of what the President intended to state to the Japanese Government at this particular moment would not mean that the Government at Chungking for its own interests would make public the information so received. If publicity resulted, I stated I feared that the extreme militaristic element in Tokio and that portion of the Tokio press which was controlled by Germany would immediately take advantage of the situation so created to inflame sentiment in Japan to such an extent as to make any possibility remote, as it might anyhow be, of achieving any satisfactory result through negotiation with Japan. Sir Alexander said he was entirely in accord and would be governed by those views. He said, of course, I realized how terribly persistent the Chinese were and that the present Ambassador in

London

-4-

London, Mr. Wellington Koo, would undoubtedly press him day in and day out to know what had transpired at the meeting between the Prime Minister and the President with regard to China. He said that he felt that the best solution was for him merely to say in general terms that the two governments had agreed that every step should be taken that was practicable at this time for China and its defense and avoid going into any details.

I subsequently went to see the President. The President said that he was entirely in accord with the redraft of point four which was better than he had thought Mr. Churchill would be willing to concede. He also accepted without question the amendment made by Mr. Churchill to point seven and the President said that it seemed to him entirely desirable since the amendment made it clear that once the war was over a transition period would have to take place and that the permanent international organization would only be set up after that experimental period had passed. He had jotted down certain minor changes in the text of the proposed joint declaration, most of which were merely verbal changes for the purpose of clarification.

I said I felt it necessary for me to ask him whether he did not believe that a very considerable
opposition

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opposition on the part of extreme isolationists in the United States would result from that portion of point seven which declares in the judgment of the United States that it is essential that aggressor nations be disarmed. I said that if a great Power like the United States publicly declares that something is essential, the inference is that that Power is going to do something itself about it. I said it appeared to me more than likely that the isolationists will insist that this public statement by the President meant that the United States would go to war in order to disarm not only Germany but even possibly Japan and theoretically, at least, even the Soviet Union if that country should later once more embark upon aggression on its neighbors. The President replied that the whole intent of point seven, as he saw it, was to make clear what the objective would be if the war was won and that he believed people in the United States would take that point of view. He further said he felt the realism inherent in article seven was one which would be apparent to the enormous majority of the American people and that they would enthusiastically support the need for the disarmament of aggressor nations.

I said I also had been surprised and somewhat discouraged by a remark that the President had casually

made

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made in our morning's conference--if I had understood him correctly--which was that nothing could be more futile than the reconstitution of a body such as the Assembly of the League of Nations. I said to the President that it seemed to me that if he conceived of the need for a transition period upon the termination of the war during which period Great Britain and the United States would undertake the policing of the world, it seemed to me that it would be enormously desirable for the smaller Powers to have available to them an Assembly in which they would all be represented and in which they could make their complaints known and join in recommendations as to the policy to be pursued by the major Powers who were doing the police work. I said it seemed to me that an organization of that kind would be the most effective safety valve that could be devised.

The President said that he agreed fully with what I said and that all that he had intended by the remark he made this morning was to make clear his belief that a transition period was necessary and that during that transition period no organizations such as the Council or the Assembly of the League could undertake the powers and prerogatives with which they had been entrusted during the existence of the League of Nations.

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I further said that while from the practical standpoint I was in agreement that the United States and Great Britain were the only Powers which could or would exercise the police trusteeship and that it seemed to me that it would be impossible if such a trusteeship were set up to exclude therefrom the other American republics or for that matter the countries at present occupied such as Norway, the Netherlands, and even Belgium. The President said that he felt that a solution for this difficulty could probably be found through the ostensible joining with Great Britain and the United States of those Powers, but it would have to be recognized that it would be ostensible since none of the nations mentioned would have the practical means of taking any effective or, at least, considerable part in the task involved.

I said that it seemed to me that now that the text of the joint declaration had been agreed upon, since I assumed from what Mr. Churchill had told me that the British Government would support his recommendations with regard thereto, all that was left to do in the way of drafting was the preparation of the brief statement which would be issued simultaneously in London and at Washington announcing that the President and the Prime Minister had met, referring to the discussions under

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the Lease-Lend Act and the inclusion at the termination thereof of the text of the joint declaration. I said that Mr. Churchill had told me that he had cabled his Government that he was not leaving Argentina until Wednesday afternoon and said it seemed to me that everything could be definitely agreed upon and cleared up by 1:00 p.m. tomorrow, and I could see no practical reason for waiting another twenty-four hours. The President agreed and said that he would try and get a decision reached in that sense when he saw Mr. Churchill this evening.

Sumner Welles

U SW.GAN

EXHIBIT NO. 23

HM: This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated November 23, 1941.

Rec'd 12:55 a. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

Triple Priority

5670, November 26, 6 a. m.

MOST SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"Your message about Japan received tonight. Also full accounts from Lord Halifax of discussions and your counter project to Japan on which Foreign Secretary has sent some comments. Of course, it is for you to handle this business and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai Shek? Is he not having a very thin diet? Our anxiety is about China. If they collapse our joint dangers would enormously encrease. We are sure that the regard of the United States for the Chinese cause will govern your action. We feel that the Japanese are most unsure of themselves."

HM

WINANT.

EXHIBIT NO. 24

CJ: This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON,

Dated November 30, 1941.

Rec'd 1:28 p. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

5770, November 30, 4 p. m.

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences. I realize your constitutional difficulties but it would be tragic if Japan drifted into war by encroachment without having before her fairly and squarely the dire character of a further aggressive step. I beg you to consider whether, at the moment which you judge right which may be very near, you should not say that "any further Japanese aggression would compel you to place the gravest issues before Congress "or words to that effect. We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a joint declaration, and in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize our action with yours. Forgive me, my dear friend, for presuming to press such a course upon you, but I am convinced that it might make all the difference and prevent a melancholy extension of the war".

EDA

WINANT.

EXHIBIT NO. 25

E

DATE RECEIVED: 1, 1962

Rec'd. 3:02 P.M.

1954, December 1, 2 P.M.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECURITY AGENCY

1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 26

[illegible]

1. The first step in the process of identifying a problem is to recognize that a problem exists. This is often done by comparing current performance with a desired state or goal. If there is a discrepancy, a problem is identified.

711.54.600

DE 68-1341

-2- #1874, December 1, 8 p.m., from Tokyo

is a position to mould public opinion to the justified conviction that Japan can now achieve without force of arms the desired purposes for which she has hitherto vainly been fighting. These unofficial views have been indirectly conveyed to the Foreign Minister. I have furthermore expressed my disagreement to the Prime Minister, at this critical moment, should he be called to deliver an address as Minister of War, and I have indicated the position and feeling of the Japanese Government and people.

Japan's newspapers report that the Government is in a state of indecision, while resiliating the difficulty of maintaining its present position of neutrality, however it is determined to maintain the Western position.

DATA

END

EXHIBIT NO. 26

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

SEP 24 1948

SEP 20 1948

Confidential File

4 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

1. The first group of people who are interested in the study of the history of the United States are the people who are interested in the history of the United States.

[illegible]

...the world of the future, the world of the present world

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED**FROM**

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM



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1

-3- 1920, September 12, 11 p.m., from ...

to the achievement of such an outcome and
future security.

GREW

10

(*) apparent mission

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-368611)
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-100000)
SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (C)

Figure 1

• 2000 •

10. The fact that the defendant is a member of the Communist Party is a factor in the determination of the defendant's guilt, and the fact that the defendant is a member of the Communist Party is a factor in the determination of the defendant's sentence.

1. The first, I am, revised the structure of the first part of the document, to be consistent with the second part of the document.

CONFIDENTIAL, U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1967 O - 341-100-1
 100-341-100-1

1. ... that the American Minister's
... threats on the part of the ...
... have in mind a " ...

"theory of international relations". 1

that the "golden rule" had come to mean "do unto others as they do unto you," and that object was, in fact, to make the

1. *How do you think the Internet will affect the future of the book?*
 2. *How do you think the Internet will affect the future of the library?*

1. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* were determined by the method of Lichtenthaler (1987).

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Journal of Management Education, 20(6), 709-728

1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 26

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En

-2- 0020, September 12, midnight from Tokyo.

hand is being overplayed, there will eventually ensue a reverse swing of the pendulum in which a reconstruction of good relations between the United States and Japan will be possible. The alternative seems to me to be hopeless.

The foregoing analysis, which has been drafted with care over a period of several days, has the expressed complete concurrence of the Naval, Military and Commercial Attaches and all other members of the Imperial Staff at this Embassy.

(END OF MESSAGE)

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EXHIBIT NO. 27

"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Introduction (Pamphlet edition, 1942) Department of State Publication 1853.

(Not reprinted by the Joint Committee. For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.)

EXHIBIT NO. 28

"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Introduction and Documents (Cloth edition, 1943) Department of State Publication 1983.

(Not reprinted by the Joint Committee. For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.)

EXHIBIT NO. 29

"Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941", Volumes I and II (1943) Department of State Publication 2008.

(Not reprinted by the Joint Committee. For sale by the Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.)

EXHIBIT NO. 30



"Ten Years in Japan", by Joseph C. Grew; Simon and Schuster (1944).

(Not reprinted by the Joint Committee.)

EXHIBIT NO. 31




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



57

AIR MAIL



~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

No. 2167

To the American Ambassador,
Tokyo.

The Secretary of State encloses for the strictly confidential information of the American Ambassador a copy of a despatch (no. 971) of April 4, 1941 from the American Ambassador at Lima in regard to the attitude of the Peruvian Government in the event that the United States and Japan become involved in the war on opposing sides.

Enclosure:

Despatch (no. 971)
of April 4, 1941.

APR 1941

FM:OS:OJL

FB

4-26-41

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
 FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 WASHINGTON, D. C.
 12-11-41
 (1-1)

Dear Sir:

Enclosed for you are


12, 11-11-41.

Very truly yours,

A few days ago the Japanese Navy
 announced the sinking of the transport ship
 USS *Winn* (T-10) in the Pacific Ocean.
 The ship was carrying a large number of
 troops and supplies. The Japanese Navy
 claimed that the ship was sunk by a
 submarine.

Yours

1-11



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

Telegram no. 200

Date

From: Bern

Rec'

It is reported by Lewis that he sec-
ing from a contact connected with the In-
Section of the Army of Switzerland: By
October, Japan will have gone into the
end of the same month, Germany will have
in Africa with the two hundred fifty thousand
of Rommel increased to a million. A par-
enforcements who have now finished train-
recently noted in Strasbourg, Karlsruhe,
as in other districts. Likewise, there
reports of troops around Bayonne. Simul-
will be made against Cyprus, Turkey, Biz-
Once the Japanese are involved in the war
by the Germans that the United States will
the Pacific Ocean and will be incapable
expedition to Dakar.

It is requested by the Military Att-
above information be communicated to the
HARRIS

U-L:SM:MPM

9-12-41

Copies to Major Dusenbury.

NYC

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect ☐ Full rate
☐ Day letter
☐ Night letter

Charge Department:

☐ Full rate
☐ Day letter
☐ Night letter

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

740.0011 P. W./601

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NOV 8 1941 PM

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Enciphered by

Sent by operator M. 19

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Santiago

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (R)

FROM

Dated December 2, 1941

Rec'd 11:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

671, December 2, 6 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR UNDER SECRETARY

ROSSETTI informs me the Japanese Minister tells

his war is almost inevitable and has asked the

privileges for Japanese in Panama to come to Chile.

This request was refused and Chilean Minister

and Consul in Panama were sent telegraphic in-

structions not to grant visas. He says that

Japanese were under close and constant observation.

He adds that the possibility of sabotage from our

mainline lines of ships and railroads connecting

through the coast is thoroughly appreciated here

and that every precaution has been taken.

Suggest that telegram from the Secretary of
Hawaii to Rosetti expressing appreciation of
the dispatch with which matters affecting the two
governments have been attended to and have no
voluntary effect.

LMS

CONFIDENTIAL

DEC 16 1941

711.94/2511

PS/AD

Confidential File

EXHIBIT NO. 32

MESSAGES BETWEEN WAR DEPARTMENT A
FROM JULY 8 TO SEPTEMBER 7, 1941

(All dates refer to 1941)

Date	From	To
8 July.....	Adj Gen.....	Short.....
25 July.....	CNO.....	Kimmel et al.....
16 Oct.....	CNO.....	Kimmel et al.....
20 Oct.....	Adj Gen.....	Short.....
24 Nov.....	CNO.....	Kimmel et al.....
26 Nov.....	Adj Gen.....	Short.....
27 Nov.....	Marshall.....	Short.....
27 Nov.....	Marshall.....	Western Defense Com- mand.....
27 Nov.....	Marshall.....	MacArthur.....
27 Nov.....	G-2.....	G-2 Hawaii.....
28 Nov.....	MacArthur.....	Marshall.....
27 Nov.....	Short.....	Marshall.....
28 Nov.....	Adj Gen.....	Short.....
28 Nov.....	Arnold.....	Hawaiian Air Force.....
28 Nov.....	Western Defense Com- mand.....	Marshall.....
28 Nov.....	Caribbean Defense Com- mand.....	Adj Gen.....
29 Nov.....	Short.....	Adj Gen.....
29 Nov.....	Caribbean Defense Com- mand.....	Adj Gen.....
4 Dec.....	Hawaiian Air Force.....	Arnold.....
5 Dec.....	G-2.....	G-2 Hawaii.....
7 Dec.....	Marshall.....	Short.....

[1] Secret
94 WAR BC 207 WD

WASHINGTON,

C G

Hawn Dept., Fort Shafter, T. H.

Nine two four seventh AGMC for your information de from numerous sources is that Japanese Govt has de policy which is supported by all principal Japanese groups period This policy is at present one of w probable aggressive action against maritime province Siberian Garrison has been materially reduced in streng that Germany will win a decisive victory in European that Jap activity in the south will be for the present development of naval army and air bases in Indo Ch against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely rule pact with Russia may be abrogated period They hav in U. S. Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by fi ment of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended vessels are being requisitioned

[2] Drafter: Op-12.
From: Chief of Naval Operations.
Released by: H. B. Stark.
Date: July 25, 1941.

A
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SF

252023

This is a joint dispatch from the CNO and the Chief of Staff US Army X Appropriate addressees deliver copies to Commanding Generals Hawaii Philippines and Caribbean Defense Command and to General Chaney in London XX You are advised that at 1400 GCT July twenty-sixth United States will impose economic sanctions against Japan X It is expected these sanctions will embargo all trade between Japan and the United States subject to modification through a licensing system for certain material X It is anticipated that export licenses will be granted for certain grades of petroleum products cotton and possibly some other materials and that import licenses may be granted for raw silk X Japanese assets and fund in the United States will be frozen except that they may be moved if licenses are granted for such movement X It is not repeated nor expected that Japanese merchant vessels in United States ports will be seized at this time X United States flag merchant vessels will not at present be ordered to depart from or not to enter ports controlled by Japan X ONO and COS do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventualities X Action being initiated by the United States Army to call the Philippine Army into active service at an early date XX This despatch is to be kept secret except from immediate Navy and Army subordinates X SPENAVO informs CNS but warn him against disclosure X Action addressees this dls are Cincpac Cincant Cincac Com Fifteen Spenavo London XX

Secret

[3] Drafter: Op-12.
From: CNO.
Released by: Ingersoll.

Date: October 16, 1941.

Addressees Priority
For action
CINCLANT
CINCPAC
CINCAF
(Acknowledge)

162203

CR 0534

The resignation of the Japanese cabinet has created a grave situation X If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti American X If the Konoye cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the US X In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility X Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers X In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X Second and third addressees inform appropriate army and naval district authorities X Acknowledge XX

Secret

[4] Secret
8 WVY BC 47 WD

WASHN., D. C., 1234P., Oct. 20, 1941.

20th Following War Dept. estimate of Japanese situation for your information stop Tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no repeat no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent

ADAMS

1087A

[5] Sealed Secret
Drafter: Op-12.
From: Chief of Naval Operations.
Released by: Ingersoll.

Date: November 24, 1941.

Addressees
For action
CINCAF
CINCPAC
COM 11
COM 12
COM 13
COM 15
For information
SPENAVO LONDON
CINCLANT

242005

CR0443

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X This situation coupled with statements of Japanese government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action aedes to inform senior army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately.
Copy to WPD, War Dept., and to
Op-12 but no other distribution

[6] Secret
RCA 831 US Govt

November 26, 1941

Washington, D. C., Nov. 26, 1941. 1149P.

COMMANDING GENERAL,

Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, T. H.

Four Six Five Twenty Sixth

Reference two B dash twenty four airplanes for special photo mission Stop It is desired that the pilots be instructed to photographic Truk Island in the Caroline group Jaluit in the Marshall group Stop Visual reconnaissance should be made simultaneously Stop Information desired as to the number and location of naval vessels including submarines comma airfields comma aircraft comma guns comma barracks and camps Stop Pilots should be warned islands strongly fortified and manned Stop Photography and reconnaissance must be accomplished at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the vicinity Stop Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed Stop Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self preservation Stop The two pilots and copilots should be instructed to confer with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advise Stop If distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great comma suggest one B dash twenty four proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake comma then Philippines by usual route photographing Ponape while enroute Moresby Stop Advise pilots best time of day for photographic Truk and Jaluit Stop Upon arrival in Philippines two copies each of any photographs taken will be sent to General MacArthur comma Admiral Hart comma Admiral Kimmel comma the Chief of Naval Operations comma and the War Department Stop Insure that both B dash twenty four airplanes are fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure from Honolulu

ADAMS

[7] Secret

Priority

Priority

November 27, 1941.

COMMANDING GENERAL,

Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

No. 472

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue Period Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment Period If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act Period This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense Period Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent Period Report measures taken Period Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan Period Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers

MARSHALL

War Department message center; Please send same radiogram to: Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, Quarry Heights, C. Z.

[8]

Priority

November 27, 1941.

COMMANDING GENERAL,
Western Defense Command,
Presidio of San Francisco, California.

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue period Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment period If hostilities cannot repeat cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act period This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense period Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent period Report measures taken period A separate message is being sent to G dash two Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in United States period Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan period Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers

MARSHALL

[9]

Priority

November 27, 1941.

COMMANDING GENERAL,
U. S. Army Forces in the Far East, Manila, P. I.

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only barest possibilities that Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue period Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment period If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act period This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize the successful defense of the Philippines period Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary period Report measures taken period Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in revised rainbow five which was delivered to you by General Brereton period Chief of Naval Operations concurs and request you notify Hart

MARSHALL

Secret

[10]

Secret

P 2 War WD Prty

Washington, D. C., November 27, 1941.

G-2 HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Ft. Shafter, T. H.

473-27TH

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate stop Hostilities may ensue Stop Subversive activities may be expected Stop Inform commanding general and Chief of Staff only.

MILES

144PM

[11]

NOVEMBER 28, 1941.
453AM

From: Manila, P. I.
To: General George C. Marshall
No. 1004, November Twenty-eighth.

Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two four air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy stop Ground security measures have been taken stop Within the limitations imposed by present state of development of this theatre of operations everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense stop Intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy.

MACARTHUR

Secret

1330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[12]

NOVEMBER 28, 1941
557AM
Secret

Priority

From: Fort Shafter T. H.

To: Chief of Staff

No. 959 November 27th

Report department alerted to prevent sabotage period Liaison with Navy reurad four seven two twenty seventh.

SHORT.

[13] Secret

Priority

114 War Kr 189 WD Prty

Washn D. C. 842P Nov. 28, 1941

C G

Hawn Dept. Ft. Shafter T. H.

482 28th critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren see paragraph three mid SC thirty dash forty five end paren stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions

ADAMS
Secret

[14] secret

Priority

COMMANDING GENERAL,

Sent No. 484, 11/28

Hawaii Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.:

Attention Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force period That instructions substantially as follows be issued to all establishments and units under your control and command is desired colon against those subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of the War Department paren see paragraph three mid SR three zero dash four five paren the present critical situation demands that all precautions be taken at once period It is desired also that all additional measures necessary be initiated by you immediately to provide the following colon protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda comma protection of all activities against espionage comma and protection against sabotage of your equipment comma property and establishments period This does not repeat not authorize any illegal measures period Avoiding unnecessary alarm and publicity protective measures should be confined to those essential to security period Para it is also desired that or on before December five this year reports be submitted to the Chief Army Air Forces of all steps initiated by you to comply with these instructions period signed Arnold.

ADAMS.

A. F. No. 461

Secret

[15]

Secret

Received: NOVEMBER 28, 1941.
11:18 PM

From: HQ WDC Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.,

To: General George C. Marshall

November 28th:

Report following measures taken as per your radio Nov twenty seven: Your radio paraphrased to Commanding Generals ADC, Second Air Force, Fourth Air Force, Ninth CAD, Pacific Coastal Frontier Sectors, Ninth Corps Area and Commandants Eleventh Twelfth and Fifteenth Naval Districts. All harbor entrance

control posts continuously manned. One gun battery each harbor defense continuously alerted. Protection against sabotage and other subversive activities intensified. Six infantry battalions and necessary motor transportation alerted so as to be instantly available to CG NCA to carry out his missions under Rainbow Five. Constant contact being maintained with corps area and naval district commanders and full cooperation assured. PCF, sector and subsector plans Rainbow Five practically completed and necessary reconnaissance being made to carry out defense of critical areas. Two rifle companies furnished CG SF P of E for guard duty and one company furnished to CG NCA for internment aliens at Angel Island. Paren in connection this report see my radio to CG GHQ Nov twenty fifth which recommended that WPL five two be extended to include Pacific coast and Japanese vessels and which outlined steps taken by me in preparation therefor. As Air Forces as well as other Army forces will be involved in the execution of WPL five two or the preparatory stage of Rainbow Five it is strongly urged that I be authorized to direct operations of Air Forces in defense [15A] of the PCF or that instructions be issued specifying air action and that I be furnished a copy of such directive. Should hostilities occur this command now ready to carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan except for woeful shortage of ammunition and pursuit and bombardment planes which should be made available without delay.

DeWITT, Commanding.

[16]

Secret

Received, NOVEMBER 29, 1941.
346 AM

From: Panama.

To: The AGO.

Panama No. 569; November 28th:

Reurad four six one November twenty seven signed Marshall report requested being forwarded air mail. CDO six eight seven.

ANDREWS.

[17] Secret

Priority

29 NOVEMBER 1941.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL

War Department, Washington D C

Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth comma full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren paragraph three mid SC thirty dash forty five end paren and Military Establishments including personnel and equipment Stop As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants comma telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma this headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides comma in effect comma that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence comma invasion comma insurrection etc Stop Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connection therewith comma being committed against vital installations and structures in the Territory Stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations Stop In this connection comma at the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordinance which permits the Commanding [17A] General Hawaiian Department comma to close comma or restrict the use of and travel upon comma any highway within the city and county of Honolulu comma whenever the Commanding General deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense Stop The authority thus given has not yet been exercised Stop Relations with F B I and all other Federal and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters.

SHORT

[18]
Secret

NOVEMBER 29, 1941.

Subject: Measures Taken for the Defense of the Caribbean Area.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. In compliance with radiogram No. 461 from the Chief of Staff, dated November 27, 1941, report that the following measures are in effect for the protection of the Caribbean Area:

a. *Naval Measures.* At the present time, it is believed that the defensive measures for the Caribbean Defense Command center largely around the Panama Canal; however, a plan for furnishing Army support to the Navy has been worked out and coordinated with the various Naval commanders in the Caribbean Theater. In the Panama Sector, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District is conducting continuous surface patrol of the area included within the Panama Coastal Frontier, supplemented, within the limits of the aircraft at his disposal, by an air patrol. In my opinion, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District does not have sufficient aircraft or vessels within his control for adequate reconnaissance.

b. *Measures for the Defense of the Panama Canal.* No additional measures other than those already in effect, have been taken for the defense of the Panama Canal, except to increase inspections in order to insure the alertness of troops. Measures, in effect are:

(1) *Harbor Defense.* Troops are on a continuous alert. Harbor defense is coordinated with the naval defense.

(2) *Aircraft Warning Service.* The two detectors installed are on a 24-hour alert. Seven observation posts have been established at various places in Panama with direct radio communication to the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center. Within the means on hand, every effort is being made to complete the installation of other detectors now available within the Department.

(3) *Antiaircraft Artillery.* All available antiaircraft equipment is installed and on a 24-hour alert.

(4) *Anti-Sabotage.* Locks and other sensitive areas are continuously guarded, and all approaches to the sensitive areas are covered by mound bunkers. Approaches to bunkers and between bunkers where practicable are covered by patrols. Transit guards are placed on all vessels transiting the Canal.

(5) *Counter-espionage.* Active counter-espionage measures are being taken continuously.

[18A] (6) *Counter-subversive activities,* with the cooperation of the Republic of Panama, are in continuous operation. Plans have been prepared with the cooperation of the Republic of Panama, for the internment of aliens, and a list of those who should be interned upon the outbreak of hostilities has been prepared and is in the hands of the American Ambassador, to be transmitted to the Panamanian Government. The Canal Zone itself has already been cleared of any known suspects.

(7) *Air Force.* A portion of the pursuit is on a continuous 24-hour alert. The Bomber Command headquarters maintains a 24-hour alert. This latter applies to the whole Caribbean Area.

c. *In Caribbean Theater, other than Panama Canal Department.*

(1) Air Corps units with from three to six B-18 or B-18-A medium bombers have been stationed at St. Croix, Antigua, St. Lucia and British Guiana. The 9th Bombardment Group (less squadrons in St. Lucia, British Guiana, and Surinam), with six B-18-A medium bombers, has been stationed at Trinidad. These units have a reconnaissance mission in the vicinity of these bases and a mission to support the Navy.

(2) A composite squadron with six (6) B-18-A medium bombers and eight (8) P-40 pursuit planes will arrive in Surinam about December 3, 1941.

(3) The ground elements of Force "A" consisting of Headquarters and Service Detachments, three composite companies of infantry and three antiaircraft platoons (each with six .50 Cal. machine guns) are enroute to Surinam. Entire force should arrive by December 5, 1941.

(4) One battalion, 33rd Infantry, with certain service elements, will be moved to Trinidad, departing Panama on December 3 and 13, 1941. One pursuit squadron will be moved to Trinidad as soon as transportation is available.

2. The efficacy of the measures taken for the defense of the Caribbean is qualified by certain deficiencies which exist in the Caribbean Defense Command. These deficiencies are:

a. *Harbor Defenses:* Less than one complete manning detail available for the harbor defense armament.

b. *Aircraft Warning Service* is totally inadequate in personnel to supervise the installation of detectors on hand and in personnel to man the equipment when installed (see 1st Ind., these headquarters, dated October 17, 1941, to The Adjutant General, on AG 320.2 (8/23/41) MC-C, dated September 2, 1941, subject: "Air Defense Organization").

c. Antiaircraft Artillery has insufficient personnel to man armament now being installed in the Canal Zone, and inadequate protection against low-flying aircraft, particularly at night, since it has only sufficient ammunition for one minute of fire per gun for its 37 mm guns, and no barrage balloons. There is also a lack of proper searchlights to light field of fire of automatic weapons.

[18B] d. *Air Forces.* No night pursuit. No VHF radio equipment with which to direct pursuit in the air. Only eight modern long-range bombers and twelve modern light bombers are available within the Caribbean Defense Command. No 37 mm cannon for P-39's.

e. The situations in Puerto Rico and the Base Commands are so new, and their major deficiencies so well known that no attempt has been made to enumerate them.

F. M. ANDREWS,

Lieutenant General, United States Army, Commanding.

[19]

Secret
11 WTJ
1251P/4th

Received ~~DECEMBER~~ 10, 1941
124 P. M.

From: Ft. Shafter, TH
To: Chief Army Air Corps.
No. 1038, December 4th.

Following report in compliance with instructions contained in a war four eight four dash twenty eight colon instructions contained in subject radiogram issued to all establishments and units under control of Hawaiian Air Force on twenty nine November Stop Entire subject of protection recently received comma and continues to receive comma detailed and comprehensive attention as result of three reports prepared by special inspector during June and July for one Stop Para additional steps initiated specifically to comply with subject radiogram substantially as follows colon assembly of intelligence officers of major subdivisions of Hawaiian Air Force twenty nine November Stop Personal inspection of stations and activities by air force commander one and two December Stop Increase in size of guard where desirable Stop Instructions issued to expedite overhauling of pass system comma civilian and military comma now in progress Stop This entire department is now operating and will continue to operate under an alert for prevention of sabotage activities Stop Para secrecy discipline being given all emphasis practicable through official and quasi official agencies Stop Work has actually been begun on essential protective fencing and flood [19A] lighting projects Stop Para with reference to counter propaganda comma the problem is educational rather than regulatory and at present is being dealt with through the medium of squadron talks Stop Need is felt for a War Department publication paren possibly in form of development and expansion of foreword to soldiers handbook comma FM twenty one dash one hundred paren suitably arranged and worded for use of relatively inexperienced personnel comma dealing with status of soldier as citizen comma ideals and doctrines influencing founders of American Government comma structure of government comma place of military establishment in the structure comma national objectives comma both domestic and international comma together with discussion of those forms of government inimical to democratic form Stop Signed Martin end

SHORT.

[20]

Secret

Sent No. 519, 12/5

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS,

G2 Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Territory Hawaii.

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.

MILES.

[21]

Secret

1549WS Washington DC 74/78 RCA USG ETAT 7 1218P.

C G

Hawn Dept Ft. Shafter, T. H.

529 7th Japanese are presenting at one pm eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop inform naval authorities of this communication

MARSHALL.

EXHIBIT NO. 33

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Military Intelligence Estimates, 1 July-7 December 1941

Item	Date	Subject
1	7 July	Estimate of the Eastern Siberian Situation.
2	11 July	Strategic Estimate of the Situation.
3	17 July	Japanese Movement into French Indo-China.
4	17 July	Mobilization of Additional Japanese Manpower.
5	18 July	New Japanese Cabinet.
6	18 July	Strategical Estimate of the Situation.
7	25 July	Sanctions against Japan.
8	30 July	German-Japanese Relations.
9	16 August	Developments in the Far Eastern Situation.
10	20 August	Chinese Resistance.
11	2 September	Conversation between the Japanese Military Attache and the Chief, Far Eastern Section.
12	5 September	Brief Periodic Estimate of the World Situation.
13	11 September	Political Developments in Japan.
14	17 September	Combat Estimate, Japan.
15	18 September	Strategic Estimate of the Situation.
16	23 September	Crisis in Japan.
17	2 October	Japanese-American Relations.
18	16 October	Fall of the Japanese Cabinet.
19	17 October	Japan's New Premier.
20	21 October	Kwantung versus the Siberian Army.
21	1 November	Possible Japanese Drive into Yunnan.
22	2 November	G-2 Estimate Far Eastern Situation.
23	13 November	Possible Japanese Drive into Yunnan.
24	25 November	Far Eastern Situation.
25	26 November	Japanese Naval Task Force.
26	27 November	Recent Developments in the Far East.
27	29 November	Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941-March 31, 1942.
28	5 December	Supplementary Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941-March 31, 1942.
29	6 December	Estimate of Japanese Strength in Indo-China.
30	6 December	Estimate of Japanese Air and Ground Forces in Indo-China, Hainan and Formosa.

NOTE. Items 2, 6, 8, 9, 12, 15, 17, 22, 23, 25 26 were classified Secret.

Items 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30 were classified Confidential.

I. B. 98

JULY 7, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Estimate of the Eastern Siberian Situation.

1. Eastern Siberia, that is to say, the region lying between Lake Baikal and the Pacific Ocean, is a distinct entity quite separate from the other portions of Siberia and old Russia. Remote and lying behind the Lake Baikal-Lena River barrier, its terrain is not that of the swampy railway-dominated wilderness of Central Siberia but admits of normal troop deployments and operations. It is economically distinct in its mineral deposits, its fisheries and its self-contained economy. Politically and psychologically it is distinct, little changed from Czarist days. It thinks for itself and will act for itself first, and for the rest of Russia only secondarily.

2. It is quite within the range of possibility that should Stalin and his communist regime be driven out of Russia the retreat would be to this Far Eastern Region.

3. The Russian forces in this region are a homeogenous army of 51 divisions, 2,500 tanks, 1,600 airplanes, 94 submarines and 220 coastal boats as opposed to Japanese forces of 10 divisions, 1,000 tanks, 300 airplanes and a balanced Fleet. The distribution and relationships of these forces are shown on the accompanying map.

4. This region is potentially a sufficiently homeogeneous one to constitute an effective buffer-state between the Bering Sea Region and the Axis powers, German or Japanese.

5. A German occupation of Eastern Siberia would require the employment of combat forces of such size as to be very difficult, if not impracticable, of accomplishment at the end of a 2,000 mile single railway system. The Axis allocation of this region, therefore to Japan is the more likely procedure, though supported perhaps by German air power and political pressures.

6. With the memory of the Russian superior fighting ability demonstrated in the border affrays of 1938-39, the Japanese are unlikely to take aggressive action against Eastern Siberian land forces. This is confirmed by evidence from other and highly authoritative sources of reluctance to change from their present southern orientation to a northern one. This, however, does not preclude increasing Japanese pressures through Outer Mongolia towards Verkhneudinsk, of naval blockades of the entrances to the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk and possibly Bering Sea.

/s/ C. H. Mason,
C. H. MASON

Colonel of Infantry, G. S. C.,
Chief, Intelligence Branch.

Distribution:

The President
Secretary of War
Chief of Staff
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence
G. H. Q.
General Embick
Mr. McCloy (Record Section)

I. B. 108-2

JULY 11, 1941.

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.

Subject: Strategic Estimate of the Situation.

1. At your informal request there are attached revised data on the foreign situation. These data supersede those furnished by 1st Indorsement, May 26, 1941, to your memorandum W. P. D. 4510, May 24, 1941.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

1 Incl.—G-2 Data for W. D. Strategic
Estimate of the Situation.

DATA FOR WAR DEPARTMENT STRATEGIC ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. SUMMATION OF THE SITUATION

a. Germany, possessing a central position and ground and air forces superior to any individual opponent, has exercised her initiative by attacking Russia. This attack will be at least so successful that, subsequent to the fall of 1941, Germany will have regained her ability to strike outwards from a central position.

b. The British Empire, widespread, with superior surface sea power, but deficient in man power, organization and battle leadership, is necessarily on the defensive. To her, the German attack on Russia affords a breathing spell in which she can buttress her home and Middle Eastern defenses. Assumption of the strategic offensive in any theater is beyond her power.

c. U. S. S. R., ill organized but formidable because of her size, is exposed to the full vigor of German attack. The most that can be expected of her is that she will remain in being in her distant fastnesses after the German onslaught has been spent. However, the German attack has cancelled out Russia as an Axis source of supply from the short-term viewpoint.

d. The United States, with a superior navy in one ocean, but without effective weapons and with but few combat organizations, is committed to opposition to Germany, is providing limited material support to the Axis' enemies, but lacks the means to take overt battle action against Germany in her own or anyone else's behalf.

e. All other countries are but the fringing satellites of the four great powers. China, Italy and Japan have some military, but indecisive potency. The others are themselves trivial, or of importance only in combination with others.

2. SITUATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL POWERS

a. Germany

(1) Germany is now engaged in a major war with Soviet Russia and has launched an offensive on the very broad front from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. In this offensive, her armies are supported by the armed forces of Finland, Slovakia, Hungary and Rumania.

(2) A large part of the German Army of 260 divisions is engaged in this Russian offensive, although some 60 divisions remain on guard in Western Europe and Norway against the possibility of a British attack in the West.

(3) The bulk of Germany's 20 armored and 20 motorized divisions are also thought to be engaged in this Russian campaign.

(4) A large part of the German Air Force of some 11,000 planes in 850 combat squadrons, and organized into seven or more air fleets, is conducting offensive operations against Russia, while at the same time there has been held a considerable number of air units in Western Europe and the Mediterranean as a defensive precaution. Around 5,000 planes in combat squadrons are believed to be participating in the campaign against Russia. To provide this operating mass of aircraft, the air forces in the Western European and Mediterranean Theaters have necessarily had to be greatly reduced below the levels prevailing in May, 1941.

(5) The German Navy, much inferior in tonnage to the British and recently weakened by the loss of the "Bismarck," is conducting an aggressive submarine campaign against British shipping with about 150 submarines. An unknown number of German auxiliary cruisers are also aggressively active against British seaborne commerce.

(6) The political and economic situation in Germany is sound. The "Hess affair" does not seem to have affected adversely the will of the German nation to continue the war.

(7) German-French relations are improving as the two nations draw closer together. Already the economic resources of France are beginning to play a considerable role in the German war effort.

(8) In consequence of this major offensive against Russia, no German offensive operations are to be expected in any other theaters of war in the immediate future. In particular, no invasion of England or of Iceland is probable during the remainder of 1941. Germany's ground forces will, undoubtedly, remain on the strategic defensive in both the Western European and Mediterranean Theaters until she can spare troops and aviation from Eastern Europe.

(9) In case of victory over Russia during the summer or fall of 1941, one may expect as logical further German moves:

(a) The consolidation of the German hegemony in Europe (less the British Isles).

(b) The expulsion of Britain from the Mediterranean.

(c) The continuation of the war of attrition against the British seaborne commerce.

(10) The complete entry of the United States into the War would probably not change the plans of the German High Command nor affect for the present Germany's military, political and economic position. It would undoubtedly depress somewhat the war spirit and morale of the German people. It would so stimulate the morale and hopes of Germany's subject populations as to increase greatly the Reich's problems in controlling them. On the other hand, our entry into war would cause Germany to activate her existing fifth column arrangements in Latin America.

b. Japan

(1) *Military Situation.* Japanese forces are deployed over a wide area from Karafuto in the north to Indo-China in the south. The Chinese, in spite of internal friction, continue to resist passively any advance by the Japanese forces. Japan has for some time been gradually assembling an expeditionary force, originally for a possible movement into southeast Asia, but which now may eventually be used in an attack upon the Maritime Provinces.

(2) *Economic Situation.* Japan is economically weak because she lacks essential war materials, adequate foreign exchange, sufficient foreign trade; she is also encumbered with financial problems connected with the war in China.

Economically Japan will be no worse off than she is at the present time unless greater obstacles are placed before her economic progress. Availability of German technical advice and the acquisition of war materials from Thailand and Indo-China will improve her economic position. Japan is increasing her imports of oil from the United States instead of decreasing them. Japan could not be thrown into bankruptcy under present circumstances; if she undertakes a war with a major naval power, much greater obstacles would immediately be placed before her economic progress.

(3) *Political Situation.* The Japanese will support any decision made by the Japanese Government. The military and naval authorities continue to be the predominant influence in Governmental decisions. It is believed that the naval authorities, and business interests will exert every effort to avoid a conflict with the United States regardless of the latter's participation in the European War.

(4) *Psychology of Japanese.* The intense patriotism, the remarkable recuperative capabilities and an indomitable tenacity of purpose along with a frugal and low standard of living have enabled the Japanese people to accept and even support the frightful cost of the indecisive war in China.

(5) *Lines of Action.* Japan has the following alternatives:

(a) Maintain status quo in China.

(b) Withdraw her armed forces from the area south of the Great Wall, make peace with Chiang Kai-Shek and use only economic penetration into south-eastern Asia.

(c) Withdraw sufficient forces from the Chinese mainland to facilitate an advance:

(1) *Southward.*

(a) Contain or isolate the Philippine Islands and Hong Kong, attack British Malaya via Thailand and Indo-China or by direct attack by land, sea, and air.

(b) Contain or isolate the Philippine Islands and Hong Kong, and attack the Netherlands' East Indies or Borneo.

(c) Reduction of the Philippine Islands and Hong Kong prior to movement to the south.

(2) Northward against Russia to secure the Maritime Provinces Japan has long regarded as indispensable to her security.

Actions indicated in (1) are all contingent upon the success of the Axis forces in the European War.

(6) *Most Probable Action.* Japan will probably continue to assemble, by gradual withdrawals from China, a field force for possible employment either in Southeastern Asia or against Russia. Her hopes of empire are bound up with an Axis victory and she is subject to strong German pressure to attack Russia at

once; nevertheless it is believed that she will avoid precipitate action and will continue her policy of avoiding war with Russia on the one hand and with the United States and Great Britain on the other. If forced or if electing to choose between action against Russia or to the Southwest, she will be influenced by Germany's success against Russia, particularly as regards possible Russian troop withdrawals from Siberia, and by America's action, particularly as regards the distribution of United States' naval strength, and as regards attempts to send supplies to Russia through Vladivostok. Should the choice be the southward advance, it will probably consist of a containment of Hong Kong and the Philippine Islands while attacking British Malaya via Thailand and Indo-China.

c. British Empire.

(1) The British Empire, at war, is on the defensive; its army, naval and air strength dispersed on exterior lines, with the United Kingdom, a theatre of combat partially encircled by hostile assault positions, absorbing the principal effective military strength. The Imperial Forces are composed of an equivalent of 84 divisions, 233 squadrons and some 360 war ships. The Army has suffered severe reverses in the past year but its morale is still high. There is a great shortage of supporting weapons, tanks, antiaircraft and antitank guns and ammunition in the Army in all theatres. While the Navy has lost several important vessels in the Atlantic, the Home Fleet has had several valuable additions. The Mediterranean Fleet was severely damaged at the Battle of Crete. Economically the condition of the Empire is not satisfactory; unless more severely restrained, German attacks on the vital sea lanes could make the United Kingdom's condition critical in less than six months. Politically the Empire is intact; so far, no important territory has been lost to the enemy. Psychologically the whole people have developed a will to win, and an increasing application of all energy to the war effort is noted. At present the Empire is not able to assume the offensive except in air raids of limited depth on the continent of Europe and in minor areas such as in Syria. Forces in the United Kingdom have limited capacity for raids against the German-held coast line of Europe. In spite of many defeats the spirit of the people is unperturbed and morale is unbroken.

(2) Great Britain still faces a possibility of invasion. Some 40 divisions and an estimated 180 squadrons of first-line airplanes are in a state of readiness to repel a German attack. The Army forces are well-trained and continuously exercised; the air forces are, in fact, constantly engaged in combat. The Army is supported by a well organized and partially armed Home Guard and an effective civil organization to counter the probable German efforts to create confusion before and during invasion. The Royal Air Force has successfully restricted large scale German air attacks on England to night operations. While it has not been able to prevent German air raids on shipping, it has become increasingly effective in a narrow zone on the Continent during the pre-occupation of the German air force in Russia. The principal mission of the Fleet at present is to reduce shipping losses due to German attack on vital sea lanes. A readily assembled naval force is a vital factor for the defence of the British Isles against invasion. The promptness of action and effectiveness thereof will be increasingly influenced by the measure of relief from distant patrolling which might result from American naval patrols east of the 30th Meridian. The reduction of shipping losses is one of the keys to the situation of Great Britain. In addition to the importation of raw materials (some 30,000,000 tons) to keep industry going, the United Kingdom must import an absolute minimum of 10,000,000 tons of food-stuffs, per annum, for human consumption.

(3) In the Middle East (Mediterranean area), the British have available some 16 divisions. They have finally disposed of all Italian forces in East Africa but they have lost their previous gains in Libya. A beleaguered British garrison at Tobruk, some 30,000 strong, is in a precarious position. A recent British offensive with one of its objects to relieve that situation ended in defeat. It is expected that the Germans will concentrate on an effort to reduce the British position. A British offensive is not possible although there may be a desperate effort to fight their way out. A small British force has put down the uprising in Iraq and has cooperated with other small British and the Free French forces in consolidating Syria. The British defeat at Crete was a severe one, especially for the Royal Navy. Repairs to individual ships and small reinforcements have enabled the fleet to participate in the Syrian campaign and to continue in a limited fashion its attack on Italian and German war communications. The Cretan campaign has definitely proved that the Mediterranean Fleet is no longer free to operate at will in that sea so long as German and Italian shore-based aviation

are maintained in their respective positions in effective strength. The opportunities for the Fleet and its future usefulness are therefore bound to more and more restricted. Already the supply of the British troops in Malta and Tobruk is a very serious matter and the supply of British troops in the Eastern Mediterranean area must now be undertaken through the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. The withdrawal of the Fleet from the Mediterranean is likely, especially if there is sufficient warning of a resumption of a major German threat in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Royal Air Force operating in the Middle East consists of approximately 30 squadrons. The principal key to the Middle East situation is the receipt of supplies from the United States. It is problematical if these will arrive in sufficient quantity or time to enable the British Command to arm and equip sufficient forces to maintain the defence of that area.

(4) In the Far East (Singapore area), there are approximately $4\frac{1}{2}$ divisions, 2 Indian, 1 Australian, and the remainder made up from local forces. At Hong Kong there is approximately a brigade of British troops and a few local units. The Royal Air Force has about 13 squadrons in this area. There are also minor naval forces.

(5) Lines of Action :

To continue on the strategic defensive in all theatres until such time as unforeseen events will permit the offensive, and to seek by every possible means to bring the United States into the war at the earliest possible moment.

d. Italy

(1) Italy, although previously defeated in the Mediterranean, has now emerged a tarnished victor as the result of active German support. While her East African colonies must be written off, she has acquired considerable Balkan territory, including the strategically important and long-desired Dalmatian coast, and her North African colony, Libya, is again almost in her possession.

(2) The Italian Army, which must be considered second rate, consists of approximately 86 divisions. It is estimated that trained man power is available for an additional 64 divisions, provided Germany could and would furnish the necessary equipment. There are about 1,500 so-called first line planes in the air force which are inferior to those of Germany and Great Britain in performance and armament. Pilots are not well trained. The Navy has, to date, made a sorry showing; however, it still must be reckoned a potent force with its present strength of 4 battleships, 11 cruisers, 75 destroyers, and 72 submarines, especially if supported by ground-based German aviation and operating against a weakened British Mediterranean fleet.

(3) Italy lacks practically all essential raw materials, including oil and steel, and was prepared for a war of only a few weeks' duration. Due to the British blockade, she has become dependent on Germany for most of her supplies, food excepted, which is resulting in German control of her industries. With rationing, she has sufficient food for her needs and is able to furnish a certain amount to Germany.

(4) The general unpopularity of the war, coupled with disastrous military defeats, resulted in rather open criticism of the Fascist Regime, together with considerable discontent. However, recent German-assisted victories and the fact that if Mussolini goes, the Germans will take over completely, have strengthened the position of Il Duce and have bolstered the morale of the mercurial Italian.

(5) Italy may be considered a second-rate military power that is a potential threat as long as she is backed by German military might. She is now in the position of a satellite of Germany, to be employed in any capacity that Hitler believes will further his aims. In this connection, the obvious and almost certain lines of action open to Italy are: (1) to maintain the defensive Axis position in the Mediterranean until the completion of the Russian campaign; (2) to provide the garrisons for the recently conquered Balkan countries; (3) to send a contingent of troops (probably a "token" one) to participate in the Russian campaign; and (4) to assist in the warfare on British shipping.

(6) The entry of the United States into the war should have no immediate effect on Italy other than causing a certain lowering of Italian morale due to the fact that a longer war is presaged.

e. France

(1) Metropolitan France, politically subservient to Germany, economically impotent and faced with possible starvation this Winter, hating the Germans and Darlan and beginning to criticize even Petain, has an Army (94,200 men) and an Air Force (273 planes) of no combat value.

Fleet (1 Battle Cruiser, 7 Cruisers, 34 Destroyers, 30 Submarines) has potential value. It is conceivable that Darlan might order it to aid Germany. Division of opinion among officers is accentuated by Vichy's decision to collaborate.

The recent creation of the Croatian kingdom under Italian suzerainty tends to free France from the traditional Italian claims in Nice and Corsica and so removes one of the French fears of further Axis aggression.

The long-range possibility exists that growing hatred of Germans and of the Darlan regime, fanned by food shortage, will produce an internal crack-up with obvious repercussions in other occupied countries.

Conclusions. Ground and air forces will not fight for Germany and cannot fight for Britain or even for themselves.

If ordered to aid Germany, some fleet units would be scuttled, some would run for North (or West) Africa, some would follow orders. Potential value of fleet as such would be destroyed.

US participation in the war would not alter the situation except to hasten the internal crack-up—especially if accompanied by wise radio propaganda.

(2) *Syria*, has just been conquered by British and Free French forces. Conquest of Syria by Britain will strengthen Allied *geographical* position in Near and Middle East but will increase administrative responsibilities and will require fair sized force for occupation and police, in other words, dispersion of military forces.

(3) *North Africa*, best governed of French territories, is short of food and other supplies, and is subject to intense Nazi propaganda. It has 8 incomplete Divisions (80,000 men), lacking mechanized equipment and short of munitions for major operations. General Weygand is much respected and strongly dislikes Germans and Darlan. Air Force has 286 planes; Navy has—Algeria; 7 Destroyers, 13 Submarines—Morocco: 1 incomplete Battleship, 7 Destroyers, 2 Cruisers, 4 Submarines. The Navy is less anti-British than the Toulon Force; the navy commander is strongly pro-American. Combat value of the troops is high.

Conclusions. Weygand will make every effort to prevent extension of collaboration to Africa but lacks means for aggressive action and can defend only if assured of prompt and adequate aid. He would not accept British aid initially.

US participation, if accompanied by materialization of prompt and adequate aid, will enable Weygand to hold North Africa.

(4) *Dakar* is the headquarters of the West Africa Government, Anti-American feeling is current there now due to unwise press and radio references to Dakar. A vital strategic location, with excellent port and air facilities, well defended from sea and air, it has successfully withstood one attack from the sea. West Africa has 6 Divisions (70,000 men), 96 planes, 1 immobilized Battleship, 8 Cruisers, 2 Destroyers, 10 Submarines. Dakar is vulnerable from land side—forces landing at St. Louis (186 miles North by good road and railroad) and Bathurst (162 miles South by good road and ferry).

Conclusions. Dakar will resist British attack. Navy would resist strenuously any US Navy attempt to take it; Army and Air Force would resist initially and half-heartedly; public would welcome US effort if wise radio propaganda prepares the way.

(5) *De Gaulle* has 2 completely equipped Divisions and a third in process of formation. Majority of his forces are with the British in East Africa and Egypt; 1 Division is operating in Syria.

Conclusions. Vichy collaboration will accelerate increase of Free French forces. Wise radio propaganda will step up the acceleration. Reported that Weygand dislikes de Gaulle personally but it is believed that—in the event of US participation—an offer by de Gaulle to place himself and his forces under Weygand's orders, to regain French independence, would be accepted. But all these forces are too inherently unstable and weak to form the predicate of any American plan.

f. *Netherlands*

(1) *Western Hemisphere possessions:*

Surinam: 950 troops, mostly black and mostly at Paramaribo; inadequately armed and equipped. The threat from 6,000 criminal prisoners in adjoining French Guiana is faced by 50 Dutch Marines on border.

Curacao: 1010 troops, including 618 British Infantry.

Aruba: 899 troops, including 612 Cameron Highlanders (Flanders veterans).

Bonaire: 50 Military Police.

Conclusions: It is believed that, preceded by proper diplomatic negotiations, U. S. occupation, in trust, of Netherlands possessions in Western Hemisphere would be welcome.

(2) *The Netherlands East Indies*, well governed, prosperous, untroubled by native difficulties or unrest, has about 80,000 men under arms, mostly on Java but with garrisons at important centers on Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes. The Island of Java and main centers on other islands are well fortified, harbors are mined, oil properties are adequately prepared for quick destruction if necessary, Navy has 3 Cruisers, 7 Destroyers, 13 Submarines, 40 auxiliaries—all modern. Air force has about 450 planes, mostly American and with large proportion of bombers. Continuous reconnaissance flights are made over the whole archipelago constantly. Defense plans are coordinated with those of British at Singapore and the Dutch have a firm determination to defend stubbornly.

Conclusions: The Netherlands East Indies will offer stubborn defense to attack. If the attack is determined and sustained, outer islands will have to be sacrificed, after destruction of oil properties, and defense will concentrate on Java which can be held until adequate naval aid arrives from U. S. forces. It is not believed that Britain is in a position to give the required aid alone.

g. U. S. S. R.

The U. S. S. R. is now engaged in a defensive war with Germany and has available for operations the following forces:

(1) *Military Forces*.—180 infantry divisions; 44 cavalry divisions; 79 tank brigades; 39 air divisions (total number of planes, 6,600). It is estimated that 5,000 planes are physically present in the western and southwestern frontier districts. General effectiveness estimated fair.

(2) *Naval Forces*.—Are considered a negligible factor in this war effort.

The definite policy of the Government is to pursue a defensive course and provide adequate armed defense forces in the critical areas of the Soviet Union. Active participation in offensive operations as acts of aggression are not the policy of the Regime; however, in areas where U. S. S. R. vital interests and defense demand that aggressive military operations be undertaken, such action has been taken and will follow.

(3) *Economic*.—Major effort within the Soviet Union industrially is to provide for the immediate self-sufficiency of the nation in munitions and war supplies. Transportation and production are inefficient, due to faulty production methods, inadequate supply of high-grade machine tools, and a lack of qualified technicians.

(4) *Morale*.—Morale within the Red Army is good; morale of the population is satisfactory in spite of the low standard of living, purges, etc.

(5) *Political*.—The recent pact with Japan indicates definite agreement with respect to the Far Eastern situation. A declaration on the part of Great Britain supporting Russia as an ally in the Russian-German conflict has again given Russia a definite place in European affairs.

The Comintern through the Soviet Regime is striving for a world revolution in the interests of Communism. Unless the U. S. S. R. emerges one of the victors in this war, Communism will definitely be on the way out in Europe.

The U. S. S. R. has the following lines of action open in case the United States entered the war as an ally of Great Britain and Russia: (1) Vigorous offensive conduct of the European conflict. (2) Continue a defensive war as at present until offensive operations can be conducted, assisted by British-U. S. support.

(3) Continued withdrawal, if necessary, to the Urals to avoid decisive defeat to lengthen German supply difficulty. It is believed the U. S. S. R. would adopt action (2).

h. Latin America.

(1) The Latin American republics, while able to defend themselves against internal aggression, cannot do so if the subversive elements are given direct support by the German air forces. These countries, due to their geographical and economic situation, their insistent demands for military assistance have become liabilities to the United States.

(2) The German military successes have increased their reluctance to permit the United States to establish desired military and naval bases.

(3) The necessity of U. S. bases in Latin America has become not only essential but *urgent*.

(4) The establishment and occupation of bases requires, at least, several months.

(5) The time has come when the United States must make specific requests for immediate concession of bases at Natal, Brazil; the Galapagos Islands, Ecuador; Buenaventura, Colombia; and Acapulco, Mexico. Further postponements, particularly as regards Natal, might prove disastrous if the Germans seize the French naval base at Dakar. The American Republics must be shown that further delay in the concession of bases might not only be interpreted as an attitude of non-cooperation, but that it will also jeopardize the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the integrity and independence of their Sovereignty.

JULY 17, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Japanese Movement Into French Indo-China.

1. As was made known to the Chief of Staff July 15, 1941, the Japanese Government on July 12, 1941, delivered what amounts to an ultimatum to the Vichy Government, the terms of which, among other items, provided for the occupation by Japanese armed forces of eight air bases and two naval bases in Southern Indo-China (see attached map).

2. It is the considered opinion of this Division that this Japanese movement as planned, while opportunistic in conception, was also strategically defensive in character and designed primarily to prevent British and American influence from shutting off supplies of rubber, tin and rice from Thailand and Indo China which are badly needed by Japan.

3. The French were given until July 20th in which to comply with Japan's demands. Military preparations were initiated by the Japanese, but no military pressure had been put on Indo-China up to midnight July 15-16.

4. On July 16th the Japanese Cabinet resigned en masse. It is too early to attempt a detailed explanation of this act. For the present, it must be taken as further proof of the fact, known for some time, that there was an element of violent discord in the inner government circles of Japan.

5. Until the personnel of the new Cabinet is announced it would be futile to attempt a prediction as to Japan's possible change of policies. One fact seems evident, however, and that is that Vichy will be given a breathing spell and the expedition to Indo-China may be deferred or even abandoned.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Enclosure 1.

cc: A. C. of S., WPD.

JULY 17, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Mobilization of Additional Japanese Manpower.

1. Prior to the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet, July 16, 1941, a large scale mobilization was started in Japan under unusual conditions of secrecy. This mobilization is continuing.

2. The Military Attache in Tokyo reports that a part (strength unknown) of this new force is being shipped to Manchoukuo to join the Kwantung Army.

3. In view of the fact that the major part of the Japanese Army is pinned down in China without a large mobile reserve and the further fact that the Siberian Army is about twice the size of the Kwantung Army (20-30 Divisions to 12), the strengthening of the Japanese force in Manchoukuo appears to be a logical precautionary procedure.

4. Whether she moves south or north Japan needs more men.

5. In the opinion of this Division the first aggressive move, if made, will be into Indo-China to deny this region to a DeGaulist Pro-British, Pro-American faction steadily growing in power there. Japan, while building up her strength in Manchoukuo, will then await the outcome of the German-Soviet War. If

and when Germany crushes European Russia and the Siberian Garrison deteriorates in strength or morale, Japan will probably move in to seize the long desired Maritime Provinces of Siberia.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Copy to War Plans Division.

I. B. 99

July 18, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: New Japanese Cabinet.

1. A United Press dispatch from Tokyo dated July 18, 1941, states that Prince Konoye has selected the key men for a new and highly militaristic Cabinet. Vital posts are reported as follows:

Premier.....	Prince Konoye
War Minister.....	General Tojo
Navy Minister.....	Admiral Oikawa
Home Minister.....	Baron Heranuma
Foreign Minister.....	Admiral Toyoda

2. The first four named above are hold-overs from the former Cabinet. Admiral Toyoda replaces former Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

3. Admiral Toyoda was a protege of the former Admiral Baron Saito (assassinated in 1936 while Premier) and is regarded as a moderate. He is known as a clever, able officer, a specialist in Ordnance, and as having had considerable experience in diplomacy, particularly with the British.

4. The new Cabinet may be regarded as strongly nationalistic, and while probably more moderate and conservative than would have been the case had an Army Officer been given the portfolio as Foreign Minister, it may be that added impulse will be given to Japan's Southward Advance. In this connection, it must be remembered also that Admiral Toyoda has just completed a tour as Minister of Commerce and Industry, and is fully aware of the deplorable condition of Japan's foreign trade and internal economy. He may be expected, therefore, to take steps, as Foreign Minister, which will improve foreign trade conditions since such trade is the life blood of industrial Japan.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:

Secretary of War
Chief of Staff
War Plans Division
GHQ
ONI
General Embick
Mr. McCloy (Record Section)

JULY 18, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Strategical Estimate of the Situation.

1. The following estimate has been prepared as requested in Memorandum from the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, 4570, June 6, 1941, which requested information on the Axis Powers as of July 1, 1941, July 1, 1942, and July 1, 1943, as a basis for the War Department STRATEGIC ESTIMATE. Specific data requested in paragraphs 2 (1), (2) of the Memorandum cited and (3) on Axis naval, air and field forces are enclosed.*

2. Estimate of disposition—military, political, economic and psychological.

a. July 1, 1941.

Germany, with the initiative, was employing the mass of her ground and air forces against the U. S. S. R., without, however, relaxing her campaign against shipping serving the British Empire. Elsewhere the military effort of the

*Omitted.

European Axis was at a minimum. Japan, her army practically contained by China, was contemplating action against Indo-China, but her policy was dominated by the uncertainties arising from the Russo-German campaign and the final outcome of the whole war. An Axis political offensive was in full swing with a view to consolidating a "United States of Europe" to include Spain and Portugal and the French, Spanish and Portuguese possessions in Africa. Axis propaganda was being used effectively in Latin America and throughout Islam and with less effect in the United States and India.

b. *By July 1, 1942.*

(1) The following are envisaged:

(a) German defeat of U. S. S. R. and re-establishment of German military initiative.

(b) Participation of the U. S. in the war under Rainbow 5.

(2) Under the foregoing the following are estimated to be the Axis disposition and capabilities:

[2] German occupation of the U. S. S. R. to Lake Balkal and possibly to the Pacific. Possible Japanese occupation of the Maritime Provinces of Siberia. Axis control of Africa, roughly north of the line Fernando Po—Djibout is either accomplished or imminent. Continuation of the aerial and naval siege of the British Isles. German attempt to invade Great Britain or (more probable) a broad strategic movement through the Middle East toward the Indian Ocean, possibly in conjunction with a southwestward advance by Japan. The political consolidation of Europe under German leadership will have been accomplished, but the political cohesion of this entity will be low. Germany and Japan will be obviously war-weary. Economic exploitation of the U. S. S. R. will have barely begun. While still debarred physically, militarily and economically from Latin America, the Axis will have achieved a considerable amount of political disunion in that area by intrigue and propaganda. German propaganda will tend to have become less effective in India, the United States and the Mohammedan world.

c. *By July 4 1943.* Axis dispositions and capabilities are estimated as follows:

Germany will still possess superior ground forces. The invasion of the British Isles, if not already achieved, will now be impracticable. Germany will have extended her penetration southward in Africa and will still be able to renew the offensive in the Middle East. Japan, if not irrevocably committed to war on the side of the Axis, will tend to stand aloof. German economic exploitation of Russia will have progressed, but the general economic condition of Europe will be low. Axis morale will be generally low and war-weariness will be rife. There will be no real political cohesion in Europe. The Axis propaganda effort, centered on Latin America will be losing ground.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Enclosure
Distribution
War Plans Division
G. H. Q.
General Embick
Mr. McCloy (Record Section)
dya

JULY 25, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Sanctions against Japan.

I. Discussion.

1. On July 12, 1941 the Japanese Government announced that it had decided to take over control of the nation's capital funds which are to be mobilized in the interests of the state. The new policy apparently discards the past economic set-up and calls for mobilization and distribution of capital at the will of the government in order to attain maximum production as well as to bolster the defense structure.

2. The new policy is obviously a belated attempt to improve the deplorable economic conditions in Japan—conditions pointed out in confidential Economic Estimate, Japan, May 27, 1941, compiled in the Far Eastern Section, this Division, a copy of which is attached hereto as Tab I.*

*Omitted.

3. This centralization of capital, which is merely an extension of the control which the government has already secured over industry and other branches of Japanese economic life, will undoubtedly bring about a more efficient control of Japan's internal structure, but will contribute nothing toward the acquisition of critical and essential raw materials so badly needed by Japan's war industries.

4. A step toward this latter end is Japan's current move to occupy southern Indo-China. In the opinion of this Division this will be followed by an extension of Japan's control to include Thailand. Further aggression by Japan after consolidating her position in these new points d'appui will be predicated upon the outcome of the European War.

5. For some time, the policy of our government has been based upon a desire to restrain Japan by moral embargoes and export control, neither of which were stringent enough to drive Japan into further aggressive action toward Malaysia and the Netherlands Indies.

[2] 6. A discussion as to whether this policy was sound at the time of its adoption is immaterial to a study of the current situation. The fact stands out, however, that Japan has now burst through these mild restraints imposed by the United States Government and is now embarked upon new aggression which endangers the safety of all the areas in the southwestern Pacific, including the Philippine Islands.

7. Under these circumstances the last reason for withholding effective sanctions against Japan has been brushed aside.

8. Attention is invited to the last sentence on page 61 of Tab I which reads: "The United States is today in a position to wreck completely the economic structure of the Japanese Empire." This statement is as sound today as when it was written in May, 1941.

9. Effective economic sanctions against Japan imposed by us, today, would not, in the opinion of this Division, force Japan to take any steps in the way of aggressive action which she does not plan to take anyway, when a favorable opportunity arises, nor would they precipitate a declaration of war on us by Japan. Such action on our part need not and should not distract our attention from the main theater of operations. On the contrary, by adopting such a policy we will be able to conserve for Britain and for ourselves supplies which from the viewpoint of our national defense, are being worse than wasted when we place them in Japanese hands.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

1 Enclosure: Tab I.

Copies to:

Secretary of War
Secretary, Joint Board
Deputy Chief of Staff
War Plans Division.

dps

[Pencilled notation:] This memo was written prior to receipt of information regarding embargo decision.

S. M.
H.

JULY 30, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: German-Japanese Relations.

I. Discussion.

1. The American Ambassador to Japan in a telegram to the Secretary of State dated July 23, 1941, points to a trend in Japanese public and private opinion indicating that Japan is no longer a happy partner in the Tripartite Agreement. He states that there has been a gradual weakening over a considerable period of time of the ties binding Japan to the Axis Powers. He further states a feeling he has had for some time that if the Germans ran true to form they would sooner or later overshoot their mark in Japan, and that the proud and sensitive Japanese people would eventually realize the fundamental contempt and scrawly concealed arrogance of the Germans for the Yellow Race.

2. According to the Ambassador there is a growing feeling among many Japanese that Japan is being treated as a satellite, if not as a dependent, a feeling

which has been developing as the result of the increasing influx of Nazi officials (including members of the Gestapo) into Tokyo, the efforts of these officials to exercise a controlling influence in matters of domestic concern and in many aspects of Japanese life, and the constant interference by the German Ambassador in trying to regiment Japanese newspapers along Axis lines.

3. The Ambassador remarks that as usual, the Germans have overshot their mark.

4. The Ambassador reported in a telegram to the State Department dated July 27, 1941, that Former Foreign Minister Matsuoka informed the Turkish Ambassador that he had cabled Ribbentrop 48 hours in advance of the Nazi attack on the Soviet asking if there were any truth in reports of such an attack and Ribbentrop replied with a categorical denial.

5. Our Minister to Thailand in a telegram to the Secretary of State dated July 26, 1941, reported that the Prime Minister had informed him that Lt. Col. Scholl, German Military Attache, had called and warned him (the Prime Minister) against "going too far" with Japan, "because", said the German Attache, "you cannot trust Japan". The German Attache stated further that "Germany will settle with Japan after she has won the war in Europe."

6. In view of the conditions depicted above, the time appears ripe for the judicious use of information which will have as its aim the dissolution of the Tripartite Agreement. Any action on our part which will make Japan an even more reluctant Axis partner weakens our potential enemies, enhances our own prestige and authority and materially and favorably affects our national defense.

II. Recommendation.

That the Secretary of War confer with the Secretary of State with a view to placing the information contained in paragraph 5 above in the hands of the Japanese Ambassador.

/s/ Sherman Miles

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Distribution:

Secretary of War
Chief of Staff
War Plans Division
G.H.Q.
General Embick
Asst. Sec. of War

I. B. 112

August 16, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Developments in the Far Eastern Situation.

1. It is believed that the Japanese Government, with the sanction of the Emperor, has decided upon a foreign policy whose objectives are as follows:

a. Adherence to Tripartite Pact.
b. Establishment of a Greater East Asia sphere of co-prosperity (under Japanese domination and control) regardless of other developments in the world situation.

c. Disposal of the China Incident.
d. Expansion southward for reasons of economic and strategic security.
2. In implementing the foregoing policy, it is believed that Japan proposes to take steps as follows:

a. Increased pressure on China from various points in the south.
b. Seizure by Japan of all Foreign Concessions in China.
c. Politico-military pressure on Indo-China and Thailand to facilitate Japan's southward advance.
d. Preparation for an attack on Siberia, but to be made at her own chosen time.

e. A resort to every means available to keep the United States out of the war.

3. Since the adoption of the policy outlined in paragraph 1 above Japan has secured military and economic control of Indo-China, is in a position to enforce her military and economic demands on Thailand and to threaten the vital Burma railroad and road, and has increased the strength of the Kwantung

Army (in Manchoukuo) to about 600,000 officers and men as opposed to a Russian force, east of Lake Balkal, of about 400,000. The following factors, however, unfavorable to the successful implementation of Japan's aggressive policy, have been injected into the situation:

- a. The German time-table for the subjugation of the U. S. S. R. has gone awry.
- b. The United States and Great Britain have frozen Japanese assets.
- c. Great Britain has announced an embargo in exports to Japan.
- d. The American, British and Dutch armed forces in the southwestern Pacific have been materially strengthened.
- e. Great Britain and the United States have pledged aid to the U. S. S. R. and additional aid to China.
- f. The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain have announced accord on an eight point program which, while not mentioning Japan by name, presents a long-range threat to her position as an Axis Power and to the retention of her conquests.

4. The great danger in the situation lies in the fact, so often proved, that Japanese military and naval authorities are not under the complete control of their Government. We have seen for the past year an extraordinary example of discipline and self control exercised by the German military in conformity to their Government's decree of avoiding any possible armed clash with the United States. We can, unfortunately, expect no such self denial and restraint on the part of the Japanese military. We can only hope that they will at least follow for a time the policies of their Government.

5. There are clear indications that, in spite of the decisions outlined in Paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the Japanese Government is willing to take extraordinary diplomatic measures to keep the United States out of the war, at least temporarily. There are indications that Japan is unwilling to commit herself to the extent that Germany would like to see her committed. There are indications that Japan realizes that she must make some concessions to the strong political stand now taken by the United States, even though those concessions consist largely in further conversations and negotiations.

6. Considering all of the above, this Division believes that forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis Japan, including the application of ever increasing military and economic pressure on our part, offers the best chance of gaining time, the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the Pacific area and of the eventual disruption of the Tripartite Pact. The exercise of increasingly strong "power diplomacy" by the United States is clearly indicated.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:

The President
Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War
Chief of Staff

War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence
General Embick.

dya

AUGUST 20, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Chinese Resistance.

1. General Chu, Chinese Military Attache, called on me today at his request to discuss the general situation. He was evidently worried because China was not specifically mentioned in all the discussion with regard to the conference between The President and the British Prime Minister. He seemed to feel that China is being forgotten for the moment. I told him of course that China is and will remain a pivotal point in the war, and that although not specifically mentioned in regard to the conference, the situation in the Far East, including China, was undoubtedly carefully considered.

2. General Chu then pointed out that much has recently been said about halting Japanese aggression both to the south and to the north, but nothing specific on stopping Japanese aggression in China proper. He went on to point out the possibility of Japan concentrating all of her efforts on crushing Chinese resistance

if she considers herself stopped by the Anglo-American front from further aggression to the south and to the north. He said, rather pointedly, "You know we cannot hold out indefinitely." I pointed out to him that the present emphasis on aid to Russia was probably due to Anglo-American belief that the Russian crisis was an immediate one, a question of holding her in the war for the next six weeks, until winter comes to her relief. Chinese resistance on the other hand would not appear to present so pressing a time factor, considering the long period of four years in which they have successfully withstood Japanese pressure. General Chu admitted this, and in answer to my questions as to the duration of Chinese resistance he said that undoubtedly the situation would hold throughout this calendar year. I pointed out to him that Japanese's present extension of her forces both in the north and in the south precluded the possibility of her concentrating her efforts against the Chinese at this time. He admitted this, but stated that he believed Japan must continue her aggressive policy, and that it was possible for her to regroup her forces against China if she were barred from the north and the south. He said that he feared that the Anglo-American policy of holding Japan in the north and the south might force her into a last desperate effort to overcome Chinese resistance. In his opinion Japan cannot stop, and in all questions of major policy the Japanese Government must bow to the decision of its military forces. He cited the Chinese proverb, "He who rides on the tiger must go where the tiger goes."

3. General Chu professed to have little information on the Russian situation, but said that what he had was encouraging. He thought the outstanding thing was that Russia had successfully taken the first shock of war. He remarked that the first few months of the Sino-Japanese war were by far the hardest, and after that the Chinese had settled down to a long resistance.

4. General Chu's visit undoubtedly indicates what we have had from other sources—that the Chinese here, and presumably also in Chungking, fear that they are being left out of the big picture, that we may not be firm in our present stand vis-a-vis Japan, and that aid to China may become more difficult in the future.

5. This Division believes that considerable morale aid might be given to China in the form of public statements emanating from high officials of the Government on our deep interest in Chinese resistance and our policy of aiding it. An official announcement of the forthcoming dispatch of a military mission to China is suggested. It is realized however that such morale aid would have to be considered in the light of its effect on the critical relations now existing between Japan and the United States.

/s/ Sherman Miles
SHERMAN MILES
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Copies to:
Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War
Chief of Staff
War Plans Division

ONI
Mr. Currie
General Magruder

SEPTEMBER 2, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Conversation between the Japanese Military Attache and the Chief, Far Eastern Section.

1. Coincident with the Japanese Ambassador's call on the President on the morning of August 28, 1941, Major General Saburo Isoda, Japanese Military Attache, called by appointment on Colonel R. S. Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section, Intelligence Branch, this Division. The following are notes of Colonel Bratton on the visit:

"I have known General Isoda and been associated with him under various circumstances for eighteen years. In consequence, our conversation was friendly, informal and entirely 'off the record.'

"General Isoda stated that, like the Ambassador, he was exploring ways and means to relieve Japanese-United States tension and bring about better relations

between the two countries. During the course of a conversation which lasted for an hour and a half, General Isoda made statements to the following effect:

- a. Due to restrictions imposed by our export control, the Japanese have begun to use a portion of their war reserve of petroleum.
- b. He, the Naval Attache, the Ambassador and the entire Embassy Staff are in accord in an earnest desire to better United States-Japanese relations.
- c. Japan made a great mistake in joining the Axis.
- d. The Army frequently gets out from under control of the Civilian Government and has to be restrained by Imperial Command.
- e. Japan has her back to the wall. She can be pushed just so far, then will have to fight us to save her national honor and integrity, though war with the United States is the last thing desired by Japan.

"When asked flatly my opinion as to what assurances on the part of Japan would be acceptable to the United States Government at this time, I told him that Prince Konoye, if he comes to talk with the President, must come with Imperial sanction and armed with authority to speak for and on behalf of the armed forces of Japan as well as on behalf of the Civilian Government. I said that, in my opinion, nothing short of this would be productive of lasting results or be acceptable to the President.

"General Isoda received this statement of opinion on my part with entire good will, expressed his pleasure over the opportunity of having a frank talk, and stated his desire to have other and more frequent talks in the future. I, in turn, assured him that I would be glad to meet him in a private and unofficial capacity at any time."

2. General Isoda's visit clearly parallels the conversations now in progress between the Japanese Ambassador and the State Department. In effect he speaks for the Japanese Embassy, the entire staff of which is sincerely working for the betterment of Japanese-American relations. He obviously did not feel empowered to speak for the Japanese Army.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff. G-2

Distribution:

Secretary of War
Chief of Staff
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence

I. B. 122

SEPTEMBER 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Brief Periodic Estimate of the World Situation.

1. This estimate covers the period September 3-December 1, 1941.
2. In this period the dominating elements of the situation will be:
 - a. The preoccupation of Germany with the U. S. S. R.
 - b. The inability of Great Britain and her associates to take the strategic offensive.

In consequence a militarily decisive phase of the war will not be reached.

3. Axis:

a. Germany (see Tab A) will be immersed in the conflict with the U. S. S. R., either in terms of combat or of large-scale military reorganization. Victories over the U. S. S. R. may tend to raise her national morale; but on balance her morale should be lower, because of losses in Russia and because of the certainty of prolongation of the war. Economically she will continue strained but stable. Specifically:

- (1) She will be unable to invade the British Isles.
- (2) She will be unable to attack in the Middle East. (See Tab B).
- (3) She is and will be able at will to occupy French Northwest Africa, but probably will not do so. (See Tab C).
- (4) She probably will be in a position to intensify her warfare against shipping as compared with its present reduced level. (See Tab A).
- (5) The policy of the United States, backed by growing armaments, particularly in terms of sea and air power, will be an increasing factor in her calculations.
- b. Subsidiary European Members of the Axis.—Their subservience to Germany will increase and their influence in world affairs will continue to diminish. Italy

in particular will garrison the Balkans and provide Axis communications with Libya. (For Spain, see Tab C.)

c. *The Conquered and Occupied Countries of Europe* may develop still greater unrest; but this element in the total situation will, for the time being, remain of little net influence on the general situation.

d. *Japan* (see Tab D), beset with uncertainties, may do nothing, may attack the Maritime Provinces, may seek to expand to the Southwest; it is even possible that she may withdraw from the Axis. Japan also has the capability of concentrating her newly augmented forces against China and seeking a decision there. No indication or likelihood of this is seen. In the general picture and excluding China, where she must continue to fight, her most likely, but by no means certain, course is inaction.

4. *Turkey*, the most practicable land corridor between Europe and the Middle East, will find her position increasingly precarious; but in this period she probably will evade choice of definite alignment with either the Axis or the Anglo-Russian bloc.

5. *Anti-Axis:*

a. *U. S. S. R.* (see Tab E), with limited and decreasing ability to pass to the offensive, faced with the loss or dislocation of most of her war industry and with inadequate communications to the outside world, is destined to continued military reverses, while exacting a significant toll from the German armed forces. Her only hope is to bring about German overextension and exhaustion. Destruction of her armed forces and overthrow of the Stalin regime within this period are possible but not yet probable. (See also TAB A for Russia vs. Germany and Tab D for Russia vs. Japan.)

b. *Great Britain* has a continued respite to perfect her home defenses, build up her air force, consolidate her Middle Eastern and Far Eastern positions, and to a limited degree improve the defense of the Atlantic sea lanes. She will have neither the ability nor the opportunity to take the strategic offensive, other than by limited air attacks on Germany's European position. She has the opportunity to launch a limited offensive against Libya. (See Tab B.)

6. *Latin America* is momentarily less concerned with the war, since its center of gravity has shifted to Eastern Europe. The Axis powers, on the whole, are losing ground before Democratic pressure, political, psychological and economic.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

5 Enclosures: Tabs A to E Inclusive.

Distribution:

The President
Secretary of War
Secretary of State
Assistant Secretary of War
Coordinator of Information
Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
Director of Naval Intelligence
G. H. Q.
Major General Embick.
Under Secretary of War

1. Tab A—GERMANY—omitted
2. Tab B—British situation in the Middle East—omitted
3. Tab C—A German drive to the Southwest—omitted
4. Tab. D.

JAPAN

1. *Lines of Action Open to Japan*

Japan has the following alternatives:

- a. Continue to withdraw her armed forces from the area south of the Great Wall with a view to attacking Siberia.
- b. Make peace with Chiang Kai-shek.
- c. Disregard American action and opinion and occupy Thailand.
- d. Attack Burma and the Burma Road via Thailand.

- e. Take or isolate the Philippine Islands and Hongkong and attack Singapore.
- f. Contain or isolate the Philippine Islands and Hongkong and seize the Netherlands East Indies.
- g. Reorient their whole foreign policy by withdrawing from the Axis.
- h. Seek a general settlement through American mediation.
- i. Bide their time, wait for a better opportunity for the pursuance of any of the above lines of action, hoping that time will be in their favor.
- j. On the basis of the neutrality pact with Russia as a "face saver", enter into an understanding with the United States and Great Britain in regard to territorial expansion and economic penetration in southeast Asia and the southwestern Pacific area.

2. Most Probable Action

Japan, beset with uncertainties, will probably "buy" time by entering into negotiations with the United States. A cabinet upset in Japan, a not unlikely event, will change the whole picture. The present cabinet, however, will initiate no additional aggression on the part of Japan until all diplomatic means of relieving pressure have been explored and exhausted. This does not preclude independent action on the part of Japan's armies in the field.

3. Japan—Combat

Japan has an active army of about 2,000,000 including an air force of 55,000 and a trained and partially trained reserve of 3,500,000 men.

The active forces are deployed over a wide area from Karafuto and Manchoukuo in the north to the Southern French Indo-China—Thailand border in the south. The estimated number of active divisions or their equivalent is 68, plus 15 depot divisions in Japan Proper. Japan has recently mobilized approximately 500,000 reserves which have been utilized as replacements and in forming new units included in the above estimate.

Japan has been withdrawing a considerable number of her troops from China and despatching them to Indo-China and Manchuria. Some of these have been replaced by Manchurian and Wang Ching-wei's puppet troops. Since the outbreak of the Russo-German war, the forces in Manchoukuo have been increased from 8 to 19 divisions with auxiliary troops including 4 tank regiments and 4 cavalry brigades, totalling about 500,000 officers and men. The Japanese army is well trained and an efficient fighting force. Officers are well qualified to perform their various duties in peace and war. The staff has functioned well during difficult tactical operations in China. The enlisted men, although somewhat lacking in initiative, are well trained, experienced in combat, well disciplined, courageous and aggressive to the point of recklessness. The Japanese have been consistently successful in China from a tactical point of view and only combat with a modern army can determine Japan's relative efficiency compared to modern occidental armies. Japan's army is physically hardy and psychologically inspired by loyalty to the Emperor, devotion to duty and a fanatical patriotism which make it a dangerous foe on the Asian continent or nearby islands.

The Japanese Army and Navy air forces have made rapid progress since 1937. Personnel strength of Army and Navy air forces is 55,000 officers and men and the two services have a combined plane strength of approximately 3,743 combat planes. The Army squadrons number 114 and the Navy has 124 squadrons. Plane design has lagged, but lack of formidable opposition has left them undisputed air superiority. Four years of continuous air operations have increased the efficiency of Japanese aviation in no small degree. Recent acquisition of German planes and technical advisors has contributed to Japanese air proficiency.

The Japanese Army is the best equipped army in Asia. Its equipment, however, is inferior to that of any of the modern European armies. The shortage of raw materials and production capacity will limit the number of new divisions which can be organized, even though Japan's partially trained manpower is ample for her anticipated needs. Personal equipment appears to be sufficient and in good condition but there is a shortage of organizational equipment such as tanks, and other mechanized equipment, antiaircraft weapons and modern artillery.

Japan has a navy consisting of approximately 180,000 men and officers exclusive of about 20,000 in the naval air corps. Naval strength comprises over a million tons already built and nearly 500,000 tons building. The navy is divided into two main divisions: the Combined Fleet and the Japanese Naval Forces in China. The latter consists of the North Central and South China Fleets. The Combined Fleet is based in home waters.

The Japanese naval personnel is well trained—a training equal to that of the British and American navies. The Japanese navy is modern, well balanced, and ready for prompt service. It is relatively strong in aircraft carriers and tenders; it would be a formidable opponent to the navy of any power or those of any combination of powers attempting offensive operations in the western Pacific area.

Japan, because of her geographic location blocks all sea approaches, north of Haiphong, to the southeastern coast of Asia; flanks all routes from the east to the eastern and northeastern coast of the mainland; and is in a remarkably strong strategical position for defense against any distant naval power. Furthermore her geographic position is such that her navy, on the strategical defensive, could from time to time successfully assume the tactical offensive.

4. Japan—Political

The political cauldron of Japan has been boiling furiously since Matsuoka was relieved as Foreign Minister. During the time that Matsuoka was Foreign Minister and under the leadership of Premier Prince Konoye, Japan set up its own version of totalitarianism last fall called the "new national structure". Political parties were disbanded and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, designed to unite all the people in assistance to the Throne, was hastily whipped into shape. The Association was not a political organization like those controlling Italy, Germany, and Russia because of the Japanese theory of the Emperor as the supreme head of the state to whom all Japanese yield obedience and service. The vaguely stated aims of the Association were too diffused to meet with general approval; as conditions are at present, it is clear that the "new structure", movement—so far as its basic purpose was concerned—has entirely miscarried. In its major tests, provided by the efforts to regiment industry and "reform" the Diet, it merely stirred up severe controversies. The original hope that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association could "unify all phases" of Japan's national life has long since disappeared.

While the outward totalitarian structure has weakened, the domination exercised by the army clique for nearly a decade continues. Practically every phase of life in Japan has been placed under governmental control.

The whole political machinery is geared to preparation for expansion into the maritime provinces of Siberia, for further expansion in southeast Asia and the southwestern Pacific and to the solution of the China "Incident." Without their previous enthusiasm and behind uncertain leadership, the Japanese are continuing in the path to what they believe is their "divinely appointed destiny" without being too sure as to where that "destiny" will take them. As a matter of fact, there are indications that the people of Japan are becoming more and more alarmed and apprehensive; they fear that the present course will take them into a major war. There is increasing dissatisfaction with the secretive nature of governmental policy. If Japan goes to war with a major power, her people will enter it desperately rather than confidently.

In September, 1940, Japan concluded a Tripartite Pact of Co-operation with Germany and Italy which by implication requires Japan to attack the United States (or any other power except Russia, not involved in the European War at that time) should it attack either of the Axis partners. Although Foreign Minister Toyoda, Matsuoka's successor, has said that there is no change in the foreign policy of Japan, and that Japan will adhere to the Axis Alliance, there are indications that Toyoda's sincerity in making such a statement is entirely different from that of Matsuoka. In other words, the advantages and value of the Tripartite Agreement are at present being very seriously questioned. But Germany, through her representatives in Japan, is doing everything within her power to keep Japan "in line." Thus Japan is most anxious to confer with the United States, "looking toward a peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues between the two countries," which means recognizing Japan's territorial and economic gains in Eastern Asia. The chief obstacle is that even if a conference were convened by the two governments, there could be no guarantee of the results of such a conference unless the Japanese Army and Navy were directly represented. Although a request for such representation would be unprecedented, G-2 is of the opinion that unless such representation is obtained, a conference at this time would be without lasting results.

Japan has boundless ambition in East Asia, but she finds herself in a poor strategic position to take advantage of the opportunities the present time affords. Japanese leaders are aware of the perils of further military commitments before the stalemate in China is broken. One of the factions in Japan favors making

a final effort to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to conclude a peace as soon as possible; another faction favors fighting the issue to a conclusion. The stalemate is about as far from decision as it has been.

In the maelstrom of Japanese indecision, one thing stands out clearly—that is, that the Japanese do not want the United States to become involved in the war, but they want the United States to stay out of the war primarily to enable Japan to retain a free hand in advancing the Co-Prosperity Sphere in Asia.

Another fact which is almost as clear is that Admiral Toyoda is a stop-gap Foreign Minister, appointed temporarily with the idea of making a more permanent appointment when Japanese policy could be more coherent and concrete.

5. Japan—Economic

Because of the ever-increasing stringency of the embargo placed on Japan by the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, the economic situation in Japan is slowly but surely becoming worse. The Japanese have always lacked war materials, adequate foreign exchange and sufficient foreign trade; the embargo has served to increase the deficiencies in these categories. These deficiencies are serious but are not likely to become dangerous before December 1, 1941. The fact that Japan is also encumbered with financial problems connected with the "incident" in China prevents any curative steps being taken.

The technical assistance which the Germans have been giving to Japan over a period of six months is no longer as welcome as it was before Germany's attack on Russia. That attack has precluded the possibilities of Japan's receiving machinery and implements of war from Germany. As a matter of fact, the Japanese are beginning to question whether the Tripartite Agreement has not brought far greater economic disadvantages than advantage to Japan in carrying out her plans for a "Co-Prosperity Sphere" in Asia. The Pro-Axis leaders are finding great difficulty in justifying the alliance with Germany.

The "Co-Prosperity Sphere" is anything but prosperous. Because of the difficulties of labor shortage, lack of sufficient transportation facilities and lack of cooperation among the people who have been brought into the "sphere" by force or persuasion, the "sphere" is about to fall apart.

The action of the Netherlands East Indies in joining with the United States and Great Britain in embargoing goods to Japan was undoubtedly a severe blow, both economically and in prestige. The economic competition going on behind the scenes in Thailand, between Japan on the one hand, and Great Britain and China on the other, will be increasingly significant. Recent information, however, indicates that Japanese banking interests are asking for a new loan of 25,000,000 Bahts from Thailand bankers, (supplementing a loan of \$3,750,000 actually made to Japan early in August in order to pay for commodities purchased by Japan in Thailand). The influence of the Chinese, the traditional financiers of Siam, cannot be overlooked here.

The processes of economic warfare are so slow that, even if the status quo ante were to be established in China by way of settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict, Japanese economic predominance in the East Asiatic area would still be so firmly established that several months would have to pass before the effects of the economic embargo would in itself influence Japanese action in the Far East.

The effects of the embargo will compel Japan to strive to obtain more assistance in East Asia as well as to try to persuade Great Britain, the United States and the Netherlands East Indies through threats and promises to soften the impact their embargo has caused. Japan obviously does not want to go to war with the United States to achieve her economic objectives, but at the same time she feels that the achievement of these objectives is an essential part of her foreign policy.

The fact remains that Japan lacks essential raw materials to support either her manufacturing industries or a major war effort. To procure them she must have foreign exchange; in order to obtain foreign exchange, she must have foreign trade, which, at present, is seriously curtailed. The stoppage of trade is reducing Japan's raw materials drastically—raw materials which are vital to the organic well-being of Japan and to her ability to wage war successfully. No other country even approaches the United States in importance to Japan's economic welfare, both as a source of raw materials and as a market for the exports of Japan. Thus through the advantage the United States has gained through the embargo, Japan finds herself in a very poor bargaining position.

I. B. 124

September 11, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Political Developments in Japan.

1. A United Press dispatch from Tokyo dated September 11, 1941, gives the following information:

"Emperor Hirohito today took direct command of Japanese Army Headquarters and moved to assure close Army collaboration with Premier Fumimaro Konoye's Government, which appeared to be trying to keep Japan out of war even if that meant drifting away from her Axis ties."

2. Major developments are reported as follows:

a. Establishment of a new Defense General Headquarters under General Otozō Yamada. Yamada is personally responsible to the Emperor and becomes virtual Generalissimo of the Army superseding previous emphasis on General Staff control.

b. Appointment of Fumio Goto, former Home Minister, as chairman of the Central Cooperative Council of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, replacing Admiral Suetsugu.

c. Entertainment of the Cabinet at luncheon by the Emperor, "in appreciation of its outstanding services to the State."

3. A proper evaluation of this news is impracticable at this early date but a definite trend seems indicated—a trend away from the Axis and toward better relations with the United States and Great Britain. The new system is interpreted as an effort to strengthen the civilian government, check militaristic domination of Imperial Policy, and erect a barrier to possible dissatisfaction among the militarists with the future course of events.

4. General Yamada is a conservative, of great energy and ability. It is reported that he stands high in the Emperor's favor. Goto is likewise a conservative and replaces one of Japan's worst jingoists. The action of the Emperor in taking direct command of the Army and his giving prestige to the Cabinet by inviting it to luncheon, and publicly thanking it is unprecedented.

5. Barring a massacre of the conservatives by the militarists, an event deemed unlikely in view of the Emperor's action, it is probable that Japan will find a peaceful way out of one of the greatest crises in her history and seek a means to realign her foreign policy in an anti-Axis direction.

(signed) Sherman Miles
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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G. H. Q.
General Embick

[Note by General Miles:] Original copy given to Gen. Watson for the President.
(signed) S. M.

September 17, 1941

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.:

Subject: Combat Estimate, Japan. (With map showing disposition armed forces.

In compliance with verbal request, this date, from the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., there is attached hereto (Tab A) a brief Combat Estimate on Japan, with a map showing the disposition of Japan's armed forces and the Asiatic area at present occupied by the Japanese.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Incls.-2
Tab A
Map¹

¹ Omitted.

TAB A—COMBAT ESTIMATE, JAPAN

Japan has an active army of about 2,000,000, including an air force of 55,000, and a trained and partly trained reserve of 3,500,000 men.

The active forces are deployed over a wide area from Karafuto and Manchoukuo in the north to the Southern French Indo-China-Thailand border in the south. The estimated number of active divisions or their equivalent is 68, plus 15 depot divisions in Japan Proper. Japan has recently mobilized approximately 500,000 reserves which have been utilized as replacements and in forming new units included in the above estimate.

Japan has been withdrawing a considerable number of her troops from China and despatching them to Indo-China and Manchuria. Some of these have been replaced by Manchurian and Wang Ching-wei's puppet troops. Since the outbreak of the Russo-German war, the forces in Manchoukuo have been increased from 8 to 21 divisions with auxiliary troops including 4 tank regiments and 4 cavalry brigades, totalling about 500,000 officers and men. The Japanese army is well trained and an efficient fighting force. Officers are well qualified to perform their various duties in peace and war. The staff has functioned well during difficult tactical operations in China. The enlisted men, although somewhat lacking in initiative, are well trained, experienced in combat, well disciplined, courageous and aggressive to the point of recklessness. The Japanese have been consistently successful in China from a tactical point of view and only combat with a modern army can determine Japan's relative efficiency compared to occidental modern armies. Japan's army is physically hardy and psychologically inspired by loyalty to the Emperor, devotion to duty and a fanatical patriotism which make it a dangerous foe on the Asian continent or nearby islands.

The Japanese Army and Navy air forces have made rapid progress since 1937. Personnel strength of Army and Navy is 55,000 officers and men and the two services have a combined plane strength of approximately 3,743 combat planes. The Army squadrons number 114 and the Navy has 124 squadrons. Plane design has lagged, but lack of formidable opposition has left them undisputed air superiority. Four years of continuous air operations have increased the efficiency of Japanese aviation no small degree. Recent acquisition of German planes and technical advisors has contributed to Japanese air proficiency.

The Japanese Army is the best equipped army in Asia. Its equipment, however, is inferior to that of any of the modern European armies. Shortage of raw materials and production capacity will limit the number of new divisions which can be organized, even though Japan's partially trained manpower is ample for her anticipated needs. Personal equipment appears to be sufficient and in good condition but there is a shortage of organization equipment such as tanks, and other mechanized equipment, antiaircraft weapons and modern artillery.

[2] Japan has a navy consisting of approximately 180,000 men and officers exclusive of about 20,000 in the naval air corps. The naval vessels have over a million tons already built and nearly 500,000 tons in the process of building. The navy is divided into two main divisions: The Combined Fleet and the Japanese Naval Forces in China. The latter consists of the North Central and South China Fleets. The Combined Fleet is based in home waters.

The Japanese naval personnel is well trained—equal to that of the British and American navies. The Japanese navy is modern, well balanced, and ready for prompt service. It is relatively strong in aircraft carriers and tenders; it would be a formidable opponent to the navy of any power or those of any combination of powers attempting offensive operations in the western Pacific area.

Japan, because of her geographic location blocks all sea approaches, north of Saigon, to the southeastern coast of Asia; flanks all routes from the east to the eastern and northeastern coast of the mainland; and is in a remarkably strong strategical position for defense against any distant naval power. Furthermore her geographic position is such that her navy, on the strategical defensive, could from time to time successfully assume the tactical offensive.

SEPTEMBER 18, 1941.

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
Subject. Strategic Estimate of the Situation.

1. The following data are furnished in response to your memorandum, above subject, WPD 4994, September 17, 1941. The succeeding paragraphs are numbered according to the questions propounded therein.

"1. Do you see any beneficial effect of America's war effort with respect to Great Britain maintaining her control over Singapore?"

America's defense effort, in terms of political, military, and economic pressure, has already contributed materially toward curbing Japan's advance to the southwest. This restraint on Japan tends to become stronger as time passes by.

"2. If Great Britain were driven out of the Mediterranean and Middle East Area, could she retain control in a remunerative sense in India and Malaysia? What are the capabilities of Japan with respect to this situation?"

Yes, provided the Trans-Pacific sea lanes are secured. In such an event Japan would be sorely tempted to attack to the southwest. Such an attack could be blocked only by the use of large U. S. Naval forces and considerable U. S. ground and air forces.

"3. If the Russian military forces were defeated in European Russia, would the Maritime and Siberian Areas continue to resist? What would their capabilities be in the premises?"

Yes, but on the basis of a purely passive defense. Resistance could be organized more effectively in eastern than in western Siberia. The degree of resistance would depend in large measure on material assistance from the United States and Japan's position in the then developing situation. The amounts of material furnished by us would be conditioned by the shipping situation, the means of land transport available on the Asiatic mainland and by the attitude of Japan.

[2] "4. What would the effect be of a successful German drive to the southwest including the north and northwest African Areas?"

Such a move would have two major disadvantages for Germany: military overextension and an increased economic problem with reference to Spain and Portugal. It would give her the following major advantages: consolidation of western Europe and north Africa; increased opportunity for naval raiding by ships and aircraft based on northwest Africa; opportunity to extend her influence in Latin American and perhaps to infiltrate there physically. Such action by Germany would necessitate the prompt occupation of the Natal area, Brazil, by the United States and the prompt occupation of the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands by the Democracies.

"5. What would the effect be on the situation if the Germans make a successful drive southeastward through Turkey, Iran and against the Suez Area?"

Such an event would entail disastrous British losses and a profound shock to British morale. It would throw the British back against India and Kenya. It would require the reorganization and protection of sea communications between India, Malaysia, Australasia and the Democracies. (See 2 above).

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

I. B. 131

SEPTEMBER 23, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Crisis in Japan.

1. This Division has information from a highly reliable source to the effect that the Japanese Cabinet is confronted with a highly critical and explosive situation. The Emperor's recent gesture in support of the Cabinet notwithstanding, certain pressure groups in Japan are making threatening gestures toward the Premier.

2. The point at issue is whether or not the Japanese Government is to encourage, authorize or permit a nationwide celebration on the anniversary of the signing of the Tripartite Agreement. Genuine Government anxiety over this point is obviously being used as a red herring in the road to national objectives in the hope that the United States Government can be rushed into making concessions designed to strengthen the authority of the present Japanese Cabinet. This on the theory that if the current Japanese Cabinet falls there will be no one left in Japan with whom we can deal satisfactorily.

3. Attention is invited to the fact that in all of her recent proposals and counter-proposals Japan has carefully avoided giving any definite assurance that she will not attack Russia.

4. The present agitation, therefore, on the part of Japan to extract an immediate agreement from the United States to some or all of her proposals for a "conference of leaders" may be motivated by a desire to cover preparations for an all out attack on Siberia timed with the expected Russian collapse in Europe.

5. A lessening of pressure at this time would be considered as appeasement by the Japanese and would be highly detrimental to the advantage that the United States has gained by the policy initiated when Japanese funds in this country were frozen and reaffirmed when a strict embargo was placed on oil going to Japan.

[2] 6. The celebration of the signing of the Tripartite Agreement by the Japanese on September 27, and the extent of that celebration is a matter entirely within the control and jurisdiction of the present Japanese Government. The United States can and should judge only by the acts and not by the words of that Government.

7. This Division still believes, as stated in I. B. 112, dated August 16, 1941, that forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis Japan, including the application of ever increasing military and economic pressure on our part offers the best chance of gaining time, the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the Pacific Area, and also the hope of the eventual disruption of the Tripartite Pact. The exercise of increasingly strong "power diplomacy" by the United States is clearly indicated.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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Director of Naval Intelligence
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I. B. 135

OCTOBER 2, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Japanese-American Relations.

1. The crisis in Tokyo brought about by the anniversary of the Tripartite Agreement has been weathered by the Konoye Cabinet through a somewhat perfunctory celebration involving speeches by the German and Italian Ambassadors, Prince Konoye, and others, at luncheons given in honor of the Axis on September 27, 1941.

2. This Division has information from a highly reliable source to the effect that at 4:30 p. m. on September 27th after completing the ceremonies celebrating the anniversary of the Tripartite Pact the Japanese Foreign Minister asked the American Ambassador to call on him, and urged him to strongly recommend to his home government an immediate meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt.

3. The Japanese Ambassador in Washington was advised as to the gist of Admiral Toyoda's conversation with Ambassador Grew. Admiral Nomura also was urged by his Foreign Minister to do everything in his power to prevail upon the President to meet and confer immediately with Prince Konoye.

4. The fervor with which the Japanese, over a period of many months, have been agitating for this "meeting of leaders" has been matched only by their reluctance to make commitments on two points, i. e. withdrawal from China, and preparation for an attack on Siberia.

5. This Division is of the belief that the present Cabinet in Tokyo does not yet feel strong enough to enforce any order for withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, even though under pressure from the United States, it might be inclined to do so. And, as a matter of fact, at this stage in the execution of our national strategic plan, a cessation of hostilities in China followed by the withdrawal of twenty-one Japanese divisions, 20 independent brigades, and 1,000 aircraft therefrom would be highly detrimental to our interests. Such a force if returned to Japan would be potentially of such an explosive nature that only a military oligarchy could control it. These militarists would submerge or destroy the moderate element in Japan replacing it with a restless Chauvinistic element possessing neither the ability nor the inclination to continue diplomatic relations with any of the Democratic Powers.

If the Japanese force in China were transferred to Indo China or Manchoukuo it would undoubtedly overflow into adjacent regions and our interests would be even further jeopardized.

It seems evident that the Konoye Government lacks confidence enough to make any promises in regard to restraining the Kwantung Army, even at its present strength, from launching an attack on Siberia. With its forces augmented by all or a part of the troops now in China, the home government would be helpless. For the Kwantung Army since 1932 has been completely independent of the various cabinets appointed in Tokyo and, reinforced by elements from China, would undoubtedly attack when it felt assured that such action was opportune. The opportune moment will be coincident with or immediately following a Russian collapse in Europe, or if and when the Russian force becomes numerically inferior because of withdrawals from Siberia to reinforce the European Armies.

6. From the foregoing it seems imperative, for the present at least, to keep as much of the Japanese Army as possible pinned down in China. In other words we must cease at once our attempts to bring about the withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from China and must give to China whatever aid is possible on our part in sustaining the Chinese power and will to continue to contain and occupy the bulk of the Japanese Army.

7. The initial feeling of revulsion over this apparent utilization of China as a cat's paw in our plan of strategy will be alleviated by an examination of the situation of the anti-Axis powers in the light of cold reason. Our objective is the destruction of Nazism, and all out aid to those powers actively engaged in resisting its aggressive drive for world domination. Russia is, as a matter of expedience, an ally in this cause. We must, among other things, do what we can with what we have at our disposal to aid Russia in her struggle with Germany. Any action on our part, therefore, which would liberate Japanese (pro-Axis) forces for action against Russia's rear in Siberia would be foolhardy.

8. The eagerness on the part of the Japanese Foreign Minister for a "meeting of leaders" is probably based on a strong desire to strengthen the position of the cabinet with respect to the internal situation in Japan. Such a conference would: (1) Strengthen Prince Konoye's position with his people, (2) Extend the tenure of the present cabinet at least through the sessions of the conference. (3) Increase the belief of all Japanese leaders that we would not meet with them unless willing to make concessions. In other words, a conference to them will mean concessions on our part. If the President of the United States can be persuaded to loosen the economic restrictions now in force against Japan, Prince Konoye can then go before the Japanese people with a fait accompli such as no other man has been able to produce in the last decade. Economic concession, it must be observed, is the one essential which the Japanese military leaders recognize as necessary to be obtained before another major war can be fought. Once the conference is convened the Japanese will be in a strong position to demand some economic concessions, pleading the certainty of the collapse of the Konoye government if he goes home empty-handed.

9. From the point of view of the United States, a conference of leaders at this time, might serve to give this country additional time in which to prepare more adequately for any eventuality. Definite understanding, however, should be established, prior to such a conference, with Great Britain, Russia, China, Thailand and the Netherlands East Indies. Through cooperative and unified action with the powers named, we have obtained the economic advantages we now hold. It is the opinion of this Division that these advantages should, under no circumstances, be sacrificed unless concessions can be gained from Japan which will benefit all the non-Axis countries of the Pacific area; otherwise the very objective this country has sought so long to attain, that of unified anti-Axis strength in the Pacific, will be lost completely.

10. This Division is of the opinion that neither a conference of leaders nor economic concessions at this time would be of any material advantage to the United States unless a definite commitment to withdraw from the Axis were obtained from Japan prior to the conference. The immediate objective of the United States is to weaken Hitler in every way possible. A Japanese guarantee not to attack Russia in Siberia would free Russia, psychologically and militarily, for stronger opposition to Hitler. With this in mind, a definite condition precedent to such a proposed conference should be a complete withdrawal by Japan from the Axis and a guarantee, backed by substantial evidence of sincerity, not to attack Russia in Siberia.

11. Since it is highly improbable that this condition can be met by the Japanese Government at the present time our course lies straight before us. This Division

still believes that forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis Japan, including the application of ever increasing military and economic pressure on our part, offers the best chance of gaining time, the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the Pacific Area, and the best hope of the eventual disruption of the Tripartite Pact. The exercise of increasingly strong "power diplomacy" by the United States is still clearly indicated.

HAYES A. KRONER,
Colonel, General Staff,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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Major General Embick

OCTOBER 16, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Fall of the Japanese Cabinet.

1. A United Press dispatch states that the three months old Konoye Cabinet resigned on October 16th under nationalistic pressure for termination of Japanese-American peace negotiations.

2. This resignation was the logical result of Foreign Minister Toyoda's failure to secure a relaxation of the economic pressure on Japan by the U. S. Government.

3. It is impossible to predict the next move on the part of Japan until the composition of the next cabinet is known. It is highly probable, however, that the trend will be toward the Axis, with the Army, rather than the Navy, exercising the controlling influence. This Army element will not be slow to take advantage of any weakening of the Siberian Army brought about by Russian reverses in Europe.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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OCTOBER 17, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Japan's New Premier.

1. The United Press reports that Lieutenant General Hideki Tojo, War Minister in the late Konoye Cabinet, has been designated Premier and ordered to form a new Cabinet.

2. General Tojo was born in 1884, the son of a Samurai. He has held several high offices in the Army, notably that of Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, Vice Minister of War and Inspector General of Aviation.

3. He has been called the father of modern Japanese Army strategy and is known to be anti-foreign, with a particular dislike for the Russians, and an open admiration for German methods. He created a sensation in 1938 when, as Vice Minister of War, he predicted that Japan would have to fight Russia as well as China. He also warned that America would have to be watched. When the Axis Alliance was signed in September 1940 he said that the road Japan would follow had been "definitely decided" and there was no turning back. General

Tojo is regarded by his associates as a man of unshakable determination. He cites reverence and filial piety as the two most important attributes of a Japanese soldier. He has little patience for arguments or other other people's views.

4. Any cabinet selected by General Tojo may be expected to have Axis leanings, but will be otherwise anti-foreign and highly nationalistic.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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OCTOBER 21, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Kwantung versus the Siberian Army.

I have prepared this copy of the above study for submission to the President. Inasmuch as it points out the desirability of certain action by the United States, it is requested that you decide whether or not it should go forward.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

I. B. 144

OCTOBER 21, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: The Kwantung versus the Siberian Army (For Situation Map see Tab A.)

1. The best information available to this Division indicates the strengths of the Siberian forces east of Lake Baikal and the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchoukuo to be approximately as indicated below:

	Kwantung Army	Siberian Army
Infantry-----	25 Divs. (450,000 men)	31 Divs. (540,000 men).
Cavalry-----	4 Brigs. (12,000 men)	10 Divs. (75,000 men).
R. R. Guards-----	36 Bns. (72,000 men)	
Tanks-----	7 Regts. (1,750 tanks)	10 Brigs. (1,600 tanks).
Air Corps-----	7 Regts. (500 planes)	10 Divs. (1,677 planes).
Army Troops and overhead--	150,000 men	25,000 men.
Total Man Power-----	684,000 men	682,000 men.

2 It is to be noted that the Siberian Army is relatively strong in cavalry and in planes at present. However, the Japanese inferiority in the air could be quickly altered by shifting from China (where Japan is practically unopposed in the air) the bulk of the Japanese air forces operating with the ground forces in that area.

3. Although the quality of the present leadership of the two opposing forces has not been tested, the consensus of opinion here is that the leadership in the Siberian and in the Japanese forces is the best in their respective armies.

4. In general, the materiel and equipment in neither force is comparable to the latest types in use by the German, British and American armies. Russian medium and heavy tanks are believed to be superior to similar equipment in the Kwantung Army.

5. Weather conditions during the fall and winter months give a slight advantage to the Siberian Army, inasmuch as the Japanese, as a people, have not had time to be come inured to the rigors of the extreme cold prevalent in Siberia during these months.

6. Neither the Siberian nor the Kwantung Army has a sufficient superiority over the other, at present, to warrant an offensive. This situation may change, however, in the near future if the Siberian force or any large part thereof is moved westward to strengthen the forces in European Russia. The Kwantung Army, on the other hand, has doubled in strength since July 1, 1941, and it is fairly certain that Japan will continue to strengthen this army with whatever men and equipment she can spare from China and Japan Proper.

7. If and when the Kwantung Army feels that it has a combat superiority over the Siberian army of 2 to 1 it is highly probable that it will take the offensive regardless of the policy and intentions of the Tokyo Government. When this ratio rises to 3 to 1 or better the probability will become a certainty.

8. This being true, it is very much to our interest, so long as Russia continues to offer active resistance to Germany, to take whatever steps may be possible to maintain the present Russian equality in combat strength vis-a-vis the Kwantung Army. Two such practicable steps immediately present themselves:

- a. Increased aid to China, to enable the latter to continue to pin to the ground in North, Central and South China the bulk of the Japanese Army.
- b. Increased aid to the Russian armies both in Europe and Siberia.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Enc.: Map.¹

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G. H. Q.
General Embick.

I. B. 148

NOVEMBER 1, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Possible Japanese Drive into Yunnan. (For map see Tab A).

1. Recent developments in the international situation, and particularly in the Pacific, indicate the possibility of a Japanese invasion of Yunnan Province in an attempt to cut China's life-line, the Burma Road.

2. Factors which indicate possibility of such a line of action by Japan:

a. The political and economic situation at home and pressure from the Axis demand action.

b. If she moved on Thailand, or elsewhere to the south, Japan runs grave risk of war with the ABD countries—an event which she wishes to avoid, at least for the present.

c. Japan's plan for conquest of Eastern Siberia would obviously best be served by a policy of watchful waiting until Russia is much weakened.

d. A drive from Indo-China into Yunnan would most probably not involve Japan with any third nation.

e. An offensive elsewhere in China could have no such decisive effect as the stoppage of supplies entering China over the Burma Road. This operation, if successful, might force capitulation of the Chinese.

3. Factors operating against such an offensive:

a. Japan is already extended in China where she has the equivalent of some 30 divisions spread so thinly that withdrawal of any troops for concentration elsewhere would seriously endanger her present lines. This was clearly shown in the recent operations at Changsha and Ichang.

b. Japan has perhaps 33 divisions in Manchuria and adjacent areas. To withdraw any considerable force from this region might cause her to "miss the bus" when her chance comes for invasion of Siberia.

c. Japan has the equivalent of some 3½ divisions in Indo-China as garrison troops and to secure the Thai borders. Continuance of the bulk of these troops on this duty is necessary.

d. Similar considerations apply to the concentration of the Japanese air forces.

e. Estimates of the initial force required for invasion of Yunnan, from various sources, British, Chinese, Russian and American, vary from 5 to 10 divisions, and all agree on the necessity of using strong air forces. Thus, a major effort would be necessary, including the use of many transports, supply ships, etc.

¹ Omitted.

f. If Japan became involved in a long campaign in southwest China, she would be seriously hampered in operations elsewhere.

4. Physical difficulties in the way of a Yunnan invasion are considerable, the most important being the terrain. The best corridor is that followed by the Yunnan meter-gauge railway from the border at Laokai to Kunming. This is a tortuous route along the sides of deep gorges, from an elevation of 305 feet at Laokai to 4,500 at Mengtze on the Yunnan plateau in a distance of 110 miles. (Airline, about 75 miles.) The dozens of bridges and tunnels have presumably been destroyed; the Chinese report that they have completely demolished the railway including the roadbed for a distance of 50 miles north of the border, and partially for an additional 15 miles. There is a trail about 30 miles west of and roughly parallel to the railroad, but there is no road south of Mengtze. Only two other corridors exist, according to the Chinese Minister of War: one, an old road parallel to and about 30 miles west of the railway; the other about 125 miles east of the railway. The same source says that lateral travel between these routes is impossible because of the ruggedness of the terrain, and that the Chinese have rendered impassable all three routes of approach. Possible use of the valleys of the larger river appears remote.

The Red River flows from the Tali Lake, just north of the Burma Road 250 miles west of Kunming, southeastward into Indo-China at Laokai. It is not navigable north of Laokai. There is a trail running northward along the river to a point 60 miles above Laokai, where it branches northeast to Mengtze. A footpath extends on up the river all way to Tali. The terrain is extremely rugged. From the scanty information available, the valleys of the Black and Makong Rivers would be even less accessible.

5. Chinese preparations against an invasion of Yunnan from Indo-China include the demolitions mentioned above. For some time, two group armies have been stationed in southeastern Yunnan. These are:

1st Group Army: 6th Army Corps of 2 divisions; 60th Army Corps of 3 divisions.

9th Group Army: 52d Army Corps of 3 divisions; 54th Army Corps of 2 divisions.

Plus 2 independent divisions. These are regular troops, but the bulk are Yunnanese, who have not previously demonstrated superior fighting qualities. The commander of the troops in this area is General Kuan Ling-shenk who took part in the successful Changsha defense of 1939.

The Chinese lack artillery, are very short of ammunition, both artillery and small arms, and to all practical purposes are devoid of an air force.

The Chinese have lightly organized a position 20 to 40 miles in depth, with the main line of resistance along a generally east-west line about 50 miles north of Laokai. Their line of observation is along the border. Two other positions south of Kunming are being organized. The southernmost is about 30 miles south of Kunming.

6. It is estimated that at the present rate of Japanese reinforcement of their troops in Indo-China, a period of from one to three months will be required before they can have a sufficient concentration for an offensive against Yunnan.

7. The rate of Japanese advance on Kunming once the border is crossed, will depend on the degree of Chinese resistance, especially in their defense of the extremely rugged terrain between the Indo-China plain and the Yunnan plateau.

8. A Japanese offensive into Yunnan from Indo-China would be an extremely difficult operation but if it were successful in closing the supply route from Burma it would be a serious blow to China's power and will to resist.

SHERMAN MILES,

Brigadier General, U. S. Army,

Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Enc.:

Tab A.

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Chief of the Air Corps
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General Embick.

NOVEMBER 2, 1941.

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D. :

Subject: G-2 Estimate, Far Eastern Situation. (For situation and communications maps see Tabs B, C, and D.)¹

In compliance with verbal request, Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., this date, the following is submitted as a G-2 Estimate of the Far Eastern Situation:

1. After four years of war in China, Japan is militarily over-extended on the mainland of Asia, economically weak, and psychologically aware of the fact that her economic structure is crumbling.

2. For obvious reasons both Germany and China would like to embroil the United States in a large scale war with Japan. While Japan is reluctant to go to war with us, her political and economic situations demand action. She has the following alternatives:

- a. Attack Siberia to neutralize the threat on her flank and rear.
- b. Occupy Thailand as a base from which to launch an offensive against Burma or Malaya.
- c. Contain or isolate the Philippine Islands and Hongkong and seize the Netherlands East Indies.
- d. Launch a direct attack on Singapore.
- e. Make a determined effort to bring the war in China to a close by cutting China's last supply route, the Burma Road.
- f. Bide her time while disposing her forces from north to south in such a way that she will be able to seize the opportunity for successful aggression in whatever direction it presents itself.

3. A Japanese attack on Siberia is unlikely as long as Russian resistance in Europe continues, and as long as the Siberian forces are not materially reduced in strength. Action under b above might, and under c or d above would certainly bring Japan into armed conflict with ABD powers—a situation which Japan, at present, wishes to avoid.

4. A drive from Indo-China into Yunnan would probably not involve Japan with any Third Power. Although an extremely difficult operation for the Japanese, requiring elaborate preparation on their part, a successful drive into Yunnan and across the Burma Road, even if it did not cause China's early capitulation, would nevertheless, be a terrific blow at her chances of holding out. It would not however, have the effect of immediately releasing any considerable Japanese force for use elsewhere, since long-drawn out mopping up operations would probably be necessary.

5. Because of the ruggedness of the terrain in southern Yunnan, and the almost complete lack of communications, the Chinese, if determined, could put up a very strong resistance even with the means now at their disposal. Such a defense would further deplete Japan's meager resources and immobilize her remaining reserves. (For a description of the terrain see Tab A.)

6. Japan's most probable line of action, therefore, will be to continue her efforts to secure a relaxation of American economic pressure while completing her plans and arranging her forces for an advance in the direction which will be most fruitful of quick results.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

I. B. 148-1

NOVEMBER 13, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Possible Japanese Drive into Yunnan.

1. Reference is made to memorandum of this Division to the Chief of Staff, I. B. 148, November 1, 1941, subject: Possible Japanese Drive into Yunnan. In this memorandum emphasis was placed on the principal avenue of advance, Laokai-Kunming. Since its submission the question has been raised of the possibility of a Japanese advance against Kunming and the Burma road through Kwangsi Province, in conjunction with a penetration up the normal avenue of the Yunnan railroad, Laokai-Mengtze-Kunming.

¹ Omitted.

2. The axis of the route through Kwangsi is the course of the Yu river, 150 miles northeast of the Yunnan railroad and roughly parallel to it. (See Map, Tab A.) This river rises in the mountains of eastern Yunnan and flows through southwest Kwangsi Province to its confluence with the West River near Nanning. It is navigable for river junks as far west as Poseh. To make use of this corridor the Japanese would have to move north from Hanoi to Caobang, thence across the Chinese border to the vicinity of Poseh, whence they could launch their attack up the Yunnan escarpment toward Kwangnan on the plateau, 150 miles southeast of Kunming.

This would be an even more difficult operation than a direct attack along the Yunnan railway line, since the supply problem would be enormous. From Caobang a fair road for light motor traffic runs 185 miles north to Poseh. Most bridges on this route have a capacity of only 1½ tons. Also it is probable that since the Japanese occupation of Indo-China, the Chinese have destroyed the road near the border.

Poseh can also be reached by the Hanoi-Langson-Nanning road, and thence northwest via Wuming and the Yu valley. Somewhat better roads exist on this route but the distance from Langson to Poseh is about 260 miles, as compared with 185 from Caobang to Poseh. Here also, the Chinese have demolished the highways near the border, and also the railway line which was under construction before the Japanese occupation of Nanning in 1940.

Arrived at Poseh the Japanese would be confronted with practically the same difficult terrain conditions as at Laokai, on the frontier. Poseh has an elevation of 525 feet; Kwangnan, 4,515. The air distance between the two is approximately 100 miles, and there are no motor roads in existence. (The Chinese have been surveying a highway from Kaihua, east of Mengtze on the Yunnan railway, through Kwangnan to Poseh, but latest reports indicate no actual construction on this route.) The terrain is almost as rugged as that north of Laokai.

The only apparent reason for use of this route would be in the event that the Japanese plan of campaign called for a "pincers" movement on Kunming. However, it would not be a true envelopment as initially it would be directed against Chinese forces not allotted to the defense of Kunming. Absence of lateral communication inside China would be a serious handicap to such an operation, to say nothing of the long line of communications through a hostile territory.

3. a. For defense against a movement through Kwangsi Province, there are available in the Fourth War Zone (Kwangsi and western Kwangtung) the following troops:

16th Group Army: 31st Army Corps of 2 divisions; 46th Army Corps of 2 divisions.

35th Group Army: 64th Army Corps of 2 divisions.

These are regular troops, largely veterans from Kwangsi and adjacent areas, of excellent fighting ability. The Zone Commander is Chang Fa-kuei, a very capable officer of long experience.

b. The Chinese lack artillery, are very short of ammunition, both artillery and small arms, and to all practical purposes are devoid of an air force.

4. An attack on Kunming through Kwangsi Province is only conceivable in conjunction with an advance up the Yunnan railway. It is estimated that this would require at least an additional five Japanese divisions, or a minimum total task force of 10 divisions.

5. It is estimated that there are now available in Indo-China for an expedition against Kunming a maximum of 40,000 troops, probably less. At least 160,000 troops would have to be brought into Indo-China through Haiphong for a double envelopment, and at least 60,000 for a single direct attack. ONI estimates the capacity of this port at 2,000 fully equipped troops per day. On this basis, under the most favorable circumstances, at least one month would be required to concentrate a sufficient force for the direct attack up the Yunnan railway. Between two and three months would be required to make the concentration for a double attack up the railway and up the Yu river valley.

6. The rate of Japanese advance on Kunming once the border is crossed, would depend on the degree of Chinese resistance, especially in the defense of the extremely rugged terrain between the Indo-Chinese and Yu river plains and the Yunnan plateau.

7. A Japanese offensive into Yunnan from Indo-China would be an extremely difficult operation but if it were successful in closing the supply route from Burma it would be a serious blow to China's power and will to resist. In this connection it is interesting to note that the British War Office concludes that such an

offensive would be rendered "most difficult" by reason of the supply problem alone, while the French Military Attache at Tokyo ridicules any idea of an attack on Yunnan from Indo-China.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Enclosure:

Tab A¹

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General Embick

NOVEMBER 25, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

1. The following are extracts from cables received in the Office of Naval Intelligence together with G-2 comment thereon:

a. *From Shanghai November 21.* Intense activity at Woosung since the 15th. Unusual number of ships present including former merchant craft 10,000 tons and up. Wednesday 10 transports sailed, eight of which carried troops. Same day 32 additional ships, similar type, anchored in lower Whangpoo. Landing boats included in outgoing equipment. On decks of three outgoing ships was observed a number of creosoted heavy timber trestles in sections each approximately 60 feet long and 8 feet wide. Several merchant vessels recently taken over observed installing machine gun mounts. One thousand troops departed from Swatow last Saturday.

G-2 Comment: Movement of troops from Central China believed directed toward Hainan and Indo-China. No evidences of heavy concentration on Taiwan (Formosa).

b. *From Guam November 23.* Increased naval activity Truk, Saipan area. Indicated increases base forces in Mandates. Additions to fleet;—Palao, one division Marus; Truk, two divisions Marus; and two seaplane tenders, also shore command (possible landing force). Saipan, two divisions Marus; Jaluit, three divisions Marus and three unidentified shore commands, also two seaplane tenders. Air force activity increasing. Eleventh Air Group believed in Palao. Airon 24 concentrated in Marshalls. Fifth Fleet apparently at Chichijima, portions possibly at Marcus. It is estimated that 70 itinerant ships arrived or departed from Mandates since November 1 with emphasis on Truk and Jaluit areas.

G-2 Comment: *Marus* are small cargo or passenger vessels requisitioned by the Navy for use as trains, supply vessels and tenders. A *Division of Marus* consists of some two to four vessels.

The *Eleventh Air Group* is something a little larger than an American Squadron. The *Fifth Fleet* consists of odds and ends of vessels not useable by the Combined Fleet. *Airon 24* consists of one old carrier (*Kamoi*) and one converted carrier.

2. From information available in the Division the Japanese strength in the mandated islands is believed to be as follows:

15,000 ground troops.	8 destroyers.
100 aircraft of all types.	9 submarines.
4 light cruisers.	

3. The Navy Department have supplied the following comment on November 24th regarding Japanese activity in the Western Pacific:

"Apparent establishment by Japan of combined air and surface patrol over shipping routes U. S. to Australia. Daily aircraft patrols observed extending

¹Omitted.

over Gilbert Islands from Jaluit. Surface craft believed covering area extending to Ellice Island. Fishing fleet reported cooperating with patrols. Fishing fleet divided in three sections: one in vicinity of Bathhurst Island, one near Arnhem, one near Thursday Islands. Fishing fleet expected to appear around Dutch New Guinea. These ships equipped with long range radio."

(signed) Sherman Miles
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:
Secretary of War
War Plans Division
GHQ

NOVEMBER 26, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Japanese Naval Task Force.

The following information was received from the Commandant 14th Naval District through the Office of Naval Intelligence at 12:45 a. m., this date:

1. The Japanese have been organizing a naval task force for the past month comprising:

a. *Second Fleet*: Under the command of Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet. (The Second Fleet corresponds roughly to our Scouting Force, consisting mainly of strong Cruiser Divisions).

b. *Third Fleet* which formerly was the China Coast Command Force including its first and second base forces, constituted by miscellaneous small vessels.

c. *Combined Air Force* consisting of all large carrier forces.

d. Also destroyer squadron 3, air squadron 7, submarine squadron 5, and possibly 1 battleship division from First Fleet consisting of 3 battleships.

Summary of Above: 14 Heavy Cruisers, 4 Light Cruisers, 10 Carriers, 3 Light Cruisers. 2 Destroyer Squadrons (24 destroyers), 2 Submarine Squadrons (18 submarines), and possibly 3 battleships.

2. The combined air force has assembled in Takao, Formosa, with some units believed in Hainan Island. The Third Fleet is believed moving in direction of Takao and Bako, Pescadores off West Coast of Formosa, from home waters in Japan. Units from the Second Fleet are at present possibly enroute to South China as advance scouts. Strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls. Present location of other units of this task force are not known.

3. The evaluation put upon the above information by the Commandant, 14th Naval District is that a strong force may be preparing to operate in Southeastern Asia, while component parts thereof may be expected to operate from Palao and the Marshall Islands.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:
Secretary of War
Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
I. B. File
Far East Section
Record Section

NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Recent developments in the Far East.

1. It has been reported on good authority, that between 18 and 24 Infantry Divisions and 8 Armored Brigades from the Russian Far Eastern Army have been identified on the Western front. If this is true, between 24 and 18 Divisions and 2 Armored Brigades remain in Eastern Siberia. Thus the possibility of a Kwantung Army offensive thrust against Siberia is increased, although such a move is not believed imminent at present.

2. Certain Japanese troops have been withdrawn from North and Central China within the last three weeks—24,000 of them sailed from Woosung (near Shanghai) between November 15 and 23. The transports carried 184 landing boats. Several other ships left during same period, number of troops and cargoes

unchecked. A special landing craft carrier left Shanghai the 18th of November and was sighted of Wenchow on the 23th sailing southwest.

3. A Naval Task Force which was reported by the 14th Naval District (Hawaii) as organized and concentrated at Taiwan and Hainan appears, according to a November 27 radio from the 16th Naval District (Manila) to be a loosely organized force on its way to an unknown concentration point. According to the latter dispatch it consists of:

3-4 battleships (possibly only)	5 mine layers
3 carriers	4 converted seaplane carriers
11 heavy cruisers	12 mine sweepers
5 light cruisers	12 patrol motor boats
47 destroyers	14 others
16 submarines	

It is apparently not yet ready for concerted action as its Commander is still in home waters and the force concentration has not yet taken place.

4. The Japanese land forces in the Mandated Islands have been gradually increased in the last 6 months from 5,000 to 15,000 men, and they now have about 100 combat planes of all types, plus the 4th Fleet, a mixed naval force of second class units.

5. Reports from Bangkok indicate that the Japanese Foreign Office officials there expect hostilities to break out in that region in the near future.

6. According to British reports, the Japanese have made and will continue to make aerial reconnaissance over British Pacific Islands, especially the Gilbert Group, Nauru and Ocean Islands; also over the Northern portion of British Malaya.

7. Reliable information has been received that the Japanese Foreign Office officials in North French Indo-China expect military movements in and through that region in the near future.

8. In Tongking, the total number of Japanese troops remains at about 25,000 (1½ Divisions), with about 90 planes. Since November 21st, additional Japanese troops have been moving into Southern French Indo-China: 10,000 from Tongking (which have been replaced there by other troops), and some 20,000 by sea. Conservative estimate of number of Japanese troops now in southern Indo-China is at least 70,000. This is approximately 3½ Divisions. The number of Japanese planes has also been increased by 82 (London, Military Attache report, November 25), bringing the total in the south to not less than 157. There may be more than this number since observation is limited. A large quantity of equipment has been landed in Indo-China in the last 60-70 days in amounts far in excess of current needs for the force believed there at present. Totals (minimum):

At Saigon:	300 side cars
90 Tanks (under 5 tons) (Bren gun carriers?)	20 road rollers
42 Tanks (7 to 9 tons)	5,000 collapsible rubber boats
About 30 other Armored vehicles (Type not specified)	500 horses
60 75-mm. guns.	3 locomotives
230 Guns—various calibers	500 light railway freight cars (4 wheel)
1,030 trucks	1,500 cases gas masks
200 motorcycles	14 ambulances
	52 armored cars

At Hanoi:

300 Trucks.

Large quantities of railway material (type not specified) oil and aviation gasoline (quantities not mentioned). Tanks and artillery (quantities, types, calibers, not mentioned).

9. According to a reliable report of November 17, there is a concentration of approximately 50,000 troops on the Island of Hainan. The air bases on the southern part of this island are capable of holding several hundred planes which can be flown from there to Tourane in Indo-China and from that point to Saigon, which is only about 400 miles from Tourane.

10. A reliable source reported on November 25 that an unconfirmed report to the Hanoi government indicated Japanese plans for an invasion of Thailand

about December 1, including seizure of the Isthmus of Kra. In connection with this last item, the Japanese are reliably reported to have been working on a naval and air base at Kompongson Bay on the Gulf of Siam, since September 27, 1941. Also Japanese reconnaissance planes have recently been seen over northern Malaya.

11. Up to the evening of November 26th, the Japanese Ambassador had been unable to make the Secretary of State yield to Japanese proposals and demands, and in consequence the Japanese hopes for an appeasing settlement by the United States are very slim.

12. There is good evidence that the Japanese are prepared to use chemical and probably bacteriological warfare whenever and wherever they deem it necessary or profitable to do so.

13. A press dispatch of November 21 quotes the Chinese military spokesman, Chungking, as accusing the Japanese of starting germ warfare. He said that on November 4th Japanese planes dropped food and clothing at Changteh, Hunan Province and that persons who made use of these were taken ill and died with symptoms similar to those of bubonic plague. (The Military Attache Chungking is investigating this report).

14. From the foregoing it appears evident that the Japanese have completed plans for further aggressive moves in Southeastern Asia. These plans will probably be put into effect soon after the armed services feel that the Kurusu mission is a definite failure. A task force of about five divisions, supported by appropriate air and naval units has been assembled for the execution of these plans. This force is now enroute southward to an as yet undetermined rendezvous.

15. This Division is of the opinion that the initial move will be made against Thailand from the sea and overland through Southern Indo-China. It is further believed that the Japanese are uncertain of the reaction of the ABD powers to this move and therefore have organized in sufficient strength to cope with any opposition they might initially encounter from those powers in the South China Sea.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution :

Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War for Air
Chief of the Army Air Forces
Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
Director of Naval Intelligence
G. H. Q.

I. B. 159

NOVEMBER 29, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941-March 31, 1942.

I. General.

1. This estimate is addressed to the objective of Nazi defeat. Its purpose is to examine the factors of strength and weakness and of strategic positions of the Nazis and of their opponents, in order to present the military possibilities and probabilities during the period December 1, 1941 to March 31, 1942.

2. *a.* During that period Germany, though weakened by her losses in Russia, will remain the only power capable of launching large scale strategic offensives. Her success in Russia and the advent of winter make disposable a larger portion of German land and air power than at any time since the beginning of the Russo-German war. On the other hand, the price she has had to pay for her Russian success and the width of the wasted zone behind her Eastern Front indicate that a considerable period of time would be required for the reorganization and redistribution of her major forces. The German conduct of war, so far, has been characterized by a thoroughness and deliberation in this regard. Between the end of one campaign and the launching of the next there have been considerable periods of time. In the present case, if Germany should decide to shift the

theater of war, all indications point to an even greater necessity for a considerable time lag than has so far existed between her successive campaigns. Large scale German strategic offensives are therefore not to be expected outside of the Russian theater within the period under consideration. It is much more probable that Germany will continue her attack on Russia, particularly in the Ukraine and the North Caucasus plain between the Azov and Caspian Seas during the winter and early spring.

b. Japan also has the strategic initiative, but to a much more limited degree than is the case with Germany. Japan, already extended militarily, has a multiplicity of strategic objectives; but for a variety of reasons, she cannot concentrate the required forces to attack any of them on a large scale and with assurance of success. A possible exception to the latter statement lies in the contingency of a serious depletion of Russian forces in eastern Siberia. But even in this case, a large scale Japanese strategic offensive against Siberia during the period in question is somewhat doubtful in the light of present politico-military situation and of the rigorous winter climate in that region.

c. Great Britain is pressing a limited strategic offensive in Libya and has taken the aerial offensive over Western Europe. She, too, is extended militarily and more extensive ground and aerial action is beyond her means.

d. All other belligerent or potentially belligerent powers must be considered incapable of large scale strategic offensives during the period in question. The United States, committed to the defeat of Nazi Germany, is an increasingly important element in the situation. Our influence is exerted in naval and aerial participation in the Battle of the Atlantic, in the supply of material and technical assistance to the four land theaters and in psychological, economic and political action against the Axis throughout the world. But all this does not sum up to a large scale strategic offensive. We have only a means of strategical maneuver—our ability to make available more or less material and technical facilities and in their allocation to those theaters where they will be most advantageously employed.

e. Neither the economic nor the psychological situation in Germany indicates any possibility of weakening the Nazi power to a critical extent during the period in question.

f. From the above it must be concluded that, during the period in question:

- (1) Neither the anti-Axis nor the Axis powers can force a decision.
- (2) The anti-Axis powers will have a period of at least four months in which they may strengthen their position in one or more of the four important theaters of war, and in which they may decide upon a regrouping of forces, subject to certain physical limitations, consonant with their chosen long range strategy for the defeat of the Nazis.

II. *Brief Estimate on the Theaters of War.*

1. *The British Isles.* This theater is the citadel of the Anti-Axis Powers. Its security is, therefore, so essential to Nazi defeat that it must be held. The ground, sea and aerial defenses of the islands have been and are being materially strengthened.

For reasons given previously, it is not believed that Germany will be in a position to attempt an invasion of the islands during the period in question. It is probable that an invasion, if attempted, will be delayed until mid-summer of 1942. An attempt made at that time will probably be unsuccessful. As for the present, after a short delay for reorganization and transfer, Germany can launch large-scale air attacks on the United Kingdom at any time that she is willing to move the necessary forces from the Russian front. In view of the improved British defenses and of the weakening of the German Air Force, however, it is estimated that in the period in question such attacks cannot reach the intensities of those of the winter of 1940-41.

From this theater the only British offensive capability lies in the air. It is to be expected that strategic bombing of Germany and the occupied territories will continue; but that this action will be indecisive.

Material aid from the United States has been an essential element in the resistance and survival of the British Isles. Continuance of this aid is still essential. It is, fortunately, the easiest of all the land theaters for us to aid.

2. *The Atlantic.* The Battle of the Atlantic is essentially a struggle for the sea lanes radiating from the United Kingdom, this conflict is now trending against Germany. Sinkings by the Axis are decreasing and ship construction in Britain and the United States is increasing. It is now probable that replacements have

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overtaken losses. Figures on ship and tonnage losses during 1941 are as follows:—

Losses (British, Allied and Neutral)

	Total		Monthly average	
	Ships	Tonnage	Ships	Tonnage
January 1 to June 30 (6 months)	628	2,755,242	105	459,207
June 30 to Nov. 15 (4½ months)	285	1,000,990	63	222,442

During October over 4,200,000 tons of goods were imported into the United Kingdom, as compared with a monthly average for the year of approximately 2,500,000. The October imports were received after the United States Navy began convoy duty in the Atlantic. As the weight of the United States Navy continues to increase, success in the Battle of the Atlantic should be assured.

Since Germany's means of attack (surface raiders, long-range planes and submarines) are of limited use in other theaters, it is to be expected that she will continue the offensive in this theater, regardless of results or of operations elsewhere.

The United States is contributing powerfully to the decision in the Battle of the Atlantic by direct naval action and by the building of cargo vessels. Continuance of this action is essential to the defeat of Germany.

3. *Eastern Theater.* By a series of relentless offensives Germany has occupied vast stretches of terrain, including many of Russia's industrial regions and has inflicted grave casualties on the Red Army. But Germany has suffered great losses in men and material, and has not yet attained her basic objectives of destroying the Russian armies and the Stalin regime. While Germany could transfer her principal military effort to other theaters this winter, it is estimated that she will continue to concentrate on the attack on Russian. Specifically she will:

Seek to destroy the mass of the Russian armies.

Continue the siege of Leningrad.

Attempt to cut the Russian supply lines to Archangel and Murmansk.

Seek to seize the general line of the Volga.

Attempt to overrun the Caucasus, thus obtaining oil and securing a jump-off position for an eventual advance into the Middle East.

The most serious German threat is southeastwards to the Caucasus, and her goal is oil. Axis forces are extending eastward north of Rostov toward the Don. They may capture Stalingrad and gain control of the Volga south to its mouth at Astrakhan. Russian defense of the North Caucasus will probably eventually fail, after substantially delaying the Axis advance. With sufficiently determined and prompt allied aid, the Germans may be kept from occupation of the Trans-Caucasus and control of the Baku oil fields.

The U. S. S. R. is weaker, relative to Germany, than at the outset of hostilities. Her political structure has remained stable and her armies, while depleted, have not been irreparably defeated. Russia is favored by the following: The extreme cold of winter is a deterrent to operations, and Russian training and technique in severe winter weather is considered better than that of the invaders. While the Soviet situation is critical, ready availability of manpower resources is in Russian favor. Defense industry is in operation at approximately 60% of pre-war volume. British and American material assistance is being received; increased and continuing allied assistance is urgently required.

The following considerations are unfavorable to the U. S. S. R.: The uncertainty of the Far Eastern situation causes concentration of efficient Soviet troops along the Manchukuo frontier, not available for use in the western theater. The Soviet Army has shortages in tanks, all weapons, probably in all ammunition. The shortage in tanks is especially serious; that in small arms and small arms ammunition is less marked than in other weapons. The means of supply from the outside world are difficult and precarious. To date no British operation elsewhere has been sufficiently strong to cause any withdrawal of German troops from Russia.

Aside from surrender, which seems unlikely, Russia's only feasible line of action is to resist stubbornly in the hope that attrition, climate and lengthened communications will eventually bring her assailants to a standstill. By the spring of 1942 it is estimated that organized but depleted Russian armies will stand behind the Volga and perhaps even as far west as Moscow. It is also probable that Russian forces will hold the Caucasus mountains and Trans-Caucasia.

With her industry dislocated, Russia is in extreme need of material assistance from abroad. She requires raw materials, machine tools and munitions. Unfortunately, the avenues of entry are vulnerable, limited in capacity and very awkwardly located. Aid to Russia has been planned on the basis of a total import capacity of 500,000 tons per month. It is by no means certain that this figure will be reached. Russian requirements can only be met by the United States and Great Britain. This relatively small contribution at the crisis of the Russo-German war appears to be the total material means available to the Democracies to influence the struggle within this theater.

4. *Middle Eastern Theater.* In this theater, extending from Libya to the Caspian, only the western segment is active. In Libya the British are engaged in an offensive the issue of which is still in doubt. Farther to the east, Syria, Iraq and Iran are shielded from the war for the time being by neutral Turkey and by the Russian forces in the Caucasus.

Because of the Russian campaign and certain great logistic difficulties, there is practically no danger of an Axis major offensive in this theater, from the north, before the spring of 1942. Even a British defeat in their current Libyan operations would so exhaust the Axis forces in North Africa as to free Alexandria and Suez from the threat of a thrust from the west. A British victory in Libya would probably force German entry into Tunisia and their occupation of Algiers and Morocco. But such an eventuality would be more apt to delay than to hasten an all-out German offensive, from the west and the north, against the Middle East Theater.

Even if successful in their current Libyan offensive, it is not believed that the British will be able to advance through Tripolitania without a considerable delay for reorganization. It is therefore probable that from the British point of view this theater will shortly become a defensive one, with a minimum of several months available for the completion of its organization.

In the eastern sector of this theater (the Levant, Iraq and Iran), the British are gradually building a substantial force to meet any Axis threat to the area through Turkey or the Caucasus Mountains. In the Levant, there are three Australian divisions with other troops, and General Wavell told our Military Observer in Iran that he expected to have at least ten divisions in Northern Iraq by March of 1942.

The United States is committed to providing great masses of material to the Middle East, and is undertaking vast construction projects to facilitate supply. Except the British Isles, the Middle East is the most accessible of the important active theaters to us, and our lines of supply to it, though long, are the least vulnerable.

We are building up an influence on British military policy in the Middle East. Further American commitments, including probably the eventual employment of our armed forces, will be necessary in this region.

5. *The Far Eastern Theater.* Here the initiative rests with Japan in spite of her military overextension. She has the following lines of action open to her:

- a. Attack Siberia.
- b. Attack Yunnan Province to cut the Burma Road with a view to an early end to the war with China.
- c. Occupy Thailand.
- d. Through Thailand, attack
 - (1) Burma and the Burma Road,
 - (2) Malaya.
- e. Attack the Philippines and Hong Kong, preparatory to a movement on Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies.
- f. Contain or isolate the Philippines and Hong Kong and
 - (1) Attack Singapore
 - (a) directly by sea;
 - (b) by sea in conjunction with a land attack through Thailand and Malaya.
 - (2) Attack the Netherlands East Indies.

g. Bide her time, wait for a better opportunity to pursue any of the above lines of action, hoping that the course of events will turn in her favor.

h. Seek a general settlement through American mediation, including an understanding with the United States and Great Britain as to political and economic penetration of southeast Asia and the southwestern Pacific.

i. Reorient her whole foreign policy by withdrawing from the Axis.

(h) and (i) are impossible, short of a complete overthrow of her governing forces.

The most probable line of action for Japan is the occupation of Thailand.

The forces of all other countries in the Far East are on the defensive before Japan. The British Commonwealth, the Netherlands East Indies and the United States are in consultative association for the defense of Maylasia. To date this association has been effective in slowing down the Japanese penetration to the southwest. China is containing the equivalent of 30 Japanese divisions. The U. S. S. R., hard pressed for troops in European Russia, has reduced her Siberian garrisons to what she estimates to be the minimum necessary to deter Japan from attacking to the north. So far she has been successful in this effort.

China, aided and encouraged by America, will remain in the war against Japan and will continue to contain important Japanese forces. The effective use of China's unlimited manpower, as an anti-Axis potential, depends entirely on the extent to which she is able to equip it, particularly in artillery and aviation. For this, she is entirely dependent upon the United States. The stronger the Chinese become, the more Japanese troops will be pinned down in China, thereby releasing further Russian strength for use against Hitler.

Although China is receiving an increasing amount of equipment from this country, a major offensive by the Chinese cannot be expected during the period ending March 31, 1942.

The British Imperial forces in Malaysia and at Hong Kong occupy a purely defensive role. The forces in Malaya have recently been re-enforced by additional troops from Australia, New Zealand (air), and India, while those in Hong Kong have been augmented by the arrival of Canadian levies. Both of these localities present a very strong defense against any possible Japanese attack.

The people and government of the Netherlands East Indies have continued, affirmatively and constructively, to function practically as a sovereign state, loyal to the mother country. As evidence of Dutch spirit, they (a) have reorganized their army, (b) are actively at work manufacturing needed army equipment, (c) are actively training reserves, (d) have expanded their system of air fields throughout the islands, (e) have cooperated with the British and United States governments in preparation of extensive plans for defense, (f) have refused to renew their commercial treaty with Japan, (g) have delivered to Japan only 10,000 tons of oil since January 1, 1941—said delivery having been on an old contract still in force.

In the Far East the United States is concerned as a possible belligerent and also as a prime source of war materials for China, the British Commonwealth and for the Netherlands East Indies. We are in process of sending a few military airplanes to Thailand. But this theater will be a secondary one from the point of view of supply. Under all circumstances we will continue to be able to supply Australasia, the Dutch East Indies, and probably also China, though somewhat precariously, through the Burma Road. Siberia will become completely cut off if Japan attacks Russia.

Our influence in the Far Eastern Theater lies in the threat of our Naval power and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner. If we become involved in war with Japan we could launch a serious offensive against her by Naval and Air forces. But such an attack would fall short of a major strategic offensive because it could not be decisive within a reasonable time, and still more, because it would be a diversion of forces away from rather than toward our objective, the defeat of the Nazis.

III. Morale.

The outstanding feature of the war in 1941 has been the rise in anti-Axis and the decline in Axis morale.

The anti-Axis powers have been heartened by the failure of the German air attack on Britain, the decreased German success in the Atlantic, the continued resistance in the Middle and Far Eastern theaters, the drain on Germany of the Russian Campaign and of her conquered territories, and probably most of all, by the continued progress of America from neutrality towards participation in the war.

Even more notable has been the decline in Axis morale. In Italy and Japan the reasons are obvious. Both are weary of unsuccessful war and economically distressed. But Germany presents a true paradox. Here is a warrior nation which has made colossal sacrifices to build war power and has had unprecedented success in war—and yet is wholly apathetic. No enthusiasm prevails, only the desire to see it all end.

In any given period, a nation at war generally finds itself in one of three military situations. To each of these situations there should be a corresponding moral reaction. These situations and reactions are:

Military Situation

Moral Reaction

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Superiority of strength. Possession of initiative. Unbroken success. | 1. The elan of victory—fighting with confidence of success. |
| 2. Approximate equality in strength. Initiative doubtful. Ultimate success still in balance. | 2. The grim struggle—fighting to gain success. |
| 3. Inferiority in strength. Strategic initiative lost. Ultimate success doubtful. | 3. Their "back to the wall"—fighting to prevent defeat. |

Perhaps the most fundamental fact in the war situation today is that Germany is, and has continuously been in military situation Number 1, while the moral reaction of her people is, and has been for some time rather lower than Number 2.

The morale factor in the war will be affected by the outcome, probably within the next month, of the operations in Russia and in Libya, and by Japan's decision. But there is no reason to believe that the trend of 1941 in German morale will be reversed or even materially reduced in the period under discussion.

In this factor lies the germ of Nazi defeat.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Distribution:

The President
Secretary of War
Secretary of State
Under Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War for Air
The Chief of Staff.
Chief of the Army Air Forces
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1
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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4
Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
G. H. Q.
Chief of the Air Corps
Director of Naval Intelligence
Coordinator of Information
General Embick
Record Section
I. B. File

dya

I. B. 159-A

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Supplementary Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941—March 31, 1942.

I. General.

1. This estimate is addressed to the objective of Nazi defeat. Its purpose is to examine the factors of strength and weakness and of strategic positions of the Nazis and of their opponents, in order to present the military possibilities and probabilities during the period December 1, 1941 to March 31, 1942. It supplements and amplifies the Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941—March 31, 1942, issued by this Division on November 29, 1941, and is believed to be more suitable for planning purposes than the previous estimate.

2. a. During that period Germany, though weakened by her losses in Russia, will remain the only power capable of launching large scale strategic offensives. Her success in Russia and the advent of winter make disposable a larger portion of German land and air power than at any time since the beginning of the Russo-German war. On the other hand, the price she has had to pay for her

Russian success and the width of the wasted zone behind her Eastern Front indicate that a considerable period of time would be required for the reorganization and redispotion of her major forces. The German conduct of war, so far, has been characterized by a thoroughness and deliberation in this regard. Between the end of one campaign and the launching of the next there have been considerable periods of time. In the present case, if Germany should decide to shift the theater of war, all indications point to an even greater necessity for a considerable time lag than has so far existed between her successive campaigns. Large scale German strategic offensives are therefore not to be expected outside of the Russian theater within the period under consideration. It is much more probable that Germany will continue her attack on Russia, particularly in the Ukraine and the North Caucasus plain between the Azov and Caspian Seas during the winter and early spring.

b. Japan also has the strategic initiative, but to a much more limited degree than is the case with Germany. Japan, already extended militarily, has a multiplicity of strategic objectives; but for a variety of reasons, she cannot concentrate the required forces to attack any of them on a large scale and with assurance of success. A possible exception to the latter statement lies in the contingency of a serious depletion of Russian forces in eastern Siberia. But even in this case, a large scale Japanese strategic offensive against Siberia during the period in question is somewhat doubtful in the light of present politico-military situation and of the rigorous winter climate in that region.

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d. All other belligerent or potentially belligerent powers must be considered incapable of large scale strategic offensives during the period in question. The United States, committed to the defeat of Nazi Germany, is an increasingly important element in the situation. Our influence is exerted in naval and aerial participation in the Battle of the Atlantic, in the supply of material and technical assistance to the four land theaters and in psychological, economic and political action against the Axis throughout the world. But all this does not sum up to a large scale strategical offensive. We have only a means of strategical maneuver—our ability to make available more or less material and technical facilities and in their allocation to those theaters where they will be most advantageously employed.

e. Neither the economic nor the psychologic situation in Germany indicates any possibility of weakening the Nazi power to a critical extent during the period in question.

f. From the above it must be concluded that, during the period in question:

- (1) Neither the anti-Axis nor the Axis powers can force a decision.
- (2) The anti-Axis powers will have a period of at least four months in which they may strengthen their position in one or more of the four important theaters of war, and in which they may decide upon a regrouping of forces, subject to certain physical limitations, consonant with their chosen long range strategy for the defeat of the Nazis.

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The anti-Axis powers have been heartened by the failure of the German air attack on Britain, the decreased German success in the Atlantic, the continued resistance in the Middle and Far Eastern theaters, the drain on Germany of the Russian Campaign and of her conquered territories, and probably most of all, by the continued progress of America from neutrality towards participation in the war.

Even more notable has been the decline in Axis morale. In Italy and Japan the reasons are obvious. Both are weary of unsuccessful war and economically distressed. But Germany presents a true paradox. Here is a warrior nation which has made colossal sacrifices to build war power and has had unprecedented success in war—and yet is wholly apathetic. No enthusiasm prevails, only the desire to see it all end.

In any given period, a nation at war generally finds itself in one of three military situations. To each of these situations there should be a corresponding moral reaction. These situations and reactions are:

*Military Situation**Moral Reaction*

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Superiority of strength. Possession of initiative. Unbroken success.
2. Approximate equality in strength. Initiative doubtful. Ultimate success still in balance.
3. Inferiority in strength. Strategic initiative lost. Ultimate success doubtful. | 1. The elan of victory—fighting with confidence of success.
2. The grim struggle—fighting to gain success.
3. Their "back to the wall"—fighting to prevent defeat. |
|--|--|

Perhaps the most fundamental fact in the war situation today is that Germany is, and has continuously been in military situation Number 1, while the moral reaction of her people is, and has been for some time rather lower than Number 2.

The morale factor in the war will be affected by the outcome, probably within the next month, of the operations in Russia and in Libya, and by Japan's decision. But there is no reason to believe that the trend of 1941 in German morale will be reversed or even materially reduced in the period under discussion.

In this factor lies the germ of Nazi defeat.

III. Brief Estimate on the Actual and Potential Theaters of War.

1. *The British Isles.* This theater is the citadel of the anti-Axis Powers. Its security is, therefore, so essential to Nazi defeat that it must be held. The ground, sea and aerial defenses of the islands have been and are being materially strengthened.

For reasons given previously, it is not believed that Germany will be in a position to attempt an invasion of the islands during the period in question. It is probable that an invasion, if attempted, will be delayed until mid-summer of 1942. An attempt made at that time will probably be unsuccessful. As for the present, after a short delay for reorganization and transfer, Germany can launch large-scale air attacks on the United Kingdom at any time that she is willing to move the necessary forces from the Russian front. In view of improved British defenses and of the weakening of the German Air Force, however, it is estimated that in the period in question such attacks cannot reach the intensities of those of the winter of 1940-41.

From this theater the only British offensive capability lies in the air. It is to be expected that strategic bombing of Germany and the occupied territories will continue; but that this action will be indecisive.

Material aid from the United States has been an essential element in the resistance and survival of the British Isles. Continuance of this aid is still essential. It is, fortunately, the easiest of all the land theaters for us to aid.

2. *The Atlantic.* The battle of the Atlantic is essentially a struggle for the sea lanes radiating from the United Kingdom, this conflict is now trending against Germany. Sinkings by the Axis are decreasing and ship construction in Britain and the United States is increasing. It is now probable that replacements have overtaken losses. Figures on ship and tonnage losses during 1941 are as follows:

Losses (British, Allied and Neutral)

	Total		Monthly average	
	Ships	Tonnage	Ships	Tonnage
January 1 to June 30 (6 Months).....	628	2,755,242	105	459,207
June 30 to Nov. 15 (4½ Months).....	285	1,000,990	63	222,442

During October over 4,200,000 tons of goods were imported into the United Kingdom, as compared with a monthly average for the year of approximately 2,500,000. The October imports were received after the United States Navy began convoy duty in the Atlantic. As the weight of the United States Navy continues to increase, success in the Battle of the Atlantic should be assured.

Since Germany's means of attack (surface raiders, long-range planes and submarines) are of limited use in other theaters, it is to be expected that she will continue the offensive in this theater, regardless of results or of operations elsewhere.

The United States is contributing powerfully to the decision in the Battle of the Atlantic by direct naval action and by the building of cargo vessels. Continuance of this action is essential to the defeat of Germany.

3. Eastern Theater. By a series of relentless offensives Germany has occupied vast stretches of terrain, including many of Russia's industrial regions and has inflicted grave casualties on the Red Army. But Germany has suffered great losses in men and materiel, and has not yet attained her basic objectives of destroying the Russian armies and the Stalin regime. While Germany could transfer her principal military effort to other theaters this winter, it is estimated that she will continue to concentrate on the attack on Russia. Specifically she will:

Seek to destroy the mass of the Russian armies.

Continue the siege of Leningrad.

Attempt to cut the Russian supply lines to Archangel and Murmansk.

Seek to seize the general line of the Volga.

Attempt to overrun the Caucasus, thus obtaining oil and securing a jump-off position for an eventual advance into the Middle East.

The most serious German threat is southeastwards to the Caucasus, and her goal is oil. Axis forces may capture Stalingrad and gain control of the Volga south to its mouth at Astrakhan. Russian defense of the North Caucasus will probably eventually fail, after substantially delaying the Axis advance. With sufficiently determined and prompt allied aid, the Germans may be kept from occupation of the Trans-Caucasus and control of the Baku oil fields.

The U. S. S. R. is weaker, relative to Germany, than at the outset of hostilities. Her political structure has remained stable and her armies, while depleted, have not been irreparably defeated. Russia is favored by the following: The extreme cold of winter is a deterrent to operations, and Russian training and technique in severe weather is considered better than that of the invaders. While the Soviet situation is critical, ready availability of manpower resources is in Russian favor. Defense industry is in operation at approximately 60% of pre-war volume. British and American material assistance is being received; increased and continuing allied assistance is urgently required.

The following considerations are unfavorable to the U. S. S. R.: the uncertainty of the Far Eastern situation causes concentration of efficient Soviet troops along the Manchukuo frontier, not available for use in the western theater. The Soviet Army has shortages in tanks, all weapons, probably in all ammunition. The shortage in tanks is especially serious; that in small arms and small arms ammunition is less marked than in other weapons. The means of supply from the outside world are difficult and precarious. To date no British operation elsewhere has been sufficiently strong to cause any withdrawal of German troops from Russia.

Aside from surrender, which seems unlikely, Russia's only feasible line of action is to resist stubbornly in the hope that attrition, climate and lengthened communications will eventually bring her assailants to a standstill. By the spring of 1942 it is estimated that organized but depleted Russian armies will stand behind the Volga and perhaps even as far west as Moscow. It is also probable that Russian forces will hold the Caucasus mountains and Trans-Caucasia.

With her industry dislocated, Russia is in extreme need of material assistance from abroad. She requires raw materials, machine tools and munitions. Unfortunately, the avenues of entry are vulnerable, limited in capacity and very awkwardly located. Aid to Russia has been planned on the basis of a total import capacity of 500,000 tons per month. It is by no means certain that this figure will be reached. Russian requirements can only be met by the United States and Great Britain. This relatively small contribution at the crisis of the Russo-German war appears to be the total material means available to the Democracies to influence the struggle within this theater.

4. Middle Eastern Theater. In this theater, extending from Libya to the Caspian, only the western segment is active. In Libya the British are engaged in an offensive the issue of which is still in doubt. Farther to the east, Syria, Iraq and Iran are shielded from the war for the time being by neutral Turkey and by the Russian forces in the Caucasus.

Because of the Russian campaign and certain great logistic difficulties, there is practically no danger of an Axis major offensive in this theater, from the north, before the spring of 1942. Even a British defeat in their current Libyan operations would so exhaust the Axis forces in North Africa as to free Alexandria and Suez from the threat of a thrust from the west. A British victory in Libya would probably force German entry into Tunisia and their occupation of Algiers and Morocco. But such an eventuality would be more apt to delay than to hasten an all-out German offensive, from the west and the north, against the Middle East Theater.

Even if successful in their current Libyan offensive, it is not believed that the British will be able to advance through Tripolitania without a considerable delay for reorganization. It is therefore probable that from the British point of view this theater will shortly become a defensive one, with a minimum of several months available for the completion of its organization.

In the eastern sector of this theater (the Levant, Iraq and Iran), the British are gradually building a substantial force to meet any Axis threat to the area through Turkey or the Caucasus Mountains. In the Levant, there are three Australian divisions with other troops, and General Wavell told our Military Observer in Iran that he expected to have at least ten divisions in Northern Iraq by March of 1942.

The United States is committed to providing great masses of material to the Middle East, and is undertaking vast construction projects to facilitate supply. Except the British Isles, the Middle East is the most accessible of the important active theaters to us, and our lines of supply to it, though long, are the least vulnerable.

We are building up an influence on British military policy in the Middle East. Further American commitments, including probably the eventual employment of our armed forces, will be necessary in this region.

5. *The Conquered Nations.* The conquered countries will continue to rally somewhat more strongly against their conqueror. While effective revolts are to be discounted, maintenance of order will divert some 40 German and some 25 Italian divisions. The economic contributions of these countries to the Axis war effort will fall below German hopes and will tend to decline. Germany's failures in administration, in organization of production and above all in reconciliation to her hegemony of Europe will become an increasing drain on her strength.

6. *The Far Eastern Theater.* Here the initiative rests with Japan in spite of her military overextension. She has the following lines of action open to her:

- a. Attack Siberia.
- b. Attack Yunnan Province to cut the Burma Road with a view to an early end to the war with China.
- c. Occupy Thailand.
- d. Through Thailand, attack
 - (1) Burma and the Burma Road,
 - (2) Malaya.
- e. Attack the Philippines and Hong Kong, preparatory to a movement on Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies.
- f. Contain or isolate the Philippines and Hong Kong and
 - (1) Attack Singapore
 - (a) directly, by sea;
 - (b) by sea in conjunction with a land attack through Thailand and Malaya.
 - (2) Attack the Netherlands East Indies.
- g. Bide her time, wait for a better opportunity to pursue any of the above lines of action, hoping that the course of events will turn in her favor.
- h. Seek a general settlement through American mediation, including an understanding with the United States and Great Britain as to political and economic penetration of southeast Asia and the southwestern Pacific.
- i. Reorient her whole foreign policy by withdrawing from the Axis.
- (h) and (i) are impossible, short of a complete overthrow of her governing forces.

The most probable line of action for Japan is the occupation of Thailand.

The forces of all other countries in the Far East are on the defensive before Japan. The British Commonwealth, the Netherlands East Indies and the United States are in consultative association for the defense of Malaysia. To date this association has been effective in slowing down the Japanese penetra-

tion to the southwest. China is containing the equivalent of 30 Japanese divisions. The U. S. S. R., hard pressed for troops in European Russia, has reduced her Siberian garrisons to what she estimates to be the minimum necessary to deter Japan from attacking to the north. So far she has been successful in this effort.

China, aided and encouraged by America, will remain in the war against Japan and will continue to contain important Japanese forces. The effective use of China's unlimited manpower, as an anti-Axis potential, depends entirely on the extent to which she is able to equip it, particularly in artillery and aviation. For this, she is entirely dependent upon the United States. The stronger the Chinese become, the more Japanese troops will be pinned down in China, thereby releasing further Russian strength for use against Hitler.

Although China is receiving an increasing amount of equipment from this country, a major offensive by the Chinese cannot be expected during the period ending March 31, 1942.

The British Imperial forces in Malaysia and at Hong Kong occupy a purely defensive role. The forces in Malaya have recently been re-enforced by additional troops from Australia, New Zealand (air), and India, while those in Hong Kong have been augmented by the arrival of Canadian levies. Both of these localities present a very strong defense against any possible Japanese attack.

The people and government of the Netherlands East Indies have continued, affirmatively and constructively, to function practically as a sovereign state, loyal to the mother country. As evidence of Dutch spirit, they (a) have reorganized their army, (b) are actively at work manufacturing needed army equipment, (c) are actively training reserves, (d) have expanded their system of air fields throughout the islands, (e) have cooperated with the British and United States governments in preparation of extensive plans for defense, (f) have refused to renew their commercial treaty with Japan, (g) have delivered to Japan only 10,000 tons of oil since January 1, 1941—said delivery having been on an old contract still in force.

In the Far East the United States is concerned as a possible belligerent and also as a prime source of war materials for China, the British Commonwealth and for the Netherlands East Indies. We are in process of sending a few military airplanes to Thailand. But this theater will be a secondary one from the point of view of supply. Under all circumstances we will continue to be able to supply Australasia, the Dutch East Indies, and probably also China, though somewhat precariously, through the Burma Road. Siberia will become completely cut off if Japan attacks Russia.

Our influence in the Far Eastern Theater lies in the threat of our Naval power and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner. If we become involved in war with Japan we could launch a serious offensive against her by Naval and Air Forces based on the Philippines and elsewhere in Malaysia. But such an attack would fall short of a major strategic offensive because it could not be decisive within a reasonable time, and still more, because it would be a diversion of forces away from rather than toward our objective, the defeat of the Nazis.

7. Northwest and West Africa. a. Northwest Africa. Although valuable as a base for aerial operations, northwest Africa cannot provide an anti-Axis offensive theater of operations. Any anti-Axis ground force that had occupied this area would be faced with the crossing of the Mediterranean, if it should decide to conduct operations on the European mainland. Its prime value, therefore, to anti-Axis forces lies primarily in denying its occupation to Axis forces. Paragraph 9, Tab A, outlines the potential opposition to Axis occupation and shows clearly that German forces would meet with little resistance. Time and space factors, as well as potential enemy resistance, clearly indicate that Germany can occupy this area ahead of an anti-Axis force.

On the other hand, enemy potentialities are not as favorable with regard to the occupation of the Azores. With control of the Atlantic still in the hands of anti-Axis forces, the Axis could hardly be expected to span one thousand miles of ocean to reach the Azores. Should the Azores be prevented from falling into the hands of Axis forces, the advantages gained by the Axis occupation of Northwest Africa would be partially nullified.

b. West Africa. West Africa is of value to the Axis in providing submarine and airplane bases from which to operate against Allied shipping and influence

Latin America. Axis occupation would also deny the direct bomber ferry service from the United States to the Middle East Theater. The theater is one which would be extremely severe, due to climatic and disease factors, to all but native troops. With France committed to collaboration with Germany, time and space factors and potential resistance would make undisputed occupation by the Axis difficult but possible. Cape Verde, on the other hand, could be occupied by anti-Axis forces and the occupation would limit the encroachment of Axis forces towards South America and reduce the scope of operation of Axis submarines and planes.

c. The probability of German occupation of Northwest and West Africa during the period December 1, 1941–March 31, 1942, is contingent on the possible outcome of the present campaign in Libya as well as on the plans of the German General Staff. The preceding sub-paragraphs show that Germany can occupy Northwest Africa at will and West Africa with some delay. On the other hand, success by the Axis in those areas, would probably invite anti-Axis occupation of the Azores and Cape Verde. It seems more likely that this German action in Africa will be postponed, but if it is launched it should surprise no one.

8. *Western Hemisphere.* During the period December 1, 1941 to March 31, 1942, it is not expected there will be any significant change in the Western Hemisphere theater.

The twenty Latin American republics all have individual problems. Most of their political difficulties are due to economic strain and jockeying for power between the "ins" and the "outs", the "outs" always being supported by the anti-American forces. They are all extremely conscious of the world situation and the two powerful antagonists, and are not anxious to make any enmities with the potential winner. Military power impresses them mightily, as few other matters do.

In this area, no direct war effort can be seen during this period, and Germany's line of action and organization will be to perfect and extend her present influence in each of the countries by propaganda, bribery and coercion. Subversive activities will be kept under cover and the Axis influence will not emerge in any large-scale version in this area until a more propitious circumstance arises which will be determined by the progress of events in Europe and Asia.

In other words, the Axis threat in the Western Hemisphere theater is potential during this period, with possibilities of political upheavals, sabotage and subversive actions only if it is to cause a diversion of American forces and attention.

SHERMAN MILES,

*Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.*

Enclosure:

Tab A

Distribution:

Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
G. H. Q.
Air Corps
Director of Naval Intelligence
Air Section
British Empire Section
Central European Section

Eastern European Section
Far Eastern Section
Latin American Section
Southern European Section
Western European Section
Record Section
I. B. File

TAB A—SUPPORTING ESTIMATES

1. The British Empire—Omitted.
2. U. S. S. R.—Omitted.
3. The Philippines—Omitted.
4. Germany—Omitted.
5. Italy—Omitted.
6. Japan
7. Thailand
8. Turkey—Omitted.
9. Iberian Peninsula, Northwest Africa—Omitted.

6. Japan.

a. Combat. Japan has an active army of about 2,000,000 including an air force of about 65,000. She now has increased her trained and partially trained reserve to approximately 4,750,000. The estimated number of active divisions is 62; of independent brigades, 22; of cavalry brigades, 5; and of tank regiments, 13; plus 15 depot divisions in Japan proper and Korea, and garrison troops and railway guard units in Manchuria.

The active forces are deployed over a wide area from Karafuto (Sakhalin) and Manchuria in the north to the French Indo-China-Thailand border in the south. According to the latest reports available, the distribution outside Japan proper is approximately as follows:

	Divs.	Ind. Brigs.	Cav. Brigs.	Tank Regts.
Manchuria and Adjacent regions	30	6	4	1
North China	8	6	1	1
Central China	10	6		1
Canton and South China Coast	2	1		1
Formosa	2			
Hainan	1	1		
French Indo-China	3	1		1

This wide deployment creates immense problems of supply and communications, and requires the use of a large number of transports and supply ships. Reliable information indicates that as of October 1, the Japanese forces on the continent south of the great wall had reserve supplies and munitions for not more than six weeks, this in spite of extensive use of vessels of the Japanese merchant fleet withdrawn from the Pacific trade. Since October 1, of course, this situation has probably been alleviated, but the problem of supply still exists. Any hostile naval or air action against the lines of communication to the continent would put the Japanese forces in Central China and all areas to the south in a very critical position.

The Japanese army is well trained and has proved an efficient fighting force against the Chinese. The staff has functioned well during difficult tactical operations in China. The enlisted men, although somewhat lacking in initiative, are well trained, the bulk experienced in combat, courageous and aggressive to the point of recklessness. The Japanese have been consistently successful in China from a tactical point of view; only combat with a modern army can determine Japan's relative efficiency compared to modern occidental armies. Japan's army is physically hardy, and psychologically inspired by loyalty to the Emperor, devotion to duty, and a fanatical patriotism which makes it a formidable foe on the Asian continent or nearby islands.

Except for the Russian forces in Siberia, the Japanese army is the best equipped army in Asia. Its equipment, however, is inferior to that of any of the powerful European armies. The shortage of raw materials and production capacity will limit the number of new divisions which can be equipped, even though Japan's partially trained man power is ample for her anticipated needs. Individual equipment appears to be sufficient and in good condition, but there is a shortage of organizational and other equipment, such as tanks, antiaircraft weapons, and modern artillery.

The Japanese Army and Navy air forces have made rapid progress since 1937. Personnel strength of both is about 100,000 officers and men, and the two services have a combined plane strength of approximately 5353 combat planes. The Army has 136 squadrons and 2362 planes; the Navy 159 squadrons and 2001 planes. Plane design has lagged, and many old type planes are included in the totals, above, but lack of formidable opposition has allowed the Japanese to maintain undisputed air superiority. Four years of continuous air operations have increased the efficiency of Japanese aviation in no small degree. Acquisition of German planes and more extensive employment of German technical advisers has probably contributed to a further increase in efficiency. Present plane production is currently estimated at 200 per month, for all combat types, both army and navy.

Japan has a navy consisting of approximately 180,000 men and officers, exclusive of about 35,000 in the naval air corps. Naval strength comprises over a million tons already built and nearly 500,000 tons building. The navy is divided into two main divisions: the Combined Fleet, and the Japanese Naval Forces in

China. The latter consists of the North Central and South China Fleets. The Combined Fleet is based in home waters.

The Japanese navy is modern, well balanced, and ready for prompt service. It is relatively strong in aircraft carriers and tenders; it would be a formidable opponent to the navy of any power, or to those of any combination of powers, attempting offensive operations in the western Pacific.

Japan, because of her geographic location including her bases on Formosa and Hainan, flanks all sea approaches to the southeastern coast of Asia north of Saigon; lies athwart all routes from the east to the eastern and northeastern coast of the mainland; and is in a remarkably strong strategical position for defense against any distant naval power. The Formosa base is the key to this position; neutralization of Formosa would imperil all her troops and installations south of Japan proper. However, Japan's geographic position is such that her navy on the strategical defensive could from time to time assume the tactical offensive. Japan's greatest weakness lies in the vital necessity of keeping open the water lines of communication to her forces in central and south China and Indo-China over routes that are vulnerable to underwater and air attack from hostile bases in the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, and China.

b. Political. A year ago, under the premiership of Prince Konoye, Japan set up its own version of totalitarianism, called the "new national structure." Political parties were disbanded, and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, designed to unite all the people in assistance to the Throne, was hastily whipped into shape. As a political organization, however, the Association does not control the country as do the Nazis in Germany or the Fascists in Italy, since such control would be contrary to the Japanese theory of the Emperor as the supreme head of the State, to whom all Japanese yield obedience and service. The stated aims of the Association were too vague to meet with general approval, and it is clear that the "new structure" movement has not been a success since it has not been able to "unify all phases of Japanese life."

While this attempt to create a totalitarian structure has been going on, the domination exercised by the army clique for nearly a decade has continued. The whole political machinery is geared to preparation for expansion into the maritime provinces of Siberia, for further expansion in southeast Asia, and the southwestern Pacific, and to the solution of the China "Incident".

The Tripartite Pact which Japan signed with Germany and Italy in September, 1940, by implication requires Japan to attack the United States, or any other power, except Russia, not involved in the European war at that time, should it attack either of the Axis partners. The strong Russian resistance to Nazi attack has, however, been a damper to Japanese enthusiasm for her Axis obligations. Although Foreign Minister Togo, who succeeded Toyoda, has announced that there is no change in the foreign policy of Japan, and that Japan will adhere to the Axis alliance, there is evidence that in order to secure a better position for herself, she might disregard her obligations, and even withdraw from the Axis. Japan has boundless ambitions in East Asia, but in view of the increasing American and British strength in the Far East, and the continued stalemate in China, she finds herself in a more and more unfavorable strategic position to realize these ambitions. Japanese government leaders are aware of the perils of further military adventures; they want to avoid a general war in the Pacific. They wish by every means possible to inveigle the United States into an agreement "looking toward a peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues between the two countries." This simply means recognition of Japan's territorial and economic gains in Eastern Asia. The result of these conflicting desires is a state of almost desperate indecision. The fact that Japanese newspapers have come out with their most bombastic bluster during the beginning of Mr. Kurusu's conference seeking a peaceful settlement with this country is the best indication of the lack of coordination, the indecision, and the confused general political situation in Japan. There can be no doubt that the army hot-heads, the Black Dragon Society, and other intransigents will oppose most strenuously any major concessions by their present government leaders. Thus the chief obstacle to successful negotiations by Mr. Kurusu or any other envoy, has been the fact that although Premier Togo is an army man, he cannot be said to control the army, the navy, or the ultra-nationalistic secret societies. Until such control is assured, no agreements through negotiations can be successfully carried out. The Kurusu conference can now be said definitely to have ended in failure because of the extreme position taken by the Japanese Government in regard to concessions which they felt could be made in the Far Eastern Area.

Without their previous enthusiasm and behind uncertain leadership, the Japanese are continuing in the path to what they believe is their "divinely appointed destiny" without being too sure as to where that destiny will take them. As a matter of fact, there is evidence that the people of Japan are becoming more and more alarmed and apprehensive; they fear that the present course is taking them into a major war with not just one power, but with a combination of powers. In her present situation, if Japan goes to war, her people will enter it desperately rather than confidently.

c. Economic. Because of the ever increasing stringency of the embargo placed on Japan by the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies, the economic situation in Japan is slowly but surely becoming worse. The Japanese have always lacked war materials, adequate foreign exchange, and sufficient foreign trade; the embargo has served to increase sharply the deficiencies in these categories.

Germany's attack on Russia has cut off the supply of military and industrial equipment and machinery from Germany to Japan. The Japanese are finding that economically, as well as politically, the Tripartite Pact has serious disadvantages to them. The pro-Axis leaders are having more and more difficulty in justifying the alliance with Germany.

Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is anything but prosperous. Labor shortages, lack of adequate and sufficient transportation facilities, guerrilla warfare and, most of all, lack of cooperation on the part of the people who have been brought into the "sphere" by force or the threat of force, have prevented Japan from realizing the economic benefits which she has so often and so loudly proclaimed would result from her scheme.

The firm united front of the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies in enforcing the embargo has put Japan "on the spot" economically. Even little Thailand has been encouraged to resist Japanese pressure for economic, as well as political, concessions. The effects of the embargo will compel Japan to strive to obtain more assistance from the regions under her control in East Asia, and to continue her efforts to persuade the ABD powers through threats and promises to relax the embargo. If she goes to war to achieve her economic objectives, Japan faces ruin; but at the same time she feels that achievement of these objectives are vital to her existence.

Japan lacks essential raw materials to support either her manufacturing industries or a major war effort, even continued effort against China. The stoppage of trade and freezing of credits has drastically reduced Japan's supply of raw materials, and has caused her to begin using her reserves. Many of her industries are suffering from shortages, rationing has been extended and intensified; in short, economically Japan is in perilous plight. The situation calls for strenuous measures; yet, if she goes to war, she may use up her reserves, especially of oil and steel, before she can force a decision favorable to herself. Thus her economic situation contributes largely to the indecision of her leaders. This is a problem which she must solve within the next few months.

7. Thailand.

a. The contributions of Thailand toward the defeat of the Nazi or Axis forces has been for the most part negligible. However, beginning in the late summer of 1941 there have been evidences of her growing will to resist any encroachments on her sovereignty. This is supported by the facts that Thailand has been strengthened both in military force and diplomacy to a position where the Thais could make a very real contribution to the common cause.

b. Thailand, or Siam, a weak buffer state between colonies of Great Powers, has traditionally played one off against the other while leaning toward the dominant one of the moment. The fall of France, accompanied with her replacement in Indo-China by aggressive Japanese troops on Thai borders, compelled the Thai government to reorient her policies. The obvious weakness of the Democracies throughout 1939, 1940 and the first half of 1941 made Thailand's foreign relations appear pro-Japanese. And there is no doubt that several Thai Cabinet Ministers and other influential leaders including Princes of Royal blood are pro-Japanese. However, the Prime Minister and Field Marshal, Luang Pibul Songgram, for all practical purposes the supreme ruler of Thailand, is positively pro-Thai to the exclusion of all foreign ties or bias. The key to the situation may be that since August 1941 Songgram has devoted almost all his efforts and his considerable abilities to the reorganization and strengthening of Thai armed forces. The Thai army is unquestionably loyal, and with their

morale high from recent victories over the French forces, they can be counted on to follow the person and leadership of their Commander-in-Chief.

c. The formation of the ABCD coalition and the strong position recently taken by the United States have effectively altered the political and diplomatic outlook. Thailand is now distrustful of Japanese designs and fearful of invasion. A guarantee of Thailand's territory and independence after the war, and immediate, substantial, material aid and supplies, would greatly strengthen Thailand's will and power to resist the Japanese.

d. With reference to Thailand, a great contribution that could be made to the defeat of Nazi forces would be to prevent this country and natural base of operations against the Burma Road, Malaya, and the East Indies from falling into Axis hands. The Thai army and people will fight bravely to defend their independence, but with little or no outside aid, probably could not withstand a determined attack in force more than two weeks. Thai forces are deployed along the long Mekong River frontier, but first line defense units of less than 40,000 reliable combat troops—especially with insignificant mechanized units and woeful weakness in antitank and antiair forces—could not block for long the logical push from northwest Cambodia west along the railroad to Bangkok and the heart of Thailand.

e. Thailand's resistance may be disastrously affected under heavy enemy bombing, unless fighting planes and antiaircraft units are made available to Bangkok in time. If supporting outside forces could assume the protection of the entire Malay Peninsula, up to and in contact with Bangkok, and give some naval aid in the Gulf of Siam, Thailand could concentrate her entire force against the major threat from the southeast to her distinct advantage. With relatively small quantities of military supplies and equipment, but particularly air force, antiair, and antimechanized elements, medium artillery ammunition, and technical or military advisers arriving in time, Thailand might hold out indefinitely.

THAILAND'S ARMED FORCES

40,000 Regular Army—well trained and equipped, organized into 5 Corps (8,000 each) of 15 Inf. Divisions (2,500 each).

8,000 men mobilized in newly organized 6th Corps.

2,500 in Marine Division.

20,000 police force and border guards under military organization.

200,000 partially trained reserves not mobilized and lacking in equipment. Only

2,000 trained reserve officers.

Mechanized force of 95 tanks and 150 motorcycle troops.

Anti Air defense—about 12 light guns, 8 75-A.A. and 8 searchlights.

Country wide air defense warning system.

Air Force

200 airplanes of all types organized into 5 Army wings and 1 Naval wing.

600 trained pilots but no reserve planes.

Thai Naval Force consists of 4 heavy gunboats, 16 medium and small torpedo boats, 12 motorboats and 5 small submarines. Sufficient trained personnel.

There is an arsenal in Bangkok with means for producing considerable small arms and light artillery ammunition.

DECEMBER 6, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Estimate of Japanese Strength in Indo-China.

1. It is estimated that there are 107,000-115,000 Japanese troops ashore in Indo-China, 25,000 in the north and 82,000-90,000 in the south.

2. Analysis of the foregoing:

a. Tong King:

Initial garrison	6,000
Landed prior to Oct. 18	5,000
Landed since Oct. 18	14,000

Present Total ***25,000**

*Exclusive of about 18,000 troops landed at Haiphong and moved south by rail.

1384 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

b. South Indo-China:

(1) Known to have landed.

Garrison Nov. 1.....	32,000
Nov. 3-18	
By sea.....	2,000
By rail.....	3,000
Nov. 18-29	
By sea.....	30,000
By rail.....	10,000
	77,000
Since Nov. 29 (est.).....	5,000
	82,000

(2) Reported by Manila, December 21—21 transports in Camrah Bay—estimated 18,000.

(3) According to various reports, there is an undetermined number of transports enroute to Indo-China.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:

Secretary of War.

Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD.

mid

DECEMBER 6, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Estimate of Japanese Air and Ground Forces in Indo-China, Hainan and Formosa.

1. Indo-China.

Japanese troops in the theater.....	125,000
In the North.....	25,000
In the South.....	82,000
On ships in harbors.....	18,000

Total.....125,000

(Other troops, number unknown, are in transit toward Indo-China, south of Shanghai)

Planes (bulk in the south).....450

2. Hainan.

Japanese troops.....	50,000
Planes (approx.).....	200

3. Taiwan (Formosa).

Japanese troops.....	40,000
Planes (approx.).....	400

4. Basis of the foregoing: Reports by M. I. D., O. N. I., State Department and British Intelligence.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:

Secretary of War.

Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD.

EXHIBIT NO. 33A

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

SECRET

DATE OCT 2 1941 R S G

1. B. 135

October 2, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Japanese-American Relations.

1. The crisis in Tokyo brought about by the anniversary of the Tripartite Agreement has been weathered by the Konoye Cabinet through a somewhat perfunctory celebration involving speeches by the German and Italian Ambassadors, Prince Konoye, and others, at luncheons given in honor of the Axis on September 27, 1941.

2. This Division has information from a highly reliable source to the effect that at 4:30 p.m. on September 27th after completing the ceremonies celebrating the anniversary of the Tripartite Pact the Japanese Foreign Minister asked the American Ambassador to call on him, and urged him to strongly recommend to his home government an immediate meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt.

3. The Japanese Ambassador in Washington was advised as to the gist of Admiral Toyoda's conversation with Ambassador Grew. Admiral Nomura also was urged by his Foreign Minister to do everything in his power to prevail upon the President to meet and confer immediately with Prince Konoye.

4. The fervor with which the Japanese, over a period of many months, have been agitating for this "meeting of leaders" has been matched only by their reluctance to make commitments on two points, i.e. withdrawal from China, and preparation for an attack on Siberia.

5. This Division is of the belief that the present Cabinet in Tokyo does not yet feel strong enough to enforce any order for withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, even though under pressure from the United States, it might be inclined to do so. And, as a matter of fact, at this stage in the execution of our national strategic plan, a cessation of hostilities in China followed by

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The withdrawal of Japanese Army divisions, 25 independent brigades, and 1000 aircraft from China could be highly detrimental to our interests. Such a move if returned to Japan would be potentially of much an explosive nature that only a military campaign could control it. These difficulties would prevent us from the complete control in Japan regarding it with a possible Communist almost possible neither the ability nor the inclination to continue diplomatic relations with any of the Powers in future.

If the Japanese forces in China were transferred to other parts of Manchuria it would undoubtedly react on our interests and our interests would be even further jeopardized.

It seems evident that the Japanese Government looks rather more anxious to make any progress in regard to controlling the Manchurian Army, even at its present strength, from becoming an ally of the United States. With the forces suggested by all or a part of the above set in China, the Chinese government would be helpless, for the Manchurian Army since 1932 has been completely independent of the various nations appointed in China and, reinforced by elements from China, would undoubtedly attack when it felt assured that such action was opportune. The opportune moment will be coincident with or immediately following a serious collapse in Europe, or if and when the Russian forces become militarily inferior because of withdrawals from Siberia to reinforce the European forces.

4. From the foregoing it seems imperative, for the present at least, to keep as much of the Japanese Army as possible placed in China. In other words we must come at once our attempt to bring about the withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from China and thus give to China whatever aid is possible on our part in maintaining the Chinese power and will to continue to contain and occupy the bulk of the Japanese Army.

5. The initial feeling of revulsion over this against withdrawal of China as a step's part in our plan of strategy will be alleviated by an examination of the situation of the anti-Japanese power in the light of cold reason. Our objective is the destruction of Manchu, and all our aim to these points actively engaged to realizing the approaching drive for world domination. Russia in an effort of aggression, is fully in line with us. We need, among other things, to keep as much as we have at our disposal to all kinds of the struggle with Germany. Any action on our part, therefore, which would withdraw Japanese from China, leaving for active Japanese forces in Siberia would be disastrous.

6. The suggestion on the part of the Japanese Government that the "Mongolian Army" is probably based on a strong desire to

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overlook the position of the cabinet with respect to the internal situation in Japan. Such a conference would: (1) Strengthen Prince Konoye's position with the people, (2) Extend the tenure of the present cabinet at least through the sessions of the conference, (3) Increase the belief of all Japanese leaders that we would not deal with them unless willing to make concessions. In other words, a conference to them will mean concessions on our part. If the President of the United States can be persuaded to loosen the economic restrictions now in force against Japan, Prince Konoye can then go before the Japanese people with a fait accompli such as no other man has been able to produce in the last decade. Economic concession, it must be observed, is the one essential which the Japanese military leaders recognize as necessary to be obtained before another major war can be fought. Once the conference is convened the Japanese will be in a strong position to demand some economic concessions, pleading the certainty of the collapse of the Konoye government if he goes home empty-handed.

9. From the point of view of the United States, a conference of leaders at this time, might serve to give this country additional time in which to prepare more adequately for any eventuality. Definite understanding, however, should be established, prior to such a conference, with Great Britain, Russia, China, Thailand and the Netherlands East Indies. Through cooperative and unified action with the powers named, we have obtained the economic advantages we now hold. It is the opinion of this Division that these advantages should, under no circumstances, be sacrificed unless concessions can be gained from Japan which will benefit all the non-Axis countries of the Pacific area; otherwise the very objective this country has sought so long to attain, that of unified anti-Axis strength in the Pacific, will be lost completely.

10. This Division is of the opinion that neither a conference of leaders nor economic concessions at this time would be of any material advantage to the United States unless a definite commitment to withdraw from the Axis were obtained from Japan prior to the conference. The immediate objective of the United States is to weaken Hitler in every way possible. A Japanese guarantee not to attack Russia in Siberia would free Russia, psychologically and militarily, for stronger opposition to Hitler. With this in mind, a definite condition precedent to such a proposed conference should be a complete withdrawal by Japan from the Axis and a guarantee, backed by substantial evidence of sincerity, not to attack Russia in Siberia.

11. Since it is highly improbable that this condition can be met by the Japanese Government at the present time our course lies

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EXHIBIT NO. 34

[Copy]

OCTOBER 18, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Resignation of Japanese Cabinet.

1. The Navy dispatched the attached message on October 16. Our G-2 does not concur in the situation pictured by the Navy. War Plans Division agrees with G-2.

2. Navy dispositions may require adjustment and a special alert. This is not true for the Army.

3. *Recommendation.*

That the Secretary of War direct that secret radiograms, as follows, be sent to the Command General, United States Army Forces in the Far East and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; C. G. Western Defense Command.

Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your information. Tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no repeat no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent end

/s/ L. T. Gerow

L. T. GEROW,

Brigadier General,

Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

Concurrence.

A. C. of S., G-2 (Bratton) concurs.

Incl.

Naval message, 10-16-41.

EXHIBIT NO. 35

JANUARY 31, 1942.

[1] Memorandum for the Record:

Subject: Warnings sent to Hawaii prior to Dec. 7, 1941.

Before leaving the Military Intelligence Division I am preparing this memorandum for record should it ever be needed. It covers the information now on hand concerning M. I. D.'s part in the warnings sent to Hawaii before December 7.

1. *Nov. 27, 1941.* Secret telegram from W. P. D. to the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department and the Caribbean Defense Command. This telegram was numbered 472 and was sent out at 6:11 p. m. on the 27th. It stated that Japanese future action was unpredictable and that hostile action was possible at any moment. It directed the Commanding Generals to undertake, prior to hostile Japanese action, such reconnaissance and other measures as they deemed necessary, and to report measures taken. The contents of this dispatch was known to me at the time, though I do not remember to have seen an exact copy.

2. *Nov. 27, 1941.* I sent a short telegram to the G-2's Hawaii and Panama and to all the Corps Areas. The telegram to Hawaii was numbered 473 and sent at 6:59 p. m. This message stated that hostilities may ensue as a result of a practical stalemate in Japanese negotiations and that subversive activities may be expected. It was sent because of the obvious seriousness of the situation and the great danger of sabotage everywhere, a point which was not specifically covered in W. P. D.'s telegram referred to in the paragraph above, and with which this Division is specifically charged under the President's directive of June 1939. This telegram was sent after consultation with W. P. D., and my recollection is that they recommended the inclusion of the direction that the G-2's would inform the Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staffs only.

3. *Nov. 27, 1941.* The Commanding General, Hawaii, replied in a short telegram to the W. P. D. telegram referred to in Par. 1 above. This telegram was numbered 959 and received in Washington at 5:57 a. m., Nov. 28. It specifically refers to the number of the W. P. D. telegram of November 27, and therefore is an answer [2] to that telegram. It states, however, that his Department was alerted "to prevent sabotage." It further stated that he had liaison with Navy. Being an answer to the W. P. D. telegram of November 27, this reply from General Short was sent to and seen by the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff and W. P. D. It was not sent to or seen by this Division. I do not remember to have been informed of this message in any way.

4. *Nov. 28, 1941.* At some time during this day, I think in the morning, General Arnold told me that he was extremely worried about sabotage of planes. He stated that a number of bombers had been received from different points in one of the western depots, all having a certain defect which indicated sabotage. He told me that he proposed to send out drastic orders to all air forces at home and abroad to take all precautions against sabotage. I told him that a general warning on sabotage had been sent the previous day to the G-2's. He was not satisfied with this, and insisted that specific directions be sent by his staff to all Air Corps commands. This directive was written by Major C. R. Blake, chief of the Counter Intelligence Branch, Office of Chief of Air Corps at the direction of General Martin Scanlon, A-2. It directed inter alia the air commands to "initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for the protection of your establishments and equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda, and protection of all activities against espionage." I strongly objected to this message going out to air forces only. I was in complete accord with the Air Corps in believing that sabotage was a real danger and that the necessary precautions should be taken, but I did not believe that the Air Forces alone should be given additional warnings, or that so broad and general a directive should be given to so many different commands. I feared all kinds of drastic measures against civilians which would have disastrous repercussions. I knew that the policy of the Chief of Staff was not to alarm the civilian population, as indicated in the W. P. D. warning message of November 27. My objection to the proposed Air Corps directive finally resulted, late in the afternoon on the 28th, in a staff conference in General Bryden's office attended by General Gerow, General Scanlon and, I believe, General Gullion. The result of this conference was the approval of a message drafted by me but containing also the sentence quoted above from the Air Corps draft, modified.

however, by a prohibition against illegal measures and a reference to the delimitation of responsibility in subversive activities as between the Army, Navy and the F. B. I. This message as approved in the staff conference was sent by The Adjutant General to the Commanding Generals of all Corps Areas and overseas departments. The message to Hawaii was numbered 482 and sent at 8:37 p. m. It was also agreed at the above mentioned staff conference, at the insistence of the Air Corps, that identical messages would be sent by the Air Staff to all air commands, and this was done. The message that went to Hawaii was numbered 484 and sent at 9:23 p. m.

[3] 5. November 29, 1941. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, replied by reference to the Adjutant General's cable #482 of November 28 (the message referred to in the paragraph immediately above as having been sent by The Adjutant General as a result of the staff conference in General Bryden's office). This message stated in detail the precautions which General Short had put into effect in Hawaii against subversive activity. It was sent by The Adjutant General on December 1, 1941 to the Secretary of the General Staff, and by the latter disseminated to the Staff, including of course M. I. D. It was considered by this Division as a satisfactory answer to the message which it purported to answer, i. e. the message of November 28 which resulted from the Bryden staff conference on subversive activity.

6. On the morning of December 7, 1941, having received certain information that morning that the Japanese negotiations would definitely be broken off at 2 p. m. that afternoon, and being convinced that this might well be timed with a planned Japanese attack somewhere, I went to the Chief of Staff's office and urged him to send a warning message to the overseas departments. While I was there General Gerow, Col. Bratton of this Division, and Col. Bundy of W. P. D., came in. They fully concurred in the necessity for such a message. It was written by the Chief of Staff, sent by the hand of Col. Bratton to the Message Center, and the Message Center stated it would be in the hands of the recipients within another half hour. Col. Bratton so reported to the Chief of Staff. It was not delivered in Hawaii until after the attack began.

7. Summary. There are obviously three points of outstanding interest in regard to these messages:

a. General Short's message, number 959, of November 27, specifically stated that it was an answer to the W. P. D. message number 472 of the same date. It was a wholly inadequate answer to that message. It was not, however, referred in any way to this Division, nor was its contents made known to this Division. Even had it been made known to this Division, the responsibility of determining whether or not it was an adequate answer to the W. P. D. message number 472 clearly lay with the latter Division.

b. The repetition of sabotage warnings contained in the M. I. D. message number 473 of November 27 and in T. A. G. message number 482 of November 28. The latter message resulted in the insistence of the Air Corps that further sabotage warning be sent, and I fully concurred in the sending of such warning provided they were sent to the responsible Commanding Generals as well as to the air commands, and that they continued precautions against unlimited action on the part of many relatively junior air commanders.

[4] c. The failure of the Signal Corps to get the message of December 7 through promptly or to notify the Chief of Staff or any Division of the Staff that it would not go through promptly.

[s] Sherman Miles,
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Enclosure:

Memo from Lt. Col. C. J. Barrett, January 29, 1942 on the background on the Air Corps message of Nov. 28, 1941.

JANUARY 29, 1942.

Memorandum for General Miles:
Subject: Interview with Major Blake.

The following information was obtained from Major Charles R. Blake, Chief, of the Counter Intelligence Branch, Office of the Chief of the Air Corps:

On the morning of November 28, Major Blake was called to General Scanlon's office and directed to prepare a message addressed to the commanders of all Air

1392 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Force activities, both in the United States and foreign possessions, directing them to take the necessary steps to prevent sabotage, espionage and the execution of any other threat to internal security. Major Blake wrote in longhand in that office a draft copy of which is attached, marked "Enclosure 1". Later he wrote a clearer copy of the same draft, still in longhand, copy of which is attached marked "Enclosure 2". The message was then typed with several carbon copies and delivered by Major Blake to General Scanlon, standing in the door to General Arnold's office. Another officer, believed to be Colonel Vanaman, was present, but since Major Blake does not know Colonel Vanaman, identity is not certain. General Scanlon took the message to General Arnold's office* and left a short time later with the statement that the message was to be coordinated with G-2.

No reason for the preparation of this message was given to Major Blake at the time. He states, however, that he was later informed unofficially that it resulted from a conference attended by the Chief of Staff, the Chief of the Army Air Forces and the Chief of Naval Operations.

/S/ C. J. Barrett

C. J. BARRETT,

Lieut. Colonel, General Staff.

Enclosures:

Cpy. radio 11-28-41

Cpy. radio 11-28-41

Encl #1

11/28/41 12:02 P. M.
CRB

Secret

A. C. of AS-A2

Auth: CH of A. G.

Date: 11-28-41

Initials: CRB

Copy No. 2 of 6

The world situation requires immediate atten. to the problem of sabotage, subversion and espionage prevention in all echelons of the AAF.

You are directed to initiate forthwith all addit. measures nec to provide for the comple prot of your establish and equip against sab, prot of your pers against subv prop and prot of all activities against esp.

It is further directed that reports of all steps init by you to comply with these instr be sub to CAAF on or before 12/2/41.

Encl. #2

Secret

Auth: CH of A. G.

AC of AS-A-2

Date: 11-28-41

Initials: /S/ CRB

Copy No. 2 of 6

To: Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command.
Chief of the Air Corps.


Commanding Generals of all Foreign Air Force Activities.

1. The world situation requires immediate attention to the problem of sabotage, subversion, and espionage prevention in all echelons of the Army Air Forces.

2. You are directed to initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for the complete protection of your establishments and equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda, and protection of all activities against espionage.

3. It is further directed that reports of all steps initiated by you to comply with these instructions be submitted to the CAAF on or before Dec. 2, 1941.

EXHIBIT NO. 36



SECRET

Investigation work will carry out the tasks assigned to
 subject of this report as they pertain to Pearl Harbor. Limit dis-
 semination of this highly secret information to minimum
 essential personnel.

L. N. Gessow

L. N. GESSOW,
 Brigadier General,
 Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

NOTES: Paragraph - Information
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EXHIBIT NO. 37

BASIC EXHIBIT

OF

DESPATCHES

Basic exhibits of despatches (1941)

Date	To	Action	Page
1 Apr	OPNAV	COM ALL NAV DIST.	1
1 Apr	OPNAV	CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 1-16.	2
1 Apr	OPNAV	ALUSNA, PEIPING, ASTALUSNA	3
1 Apr	CNO	CHUNGKING & SHANGHAI.	
1 Apr	CNO	CINCAF, CINCPAC, CINCLANT COM 15	4
1 Apr	CNO	(AIRMAIL) SPENAVO LONDON.	
1 Apr	OPNAV	CINCAF, CINCPAC	5
1 Apr	OPNAV	CINCAF	6
1 Apr	OPNAV	CINCAF	7
1 Apr	OPNAV	CINCAF	8
1 Apr	OPNAV	CINCAF	9
1 Apr	OPNAV	CINCAF	10
1 Apr	COM 16	OPNAV	11
1 Apr	COM 16	OPNAV PRIORITY ROUTINE--CINC-	12
1 Apr	CNO	PAC, CINCAF, COM 14.	
1 Apr	CNO	LIST OF ADDRESSESE CINCPAC, CIN-	13
1 Apr	CNO	CAF, CINCLANT, COM 15 SPENAVO	
1 Apr	CNO	LIST OF ADDRESSEES	13
1 Apr	CNO	CINCPAC, CINCAF, CINCLANT, COM	14
1 Apr	CNO	15 SPENAVO LONDON.	
1 Apr	OPNAV	CINCAF, CINCPAC, CINCLANT.	15
1 Apr	CNO	CINCPAC, COMPAN NAVCOAST	16
1 Apr	CNO	FRONTIER.	
1 Apr	CNO	U. S. HOLDERS WPL52	17
1 Apr	CNO	CINCLANT, CINCPAC, CINCAF	18
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1 Apr	CNO	CINCPAC	22
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1 Apr	OPNAV	CINCAF, COMPACSO NAV COASTAL-	26
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1 Apr	OPNAV	CINCPAC, CINCAF.	27
1 Apr	CINCPAC	OPNAV	28
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1 Apr	COM 12	OPNAV	31
1 Apr	CNO	CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 11, 12, 13, 15	32
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1 Apr	CNO	COM PNNCP, COM PSNCF	38
1 Apr	OPNAV	CINCAF	39
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1 Apr	OPNAV	NAVSTA GUAM	44
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[1] Top Secret

1 April 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: Com all Nav Districts NY Wash Governors of Guam and Samoa

Info:

912358

Personnel of your Naval Intelligence Service should be advised that because of the fact that from past experience shows the Axis powers often begin activities

SECRET

Instructions were not to carry out the tasks assigned in
without first to see as they pertain to Japan. Limit dis-
semination of this highly secret information to minimum
essential officials.

R. T. Gessow
R. T. GESSOW,

Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-10-80 BY 1045
AUTHORITY TO DECLASSIFY THIS
DOCUMENT IS GRANTED BY THE
NATIONAL ARCHIVES

NOTES: Paragraphs 1-4 of this
copy of memo are all
11-27-41 to 11-28-41, and
Paragraph 5, of 11-28-41,
on 11-28-41, reference to
intelligence of Navy
and Air Force. 11-28-41

NOTES: This
is a copy of a letterhead memorandum
dated 11-27-41, from the
Brigadier General, Acting
Assistant Chief of Staff,
to the Chief of Staff,
11-27-41.

[Handwritten signature]

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EXHIBIT NO. 37

BASIC EXHIBIT

OF

DESPATCHES

Basic exhibits of despatches (1941)

Date	To	Action	Page
1 Apr	OPNAV	COM ALL NAV DIST	1
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15 Apr	OPNAV	ALUSNA, PEIPING, ASTALUSNA CHUNGKING & SHANGHAI	3
1 Jul	CNO	CINCAF, CINCPAC, CINCLANT COM 15 (AIRMAIL) SPENAVO LONDON	4
1 Jul	OPNAV	CINCAF, CINCPAC	5
7 Jul	OPNAV	CINCAF	6
7 Jul	OPNAV	CINCAF	7
12 Jul	OPNAV	CINCAF	8
17 Jul	OPNAV	CINCAF	9
19 Jul	OPNAV	CINCAF	10
20 Jul	COM 16	OPNAV	11
20 Jul	COM 16	OPNAV PRIORITY ROUTINE-CINC- PAC, CINCAF, COM 14	12
20 Jul	CNO	LIST OF ADDRESSEES CINCPAC, CIN- CAF, CINCLANT, COM 15 SPENAVO	13
20 Jul	CNO	LIST OF ADDRESSEES	13
20 Jul	CNO	CINCPAC, CINCAF, CINCLANT, COM 15 SPENAVO LONDON	14
14 Aug	OPNAV	CINCAF, CINCPAC, CINCLANT	15
20 Aug	CNO	CINCPAC, COMPAN NAVCOAST FRONTIER	16
9 Oct	CNO	U. S. HOLDERS WPL52	17
10 Oct	CNO	CINCLANT, CINCPAC, CINCAF	18
10 Oct	OPNAV	ALL MERCHANT SHIPS	19
17 Oct	OPNAV	NAVSTA TUTULA SAMOA CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 11-16	20
17 Oct	OPNAV	CINCAF, COM 12	21
17 Oct	CNO	CINCPAC	22
20 Oct	OPNAV	COM 12, 14, 16 CINCPAC, CINCAF	23
4 Nov	OPNAV	CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 11-16	24
18 Nov	OPNAV	CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 12, 14	25
20 Nov	OPNAV	CINCAF, COMPACSO NAV COASTAL- FRON	26
21 Nov	OPNAV	CINCPAC, CINCAF	27
22 Nov	CINCPAC	OPNAV	28
23 Nov	OPNAV	CINCPAC	29
24 Nov	OPNAV	CINCPAC	30
25 Nov	COM 12	OPNAV	31
26 Nov	CNO	CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 11, 12, 13, 15	32
26 Nov	OPNAV	CINCAF	33
26 Nov	OPNAV	COM 12	34
27 Nov	OPNAV 388	COM ALNAL COAST FRON COM 14, 16, CINPAC, CINCAF	35
27 Nov	CNO	CINCAF, CINCPAC	36
27 Nov	OPNAV	COM 1-13, 15, NAVY YARD WASHING- TON, GOV GUAM & SOMOA	37
28 Nov	CNO	COM PNNCP, COM PSNCF	38
1 Dec	OPNAV	CINCAF	39
1 Dec	OPNAV	CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14, 16	40
2 Dec	OPNAV	CINCAF, COM 16	41
4 Dec	OPNAV	ALUSNA TOKYO, BANGKOK ASTA- LUSNA PEIPING, SHANGHAI	42
4 Dec	OPNAV	CO MARDET PEIPING CO MARDET TIENTSIN	43
4 Dec	OPNAV	NAVSTA GUAM	44
6 Dec	OPNAV	CINCPAC	45
6 Dec	COM 14	OPNAV	46

[1] Top Secret

1 April 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: Com all Nav Districts NY Wash Governors of Guam and Samoa

Info:

912358

Personnel of your Naval Intelligence Service should be advised that because of the fact that from past experience shows the Axis powers often begin activities

1396 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the country concerned, they should take steps on such days to see that proper watches and precautions are in effect.

[2] Top Secret

4 April 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCPAC CINCAF Com 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Info: CINCLANT COMBATFOR COMSCOFOR COMBASEFOR COMDTS Navy
Yards Boston, Portsmouth, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Charleston, Mare
Island, Pearl Harbor, Puget Sound, NAD Puget Sound, Mare Island, Oahu &
Cavite.

041700

Except DESDIV 50 (S-27, S-28 and NTS) vessels on routine supply trips fill allowances and obtain supplies required for mobilization.

At discretion fleet commanders will accept final increment of mobilization supply ammunition.

Strip ship in accordance with orders action ADDEES.

Ships assigned availability for drydocking at ADDEES discretion.

For this purpose ships of the Pacific Fleet are not to return to mobilization ports on the continent.

[5] Confidential

18 April 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: ALUSNA Peiping; Astalusna Chungking; Astalusna Shanghai.

Info: CINCPAC; CINCAF; COMSIXTEEN.

181535

Include CINCPAC as information addressee in all despatch reports also furnish one copy of all intelligence reports plus present distribution direct to CINCPAC. Send them by way of issuing officer Comsixteen for secret and confidential and through Fleet Postoff Pearl for other.

[4] Top Secret

3 July 1941

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Action: CINCAF-CINCPAC-CINCLANT-COM 15 (Airmail) SPENAVD London

Info:

031939

[Paraphrase]

The unmistakable deduction from information from numerous sources is that the Japanese Govt has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This policy probably involves war in the near future. An advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out, however the CNO holds the opinion that Jap activity in the South will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval, army and air bases in Indo China. The neutrality pact with Russia will be abrogated and major military effort will be against their maritime provinces which will probably be toward the end of July though attack may be deferred until after collapse of European Russia. They have ordered all Jap vessels in US Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by 1 Aug. Movement of Jap flag shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned. Using utmost secrecy, inform principal Army commanders and your own immediate subordinates except Ghormley. Also British Chiefs of Staff and Ambassador.

Copy to

COS, US Army

OP-12

[5] Top Secret

3 July 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCAF CINCPAC

Info: CINCLANT COM 11-12-13-14-15-16; ALUSNA London: ALUSNA
Tokyo: ASTALUSNA Shanghai

032130

[Paraphrase]

Definite information has been received that between July 16 and 22 the Japanese Gov't has issued orders for 7 of the 11 Nip vessels now in the North Atlantic and Caribbean area to pass through the Panama Canal to the Pacific. Under routine schedules three of the remaining ships will move to the Pacific during this same period. The one remaining ship, under routine movement, can be clear by July 22nd. Briefly, all Nipponese merchant vessels will be clear of the Caribbean and North Atlantic areas by July 22nd. In Jap business communities strong rumors are current that Russia will be attacked by Japan on July 20th. From unusually reliable Chinese sources it is stated that, within 2 weeks Japan will abrogate neutrality treaty with Russia and attack. The present strength and deployment of Nip Army in Manchuria is defensive and the present distribution of Jap Fleet appears normal and that it is capable of movement either north or south. That a definite move by the Japanese may be expected during the period July 20th dash August first, is indicated by the foregoing.

[6] Top secret

7 July 1941

From: Opnav

Action: Cincaf

Info: Cincpac

070224

Tokyo to Washington 1 July 329:

Japan directs eight Marus on East Coast United States rush cargo handling and proceed Colon Pass through Canal to Pacific between 16 and 22 July on following schedule: 16th, Tokai; 17th, Amagisan; 18th, Awajisan; 19th, Tosan; 20th, Kiyosumi; 21st, Kirishima; 22nd, Norfolk and Asuka X.

Tokyo to Berlin 2 July 585: (English text note to Ribbentrop in part)

"Japan is preparing for all possible eventualities regarding Soviet in order join forces with Germany in actively combatting Communist and destroying Communist system in eastern Siberia X at same time Japan cannot and will not relax efforts in the south to restrain Britain and United States X new Indo-China bases will intensify restraint and be vital contribution to Axis victory."

Berlin to Tokyo 2 July 825:

Oshima delivers above note and tells Ribbentrop in part, "Matsuoka will soon submit a decision X if you Germans had only let us know you were going to fight Russia so soon we might have been ready X We were planning to settle South Seas questions and China incident hence decision cannot be reached immediately, but Japan will not sit on fence while Germany fights Russia."

[7] Top secret

7 July 1941

From: Opnav

Action: Cincaf

Info: Cincpac

070243

Tokyo to Berlin and Vichy 16 June 519:

Matsuoka requests Ribbentrop's aid in demand on French for following naval bases: "Saigon and Camranh"; and following air bases in southern French Indo-China: "Saigon, Bienhoa, Phnompenh, Kompontrach, Nhatrang, Soctrang, Touraine, Simreap" X Japan determined acquire above quickly, diplomatically

1398 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

if possible or by force if necessary in order expand and strengthen them X Chief reason given is to prevent British moving in.

Berlin to Tokyo 21 June 739:

Ribbentrop reluctant to force issue now.

Tokyo to Berlin and Vichy 22 June 549 and 246 respectively:

Matsuoka will negotiate directly with French X Repeats determination get bases soon.

Tokyo to Vichy 28 June 258:

French Indo-China base question this date receives Imperial sanction.

30 June 252:

Japan now considers it absolutely essential to force France accede to demands for above bases.

[8] Top secret

15 July 1941

From: Opnav

Action: Cincaf

Info: Cincpac

151924

Summary of Tokyo to Washington fifteen July three six eight X Relayed to London X Quote within next day or two Japan Vichy commercial negotiations begin X Japan will propose in name of mutual defense taking over southern French Indo China naval and air bases outlined in Jonab dated seven July X At same time Japan will attempt to station necessary army navy air forces in that area peacefully with French agreement if possible X If French object Japan has decided to use force X Japan does not intend move further south or interfere with colonial government X Move necessary to guarantee supplies from colony and Thailand and prevent Syrian type British action X Tokyo wishes avoid friction with Britain and particularly the United States if possible but risk is necessary unquote.

[9] Top secret

17 July 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCAF

Info: CINCPAC

184390

Tokyo to Vichy twelve July two seven four and two seven five list six terms of ultimatum to be answered by twenty July x Japan will send necessary army navy air forces to southern French Indo China x French turn over naval and air bases listed in Jonab of seven July x expeditionary force to have right to maneuver and move about freely x French withdraw forces at landing points to avoid possible clashes x Vichy authorize French Indo China military to arrange details with Japanese either before or after landing x colony to pay Japan twenty three million piastres annually to meet cost of occupation xx Tokyo to Vichy fourteen July two eight one army now planning advance on or about twenty July xx Tokyo to Saigon and Hanoi sixteen July circular one five one eight formal demands presented to Vichy on fourteenth x reply asked by twentieth x Japan intends carry out plans by force if opposed or if British or United States interferes x Kanju Maru being held at Saigon to evacuate all Japanese there sailing early dawn twenty four July x burn codes x Japanese in northern area evacuate or move into Hanoi.

[10] Top secret
19 July 1941
From: OPNAV
Action: CINCAF
Info: CINCPAC
193239

Purple fourteen July Canton to Tokyo two five five quote information from military officials to attaches in Canton follows x one x the recent general mobilization order expresses Japans irrevocable resolution to end Anglo American assistance in thwarting Japans natural expansion and her indomitable intention to carry this out with the backing of the Axis if possible but alone if necessary x formalities such as dining the expeditionary forces and saying farewell to them were dispensed with to avoid alarm and because we wished to face this new war with a calm and cool attitude x two x immediate object will be to attempt peaceful French Indo China occupation but will crush resistance if offered and set up martial law x secondly our purpose is to launch therefrom a rapid attack when the international situation is suitable x after occupation next on our schedule is sending ultimatum to Netherlands Indies x in the seizing of Singapore the Navy will play the principal part x Army will need only one division to seize Singapore and two divisions to seize Netherlands Indies x with air forces based on Canton comma Spratley comma Palau comma Singora in Thailand comma Portuguese Timor and Indo China and with submarine fleet in Mandates comma Hainan comma and Indo China we will crush British American military power and ability to assist in schemes against us x three x occupying force will be reorganized as twenty fifth Army corps of four divisions and also thirtieth Army corps consisting of South China forces to be assigned special duty with airplanes tanks and howitzers x General Iida in command will set up headquarters in Saigon x preparation complete x expedition will soon proceed from here unquote parenthesis note by Opnav it should be noted that above is not a directive but appears to express thinking and opinions of Canton orange military parenthesis.

[11] Top secret
19 July 1941
From: COM SIXTEEN
Action: OPNAV
Info: CINCPAC CINCAF
191514

Tokyo to met number fifteen sixty of nineteenth in prep affirm code states that although cabinet has changed there will of course be no departure from the principle that tripartite pact forms keystone of Japans national policy and new cabinet will also pursue policy of former cabinet in all other matters.

[12] Top secret
20 July 1941
From: COM 16
Action: CINCPAC ROUTINE, CINCAF ROUTINE, COM 14 ROUTINE, OPNAV
PRIORITY
Info:
2913356

Tokyo to Vichy number two nine five purple of nineteenth XX army has all preparations made XX have decided to advance on twenty fourth regardless of whether demands accepted or not X orders for advance will be issued on July twenty third Japanese time X remainder of message contains instructions to ambassador regarding exchange of official documents in case of acceptance X instructions regarding notifying Tokyo of Frances reply etcetera.

1400 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[13] Top secret

25 July 1941

From: Chief of naval operations.

Action: Addressees as per attached list.

Info:

251699

At twelve hundred gct July twenty sixth 1941 execute wpl51 except the ninth to eighteenth words inclusive of task baker of paragraph seven the word United States being considered as one word X The excepted words will be executed at a later date after necessary arrangements have been made

Addressees for despatch concerning execution of wpl-51

By rapid communication means to:

Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet (require acknowledgement from this addressee).

Commander, Battleships, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Battleship Division Three, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Cruisers, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Cruiser Division Two, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Aircraft, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Patrol Wings, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Submarines, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Support Force, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Train, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Transports, Atlantic Fleet.

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newfoundland.

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Bermuda.

Commandant, Tenth Naval District.

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba.

Special Naval Observer, London.

U. S. Naval Attache, Ottawa, Canada.

By registered air mail to:

President, Naval War College; Commandant, First Naval District; Commandant, Third Naval District; Commandant, Fourth Naval District; Commandant, Fifth Naval District; Commandant, Sixth Naval District; Commandant, Seventh Naval District; Commandant, Eighth Naval District; Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.

By registered ordinary mail to:

Commandant, Eleventh Naval District; Commandant, Twelfth Naval District; Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District; Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

[14] Top secret

25 JULY 1941.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

Action: CINCPAC CINCAF CINCLANT COM 15 SPENAVO London

Info:

252023

This is a joint despatch from the CNO and the Chief of Staff US Army X Appropriate Adee's deliver copies to commanding generals Hawaii Philippines and Caribbean Defense Command and to General Chaney in London XX You are advised that at 1400 GCT July twenty sixth United States will impose economic sanctions against Japan X It is expected these sanctions will embargo all trade between Japan and the United States subject to modification through a licensing system for certain material X It is anticipated that export licenses will be granted for certain grades of petroleum products cotton and possibly some other materials and that import licenses may be granted for raw silk X Japanese assets and funds in the United States will be frozen except that they may be moved if licenses are granted for such movement X It is not repeat not expected that Japanese merchant vessels in United States ports will be seized at this time X United States flag merchant vessels will not at present

be ordered to depart from or not to enter ports controlled by Japan X CNO and COS do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventualities X Action being initiated by the United States army to call the Philippine army into active service at an early date XX This despatch is to be kept secret except from immediate navy and army subordinates X SPENAVO inform CNS but warn him against disclosure X Action addrees this dis are cincpac cinclant cincaf com flteen spenavo London

(Deliver one copy to War Plans Division U. S. Army)

[15] Top secret

14 AUGUST 1941.

From: OPNAV
Action: CINCAF, CINCPAC, CINCLANT
Info: COM 11-12-13—COM 14-15-16.
142155

Indications that orange ships formerly in North Atlantic and those on South Atlantic routes returning Japan via Magellan comma 4 tankers only vessels on Pacific coast, none enroute to USA, none North Atlantic, estimated 17 west coast of South America, none Los Angeles to Panama. Japanese rapidly completing withdrawal from world shipping routes. Scheduled sailings cancelled and majority ships in other than China and Japan seas areas home-ward bound. Resumption of shipping services indefinite result of USA, British and Dutch pressure through refusal of transit of Panama Canal, export control restrictions, refusal of bunkering and port facilities and fund freezing.

[16] Top Secret.

28 AUGUST 1941.

From: CNO.
Action: CINCPAC Commander Panama Naval Coastal Frontier.
Info: CINCLANT; SPENAVO, LON; Commander Pacific Southern Coastal Frontier; Commander Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier & COM 11.
282121

(Paraphrase)

Certain operations prescribed for the Atlantic by WPL 51 are hereby extended to areas of the Pacific Ocean as described herein in view of the destruction by raiders of merchant vessels in the Pacific Ocean within the Western Hemisphere neutrality zone as defined in the declaration of Panama of Oct. 3, 1939. Formal changes in WPL 51 will be issued but meanwhile action addressees will execute immediately the following instructions. CINCPAC constitute the Southeast Pacific Force consisting of two 7500 ton light cruisers and dispatch it to Balboa. For task purposes this force will operate directly under CNO after entering the Southeast Pacific sub area as defined in WPL 48 para 3222 except western limit is longitude 100 degrees west. Within the Pacific sector of the Panama naval coastal frontier and within the Southeast Pacific sub area the commander Panama naval coastal frontier and commander Southeast Pacific Force will in cooperation and acting under the strategic direction of the Chief of Naval Operations execute the following task colon Destroy surface raiders which attack or threaten United States flag shipping. Interpret an approach of surface raiders within the Pacific sector of the Panama naval coastal frontier or the Pacific Southeast sub area as a threat to United States flag shipping. XX For the present the forces concerned will base Balboa but CNO will endeavor to make arrangements for basing on South American ports as may be required XX Action Adees and commander Southeast Pacific Force inform CNO when these instructions have been placed in effect. XX

Distribution:

Copies to 12, 16, 20, 30, 38, 38W; WPD, U. S. Army; Brit. Nav. Staff in Washington.

1402 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[17] Top Secret.

9 OCTOBER 1941.

From: CNO.

Action: All U. S. holders of WPL fifty-two outside of Navy Department

Info:

062335

(Paraphrase)

On October 11th at 0200 GCT cancel WPL 51 and place WPL 52 in effect.

[18] Top Secret.

16 OCTOBER 1941.

From: CNO.

Action: CINCLANT CINCPAC CINCAF (Acknowledge).

Info:

162203

The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation X If a new Cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti American X If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the US X In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility X Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers X In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X Second and third Adees inform appropriate Army and Naval District authorities X Acknowledge XX

[19] Top Secret.

16 OCTOBER 1941.

From: OPNAV.

Action: All merchant ships.

Info:

162300

(Paraphrase)

The following despatch is for all United States merchant ships in the Pacific: There is a possibility of hostile action by Japan against U. S. shipping. United States merchant ships at sea in the Pacific proceed now as follows: In Chinese waters, China Sea or Dutch Indies waters, proceed immediately to Manila, Singapore, or a North Australian Port. In North Pacific westbound, except those bound to Vladivostok, proceed to Honolulu unless close to the Philippines, in the latter case proceed there. Ships bound for Vladivostok, proceed on voyage. If Honolulu bound continue voyage. If in North Pacific eastbound, continue voyage. If in South Pacific, continue voyage. Vessels operating coastwise off of South America or between the United States and the west coast of South America, continue voyage. All coastwise shipping eastern Pacific, continue voyage. Usual trade routes should be avoided.

[20] Top secret.

10/17/41.

From: OPNAV.

Action: NAVSTA TUTUILA SAMOA COM 11, 12, 13, 14 NAVDISTRICTS
CINCPAC CINCAF COM 15, 16.

Info:

162289.

Attention invited to OPNAV warning merchant vessels 162300 this date X Routing instructions will be sent you later.

[21] Top secret.

19-17-41.

From: OPNAV.

Action: CINCAF COM 12.

Info: COM 11, 15, 13, 16, 14 CINCPAC NAVSTA TUTUILA SAMOA ALUSNA
Melbourne and British Admiralty Delegation Washn.

162258.

(Paraphrase)

Effective immediately route all trans-Pacific U. S. flag shipping to and from the following areas Far East area plus Shanghai and India and East India area as defined in WPL 46 thru Torres Straits keeping to the southward and well clear of Orange mandates taking maximum advantage of Dutch and Australian patrolled areas X Make arrangements with Australian naval board for Torres Straits pilots.

[22] Top secret.

17 OCTOBER 1941.

From: CNO.

Action: CINCPAC.

Info:

171458.

(Paraphrase)

Because of the great importance of continuing to reenforce the Philippines with long range Army bombers you are requested to take all practicable precautions for the safety of the airfields at Wake and Midway.

[23] Top secret

23 OCTOBER 1941.

From: OPNAV

Action: COM 12 COM 14 CINCPAC CINCAF COM 16.

Info: COM 11 COM 13 COM 15 NAVSTA GUAM.

222259

[Paraphrase]

Until further orders all army and navy transpacific troop transports, ammunition ships and such others with sufficiently important military cargo will be escorted both ways between Honolulu and Manila. Authorized route slow vessels in above categories which would unduly prolong voyage via Torres Straits without escort. To insure minimum demands for escort from Pacific fleet schedules must be arranged so that these ships proceed in company. CINCAF should take over escort when and where practicable as arranged between CINCPAC and CINCAF. General escorting other transpacific American flag shipping not considered warranted at this time in view of routing prescribed in my 162258. Where cargo in merchant bottoms for Guam is involved normal routing is authorized.

Cargo for Guam should be so assembled and loaded that a minimum number of ships be required to make that port. Reference COM 12 despatches to CINCPAC Nos. 212352 and 212358 and CINCAF confidential serial #1633.

[24] Top secret

4 NOVEMBER 1941.

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCPAC; CINCAF; COM 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16.

Info:

941899

Japanese merchant vessels complete withdrawal from Western Hemisphere waters appears in progress. Ships in area have departed or are preparing to depart except Naruto presently completing run from west coast of Mexico for South American ports. No ships presently reported en route from Japan.

1404 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[25] Top secret

18 NOVEMBER 1941.

From: OPNAV
Action: CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 12, 14
Info:
181705

[Paraphrase]

In convoy with American flag vessels, placing of Bloemfontein is authorized. Until international conditions on and subsequent to 25 Nov. become defined and clarified however any further direct or great circle routing between Hawaii and Philippines should not repeat not be used. Until further advised by Dept. routes south of mandates should be prescribed.

[26] Top secret

20 NOVEMBER 1941.

From: OPNAV
Action: CINCAF, COMPACSO NAVCOASTAL FRONTIER.
Info: CINCPAC COM-14, COM-16
192235

Routing proposed by COM-14 150118 satisfactory. CINCAF and Comdr. Pacific southern naval coastal frontier coordinate routing to avoid congestion.

[27] Top secret

21 November 1941

From: OPNAV
Action: CINCPAC, CINCAF
Info: Com 14, Com 16
211755

Reliable reports indicate the recent establishment by Japan of a combined air and surface craft patrol covering shipping routes from the U S to Australasia X Daily aircraft patrols have been observed extending to the Gilbert Islands from base at Jaluit X Surface craft believed to cover area reaching Ellice Islands X Japanese East Indies fishing fleet also reported coordinated in patrol operations X Present indications this fleet divided into three groups now in areas vicinity Bathurst Island X Arnheim and Thursday Island in Torres Strait X They are expected round Dutch New Guinea operating from base in Palau and are equipped with long range radio sets X

[28] Top secret

22 November 41

From: CINCPAC
Action: OPNAV
Info: CINCAF Com 12, 14, 16
220417

Manila convoy consisting Coast Farmer Admiral Halstead Chaumont Meigs Republic Holbrook Bloemfontein reporting Com fourteen with conflicting routings X Due depart Honolulu twentyseven November ten knots X First three ships have cargo for Guam and Chaumont personnel for Midway Wake X Last two cannot use Torres routing because limited fresh water radius X Only one cruiser detailed escort X In view above and information OPNAV 211755 consider route via Guam no additional hazard X Unless otherwise directed will instruct Com fourteen route all via northern route Chaumont departing two days early and joining convoy in vicinity Wake thence via Guam and San Bernardino X No escort for Chaumont as far as Wake considered necessary at present X Request CINCAF arrange escort Guam ships to Manila if delays discharging necessitate splitting convoy at Guam

[29] Top secret

22 November 1941

From: OPNAV
Action: CINCPAC
Info: CINCAF Com 12 Com 16 Com 14
221805

Urdis 220417 X Pacific situation unchanged comply my 181705 X Guam cargo should be sent Manila then transshipped for Guam X Make other arrangements

personnel in Chaumont for Midway and Wake X Bloemfontein and Holbrook obtain water en route at Tutuila Suva or other port as expedient

Ref: 11-664. Manila convoy consisting reporting Com 14 with conflicting orders for routing X

Ref: 11-533 Placing Bloemfontein in convoy . . . direct routes not to be used between Hawaii and Philippines

[30] Top secret

23 November 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCPAC

Info: COM 16-12-14, CINCAF

221801

My dispatch 181705 and 192235. Move Point Baker further to south of Ellice Islands. Refer last sentence first mentioned dispatch routes south of mandates means through Torres Straits.

[31] Top secret

23 November 1941

From: COM 12

Action: OPNAV

Info: CINCPAC

230258

[Paraphrase]

Department dispatches apparently do not take cognizance of magnitude of Army troop movement directed by War Department from San Francisco by December 10 involving about 22 vessels including largest liners. Aside from troop transportation about 12 merchant on scheduled voyages ready to sail trans Pacific. Seven vessels already sailed. Com 12 organizing 17 knot convoy to depart San Francisco by December 8. Also planning 10 knot convoy to assemble Honolulu by December 15 routings prescribed eastward of Ellice Islands thence Torres Straits. Watering necessary practically all vessels especially troop transports. In view reports Japanese patrolling this area believe it vulnerable. Subject to further study believe routing south about Australia impracticable. If troop movement must be made at this time recommend great circle course to San Bernardino Strait with adequate fleet protection.

[32] Top secret

November 24, 1941

From: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Action: CINCAF CINCPAC COM11 COM12 COM13 COM15

Info: SPENAVO London CINCLANT

242005

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action adees to inform senior Army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately.

Copy to WPD, War Dept. and to Op-12 but no other distribution.

[33] Top secret

November 24, 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCAF

Info: COM 16 ALUSNA, CHUNGKING, ASTALUSNA, SHANGHAI; ALUSNA, TOKYO; CINCPAC

242239

Orange naval movements as reported from individual information addresses are often conflicting because of necessarily fragmentary nature X Since Com 16

1406 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

intercepts are considered most reliable suggest other reports carefully evaluated be sent to Com 16 for action OPNAV for information X After combining all incoming reports Com 16 direct dispatches to OPNAV info CINCPAC based on all information received indicating own evaluation and providing best possible continuity X Request CINCAF issue directive as necessary to fulfill general objective

[34] Top secret

25 November 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: COM 12

Info: CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 14, COM 16

252298

Route all transpacific shipping thru Torres Straits. CINCPAC and CINCAF provide necessary escort. Refer your dispatch 239258.

[35] Top secret

27 November 1941

From: OPNAV 388

Action: Commandants all Naval Coastal Frontiers, Com 14, 16 CINCPAC, CINCAF.

Info: CINCLANT

271519

On account of fact that existing and subsequent merchant ship codes may be compromised the use of secret positions in assignment of routes for merchant ships will be initiated as rapidly as possible and instructions for their use given to masters as this will enable directions for diversions to be given without disclosing to axis nations the location of our ships.

[36] Top secret

November 7, 1941.

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Action: CINCAF, CINCPAC

Info: CINCLANT, SPENAVO

272387

This despatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or Kra peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46 X Inform district and army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Spenavo Inform British X Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

Copy to WPD, War Dept.

[37] Top Secret

27 November 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: Coms 1-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-15 Navyyard Washn Governor Guam & Samoa

Info:

272388

(Paraphrase)

Commandants will take appropriate measures for security against subversive activity and sabotage due to critical status of orange negotiations and imminent probability extension orange operations X Publicity to be avoided.

[38] Top Secret

November 8, 1941

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Action: Com PNCF Com PSNCF

Info: CINCPAC Com PNCF

299119

Refer to my 272338 X Army has sent following to commander western defense command quote negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue X Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment X If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act X This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense X Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent X Report measures taken X A separate message is being sent to G two Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in United States X Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan X Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers X Unquote XX WPL52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in southeast Pacific sub area and Panama naval coastal frontler X Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act X Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur

[39] Top Secret

2 December 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCAF

Info:

912356

(Paraphrase)

President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and within two days if possible after receipt this despatch. Charter 3 small vessels to form a "defensive information patrol". Minimum requirements to establish identity as U. S. men-of-war are command by a naval officer and to mount a small gun and 1 machine gun would suffice. Filipino crews may be employed with minimum number naval ratings to accomplish purpose which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in west China Sea and Gulf of Siam. One vessel to be stationed between Hainan and Hue one vessel off the Indo-China Coast between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jacques and one vessel off Pointe de Camau. Use of Isabel authorized by president as one of the three but not other naval vessels. Report measures taken to carry out presidents views. At same time inform me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at sea by both army and navy whether by air surface vessels or submarines and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures.

[40] Top Secret

8 December 1941

From: OPNAV

Action CINCAF, CINCPAC, Com 14, Com 16

Info:

961860

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong-kong X Singapore X Batavia X Manila X Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents X

[41] Top Secret
 3 December 1941
 From: OPNAV
 Action: CINCAF, Com Sixteen
 Info: CINPAC, Com Fourteen
 031855

Circular twenty four forty four from Tokyo one December ordered London X Hongkong X Singapore and Manila to destroy Purple machine XX Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo XX December second Washington also directed destroy Purple X All but one copy of other systems X And all secret documents XX British Admiralty London today reports embassy London has complied

[42] Top Secret
 4 December 1941
 From: OPNAV
 Action: ALUSNA Tokyo, ALUSNA Bangkok, ASTALUSNA Peiping, ASTALUSNA Shanghai
 Info: CINCAF, ALUSNA Changking, Com 16
 040330

Destroy this system at discretion and report by word Jabberwock. Destroy all registered publications except CSP 1085 and 6 and 1007 and 1008 and this system and report execution by sending in plain language "Boomerang".

[43] Top Secret
 4 December 1941
 From: OPNAV
 Action: CO MARDET Peiping, CO MARDET Tientsin
 Info: CINCAF, Com 16
 040343

Destroy this system at discretion and send word Jabberwock when this has been done. All registered publications except this system must be destroyed immediately by Mardets Peiping and Tientsin and reported by word "Boomerang" in plain language. Use discretion on all other confidential papers.

[44] Top Secret
 4 December 1941
 From: OPNAV
 Action: NAVSTA Guam
 Info: CINCAF CINCPAC Com 14 Com 16
 042017

Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence retaining minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with CINCAF CINCPAC Com 14 Com 16 and OPNAV X Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain X Report crypto channels retained

[45] Top Secret
 6 December 1941
 From: OPNAV
 Action: CINCPAC
 Info: CINCAF
 061743

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency X Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment.

[46] Top Secret.
December 6, 1941
From: COM FOURTEEN
Action: OPNAV
Info:
060114

Believe local Consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not included your eighteen double five of third.

EXHIBIT NO. 38

[Copy]

Drafting Section:
Administrative
Drafting Officer
T. J. B.
G-2 File Number:

PARAPHRASE OF AN OUTGOING SECRET RADIOGRAM

No. 40, Sent Dec. 3, 1941
Date: December 3, 1941

To: Military Attache, American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan.

Memorize emergency key word #2 for use of SIGNUD without repeat without indicators, destroy document stop SIGNNQ, SIGPAP and SIGNDT should be retained and used for all communications except as last resort when these documents should be destroyed and memorized SIGNUD used stop destroy all other War Department ciphers and codes at once and notify by code word BINAB stop early rupture of diplomatic relations with Japan has been indicated. State Department informed you may advise Ambassador.

MILES

EXHIBIT NO. 39

DECEMBER 15, 1941.

Memorandum for Record:

On Sunday, December 7, 1941, about 11:30 A. M., E. S. T., General Marshall called me to his office. General Miles and Colonel Bratton were present. General Marshall referred to the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had been directed to deliver a note to the State Department at 1 P. M., December 7, 1941. He felt that the Japanese Government instructions to deliver the note at an exact hour and time might have great significance. The pencilled draft of an alert message to be sent at once to CG, U. S. Army Forces in Far East; CG Caribbean Defense Command; CG Hawaiian Department; and CG Fourth Army was read aloud by General Marshall and concurred in by all present. Colonel Bratton was directed to take the pencilled draft of the message to the Message Center and have it sent immediately by the most expeditious means. Colonel Bratton returned in a few minutes and informed General Marshall that the message had been turned over to the Message Center and would reach destinations in about thirty minutes. The pencilled draft was typed later during the day and formally made of record.

(Signed) L. T. Gerow

L. T. GEROW,

Brigadier General,

Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

DECEMBER 15, 1941.

Memorandum for Record:

The attached message was taken personally by direction of the Chief of Staff to the War Department Message Center by Colonel Bratton, G-2, who gave it in person to the Message Center Chief, Colonel French, at 11:50 a. m., Decem-

ber 7. It was typed in Colonel Bratton's presence and delivered to the Code Clerk. Time of recording on the Message Center records is 12 noon, December 7.

Colonel Bratton asked Colonel French at this time how long it would take before the message was on the way. Colonel French replied that it would be on the way in ten minutes and that it would be in the hands of addressees within 30 minutes at the latest. Colonel Bratton reported these facts to the Chief of Staff.

The following is the log of the message:

	E. S. T.	Honolulu Time
Filed War Department Message Center.....	12:00 noon	6:30 AM
Sent Western Union.....	12:17 PM	6:47 AM
Received RCA, Honolulu.....		7:33 AM
Delivered to Signal Officer, Honolulu		11:45 AM
Delivered to AGO, Hawaiian Department.....		2:58 PM

The Message Center reports that a check from Honolulu indicates that on receipt this message was handed to an oriental messenger (statement Colonel French to Colonel Smith, Secretary, General Staff) for delivery by hand to Army Headquarters.

(Signed) W. B. Smith,
W. B. SMITH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.

DECEMBER 15, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Sunday morning, December 7, 1941.

1. My recollection of what occurred in your office on that morning is as follows:

I found you alone in your office at about 11:25 a. m. We were almost immediately joined by Col. Bratton, who brought in the Japanese reply and the Japanese directive that the reply be given to Secretary Hull at 1:00 p. m. that day.

You then read aloud the Japanese reply, which was of considerable length. You then asked what Col. Bratton and I thought should be done about it, or what it signified. We said that we believed there was important significance in the time of the delivery of the reply—1:00 p. m.—an indication that some military action would be undertaken by the Japanese at that time. We thought it probable that the Japanese line of action would be into Thailand, but it might be any one or more of a number of other areas.

I urged that the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama and the West Coast be informed immediately that the Japanese reply would be delivered at one o'clock that afternoon, and to be on the alert. You then picked up the telephone and got Admiral Stark. You told him you thought we should send out warning as indicated above. After Admiral Stark replied, you put down the telephone and said that the Admiral did not think any further warnings necessary, since all the forces had already been several times alerted. Col. Bratton and I nevertheless urged that warnings be sent.

You then wrote out the warning message. There was some discussion as to whether the Philippines should be included or not, but I am not quite clear exactly when this discussion occurred. You again got Admiral Stark on the telephone and read the message to him. He apparently concurred, and asked that the naval forces be informed. You added that at the bottom of the message.

At about this time General Gerow and Col. Bundy arrived. You asked us in succession, beginning with me, what we thought the Japanese reply and timing meant. I said that I thought it probably meant Thailand, but that the timing had some significance and warning messages should be sent. General Gerow and Colonels Bratton and Bundy concurred. The message in your handwriting was then given to Col. Bratton to take immediately to the Message Center. (There was a little discussion here as to whether it should go to General Gerow's office for typing first, but time was then pressing and I gave it to Bratton for immediate delivery. General Gerow said as Bratton was leaving, "Tell them to give first priority to the Philippines if there is a question of priority" or something to that

effect.) Bratton returned in a few moments and you directed him to find out how long it would take for the delivery of those messages. Again he went to the Message Center and returned and reported to you that they would have them encoded in three minutes, on the air in eight, and in the hands of the recipients in (I think) twenty.

Col. Bratton states that he looked at his watch on delivering your message to the Signal Corps, and the time was 11:50 a. m. He further states that the Message Center gave him no intimation that all four messages would not go over Army radio direct to the four Army Headquarters.

(Signed) Sherman Miles,
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

JUNE 8, 1942.

Memorandum for Brig. General W. B. Smith:

In connection with the request General Surles sent to you, I am sending you two files; one is the Log, which shows the record of messages received, etc., on December 7, 1941; the other file includes statements by different officers covering their recollections of occurrences on that date.

I understood from you that what Mr. Lindley was particularly interested in was what the situation was at the time the first word of the attack was received. Inasmuch as I was the only officer present in this office at the time, I present you with the following statement:

"On the morning of December 7th, I was on duty in the Office of the Chief of Staff doing some special work that I had been directed to do by General Marshall. He arrived at the office at about 10:00 o'clock or shortly thereafter and had a series of conferences with staff officers from G-2 and the War Plans Division. At about 12:00 o'clock he called me to his office and informed me that he expected to see the President that afternoon at about 3:00 o'clock and for me to arrange to keep the office open and have some of the commissioned and civilian personnel report for duty.

"At about 1:30 P. M. an enlisted man from the Navy rushed into my office out of breath, with a pencil note which was supposed to have been a message from the Navy radio operator at Honolulu and which said, as I recall: 'Pearl Harbor attacked. This is no drill.' I immediately telephoned General Marshall at his quarters at Fort Myer where he was having lunch and told him of the message. He directed me to contact Hawaii if possible and verify the message. Before I could do this another and more official message came, indicating the correctness of the first message that had been received. General Marshall was in his office within ten minutes after I telephoned him and after remaining in the office for a short period he went to the White House where he stayed until about 4:00 P. M."

Miss Nason does not recall a particular chronological record of events having been prepared or filed, but if the data I have furnished you here is not sufficient, I suggest that you talk to her and perhaps she will recall what you have in mind.

These files of course are very precious from the historical point of view and I would appreciate it if you would return them to this office just as soon as you have finished with them; also that you do not release any information contained in them until it has been cleared by the Chief of Staff.

(Initialed) JRD
J. R. DEANE,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.

Incls.

Secret folder on Hawaii
Log-Cpy #1
Memo. to Gen. WB Smith fr.
Gen. Surles 6/3/42

EXHIBIT NO. 40

COPY

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET - CONFIDENTIAL - RESTRICTED

FROM: CINCPAC

TO: OPNAV

INFO: CINCPAC

REFERENCE NO.: ST/0048

MONTH: DEC. YEAR 1941

LEARN FROM SINGAPORE WE HAVE ASSURED BRITAIN
ARMED SUPPORT UNDER THREE OR FOUR EVENTUALITIES &
HAVE RECEIVED NO CORRESPONDING INSTRUCTIONS
FROM YOU

TOP SECRET

[1]

EXHIBIT NO. 41

INFORMATION FROM DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON MESSAGES No. 1) 901, 902, 907, 910

NOTE: Information based on documents in Navy files indicated by "(N)"; information based on documents in Army files indicated by "(A)".

No. 901 (pilot message; Exhibit 1, p. 238)

Washington Time

Filed by the Japanese 8:56 p. m. 6 Dec. Tokyo time (A & N) ----- 6:56 a. m. 6 Dec
 Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S (Bain-
 bridge Island, Washington) 1215-1220 GMT 6 Dec (N) - 7:15-7:20 a. m. 6 Dec
 Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N & A)
 Teletype sheet containing Japanese code received by Army
 SIS from Navy (A) ----- 12:05 p. m. 6 Dec
 Decoded, translated and typed at Army SIS (A) ----- 6 Dec

No. 902 (14 part memo; Exhibit 1, pp. 239-45)

Part 1

Filed by the Japanese 10:00 p. m. 6 Dec Tokyo time (N) ----- 8:00 a. m. 6 Dec
 Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S (Bain-
 bridge Island, Washington) 1303-1310 GMT 6 Dec (N) - 8:03-8:10 a. m. 6 Dec
 Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
 Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1649 GMT 6 Dec (N) -- 11:49 a. m. 6 Dec
 Decoded¹ and typed up at Navy (N) ----- 6 Dec

¹ All parts of the message were in English, so that translation was not required.

1414 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[2]

Part 2

Washington Time

Filed by the Japanese 10:30 p. m. 6 Dec. Tokyo time (N) -- 8:30 a. m. 6 Dec
Intercepted by Navy Station S 1337-1343 GMT
6 Dec (N) ----- 8:37-8:43 a. m. 6 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1649
GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 11:49 a. m. 6 Dec
Decoded² and typed up at Navy (N) ----- 6 Dec

Part 3

Filed by the Japanese 10:40 p. m. 6 Dec. Tokyo time (N) -- 8:40 a. m. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S
1349-1358 GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 8:49-8:58 a. m. 6 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1649 GMT
6 Dec (N) ----- 11:49 a. m. 6 Dec
Decoded and typed up at Navy (N) ----- 6 Dec

Part 4

Filed by the Japanese 11:55 p. m. 6 Dec Tokyo time (N) -- 9:55 a. m. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S
1505-1520 GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 10:05-10:20 a. m. 6 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1649
GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 11:45 a. m. 6 Dec
Decoded and typed up at Navy (N) ----- 6 Dec

[3]

Part 5

Filed by the Japanese 11:59 p. m. 6 Dec Tokyo time (N) -- 9:59 a. m. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
1540-1546 GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 10:40-10:46 a. m. 6 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1951
GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 2:51 p. m. 6 Dec
Decoded and typed up at Navy (N) ----- 6 Dec

Part 6

Filed by the Japanese 12:30 a. m. 7 Dec Tokyo time (N) -- 10:30 a. m. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
1618-1624 GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 11:18-11:24 a. m. 6 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1951
GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 2:51 p. m. 6 Dec
Decoded and typed up at Navy (N)

Part 7

Filed by the Japanese 1:07 a. m. 7 Dec Tokyo time (N) -- 11:07 a. m. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
1605-1618 GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 11:05-11:18 a. m. 6 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1951
GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 2:51 p. m. 6 Dec
Decoded and typed up at Navy (N)

Part 8

Filed by the Japanese 1:07 a. m. 7 Dec. Tokyo time (N) -- 11:07 a. m. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
1640-1658 GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 11:40-11:58 a. m. 6 Dec

² Actually the decode was on the basis of a teletype from Navy Station N (Cheltenham, Maryland), apparently received before teletype from Station S was received.

[4]

Part 8 (Cont'd)

Washington Time

Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)

Received in Japanese Code in Navy Dept. 1951

GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 2:51 p. m. 6 Dec

Decoded and typed up at Navy (N) ----- 6 Dec

Part 9

Filed by Japanese 11:55 p. m. 6 Dec Tokyo time

(N) ----- 9:55 a. m. 6 Dec

Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,

1530-1536 GMT 6 Dec ----- 10:30-10:36 a. m. 6 Dec

Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)

Decoded by Army SIS (N)

Typed at Navy (N) ----- 6 Dec

Part 10

Filed by Japanese 11:59 p. m. 6 Dec. Tokyo time

(N) ----- 9:59 a. m. 6 Dec

Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,

1517-1525 GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 10:17-10:25 6 Dec

Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)

Decoded by Army SIS (N)

Typed at Navy (N) ----- 6 Dec

Part 11

Filed by the Japanese 12:31 a. m. 7 Dec Tokyo

time (N) ----- 10:31 a. m. 6 Dec

Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,

1607-1616 GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 11:07-11:16 a. m. 6 Dec

Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)

Received in Japanese code by Navy Dept. 1951

GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 2:51 p. m. 6 Dec

Decoded and typed by Navy (N) ----- 6 Dec

[5]

Part 12

Filed by the Japanese 12:49 a. m. 7 Dec Tokyo

time (N) ----- 10:49 a. m. 6 Dec

Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,

1600-1608 GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 11:00-11:08 a. m. 6 Dec

Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N).

Received in Japanese code by Navy Dept. 1951

GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 2:51 p. m. 6 Dec

Decoded and typed by Navy (N) -----

Part 13

Filed by the Japanese 1:25 a. m. 7 Dec. Tokyo

time (N) ----- 11:25 a. m. 6 Dec

Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,

1635-1652 GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 11:35-11:52 a. m. 6 Dec

Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N).

Received in Japanese code by Navy Dept. 1951

GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 2:51 p. m. 6 Dec

Decoded and typed by Navy (N) ----- 6 Dec

Part 14

Filed by the Japanese 4:38 p. m. 7 Dec Tokyo

time (N) ----- 2:38 a. m. 7 Dec

Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,

0805-0810 GMT 7 Dec (N) ----- 3:05-3:10 a. m. 7 Dec

Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)

Decoded and typed by Navy (N) ----- 7 Dec.

1416 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

No. 907 (one o'clock message; p. 248 Exhibit 1)

Filed by the Japanese 6:18 p. m. 7 Dec. Tokyo Washington Time
time (N)----- 4:18 a. m. 7 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S
(Bainbridge Island, Washington) 0937 GMT 7
Dec (N)----- 4:37 a. m. 7 Dec

[6] (Cont'd)

Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (A)
Decoded by Navy (A)
Sent by Navy to Army SIS
Translated and typed by Army SIS on basis of Navy decode (A)----- 7 Dec

No. 910 (code destruction; p. 249 Exhibit 1)

Filed by the Japanese 6:44 p. m. 7 Dec Tokyo time (N & A)----- 4:44 a. m. 7 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S (Bainbridge
Island, Washington) 1007 GMT 7 Dec (N)----- 5:07 a. m. 7 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (A)-----
Decoded by Navy (A)-----
Sent by Navy to Army SIS-----
Translated and typed by Army SIS on basis of Navy decode (A)----- 7 Dec

EXHIBIT NO. 42

AR 10-15
1-2

Army Regulations
No. 10-15

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, August 18, 1936.

GENERAL STAFF ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL DUTIES

SECTION I. War Department General Staff----- Paragraphs 1-13
II. General Staff with troops----- 14

Section I

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

	Paragraph
Chief of Staff, general duties-----	1
Deputy Chief of Staff, general duties-----	2
Secretary, general duties-----	3
War Department General Staff, general duties-----	4
Communication; general procedure-----	5
Issuance of instructions-----	6
Organization; designations-----	7
Personnel Division, general duties-----	8
Military Intelligence Division, general duties-----	9
Operations and Training Division, general duties-----	10
Supply Division, general duties-----	11
War Plans Division, general duties-----	12
The General Council-----	13

1. Chief of Staff, general duties.—a. General.—The Chief of Staff is the immediate adviser of the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the Military Establishment and is charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development, and execution of the military program. He will cause the War Department General Staff to prepare the necessary plans for recruiting, mobilizing, organizing, supplying, equipping, and training the Army of the United States for use in the national defense and for demobilization. As the agent, and in the name of the Secretary of War, he issues such orders as will insure that the plans of the War Department are harmoniously executed by all agencies of the Military Establishment, and that the military program is carried out speedily and efficiently.

This pamphlet supersedes AR 10-15, November 25, 1921, including C5, July 2, 1927.

[2] b. As Commanding General of the Field Forces.—The Chief of Staff in addition to his duties as such, is, in peace, by direction of the President, the Commanding General of the Field Forces and in that capacity directs the field operations and the general training of the several armies, of the oversea forces, and of GHQ units. He continues to exercise command of the field forces after the outbreak of war until such time as the President shall have specifically designated a commanding general thereof.

2. Deputy Chief of Staff, general duties.—a. The Deputy Chief of Staff will assist the Chief of Staff and will act for him in the War Department in his absence. The Deputy Chief of Staff will report directly to the Secretary of War in all matters not involving the establishment of important policies.

His office is charged with the preparations of plans and policies in connection with legislation and with military estimates for funds; with processing budgetary matters in the General Staff; with reports concerning legislation and requests for legislation that come within the purview of The General Council or that are referred to the General Staff; *with public relations to include all forms of publicity*; and with such other duties as the Chief of Staff may prescribe.

b. In addition to his other duties the Deputy Chief of Staff is charged with supervision over the activities of all the divisions of the War Department General Staff.

3. Secretary, general duties.—The Secretary of the General Staff will maintain an office of temporary record for the Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief of Staff. He will transmit to the proper destination in the War Department, all papers emanating or returning from the Chief of Staff or the Deputy Chief of Staff. Under the supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff, he will collect statistical information of military importance for the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff.

4. War Department General Staff, general duties.—a. The War Department General Staff is charged with the preparation in time of peace of the plans outlined in paragraph 1. In a national emergency it is charged with the creation and maintenance of the necessary and proper forces for use in the field. To this end it will, under the Chief of Staff, coordinate the development in peace and war of the separate arms and services so as to insure the existence of a well-balanced and efficient military team. Assisted by an appropriate number of National Guard and Reserve officers (as prescribed in sec. 5, act June 3, 1916 (39 Stat. 167), as amended by sec. 5, act June 4, 1920 (41 Stat. 763), as amended by sec. 2, act June 15, 1933 (48 Stat. 153) (U. S. C. 10:38; secs. 1258 and 1339, M. L., 1929)), it will formulate all policies and regulations affecting the organization, distribution, and training of the National Guard of the United States, Officers' Reserve Corps and the Organized Reserves, and all policies and regulations affecting the appointment, assignment, promotion, and discharge of Reserve officers. It will perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be from time to time prescribed by the President, and will render professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff.

[3] b. The divisions and subdivisions of the War Department General Staff will not engage in administrative duties for the performance of which an agency exists, but will confine themselves to the preparation of plans and policies (particularly those concerning mobilization) and to the supervision of the execution of such plans and policies as may be approved by the Secretary of War.

c. All divisions of the General Staff, and all other agencies in the military service, are charged with the collection and transmission to The Adjutant General for the use of the historical section, Army War College, of such military records and historical data as become available incident to their work.

5. Communication; general procedure.—a. The chiefs of the several arms, services, and bureaus of the War Department and of the several divisions of the War Department General Staff, or of subdivisions thereof, are authorized and expected to communicate *informally* with each other concerning matters over which they severally have supervision, *but formal opinions of The Judge Advocate General should be obtained through The Adjutant General. The Secretary of War, Under Secretary of War, Assistant Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, or any Assistant Chief of Staff may directly request and receive an opinion of The Judge Advocate General, but when such an opinion is requested by the chief of an arm, service, or bureau of the War Department, the opinion when rendered will be sent to The Adjutant General.*²

¹ WD Cir 81, 30 July 40.

² WD Cir 77, 19 Apr 41.

b. Approved memoranda, or excerpts therefrom, establishing policies will, except in highly confidential cases, be furnished by the chief of division of the War Department General Staff charged with supervision over the activity covered by the particular memorandum to The Adjutant General, who will furnish copies to other interested arms, services, and bureaus.

c. When a case arises which is covered by an approved policy, the proper office will take appropriate action on the case in accordance with the policy, and it will not be referred to the War Department General Staff for decision except in cases of unusual importance or when an exception to the established policy appears desirable.

[4] d. Papers requiring General Staff action which reach the office of The Adjutant General will be sent directly to the division of the War Department General Staff concerned.

6. Issuance of instructions.—The Deputy Chief of Staff and the assistant chiefs of staff, in charge of the divisions of the General Staff hereinafter provided for, are authorized on matters under their supervision to issue instructions in the name of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff.

7. Organizations; designations.—a. The War Department General Staff will include the following divisions, each division being under the immediate control of an assistant chief of staff:

- (1) Personnel Division (First Division).
- (2) Military Intelligence Division (Second Division).
- (3) Operations and Training Division (Third Division).
- (4) Supply Division (Fourth Division).
- (5) War Plans Division.

b. For the first four divisions the abbreviations G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, respectively, are prescribed. The prescribed abbreviation for the War Plans Division is WPD.

c. The chiefs of the several divisions of the War Department General Staff will be designated as assistant chiefs of staff; the prescribed abbreviations will be A. C. of S. followed by the prescribed abbreviation of the division.

d. (1) The interior organization of each division will be prescribed by its chief in such a way as to facilitate the performance of the functions assigned and the easy transition from a peace to war status.

(2) The War Plans Division will, in the event of mobilization of General Headquarters, be increased by one or more officers from each of the other General Staff divisions, so as to enable it to furnish the nucleus of the General Staff of the General Headquarters. The necessary General Staff personnel, in addition to the above required for General Headquarters, will, insofar as practicable, be obtained from personnel with General Staff experience and personnel of the Army War College, which will upon mobilization temporarily suspend its course. In carrying out the above provisions care will be taken to insure that no disruption of the War Department General Staff, or of any division thereof, occurs due to the excessive removal of personnel therefrom.

8. Personnel Division, general duties.—a. The Personnel Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the personnel of the Army as individuals.

[5] b. The Personnel Division is specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of activities concerning—

(1) The procurement, classification, assignment, promotion, pay,⁴ transfer, retirement, and discharge, in peace and war, of all personnel of the Army of the United States, including the Regular Army, the National Guard, the Organized Reserves, the Officers' Reserve Corps, and the Enlisted Reserve Corps.

(2) Measures for conserving man power.

(3) Replacements of personnel, in accordance with priorities formulated by G-3.

(4) Army Regulations, uniform regulations, and such general regulations as especially concern individuals or matters of routine not specifically assigned to other sections.

(5) Decorations.

(6) Religious, recreational, and morale work (except that all programs of time allotted will be arranged in agreement with G-3).

(7) The Red Cross and similar agencies with the exception of such part or parts of said agencies as may be wholly devoted to hospital and medical relief work.

(8) Enemy aliens, prisoners of war, and conscientious objectors, including their security.

(9) *Mobilization of military police units as part of station complements for local security.*¹

c. The Personnel Division is further charged with furnishing G-4 with information as to the amount and location of shelter necessary for activities under its supervision.

d. The functions of the War Department General Staff with reference to the selection, assignment, etc., of General Staff officers will be performed by the Personnel Division, subject to the proviso that no officer will be assigned to, or relieved from, either the War Department General Staff or the General Staff with troops without the personal approval of the Chief of Staff or the Deputy Chief of Staff.

[6] 9. Military Intelligence Division, general duties.—a. The Military Intelligence Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the collection, evaluation and dissemination of military information.

b. The Military Intelligence Division is specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of all activities concerning—

(1) Military topographical surveys and maps, including their *acquisition*,² reproduction and distribution (except special situation maps prepared by G-3).

(2) The custody of the General Staff War Department map and photograph collection.³

(3) Military attaches, observers, and foreign-language students.

(4) Intelligence personnel of all units.

(5) Liaison with other intelligence agencies of the Government and with duly accredited foreign military attaches and missions.

(6) Codes and ciphers.

(7) Translations.

(8) ~~Public relations; to include all forms of publicity.~~ See AR 600-700.²

(9) Censorship in time of war.

(10) *Safeguarding of military information.*⁴

10. Operations and Training Division, general duties.—a. The Operations and Training Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the organization, training, and operation of the military forces, and which are not hereinafter expressly assigned to the War Plans Division.

b. The Operations and Training Division is specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of activities concerning—

(1) Organization, including Tables of Organization, for all branches of the Army of the United States.

[7] (2) Assignment of units to higher organizations.

(3) So much of Tables of Basic Allowances, Tables of Allowances, and Tables of Equipment as relate to the allotment of major items of equipment to units and the distribution of such items within units.

(4) Distribution and training, including educational and vocational training of the Army of the United States, including the National Guard and Organized Reserves; location of units of the Regular Army and Organized Reserves.

(5) All training and tactical publications.

(6) The United States Military Academy; special service schools; The Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and The Army War College.

(7) Military training in civilian institutions and in civilian training camps.

(8) Consultation with G-4 on types of equipment, and on major items such as guns, rifles, tanks, etc., consultation with WPD.

(9) Priorities in assigning replacements and equipment, and important priorities affecting mobilization.

(10) Movement of troops, to include those necessary in the execution of the approved plan of strategical deployment prepared by the War Plans Division (movements of supply, technical, and labor troops not employed as combat units to be made on request of G-4).

¹ WD Cir 81, 30 July 40.

² C 2, 10 Oct 39.

³ WD Cir 152, 31 July 41.

- (11) **Military police.** Mobilization of military police units, zone of the interior.
 (12) The system of military publications.
 (13) **Maneuvers, command post exercises, terrain exercises, and staff rides,** including joint anti-aircraft and air exercises and joint Army and Navy exercises. (Exercises involving tests of war plans will be planned in collaboration with the War Plans Division.)^a

11. Supply Division, general duties.—a. The Supply Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the supply of the Army.

b. The Supply Division is specifically charged with the duty of preparing basic supply plans in such detail as will enable the several [8] supply arms and services of the Army to prepare detailed plans for the accomplishment of their several missions and with the adjustment of such basic plans to meet the changing military needs and the limitations of appropriations or procurement possibilities.

In the development of the detailed plans the arms and services will request decisions on military questions from the Supply Division, General Staff, and decisions on business or industrial questions from the Assistant Secretary of War.

c. The Supply Division is also charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of activities concerning—

- (1) Distribution, storage, and issue of supplies.
- (2) Transportation by land and water, including ports of embarkation and their necessary auxiliaries.
- (3) Traffic control (the police of roads and routes to be ordered by G-3 on plans formulated by G-4).
- (4) Tables of Basic Allowances, Tables of Allowances, and Tables of Equipment, the quantities and types of military supplies required for the use of the Army and essential to the military program, time and priorities of delivery pertaining thereto, types and priorities to be determined in agreement with G-3 and in the case of major items in consultation also with WPD; Tables of Basic Allowances, Tables of Allowances, and Tables of Equipment to be in agreement with G-3 insofar as concerns allotment and distribution of major items.
- (5) Inventions.
- (6) Leasing of War Department facilities and issuing of revocable licenses.
- (7) Hospitalization and evacuation of men and animals, including such agencies or parts of agencies as may be wholly devoted to hospital and medical relief work.
- (8) Distribution and movement of supply, technical, and labor troops not employed as combat units (orders for movements to be issued by G-3 on request).
- (9) Property responsibility and accountability.

d. The Supply Division is further charged, in coordination with other divisions of the War Department General Staff, with the determination and statement of plans and policies governing the preparation of estimates for funds for military purposes and priorities pertaining thereto, and, when necessary, with the restatement of such priorities to govern the expenditure of all funds appropriated.

[9] e. The Supply Division is also charged with the formulation of policies and projects governing—

- (1) The procurement of real estate in connection with the training, shelter, and housing of troops, and with the storage, distribution, and issue of supplies.
- (2) The procurement (not involving procurement of real estate), construction, repair, maintenance, and disposition of buildings and all utilities connected therewith (except insofar as relates solely to procurement).

12. War Plans Division, general duties.—a. The War Plans Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the formulation of plans for the use in the theater of war of the military forces, separately or in conjunction with the naval forces, in the national defense.

b. The War Plans Division is specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of activities concerning—

- (1) Location and armament of coast and land fortifications.

^a WD Cir 152, 31 July 41.

^b WD Cir 33, 28 Feb 41.

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(2) Estimate of forces required and times at which they may be needed under the various possible conditions necessitating the use of troops in the national defense.

(3) The initial strategical deployment (plans and orders for the movement of troops to execute the initial deployment to be the duty of the Operations and Training Division).

(4) Actual operations in the theater of war.

(5) Consultation with the Operations and Training Division and the Supply Division on major items of equipment.

(6) Peace maneuvers, command post exercises, terrain exercises, and staff rides involving units higher than an army, joint Army and Navy exercises, and exercises involving tests of war plans.⁶

13 The General Council.—a. Creation and function.—For the purpose of periodically reviewing and properly coordinating all major War Department projects, and passing on matters of current policy, there is hereby created under the Chief of Staff, The General Council.

b. Composition.

(1) The General Council will be composed of the Deputy Chief of Staff, who will be president of The General Council, the [10] assistant chiefs of staff, and the executive officer of the Assistant Secretary of War.

(2) The Adjutant General, the chiefs of arms and other services, the Commandant of the Army War College, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the Executive for Reserve Affairs, Office of the Chief of Staff will be directed to sit as members of The General Council during the discussion of any important subject bearing upon their individual responsibilities. They may elect to sit during the discussion of any important subject in which they are interested.

c. Secretary; records.—The Secretary of the General Staff will act as secretary for The General Council. No records will be kept except those necessary to record dates of meetings, officers present, questions considered, and action taken. In the absence of the Deputy Chief of Staff, the senior assistant chief of staff present will preside.

d. Recommendations.—The General Council will report its recommendations to the Chief of Staff.

e. Relations with the War Council.—When important matters of General Staff policy are brought before The War Council, the Chief of Staff will present the recommendations of The General Council thereon.

Section II

GENERAL STAFF WITH TROOPS

Organization; distribution of duties..... Paragraph 14

14. Organization; distribution of duties.—(As changed by C 1, April 16, 1938.)⁴ The general staff at each headquarters will be organized into four *divisions sections*.⁵ The duties performed by these *divisions sections* will be similar to those performed by the first four divisions of the War Department General Staff and are prescribed in Staff Officers' Field Manual, Part One.⁶ For war planning, see AR 160-10. Mobilization planning is a function of the General Staff *general staff* as a whole and not of any particular *division section* thereof.

[A. G. 320.2 (5-25-36).]

By order of the Secretary of War:

Official:

E. T. CONLEY,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

⁴ C 2, 10 Oct 39.

⁵ WD Ctr 33, 28 Feb 41.

EXHIBIT NO. 43

Serial 011512-3

27-1-41 Secret

STATEMENT BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF

1. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army of the United States are aware of the advantages that will accrue to both nations in the prosecution of any war in which the United States and the British Commonwealth may participate as associates, should tentative understandings be reached in advance concerning military cooperation. Therefore, they have prepared this statement in the hope that it will clear the way for the discussions which are to follow.

2. As understood by these two officers, the purpose of these staff conversations is to determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth can defeat Germany and the powers allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war.

3. The American people as a whole desire now to remain out of war, and to provide only material and economic aid to Great Britain. So long as this attitude is maintained, it must be supported by their responsible military and naval authorities. Therefore, no specific commitments can now be made except as to technical methods of cooperation. Military plans which may be envisaged must, for the present, remain contingent upon the future political action of both nations. All such plans are subject to eventual official approval by the two Governments.

4. The present national position of the United States is as follows:

(a) A fundamental principle of United States policy is that the Western Hemisphere remain secure against the extension in it of non-American military and political control.

(b) The United States has adopted the policy of affording material and diplomatic assistance to the British Commonwealth in that nation's war against Germany.

(c) The United States by diplomatic means has opposed any extension of Japanese rule over additional territory.

5. If the United States Government decides to make war in common with the British Commonwealth, it is the present view of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff that:

(a) The broad military objective of United States operations will be the defeat of Germany and her allies, but the United States necessarily must also maintain dispositions which, under all eventualities, will prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic political and military power.

(b) The objective of the war will be most effectively attained by the United States exerting its principal military effort in the Atlantic or navally in the Mediterranean regions.

(c) The United States and British Commonwealth should endeavor to keep Japan from entering the war or from attacking the Dutch.

(d) Should Japan enter the war, United States' operations in the mid-Pacific and the Far East would be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate the exertion of its principal military effort in the Atlantic or navally in the Mediterranean.

(e) As a general rule, United States forces should operate in their own areas of responsibility, under their own commanders, and in accordance with plans derived from United States-British joint plans.

(f) The United States will continue to furnish material aid to Great Britain, but will retain for building up its own forces material in such proportion as to provide for future security and best to effectuate United States-British joint plans for defeating Germany.

6. The scope of the staff conversations should preferably cover the examination of those military efforts which will contribute most directly to the defeat of Germany. As a preliminary to military cooperation, tentative agreements should be reached concerning the allocation of the principal areas of responsibility, the major lines of the military strategy to be pursued by both nations, the strength of the forces which each may be able to commit, and the determination of satisfactory command arrangements, both as to supreme control, and as to unity of field command in cases of strategic or tactical joint operations. Staff conversations should also include an examination into the present military situations of the United States and the British Commonwealth, and also into the probable situations that might result from the loss of the British Isles.

7. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff would appreciate it if the British Staff Representatives could furnish the United States Staff Representatives with an estimate of the military situation of the British Commonwealth as a preliminary to the staff discussions.

Copy No. 21 of 25.

OCS/18138-140

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(79th Congress)

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 15

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 44 THROUGH 87

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

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PART 15

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 44 THROUGH 87

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



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**JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK**

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, *Chairman*

JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, *Vice Chairman*

WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia	JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from Pennsylvania
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois	BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representative from California
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine	FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from Wisconsin
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michigan	
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from North Carolina	

COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, General Counsel
GERHARD A. GIBELL, Chief Assistant Counsel
JULS M. HANNAFORD, Assistant Counsel
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel

(After January 14, 1946)

SETH W. RICHARDSON, General Counsel
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, Associate General Counsel
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel
EDWARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. LANE, Assistant Counsel

HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Pages	Transcript pages	Hearings
1	1- 399	1- 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Exhibits Nos.
12	1 through 6.
13	7 and 8.
14	9 through 43.
15	44 through 87.
16	88 through 110.
17	111 through 128.
18	129 through 156.
19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments.

Description

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

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11-15-45 | 1 | Selection of intercepted diplomatic messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between July 1 and Dec. 8, 1941. |
| 2----- | 24
11-15-45 | 254 | Selection of intercepted messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between Dec. 2, 1940, and Dec. 8, 1941, concerning military installations, ships movements, espionage reports, etc. |
| 3----- | 87
11-16-45 | 317 | Navy Department dispatch No. 252203 dated Nov. 25, 1941, directing the routing of trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits. |
| 4----- | 142
11-16-45 | 318 | Chart showing plotting record of early plane flights Dec. 7, 1941, obtained by Opana Radar Detector Station. |
| 5----- | 153
11-16-45 | 318 | Army compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Colonel Thielen as illustrating his narrative statement. |
| 6----- | 153
11-16-45 | 337 | Navy compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Admiral Inglis as illustrating his narrative statement. |
| 7----- | 172
11-17-45 | 391 | Photostatic copy of Opana Radar Detector Station plot, submitted by Senator Ferguson, identified by Admiral Inglis, previously marked "Exhibit 3-B in evidence" in proceedings before Army Pearl Harbor Board. |
| 8----- | 233
11-19-45 | 391 | Material obtained by Army and Navy primarily from Japanese sources, relating to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |
| 8-A----- | 1792
12-18-45 | 413 | Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack. |
| 8-B----- | 1792
12-18-45 | 415 | Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack. |
| 8-C----- | 1792
12-18-45 | 424 | Report dated Dec. 4, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack. |

| Exhibit No. | Hearings, page and date introduced | Exhibits page No. | Description |
|-------------|------------------------------------|-------------------|--|
| 8-D----- | 2480
1-5-46 | 425 | Report dated Dec. 13, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack. |
| 9----- | 256
11-19-45 | 923 | Selection of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral J. O. Richardson, from Jan. 18, 1940, to Feb. 10, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |
| 10----- | 279
11-20-45 | 1000 | Letter dated Jan. 24, 1941, from Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War regarding defenses of Pearl Harbor, and reply by Secretary of War, dated Feb. 7, 1941; letter from Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated Feb. 7, 1941, transmitting the above letters with instructions and receipt therefor. |
| 11----- | 319
11-21-45 | 1006 | Memorandum dated Oct. 16, 1940, from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Hart, concerning a proposed blockade of Japan in the event of aggressive action over the reopening of the Burma Road. |
| 12----- | 363
11-21-45 | 1013 | Letters from War Department and Navy Department with enclosures, dated Nov. 7, 1945, and Nov. 14, 1945, respectively, to Congressman Frank B. Keefe, concerning data on amounts requested by the services, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and contract authorizations for the years 1932 through 1941. |
| 13----- | 387
11-21-45 | 1019 | Study of the air situation in Hawaii dated Aug. 20, 1941, by Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, for Commanding General, Army Air Forces, through Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. |
| 14----- | 397
11-21-45 | 1040 | Letter dated Apr. 14, 1941, from Assistant Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department to the Adjutant General, entitled "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor" in reply to letter of Feb. 7, 1941, on this subject (see exhibit No. 10), enclosing Annex No. 7 to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Joint Estimate Hawaiian Air Force, and Patrol Wing 2 (Naval Base Defense Air Force), and Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security). |
| 15----- | 401
11-23-45 | 1042 | Dispatches from Ambassador Joseph E. Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State, dated Jan. 27, 1941, Nov. 3, 1941, and Nov. 17, 1941; memorandum dated Feb. 1, 1941 from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, advising him of contents of above message dated Jan. 27, 1941, which reported Japan would make surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in event of trouble with United States. |

(1) Memorandum of War Department Situation dated Nov. 3, 1941, for General Marshall by General Grew.
(2) Memorandum of War Department Situation dated Nov. 3, 1941, for General Marshall by General Grew.
(3) Memorandum of War Department Situation dated Nov. 3, 1941, for General Marshall by General Grew.

| | | | |
|------|--------------------------------------|------|---|
| 16 | 401
11-23-45 | 1061 | (a) Memorandum "Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation", dated Nov. 5, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark;
(b) Minutes of The Joint Board for Nov. 3, 1941;
(c) Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 3, 1941, for General Marshall by General Gerow. |
| 16-A | 3889
2-6-46 | 1077 | Undated note from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, attached to letter dated Oct. 30, 1941, from Secretary Morgenthau to the President, transmitting a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. |
| 16-B | 4341
2-13-46 | 1081 | Message dated Nov. 7, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, delivered through the Department of State. |
| 17 | 402
11-23-45 | 1083 | Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 27, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark. |
| 18 | 402
11-23-45 | 1084 | Documents relating to proposed " <i>Modus Vivendi</i> ," including Secretary Hull's recommendation dated Nov. 26, 1941, to President Roosevelt. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit). |
| 19 | 402
11-23-45 | 1201 | Memorandum dated Nov. 29, 1941, by Secretary Hull for the President, and attached draft of a proposed message from the President to Congress, and proposed message from President to Emperor of Japan. |
| 20 | 402
11-23-45 | 1226 | Message dated Dec. 6, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Emperor of Japan, and related documents, including draft of proposed message dated Oct. 17, 1941. |
| 21 | 402
11-23-45 | 1246 | Two dispatches dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, London, to State Department; memorandum of conversation dated Nov. 30, 1941, between Secretary Hull and British Ambassador, with attached memorandum; memorandum handed to Mr. Hornbeck by Netherlands Minister on Nov. 21, 1941; dispatch from Secretary of State to United States Consul, Manila, P. I., dated Nov. 29, 1941.
All documents concern intelligence information relating to Japanese military and naval units in the Far East. |
| 22 | 458
11-23-45 | 1252 | (a) British draft, dated Aug. 10, 1941, of proposed parallel communications to Japanese Government;
(b) Two messages from the President (at Atlantic Conference) to Secretary Hull, Nos. 121645 and 160115;
(c) Draft, dated Aug. 15, 1941 (not used), of proposed communication to the Japanese Ambassador brought to State Department by Sumner Welles following (Atlantic) conference between the President and British Prime Minister. |
| 22-A | 1694
12-15-45
2065
12-31-45 | 1262 | Revised draft (not used), dated Aug. 16, 1941, of draft dated Aug. 15, 1941 ((c) above), of proposed statement to the Japanese Ambassador, prepared by Sumner Welles. (See p. 556, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 29, for text of statement made to Japanese Ambassador by the President on Aug. 17, 1941.) |

| Exhibit No. | Exhibits page and date introduced | Exhibits page No. | Description |
|-------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------|--|
| 22-B | 1783
12-18-45 | 1269 | Memorandum, dated Aug. 10, 1941, prepared by Sumner Wells of his conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning proposed parallel action with reference to Japan. |
| 22-C | 1783
12-18-45 | 1275 | Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, prepared by Sumner Wells, of conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, attended by Welles, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Harry Hopkins concerning "British-American Cooperation". |
| 22-D | 1783
12-18-45 | 1292 | Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, of conversation between Sumner Wells and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning "British-American Cooperation" at the Atlantic Conference, and Welles' subsequent conversation with the President. |
| 23 | 476
11-24-45 | 1300 | Message, dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant. |
| 24 | 476
11-24-45 | 1300 | Message, dated Nov. 30, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant. |
| 25 | 574
11-26-45 | 1301 | Dispatch, dated Dec. 1, 1941, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, reporting reaction in Japan to the Secretary's proposal of Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note). See pp. 766 to 770, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, for proposal dated Nov. 26, 1941, to the Japanese Government. |
| 26 | 634
11-27-45 | 1303 | Dispatch, dated Sept. 24, 1940, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State concerning general policy toward Japan (so-called "green light" dispatch). |
| 27 | 670
11-27-45 | 1315 | "Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Introduction (pamphlet edition, 1942). Department of State Publication 1853. |
| 28 | 670
11-27-45 | 1315 | "Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Introduction and Documents (cloth edition, 1943). Department of State Publication 1983. |
| 29 | 670
11-27-45 | 1315 | "Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941", vols. I and II (1943). Department of State Publication 2008. |
| 30 | 670
11-27-45 | 1315 | "Ten Years in Japan", by Joseph C. Grew, Simon and Schuster (1944). |

1. The Government of the United States has received information that the Government of Japan is planning to send a large number of Japanese citizens to the United States for the purpose of working in the war industry. The Government of the United States is aware of the fact that the Japanese Government has been making extensive use of forced labor in its war industry, and it is concerned that the Japanese Government may be attempting to use the same method in the United States. The Government of the United States is therefore taking steps to prevent the Japanese Government from sending Japanese citizens to the United States for the purpose of working in the war industry. The Government of the United States is also taking steps to prevent the Japanese Government from sending Japanese citizens to the United States for the purpose of working in the war industry. The Government of the United States is also taking steps to prevent the Japanese Government from sending Japanese citizens to the United States for the purpose of working in the war industry.

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|------|------------------|------|--|
| 31 | 737
11-28-45 | 1316 | Six dispatches bearing various dates from April 4 to Dec. 2, 1941, from United States diplomatic officials in foreign countries reporting to the Department of State inquiries and comments of Japanese representatives in those countries concerning possible break in United States-Japanese relations. |
| 32 | 778
11-29-45 | 1326 | Selection of messages between War Department and Hawaiian Department from July 8 to Dec. 7, 1941. Included are certain messages sent by the War Department to the Western Defense Command, to General MacArthur in the Philippines, and to Commanding General, Panama, as well as their replies. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |
| 33 | 778
11-29-45 | 1334 | Selection of Military Intelligence Estimates prepared by G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., covering period July 7 to Dec. 6, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |
| 33-A | 2092
12-31-45 | 1385 | Secretary of War's copy of memorandum, dated Oct. 2, 1941, from Col. Hayes A. Kroner to the Chief of Staff, concerning "Japanese-American Relations", bearing note in handwriting of Secretary Stimson. |
| 34 | 825
11-30-45 | 1389 | Memorandum, dated Oct. 18, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for Chief of Staff, concerning "Resignation of Japanese Cabinet" and proposed message to Army outpost commanders. |
| 35 | 828
11-30-45 | 1390 | Memorandum, dated Jan. 31, 1942, prepared by Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, concerning "Warnings Sent to Hawaii Prior to Dec. 7, 1941", with enclosures. |
| 36 | 830
11-30-45 | 1393 | Photostatic copy of draft of General Marshall's message of Nov. 27, 1941, to General Short, containing phrase "hostile action possible at any moment", which draft contains a sentence that did not appear in the message as transmitted to General Short. (See Exhibit No. 32 for message sent.) |
| 37 | 839
11-30-45 | 1395 | Selection of dispatches sent and received by the Navy Department entitled "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |
| 38 | 841
11-30-45 | 1409 | Paraphrase of message, dated Dec. 3, 1941, from General Miles to Military Attaché, Tokyo, concerning the handling of his codes and secret documents. |
| 39 | 928
12-4-45 | 1409 | Memoranda for the record on events of Dec. 7, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff; Col. W. B. Smith, Secretary, General Staff; Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Col. J. R. Deane, Secretary, General Staff. |
| 40 | 954
12-4-45 | 1412 | Dispatch, dated Dec. 7, 1941, from CinCAF to OPNAV (070645) concerning report of promised armed support to British under certain conditions. |
| 41 | 988
12-5-45 | 1413 | Information from documentary evidence on interception, decoding, and translating of Japanese messages; Nos. 901, 902, 907, 910 (so-called pilot message, 14 part message, 1 o'clock delivery message, and code destruction message). |

| Exhibit No. | Hearings, page and date introduced | Exhibits page No. | Description |
|-------------|------------------------------------|-------------------|--|
| 42 | 990
12-5-45 | 1416 | Copy of Army Regulation No. 10-15, dated Aug. 18, 1936, with amendments up to Dec. 7, 1941, entitled "General Staff—Organization and Duties". |
| 43 | 997
12-5-45 | 1422 | Instructions dated Jan. 27, 1941, of Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff concerning staff conversations to be held with representatives of British Commonwealth. |
| 44 | 1001
12-5-45 | 1423 | Compilation entitled "Copies of Defense Plans", which contains extracts from various basic Army and Navy plans, to illustrate defensive measures contemplated against air attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |
| 45 | 1019
12-5-45 | 1471 | Memorandum, dated Nov. 27, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Far Eastern Situation" and warning messages to outpost commanders. |
| 46 | 1027
12-5-45 | 1472 | Photostatic copies of replies by General MacArthur and General Short to warning messages of Nov. 27, 1941, with routing slip. |
| 47 | 1041
12-5-45 | 1476 | Supplementary documents concerning the Nov. 5, 1941 Marshall-Stark memorandum for the President (see Exhibit No. 16), including dispatch dated Nov. 3, 1941, from Ambassador Gauss to State Department; message dated Nov. 2, 1941, from Chiang Kai-Shek to President Roosevelt; memorandum for Director of Naval Intelligence concerning "Dispatch from Alusna, Chungking, 349859"; dispatch 349859 from Alusna, Chungking, to OPNAV dated Oct. 30, 1941, and another same date, same correspondents; message dated Oct. 28, 1941, from General Magruder, Chungking, to War Department. |
| 48 | 1044
12-5-45 | 1481 | Two memoranda dated Nov. 17, 1941, by Brig. General Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers", and letter dated Dec. 20, 1941, to Gen. Delos C. Emmons, from General Marshall, concerning unity of command in Hawaii. |
| 48-A | 2093
12-31-45 | 1484 | Memorandum, dated Dec. 5, 1941, from General Marshall for General Gerow, concerning coordination of command. |
| 49 | 1053
12-6-45 | 1485 | Report dated Mar. 27, 1941, of United States-British Staff conversations (ABC-1). |
| 50 | 1053
12-6-45 | 1551 | Report of American-Dutch-British Staff conversations at Singapore, dated Apr. 27, 1941 (A. D. B.). |

Continuation of communication between the War Department and General Herring at Hawaii, 1941.
Continuation of communication between the War Department and General Herring at Hawaii, 1941.
(See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)

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| 52 | 1053
12-6-45 | 1593 | Compilation of communications between the War Department and General Herron at Hawaii, concerning 1940 alert of Hawaiian Department. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |
| 53 | 1063
12-6-45 | 1600 | Compilation of correspondence between General Marshall and General Short from Feb. 7 to Oct. 28, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |
| 54 | 1067
12-6-45 | 1627 | "Notes on General Council Meeting", Feb. 19, 1941, concerning "Defense Objectives" (revised Feb. 13, 1941). |
| 55 | 1067
12-6-45 | 1628 | Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff", on Feb. 25, 1941, at which air defense of Pearl Harbor was discussed. |
| 56 | 1076
12-6-45 | 1630 | Memorandum, dated May 13, 1941, concerning "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department" by Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony, for the Chief of Staff. |
| 57 | 1077
12-6-45 | 1631 | Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Secretary of War, May 19, 1941", concerning use of planes in proposed expedition against Martinique, referring to supply of B-17 bombers that were not dispatched to Hawaii. |
| 58 | 1088
12-6-45 | 1632 | List of President's appointments with military representatives from Oct. 1 to Dec. 7, 1941; telephone calls through White House switchboard on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941; White House dinner guests on Dec. 6, 1941; list of President's appointments on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |
| 59 | 1092
12-6-45 | 1635 | General Marshall's aide memoire to the President concerning "Defense of Hawaii". |
| 60 | 1094
12-6-45 | 1636 | General Marshall's memorandum for the President concerning "Ground Forces". |
| 61 | 1112
12-7-45 | 1640 | Photostatic copy of Dec. 7, 1941, warning sent by General Marshall to theater commanders. |
| 62 | 1284
12-10-45 | 1641 | Minutes of The Joint Board meeting, Nov. 26, 1941, at which the situation in the Pacific was discussed. |
| 63 | 1345
12-11-45 | 1644 | Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General in connection therewith. |

| Exhibit No. | Hearings, page and date introduced | Exhibits page No. | Description |
|-------------|------------------------------------|-------------------|---|
| 64 | 1544
12-13-45 | 1645 | Tentative draft of Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, 1941. |
| 65 | 1541
12-13-45 | 1677 | Memorandum, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to Special Navy and Army Observers, London, instructing them to advise British that United States disapproves A. D. B. Report for reasons stated. |
| 66 | 1642
12-15-45 | 1680 | Dispatch, dated Dec. 6, 1941 (061255), from CinCAF to OPNAV, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, by R. E. Schuirmann, for the State Department, relating contents of the dispatch which reported the sighting of Japanese convoys in Far Eastern waters. |
| 67 | 1642
12-15-45 | 1682 | Intercepted messages, dated Aug. 17, 1941, from Japanese Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, repeating the material handed him that date by President Roosevelt after the President's return from the Atlantic Conference (so-called "parallel action message"). |
| 68 | 1675
12-15-45 | 1689 | Log of U. S. S. <i>Boise</i> for period Nov. 25 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and map showing position of the ship on certain dates. |
| 69 | 1677
12-15-45 | 1715 | Table showing scheduled inspections of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November and December 1941. |
| 70 | 1695
12-15-45 | 1716 | Message, dated Aug. 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, concerning the President's statements to the Japanese Ambassador on Aug. 17, 1941. |
| 71 | 1696
12-15-45 | 1719 | Message, dated Aug. 25, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, quoting an extract from radio address of Prime Minister Churchill on Aug. 24, 1941. The extract refers to Japanese policies. |
| 72 | 1696
12-15-45 | 1721 | Dispatch dated Aug. 1, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, and the Ambassador's reply dated Aug. 2, 1941; both concerning the report of Japanese aggression against Thailand; digest of Secretary of State's news conference on Aug. 6, 1941, when he was questioned concerning reports of Japanese aggression against Thailand. |
| 73 | 1700
12-15-45 | 1727 | Three State Department drafts, all dated Oct. 16, 1941, of a proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan, and a memorandum expressing views of officers in the Far Eastern Division of State Department on the matter. No message was sent to the Emperor at that time (fall of the Konoze cabinet in Japan). |

Continued on next page

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| 74 | 1703
12-15-45 | 1735 | Three messages from State Department to Far Eastern offices, advising American citizens to leave the Orient, dated Oct. 6, 1940, Feb. 11, 1941, and Nov. 19, 1941. |
| 74-A | 2768
1-19-46 | 1741 | Memorandum, dated Dec. 4, 1941, from Far Eastern Affairs Division officers to the Secretary of State concerning British suggestion on exchange of nationals with Japanese Government in event of hostilities. |
| 75 | 1705
12-15-45 | 1744 | Three messages, all dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, explaining the delivery of the so-called "Ten Point Note" on that date to the Japanese Ambassadors and their oral comments upon its receipt, and furnishing Ambassador Grew with the text of the note. |
| 76 | 1709
11-15-45 | 1754 | Translation of notes regarding discussion between Adolf Hitler, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, State Minister Meissner, and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin, Apr. 4, 1941, as introduced at the Nuremberg trials on Nov. 23, 1945. |
| 77 | 1712
12-15-45 | 1757 | Message, dated Aug. 31, 1940, from United States Embassy, Peiping, China, to State Department presenting summary of situation in Japan and Manchuria as prepared by A. T. Steele, correspondent for Chicago Daily News, which summary is referred to in Ambassador Grew's message dated Sept. 12, 1940 (Joint Committee Exhibit No. 26), his so-called "green light" dispatch. |
| 78 | 1724
12-17-45 | 1768 | Navy dispatches concerning "Kra Peninsula Alert (1941)". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |
| 79 | 1724
12-17-45 | 1770 | Navy dispatches concerning Netherlands East Indies Alert (1941). (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |
| 80 | 1724
12-17-45 | 1774 | Office of Naval Intelligence "Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations" dated Nov. 1, Nov. 15, and Dec. 1, 1941. |
| 81 | 1724
12-17-45 | 1837 | Selection of Office of Naval Intelligence periodic estimates and memoranda dated from Apr. 17 to Dec. 6, 1941. |
| 82 | 1728
12-17-45 | 1864 | Navy Regulations concerning Duties of Intelligence Division (OP-16). |
| 83 | 1754
12-17-45 | 1866 | Message, dated Dec. 3, 1941 (931850), from OPNAV to CinCAF, CinPAC, COM 14, and COM 16, advising them of instructions Japanese sent on Dec. 2, 1941, to certain consular and diplomatic posts to destroy most of their codes and secret documents. |
| 84 | 1775
12-17-45 | 1867 | Transcript of telephone call on Dec. 3, 1941, between Japanese citizen in Honolulu and person in Tokyo (so-called "Mori telephone call"). |

| Exhibit No. | Hearings, page and date introduced | Exhibits piece No. | Description |
|-------------|------------------------------------|--------------------|--|
| 85 | 1799
12-18-45 | 1870 | Selection of Navy Department memoranda reporting Japanese fleet locations during period Nov. 4 through Dec. 3, 1941. |
| 86 | 1825
12-18-45 | 1901 | Tabulation showing Naval combatant strength of the Axis and Allied Powers as of May 1, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941, in both Atlantic and Pacific Ocean areas. |
| 87 | 1889
12-19-45 | 1907 | Memorandum, dated Dec. 15, 1945, prepared by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, concerning "Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on June 17, 1940", with attached documents referred to therein. |
| 88 | 1912
12-19-45 | 1937 | Sections of document "Organization of the Office of Naval Operations, Oct. 23, 1940", concerning duties of "War Plans Division (OP-12)". |
| 89 | 1938
12-20-45 | 1937 | Memorandum prepared by Gen. L. T. Gerow, regarding the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy "For Defense Against Air Attack in Hawaii". |
| 90 | 2066
12-31-45 | 1941 | Dispatch dated Dec. 18, 1941, from the State Department to the American Legation, Bern, Switzerland, concerning Swiss Government's offer to represent American interest in Japanese-occupied territories, and instructions for closing of diplomatic stations under certain emergencies. |
| 91 | 2067
12-31-45 | 1950 | Dispatches dated Dec. 15, 1941 (2), Feb. 16, 1942, and Mar. 25, 1942, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State Department, relating action taken in Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers, and confidential papers and records after outbreak of hostilities. |
| 92 | 2068
12-31-45 | 1960 | Photostatic copy of pp. 591 to 618, vol. 377, Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, containing statement by Prime Minister Churchill before the House of Commons on Jan. 27, 1942. |
| 93 | 2075
12-31-45 | 1974 | Photostatic copy of p. 2, G-2 Record Section Register of Incoming Cables on Dec. 5, 1941. |
| 94 | 2078
12-31-45 | 1975 | 3 intercepted messages dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, transmitting the so-called "Ten Point Note" which was handed to the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull on that date. |
| 95 | 2091
12-31-45 | 1987 | Memoranda dated July 12, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, concerning his conversation with Admiral J. O. Richardson on July 11, 1940, and a handwritten note by Admiral H. R. Stark. |

Stamley K. Hornbeck, for Under Secretary of the Interior, written, submitted by Stamley K. Hornbeck, 2272 G. Street, Washington, D. C.

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| 96 | 2091
12-31-45 | 1989 | Memorandum dated July 16, 1940, and study "Reflections on Certain Features of the Far Eastern Situation and certain problems of United States Far Eastern Policy, July 4, 1940", attributed to Stanley K. Hornbeck. |
| 97 | 2091
12-31-45 | 2007 | Memorandum dated Sept. 21, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, for Under Secretary Sumner Welles, concerning a Navy proposal for execution of a fleet problem involving simulated attack on the Panama Canal during January 1941, and three related memoranda. |
| 98 | 2093
12-31-45 | 2014 | Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, by Secretary Stimson for the President concerning "Japanese Convoys Movement Toward Indo-China". |
| 99 | 2094
12-31-45 | 2015 | Memorandum dated Sept. 26, 1944, prepared by J. W. Ballantine and M. M. Hamilton, relating their recollection of the delivery of intercepted Japanese messages to Secretary Hull's office by Lieutenant Commander Kramer on the morning of Dec. 7, 1941. |
| 100 | 2095
12-31-45 | 2016 | Transcript of Interrogation on Dec. 8, 1941, of (Japanese) Prisoner of War No. 1, by Naval Intelligence officers at Honolulu, statement by the prisoner, and memorandum concerning "Investigation of Japanese Submarine Aground in Waimanalo Bay". |
| 101 | 2095
12-31-45 | 2023 | Log of U. S. S. <i>Enterprise</i> from Nov. 24 to Dec. 16, 1941, inclusive. |
| 102 | 2095
12-31-45 | 2107 | Log of U. S. S. <i>Lexington</i> from Dec. 5 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive. |
| 103 | 2095
12-31-45 | 2118 | "Report of Action With Japanese Air Force at Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941", by Commander. <i>Enterprise</i> Air Group to his Commanding Officer, dated Dec. 15, 1941. |
| 104 | 2095
12-31-45 | 2122 | "U. S. S. <i>Lexington</i> War Diary" for period Dec. 7 to Dec. 25, 1941, inclusive. |
| 105 | 2096
12-31-45 | 2140 | Certain estimates of Japanese Situation and Intentions as made by British agencies and relayed to this Government during period from Oct. 21, to Nov. 22, 1941. |
| 106 | 2096
12-31-45 | 2144 | Compilation of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral H. E. Kimmel from Jan. 13 to Dec. 12, 1941. |
| 107 | 2849
1-4-46 | 2258 | "Appendix to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Pearl Harbor Investigations", prepared by Navy Department. It contains endorsements by Secretary James Forrestal, Judge Advocate General, Admiral T. L. Gatch, and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, to the Hewitt Report, and endorsements by the same officials to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry's Findings of Fact. |

| Exhibit No. | Hearings, page and date introduced | Exhibits page No. | Description |
|-------------|------------------------------------|-------------------|---|
| 107-A | 2479
1-5-46 | 2393 | "The Findings, Conclusions and Action by the Secretary of the Navy", including the Fourth Endorsement by Secretary Forrestal to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry, and a summary of an offer by the Navy Department of a General Court Martial for Rear Adm. H. E. Kimmel. |
| 108 | 2364
1-4-46 | 2432 | Memorandum, dated Nov. 2, 1944, by Stanley K. Hornbeck attached to his memorandum of Feb. 28, 1944, which related to an attached third memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck dated Nov. 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of situation and certain probabilities", described, by him as "a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been leaks and misrepresentation". |
| 109 | 2476
1-5-46 | 2444 | Guide to Symbols, and series of maps submitted by Admiral R. N. Turner, showing the location of ships Dec. 1 to 6, inclusive, 1941. |
| 110 | 2477
1-5-46 | 2444 | Compilation of letters from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral T. C. Hart, from Feb. 9, 1940, to Nov. 8, 1941. |
| 111 | 2495
1-15-46 | 2457 | Letter dated Dec. 5, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Mr. Wendell Willkie, concerning proposal from Australian Minister for Mr. Willkie to make a trip to Australia, together with related correspondence and memoranda. |
| 112 | 2496
1-15-46 | 2458 | Dispatches and other material referred to in footnotes to Admiral Kimmel's prepared statement before the Joint Committee. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |
| 113 | 2558
1-16-46 | 2502 | Letter, dated Aug. 13, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Task Force Commanders, concerning Employment Schedules, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942, and attached Employment Schedules for Task Forces 1, 2, and 3. |
| 113-A | 2807
1-19-46 | 2532 | Letter, dated Feb. 21, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Commanders, concerning "Battle Organization and Condition Watches". |
| 113-B | 2807
1-19-46 | 2534 | Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14GL-41, dated Oct. 31, 1941, concerning "Task Forces—Organization and Missions". |
| 113-C | 3449
1-31-46 | 2538 | (a) Revised Employment Schedules of Task Force 9, submitted pursuant to Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, together with documents which approve same; (b) Watch and Duty Schedules for Patrol Wing 2 (December 1941). |

1. The following information was obtained from the Bureau of Naval Affairs, Department of the Navy, Washington, D. C., on 12/2/44:

2. The Fleet Administration Office, Fleet Unit: (a) Fourteenth Fleet, (b) Third Fleet, (c) Fifth Fleet, (d) Seventh Fleet, (e) Tenth Fleet, (f) Twelfth Fleet, (g) Thirteenth Fleet, (h) Fourteenth Fleet, (i) Fifteenth Fleet, (j) Sixteenth Fleet, (k) Seventeenth Fleet, (l) Eighteenth Fleet, (m) Nineteenth Fleet, (n) Twentieth Fleet, (o) Twenty-first Fleet, (p) Twenty-second Fleet, (q) Twenty-third Fleet, (r) Twenty-fourth Fleet, (s) Twenty-fifth Fleet, (t) Twenty-sixth Fleet, (u) Twenty-seventh Fleet, (v) Twenty-eighth Fleet, (w) Twenty-ninth Fleet, (x) Thirtieth Fleet, (y) Thirty-first Fleet, (z) Thirty-second Fleet, (aa) Thirty-third Fleet, (ab) Thirty-fourth Fleet, (ac) Thirty-fifth Fleet, (ad) Thirty-sixth Fleet, (ae) Thirty-seventh Fleet, (af) Thirty-eighth Fleet, (ag) Thirty-ninth Fleet, (ah) Fortieth Fleet, (ai) Forty-first Fleet, (aj) Forty-second Fleet, (ak) Forty-third Fleet, (al) Forty-fourth Fleet, (am) Forty-fifth Fleet, (an) Forty-sixth Fleet, (ao) Forty-seventh Fleet, (ap) Forty-eighth Fleet, (aq) Forty-ninth Fleet, (ar) Fiftieth Fleet, (as) Fifty-first Fleet, (at) Fifty-second Fleet, (au) Fifty-third Fleet, (av) Fifty-fourth Fleet, (aw) Fifty-fifth Fleet, (ax) Fifty-sixth Fleet, (ay) Fifty-seventh Fleet, (az) Fifty-eighth Fleet, (ba) Fifty-ninth Fleet, (bb) Sixtieth Fleet, (bc) Sixty-first Fleet, (bd) Sixty-second Fleet, (be) Sixty-third Fleet, (bf) Sixty-fourth Fleet, (bg) Sixty-fifth Fleet, (bh) Sixty-sixth Fleet, (bi) Sixty-seventh Fleet, (bj) Sixty-eighth Fleet, (bk) Sixty-ninth Fleet, (bl) Seventieth Fleet, (bm) Seventy-first Fleet, (bn) Seventy-second Fleet, (bo) Seventy-third Fleet, (bp) Seventy-fourth Fleet, (bq) Seventy-fifth Fleet, (br) Seventy-sixth Fleet, (bs) Seventy-seventh Fleet, (bt) Seventy-eighth Fleet, (bu) Seventy-ninth Fleet, (bv) Eightieth Fleet, (bw) Eighty-first Fleet, (bx) Eighty-second Fleet, (by) Eighty-third Fleet, (bz) Eighty-fourth Fleet, (ca) Eighty-fifth Fleet, (cb) Eighty-sixth Fleet, (cc) Eighty-seventh Fleet, (cd) Eighty-eighth Fleet, (ce) Eighty-ninth Fleet, (cf) Ninetieth Fleet, (cg) Ninety-first Fleet, (ch) Ninety-second Fleet, (ci) Ninety-third Fleet, (cj) Ninety-fourth Fleet, (ck) Ninety-fifth Fleet, (cl) Ninety-sixth Fleet, (cm) Ninety-seventh Fleet, (cn) Ninety-eighth Fleet, (co) Ninety-ninth Fleet, (cp) One hundredth Fleet, (cq) One hundred and first Fleet, (cr) One hundred and second Fleet, (cs) One hundred and third Fleet, (ct) One hundred and fourth Fleet, (cu) One hundred and fifth Fleet, (cv) One hundred and sixth Fleet, (cw) One hundred and seventh Fleet, (cx) One hundred and eighth Fleet, (cy) One hundred and ninth Fleet, (cz) One hundred and tenth Fleet, (da) One hundred and eleventh Fleet, (db) One hundred and twelfth Fleet, (dc) One hundred and thirteenth Fleet, (dd) One hundred and fourteenth Fleet, (de) One hundred and fifteenth Fleet, (df) One hundred and sixteenth Fleet, (dg) One hundred and seventeenth Fleet, (dh) One hundred and eighteenth Fleet, (di) One hundred and nineteenth Fleet, (dj) One hundred and twentieth Fleet, (dk) One hundred and twenty-first Fleet, (dl) One hundred and twenty-second Fleet, (dm) One hundred and twenty-third Fleet, (dn) One hundred and twenty-fourth Fleet, (do) One hundred and twenty-fifth Fleet, (dp) One hundred and twenty-sixth Fleet, (dq) One hundred and twenty-seventh Fleet, (dr) One hundred and twenty-eighth Fleet, (ds) One hundred and twenty-ninth Fleet, (dt) One hundred and thirtieth Fleet, (du) One hundred and thirty-first Fleet, (dv) One hundred and thirty-second Fleet, (dw) One hundred and thirty-third Fleet, (dx) One hundred and thirty-fourth Fleet, (dy) One hundred and thirty-fifth Fleet, (dz) One hundred and thirty-sixth Fleet, (ea) One hundred and thirty-seventh Fleet, (eb) One hundred and thirty-eighth Fleet, (ec) One hundred and thirty-ninth Fleet, (ed) One hundred and fortieth Fleet, (ee) One hundred and forty-first Fleet, (ef) One hundred and forty-second Fleet, (eg) One hundred and forty-third Fleet, (eh) One hundred and forty-fourth Fleet, (ei) One hundred and forty-fifth Fleet, (ej) One hundred and forty-sixth Fleet, (ek) One hundred and forty-seventh Fleet, (el) One hundred and forty-eighth Fleet, (em) One hundred and forty-ninth Fleet, (en) One hundred and fiftieth Fleet, (eo) One hundred and fifty-first Fleet, (ep) One hundred and fifty-second Fleet, (eq) One hundred and fifty-third Fleet, (er) One hundred and fifty-fourth Fleet, (es) One hundred and fifty-fifth Fleet, (et) One hundred and fifty-sixth Fleet, (eu) One hundred and fifty-seventh Fleet, (ev) One hundred and fifty-eighth Fleet, (ew) One hundred and fifty-ninth Fleet, (ex) One hundred and sixtieth Fleet, (ey) One hundred and sixty-first Fleet, (ez) One hundred and sixty-second Fleet, (fa) One hundred and sixty-third Fleet, (fb) One hundred and sixty-fourth Fleet, (fc) One hundred and sixty-fifth Fleet, (fd) One hundred and sixty-sixth Fleet, (fe) One hundred and sixty-seventh Fleet, (ff) One hundred and sixty-eighth Fleet, (fg) One hundred and sixty-ninth Fleet, (fh) One hundred and seventieth Fleet, (fi) One hundred and seventy-first Fleet, (fj) One hundred and seventy-second Fleet, (fk) One hundred and seventy-third Fleet, (fl) One hundred and seventy-fourth Fleet, (fm) One hundred and seventy-fifth Fleet, (fn) One hundred and seventy-sixth Fleet, (fo) One hundred and seventy-seventh Fleet, (fp) One hundred and seventy-eighth Fleet, (fq) One hundred and seventy-ninth Fleet, (fr) One hundred and eightieth Fleet, (fs) One hundred and eighty-first Fleet, (ft) One hundred and eighty-second Fleet, (fu) One hundred and eighty-third Fleet, (fv) One hundred and eighty-fourth Fleet, (fw) One hundred and eighty-fifth Fleet, (fx) One hundred and eighty-sixth Fleet, (fy) One hundred and eighty-seventh Fleet, (fz) One hundred and eighty-eighth Fleet, (ga) One hundred and eighty-ninth Fleet, (gb) One hundred and ninetieth Fleet, (gc) One hundred and ninety-first Fleet, (gd) One hundred and ninety-second Fleet, (ge) One hundred and ninety-third Fleet, (gf) One hundred and ninety-fourth Fleet, (gg) One hundred and ninety-fifth Fleet, (gh) One hundred and ninety-sixth Fleet, (gi) One hundred and ninety-seventh Fleet, (gj) One hundred and ninety-eighth Fleet, (gk) One hundred and ninety-ninth Fleet, (gl) Two hundredth Fleet, (gm) Two hundred and first Fleet, (gn) Two hundred and second Fleet, (go) Two hundred and third Fleet, (gp) Two hundred and fourth Fleet, (gq) Two hundred and fifth Fleet, (gr) Two hundred and sixth Fleet, (gs) Two hundred and seventh Fleet, (gt) Two hundred and eighth Fleet, (gu) Two hundred and ninth Fleet, (gv) Two hundred and tenth Fleet, (gw) Two hundred and eleventh Fleet, (gx) Two hundred and twelfth Fleet, (gy) Two hundred and thirteenth Fleet, (gz) Two hundred and fourteenth Fleet, (ha) Two hundred and fifteenth Fleet, (hb) Two hundred and sixteenth Fleet, (hc) Two hundred and seventeenth Fleet, (hd) Two hundred and eighteenth Fleet, (he) Two hundred and nineteenth Fleet, (hf) Two hundred and twentieth Fleet, (hg) Two hundred and twenty-first Fleet, (hh) Two hundred and twenty-second Fleet, (hi) Two hundred and twenty-third Fleet, (hj) Two hundred and twenty-fourth Fleet, (hk) Two hundred and twenty-fifth Fleet, (hl) Two hundred and twenty-sixth Fleet, (hm) Two hundred and twenty-seventh Fleet, (hn) Two hundred and twenty-eighth Fleet, (ho) Two hundred and twenty-ninth Fleet, (hp) Two hundred and thirtieth Fleet, (hq) Two hundred and thirty-first Fleet, (hr) Two hundred and thirty-second Fleet, (hs) Two hundred and thirty-third Fleet, (ht) Two hundred and thirty-fourth Fleet, (hu) Two hundred and thirty-fifth Fleet, (hv) Two hundred and thirty-sixth Fleet, (hw) Two hundred and thirty-seventh Fleet, (hx) Two hundred and thirty-eighth Fleet, (hy) Two hundred and thirty-ninth Fleet, (hz) Two hundred and fortieth Fleet, (ia) Two hundred and forty-first Fleet, (ib) Two hundred and forty-second Fleet, (ic) Two hundred and forty-third Fleet, (id) Two hundred and forty-fourth Fleet, (ie) Two hundred and forty-fifth Fleet, (if) Two hundred and forty-sixth Fleet, (ig) Two hundred and forty-seventh Fleet, (ih) Two hundred and forty-eighth Fleet, (ii) Two hundred and forty-ninth Fleet, (ij) Two hundred and fiftieth Fleet, (ik) Two hundred and fifty-first Fleet, (il) Two hundred and fifty-second Fleet, (im) Two hundred and fifty-third Fleet, (in) Two hundred and fifty-fourth Fleet, (io) Two hundred and fifty-fifth Fleet, (ip) Two hundred and fifty-sixth Fleet, (iq) Two hundred and fifty-seventh Fleet, (ir) Two hundred and fifty-eighth Fleet, (is) Two hundred and fifty-ninth Fleet, (it) Two hundred and sixtieth Fleet, (iu) Two hundred and sixty-first Fleet, (iv) Two hundred and sixty-second Fleet, (iw) Two hundred and sixty-third Fleet, (ix) Two hundred and sixty-fourth Fleet, (iy) Two hundred and sixty-fifth Fleet, (iz) Two hundred and sixty-sixth Fleet, (ja) Two hundred and sixty-seventh Fleet, (jb) Two hundred and sixty-eighth Fleet, (jc) Two hundred and sixty-ninth Fleet, (jd) Two hundred and seventieth Fleet, (je) Two hundred and seventy-first Fleet, (jf) Two hundred and seventy-second Fleet, (jg) Two hundred and seventy-third Fleet, (jh) Two hundred and seventy-fourth Fleet, (ji) Two hundred and seventy-fifth Fleet, (jj) Two hundred and seventy-sixth Fleet, (jk) Two hundred and seventy-seventh Fleet, (jl) Two hundred and seventy-eighth Fleet, (jm) Two hundred and seventy-ninth Fleet, (jn) Two hundred and eightieth Fleet, (jo) Two hundred and eighty-first Fleet, (jp) Two hundred and eighty-second Fleet, (jq) Two hundred and eighty-third Fleet, (jr) Two hundred and eighty-fourth Fleet, (js) Two hundred and eighty-fifth Fleet, (jt) Two hundred and eighty-sixth Fleet, (ju) Two hundred and eighty-seventh Fleet, (jv) Two hundred and eighty-eighth Fleet, (jw) Two hundred and eighty-ninth Fleet, (jx) Two hundred and ninetieth Fleet, (jy) Two hundred and ninety-first Fleet, (jz) Two hundred and ninety-second Fleet, (ka) Two hundred and ninety-third Fleet, (kb) Two hundred and ninety-fourth Fleet, (kc) Two hundred and ninety-fifth Fleet, (kd) Two hundred and ninety-sixth Fleet, (ke) Two hundred and ninety-seventh Fleet, (kf) Two hundred and ninety-eighth Fleet, (kg) Two hundred and ninety-ninth Fleet, (kh) Two hundredth Fleet, (ki) Two hundred and first Fleet, (kj) Two hundred and second Fleet, (kk) Two hundred and third Fleet, (kl) Two hundred and fourth Fleet, (km) Two hundred and fifth Fleet, (kn) Two hundred and sixth Fleet, (ko) Two hundred and seventh Fleet, (kp) Two hundred and eighth Fleet, (kq) Two hundred and ninth Fleet, (kr) Two hundred and tenth Fleet, (ks) Two hundred and eleventh Fleet, (kt) Two hundred and twelfth Fleet, (ku) Two hundred and thirteenth Fleet, (kv) Two hundred and fourteenth Fleet, (kw) Two hundred and fifteenth Fleet, (kx) Two hundred and sixteenth Fleet, (ky) Two hundred and seventeenth Fleet, (kz) Two hundred and eighteenth Fleet, (la) Two hundred and nineteenth Fleet, (lb) Two hundred and twentieth Fleet, (lc) Two hundred and twenty-first Fleet, (ld) Two hundred and twenty-second Fleet, (le) Two hundred and twenty-third Fleet, (lf) Two hundred and twenty-fourth Fleet, (lg) Two hundred and twenty-fifth Fleet, (lh) Two hundred and twenty-sixth Fleet, (li) Two hundred and twenty-seventh Fleet, (lj) Two hundred and twenty-eighth Fleet, (lk) Two hundred and twenty-ninth Fleet, (ll) Two hundred and thirtieth Fleet, (lm) Two hundred and thirty-first Fleet, (ln) Two hundred and thirty-second Fleet, (lo) Two hundred and thirty-third Fleet, (lp) Two hundred and thirty-fourth Fleet, (lq) Two hundred and thirty-fifth Fleet, (lr) Two hundred and thirty-sixth Fleet, (ls) Two hundred and thirty-seventh Fleet, (lt) Two hundred and thirty-eighth Fleet, (lu) Two hundred and thirty-ninth Fleet, (lv) Two hundred and fortieth Fleet, (lw) Two hundred and forty-first Fleet, (lx) Two hundred and forty-second Fleet, (ly) Two hundred and forty-third Fleet, (lz) Two hundred and forty-fourth Fleet, (ma) Two hundred and forty-fifth Fleet, (mb) Two hundred and forty-sixth Fleet, (mc) Two hundred and forty-seventh Fleet, (md) Two hundred and forty-eighth Fleet, (me) Two hundred and forty-ninth Fleet, (mf) Two hundred and fiftieth Fleet, (mg) Two hundred and fifty-first Fleet, (mh) Two hundred and fifty-second Fleet, (mi) Two hundred and fifty-third Fleet, (mj) Two hundred and fifty-fourth Fleet, (mk) Two hundred and fifty-fifth Fleet, (ml) Two hundred and fifty-sixth Fleet, (mm) Two hundred and fifty-seventh Fleet, (mn) Two hundred and fifty-eighth Fleet, (mo) Two hundred and fifty-ninth Fleet, (mp) Two hundred and sixtieth Fleet, (mq) Two hundred and sixty-first Fleet, (mr) Two hundred and sixty-second Fleet, (ms) Two hundred and sixty-third Fleet, (mt) Two hundred and sixty-fourth Fleet, (mu) Two hundred and sixty-fifth Fleet, (mv) Two hundred and sixty-sixth Fleet, (mw) Two hundred and sixty-seventh Fleet, (mx) Two hundred and sixty-eighth Fleet, (my) Two hundred and sixty-ninth Fleet, (mz) Two hundred and seventieth Fleet, (na) Two hundred and seventy-first Fleet, (nb) Two hundred and seventy-second Fleet, (nc) Two hundred and seventy-third Fleet, (nd) Two hundred and seventy-fourth Fleet, (ne) Two hundred and seventy-fifth Fleet, (nf) Two hundred and seventy-sixth Fleet, (ng) Two hundred and seventy-seventh Fleet, (nh) Two hundred and seventy-eighth Fleet, (ni) Two hundred and seventy-ninth Fleet, (nj) Two hundred and eightieth Fleet, (nk) Two hundred and eighty-first Fleet, (nl) Two hundred and eighty-second Fleet, (nm) Two hundred and eighty-third Fleet, (no) Two hundred and eighty-fourth Fleet, (np) Two hundred and eighty-fifth Fleet, (nq) Two hundred and eighty-sixth Fleet, (nr) Two hundred and eighty-seventh Fleet, (ns) Two hundred and eighty-eighth Fleet, (nt) Two hundred and eighty-ninth Fleet, (nu) Two hundred and ninetieth Fleet, (nv) Two hundred and ninety-first Fleet, (nw) Two hundred and ninety-second Fleet, (nx) Two hundred and ninety-third Fleet, (ny) Two hundred and ninety-fourth Fleet, (nz) Two hundred and ninety-fifth Fleet, (oa) Two hundred and ninety-sixth Fleet, (ob) Two hundred and ninety-seventh Fleet, (oc) Two hundred and ninety-eighth Fleet, (od) Two hundred and ninety-ninth Fleet, (oe) Two hundredth Fleet, (of) Two hundred and first Fleet, (og) Two hundred and second Fleet, (oh) Two hundred and third Fleet, (oi) Two hundred and fourth Fleet, (oj) Two hundred and fifth Fleet, (ok) Two hundred and sixth Fleet, (ol) Two hundred and seventh Fleet, (om) Two hundred and eighth Fleet, (on) Two hundred and ninth Fleet, (oo) Two hundred and tenth Fleet, (op) Two hundred and eleventh Fleet, (oq) Two hundred and twelfth Fleet, (or) Two hundred and thirteenth Fleet, (os) Two hundred and fourteenth Fleet, (ot) Two hundred and fifteenth Fleet, (ou) Two hundred and sixteenth Fleet,

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|-------|-----------------|------|---|
| 114 | 2558
1-16-46 | 2568 | WPac-46, and letters from Admiral Kimmel to his commanders, dated July 21 and July 25, 1941, promulgating WPac-46, which is U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow 5). |
| 115 | 2558
1-16-46 | 2601 | Communications Intelligence Summaries concerning location of Japanese Fleet Units: (a) Fourteenth Naval District Summaries, dated Nov. 1 to Dec. 6, 1941; (b) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer Reports dated Oct. 27 to Dec. 2, 1941; (c) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Memorandum dated Dec. 1, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |
| 115-A | 3449
1-31-46 | 2672 | Fourteenth Naval District "Communication Intelligence Summaries of Dec. 9 and 10, 1941, showing assumed Composition of Japanese Striking Force". |
| 115-B | 3450
1-31-46 | 2677 | Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, dated Nov. 27, 1941. |
| 116 | 2558
1-16-46 | 2700 | Selection of correspondence of Admiral H. R. Stark, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, and others from Feb. 11, 1941, to Oct. 3, 1941, concerning anti-torpedo baffles for protection of ships in harbor against torpedo plane attacks. |
| 117 | 2559
1-16-46 | 2707 | Selection of Army and Navy correspondence from Jan. 16, to Feb. 14, 1941, concerning the air defenses of the Hawaiian Islands. |
| 117-A | 5015
2-20-46 | 2713 | Letter dated Feb. 17, 1941, concerning "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," from Gen. W. C. Short to his Commanders. |
| 118 | 2559
1-16-46 | 2714 | Memoranda, dated Nov. 30 and Dec. 5, 1941, of Admiral Kimmel, entitled "Steps to be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War within Next Twenty-Four Hours". |
| 119 | 2559
1-16-46 | 2716 | Radio Log of Bishop's Point Radio Station, Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941. |
| 120 | 2559
1-16-46 | 2721 | (a) Memorandum dated Dec. 19, 1941, by Admiral Bellinger for Admiral Kimmel concerning "Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of Dec. 7, 1941"; (b) Compilation of dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid drills were held during 1941; (c) Report of Army-Navy Board dated Oct. 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas, Hawaiian area. |
| 121 | 2561
1-16-46 | 2727 | Statement by Admiral H. E. Kimmel and copies of correspondence submitted by him, concerning the circumstances of his retirement by the Navy Department, and related matters. |
| 122 | 2588
1-16-46 | 2735 | Selected correspondence in June and August 1941 of Admiral H. E. Kimmel, Admiral C. C. Bloch, and Gen. W. C. Short concerning aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department. |

| Exhibit No. | Exemptions, page and date introduced | Exhibits page No. | Description |
|-------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------|--|
| 123----- | 2588
1-10-46 | 2736 | Selection of correspondence, memoranda, and dispatches concerning the proposed construction of a combined operating center for Army and Navy in Hawaii from Oct. 29, 1941, to Jan. 7, 1942. |
| 123-A----- | 5015
2-20-46 | 2743 | Additional selection of correspondence and memoranda concerning Joint Operations Centers for Army and Navy from Oct. 17, 1941, to Jan. 10, 1942. (See also Exhibit No. 123.) |
| 124----- | 2674
1-17-46 | 2749 | Intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages between Washington and Tokyo, dated Aug. 18 to Aug. 29, 1941, inclusive, concerning United States-Japanese negotiations and the United States note to Japan dated Aug. 17, 1941. These intercepted messages are additional to those published in Joint Committee Exhibit No. 1. |
| 125----- | 2678
1-17-46 | 2801 | Log of the <i>U. S. S. Wright</i> from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and chart of locations of the ship on Nov. 27 and Dec. 7, 1941. |
| 126----- | 2767
1-19-46 | 2832 | (a) Navy Department General Order No. 143, dated Feb. 3, 1941, entitled "Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States"; (b) excerpts from Navy Regulations, setting forth the general duties of a Commander in Chief; (c) Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions (1941), dated July 14, 1941. |
| 127----- | 2768
1-19-46 | 2867 | Correspondence, memoranda and dispatches concerning the aircraft situation in Hawaii after Dec. 7, 1941. (See also Exhibit No. 112, p. 77, for letter dated Jan. 7, 1942, by Admiral Nimitz on same subject.) |
| 128----- | 2768
1-19-46 | 2870 | Selected correspondence relating to the proposed prosecution of Japanese consular agents in Hawaii, recommended by United States Attorney in Hawaii by letter dated June 4, 1941. |
| 129----- | 2842
1-19-46 | 2875 | Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46), and letter dated May 26, 1941, from Admiral H. R. Stark promulgating the plan. |
| 130----- | 2879
1-21-46 | 2941 | Selection of memoranda and dispatches contained in files of State Department concerning Japanese and United States air reconnaissance in Pacific prior to Dec. 7, 1941, including dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to State Department forwarding note from Japanese Government protesting reported flight of United States planes over Taiwan Nov. 20, 1941, and State Department's reply to Ambassador Grew. |
| 131----- | 2892
1-21-46 | 2943 | Testimony of Admiral H. E. Kimmel before the Roberts Commission, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Army Pearl Harbor Board. |

(a) Navy Department General Order No. 143, dated Feb. 3, 1941, entitled "Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States"; (b) excerpts from Navy Regulations, setting forth the general duties of a Commander in Chief; (c) Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions (1941), dated July 14, 1941.

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|-------|-----------------|------|---|
| 132 | 2917
1-21-46 | 2943 | Selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 7874-7877, Joint Committee Transcript):
(a) Memorandum "Report on Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the American Ambassador, 7:30 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941";
(b) Memorandum "Gist of Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the British Ambassador, 8:00 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941";
(c) Memorandum written by one Matsumoto, Head of Treaty Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "On the Declaration of War against the United States and Great Britain—Meeting of Privy Council, Dec. 8, 1941." |
| 132-A | 5137
2-20-46 | 2946 | Additional selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 13662-13665 Joint Committee Transcript): (a) Diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington which had not been completely intercepted, being Washington to Tokyo Nos. 881, 941, and Tokyo Circular Nos. 2288, 2313 and 2193; (b) Memoranda of three conversations on Aug. 19, 29 and 30, 1941, between German Ambassador Ott and Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda and Vice-Minister Aihara; (c) Memoranda dated Sept. 6 and 13, 1941, concerning basic conditions for a peace settlement between Japan and China; (d) Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, summary of the progress of Japanese-American negotiations. |
| 133 | 2965
1-23-46 | 2953 | Statement by Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attacks Dec. 7, 1941, introduced at his request. Identical with exhibit he introduced before Roberts Commission and Army Pearl Harbor Board. |
| 134 | 2965
1-23-46 | 3124 | Dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from War Department to Gen. W. C. Short, concerning reinforcement of advance Pacific bases, and five charts and Bureau of the Census publication on the Population characteristics of Hawaii used by General Short in his prepared statement before the Joint Committee. |
| 135 | 2965
1-23-46 | 3171 | Compiled summary of evidence concerning time of sending and receipt of War Department warning messages of Nov. 27-28, 1941, and replies thereto, together with photostatic copies of the messages. |
| 136 | 2966
1-23-46 | 3187 | Memorandum dated Nov. 14, 1941, by Lt. Col. C. A. Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, concerning operation of radar equipment during recent military exercises, and attached transmitting memorandum for Special Assistant to Secretary of War. |
| 137 | 2966
1-23-46 | 3187 | Four original reports concerning training and operations time schedules of radar stations, Hawaiian Department, from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and related material. |
| 138 | 2976
1-23-46 | 3195 | Photostatic copy of memorandum bearing approval of Gen. W. C. Short of report prepared by Gen. F. L. Martin dated Aug. 20, 1941, entitled "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii". (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 13.) |

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|-----|-----------------|------|---|
| 146 | 3929
2-7-46 | 3332 | Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, convened by the Secretary of the Navy pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 32 and 33.) |
| 147 | 3929
2-7-47 | 3332 | Proceedings of Investigation conducted by Col. Carter W. Clarke, U. S. Army, Sept. 14, 15, and 16, 1944, and continued from July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945. (See Part No. 34.) |
| 148 | 3929
2-7-46 | 3332 | Report of Investigation during the period Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945, conducted by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, A. U. S., for the Secretary of War, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. (See Part No. 35.) |
| 149 | 3929
2-7-46 | 3332 | Proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., pursuant to precept dated May 2, 1945, of the Secretary of the Navy, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (See Parts Nos. 36 through 38.) |
| 150 | 4083
2-8-46 | 3333 | Letter dated Mar. 18, 1944, from Admiral H. E. Kimmel, retired, to Admiral W. E. Halsey, suggesting questions for Comdr. A. D. Kramer concerning the so-called "winds" message. |
| 151 | 4421
2-13-46 | 3335 | Six memoranda prepared by Capt. L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, during May, June, and July, 1945 in connection with the inquiry conducted by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, concerning intercepted Japanese messages. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |
| 152 | 4794
2-18-46 | 3351 | Memorandum dated Dec. 23, 1941, "General Observations of Damage by Projectiles in the City of Honolulu on Dec. 7, 1941", prepared by employees of the Honolulu Board of Water Supply, and a map of the city of Honolulu, T. H., showing points struck by projectiles, Dec. 7, 1941. |
| 153 | 5009
2-19-46 | 3353 | Prepared statement dated Dec. 1, 1945 entitled "The War Record of Civilian and Industrial Hawaii", with attached Exhibits, submitted to the Joint Committee by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association. |
| 154 | 5013
2-20-46 | 3430 | Compilation of selected correspondence between Gen. H. H. Arnold and Gen. F. L. Martin from Aug. 15 to Nov. 27, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |
| 155 | 5068
2-20-46 | 3435 | Original Radar Plot of Detector Station OPANA, Dec. 7, 1941. |
| 156 | 5122
2-20-46 | 3436 | Memorandum dated June 21, 1941 prepared by Col. Moses W. Pettigrew concerning "Final Recommendations Far Eastern Intelligence Organization". |
| 157 | 5201
4-11-46 | 3441 | Reports, findings, and conclusions of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements. (See Part No. 39.) |

| Exhibit No. | Hearings, page and date introduced | Exhibits page No. | Description |
|-------------|------------------------------------|-------------------|---|
| 158 | 5201
4-11-46 | 3441 | Compilation of selected documents obtained from State Department files relating to United States-British Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |
| 159 | 5201
4-11-46 | 3488 | Compilation of selected material obtained from State Department files relating to United States-Chinese Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |
| 160 | 5240
4-11-46 | 3502 | Transcript of remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 8:30 (p. m.) and continuing at 9 o'clock with legislative leaders, on Dec. 7, 1941. |
| 161 | 5241
4-11-46 | 3508 | Drafts of Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson of a proposed message for the President to deliver to Congress on the state of relations with the Japanese Government. (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 19 for final draft by Secretary Hull.) |
| 161-A | 5464
5-23-46 | 3520 | Draft of a proposed message to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains suggestions made in the memoranda by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, as shown in exhibit No. 161. |
| 162 | 5269
4-11-46 | 3534 | Log of the Watch Officer, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, from 1145, Dec. 6, 1941, to 2000, Dec. 7, 1941. |
| 162-A | 5464
5-23-46 | 3543 | Naval communications referred to by serial numbers in Log of the Watch Officer, as shown in exhibit No. 162. |
| 163 | 5292
4-11-46 | 3557 | Log of the U. S. S. <i>Helena</i> from Nov. 26 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive. |
| 164 | 5292
4-11-46 | 3593 | Reports made by Gen. W. C. Short and his subordinate officers to the War Department concerning the attack on Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941. |
| 165 | 5292
4-11-46 | 3643 | Copy of a partial translation of a document relating to a Feb. 23, 1941, conference between German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima. |
| 166 | 5468
5-23-46 | 3648 | State Department dispatch No. 5682 dated Dec. 5, 1941, to the American Embassy in London. (This dispatch is mentioned in American Embassy, London, dispatch No. 5923 dated Dec. 6, 1941, to State Department, which appears in exhibit No. 21.) |

[illegible]

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| 167 | 5468
5-23-46 | 3652 | (a) State Department file copy of document handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassador on Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note); (b) State Department statement to the press on Nov. 26, 1941, relating to the delivery of (a); (c) State Department Press Release No. 585, dated Dec. 7, 1941, concerning the delivery and text of (a); and (d) memorandum dated Dec. 2, 1941, concerning President Roosevelt's remarks at his press conference that date, relating to delivery of (a) and general Far East matters. |
| 168 | 5468
5-23-46 | 3666 | Compilation of documents from State Department files which are dated in November and December 1941, concerning a proposed <i>modus vivendi</i> , which documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 18. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |
| 169 | 5469
5-23-46 | 3696 | Compilation of documents relating to conversations between State Department officials and representatives of the Thailand Government, between Aug. 6 and Dec. 8, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |
| 170 | 5469
5-23-46 | 3789 | Compilation of documents from War Department files concerning the retirement of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) These documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 140. |
| 171 | 5469
5-23-46 | 3942 | Compilation of documents from Navy Department files concerning the retirement of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |
| 172 | 5469
5-23-46 | 3978 | Compilations made by War and Navy Departments of data concerning airplanes and antiaircraft guns produced and their distribution from Feb. 1 to Nov. 30, 1941. |
| 173 | 5469
5-23-46 | 3985 | Memoirs of Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister of Japan, and related documents. |
| 174 | 5469
5-23-46 | 4030 | Compilation of miscellaneous documents from State Department files. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |
| 175 | 5470
5-23-46 | 4115 | Memorandum from Secretary of Navy dated Dec. 5, 1941 and letter from Secretary of War dated Dec. 6, 1941, submitting estimates concerning Japanese forces in Indochina and adjacent areas, to the Secretary of State for delivery to the President, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Secretary of State for the President. |
| 176 | 5470
5-23-46 | 4121 | Compilation of location of United States naval forces in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East, also foreign naval forces in the Pacific and Far East, as of Dec. 7, 1941. |
| 177 | 5470
5-23-46 | 4132 | Compilation of State Department documents dated in 1939, concerning a proposal made by former Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma for United States-Japanese understanding. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |

| Exhibit No. | Hearings, page and date introduced | Exhibits page No. | Description |
|-------------|------------------------------------|-------------------|---|
| 178 | 5470
5-23-46 | 4209 | Compilation of documents from Ambassador Joseph C. Grew to the President and the State Department, and attached memoranda. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) |
| 179 | 5470
5-23-46 | 4241 | Miscellaneous documents from the files of the late President F. D. Roosevelt, as furnished to the Committee, concerning Far East matters. |
| 180 | 5471
5-23-46 | 4551 | Organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington, D. C., and Hawaii, as of Dec. 7, 1941. |
| 181 | 5520
5-23-46 | 4565 | The United States News, extra number, Sept. 1, 1945, publishing reports of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry, and related documents. |
| 182 | 5537
5-23-46 | 4702 | Compilation of military intelligence estimates, prepared by G-2, War Department, for period Jan. 1 to July 1, 1941. |
| 183 | 5468
5-23-46 | 4766 | Material compiled at request of Senator Ferguson by letter dated May 20, 1946, to Committee counsel (p. 5464), including data concerning the test bombing of the <i>Uta</i> by the Army Air Corps in 1937, and data concerning the program of the Army Air Corps for 1940-45 production of B-17 4-engine bombers. |

178 179 180 181 182 183
 5470 5470 5471 5520 5537 5468
 5-23-46 5-23-46 5-23-46 5-23-46 5-23-46 5-23-46
 4209 4241 4551 4565 4702 4766

EXHIBIT NO. 44**COPIES OF DEFENSE PLANS***Contents**Item*

1. Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Orange (1938)
2. Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 1
3. Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5
4. Extracts from War Department Operations Plan—Rainbow No. 5
5. Extracts from Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision 1940
6. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaii
7. Annex No. VII to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaii
8. Joint Air Estimate, Hawaii (Martin-Bellinger Agreement)
9. 5 November 1941 Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department
10. Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security), Hawaiian Department
11. Extracts from Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5
12. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 20L-41 (Revised)—Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas
13. Operations Plan No. 1-41. Headquarters, Naval Base Defense Force, Fourteenth Naval District

[1] EXTRACTS FROM JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—ORANGE (1938)**SECTION I—DIRECTIVE**

This JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—ORANGE—shall constitute the basis upon which all Army Plans—ORANGE, all Navy Plans—ORANGE, all Joint Plans—ORANGE, and all supporting allocations for an ORANGE war shall be formulated and developed.

SECTION II—ASSUMPTIONS

This Plan is applicable to any probable situation between UNITED STATES and ORANGE which requires action by the armed forces. The character of the particular situation that may arise cannot be predicted, but in general it may be assumed that—

1. There will be a period of strained relations preceding the outbreak of war with ORANGE, during which period preparatory measures prior to mobilization can be taken.

2. Active hostilities against the UNITED STATES by ORANGE will be precipitated without a formal declaration of war.

3. The superiority of the UNITED STATES naval strength over that of ORANGE will be adequate to permit operations by the UNITED STATES FLEET to the westward of OAHU; and any assistance which may be given to ORANGE or to the UNITED STATES by other powers will not materially reduce this superiority.

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[2] SECTION IV—MISSIONS

1. *Joint Mission for the Armed Forces.*—To defeat ORANGE by operations against ORANGE armed forces and communications, while conserving the resources of the UNITED STATES and protecting UNITED STATES' territory, sea communications, and interests.

2. *Mission for the Army.*—To defend the Continental UNITED STATES and its overseas possessions; to provide for contingencies which may arise from either foreign intervention or the ultimate exigencies of the Joint Mission, and to support the Navy.

3. *Mission for the Navy.*—To defeat ORANGE forces, interrupt ORANGE sea communications, protect UNITED STATES' sea communications and UNITED STATES' interests abroad, and to support the Army.

SECTION V—JOINT DECISIONS

2. COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE.

b. *HAWAIIAN Coastal Frontier*—(1) *Boundaries.*—The HAWAIIAN Coastal Frontier consists of OAHU and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of OAHU.

[3] (2) *Category of Defense.*—Category D, as defined in Section III, Chapter V, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935."

(3) *Missions*—(a) *Joint Mission.*—To hold OAHU as a main outlying Naval Base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

(b) *Mission for the Army.*—To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the Naval forces.

(c) *Mission for the Navy.*—To patrol the coastal zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Armed forces.

(4) *Forces*—(a) *Army Forces.*—The peace garrison, augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by initial reinforcements of about 25,000 troops from Continental UNITED STATES. The reinforcements from Continental UNITED STATES will be those so designated in the Concentration Plan of the Army Strategical Plan—ORANGE.

[4] (b) *Naval Forces.*—(i) Naval Local Defense Forces of the 14th Naval District, augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements to a total of about 7,000 individuals, as provided for in the Navy Basic War Plan—ORANGE.

(ii) In time of Peace, the major part of the submarine and Naval air forces based on PEARL HARBOR will be retained in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS whenever the UNITED STATES FLEET is not in the Eastern PACIFIC.

(5) *Joint Plan to be Prepared.* Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.

SECTION VI—SUPPORTING MEASURES

1. TIME OF EXECUTION.

M-Day is the first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execution of this JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—ORANGE. M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of this Plan prior to M-Day.

EXTRACTS FROM JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—RAINBOW No. 1¹

SECTION VI—TASKS

Joint Tasks

7. Joint Task

HOLD OAHU AS A MAIN OUTLYING NAVAL BASE AND CONTROL AND PROTECT SHIPPING IN THE COASTAL ZONE.

Joint Decisions

a. *Boundaries.* The Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of Oahu.

b. *Category of Defense:* Category D, as defined in Section III, Chapter V, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935."

c. *Army Task:* To hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the Naval forces.

¹ Approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy 14 August 1939, verbally by the President 14 October 1939; revised by the Joint Board 10 April 1940.

d. Navy Task: To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army Forces.

f. Joint Plan to be Prepared: Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.

[2] SECTION VII—JOINT DECISIONS FOR SUPPORTING MEASURES

2. *Time of Execution.*—M-Day is the first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execution of this Plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war or the occurrence of hostile acts. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of this Plan prior to M-Day.

EXTRACTS FROM JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5¹

SECTION VII—TASKS

The Pacific Area

33. *Army Tasks.*

d. In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense Command Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

35. *Navy Tasks.*

f. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area.

g. Defend Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Wake, Samoa and Guam.

h. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

47. *Categories of Defense.*

| | |
|----------------------------------|------------|
| Hawaiian Coastal Frontier..... | Category D |
| Philippine Coastal Frontier..... | Category E |
| Midway, Johnston, Palmyra..... | Category D |
| Guam | Category E |

[2] SECTION IX.—SUPPORTING MEASURES

53. *Time of Execution.* M-Day is the time origin for the execution of this Plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war or the occurrence of hostile acts. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of this Plan prior to M-Day.

Annex I. Coastal Frontiers

Reference: (a) Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.

1. For purposes of this Plan, this ANNEX I to Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5 temporarily amends Section IV of reference (a), as indicated herein.

¹ Approved by the Secretary of the Navy, 28 May 1941, and by the Secretary of War, 2 June 1941.

2. Change paragraph 33 of reference (a) to read:

"33. Joint Organization and command.

"a. Coastal divisions with geographical coterminous boundaries within which an Army officer and a Naval officer will exercise command over the Army forces and the Navy forces, respectively, assigned for the defense of these divisions, have been established in order to provide a joint organization and to ensure the effective coordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense. These coastal divisions comprise coastal frontiers, sectors, and sub-sectors. The system of coastal frontiers includes certain outlying land, island and sea areas, as well as the coasts of continental United States. The joint organization, together with the commanders responsible for the execution of security measures on and after M-day and the necessary peacetime planning therefor, are stated below.

NOTE: The preceding subparagraph, for purposes of this plan, modifies Chapter V, paragraph 28 a, Section 1, of reference (a).

"b. A Defense Command is a geographical area within which an Army officer is responsible for the coordination or preparation, and for the execution of all plans for the employment of Army forces and installations lying within the command boundaries; where pertinent, a Defense Command includes one or more coastal frontiers and may include isolated localities. (See map attached showing defense commands in continental United States.)

[3] "c. Normally a naval coastal frontier includes the coastal zone adjacent to the coastal frontier. In certain cases, two naval coastal frontiers may be included in coastal frontier; in other cases the naval coastal frontier includes waters which extend beyond the limits of the coastal frontier.

"d. The provisions of ABC-22 may prescribe the extension of the North Atlantic coastal frontier and the Pacific coastal frontier to include part of the territory and coastal waters of Canada.

"e. Coordination between Army and Navy forces in coastal frontier operations shall be by the method of mutual cooperation, subject to the provisions of paragraph 9 b."

9. Insert in reference (a), the following new paragraphs:

"36A. Hawaiian coastal frontier.

"a. Boundaries.

The Hawaiian coastal frontier consists of Oahu, and all of the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef.

"b. Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Navy.—The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Hawaiian naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment, in cooperation with the Army."

[1] EXTRACTS FROM WAR DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS PLAN RAINBOW NO. 5¹

SECTION VII—MISSIONS AND FORCES

30. Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

a. Extent.

OAHU and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of OAHU.

b. Category of Defense: D (as defined in Section III, Chapter V, J. A. A. & N., 1935).

c. Missions.

(1) Joint—Hold OAHU as a main outlying Naval base and control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

¹ Approved by the Chief of Staff, 19 August 1941.

(2) Army—Hold OAHU against attacks by land, sea, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers. Support Naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

(3) Navy—Patrol the Coastal Zone; control and protect shipping therein; support the Army.

[2] SECTION VIII—GENERAL PROVISIONS AND NAVAL SUPPORTING MEASURES

40. *General Provisions.*

a. *How put into effect.*

This plan or any portion thereof will be put into effect on orders of the War Department.

b. *Chemical Warfare.*

All necessary precautions will be made for the use of chemicals from the outbreak of hostilities; but the use of toxic agents is prohibited unless and until authorized by the War Department.

c. *Active Air Defense Measures, Continental United States.*

(1) *Responsibility*—The Chief of the Army Air Forces, under GHQ, is responsible for so much of the active air defense of the continental United States as includes planning and execution of operations of air, antiaircraft artillery, balloon barrage units and aircraft warning service, except:

(a) Local defense by ground units with their organic weapons against low-flying aircraft;

(b) When the War Department, to meet an actual or threatened invasion, activates a Theater of Operations (or similar command) in the United States or contiguous territory for the combined employment of air forces and ground arms (other than antiaircraft artillery) the commander of the theater (or similar command) will be responsible for all air defense measures in his theater.

(2) *Mission*—The air defense mission is stated in terms of priority of areas vital to national security under varying strategic conditions. Other localities or installations not named are not excluded from defense measures but are of less national importance.

(a) Condition A: No threat to vital installations on the West Coast. Hostile aerial raids probable against vital installations on the Atlantic Coast.

1st Priority: New York-Philadelphia Area.

2d Priority: Baltimore-Washington-Norfolk Area.

3d Priority: Boston-Narragansett Area.

(b) Condition A (1): Same as A except that threat appears to be localized in North Atlantic.

Priorities as in (a) above.

[3] (c) Condition B: No threat against vital installations on the East Coast. Hostile aerial raids probable against vital installations on any part of Pacific Coast.

1st Priority: Los Angeles-San Diego Area.

2d Priority: Puget Sound Area.

3d Priority: San Francisco Area.

(d) Condition B (1): Same as B except that threat appears to be localized in Puget Sound-San Francisco Area.

1st Priority: Puget Sound Area.

2d Priority: San Francisco Area.

3d Priority: Los Angeles-San Diego Area.

(e) Condition B (2): Same as B except that threat appears to be localized in San Francisco-San Diego Area.

1st Priority: Los Angeles-San Diego Area.

2d Priority: San Francisco Area.

3d Priority: Puget Sound Area.

(f) Condition C: Threat to vital installations equally divided between the East and West Coasts.

1st Priority: New York-Philadelphia Area.

2d Priority: Los Angeles-San Diego Area.

3d Priority: Baltimore-Washington-Norfolk Area.

4th Priority: Puget Sound Area.

5th Priority: Boston Area.

6th Priority: San Francisco Area.

(3) *Forces:*

See Sections 1 and 2, Table II, Annex II, Concentration Tables. The Chief of the Army Air Force or subordinates designated by him will exercise command functions over all mobile and fixed Aircraft Warning units in continental United States, and over such other forces as are allocated for air defense except as otherwise indicated in subparagraph (1) above.

(4) The Chief of the Army Air Force will render such assistance and advice as may be practicable to communities, installations, military or naval forces not under his command regarding weaknesses and improvements in the air raid precautions system. For this purpose he is authorized to consult directly with the authorities concerned.

d. Logistics.

For details relative to mobilization, concentration, embarkation, administration, military government of occupied territory, intelligence, organization, training, supply, and evacuation, see Concentration Plan and Annex III—Logistics to this Operations Plan.

[1] EXTRACTS FROM HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECT, REVISION 1940

SECTION II—BRIEF ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. *a. Missions.*

(1) *Joint Mission:* To hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

(2) *Mission for the Army:* To hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces against hostile sympathizers; and to support the naval forces.

(3) *Mission for the Navy:* To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces. (Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan-Orange).

b. Category of Coastal Frontier Defense: Category "D" defense, prescribed by the War Department for this department, assumes the possibility, but not the probability, of a major attack. Defense measures specified envision the employment of seacoast, air, and antiaircraft elements, and the use of a general reserve. (Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935).

d. Forms of hostile attacks. The basis of the forms of attack listed below is the War Department assignment of Category "D" to this Department.

(1) Possible enemy attacks against the OAHU area in the order of probability are:

(a) Submarine—torpedo and mine.

(b) Sabotage.

(c) Disguised merchant ship attack by blocking channels, by mines, or by air or surface craft.

(d) Air raids, carrier based.

(e) Surface ship raids.

(f) Major combined attack in the absence of the U. S. Fleet.

[2] (2) *Sabotage and Internal Dissension.*

(a) It is believed that the Orange population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, in event of war, will divide itself as follows:

(1) Loyal to the United States. This group will certainly include some American citizens of Japanese origin.

(2) Passive until developments indicate definitely the probable victor, when it will join that side. This group will probably include a fair proportion of the aliens and many citizens.

(3) Loyal to Orange (to extent of sabotage and other subversive actions). This group will probably be small, although formidable.

5. *a. Basis for Planning.*

(1) *Missions and Conditions.*

(a) All defense plans of Oahu will be based upon the following conditions: The currently assigned category of defense will be Category D (see par.

1 b).

The defense of Oahu will be joint defense by Army and Navy forces under the missions as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange (see par. 1 a).

(b) Possible and Probable War Situations are:

(1) That sea lanes from continental United States to Hawaii are open and, that the garrison of Hawaii will be reinforced from continental United States.

(2) That the most probable form of attack is a surprise attack consisting of raids, and bombardments by ships' fire and air forces, and action by local sympathizers.

[3] (3) That the sea lanes from continental United States will be closed and that there may be an attack by a major expeditionary force. From the War Department point of view, this contingency is so remote that it will make no additional allowances of either men or reserves to meet it. This is commonly referred to as the "cut-off from the Mainland situation".

(4) The latter contingency forms the basis for our training, as being all inclusive and providing maximum reality for the troops during their training.

b. *Conclusion.*—To adopt a defense plan adequate initially, to meet an enemy's maximum effort. This plan is outlined in the next paragraph.

c. Scheme of defense, command organization, and missions assigned to major echelons upon initial deployment:

(1) The defense of Oahu combines an air, naval, antiaircraft, seacoast and beach and land defense, together with the supervision and utilization of civilian activities and utilities and, under martial law, their control. To effectively accomplish this defense, particularly when its elements must be controlled simultaneously, the Department Commander decentralizes his command function by assignment of definite missions of responsibility to major echelon commanders, as follows:

(a) *To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Division:*

The beach and land defense of Oahu. (For details, see paragraph 6).

The beach and land defense is based upon the principle of the "position in readiness", which permits concentration of forces in critical areas and assures flexibility to meet external and internal attacks.

(b) *To Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade:*

The antiaircraft and seacoast defense of Oahu and in addition furnishing the necessary support to the beach and land defense and the naval forces. (See paragraph 6.)

[4] (c) *To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force:*

In carrying out the air defense, he may conduct independent operations or may operate in conjunction with, supported by, or in support of naval air forces, or temporarily under the direction of the Naval Air Force Commander as provided in Chapter II, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, and will cooperate with all forces in direct defense of Oahu.

* * * * *

[1]

Headquarters
Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.
11 April 1941

Headquarters
Fourteenth Naval District,
Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, T. H.
11 April 1941

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN—HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT SECTION I^a—DIRECTIVES

1. *Responsibility.* This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is prepared, under the direction of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

2. *Basis.* This plan is based on Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan RAINBOW No. 1, and Section V, page 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935 and will constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans are based.

3. *Method of coordination.* The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined that

in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9 b.

4. *Planning representatives.* The Assistant Chief of Staff for War Planning (G-3) Headquarters Hawaiian department, and the War Plans Officer, Headquarters Fourteenth Naval District, are designated as planning representatives respectfully for the Army and Navy Commanders in the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. (Par. 40 a, page 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.)

5. *Joint planning committee.* A Local Joint Planning Committee is established to consist of the Chiefs of Staff, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District and such other Army and Navy Officers as may be appointed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (Section VI, page 133, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935). The Joint Planning Committee shall take cognizance of all matters affecting joint coordination in all subsidiary Plans or Projects constituting the Joint Defense Plans, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. The senior member thereof is authorized to designate such standing or special sub-committees as from time to time may be necessary.

[2]

SECTION II—DELIMITATION OF AREAS

6. *Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.* "The Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of Oahu."

It has been determined that the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consists of land and sea areas bounded by arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at Opana Point, Maui; Kauiki Head Light, Maui; Laupahoehoe Light, Hawaii; Cape Kumukahi Light, Hawaii; Kalae Light, Hawaii; Southwest Headland, Kahoolawe; Leahi Point, Niihau; Lehua Island, Niihau; Kailu Point, Kauai; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at Kahuku Point, Oahu, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named.

7. *Hawaiian Coastal Zone.* The Hawaiian Coastal Zone comprises the waters of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

8. *Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.* The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier comprises the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier plus the areas bounded by the territorial waters of Midway Island, Johnson Island, Palmyra Island, Canton Island, and Wake Island.

9. *Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone.* The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone comprises the Hawaiian Coastal Zone plus the territorial waters of Midway Island, Johnston Island, Palmyra Island, Canton Island, and Wake Island.

10. *Hawaiian Defensive Sea Areas.* WPL-8, paragraph 2201, defines Defensive Sea Areas as of two kinds. In the Fourteenth Naval District of the first kind—2201.a.1 of WPL-8—is the Defensive Sea Area of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier approved by the Joint Board, Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy and will be made effective by proclamation. Defensive Sea Areas of the second kind—2201.a.2. of WPL-8—have been established by executive order for Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe.

(1) *Defensive Sea Area of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.* The Defensive Sea Area of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier includes all waters within an area bounded as follows:

By arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at Opana Point, Maui; Kauiki Head Light, Maui; Laupahoehoe Light, Hawaii; Cape Kumukahi Light, Hawaii; Kalae Light, Hawaii; Southwest Headland, Kahoolawe; Leahi Point, Niihau; Lehua Island, Niihau; Kailu Point, Kauai; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at Kahuku Point, Oahu, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named. This area when made effective will be given the short title—Hawaiian D. S. A.

(2) *Pearl Harbor—Defensive Sea Area.* The Pearl Harbor—Defensive Sea Area comprises: The area of water in Pearl Harbor lying between extreme high water mark and the sea, and in an about the entrance channel to said harbor within an area bounded by the extreme high water mark at the bearing south true from the southwestern corner of the Puuloa Naval Reservation, a line bearing south true from Ahua Point Light, and a line bearing west true from a point three (3) nautical miles due south true from Ahua Point Lighthouse. This area is given the short title—Pearl D. S. A.

(3) *Kaneohe Bay—Defensive Sea Area.* The Kaneohe Bay—Defensive Sea Area comprises: All waters enclosed by lines drawn as follows: A line bearing northeast true extending three miles from Kaolo Point, a line bearing northeast true extending four (4) nautical miles from Kapoho Point, and a line joining the seaward extremities of the two above-described bearing lines. This area is given the short title—Kaneohe D. S. A.

(4) *Palmyra, Kingman Reef, Johnston, Midway, and Wake—Defensive Sea Areas.* These defensive sea areas comprise: Territorial waters surrounding the islands from high water marks to a distance of three (3) nautical miles from these marks.

11. *Oahu Defensive Coastal Area.* The Defensive Coastal Area for Oahu comprises all water areas within the area of circles and the connecting tangents drawn with points as centers and with respective radii, as follows:

Keahi Point—Forty-nine thousand (49,000) yards.

Puu Kapolei—Forty-five thousand (45,000) yards.

Kahuku Point } Twenty-three thousand (23,000) yards.
Puukiki Station }

This area is given the short title—Oahu D. C. A.

SECTION III—ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION—TASKS AND FORCES

12. *Category of Defense.* Category "D", as defined in Section III, Chapter V, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.

13. The estimate of the situation applicable to the respective forces is found in Estimate of the Situation, Hawaiian Department, and Estimate of the Situation, Fourteenth Naval District, Rainbow No. 1.

14. Tasks.

a. *Joint task.* To hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

b. *Army Task.* To hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

c. *Navy task.* To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces.

[4] a. *Army Forces.* The present garrison augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements from Continental United States as provided for in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 1.

b. *Naval Forces.* Naval Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District, augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements as provided for in the Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 1.

c. *Overseas Reinforcements.* (1) Army garrisons and Naval Local Defense Forces in the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier will be reinforced at the earliest possible date; to the extent practicable, this will be done prior to M-Day.

(2) M-Day is the first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execution of this plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of their respective plans prior to M-Day. Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.

d. *Civil Organization.* A Civil Organization, under the supervision of Army authorities, and in consultation and accord with Navy authorities, to organize the Territory of Hawaii for war, utilizing all personnel and material resources of the Territory of Hawaii in assisting the military and naval forces.

SECTION IV—DECISIONS

16. General.

a. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to provide for the needs of the defense of Oahu in accordance with the tasks, paragraph 14 above, and submit these plans to the War and Navy Departments, respectively.

b. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans for the execution of the tasks given in paragraph 14 above, these plans to include initial deployment and assignment of reinforcements when received.

[5] c. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in consultation and accord with the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans

for the Mobilization of man-power and material resources in the Territory of Hawaii and their allocation to the Army and Navy forces in the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier in accordance with the detailed agreements covered under Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document.

d. Army and Navy subordinate tasks are assigned in accordance with Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, listed respectively, in paragraphs 17 and 19.

17. *Army.* The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, shall provide for:

a. The beach and land, seacoast and antiaircraft defense of Oahu with particular attention to the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and naval forces present thereat, Honolulu Harbor, city of Honolulu, and the Schofield Barracks-Wheeler Field-Lualualei area. The increasing importance of the Kaneohe area is recognized.

b. An antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.

c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces.

d. Defense of installations on Oahu vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, except within naval establishments.

e. Defense against sabotage within the Hawaiian Islands, except within naval shore establishments.

f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the Oahu D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18 a.), and an aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the Hawaiian Islands.

g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea conducted within range of Army bombers.

h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided for in paragraph 18. e.

i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordinated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intelligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by "Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940."

[6] j. An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the Hawaiian Islands.

k. Counter-espionage within the Hawaiian Islands.

l. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the Hawaiian Islands.

m. Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the Hawaiian Islands.

o. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the Hawaiian Islands.

p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the civil population.

18. *Navy.* The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, shall provide for:

a. An inshore patrol.

b. An offshore patrol.

c. An escort force.

d. An attack force.

e. Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of Pearl and Honolulu Harbors.

f. Installation and operation of an underwater defense for Pearl and Honolulu Harbors. (Hydro-acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and installed probably will be under cognizance of the Army.)

g. Support of Army forces in the Oahu-D. C. A. and installation of submarine mine fields in the defense of the Oahu-D. C. A. as may be deemed necessary and practicable.

h. Sweeping channels and mine fields.

i. Distant reconnaissance.

j. Attacking enemy naval forces.

k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval shore establishments.

[7] l. In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 i, a local communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence.

m. Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counter-espionage, for the collection, evaluation, dissemination of hostile information.

o. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.

p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities pertaining thereto.

SECTION V—MOBILIZATION

19. Mobilization Plans.

a. General.

(1) Mobilization plans to be prepared under directives of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 1, will provide for the maximum possible effort to include the variant plan for the possible situation of a cutoff from the Mainland.

(2) The mobilization plans will present the detailed utilization of the man-power and material resources of the Hawaiian Islands, as well as of the reinforcements to be received from the Mainland.

(3) Mobilization plans will provide that, where facilities do not exist for the defense of Oahu, all work possible under current appropriations will be done to prepare them so that M-Day operation will be possible.

b. Army Plans. The mobilization plans to be prepared for the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, will provide for—

(1) A survey in time of peace of the resources of the Hawaiian Islands in men, material, supply and installations and a tabulation of those of military value or necessary for the maintenance of the civil population.

(2) An allocation, in consultation and accord with the Navy, of the resources of the Hawaiian Islands to the Army, to the Navy, and to the civilian population in conformity with Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document.

[8] (3) Plan for recruitment of Army personnel.

(4) Reception and distribution of Army personnel procured by selective service.

(5) Operation of a labor pool, in consultation and accord with the Navy, for use by the Army, by the Navy, and by civilian establishments in conformity with the detailed agreements, of this document, and utilizing to the best advantage the Territorial Civilian Effort Plan.

(6) Operation and administration of martial law in the Hawaiian Islands, except in localities under naval jurisdiction, in event of martial law.

(7) Control and care of the civil population of the Hawaiian Islands (civil organization (Par. 15 d, above) to assist), in event of martial law.

(8) Operation or supervision, in consultation and accord with the Navy, of all civil utilities and establishments in the Hawaiian Islands vital to military effort and civil life, in event of martial law.

(9) Maintenance and hospitalization of the civil population, in event of martial law.

(10) Operation or supervision of all local shipping facilities on shore allotted to the Army as covered in Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document, in event of martial law.

(11) Reception, housing or storage, and distribution of all Army reinforcements and supplies received on Oahu.

c. Navy Plans. The mobilization plans to be prepared by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, will provide for—

(1) A survey in time of peace of the Navy requirements in man-power, material, supplies, and installations desired from local sources.

(2) Plan for recruitment of Navy personnel.

(3) Reception and distribution of Navy personnel procured by selective service.

(4) Procurement and distribution of local civil personnel needed for naval employment through the labor pool operated by the Army in conformity with the detailed agreements covered under Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements of this document, in event of martial law.

(5) Operation or supervision of such civil utilities and establishments in the Hawaiian Islands as are assigned to the Navy, as covered in Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements of this document, in event of martial law.

(6) Operation or supervision of all civil agencies in the Hawaiian Islands for the regulation of water shipping, in event of martial law.

(7) Patrol and police of water areas, to include patrol of coastal zone and protection of shipping therein.

(8) Control of harbor and coastal lights, buoys, and aids to navigation.

(9) Control of all shipping activities in the Hawaiian Islands.

(10) Operation or supervision of all local shipping facilities on shore allotted to the Navy as covered in Section VI, Joint Agreements, of this document, in event of martial law.

SECTION VI—JOINT AGREEMENTS

20. The details of the allocation of local resources of man-power, supply, material, and installations will be determined by joint agreement. Agreements will cover the following general subjects and such others as may require coordination from time to time:

Allocation of military and civil man-power.

Allocation of utilities and installations for furtherance of military operations.

Allocation of transportation, land and water.

Allocation of signal communications.

Allocation of material and supplies.

Allocation of food supply.

21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department. This HCF-41 (JCD-42) supercedes HCF-39 (JCD-13) except that the Annexes Nos. I to VIII of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to VII, inclusive, of this plan.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch,

C. C. BLOCH.

Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy.

Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

(Signed) Walter C. Short,

WALTER C. SHORT,

Lieut. General, U. S. Army.

Commanding, Hawaiian Department.

[1] Headquarters
14th Naval District,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Headquarters
Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT—1939

28 MARCH 1941.

ANNEX NO. VII, SECTION VI—JOINT AGREEMENTS—JOINT SECURITY MEASURES, PROTECTION OF FLEET AND PEARL HARBOR BASE

I. General.

1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the HCF-39, (14 ND-JCD-13), are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their renouncement in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to incorporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desirable and necessary.

II. Joint air operations.

2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make avail-

able without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans:

a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks; if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

[2] b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District), and reverts to Navy control.

c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.

III. Joint Communications

5. Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, The Army will operate an Antiaircraft Intelligence Service which, using wire and radio broadcasts, will disseminate information pertaining to the movements of friendly and hostile aircraft. It should be understood that the limitations of the AAAIS are such that the interval between receipt of a warning and the air attack will in most cases be very short. Radio broadcasts from the AAAIS will be transmitted on 900 kilocycles. All information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Provisional Antiaircraft Brigade.

6. Upon establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, provision will be made for transmission of information on the location of distant hostile and friendly aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers, so that they may make their own evaluation of available information and transmit them to their respective organizations. Information relating to the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted without delay to the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center.

7. The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, the Antiaircraft Intelligence Service, and the Aircraft Warning Service (after establishment) will be manned and operated during combat, alert periods, joint exercises which involve these communications systems, and at such other periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense [3] Officer. The temporary loan of surplus communication equipment by one service to the other service to fill shortages in joint communication nets is encouraged where practicable. Prompt steps will be taken by the service receiving the borrowed equipment to obtain replacements for the borrowed articles through their own supply channels.

IV. Joint Antiaircraft Measures.

8. *Arrival and Departure Procedure, Aircraft.*—During joint exercises, alert periods, and combat, and at such other times as the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commanding Fourteenth Naval District) may agree upon, all Army and Navy aircraft approaching Oahu or leaving airfields or air bases thereon will conform to the Arrival and Departure Procedure prescribed in Inclosure A. This procedure will not be modified except when a departure therefrom is essential due to combat (real or simulated during exercises) or due to an emergency.

9. *Balloon barrages.*—Reports from abroad indicate the successful development and use of balloon barrages by European belligerents both British and German. Although detailed information is not available, the possibilities of balloon barrages in the Oahu area are recognized. Further investigation and study is necessary both locally and by the War and Navy Departments in order to determine the practicability of this phase of local defense.

10. *Marine Corps Antiaircraft Artillery.*—When made available by the Naval Base Defense Officer, (Commandant, 14th Naval District), Marine Corps units manning antiaircraft artillery present on Oahu will be placed under the tactical control of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.

11. *Aircraft Warning Service.*—The Army will expedite the installation and placing in operation of an Aircraft Warning Service. During the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of Radar and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable.

Approved: 2 April 1941.

(Signed) Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding Hawaiian Department.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch,
C. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

[1]
Comdr. Naval Base
Defense Air Force,
Commander Patrol Wing TWO,
Naval Air Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

MARCH 31, 1941.

Commanding General
Hawaiian Air Force,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

JOINT ESTIMATE COVERING JOINT ARMY AND NAVY AIR ACTION IN THE EVENT OF SUDDEN HOSTILE ACTION AGAINST OAHU OR FLEET UNITS IN THE HAWAIIAN AREA

1. *Summary of the Situation.*

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

II. *Survey of opposing Strengths.*

(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armoured and armed with 10-8" guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However the best estimate at present available is that the small [2] carriers can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones about 60. Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between

fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch gun and at least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area.

(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-based air force available to us in a constantly varying quantity which is being periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on Oahu, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present planes are used to bomb well defended ship objectives the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for [3] combatant work, can be used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other types of aircraft, in general, can perform functions that accord with their type.

III. Possible enemy action.

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make [4] a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

IV. Action open to us:

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but

can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands:

1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.

2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force and its dispatch for attack when information is available.

(c) In the event of an air attack on Oahu, in addition to (b) above:

1. The immediate dispatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept the attackers.

[5] 2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range shore based aircraft.

3. The prompt dispatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to their carriers.

(d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addition to (b) above:

1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.

2. Dispatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the attack area.

3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required:

1. Search Unit.

2. Attack Unit.

3. Air Combat Unit.

Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group commander.

[6] V. Decisions:

1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against OAHU or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures.

2. *Subsidiary decisions.* In order to be in all respects prepared to promptly execute the above decision:

(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation plan:

1. *Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO))* The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Patrol squadrons.

Shore-based VO-VS units.

Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.

Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to air combat group.

Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.

Army bombardment squadrons.

Army reconnaissance squadrons.

Navy Utility Squadrons.

2. Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian Air Force) The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Army pursuit squadrons.

Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.

Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.

One division of shore-based carrier VS planes. (Primarily for trailing aircraft)

(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows:

[7] 1. *Search and Attack Group*. Locate, report and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

2. *Air Combat Group*. Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when:

(a) An air attack occurs on Oahu.

(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable.

(c) Information is received that an attack has been made on fleet units.

(d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows:

Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of readiness prescribed for that part.

MATERIAL READINESS

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

[8] C. Approximately one quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

DEGREE OF READINESS

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.

2. All types—30 minutes.

3. All types—one hour.

4. All types—two hours.

5. All types—four hours.

The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed therein.

(e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior officers present of the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them. In using the above conditions it should be noted that: CONDITION A-1 requires a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a short time as it is an all hands condition. CONDITIONS B-1 and B-2 require watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any condition 1, 2, or 3 will curtail essential expansion training work. CONDITIONS C, or D, 4 or 5 can be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.

[9] (f) In order to perfect fundamental communications by use and to insure that prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the forces immediately available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of a sudden emergency, provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of normal daily flying from all units to their prospective task force commander. These reports to state:

- (a) Number of planes in the unit by functional types such as bomber, fighter, etc.
- (b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of readiness as defined above.
- (g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision (a) above has been issued, the task group commanders designated therein will prepare detailed contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable situations requiring quick action in order that the desired immediate action in an emergency can be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in this work the following temporary details will be made:
- (a) By Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO) an officer experienced in VF and VS operations and planning to assist the Commander of Air Combat Group.
- (b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an officer experienced in Army bombardment and reconnaissance operations and planning to assist the Commander of the Search and Attack Group.

(Signed) F. L. Martin,
F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.

(Signed) P. N. L. Bellinger,
P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO)

[1] STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

5 NOVEMBER 1941.

SECTION I—GENERAL

5. *Tactical principles.*—* * * The chief tactical principles applicable to the problem of the defense of Oahu and the air fields on the outlying islands are as follows:

- a. Complete organization of the ground
- b. Position to be held lightly
- c. Large reserves, held mobile, with motor transportation sufficient to transport them
- d. Automatic counter-attack.

6. *Security.*—Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground or air forces.

10. *Antiaircraft defense.*—a. Antiaircraft defense is a responsibility of every unit.

d. All unit commanders will be held responsible for the following:

- (1) Maintenance of air guards to give timely warning of the approach of hostile aviation.
- (2) Adoption of necessary measures to prevent hostile observation and aerial photography through advantageous use of terrain, utilization of cover, and use of camouflage.
- (3) Reduction of vulnerability to air attack and observation by dispersion of personnel and material when in bivouac or in position and by increased speed during movement.

[2] SECTION III—ALERTS

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph 15/ (8) below.

14. *Alert No. 1.*—a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.

b. At Department Headquarters, all General and Special Staff Sections will continue with their usual duties at their present stations, pending further orders.

c. Department Troops will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

d. Each Infantry Division will:

- (1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.
- (2) Maintain one (1) Infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.
- (3) Protect the Schofield Barracks Reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.

* * * * *

e. The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command will:

- (1) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.
- (2) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command.

* * * * *

f. The Hawaiian Air Force will:

- (1) Protect all vital installations on posts on Oahu garrisoned by air forces.
- (2) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 14 g below.
- (3) g. The District Commanders, assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, and maintain order in the civil community.

* * * * *

i. The Station Complements of Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the protection of all vital installations on their respective posts.

* * * * *

15. Alert No. 2.—a. This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.

b. At Department Headquarters, only the G-2 and G-3 Sections will be required to operate on a 24-hour basis. All other sections of the General and Special Staffs will continue with their normal schedule.

c. Department Troops will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

d. Each Infantry Division will:

- (1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.
- (2) Maintain available all units at fifty percent (50%) of their present strength, except those required under (3), (4) and (5) below.
- (3) Maintain one (1) Infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.
- (4) Protect the Schofield Barracks Reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.

* * * * *

(6) Place 240 mm howitzers in position, establish the necessary guards and, when directed, place ammunition at positions.

[4] (7) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155 mm. guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 15 e below.

* * * * *

e. The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, and attached Field Artillery, will:

- (1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft defense positions, except that railway batteries will remain at Fort Kamehameha or where emplaced.
- (2) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.
- (3) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

(4) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, except Fort Shafter. For Fort Shafter, see paragraph 15 k (1) below.

(5) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.

(6) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.

(7) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.

(8) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.

(9) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.

(10) Provide Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.

f. The Hawaiian air force will:

(1) Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this headquarters. See paragraph 17.

(2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.

(3) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.

(4) Disperse bombers with crews.

(5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.

(6) Protect all vital installations on posts on Oahu garrisoned by air forces.

(7) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 15 g below.

(8) In case of surprise hostile attack:

(a) Release to Navy for operational control all bombers in condition of readiness "A". The bomber commander will report to the Commander of Patrol Wing Two.

(b) Receive all available shore based Naval and Marine Corps fighter planes in appropriate condition of readiness and release them to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

g. The District Commanders, assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, will: Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

* * * * *

i. The Department Signal Officer will:

(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.

(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.

j. The Interceptor Command will: Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the Aircraft Warning Service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:

(1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft.

(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in Pearl and/or Honolulu Harbors.

[6] (3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

k. Station Complements:

(1) The Fort Shafter Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on Fort Shafter and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

(2) The Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

* * * * *

16. Alert No. 3—a. This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations on outlying islands.

b. At Department Headquarters:

(1) All sections of the forward echelon * * * will occupy their stations at forward command post, prepared to operate on a 24-hour basis.

(2) All sections of the rear echelon * * * will continue their usual duties at their present stations. Blackout instructions will be complied with.

c. Department Troops will remain in condition of mobile readiness at their permanent stations, pending instructions from this headquarters.

d. Each Infantry Division will:

(1) Defend its assigned sector on Oahu.

(2) Protect all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.

(5) Place 240mm howitzers in position.

(6) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155 mm guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 16 *e* below.

[7] *e.* The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, and attached Detachment Field Artillery will:

(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft positions.

(2) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.

(3) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.

(4) Support the Infantry Divisions.

(5) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.

(6) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.

(7) Provide the Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.

(8) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

(9) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, except Fort Shafter. For Fort Shafter, see paragraph 16 *i* (2) below.

(10) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

f. The Hawaiian Air Force will:

(1) Destroy enemy aircraft.

(2) Carry out bombing missions as directed.

(3) Cooperate with Naval air forces.

(4) On Oahu, defend all posts garrisoned by air forces against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

(5) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 16 *h* below.

(6) Arm all planes, except that normally *bombs* will not be loaded on ships dispatched to outlying islands.

(7) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.

(8) Disperse bombers with crews.

(9) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.

(10) Perform observation, command and photographic missions.

(11) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.

h. The District Commanders of Hawaii, Maui (includes Molokai) and Kauai Districts, assisted by the air corps detachments present within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

i. The Interceptor Command will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control to include:

(1) Arrival and departure of *all* friendly aircraft.

(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in Pearl and/or Honolulu Harbors.

(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

k. The Department Signal Officer will:

(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.

(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.

(3) Be prepared to assume control over essential civilian communications.

l. Station Complements.—

(1) The Schofield Barracks Complement will protect all vital installations on the Schofield Reservation.

(2) The Fort Shafter Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on Fort Shatter and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

(3) The Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Field Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

SECTION III—CONDITION OF READINESS FOR AIRCRAFT

[9] 17. Condition of readiness for aircraft will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number as indicated in paragraphs *a* and *b* below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

a. Material Readiness.—

A—All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B—One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C—Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D—Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E—All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

b. Degree of operational Readiness.—

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and prepared to carry out the assigned task.

1—For pursuit and VF types: Four minutes. Types other than fighters: Fifteen minutes.

2—All types: 30 Minutes.

3—All types: One hour.

4—All types: Two hours.

5—All types: Four hours.

SECTION IV—INTELLIGENCE

20. Measures to obtain information.—

a. Navy.—

(1) Transmit, through the Joint Intelligence Loop, information received from the Offshore and Inshore Patrols, from any escort or attack forces formed, and from any other Naval Ships relative to:

(a) Location, composition, course, and speed of enemy units encountered, with particular reference to location of aircraft carriers and transports.

[10] (d) Indications of any hostile aerial activity in strength.

b. Army.

(1) Hawaiian Air Force.

(a) Observe all waters within an area bounded as follows:

By arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at Opana Point, Maui; Kauniki Head Light, Maui; Laupahoehoe Light, Hawaii; Cape Kumukahi Light, Hawaii; Kalae Light, Hawaii; Southwest Headland, Kahoolawe; Leahi Point, Niihau; Lahua Island, Niihau; Kailua Point, Kauai; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at Kahuku Point, Oahu, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named.

Report location, composition, course and speed of enemy units encountered. Maintain continuous contact with major subdivisions of enemy units. Particular attention to location of aircraft carriers and transports. First contact, material changes of direction, and definite location of aircraft carriers to be reported immediately by Joint Intelligence Loop; thereafter on the hour by department Intelligence Loop.

(b) Report indications of landing on any island, giving location, number, type and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting Naval group. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loops.

(c) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops, and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment, incurred or observed by their operations. Important damage, including damage to landing fields, and use of chemicals, immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop; other damage at 1815 by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report any hostile aerial activity in strength, including number, type, direction and area of attack or observation, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

• • • • •
(3) *Interceptor Command.*—

(a) Report immediately any and all information of hostile air force or surface vessel.

[11] (b) Report, upon completion of action by or with enemy air force, composition of enemy forces, direction of approach, time of action, area attacked, and damage to enemy airplanes.

• • • • •
c. All Elements of Hawaiian Department.—

(1) Report presence of parachute troops and assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers and overt acts of sabotage or terrorism, giving location, time, numbers involved, and probable intentions or damage accomplished.

• • • • •
SECTION V—ADMINISTRATION

25. *Supply.*

• • • • •
e. Class V Supplies:

• • • • •
(4) Credits of an "initial issue" and of one "unit of fire" are automatically placed at the disposal and under the control of all major echelon commanders whenever an Alert is ordered. Quantities of various types of ammunition included in the "initial issue" and in a "unit of fire" are shown in Inclosures Nos. 6 and 7 herewith. Load of Aircraft Ammunition per airplane is indicated in Inclosure No. 8.

(5) At the time Alert No. 2 or No. 3 is ordered, all units will draw such of their "initial issue" as has not already been drawn, except that for Alert No. 2 the Infantry Divisions will draw initially only $\frac{1}{2}$ of the "initial issues" and the balance thereof will be drawn after occupation of positions with their organic and/or sector weapons. Whenever issues cannot be made simultaneously, they will be made according to the following order of priority and according to a schedule to be mutually arranged between the Unit Supply Officer and the Supply Point concerned.

Aircraft bombs and ammunition for aircraft weapons.

Antiaircraft 3", 37 mm. and Machine Gun ammunition.

Ground machine gun ammunition—all types.

Other small arms ammunition.

All artillery ammunition, less antiaircraft.

(6) At the time Alert No. 1 is ordered, only small arms ammunition included in the "initial issue" will be drawn.

[12] (7) Aircraft bombs will not be issued in "initial issue" but will be held available in bomb storage areas.

(8) Two "units of fire" of bombs and machine gun ammunition will be maintained on outlying islands for each airplane operating therefrom.

f. Dumps and Ammunition Distributing Points will be established as directed by this headquarters.

• • • • •

1446 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

(Inclosure No. 6)

[13] Allowances of ordnance ammunition per weapon (other than aircraft)
for initial issue, Hawaiian Department

| Weapon | Arm or service | No. of rds. per weapon | | | |
|---|---------------------------------|------------------------|-------|--------|-------|
| | | AP | Ball | Tracer | Total |
| Rifle, cal. .30, M1903 | CA | 25 | 140 | 20 | 185 |
| | Eng. | | 40 | | 40 |
| | FA | | 32 | 8 | 40 |
| | Inf. (Rifle Plat.) | 16 | 112 | 32 | 160 |
| | Inf. (except Rifle Plat.) | 4 | 28 | 8 | 40 |
| | QM | | 40 | | 40 |
| | Sig. | | 25 | | 25 |
| | Others | 30 | 105 | 15 | 150 |
| Rifle, U.S. cal. .30, M1 | Eng. | 48 | 80 | 24 | 152 |
| | Inf. (Rifle Plat.) | 24 | 162 | 46 | 232 |
| | Inf. (except Rifle Plat.) | 4 | 28 | 8 | 40 |
| | Ord. | | 64 | 16 | 80 |
| | Sig. | | 40 | | 40 |
| | MP | | 48 | | 48 |
| | Others | 30 | 105 | 15 | 150 |
| | CWS | | 460 | 120 | 580 |
| Rifle, automatic, cal. .30 | CA | 60 | 560 | 60 | 680 |
| | FA | 960 | | 240 | 1,200 |
| | Inf. | 60 | 992 | 120 | 1,172 |
| | Ord. | | 240 | 60 | 300 |
| | QM | 30 | 30 | 20 | 80 |
| | Others | 150 | 525 | 75 | 750 |
| | Eng. | 250 | 1,500 | 250 | 2,000 |
| | Inf. | 500 | 3,500 | 1,000 | 5,000 |
| Machine gun, cal. .30, HB
(M1919A4). | Tanks or Armid. Cars | 4,800 | | 1,200 | 6,000 |
| | CA | 7,200 | | 1,800 | 9,000 |
| | (AW Bn.) CA (except AW Bn.) | 3,600 | | 900 | 4,500 |
| | Eng. | 250 | 1,500 | 250 | 2,000 |
| | Inf. | 675 | 4,725 | 2,350 | 6,750 |
| | Others | 600 | 2,100 | 300 | 3,000 |
| | CWS, CA, Eng., Inf. | | 28 | | 28 |
| | FA, Ord., QM, Sig., MP, others. | | 21 | | 21 |
| Submachine gun, cal. .45 | Sig. (motorcycles) | | 340 | | 340 |
| | Sig. (other than motorcycles) | | 350 | | 350 |
| | MP | | 440 | 110 | 550 |
| | Others | | 240 | 60 | 300 |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| Machine gun, cal. .50, WC (AA) | CA (AW Bn.) | 5,760 | | 1,440 | 7,200 |
| | CA (except AW Bn.) | 2,880 | | 720 | 3,600 |
| | Others | 2,880 | | 720 | 3,600 |
| | FA | 600 | | 150 | 750 |
| Machine gun, cal. .50, HB | Inf. | 960 | | 240 | 1,200 |
| | Tanks or Armid. Cars | 1,568 | | 392 | 1,960 |
| | | | | | |

[14]

| [15] Weapon | Arm or Service | No. of rds. per weapon | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------|------|---------|-------|-------|
| | | AP | Ball | Tracer | HE | Total |
| Shotgun | All | | | | | 25 |
| Grenades, hand, frag. (per Rifle Co.) | Inf. | | | | | 150 |
| Signals, ground (asstd.) | Inf. | | | | | 25 |
| | Sig. (Avn. or Wg. Co.) | | | | | 5 |
| | Sig. (Opn. or Tri. Div. Co.) | | | | | 30 |
| Lights, Very signal (assorted) | All | | | | | 24 |
| 37mm gun, M1916 | | | | | 240 | 240 |
| 37mm gun, Antitank (M3) | FA | 200 | | | | 200 |
| | Inf. | 180 | | | 20 | 200 |
| 37mm gun, Antiaircraft | CA | 180 | | | 1,620 | 1,800 |
| 60mm Mortar | Inf. | | | | 120 | 120 |
| 81mm, or 3" Trench Mortar | Inf. | | | (light) | 132 | 150 |
| | | | | (heavy) | 18 | |
| 75mm gun, Truck-D | All | | | | | 1,459 |
| 75mm gun, Antitank | FA | | | | | 1,144 |
| 105mm How | FA | | | | | 1,205 |
| 155mm How | FA | | | | | 1,117 |
| 3" AA mobile | CA | 15 | | | 285 | 300 |
| 90mm AA mobile | CA | 12 | | | 238 | 250 |
| 3" AA fixed | CA | | | | 300 | 300 |
| 155mm gun, M1918M1 | All | | | | 100 | 100 |
| 240mm How. M1918 | FA | | | | 60 | 60 |
| 8" Ry. Gun | CA | 85 | | | | 85 |
| FIXED SEACOAST ARTILLERY | | | | | | |
| 3" gun, M1903 | | | | | 505 | 505 |
| 6" gun | | 1,000 | | | | 1,000 |
| 8" gun | | 350 | | | 200 | 550 |
| 12" gun (Barbette Carriage) | | 335 | | | | 335 |
| 12" gun (Disappearing Carriage) | | 275 | | | | 275 |
| 12" Mortar | | 300 | | | | 300 |
| 14" gun | | 280 | | | | 280 |
| 16" gun | | 250 | | | | 250 |

NOTES

Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept.
Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.

¹ Proportions of types (shrapnel, reduced charge HE, and normal charge HE) will be shown on requisitions kept on file at the designated supply points.

1448 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

(Inclosure No. 7)

[16] Unit of fire (other than aircraft)—Hawaiian Department

| Weapon | No. rds. for one (1) unit of fire | | | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|-------|-----------|-----|-------|
| | AP | Ball | Tracer | HE | Total |
| Rifle, cal. .30, M1 or M1903 | 30 | 105 | 15 | | 150 |
| Rifle, automatic, cal. .30 | 150 | 525 | 75 | | 750 |
| Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A4) (other than combat vehicle) | 150 | 525 | 75 | | 750 |
| Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A2 or A4) (combat vehicle) | 600 | | 150 | | 750 |
| Machine gun, cal. .30 (M1917-17A1) | 600 | 2,100 | 300 | | 3,000 |
| Pistol, cal. .45 | | 20 | | | 20 |
| Submachine gun, cal. .45 | | 160 | 40 | | 200 |
| Machine gun, cal. .50, HB | 720 | | 180 | | 900 |
| Machine gun, cal. .50, AA, WC (except in Gun Batteries) | 1,920 | | 480 | | 2,400 |
| Machine gun, cal. .50, AA, WC (in Gun Batteries) | 960 | | 240 | | 1,200 |
| Grenades, hand, frag. (per Rifle Co.) | | | | | 150 |
| Projector, signal ground (assorted) | | | | | 25 |
| Pistol, Very, Mk III | | | | | 25 |
| 37mm gun, M1916 | | | | 120 | 120 |
| 37mm gun, antitank, M3 | 84 | | | 36 | 120 |
| 37mm gun, antiaircraft | 60 | | | 540 | 600 |
| 60mm Mortar | | | | 400 | 400 |
| 81mm Mortar | | | (Light) | 234 | 234 |
| | | | (Heavy) | 66 | 200 |
| 3" Trench Mortar | | | | 36 | 360 |
| 75mm Field Gun | | | (Super) | 36 | 360 |
| | | | (Normal) | 150 | |
| | | | (Reduced) | 114 | |
| 75mm gun, antitank | 111 | | | 39 | 150 |
| 105mm How | | | | 225 | 225 |
| 155mm How. M1918 | | | | 180 | 180 |
| 3" AA gun, mobile | 15 | | | 285 | 300 |
| 90mm AA gun, mobile | 12 | | | 238 | 250 |
| 3" AA gun, fixed | | | | 300 | 300 |
| 155mm gun, M1918 M1 | 112 | | | 38 | 150 |
| 240mm How. M1918 | | | | 60 | 60 |
| 8" Ry Gun | 85 | | | | 85 |
| 4" Chemical Mortar | | | | | 200 |
| 4.2" Chemical Mortar | | | | | 200 |

Notes

Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept.
Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.

[17]

(Inclosure No. 8)

Load of aircraft ammunition per airplane

| Item | Type Airplane | | | | | | |
|------------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|---------|--------|--------|---------------|
| | Bombers | | | Pursuit | | | OBS.
(C&D) |
| | Hv.
(B17D) | Med.
(B-18) | Lt.
(A20A) | (P-40) | (P36A) | (P-26) | |
| Ctg. AP Cal 30 | | | | | | | |
| Ctg. ball Cal 30 | 480 | 1,280 | 1,920 | 1,600 | 400 | 800 | 640 |
| Ctg. tr Cal 30 | 120 | 320 | 480 | 400 | 100 | 200 | 160 |
| Total Cal 30# | 600 | 1,600 | 2,400 | 2,000 | 500 | 1,000 | 800 |
| Ctg. AP Cal 50 | 60 | | | 20 | 10 | | |
| Ctg. ball Cal 50 | 900 | | | 300 | 150 | | |
| Ctg. tr Cal 50 | 240 | | | 80 | 40 | | |
| Total Cal 50# | 1,200 | | | 400 | 200 | | |
| BOMBS | | | | | | | |
| Bomb frag. 30# | | | 40 | | | 10 | |
| and | | | | | | | |
| Bomb Demo. 100# | 20 | 32 | 12 | | | | |
| or | | | | | | | |
| Bomb Demo. 300# | 14 | 14 | 4 | | | | |
| or | | | | | | | |
| Bomb Demo. 500-600# | 8 | 6 | 2 | | | | |
| or | | | | | | | |
| Bomb Demo. 1000-1100# | 6 | 4 | 1 | | | | |
| or | | | | | | | |
| Bomb Demo. 2000# | 4 | 2 | | | | | |
| PYROTECHNICS | | | | | | | |
| Bomb Photoflash | 14 | 14 | | | | | 14 |
| Flare M26 ¹ | 3 | 3 | 1 | | | | 1 |
| Flare M 9 | 6 | 6 | 6 | | | | 5 |
| Sig. AC Asstd | 20 | 20 | 20 | | | | 20 |
| Sig. Drift | 10 | 7 | | | | | |

¹ For Reconnaissance squadrons only.² Flare M8A1 used as temporary substitute on the basis of 2-M8 or M8A1 flares per M26 flare.

[1]

OPERATIONS ORDERS**HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT****PART VI—FIELD ORDER NUMBER 1 NS (NAVAL SECURITY)**

Field Orders No.—Ins

**HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H.**(Date)¹(Hour)¹

Maps: Topographic, Island of Oahu, 1/62,500 (1940 Edition); Terrain Map, Island of Oahu, 1/20,000 (1940 Edition); Island of Oahu 1/180,000 (1939 Edition); Hawaiian Islands, Eastern Part U. S. C&G.S. Chart No. 4102.

1. a. (1) For information of the enemy see Current Summaries of Intelligence.

(2) In the current unsettled international situation, it is assumed that it is possible that a declaration of war upon the United States may be preceded by a surprise raid or attack upon the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and ships of the Pacific Fleet by hostile aircraft, submarines, or surface ships with a view to the destruction or damaging of naval installations, ships, and facilities. Such a raid or attack may be accompanied by acts of sabotage committed by hostile sympathizers.

¹ Date and hour this Field Order becomes effective will be announced by orders from this headquarters. See also par. 3 c (6) (Page 3).

b. The Pacific Fleet and the Fourteenth Naval District, while continuing normal training and operations, are taking certain security measures, which include:

(1) By the Pacific Fleet:

(a) Daily air patrols of areas in which elements of the Pacific Fleet are operating.

(b) The organization of a striking force of cruisers and destroyers to cooperate with Army and Navy aviation in the attack on hostile surface ships.

(c) The organization of a destroyer attack unit to locate and destroy hostile submarines.

(d) The organization of four air defense groups for the control and distribution of the antiaircraft fire of all ships anchored in Pearl Harbor.

(2) By the Naval Base Defense Force (Fourteenth Naval District and attached units):

[2] (a) Establishment of an inshore patrol consisting of a destroyer patrol at the entrance to the Pearl Harbor channel, a boom patrol, a harbor patrol, and daily mine sweeping operation.

(b) The organization of an air striking force consisting of Patrol Wing Two, attached Fleet aircraft, and attached aircraft from the 18th Bombardment Wing to search for and attack hostile surface ships.

(c) Establishment of a harbor control post.

(d) The placing under the tactical control of the Army of certain land based fighter aircraft and Marine Corps antiaircraft artillery units.

2. The Hawaiian Department, supported by Naval Units placed under the tactical control of the Army, will operate to defend Oahu from attacks by hostile aircraft and hostile naval vessels, will take precautionary measures to prevent acts of sabotage by hostile sympathizers, and will support naval forces conducting aerial attacks on hostile naval vessels.

3. a. The Hawaiian Division will provide protection for vital installations on Oahu, except those located within Police District No. 1, against acts of sabotage committed by hostile sympathizers, will maintain one infantry battalion with necessary motor transportation in readiness at Schofield Barracks prepared to move on two hours notice, and will maintain normal training activities with the remainder of the command.

b. The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, supported by such Marine Corps antiaircraft artillery units as may be made available, will defend Oahu against attacks by aircraft, surface vessels and submarines, paying particular attention to the defense of the Pearl Harbor-Hickam Field area, and in addition thereto, will—

(1) Provide the Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.

(2) Cooperate with Army and Navy Air Forces in safe guarding friendly aircraft from the fire of antiaircraft artillery troops.

(3) Arrange for such coordination of the antiaircraft artillery fire of naval ships in Pearl Harbor and the Army antiaircraft artillery defense as may be practicable. This coordination will include measures to protect friendly aircraft from the antiaircraft artillery fire of Naval ships anchored in Pearl Harbor.

(4) Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, disseminate warnings of hostile air attacks by radio broadcast.

(5) Unless specifically authorized, railway guns will not be moved from the home stations of the units manning this armament.

[3] c. The Hawaiian Air Force, in cooperation with fleet aircraft, will defend Oahu against attacks by aircraft, will attack hostile Naval vessels, and in furtherance thereof, will conduct operations as follows:

(1) *Offensive Action.* Conduct air operations against hostile naval vessels. Bombardment and reconnaissance aircraft participating in joint air operations will be placed under the tactical control of the Navy.

(2) *Defensive Action.* Reinforced by shore based fighter aircraft of the Navy made available, defend Oahu against air attack. Provide antiaircraft machine gun defense for airplanes on ground on all fields.

(3) *Reconnaissance.* Conduct reconnaissance essential to the combat efficiency of the Air Force and to supplement, where practicable, that of naval air forces in securing information of hostile fleet movements.

(4) *Cooperation.* In the preparations for and conduct of joint air operations, close cooperation will be maintained with the commanders of local Navy air units. Close cooperation will also be maintained with the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade to provide for safeguarding Army and Navy aircraft from the fire of friendly antiaircraft artillery.

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(5) *Conditions of Readiness.* Aircraft and crews thereof will be maintained in the condition of readiness directed by this headquarters.

(6) *Hostile Air Attack.* Air operations directed above will be instituted without further orders from this headquarters by all aircraft maintained in condition of readiness therefor upon receipt of information of an air attack upon Oahu or an attack upon fleet units in Hawaiian waters. All other aircraft and crews thereof will be alerted and this headquarters advised of action taken.

d. The Department Signal Officer, in cooperation with Naval communications personnel will insure that, insofar as equipment available permits, the joint communications described in Section III of Annex No. VII, HCF-39 are in readiness for immediate employment at any time that they may be required.

e. The Department Provost Marshal, in addition to his normal duties, will:

(1) Be prepared to initiate such precautionary measures as may be required by the situation to insure protection of vital installations within Police District No. 1, City and County of Honolulu, exclusive of those located on garrisoned Army and Navy reservations. These precautionary measures will be limited to the minimum necessary in order to avoid undue alarm and hysteria of the civil population.

[4] (2) Maintain close liaison with civilian law enforcement agencies to determine any indications of the possibility of sabotage by hostile sympathizers.

f. The Commanding Officers, Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai Districts, Department Service Command will maintain close liaison with civilian law enforcement agencies to determine indications of the possibility of sabotage or attacks by hostile sympathizers, take such precautionary steps as may be required by the situation within the means available to them, and when necessary, secure the cooperation of civilian agencies in the guarding of military airfields.

g. (1) All major units of the defense will cooperate with the 14th Naval District and elements of the Pacific Fleet in all spheres of action compatible with their missions, armament, and equipment.

(2) Hostile surface ships and aircraft will not be taken under fire except under the following conditions:

(a) After hostile offensive action, such as the use of bombs, torpedoes, mines or other ammunition, has been observed.

(b) After receipt of a verified report of a hostile attack.

(c) Upon orders from this headquarters.

(3) Instructions will be issued to all sentinel and patrols guarding vital installations requiring that ammunition will be used only after all other measures have been employed, without success.

(4) During periods when elements of the command are alerted under the provisions of this order, normal training will be continued to the extent practicable.

4. a. Small arms and artillery ammunition issued to troops initially will not exceed approximately one-half day of fire. Provision will be made for prompt issue of additional quantities of ammunition. Stocks of aircraft ammunition and bombs will be maintained at airfields in accordance with existing policies.

b. Other administrative details normal.

5. Command Posts:

Hawaiian Department: Fort Shafter.

Hawaiian Division: Schofield Barracks.

[5] Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade: Fort DeRussy.

Hawaiian Air Force: Fort Shafter.

Fourteenth Naval District: Pearl Harbor.

By command of Lieutenant General Short:

(S) Philip Hayes
PHILIP HAYES,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Official:

(S) R. C. Throckmorton

R. C. THROCKMORTON,

Lieut. Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

[6] Distribution:

Distributed as a component part of "Army Operating Defense Plans, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Operations Orders, Hawaiian Department, 1938"

* * * * *

[1] EXTRACTS FROM NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5

PART III. ASSIGNMENT OF TASKS

CHAPTER II. FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AREA

SECTION 3. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES

* * * * *

3233. The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces (Chapter VIII, Appendix II) in the Pacific Area are assigned the following tasks:

(a) Task.

Defend the Naval Coastal Frontiers in categories indicated below:

* * * * *

Category D. * * *

—The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier

* * * * *

APPENDIX I—ANNEX 1. COASTAL FRONTIERS

* * * * *

9. Insert in reference (a) (Joint action of the Army and Navy, 1935) the following new paragraphs:

"36A. Hawaiian coastal frontier.

"(a) Boundaries.

"The Hawaiian coastal frontier consists of Oahu, and all the land and sea areas required for its defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra Islands and Kingman's Reef.

[2] "(b) Commanders.

"Army.—The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

"Navy.—The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. This officer also commands the assigned naval local defense force and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment, in cooperation with the Army.

Cincpac File No.

A2-11/FF12/

A4-3 QL/(13)

Serial 01646

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Confidential

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., October 14, 1941.

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER No. 2CL-41 (REVISED)

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To : Pacific Fleet

Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.

Reference:

(a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.

(b) Cincpac conf. ltr. file A7-2 (18) Serial 01221 of 3 August 1941.

(c) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 1CM-41.

(d) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 2CM-41.

(e) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L 40 (Revised).

(f) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40.

(g) Section 3, Chapter II, U. S. F. 10.

(h) Chapter IV, U. S. F. 10.

Enclosure:

(A) Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan showing Air Defense Sector.

(B) Measures to be effective until further orders.

1. Reference (a) is revised herewith. References (b), (c) and (d), are cancelled and superseded by this letter.

2. The security of the Fleet, operating and based in the Hawaiian Area, is predicated, at present, on two assumptions:

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

(1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft.
(2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel.

(3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by:

(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
(3) a combination of these two.

3. The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part in accordance with enclosure (B) or in their entirety as may later be directed by the Commander-in-Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer Present Afloat in the Hawaiian Area:

[2] (A) *Continuous Patrol:*

(1) Inshore Patrol (administered and furnished by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District).

(2) Boom Patrols.

(3) Harbor Patrols.

(B) *Intermittent Patrols:*

(1) Destroyer Offshore Patrol:

(a) The limits of this patrol shall be the navigable portion to seaward of a circle ten miles in radius from Pearl Harbor entrance buoy number one which is not patrolled by the Inshore Patrol.

(b) Three destroyers to search twelve hours prior to the sortie or entry of the Fleet or of a Task Force containing heavy ships. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol and when a sortie and entry occur in succession the Commander entering shall furnish it.

(c) One destroyer (Ready Duty) to screen heavy ships departing or entering Pearl Harbor other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry. The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will administer the Ready Duty Destroyer for this purpose and issue necessary orders when requested by forces afloat. Such Ready Duty Destroyer shall be on one hour's notice.

(2) Air Patrols:

(a) Daily search of operating areas as directed by Aircraft, Scouting Force.

(b) An air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force. It will search that part of a circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel buoys which is south of latitude 21°-21' N. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol, establishing it at least two hours prior to the sortie or entrance, and arranging for its discontinuance. When a sortie and entry occur in succession, the Commander entering shall supply this patrol.

(c) Air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than described in foregoing subparagraph. The ship concerned shall furnish the patrol mentioned therein.

(3) Daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines by Fourteenth Naval District Forces. The swept channel for Fleet and Task Force sorties or entries is two thousand yards wide between Points "A" and "X" as defined in subparagraph (C) (3), below.

(C) *Sortie and Entry:*

(1) Reference (h) will not be in effect in the Pacific Fleet during the present emergency.

(2) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District controls the movements of ships within Pearl Harbor, the Entrance Channel, and the swept channel.

(3) Point "A" is midway between Pearl Harbor entrance channel buoys Nos. ONE and TWO; Point "A-1" is midchannel on a line drawn 270° true from Buoy No. EIGHTEEN; Point "X" unless otherwise prescribed is three thousand yards bearing 153° true from Point "A."

[3] (4) Zero hour is the time first ship passes Point "A-1" abeam for sortie, or Point "A" for entry, and will be set by despatch. Interval between ships will be as prescribed by Fleet or Task Force Commanders.

(5) Fleet and Task Force Commanders shall, for their respective forces:

(a) Arrange with Commandant Fourteenth Naval District for times of entry and departure, berthing and services.

- (b) Prepare and issue sortie and entrance plans.
- (c) Clear the Defensive Sea Area promptly after sortie.
- (d) When a sortie and entry occur in succession, keep entry force well clear of Defensive Sea Area until sortie force is clear.
- (e) Furnish own patrols except as modified by (B)(1)(b) and (B)(2)(b), above.

(6) Units departing or entering Pearl Harbor at times other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, request authority and services as required, direct from Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

(7) Heavy ships (including 7,500 ton light cruisers) maintain a minimum speed of 15 knots when within a radius of 15 miles from the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor. During approach and entry, individual units govern movements to provide for minimum time in waters adjacent to the entrance.

(D) Operating areas:

(1) The Naval Operating Areas in Hawaiian Waters (U. S. C. & G. S. Chart No. 4102) are considered submarine waters. Observe requirements of reference (g).

(2) Ships, except submarines, shall anchor only in protected anchorages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului are considered as such if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and if ships are so moored as not to be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor.

(3) Submarines may anchor in the following places: in Pearl Harbor, off Lahaina, inside or outside Kahului, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols need be maintained.

(4) Submarines shall not operate submerged in the vicinity of surface ships except in accordance with prearranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery exercises, or for services to other types.

(5) Submarine operations, except (4) above, shall be confined ordinarily to Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21 and M-24. Under special circumstances submarine squadrons may request additional areas from the officer responsible for assigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the general area allocated to surface ships and shall notify all Fleet units in the Hawaiian area. While submarines are operating submerged in C-5 and C-7 they shall maintain a guard ship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships.

[4] (6) Except as specifically directed for exercise purposes, all operations of submarines other than those covered in sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) above, shall be on the surface.

(7) Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, shall ensure that commanders of surface and air task forces are furnished with detailed submarine schedules and all changes thereto. The latter shall ensure that units concerned, including air patrols, operating under their command are properly notified thereof.

(8) Ships proceeding independently across the operating areas at night shall follow neutral zones and area boundaries where practicable. The Task Force Commander in the vicinity shall be informed of: (a) the route to be followed using point numbers on the Operating Chart, (b) time of starting route, (c) the speed of advance. The Task Force Commander shall notify vessels of his force that may be concerned.

(E) Ships at Sea:

(1) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor they shall be organized as a Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and aircraft as necessary for screening. Each task force shall be organized offensively and defensively. These organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port and shall provide for the following:

(a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines.

(2) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number of destroyers available, priority in assignments being governed by the following:

Priority 1—BBs

Priority 2—CVs

Priority 3—CAs

Priority 4—CLs

(c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier (if operating) and destroyers, to co-operate with Patrol Wings and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier group.

(d) A concentration of own operating submarines preparatory to disposition as circumstances require.

(e) Inner air patrol for dispositions or formations, when in operating areas. Such screen shall be maintained by Task Groups, if the Task Force Commander so directs.

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(f) Inner anti-submarine screens, insofar as practicable with assigned destroyers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening when they are not employed in plane guarding.

(g) Maintenance of condition of readiness Three on torpedo defense batteries and equivalent condition of readiness in destroyers. Supply ready ammunition and keep depth charges ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless especially directed.

(h) Maintenance of material condition X-ray, or equivalent to all ships.

[5] (1) Steaming darkened at night in defensive disposition either as a Task Force or by Task Groups as practicable.

(j) Restricting use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations.

(k) Maintenance of horizon and surface battle lookouts.

(l) Energizing degaussing coils whenever there is any possibility of the presence of magnetic mines. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided if operations permit.

(2) Ships towing targets in operating areas at night will show appropriate running and towing lights, except when engaged in exercises the nature of which requires them to be darkened.

(F) Ships in Port:

(1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carry out applicable measures outlined in references (e) and (f).

(G) Defense Against Air Attack:

(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions.

(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

(3) Enclosure (A) defines the air defense sectors in Pearl Harbor and is the basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire. Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships in that sector. However, ships in other sectors may augment fire of any other sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.

(5) The Senior Officer Present in each sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) (3) above, is the Sector Commander, and responsible for the fire in his own sector.

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (N. B. D. O.). As such he shall:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

[6] (c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

(d) Coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

(2) Holding necessary drills.

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.

(4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) Arranging communication plan.

(6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.

(7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed:

CONDITION I.—General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

CONDITION II.—One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

CONDITION III.—Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

(8) Searchlights of ships shall not be used in event of a night attack.

(9) In event of an air attack, the following procedure shall be followed by the task forces:

(a) *Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor.*

(1) Execute an emergency sortie order which will accomplish (2), (3), and (4) below. (This order must be prepared and issued in advance).

(2) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating task force commander.

(3) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable sortie.

(4) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force Commander operating at sea, advised.

[7] (b) *Task Force Commander operating at sea.*

(1) Despatch striking unit. (See (E) (1) (c) above.)

(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea.

(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require. (May utilize unit of (E) (1) (a) for this if not needed for A/S purposes.)

(4) Direct commander of operating submarines to carry out action desired of him.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

(c) *Naval Base Defense Officer.*

(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not already blacked out, each unit shall execute blackout when the alarm is given.

(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(8) Launch air search for enemy ships.

(4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available.

(H) *Action to be Taken if Submarine Attacks in Operating Area:*

(1) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following general procedure will be followed:

Ship Attacked.

(a) Proceed in accordance with Article 509, F. T. P. 188. Originate a plain language despatch, urgent precedence, containing essential details addressed for action to the Task Force Commander in the operating area and for information to Commander-in-Chief, Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and S. O. P. A. Pearl Harbor. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear the immediate submarine danger area, at best remaining speed, then proceed toward Pearl Harbor using zigzag appropriate for speed in use.

Ships other than one attacked.

(b) *Battleships.* Zigzag at maximum speed. Launch aircraft armed for inner air patrol. Do not approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during remainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enable them to join quickly.

(c) *Carriers.* Same as for battleships, except place all aircraft in Condition ONE, armed. (At least one squadron with depth charges when they become available.) Aircraft for initial inner air patrol may be launched unarmed. Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol as ordered by Task Force Commander or as circumstances warrant.

[8] (d) *Cruisers.* Same as for battleships, except, use one-half available aircraft (armed) for own inner air patrol. Send the second half to scene of attack (armed), to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol for damaged ship if damaged ship has been unable to provide its own inner air patrol.

(e) *Destroyers.* Attack unit proceed at maximum speed to scene of attack. Take determined offensive action. Screening units join heavy ship units to which

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assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Report to Task Force Commander when clear of Channel.

(f) *Submarines*. Surface if submerged. Remain in own assigned areas, zig-zagging at best speed until directed otherwise.

(g) *Minecraft*. Augment screening units as directed by Task Force Commander.

(h) *Base Force*. If ship attacked is damaged, tugs in operating areas join her at best speed, prepared to tow, slipping targets as necessary. Report in code, positions of rafts abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. High speed towing vessels proceed at discretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of attack.

(i) *Patrol Wings*. Assume readiness for search and for offensive action. Carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish station patrol 220 mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(j) *Shore-based Fleet Aircraft*. Prepare to relieve planes in the air over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by Naval Base Defense Officer have priority.

(k) *Naval District*. Clear Pearl Harbor Channel at once for either sortie or entry. Prepare to receive damaged ship(s) for repair.

(l) *S. O. P. A., Pearl Harbor*. Prepare destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie and direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Commander at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys.

(m) *Task Force Commander at Sea*. Coordinate offensive and defensive measures. When immediate defensive measures have been accomplished, prescribe rendezvous and issue necessary instructions for concentrating and forming the Task Force.

(2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack.

(3) It must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation [9] and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means.

4. Subordinate Commanders shall issue the necessary orders to make these measures effective.

H. E. KIMMEL

Distribution: (5CM-41)

List II, Case 1: A. X.

EN1, EN3, NA12, ND11AC, ND11-12-13-14, NY8-10,

(A1—Asiatic, A1—Atlantic).

P. C. CROSLKY,

Flag Secretary,

USS Penn.—75—10-15-41—1,000.



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MEASURES TO BE EFFECTIVE UNDER PARAGRAPH 3 OF BASIC LETTER UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS

(A) (1)

(A) (2)

Boom—administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(A) (3)

Harbor—administered by Commander Base Force with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(B) (1) (a) (b) (c)

Furnished by Destroyers, Battle Force; Minecraft, Battle Force; and Minecraft, Base Force, and coordinated by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

(B) (2) (a) (b) (c)

(B) (3)

(C) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (6) (7)

(D) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

(E) (1) (a) (b) (c) (d)

Assignments only shall be made. The Task Force Commander will hold one drill during each operating period, if employment permits, in the establishment of units prescribed.

(E) (1) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)

(E) (2)

(F)

The provisions of reference (e).

(G)

Entire article, except sub-paragraph 6 (b), which will be as arranged by Naval Base Defense Officer with Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

[1] File

C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14(0164)

Confidential

Operation Plan No. 1-41

HEADQUARTERS,
NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
Pearl Harbor, T. H. 27 February 1941.

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) *Inshore Patrol* (Commander Inshore Patrol)

Destroyer Patrol (2 DD)

Outer—1 DD

Inner—1 DD

Boom Patrol (1 Power Boat)

Harbor Patrol (4 Power Boats)

A/B Boom

Mine Sweepers—Magnetic (KEOSANQUA, YS-86) Anchored (Mine Force and Base Force Detail)

(b) *Base Defense Air Force* (Commander Patrol Wing Two) In conjunction with Army.

(c) *Anti Aircraft Defense* (District Marine Officer) In conjunction with Army.

(d) *Harbor Control Post* (District Operations Officer) In conjunction with Army.

1. *Information.* Attention is directed to Pacific Fleet Confidential letter No. CL-41 of 15 February 1941, to Pacific Fleet Confidential Memorandum No. 1 CM-41 of 25 February 1941, and to 14ND-JCD-13 (Hawaiian Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan).

By cooperation in support of the Army, Naval security measures will be established as necessary for the joint protection of PEARL HARBOR Base in order to safeguard the Fleet.

In conjunction with the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) will arrange to coordinate joint effort; to set conditions of readiness; to hold required drills; to make "alarm" and "all clear" signals.

Assumptions.

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

(1) Sabotage from small craft on ships based in PEARL HARBOR.

(2) Block the entrance channel to PEARL HARBOR by sinking an obstruction in the channel.

(3) Lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to PEARL HARBOR.

(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by:

(1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in base area—probable.

(2) A surprise air attack on ships in PEARL HARBOR—possible.

[2] (3) A combination of these two—possible.

2. This force, in cooperation with and in support of the Army, will establish security measures including air defense and surface ship patrol to enforce Presidential Proclamation No. 2375 of 4 November 1939, and General Order one hundred eighteen in order to protect PEARL HARBOR and to safeguard the Fleet.

3. (a) *Inshore Patrol.* Maintain a continuous patrol of the Interior Waters of PEARL HARBOR, and the seaward approaches thereto; sweep the PEARL HARBOR channel and its approaches against magnetic and anchored mines; operate and patrol the A/B boom; prevent approach to the channel entrance of any unauthorized vessel; maintain continuous listening watch for submarines; and report movement of foreign registry ships. Detailed Inshore Patrol Plan—Annex "A".

(b) *Base Defense Air Force.* Maintain readiness of shore based Fleet aircraft for joint effort in conjunction with Army air units against air attack on PEARL HARBOR area.

Commander Patrol Wing TWO in consultation with the Army will prepare detailed naval participation air defense plan—Annex "B".

(c) *Anti-Aircraft Defense.* Defense Battalions of the Fleet Marine Force present in PEARL HARBOR in conjunction with Army and Fleet units in PEARL HARBOR, provide anti-aircraft defense.

The District Marine Officer will, in consultation with Army and Fleet Officers concerned, prepare the detailed naval participation anti-aircraft defense plan—Annex "C".

(d) *Harbor Control Post.* Establish and maintain Harbor Control Post in the Operations Office, Fourteenth Naval District. Provide selected telephone circuits separate from dial system, to Army and Navy activities necessary for proper functioning of this post under present conditions. In conjunction and cooperation with Army personnel attached to Harbor Control Post train officer personnel and carry out duties prescribed in OpNav serial 041230 of 5 November 1940. Detailed Harbor Control Post Plan—Annex "D".

[3] (x) This plan will be implemented by orders and instructions to the task groups concerned incorporated in this plan as annexes. As operating experience is gained, and conditions change, these annexes will be revised and re-issued as replacements.

4. Logistics for Fleet details provided by Type Commanders; for District forces by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

5. (1) Communications in accordance with Annex "E".

(2) Use zone plus ten and one half time.

(3) Naval Base Defense Officer (Com 14) at Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District.

C. C. BLOCH.

Naval Base Defense Officer.

(Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District).

Annexes:

- A. Inshore Patrol Plan
- B. Base Defense Air Force Plan
- C. Anti-Aircraft Defense Plan
- D. Harbor Control Post Plan
- E. Communication Plan.

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Distribution-complete with Annexes.

CinCPAC (10)
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 Operations Officer 14ND
 Comdr. Inshore Patrol 14ND
 Captain of the Yard NYd PEARL
 District Intelligence Officer 14ND
 NTS-14ND (10)
 CO NAS PHTH (5)
 CO SUB BASE PHTH (5)
 COMAIRSCOFOR (3)
 CO USS PENNSYLVANIA (2)
 COMBATFOR (15)

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[1] File -A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14 (0563)

Confidential**ANNEX "A" REVISED TO NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE OPERATING PLAN No. 1-41**

Operation Plan I. S. P. No. A-1-41

HEADQUARTERS,
 NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE,
 FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) *Outer Harbor Patrol*: Senior Unit Commander or C. O. Desdiv Elghty, TANEY, and Fleet Vessels Detailed.

(1) *Picket line*: Unit Commander or Senior C. O. Not to be stationed at present.

(2) *Channel Entrance Patrol*: C. O. DD detailed. 1 DD, detailed by Comdesdiv Elghty, or TANEY.

(3) *Ready Duty Destroyer*: C. O. DD Detailed. 1 DD detailed by Comdesbatfor.

(b) *Harbor Channel Patrol*: Senior Boat Officer.

(1) *Entrance Channel Patrol*: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat. Not to be stationed at present.

(2) *Boom Patrol*: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat detailed by Combatfor.

(c) *Inner Harbor Patrol*: Senior Boat Officer. 4 Power Boats detailed by Combatfor and administered by Combase.

(1) *Drydock Channel Patrol*: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat.

(2) *East Loch Patrol*: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat.

(3) *Middle Loch Patrol*: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat.

(4) *West Loch Patrol*: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat.

(d) *A/B Boom*: Lieut. Spear.

Maintenance and Operating crews furnished by Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, and boom operated as at present.

(e) *Minecraft*:

(1) XAMc Division: Lieut. Cmdr. C. D. Kline, D-O, USNR REEDBIRD, CON-DOR, COCKATOO, CROSSBELL.

(2) YS-86; C. O. Towing Vessel. KEOSANOU, and YT-142 towing vessels detailed by Captain of the Yard, Pearl Harbor Navy Yard.

[2] 1. This paragraph same as paragraph 1 of basic plan, No. 1-41 Serial ND14 (0164) of 27 February, 1941. In addition, the following excerpts from "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy 1935" and "14ND J. C. D. 42 (Joint Coastal Defense Plan)," are quoted in order to clarify the extent and limits of the Harbor Patrol and to standardize the nomenclature of Task Groups:

"A defensive coastal area pertaining to a fortified harbor includes the *Outer Harbor Area*, the *Harbor Channel Area*, and the *Inner Harbor Area*."

"The *OAHU Defensive Coastal Area* (Oahu D. C. A.) comprises all water areas within circles and the connecting tangents drawn with points as centers and with respective radii as follows:—

| | |
|---------------------|--|
| KEAHI POINT----- | Forty-nine thousand (49,000) yards. |
| PUU KAPOLEI----- | Forty-five thousand (45,000) yards. |
| PUUIKI STATION----- | } Twenty-three thousand (23,000) yards." |
| KAHUKU POINT----- | |

"The Outer Harbor Area is the water area which extends to seaward from the outer exits of the entrance channels to a fortified harbor and lies within the range of the harbor defense batteries." (OAHU being a small island containing three fortified harbors, PEARL, HONOLULU and KANEOHE, whose defensive batteries comprise all the island coast defense batteries, the outer harbor areas of these harbors merge and complete the waters of the OAHU Defensive Coastal Area).

"The Harbor Channel Area is the water area which lies between the Outer Harbor Area and the Inner Harbor Area, and which comprises all the entrance channels to the harbor.

"The Inner Harbor Area is the entire water area of a fortified harbor inside the inner entrance of all the entrance channels to the harbor."

[3] This force will maintain a continuous patrol of the interior waters of PEARL HARBOR, and the seaward approaches thereto; sweep the PEARL HARBOR channel and its approaches against magnetic and anchored mines; patrol the A/B boom; prevent approach to the channel entrance of any unauthorized vessel; maintain continuous listening watch for submarines; and report movement of foreign registry ships.

3. (a) *Outer Harbor Patrol* maintain a continuous patrol of the water approaches to PEARL HARBOR as follows:

(1) *Picket Line* patrol the outer limits of the Outer Harbor Area (OAHU D. C. A.) Report all surface vessels, submarines, and aircraft sighted or contacted, and subsequent development and identification reports direct to Army Harbor Defense Command Posts and to Commander Inshore Patrol by voice radio on Patrol Group Inshore Patrol frequency 2760 2690 kcs. (2702 in peace time). Escort vessels through Outer Harbor Area (OAHU D. C. A.) as ordered. (Details in Addendum I)

(2) *Channel Entrance Patrol* patrol the seaward area within one and one half mile radius of entrance buoys. Enforce General Order one hundred eighteen. Prevent approach to the entrance channel of the harbor by any unauthorized vessel. If necessary to seize a vessel, report to Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District) for instructions. See District Order 17-41 (Revised). Report movements of foreign registry ships.

(3) *Ready Duty Destroyer* moor at normal berth in PEARL HARBOR or at discretion remain under way in vicinity of harbor entrance, ready to proceed immediately to re-enforce the Channel Entrance Patrol in repelling hostile run-in [4] attempts, submarine attacks, or mining operations; to act as screening vessel in the area between PEARL HARBOR channel entrance buoys and outer limits of Outer Harbor Area for Gunnery School Vessels and others when ordered. Maintain the following condition of readiness: Boiler Power for twenty-five (25) knots. (If moored in port, steaming and sea watches posted, engines ready to answer all bells, and ship ready to get underway).

(b) *Harbor Channel Patrol* maintain continuous patrol of Harbor Channel waters as follows:

(1) *Boom Patrol* patrol the seaward side of the A/B boom in order to safeguard the boom and prevent damage thereto by sabotage attempts from small craft or from shore. (Details in Addendum I).

(2) *Entrance Channel Patrol* patrol the entrance channel from the A/B boom to the entrance buoys and the waters of the Defensive Sea Area of PEARL HARBOR inshore of the entrance buoys. (Details in Addendum I).

(c) *Inner Harbor Patrol* maintain continuous patrol of the interior waters of PEARL HARBOR in order to control small boat traffic, guard against laying of mines in the harbor, and prevent damage to ships of the Fleet at anchor and to Navy Yard waterfront property, from sabotage attempts. (Details in Addendum I).

(d) A/B Boom to be maintained and operated at present under the Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.

(e) *Minecraft* conduct sweeping operations in the seaward approaches to PEARL HARBOR as follows:

(1) XAMc Division daily, commencing at 0200, sweep a channel one mile wide on either side of [5] buoyed channel axis extended) from entrance buoys to the one hundred fathom curve. Carry out daily operations with two vessels each making single ship sweep, one for moored mines and one for magnetic mines. Immediately upon completion of sweeping operation, the senior commanding officer of the sweeping group will send the following despatch "priority" in plain language, addressed to the Commandant Navy Yard PEARL HARBOR and Commander Inshore Patrol, Fourteenth Naval District, "Clear" to mean

"The sweeping operation at the PEARL HARBOR channel entrance is completed."

(2) YS-86 conduct magnetic sweeping as ordered.

(x) (1) The following task groups under Task Organization will not be stationed at present, due to lack of available vessels:

(a) (1) *Picket Line.*

(b) (2) *Entrance Channel Patrol.*

(2) The following task group under Task Organization will be administered by Commander Base Force in accordance with Base Force Operation Plan No. 6-40 of 12 June 1940:

(c) Inn Harbor Patrol

4. Logistics as provided in basic plan No. 1-41 of Serial ND14 (0164) of 27 February 1941.

5. Communications in accordance with Naval Base defense

Communication Plan, Annex E.

Use zone time plus ten and one half.

Commander Inshore Patrol, 14ND, at Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District.

/s/ G. B. Woolley

G. B. WOOLLEY,

Commander, U. S. N. (Ret).,

Commander Inshore Patrol,

Fourteenth Naval District.

/s/ J. W. Bays

J. W. BAYS,

Aide to Commandant.

Distribution:

Same as Basic Plan.

[1] C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14(0348)

Confidential

BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE, PATROL WING TWO,

FLEET AIR DETACHMENT, NAVAL AIR STATION,

Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 9, 1941.

ANNEX BAKER TO COMMANDER NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE OPERATION PLAN No. 1-41 DATED FEBRUARY 27, 1941—NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE OPERATION PLAN No. A-1-41

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) *Search and Attack Group* (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO))

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Patrol Squadrons.

Shore-based VO—VS units.

Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.

Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air.

Combat group.

Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.

Army bombardment squadrons.

Army reconnaissance squadrons.

Navy Utility squadrons.

(b) *Air Combat Group* (Senior VF Squadron Commander)

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.

Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.

One division of shore-based carrier type VS planes.

1. Information:

This plan is made in accordance with: The Joint Air Operations agreement approved and promulgated on 21 March 1941; Joint Estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action, addendum I to this plan; and Pacific fleet confidential letter No. 2CL-41 dated 15 February 1941. An air combat group under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Air Force will: Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft; Identify and report type of attacking aircraft; Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and

attack group; and as a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

[2] **Assumptions:** As in Addendum I of this plan. Antiaircraft gun control in the PEARL HARBOR area will be coordinated with operations under this plan. Air traffic lanes and recognition signals will be prescribed as found necessary.

2. This force will locate and destroy hostile forces raiding against OAHU or Fleet Units in the Operating Areas.

3. (a) **Search and Attack Group.** (a) Locate, report, and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

(b) **Air Combat Group.** (b) Operate as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force.

(x) This plan is effective upon receipt. It is operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack on OAHU. It might be made operative by despatch. In the meanwhile conditions of readiness prescribed in Addendum II will be taken as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department for Army units and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) for Navy units. This plan supersedes and replaces Annex Baker of Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41 of 27 February 1941. Units assigned to task groups of this plan shall make readiness reports in accordance with Addendum II of this plan.

4. The senior carrier commander based ashore at Fleet Air Detachment, PEARL HARBOR, shall at all times see that one division of VS planes is detailed to the Air Combat Group. When all carrier planes are to embark the Group Commander shall so inform the Commander Second Marine Aircraft Group who will make the detail required by this paragraph.

5. Communications in accordance with Annex Easy to Naval [3] Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-40 of 27 February 1941. Use zone plus ten and one-half time. Operation orders for the search and attack group will be separately distributed.

Addendum I—Joint Estimate.

Addendum II—Aircraft Readiness.

P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO).

Approved :

C. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Force.

Authenticated :
[Signature Illegible]
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

[1] C-A16-3/4-3(5)/ND14(0348)

CONFIDENTIAL

Commander Naval Base
Defense Air Force,
Patrol Wing Two,
Naval Air Station
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

MARCH 31, 1941.

Commanding General,
Hawaiian Air Force,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

ADDENDUM I TO NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. A-1-41

Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against OAHU or Fleet Units in the Hawaiian area.

I. Summary of the Situation.

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain, and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on OAHU might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

II. Survey of Opposing Strengths.

(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armored and armed with 10-8" guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However the best estimate at present available is that the small carriers can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones [2] about 60. Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch gun and least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area.

(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-based air force available to us is a constantly varying quantity which is being periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on OAHU, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over OAHU, as a complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present planes are used to bomb well defended ship objectives, the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for combatant work, can be used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other types of aircraft, in [3] general, can perform functions that accord with their type.

III. Possible Enemy Action.

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second

attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

IV. Action open to us:

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands:

1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.

2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force and its despatch for attack when information is available.

(c) In the event of an air attack on OAHU, in addition to (b) above:

1. The immediate despatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept the attackers.

2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range shore based aircraft.

3. The prompt despatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to their carrier.

[5] (d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addition to (b) above:

1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.

2. Despatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the attack area.

3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required:

1. Search Unit.

2. Attack Unit.

3. Air Combat Unit.

Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group commander.

V. Decisions:

1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against OAHU or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures.

[6] 2. *Subsidiary decisions.* In order to be in all respects prepared to promptly execute the above decision:

(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation plan:

1. *Search and Attack Group* (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO)) The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

- Patrol squadrons.
- Shore-based VO-VS units.
- Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
- Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.
- Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
- Army Bombardment squadrons.
- Army reconnaissance squadrons.
- Navy Utility squadrons.

2. *Air Combat Group* (Commander Hawaiian Air Force) The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

- Army pursuit squadrons.
- Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
- Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
- One division of shore-based carrier VS planes. (Primarily for trailing aircraft)

(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows:

1. *Search and Attack Group*. Locate, report and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of out surface vessel interception.

2. *Air Combat Group*. Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail [7] attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when:

(a) An air attack occurs on OAHU

(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable.

(c) Information is received that an attack has been made on fleet units.

(d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows: Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of readiness prescribed for that part.

MATERIAL READINESS

- A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
- B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for task.
- C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- E. All aircraft conducting routing operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

DEGREE OF READINESS

- 1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.
- 2. All types—30 minutes.
- 3. All types—one hour.
- 4. All types—two hours.
- 5. All types—four hours.

The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed therein.

(e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior Officers Present of the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them.

In using the above conditions it should be noted that: CONDITION A-1 requires a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a short time as it is an all hands condition. CONDITIONS B-1 and B-2 require watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any Condition I, 2, or 3 will curtail essential expansion training work. CONDITIONS C, or D, 4 or 5 can be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.

(f) In order to perfect fundamental communications by use and to insure that prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the forces immediately available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of a sudden emergency, provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of normal daily flying from all units to their prospective task force commander. These reports to state:

(a) Number of planes in the unit by functional types such as bomber, fighter, etc.

(b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of readiness as defined above.

(g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision (a) above has been issued, the task group commanders designated therein will prepare detailed contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable situations requiring quick action in order that the desired immediate action in an emergency can be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in this work the following temporary details will be made:

[9] (a) By Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO): an officer experienced in VF and VS operations and planning to assist the commander of Air Combat Group.

(b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an officer experienced in Army bombardment and reconnaissance operations and planning to assist the Commander of the Search and Attack Group.

F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.
P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO).

Authenticated:

/s/ J. W. HAYES,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

[1] C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14 (0348)

Confidential

BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE, PATROL WING TWO,
FLEET AIR DETACHMENT, NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 9, 1941.

ADDENDUM II TO NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. A-1-41- CONDITIONS OF READINESS AND READINESS REPORTS

1. Conditions of readiness will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

MATERIAL READINESS

- A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
- B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

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DEGREE OF OPERATIONAL READINESS

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and proceeding with the assigned task.

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.

2. All types—30 minutes.

3. All types—one hour.

4. All types—two hours.

5. All types—four hours.

2. The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the task assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed in these.

[2] 3. *Readiness Reports:*

(a) A despatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day shall be made by each unit assigned to a task group by this plan as follows:

(1) Units of "Search and Attack Group" to the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO).

(2) Units of the "Air Combat Group" to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force via Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

(b) These reports shall state:

(1) The number of operating planes in the unit by functional types as bomber, fighter, etc.

(2) The number of each type in material readiness for flight and their degree of operational readiness as defined above.

(c) The officer detaching VS planes to the Air Combat Unit (paragraph 4 of N. B. D. A. F. plan No. A-1-41) shall inform the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force and Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force by despatch of the detail and any changes therein.

ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSES

Task Organizations:

(a) *Group One:* All ships in PEARL HARBOR assigned by Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 to Sector I.

(b) *Group Two:* Those so assigned to Sector II.

(c) *Group Three:* Those so assigned to Sector III.

(d) *Group Four:* Those so assigned to Sector IV.

(e) *Group Five:* All antiaircraft units of Defense Battalions of the Marine Corps present.

1. *Information:* See Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41, Fourteenth Naval District Operation Plan 1-41 and OCABF-38. Information on special situations as they arise will be furnished to all units in accordance with the Communication Plan, Annex "E".

2. All naval forces of the Fourteenth Naval District and those of the U. S. Fleet in insular waters will support the Army antiaircraft defence of OAHU: (1) by gun fire, (2) by antiaircraft watches, and (3) by furnishing RADAR service when available.

3. (a) *Groups One to Four, inclusive:* Assume defense missions and defense conditions in accordance with the provisions of Pacific Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.

(b) *Group Five:* Report to Commanding General, Provisional Antiaircraft Brigade for tactical assignment. Conform to conditions of readiness prescribed for that brigade.

4. *Logistics: Group Five:* Classes 1, 2 and 3 Supplies—normal. Ammunition except for infantry weapons, to be furnished by COM 14.

5. *Group Five:* Command Post: To be announced later.

H. K. PICKETT,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps.
District Marine Officer.

Approved:

C. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Army,
Commander Naval Base Defense Force,
(Commandant, 14th Naval District).

[1] File A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14 (0164)

Confidential

HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
Washington, December 5, 1941.

Operation Plan No. 1-41

ANNEX "D"

Task Organization**(a) Harbor Control Post District Operations Officer.**

1. **Information.** As in basic plan No. 1-41. The Harbor Control Post has been established in the Operations Office, Fourteenth Naval District, in a modified form. The Army has provided telephone connections to the various Army Circuits listed herein, and will maintain a suitable watch at their various stations; the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade will endeavor to provide the Harbor Control Post with a teletype connecting into the HSCAB loop, and operator for same. Army officer personnel and secretaries for the Harbor Control Post will be provided from available personnel from HSCAB as needed. Army observation (lookout) stations around the island of OAHU will be manned as required and Army defense units will be placed in the condition of "alert" considered necessary. The water area under the cognizance of the Harbor Control Post embraces the OAHU Defensive Coastal Area, with particular interest in the area south of OAHU, and will be known as the Control Post Area.

2. This Harbor Control post will train personnel and operate in a modified form in accordance with OpNav serial 041230 in the establishment of security measures as necessary for the joint protection of PEARL HARBOR Base in order to safeguard the Fleet.

3. (a) Harbor Control Post.

(1) In conjunction and cooperation with the Army and Navy units listed below, man as necessary and operate the following direct telephone connections:

Harbor Control Post to
Hdqtrs. Haw'n Dept. Ft. Shafter
Hdqtrs. HSCAB, Ft. Derussy
Command Post, Ft. Kamehameha
Command Post, Hickam Field
Commander Patrol Wing Two
SOPE (if at dock)
Navy Yard Signal Tower
Navy Yard Power House

(2) In conjunction with Army and Navy reporting, communication, and intelligence agencies be prepared to "alert" Army and Navy forces against aircraft or other surprise attack, and assist in coordinating their defense measures. Direct Yard Power [2] House when to sound air raid and blackout alarms and the secure signal.

(3) Report promptly any action taken to immediate Superiors in Command, Army and Navy, and keep them advised of all known developments.

(4) In conjunction with Commander Inshore Patrol, Captain of the Yard, and District Public Works Officer keep the Army Harbor Defenses informed of authorized ship movements within the Control Post Area.

(x) (1) All personnel of Harbor Control Post will become familiar with the Communication Plan, Annex "E," and be prepared to direct Power House as to Signal to be used (See paragraph 6,000, *Special Signals*.)

(2) Obtain from Commander Inshore Patrol the day-by-day list of Patrol and mine sweeping vessels under his command. Maintain up to date data on Army-Navy defenses and Conditions of Readiness.

(3) This annex will be revised from time to time as operating experience is gained, facilities are increased, and conditions change.

4. (1) Telephone switchboard watch standers will be provided from the enlisted personnel of the Organized Reserves on active duty. Until such time as watch standers are available to the Operations Officer, the necessary officer watch standing duties after working hours, will be carried out by the District and Navy Yard Duty Officer.

(2) The following Conditions of Readiness are prescribed for the Harbor Control Post:

Condition I: Post fully manned and ready to operate in all respects.

Condition II: Post manned by Army and Navy watch officers, telephone and teletype operators on watch.

Note: Conditions I and II are "Alert" conditions.

Condition III: Normal condition. Telephone operator on watch. District and Yard Duty Officer on call.

[3] 5. (1) The Harbor Control Post may be called on any of the telephones listed in paragraph 3. (a) (1). The District Operations Officer may be reached over these telephones during working hours, and over dial phones 411 and 508; after working hours on Honolulu 75143.

(2) Use zone plus ten and one half time.

(3) District Operations Officer at Harbor Control Post (District Operations Office), headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District.

/s/ H. B. Knowles
H. B. KNOWLES
Commander, U. S. Navy
District Operations Officer

Approved:

/s/ C. C. Bloch
C. C. BLOCH
Naval Base Defense Officer
(Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District)

Distribution: In accordance with Distribution List of Operating Plan No. 1-41

EXHIBIT NO. 45

NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

[Stamped notation:] Nov 28, 1941. Noted—Chief of Staff.

(WBS—handwritten). Noted—Deputy Chief of Staff.

(WBS—handwritten).

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

1. The Secretary of War sent for me about 9:30 a. m., November 27, 1941. General Bryden was present. The Secretary wanted to know what warning messages have been sent to General MacArthur and what were proposed: I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24. I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting. He told me he had telephoned both Mr. Hull and the President this morning. Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been terminated with the barest possibility of resumption. The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines. I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

2. Later in the morning, I attended a conference with the Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, and Admiral Stark. The various messages to the Army and Navy Commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed. A joint message for General MacArthur and Admiral Hart was approved (copy attached). The Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum you and Admiral Stark directed be prepared for the President. The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations. He was reassured on that point. It was agreed that the memorandum would be shown to both Secretaries before dispatch.

3. Both the message and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War. He suggested some minor changes in the memorandum. These were made (copy attached).

(Signed) L. T. Gerow
L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

2 Incls:

Memo. for President, 11-27-41

Memo. for TAG, 11-27-41

EXHIBIT NO. 46

PC 14

325F

CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

NOVEMBER 28, 1941

453A M.

From MANILA PI

To GENERAL GEORGE C MARSHALL

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 1004 NOVEMBER TWENTY EIGHTH
 PURSUANT TO INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN YOUR RADIO SIX
 TWO FOUR AIR RECONNAISSANCE HAS BEEN EXTENDED AND
 INTENSIFIED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE NAVY STOP GROUND
 SECURITY MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN STOP WITHIN THE
 LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY PRESENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT
 OF THIS THEATRE OF OPERATIONS EVERYTHING IS IN READINESS
 FOR THE CONDUCT OF A SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE STOP INTIMATE
 LIAISON AND COOPERATION AND CORDIAL RELATIONS EXIST
 BETWEEN ARMY AND NAVY

46 A G O
 DEC 3 1941
 Received

MACARTHUR

NOTED - CHIEF OF STAFF

NOTED, WPD R18

Action Copy

F.N.

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg. Washington, D.C.

From

To

As per furnished as memo

U.S. DEPT. OF WAR

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.C.

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[Handwritten signature/initials]

Action Copy

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE, SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF

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| | Budget & Legislative Planning Branch..... |
| | Statistics Branch..... |
| | Executive for Reserve Affairs..... |

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| Necessary action | Draft of reply. |
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| Comment or concurrence. | Signature. |
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{direction} of Sec. War. | D. C. of S. |

By direction of D. C. of S. *[Signature]*




EXHIBIT NO. 47

[Telegram received]

TK. This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC).

From: Chungking via N. R.

Dated November 3, 1941

Rec'd 8:48 P. M.

SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

435, November 3, 5 p. m., (Section One).

Reference my 431 not rec'd in Dept. of November 1, 11 a. m.

Foreign Minister has now sent me copy of Generalissimo's message to President which was telegraphed yesterday to Hu Shih who no doubt will make it available to the Department. I am forwarding copy by airmail unless instructed to repeat it by radio.

The message differs in form but not in substance from that originally summarized to me by Foreign Minister.

It is not yet certain that Japan will undertake the difficult invasion of Yunnan from Indochina but I believe it is certain that in any case large Japanese air forces will operate from that base against the Burma Road within China and against the American or any other volunteer air force when they enter China.

It is true, of course, that a major defeat of a Japanese attack upon Yunnan would have very advantageous effects in restraining Japanese ambitions in the Far East.

If it should be found possible and practicable to send Anglo-American air units into Yunnan they should be in sufficient force to maintain themselves against heavy Japanese air concentrations.

GAUSS.

KLP

[Telegram received]

DES. This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC).

From: Chungking via N. R.

Dated November 3, 1941

Rec'd 6:45 a. m., 4th.

SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

Priority.

435, November 3, 5 p. m. (Section Two).

Half or token measures would prove disastrous. Maintenance and supply of such an air force in Yunnan would heavily tax facilities of the Burma Road, operation of which would probably need to be under effective military control. Advance depots of supplies would need to be built up at once. Time factor is of utmost importance if as the Generalissimo thinks, Japanese are to move in immediate future.

The successful invasion of Yunnan by the Japanese would probably seriously affect Chinese morale and deprive China of supplies for continued organized resistance. I do not believe however, that it would result in any early solution of Japan's problem in China. Japan would still find herself obliged to maintain large forces in this country for an indefinite period.

(End of Message)

GAUSS.

BB

(Handed me by Mr. Liu XI-4-41, 9:30 a. m. /s/ SKH)

Telegram from Chungking November 2, 1941

(Rec'd from S File—H. E. F.)

Confidential.

Message of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to President Roosevelt.

"In view of a rapidly developing danger which threatens to change the whole military situation in China, I have communicated the following views to Mr. Winston Churchill:

"Intelligence in which I have complete confidence shows that the Japanese are determined upon an attack against Yunnan from Indo-China in order to take Kunming and to cut China's lines of communication with Britain and the United States. Preparations are already on foot and the attack may be expected shortly. This is in my view the first step in their policy of expansion either northward or southward, and I feel therefore that I should bring to your notice certain facts and aspects of the situation. Indeed I feel it my duty and my right to impress them upon you, for much the future lies in your hands.

"Once Kunming is taken, the Japanese would be rid of all fear of attack in the rear. You will, I feel sure, be the first to see that its capture is not merely one objective of Japan's war of aggression on [2] China but is a first and necessary step to free herself for fresh enterprises. And you will appreciate how vitally the coming battle will bear upon the safety of all countries on the Pacific, upon yourselves and ourselves alike.

"You know you may count upon me to do my utmost to defend Kunming, and believe me when I tell you that my armies can do it. But you know as I do that I have no air force. And without an air force what can our army do against another that is strong in the air? A glance at the map will show that if the city falls, China will be cut off from supplies outside, and her armies will be encircled and deprived of all contact with yours and those of her other friends. And moreover the morale of the Chinese army and Chinese people will be shaken to its foundation. Our morale has stood for more than four years on the eastern fronts where our friends cannot directly reach us. It would be gravely menaced by a Japanese triumph on the one front where as all the nation knows the armed forces of our friends are within a hand's reach. For the first time in this long war a real collapse of resistance would be possible.

"For more than four years now China has kept some five million men in the field and thus immobilizes the [3] man-power of Japan. The implications of this must be clear to you; indeed I think they are already recognized by yourself and all other friends of China. If Kunming fell, Japan would then be able to cast all caution away and turn her whole might elsewhere. The coming battle is therefore not merely a question of victory or defeat of China but the peace and security of the Pacific hang upon it. Indeed it is not too much to say that the outcome of the European (?) war may hang upon it.

"If China had the air force she needs, I should be making no appeal to you, because I should feel confident of our ability to defeat the invaders. But we have nothing that can be called an air force to match against what the Japanese would bring to bear upon us, for we may be sure that they will use their finest and their strongest. If however in the battle the Japanese air force can be checked or even smashed, her power to enter upon what I have called fresh enterprise will be much diminished. It is true that her navy will remain to her, but with that she can do little without the strength in the air without which there would be an end to her schemes of expansion. From then on her submission could be brought about by political and economic pressure. Do not let us therefore make mistakes as they have made elsewhere in this [4] war, and let the Japanese attack us, as they mean to do, one by one, I am not asking you to declare war upon Japan. I merely wish to leave you in no doubt about the situation in which I find myself, to make it clear that I am no match of the enemy in the air, to tell you what this means and to suggest a remedy. The American volunteer air force now under training is good but very small. Our only hope is that the British air force in Malaya, with American cooperation, may come into action and support the American volunteers and the existing Chinese air force. The British air force could cooperate as part of the Chinese air force or assume the role of an international volunteer force. The result would be to save China and to save the Pacific.

"You might feel at a first glance that this would involve you in war with Japan while you are fighting with such courage in Europe and the Middle East. I see things otherwise. I do not believe that Japan feels that she has the strength to attack so long as the resistance of China persists. But once she is rid of this, she will attack you as and when it suits her and whether or not she is * * * by such action on your part as I have now suggested. It would be impossible to minimize the importance of British air action in Yunnan, for upon this the fate of democratic cause will [5] turn. China has reached the most critical phase of her war of resistance. Her ability to defend landward approaches to Singapore and Burma now depends primarily on British and American willingness to cooperate in the defence of Yunnan. If the Japanese

can break our front here we shall be cut off from you, and the whole structure of your own air and naval coordination with America and the Netherlands East Indies will be seriously threatened in new ways and from a new direction. I should like to express, with all the strength at my command, the conviction that wisdom and foresight demand that China be given the plea that I have indicated. Nothing else can ensure alike the defeat of Japan and the success of the countries now resisting aggression."

"I have also discussed the strategic subject matter of the foregoing letter with Brigadier-General Magruder and have asked him to convey to you what I consider to be the decisive importance of the campaign in Yunnan. In addition I should like to urge on you my conviction that British determination in dealing with Japan waits at present upon the lead and stimulating influence of America; if the United States would draw on its air arm in the Philippines to provide either an active unit or a reserve force in the combined operation. I am convinced that unless Japan is checked sharply and at once, she is on the verge of winning a position from which she can deal with each of us separately and in her own time. The opportunity to check her is a fleeting one. You [6] are, Mr. President, recognized as the leader in the front of democratic nations fighting aggression. I feel sure that you will move with the rapidity that the urgency of the moment demands. It is now essential to avoid the errors by which statesmen of Europe allowed Nazi Germany to divide them and to acquire a commanding position, and to prevent Japan from attacking us in succession and separately and thus attaining the stature of a second Nazi Germany in the Far East."

(signed) CHIANG KAI-SHEK

In reply refer to No. Op-16-F-2

Copy No. 1

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Office of Naval Intelligence,
Washington, November 1, 1941.

Secret

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Subject: Dispatch from Alusna, Chungking, 300850

1. In this dispatch Major McHugh assumes that a Japanese drive from northern Indo-China to cut the Burma Road is imminent. He further states that the only hope of blocking this drive would be active participation in the campaign of all American and British Far Eastern air units which would require foreign (presumably American) seizure and control of means of transportation and air fields in Yunnan province.

2. In a message which the American Ambassador states is now being forwarded to President Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek states that the Japanese will launch a drive to cut the Burma Road within 30 days. He takes a somewhat less serious view of the situation than does Major McHugh. Chiang says that he has land forces adequate to defend the road but will need air support. He indicates that he desires aid from British and American air effectives in Singapore and Manila in a voluntary status. He says nothing about foreign control of Chinese air fields and Chinese means of communication.

3. Considering the extreme difficulty of the terrain between the Indo-China border and Kunming, it is believed that the Chinese, if they fight and are given some air support from Britain and America, can halt this Japanese drive. The Japanese now have less than 100,000 men in Indo-China. How many they can transport there in the next 30 days is problematical, but it is considered that they cannot maintain their present concentrations (which threaten Russia in the North), maintain their present garrisons in China, and at the same time spare more than 200,000 troops for the drive into Yunnan.

4. The real question here is: Will the Chinese fight? In this connection there have been many rumors that Lung Yun, Governor of Yunnan Province, has sold out or soon will sell out to Wang Ching-wei. If this happens there is little that Chiang Kai-shek, the British, or the United States can do to save the Burma Road. This rumor, however, lacks confirmation.

5. Chinese character should also be taken into consideration. When aid is promised to them they have a strong tendency to stop fighting themselves, sit back, and wait until the aid arrives. For this reason it might be well not to promise them too much. One other point should be mentioned. What Major

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McHugh recommends is war-like action by the United States and Britain against Japan—in short, de-facto war with Japan. If we are going to fight Japan, rather than transporting our men and equipment to far-off West Yunnan province, thus placing ourselves under all the handicaps of difficult transportation, it would seem more sensible to attack the Japanese supply lines and home bases from our already established bases, thus diverting their attention from the Burma Road.

(Signed) R. A. BOONE,
For A. H. McCOLLUM.

Distribution: Original and 1 copy to DNI—Copy No. 1 and 2

CC—Op-16—F—Copy No. 3

Op-10/11—Copy No. 4

Op-12—Copy No. 5

File—Copy No. 6

[Copy]

Secret

From: Alusna, Chungking. Action: OPNAV PRIORITY

Date: 30 October 1941.

Tor Coderoom: 1450.

Decoded by: TIERS.

Paraphrased by: REISS.

~~300850~~ CR 0531

Active participation all American British Far East air units would be only hope for blocking invasion Yunnan which Sinos now seek. Supply and protection available fields however very serious task not repeat not presently feasible under existing conditions. Transport over Burma Road still insufficient and lacking coordination. Problem possible of solution only if highest home authorities order immediate action thereby justifying seizure and operating under foreign control of all available transport including civil air. Believe Chiang will support this also that general public reaction would inspire voluntary Sino cooperation. Present indirect methods for timely results totally inadequate.

20 OP File CNO File

Distribution:

16 Action Record Copy 12 13 Bauer File.

Naval Message

Phone Extension Number:

Addresses

Navy Department

Message precedence

From: Alusna Chungking

Released by: OPNAV P P P P P P

Astalusna Shanghai

Date: 30 October 1941

CINCPAC

P P P P P P

TOR Coderoom: 1433

CINCAF

De/coded by: TIERS

COMSOPAT

Paraphrased by: V. TUCKER

COM 16TH Nav Dist

Troops arrived daily Haiphong plus steady stream of supplies and materials reported arriving at Formosa and Hainan indicate possible invasion Yunnan. Such operation while difficult would be feasible if executed in force. Chinese contention that it would be turning point in battle for Asia believed correct. Capture of Kunming would completely crush Sino resistance while penetration even to Mengtze would close Burma Road. Foreign attaches here agree minimum requirement is 7 divisions and preferably ten.

Distribution:

16 Action

10/11 12 13 20OP FILE FILE.

[Stamped:] Confidential Top Secret.

OCTOBER 28, 1941.

2:42 P. M.

NPM 5342
Filed 0140*Priority*

From: CHUNGKING.

To: FOR AMMISCA.

Number 28. October 28th.

Part 1. Especial attention Secretary of War and Chief of Staff. The Generalissimo, who has been absent since our arrival, received me today, accompanied by MacMorland. After exchange of messages and amenities he expressed deep appreciation for the sending of the mission.

In order to get his reaction to the objectives of the mission I outlined my conception of the methods to be employed in making available the assistance afforded by lend lease material and services. I suggested five different military problems to which lend lease material was applicable and regarding which our personnel could collaborate on the solution. These were: 1, the communications problem; 2, the aviation project; 3, the supply of equipment to reorganized army forces; 4, the supply of raw materials; 5, the projects for training in and maintenance of new material.

Part 2. He made a note of these five points and expressed satisfaction with this method of approach, then quickly singled out aviation as the most pressing problem. He stated bluntly that he would like the mission to take over the control and development of his aviation service, disregarding apparently the Chinese air force and referring to Chennault's volunteer force as the only aviation that counted.

He requested with emphasis that a high ranking aviation officer be sent to take over his air force.

[2] I had no opportunity to comment on these points.

Becoming intently earnest he said there was another emergency about which he wished to ask immediate assistance. More follows.

Part 3. The Japanese, he knew, were preparing to attack Kunming from Indo China and cut the Burma Road. He expects the attack by the end of November. By a concentration of his land forces he could resist this attack, he said, but only if he had air support. Then, queried later, he insisted that he had the resources to defeat the Japanese if air assistance were forthcoming. The generalissimo insisted, and rightly, that Chinese resistance would end if Kunming were lost. In his analysis he argued that Kunming was the key to the Pacific, if it fell, China would fall, and the attack on Malay Asia would inevitably follow. War in the Pacific then, was a certainty. If China could hold, peace in the Pacific might be saved. But China must have air support, he repeated. The British should reinforce the American volunteer unit. They must be convinced of the necessity of this course of action. Although not so expressed, it was to be inferred that no other assistance would be forthcoming in time. Not once did he mention American reinforcements of any kind, pleading the critical situation he repeatedly said that only British air support could save China and peace in the Pacific.

Part four. The generalissimo then asked directly that I inform Washington of the threatening situation at once, and urge that the President intercede with London to make available the Singapore air forces to support his defense. Also he requested me personally to appeal to the British commander in chief in Singapore to the same effect. Para. Quoting some announcement of the administration to the effect that a movement [3] southward by Japan would be considered inimical to American interests, he argued that our govt could properly interpret an attack on Kunming in that light. Even worse, since it would be the first item in a more effective movement south if Chinese resistance were eliminated he added that with the Burma Road cut, America's right to trade with China would be infringed.

Part 5. He then pled that the President be urged to bring diplomatic pressure on Japan and to appeal as well to Britain jointly to warn Japan that an attack upon Kunming would be considered inimical to our interests. This course, he believed, would cause Japan to desist.

In the circumstances, I had no opportunity to turn the interview into channels in which I was authorized to act. I seized one opportunity to point to the critical deficiency of operations on the Burma Road that the success of the defense depended upon improving the traffic there whether or not the British gave all support. I further reminded him that an argument the British might offer for refusing

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support would be their inability to supply their air units with the road in its present condition. With respect to the road I made clear that the mission was prepared to offer technical assistance in improving the conditions but that the political complications would have to be cleared by the Chinese themselves.

Part 6. The generalissimo informed me that he had taken up the question of aviation support with the British Ambassador on several occasions. Madame Chiang interjected that the Chinese had given assurances of support of large land forces if Singapore were attacked, but that Britain refused to give assurances of air support if Kunming were attacked, unless British territory were invaded.

I told the generalissimo that I could transmit his request to the Secretary of War.

[4] Previous to the interview I had drafted a radio on the subject of the probability of an attack on Kunming. Present indications point strongly that way. If successful, there is little doubt that China's resistance would end. Also it is doubtless true that without effective air support the Japanese might succeed in this decisive effort.

Part seven. It may not be an exaggeration to say that Kunming momentarily has become the key to the Pacific. There is no combat value in the Chinese air force. The American volunteers alone at present strength and as presently equipped are ineffective and will not be ready for combat for several months. Increments of lend lease aviation matériel contemplated will be too little and too late. Only British forces at Singapore, or perhaps organized units from the Philippines would be available in time to afford effective support to China.

I have discussed the interview with our Ambassador and he has read this radio.

MAGRUDER.

EXHIBIT NO. 48

WPD 2917-32

WPD 2917-26-47 396

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
WAR PLANS DIVISION,
Washington, November 17, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Method of Coordination of Command
in Coastal Frontiers.

1. The attached Joint Board case has been before the Joint Planning Committee since last February. At a recent meeting of The Joint Board, Admiral Stark suggested that the Army take action on the Navy proposal.

2. The case is divisible into two main subjects—Changes in Coastal Frontiers and the assignment of Command in the Caribbean, Panama, Hawaii and Philippine Coastal Frontiers. The Army and Navy sections of The Joint Planning Committee have reached an agreement with regard to changes in Coastal Frontiers. They disagree, however, as to the service that should exercise Unity of Command in the Coastal Frontiers.

3. The proposals of the Army and Navy Sections on command are outlined in the attached Memorandum to you. The Memorandum also embodies my views on the question of unity command in the Caribbean Area, Hawaii, and the Philippines.

4. If The Joint Board desires definite action on this case, I recommend that you approve the attached Memorandum. I believe the Navy will agree with the solution proposed, which simply means that we will continue to operate by mutual cooperation. If you do not wish to raise the question of command at this time I can hold the case in suspense for the time being.

/s/ L. T. Gerow,
L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

2 Incls:

Memo. to C/S, fr.
Actg. A. C. of S., WPD.
JB No. 350 (Ser. 678)

[1]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
WAR PLANS DIVISION,
Washington, November 17, 1941.

WPD 2917-32

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Method of Coordination of Command in
Coastal Frontiers.

I. Discussion.

1. Joint Board case (J. B. No. 350, Serial 678) prescribing coordination of command is now before the Joint Planning Committee.

2. The Navy section proposes changes in command relations in the following coastal frontiers:

a. Caribbean.

Coordination by the method of unity of command, command being vested in the Commandant of the 10th Naval District.

b. Panama.

Coordination by unity of command, command being vested in the Commanding General, Panama Canal Department except when major naval forces are based in the frontier for general strategic naval operations in either the Caribbean Sea or the Pacific Ocean. In this contingency command would be vested in the Commandant of the 15th Naval District.

c. Hawaii.

Coordination by unity of command as follows:

(1) Command vested in Commanding General, Hawaiian Department when the most important strategic problem is one of territorial defense of the Hawaiian Islands and when major naval forces have been withdrawn and not based in the frontier for general strategic naval operations either in the vicinity or at a distance.

(2) Command vested in the Commandant of the 14th Naval District when major naval forces are based in the frontier for general strategic naval operations either in the vicinity or at a distance.

3. The Army section proposes the following, applicable to all coastal frontiers:

a. Unity of command over forces assigned to the defense of a coastal frontier is vested in the Army, except when the United States Atlantic or Pacific Fleet or the major portion thereof is operating against comparable hostile forces within the radius of possible support by Army aviation operating from bases within the coastal frontier. In the excepted case, unity of command is vested in the Navy.

[2] b. In a specific operation, unity of command in coastal frontiers may be transferred from the Army to the Navy and vice versa, when the senior Army and Navy commanders concerned agree that such change is necessary and further agree as to the service that shall exercise such command.

c. Unity of command does not authorize the service in which it is vested to assign missions that will require the forces of the other service to operate from bases outside the coastal frontier.

4. The Army and Navy sections of the Joint Planning Committee have been unable to reach an agreement on a compromise solution of the problem of unity of command. The Army section does not believe that unity of command in coastal frontiers is essential. It is believed that the Navy section will agree to a continuation of coordination by mutual cooperation.

5. The vesting in a single individual of full responsibility for a military operation is a generally accepted principle for the accomplishment of effective military action. In theory at least, no amount of personal willingness to cooperate can eliminate the objections inherent in the committee system of control of military forces. The most frequently cited recent example of the effect of such divided responsibility is that of failure of the defense of Crete as contrasted with the successful attack on that Island in which the attacking force presumably was commanded by a single individual.

6. Unity of command is the accepted method of coordination within the Army and within the Navy, themselves. However, the many practical difficulties encountered in the application of that principle as applied to joint operations of the Army and Navy have usually led to the adoption of the method of coordination by mutual cooperation except when specific tasks are planned.

7. The difficulty of determining the service in which unity of command should vest in the defense of a coastal frontier lies in the inability to determine in advance when hostilities will begin and the nature and the extent of the operations. For that reason it is difficult to foresee which service will play the major part in the defense and will have primary interest. The major responsibility may well pass from one service to the other during defensive operations. On the other hand, overseas landing expeditions or land operations requiring support from Naval forces, such as those in Libya, present problems in which the service having preponderance of responsibility can readily be determined. The time such an operation should begin, as well as terminate, and its nature and extent can be forecast and the service having the preponderance of responsibility definitely agreed upon between the two services, thereby indicating the service in which unity of command should vest. In [3] such operations the preponderance of responsibility will not fluctuate from one service to the other as might be the case in defense of coastal frontiers.

8. A fact frequently lost sight of in consideration of the method of coordination under the principle of mutual cooperation is that, although the major operation is being conducted under that principle, joint operations subordinate thereto may still be conducted under the principle of unity of command if so agreed to by the Army and Navy commanders concerned. This method is particularly applicable to joint operations by forces having similar combat characteristics, such as the air forces of the two services.

II. Action recommended.

That coordination of joint operations in the Caribbean, Panama and Hawaiian Coastal Frontiers continue to be effected by mutual cooperation. If this recommendation is approved, such a proposal will be discussed with the Navy section of the Joint Planning Committee.

/s/ L. T. Gerow
L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

[1] OCS 21278-10

GCM
DECEMBER 20, 1941.

Personal and Confidential

MY DEAR EMMONS: Instructions to the Army and Navy were issued a few days ago assigning unity of command to the Navy in Hawaii. At the same time unity of command was assigned to the Army in Panama.

For your confidential information, this action was taken in the following circumstances: In the first place, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were determined that there should be no question of future confusion as to responsibility. Further, the efforts I have been making for more than a year to secure unity of command in various critical regions had been unavailing. All sorts of Naval details, such as the operations of ships and submarines, the coordination of efforts to locate purely Naval objectives, and similar matters had been raised in objection to Army control wherever that was proposed. I must say at the same time that some of the Army staff brought up somewhat similar objections to Naval control. Both Stark and I were struggling to the same end, but until this crash of December 7th the difficulties seemed, at least under peacetime conditions, almost insurmountable. However, the two decisions I have just referred to have been made and further ones are in process of being made, all of which I feel will add immeasurably to our security, whatever the local embarrassments. Also, I regard these as merely stepping stones to larger decisions involved in our relations with Allies.

I am giving you this information in order that you may better appreciate the problem and, therefore, be better prepared to assist me by endeavoring to work with Nimitz in complete understanding.

Whatever difficulties arise that cannot be adjusted locally, should be brought to our attention here for consideration by Admiral Stark and myself. These days are too perilous for personal feelings in any way to affect efficiency.

This is a very hasty note, but I want General McCoy to take it off with him this morning.

You have my complete confidence and I will do everything possible to support you.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd.) G. C. MARSHALL.

General DELOS C. EMMONS,
Commanding Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, T. H.

MY

EXHIBIT NO. 48A

Confidential

2017-32

WAR DEPARTMENT.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF.
Washington, December 5, 1941.

OCS 21278-5

Memorandum for General Gerow:

I would like this matter of Coordination of Command discussed with the Naval Section of the Joint Planning Committee. However, I think it is important that a general policy, or what might be called an explanation, should first be decided on, expressed in carefully considered sentences, as to the *application* of unity command.

A discussion of this runs through a series of paragraphs on your memorandum and you have covered it orally to me, but no where is it presented in a concise form.

[handwritten] G. C. M.
Chief of Staff.

Copy

EXHIBIT NO. 49

SECRETU. S. Serial 01-512-12(R)E.U.S.(J)(41)50Short title ABC-1UNITED STATES - BRITISHSTAFF CONVERSATIONSREPORT

[Permitted notation:]

Approved by Sir Harry 28 Aug 41
" " " War 2 Jan 41

Not approved by President

WASHINGTON, D.C.
March 27, 1941.

[Permitted notation:]

For map showing Landeria
described in ABC-1 see
Copy No. 97 of ABC 1 & 2Copy No. 98 of 125.

SECRETU. S. Serial 011512-12(R)B. U. S. (J)(41)30Short Title ABC-1UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONSLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

| | <u>No. of pages</u> | <u>Change in effect</u> |
|-------------------------|---|-------------------------|
| Cover Page | 1 | ORIGINAL |
| List of Effective Pages | 11 | ORIGINAL |
| Report | title page unnumbered
pages 2 to 10 inc. | ORIGINAL |
| Annex I | pages 1 to 4 inc. | ORIGINAL |
| Annex II | title page unnumbered
pages 2 to 3 inc. | ORIGINAL |
| Annex III | pages 1 to 32 inc. | ORIGINAL |
| Annex IV | title page unnumbered
pages 2 to 5 inc. | ORIGINAL |
| Annex V | title page only
(unnumbered) | ORIGINAL |

Copy No. 98 125.

-11-

SECRET

U. S. Serial 011512-12(R)

B.U.S.(J)(41)30

Short Title ABC-1

March 27, 1941

UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONS

REPORT

GENERAL

1. Staff Conversations were held in Washington from January 29, 1941 to March 27, 1941, between a United States Staff Committee representing the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army, and a United Kingdom Delegation representing the Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the Dominions of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were associated with the United Kingdom Delegation throughout the course of these conversations, but were not present at joint meetings.

2. The personnel of the United States Staff Committee and of the United Kingdom Delegation comprise the following:

United States Representatives:

Major-General S. D. Embick
Brigadier-General Sherman Miles
Brigadier-General L. T. Gorow
Colonel J. T. McNarney

British Representatives:

Rear-Admiral R. H. Bellairs
Rear-Admiral V. H. Danckwerts
Major-General E. L. Morris
Air Vice-Marshal J. C. Slessor
Captain A. W. Clarke

Rear-Admiral R. L. Ghormley
Rear-Admiral R. K. Turner
Captain A. G. Kirk
Captain DeWitt C. Ramsey
Lt.-Colonel O. T. Pfeiffer

Secretariat:

Lt.-Colonel W. P. Scooby
Commander L. R. McDowell
Lt.-Colonel A. T. Cornwall-Jones

PURPOSES
OF THE
STAFF
CONFERENCE.

3. The purposes of the Staff Conference, as set out in the instructions to the two representative bodies, were as follows:

(a) To determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and British Commonwealth, with its present Allies, could defeat Germany and the Powers allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war.

Copy No. 98 of 125.

SECRET

U. S. Serial 011512-12(R)

E.O.S.(J)(41)30.

Short Title ABC-1

March 27, 1941

(b) To coordinate, on broad lines, plans for the employment of the forces of the Associated Powers.

(c) To reach agreements concerning the methods and nature of Military Cooperation between the two nations, including the allocation of the principal areas of responsibility, the major lines of the Military Strategy to be pursued by both nations, the strength of the forces which each may be able to commit, and the determination of satisfactory command arrangements, both as to supreme Military control, and as to unity of field command in cases of strategic or tactical joint operations.

APPROVAL
OF THE
REPORT.

4. The Staff Conference, interpreting the foregoing instructions in the light of the respective national positions of the two Powers, has reached agreements, as set forth in this and annexed documents, concerning Military Cooperation between the United States and the British Commonwealth and its present Allies should the United States associate itself with them in war against Germany and her Allies. The agreements herewith submitted are subject to confirmation by:

(a) The Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet in the United Kingdom.

(b) The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

5. The Chiefs of Staff will request His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to endeavor to obtain, where necessary, the concurrence of His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions, the Government of India, and the Governments of Allied Powers to the relevant provisions of the agreements herein recorded. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff will similarly request the United States Government to endeavor to obtain, where necessary, the concurrence of the Governments of such other American Powers as may enter the war as associates of the United States.

SECRETU. S. Serial 011512-12(R)S.U.S.(J)(41)SG.Short Title ABC-1March 27, 1941**COLLABORA-****TION IN**
PLANNING.

6. The High Command of the United States and United Kingdom will collaborate continuously in the formulation and execution of strategic policies and plans which shall govern the conduct of the war. They and their respective commanders in the field, as may be appropriate, will similarly collaborate in the planning and execution of such operations as may be undertaken jointly by United States and British forces. This arrangement will apply also to such plans and operations as may be undertaken separately, the extent of collaboration required in each particular plan or operation being agreed mutually when the general policy has been decided.

ASSUMP-
TIONS.

7. The term "Associated Powers" used herein is to be taken as meaning the United States and British Commonwealth, and, when appropriate, includes the Associates and Allies of either Power.

8. The Staff Conference assumes that when the United States becomes involved in war with Germany, it will at the same time engage in war with Italy. In these circumstances, the possibility of a state of war arising between Japan and an Association of the United States, the British Commonwealth and its Allies, including the Netherlands East Indies, must be taken into account.

9. The Conference assumes that the United States will continue to furnish material aid to the United Kingdom, but, for the use of itself and its other associates, will retain material in such quantities as to provide for security and best to effectuate United States-British joint plans for defeating Germany and her Allies. It is recognized that the amount and nature of the material aid which the United States affords the British Commonwealth will influence the size and character of the Military forces which will be available to the United States for use in the war.

THE BROAD
STRATEGIC
OBJECTIVE.
(OBJECT)

10. The broad strategic objective (object) of the Associated Powers will be the defeat of Germany and her Allies. *Strategic Objective*

STRATEGIC
DEFENSE
PRINCIPLES.

11. The principles of United States and British national strategic defense policies of which the Military forces of the Associated Powers must take account are:

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The paramount territorial interests of the United States are in the Western Hemisphere. The United States must, in all eventualities, maintain such dispositions as will prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic political or Military power.

(b) British Commonwealth.

The security of the United Kingdom must be maintained in all circumstances. Similarly, the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India must maintain dispositions which, in all eventualities, will provide for the ultimate security of the British Commonwealth of Nations. A cardinal feature of British strategic policy is the retention of a position in the Far East such as will ensure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the maintenance of its war effort.

(c) Sea Communications.

The security of the sea communications of the Associated Powers is essential to the continuance of their war effort

GENERAL
STRATEGIC
CONCEPT.

12. The strategic concept includes the following as the principal offensive policies against the Axis Powers:

(a) Application of economic pressure by naval, land, and air forces and all other means, including the control of commodities at their source by diplomatic and financial measures.

(b) A sustained air offensive against German Military power, supplemented by air offensives against other regions under enemy control which contribute to that power.

(c) The early elimination of Italy as an active partner in the Axis.

(d) The employment of the air, land, and naval forces of the Associated Powers, at every opportunity, in raids and minor offensives against Axis Military strength.

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(e) The support of neutrals, and of Allies of the United Kingdom, Associates of the United States, and populations in Axis-occupied territory in resistance to the Axis Powers.

(f) The building up of the necessary forces for an eventual offensive against Germany.

(g) The capture of positions from which to launch the eventual offensive.

13. Plans for the Military operations of the Associated Powers will likewise be governed by the following:

(a) Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre. The principal United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre, and operations of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort.

(b) Owing to the threat to the sea communications of the United Kingdom, the principal task of the United States naval forces in the Atlantic will be the protection of shipping of the Associated Powers, the center of gravity of the United States effort being concentrated in the Northwestern Approaches to the United Kingdom. Under this conception, the United States naval effort in the Mediterranean will initially be considered of secondary importance.

(c) It will be of great importance to maintain the present British and Allied Military position in and near the Mediterranean basins, and to prevent the spread of Axis control in North Africa.

(d) Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against eventual Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present Military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner

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best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

(e) The details of the deployment of the forces of the Associated Powers at any one time will be decided with regard to the Military situation in all theatres.

(f) The principal defensive roles of the land forces of the Associated Powers will be to hold the British Isles against invasion; to defend the Western Hemisphere; and to protect outlying Military base areas and islands of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack.

(g) United States' land forces will support United States' naval and air forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or operating in the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availability of trained and equipped organizations, United States' land forces will, as a general rule, provide ground and anti-aircraft defenses of naval and air bases used primarily by United States' forces.

(h) Subject to the requirements of the security of the United States, the British Isles and their sea communications, the air policy of the Associated Powers will be directed towards achieving, as quickly as possible, superiority of air strength over that of the enemy, particularly in long-range striking forces.

(i) United States Army Air Forces will support the United States land and naval forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or operating in the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availability of trained and equipped organizations, they will undertake the air defense of those general areas in which naval bases used primarily by United States forces are located, and subsequently, of such other areas as may be agreed upon. United States

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Army air bombardment units will operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against German Military power at its source.

(j) United States forces will, so far as practicable, draw their logistic support (supply and maintenance) from sources outside the British Isles. Subject to this principle, however, the military bases, repair facilities, and supplies of either nation will be at the disposal of the Military forces of the other as required for the successful prosecution of the war.

PRINCIPLES
OF
COMMAND

14. Subject to the provisions of Annexes II and III, and to other agreements made between appropriate authorities to meet special conditions, the following principles will govern the exercise of command of the Military forces of the Associated Powers;

(a) In accordance with plans based on joint strategic policy, each Power will be charged with the strategic direction of all forces of the Associated Powers normally operating in certain areas. The areas are defined initially in Annex II.

(b) As a general rule, the forces of each of the Associated Powers should operate under their own commanders in the areas of responsibility of their own Power.

(c) The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operations into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.

(d) The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their type, be employed as task (organized) forces charged with the execution of specific strategic tasks. These task (organized) forces will operate under their own commanders and will not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces of the other Power. Only exceptional Military circumstances will justify the temporary suspension of the normal strategic tasks.

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(e) When units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of time in grade.

(f) United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate under United States naval command, and will remain an integral part of United States naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups.

MILITARY MISSIONS.

15. To effect the collaboration outlined in paragraph 6, and to ensure the coordination of administrative action and command between the United States and British Military Services, the United States and United Kingdom will exchange Military Missions. These Missions will comprise one senior officer of each of the Military Services, with their appropriate staffs. The functions of these missions, the organization of which is described in Annex I, will be as follows:

(a) To represent jointly, as a corporate body, their own Chiefs of Staff (the Chief of Naval Operations being considered as such), vis-a-vis the group of Chiefs of Staff of the Power to which they are accredited, for the purpose of collaboration in the formulation of Military policies and plans governing the conduct of the war in areas in which that Power assumes responsibility for strategic direction.

(b) In their individual capacity to represent their own individual Military Services vis-a-vis the appropriate Military Services of the Power to which they are accredited, in matters of mutual concern in the areas in which that Power assumes responsibility for strategic direction.

16. The personnel of either Mission shall not become members of any regularly constituted body of the government of the Power to which they are accredited. Their staffs will, however, work in direct cooperation with the appropriate branches and committees of the staff of the Power to which they are accredited.

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17. The United States, as may be necessary, will exchange liaison officers with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand for effectuating direct cooperation between United States and Dominion forces.

18. To promote adequate collaboration and prompt decision, a military transportation service will be established between England and the United States. Ships and airplanes will be assigned to this service by the United States and the United Kingdom as may be found necessary.

INTELLI- 19. Existing Military intelligence organiza-
GENCY. tions of the two Powers will operate as independent intelligence agencies, but will maintain close liaison with each other in order to ensure the full and prompt exchange of pertinent information concerning war operations. Intelligence liaison will be established not only through the Military Missions but also between all echelons of command in the field with respect to matters which affect their operations.

ANNEXES. 20. Agreements as to the details of the foregoing and as to technical methods of cooperation are annexed hereto as follows:

- I. ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY MISSIONS.
- II. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE STRATEGIC
DIRECTION OF MILITARY FORCES.
- III. UNITED STATES - BRITISH COMMONWEALTH
JOINT BASIC WAR PLAN.
- IV. COMMUNICATIONS.
- V. CONTROL AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING.

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S. D. Embick,
Major-General, U. S. Army.

R. M. Bellairs,
Rear-Admiral, Royal Navy.

Sherman Miles,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.

V. H. Danckwerts,
Rear-Admiral, Royal Navy.

L. T. Gerow,
Brigadier-General, U.S. Army.

E. L. Morris,
Major-General, British Army.

J. T. McMarney,
Colonel, U. S. Army.

J. C. Slessor,
Air-Vice Marshal, Royal Air
Force.

R. L. Ghormley,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy.

A. W. Clarke,
Captain, Royal Navy.

R. K. Turner,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy.

A. G. Kirk,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

DeWitt C. Ramsey,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

O. T. Pfeiffer,
Lt.-Colonel, U. S. M. C.

SECRETB.U.S.(J)(41)3CU.S. Serial 011512-12(R-A1)Short Title ABC-1 Annex IMarch 27, 1941UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONSREPORTANNEX IORGANIZATION OF MILITARY MISSIONSDESIGNATION.

1. In accordance with paragraph 15 of the Main Report, the two Powers will establish the following:

(a) The United States Military Mission in London.

(b) The British Military Mission in Washington.

THE OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MISSIONS

2. These Military Missions will be established and announced as the duly accredited representatives of their respective Chiefs of Staff vis-a-vis the Chiefs of Staff of the other Power, immediately upon the entry of the United States into the war as an Associate of the British Commonwealth.

ORGANIZATION OF MISSIONS.

3. The organization of the missions will be such as to enable them to carry out their functions, as prescribed in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Main Report.

ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY MISSION IN LONDON.

4. The United States Military Mission in London will consist of two members and a staff. The members will be a flag officer of the United States Navy and a general officer of the United States Army. The staff will be approximately as follows:

(a) The Joint Planning Staff, which will collaborate with the Joint Planning Subcommittee of the War Cabinet, will consist of one naval officer and at least three assistants, one army officer and at least three assistants, and a small secretariat.

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(b) The Naval Staff, which will collaborate with the Admiralty and, as necessary, with the Air Ministry, will consist of the following:

| <u>Sections</u> | <u>Officer Personnel</u> |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Operations | 6 |
| Planning | 4 |
| Aviation | 4 |
| Intelligence | 3 |
| Shipping Control | 5 |
| Submarine and Anti-Submarine | 2 |
| Communications (Signals) | 3 |
| Material | 4 |
| Secretariat | 3 |
| TOTAL | 34 |

(c) The Army Staff, which will collaborate with the War Office and with the Air Ministry, will consist of the following:

| <u>Sections</u> | <u>Officer Personnel</u> |
|--|--------------------------|
| <u>Personal Staff</u> | |
| Aides | 1 |
| <u>General Staff</u> | |
| Chief of Staff | 1 |
| G-1(Personnel) | 2 |
| G-2(Intelligence) | 3 |
| G-3(Organization, Operations,
and Training) | 3 |
| G-4(Supply and Evacuation) | 3 |
| <u>Special Staff</u> | |
| Aviation | 4 |
| Anti-aircraft | 2 |
| Armored Force | 1 |
| Artillery | 1 |
| Chemical Warfare | 1 |
| Engineer | 2 |
| Infantry | 1 |
| Ordnance | 2 |
| Signal (Communications) | 2 |
| Medical | 2 |
| Adjutant General | 1 |
| Judge Advocate | 1 |
| Quartermaster | 2 |
| TOTAL | 35 |

SECRETE.U.S.(J)(41)30U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A1)Short Title AEC-1 Annex IMarch 27, 1941ORGANIZA-TION OF THEBRITISHMISSION INWASHINGTON.

5. The British Military Mission in Washington will consist of three members, a staff, and a secretariat. The members will be a flag officer of the British Navy, a general officer of the British Army, and an Air Officer of the Royal Air Force. The

staff will consist of the following:

(a) The Joint Planning Staff, which will collaborate with the United States Joint Planning Committee, will consist of one Naval, one Army, and one Air Force officer.

(b) The Naval Staff, which will collaborate with the United States Navy Department, will consist of the following:

| <u>Sections</u> | <u>Officer Personnel</u> |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Operations) | |
| Convoy and Trade) | |
| Protection) | 4 |
| Intelligence | 2 |
| Signals (Communications) | 1 |
| Anti-Submarine Warfare | 1 |
| Fleet Air Arm | 1 |
| TOTAL | <u>9</u> |

(c) The Army Staff, which will collaborate with the United States War Department, will consist of the following:

| <u>Sections</u> | <u>Officer Personnel</u> |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| Intelligence | 2 |
| Signals(Communications) | 1 |
| Antiaircraft | 1 |
| Organization | 1 |
| Administration | 1 |
| TOTAL | <u>6</u> |

(d) The Air Staff, which will collaborate with the United States War Department and with the United States Navy Department, will consist of the following:

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| <u>Sections</u> | <u>Officer Personnel</u> |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Intelligence | 2 |
| Signals (Communications) | 2 |
| Organization and
Administration | 1 |
| Training | 1 |
| Coastal Command | <u>1</u> |
| TOTAL | 7 |

(e) The Secretariat will consist of approximately three officers and a suitable number of clerical and typing personnel.

(f) The Dominions of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand will be represented on the above staff of the Mission in Washington by their service attaches.

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UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONSREPORTANNEX IIRESPONSIBILITY FOR THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION
OF MILITARY FORCES

UNITED STATES AREAS. 1. Upon entering the war the United States will assume responsibility for the strategic direction of its own and British Military forces in the following areas:

(a) The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas, north of Latitude 25° South and west of Longitude 30° West, excepts:

- (1) The area between Latitude 20° North and Latitude 43° North which lies east of Longitude 40° West.
- (2) The waters and territories in which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces, as may be defined in United States - Canada joint agreements.

(b) The Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas, as follows:

- (1) North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East;
- (2) North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East;
- (3) South of the equator and east of Longitude 100° to the South American coast and Longitude 74° West;

except for the waters and territories in which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces, as may be defined in United States - Canada joint agreements. The United States will afford

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1. (b) (Cont'd)

support to British naval forces in the regions south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

2. As soon after entering the war as the augmentation of its naval forces in the Atlantic will permit, the United States will assume responsibility for the strategic direction of its own and British Military forces in that part of the South Atlantic Ocean south of Latitude 25° South and west of Longitude 30° West.

THE FAR EAST AREA. 3. Coordination in the planning and execution of operations by the Military forces of the United States, British Commonwealth, and Netherlands East Indies in the Far East Area will, subject to the approval of the Dutch authorities, be effected as follows:

(a) The commanders of the Military forces of the Associated Powers will collaborate in the formulation of strategic plans for operations in that area.

(b) The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers will be the responsibility of the respective commanders of the Military forces concerned. These commanders will make such arrangements for mutual support as may be practicable and appropriate.

(c) The responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines, will be assumed by the British naval Commander in Chief, China. The Commander in Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines.

(d) For the above purposes, the Far East Area is defined as the area from the coast of China in Latitude 30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, thence south to the equator, thence east to Longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, thence south to Latitude 13° South, thence

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3. (d) (Cont'd)

west to Longitude 92° East, thence north to
Latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between
India and Burma.

JOINT

LAND

OFFENSIVES.

4. Responsibility for the strategic direction
of the Military forces engaged in joint offen-
sive action on land will be in accordance with
joint agreements to be entered upon at the proper time. In
these circumstances unity of command in the theater of
operations should be established.

BRITISH

COMMON-

WEALTH

AREAS.

Annex II.

5. The British Commonwealth will assume
responsibility for the strategic direction of
Associated Military forces in all other areas not
described in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this

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UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONS

REPORT

ANNEX III

UNITED STATES - BRITISH COMMONWEALTH JOINT BASIC WAR PLAN

1. This Annex III is the Joint Basic War Plan Number One of the United States and the British Commonwealth for war against the Axis Powers. The assumptions and strategic considerations on which this plan is based will be found in paragraphs 7 to 13 of the Main Report.

2. This Plan is arranged in the following sections:-

I. UNITED STATES AREAS

- (a) Western Atlantic
(Paragraphs 7 to 16)
- (b) Pacific (Paragraphs 17 to 27)

II. THE FAR EAST AREA AND THE AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AREA

(Paragraphs 28 to 38)

III. BRITISH AREAS

- (a) United Kingdom and Home Waters
(Paragraphs 39 to 52)
- (b) North Atlantic
(Paragraphs 53 to 61)
- (c) South Atlantic
(Paragraphs 62 to 69)
- (d) Mediterranean and Middle East
(Paragraphs 70 to 76)
- (e) India and the East Indies
(Paragraphs 77 to 80)

3. Uncertainties exist as to the stability of the strategic situations in various theaters, and as to the time of entry into the war of the United States, Japan,

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and the Netherlands East Indies. The strategic deployments, strengths, and tasks of the armed forces of the Associated Powers, as hereinafter listed, must therefore be regarded as subject to final decision in the light of the strategical situation at the time when any of these three Powers enter the war.

4. Certain joint agreements are being drawn up between the United States and Canada regarding the defense of the Western Hemisphere. The Staff Conference assumes that these agreements will conform generally to the agreements set out in this Report.

5. The term "United States naval forces" as used herein will be construed as including United States naval aviation. The term "air forces" will be construed as including only the United States Army Air Corps and the Royal Air Force.

6. United States naval and British naval, army, and air strengths are assigned on the basis of estimated probable strengths on April 1, 1941, unless otherwise indicated. Naval auxiliary, coastal, and harbor types, and vessels under extensive repair or refit are omitted. United States Army strengths are those which it is estimated will be available on the dates stated herein. See also Appendix B, "General Note on the Disposition of British Naval Forces".

I. UNITED STATES AREAS

THE WESTERN ATLANTIC

Definition of Area.

7. The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas north of Latitude 25° South, and west of Longitude 30° West, except the area between Latitudes 20° North and 43° North which lies east of Longitude 40° West.

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(a) Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

(b) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

(c) Protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy Military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying hostile expeditionary forces and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere.

(d) Prepare to occupy the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands.

So far as practicable the naval forces in the Western Atlantic will be covered and supported, against attack by superior enemy surface forces, by the naval forces of the Associated Powers which are operating from bases in the United Kingdom and the Eastern Atlantic.

9. Initial Naval ForcesUnited StatesBritish Commonwealth(a) Ocean Escort
(based on Halifax)

| | | |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------|---|
| 3 Battleships | 10 Armed Merchant | x |
| 2 8" Cruisers | Cruisers | |
| 2 Destroyers (1850 tons) | 8 Submarines | x |
| 7 Destroyers | 2 Destroyers | x |
| 4 Minesweepers (destroyer type) | | |
| 9 Destroyers (old) | | |
| (temporarily, pending re-gunning) | | |

x From existing American and West Indies and Halifax Commands. Submarines also in part from Western Approaches Force.

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(b) Striking Force
(based on Newport, Bermuda
or Trinidad, as required)

2 Aircraft Carriers
2 8" Cruisers NIL.
4 Destroyers
6 Patrol type Seaplanes (Bermuda)

(c) Southern Patrol Force
(based on Trinidad)

4 6" Cruisers (old) 1 Sloop (Dutch)

(d) Submarine Force

6 Submarines (old) NIL.

(e) Fleet Marine Force
(based on United States)

1 Infantry Division (7,500
troops)
1 Defense Battalion (900 troops) NIL.
1 Aircraft Group (63 airplanes)

(f) Coastal Frontiers:

North Atlantic

12 Patrol type Seaplanes NIL.

Caribbean

12 Patrol type Seaplanes NIL.
5 Destroyers (old)

Panama

12 Patrol type Seaplanes NIL.
4 Destroyers (old)

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10. It is estimated that by July 1, 1941, the following reinforcements will be available for this area. The date on which units of the Pacific Fleet can be moved to the Atlantic, however, will depend upon the situation in the Pacific.

United States.British Commonwealth.(a) Ocean Escort

3 8" Cruisers (2 from
Striking Force in paragraph 9b) NIL.

6 Destroyers (1850 tons)

(b) Striking Force.

4 6" Cruisers NIL.

(d) Submarine Force.

3 Submarines (old) NIL.

(g) Patrol Planes

12 Patrol type Seaplanes
(Assignment indeterminate) NIL.

Land Forces11. Tasks

(a) In conjunction with naval and air forces, protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the expansion of enemy military or political power into the Western Hemisphere by denying use to the enemy of land positions in that Hemisphere.

(b) In conjunction with naval and air forces, support Latin American Republics against invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy in the Western Hemisphere.

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(c) Relieve, as soon as practicable, British forces in Curacao and Aruba (subject to the agreement of the Netherlands Government in London).

(d) Provide defensive garrisons for bases leased in British territory.

(e) Build up forces in the United States for eventual offensive action against Germany.

12. United States Land Forces

(a) Continental United States

The Army of the United States now in process of organization consisting of:

2 Cavalry Divisions
4 Armored Divisions
27 Infantry Divisions

Appropriate Army, Corps, and GHQ reserve units

The above includes a reinforced Corps of three Infantry Divisions which will normally be maintained as a reserve for the support of overseas garrisons and the Latin American Republics. A maximum of four Infantry Divisions and two Armored Divisions will be trained and equipped by September 1, 1941.

(b) Overseas Garrisons on April 1, 1941

Panama Canal - 23,000 troops
Puerto Rico - 12,000 troops
Newfoundland - 1,000 troops

13. British Commonwealth Land Forces

(a) Field Army

Now in process of organization in Canada)

1 Armored Division
1 Army Tank Brigade
2 Divisions

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Jamaica -- One Canadian Battalion
 Bermuda -- One Company
 Curacao -- One Battalion
 Aruba -- One Battalion, less one Company
 Newfoundland -- One Canadian Battalion

Air Forces14. Tasks

(a) Support the land and naval forces in the defense of the Western Hemisphere and in the support of Latin-American Republics by providing for the air defense of vital installations, by destroying enemy expeditionary forces, and by denying use by the enemy or forces supporting the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and naval bases.

(b) Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

15. United States Air Forces(a) Continental United States

The GHQ Air Force now in process of organization in Continental United States, consisting of:

9 Bombardment Groups, Heavy
 7 Bombardment Groups, Medium
 7 Bombardment Groups, Light
 14 Pursuit Groups, Interceptor
 3 Pursuit Groups, Fighter
 1 Composite Group

This force includes all units which may become available for dispatch to overseas theaters of war.

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- (b) Overseas Garrisons (now in process of organization)

Panama Canal

2 Bombardment Groups, Heavy
1 Bombardment Squadron, Light
2 Pursuit Groups, Interceptor
1 Pursuit Group, Fighter

Puerto Rico

1 Bombardment Group, Heavy
1 Pursuit Group, Interceptor

16. British Commonwealth Air Forces

None except minor forces on the east coast of Canada.

THE PACIFICDefinition of Area

17. The Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas, is as follows:

- (a) North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East,
(b) North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East.
(c) South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South American coast and Longitude 74 West.

Naval Forces18. Tasks

(a) Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East Area by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.

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(b) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

(c) Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Area.

(d) Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

(e) Protect the territory of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Area, and prevent the extension of enemy Military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that Hemisphere.

(f) Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area.

19. Initial United States Naval Forces

(a) Pacific Fleet (based in Hawaii)

8 Battleships
2 Aircraft Carriers
8 8" Cruisers
5 6" Cruisers
3 6" Cruisers (old)
5 Destroyers (1850)
40 Destroyers
5 Minesweepers (Destroyer type)
19 Submarines (3 enroute from Atlantic)
4 Submarines (old)
8 Minelayers (Destroyer type)
1 Minelayer
84 Patrol type Seaplanes

(b) Atlantic Reinforcement

(Available for Pacific operations until transferred, vide paragraph 57)

3 Battleships
1 Aircraft Carrier

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4 8" Cruisers
 4 6" Cruisers
 6 Destroyers (1850 ton)
 8 Destroyers

(c) Southeast Pacific Force (based in Canal Zone)

2 6" Cruisers (old)
 4 Destroyers

(d) Fleet Marine Force (based on San Diego)

1 Infantry Division (7500 troops)
 1 Defense Battalion (900 troops)
 1 Aircraft Group (63 planes)

(e) Coastal Frontiers:Pacific

9 Destroyers (old)
 2 Submarines
 24 Patrol type Seaplanes

Hawaii

4 Destroyers (old)

20. There will be no British naval forces in this area other than local naval defense craft on the Canadian seaboard.

21. Estimated United States Naval Reinforcements by July 1, 1941.(a) Pacific Fleet

1 Battleship
 1 Aircraft Carrier
 10 Submarines
 1 Submarine Minelayer

Land Forces22. Tasks

In conjunction with the naval and air forces in the area:

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- (a) Hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base.
- (b) Defend the Panama Canal, the Pacific Coast of the United States and Canada, and Alaska, including Kodiak and Unalaska.
- (c) Support Latin-American Republics on the West Coast of South America against invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy established in this area.

23. United States Land Forces

(a) Continental United States

Included in paragraph 12(a). One Reinforced Division listed therein is reserved on the Pacific Coast for the support of the Latin-American Republics.

(b) Overseas Garrisons on April 1, 1941

Hawaii, 23,000 troops
Alaska, 3,600 troops

24. British Commonwealth Land Forces

Included in paragraph 13 (a).

Air Forces

25. Tasks

- (a) Support the land and naval forces in the defense of Oahu, the Panama Canal, the Pacific Coast of the United States, Canada, and Alaska, and in the support of Latin-American Republics on the west coast of South America by providing for the air defense of vital installations, by destroying enemy expeditionary forces, and by denying use by the enemy or forces supporting the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and naval bases.

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(b) Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

26. United States Air Forces**(a) Continental United States**

Included in paragraph 15 (a).

(b) Overseas Garrisons (now in process of organization)**Hawaii**

2 Bombardment Groups, Heavy
1 Bombardment Squadron, Light
1 Pursuit Group, Interceptor
1 Pursuit Group, Fighter

Alaska

1 Composite Group, consisting of:
1 Bombardment Squadron, Heavy
1 Bombardment Squadron, Medium
1 Pursuit Squadron, Interceptor

27. British Commonwealth Air Forces

Canada. None, except minor forces on the West Coast of

II. THE FAR EAST AREA AND THE AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AREA**Definition of Far East Area**

28. The Far East Area is defined as the area bounded by lines from the coast of China in Latitude 30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, thence south to the Equator, thence east to Longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the South coast, thence westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, thence south to Latitude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence north to Latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma.

SECRETB.U.S.(J)(41)30U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-43)Short Title ABC-1 Annex 3March 27, 1941.Definition of Australia and New Zealand Area

29. The Australia and New Zealand Area comprises the Australian and New Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180° and south of the equator. The limits of these Stations are defined in Appendix "A".

Special Command Relationships

30. The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers in the Far East Area will be the responsibility of the respective Commanders of the Military forces concerned. These Commanders will make such arrangements for mutual support as may be practicable and appropriate.

31. In the Far East Area the responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines, will be assumed by the British naval Commander in Chief, China. The Commander in Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines.

32. The British naval Commander in Chief, China, is also charged with responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers operating in the Australia and New Zealand Area as defined in paragraph 29.

Naval Forces33. Tasks in the Far East Area

(a) Raid Japanese sea communications and destroy Axis forces.

(b) Support the land and air forces in the defense of the territories of the Associated Powers. (The responsibility of the Commander in Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, for supporting the defense of the Philippines remains so long as that defense continues).

(c) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

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(d) Protect sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

34. Tasks in the Australia and New Zealand Area

The tasks of the naval forces in the Australia and New Zealand Area are the same as those for the Far East Area.

35. Naval Forces

Far East Area

United States Asiatic Fleet

1 8" Cruiser
1 6" Cruiser (old)
13 Destroyers (old)
11 Submarines
6 Submarines (old)
24 Patrol type Seaplanes

Netherlands Forces

2 6" Cruisers
6 Destroyers
11 Submarines
4 Submarines (old)
27 Patrol type Seaplanes (plus 12*)
2 Sloops

*Crews not as yet trained.

Far East Area and Australia and New Zealand Area

British forces available for operations in those areas and the British reinforcements which may be sent:

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| Types of
Ships | British and
Dominion Forces | Immediate
British
Reenforce-
ments | Ultimate
British
Reenforce-
ments |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------|---|--|
| I. | II. | III. | IV. |
| Battleships | - | - | 5(a) |
| Battlecruisers | - | 1(b) | - |
| Aircraft Carriers | - | 1(b) | - |
| 8" Cruisers | 1 | 1(c) | 2(d) |
| 6" Cruisers | 3 | 3(c) | 5(d) |
| 6" Cruisers (old) | 4 | - | 4 |
| Armed Merchant Cruisers | 3 | - | - |
| Destroyers | - | 5(e) | 27(e) |
| Destroyers (old) | 5 | - | - |
| Flying-Boats | 9 | - | - |
| Sloops | 1 | - | - |

- (a) 3 from Halifax Force, one from Force H, one from vessels unallocated.
- (b) From Force H, vide paragraph 55.
- (c) From Force H and other areas.
- (d) Probably from Home Fleet and new construction.
- (e) From North Atlantic Command and other unallocated vessels, vide paragraph 55 and Appendix B.

Land and Air Forces

36. Tasks

Far East Area

- (a) Defend Hong Kong, the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies and such other territories and islands as it may be decided from time to time to occupy as bases.

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(b) Hold Malaya, Singapore, and Java against Japanese attack.

(c) Support the naval forces.

Australia and New Zealand Area

(d) In conjunction with naval and air forces, protect British territory and prevent the extension of enemy Military power in this area.

(e) Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers.

37. Strength of Land Forces on April 1, 1941:

Philippines

20,000 troops (includes Organized Philippine Army)

Netherlands East Indies

2 Divisions

Hong Kong

4 Battalions

Malaya

Equivalent of 7 Brigade Groups

Note: One additional Brigade Group will arrive late in April, and a second in May, 1941.

Australia and New Zealand

Field Army

One Division is forming in Australia

Garrison

One New Zealand Brigade at Suva, Fiji Islands

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38. Strength of Air Forces on April 1, 1941:

Philippines

- 1 Composite Group consisting of ;
- 1 Bombardment Squadron
- 3 Pursuit Squadrons

Netherlands East Indies

- 9 Bomber Squadrons
- 2 Fighter Squadrons
- 1 Bomber Reconnaissance Squadron
- 27 (plus 12) Patrol type Seaplanes
- (Also shown in paragraph 35)

Malaya

- 5 Medium Bomber Squadrons
- 1 Fighter Bomber Squadron
- 1 Fighter Squadron
- 2 Torpedo Bomber Squadrons
- 1 General Reconnaissance Squadron
- 1 General Reconnaissance Flying-Boat Squadron

NOTE: A program of reenforcement of British air strength for Malaya, which will bring the total number of aircraft in Malaya to 336 (i.e. 22 squadrons), is being carried out gradually as the situation elsewhere permits.

Australia

- 6 General Reconnaissance Squadrons
- 4 General Purpose Squadrons
- 2 Army Cooperation Squadrons
- 1 Flying-Boat Squadron

New Zealand

- 3 General Reconnaissance Squadrons

III. BRITISH AREAS

UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS

Definition of Area

S E C R E TB.U.S.(J)(41) 30U. S. Serial C11512-12(R-A3)Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3March 27, 1941.

39. (a) Waters to the eastward of Longitude 30° West and to the northward of Latitude 43° North.

(b) Land areas bordering on, and islands in, the above ocean area.

Naval Forces40. Tasks

(a) In conjunction with land and air forces protect the British Isles against invasion.

(b) Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

(c) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

41. British Commonwealth and Allied Naval Forces:(a) Home Fleet

| | |
|---|-----------|
| 3 Battleships | } NOTE 1. |
| 2 Battle Cruisers | |
| 2 Aircraft Carriers | |
| 3 8" Cruisers | |
| 14 6" Cruisers (including some ships armed with 5.25" guns) | |
| 2 Anti-Aircraft Cruisers | |
| 2 Other Anti-Aircraft ships | |
| 22 Destroyers | |
| 25 Submarines | |

NOTE 1. Would be reduced if reinforcements are sent to the Far East, vide paragraph 35.

(b) Mine Laying Squadron

5 Large Minelayers
4 Destroyers

SECRETE.O.S.(J)(41)30.U.S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 1March 27, 1941(c) Northern and Western Patrols

8 Ocean Boarding Vessels

(d) Western Approaches Command

1 Anti-Aircraft Cruiser

93 Destroyers

49 Corvettes

9 Sloops

14 Submarines

NOTE 2.

NOTE 2. 6 of these are included in the submarines shown as Ocean Escorts in paragraph 9(a).(e) Other Home Commands and Channel and North Sea Trade Protection

1 6" Cruiser, old (gunnery training)

61 Destroyers

7 Corvettes

10 Sloops

5 Submarines

5 Minelayers

42. Initial Strength of United States Naval Forces(a) Northwest Escort ForceTask. Escort convoys in the Northwest Approaches, acting under the strategic direction of the British Commander in Chief of the Western Approaches.

9 Destroyers

18 Destroyers (old)

48 Patrol type Seaplanes

(b) SubmarinesTask. Raid enemy shipping in an area to be designated later, acting under the strategic direction of the British Vice Admiral, Submarines.

9 Submarines (old)

SECRET**E.U.S.(J)(41)30.****U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)****Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 2****March 27, 1941****43. Estimated United States Naval Reinforcements
by July 1, 1941:****(a) Northwest Escort Force****5 Destroyers****9 Destroyers (old) (from Ocean Escort,
after completion of rearming).****(b) Submarines****3 Submarines (old)****(Assignment indeterminate)****Land Forces****44. Tasks****(a) In conjunction with naval and air forces,
hold the United Kingdom against invasion and defend it
against air attack.****(b) Defend Iceland and the Faroes.****(c) Undertake offensive land operations as
opportunity offers, in accordance with joint United States -
British plans to be agreed upon at a later date.****(d) Hold forces in readiness to occupy the
Azores and Cape Verde Islands until such time as this
responsibility is assumed by the United States.****45. British Commonwealth and Allied Land Forces:****(a) Field Army****28 Divisions (includes 1 in Iceland
and 4 Independent Brigade
Groups)****1 Armored Division (plus 4 forming)****1 Army Tank Brigade (plus 2 forming)****(b) Air Defense****Approximately 10 anti-aircraft Divisions.**

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46. United States Land Forces.

When the United States enters the war, it will provide:

(a) 1 Reinforced Division to relieve British forces now charged with the defense of Iceland.

(b) Troops for ground and anti-aircraft defenses for such naval and air bases used primarily by United States forces as may be agreed upon at the time.

(c) Approximately one reinforced regiment (Brigade Group) in the United Kingdom.

Note: None of the above will be available before September 1, 1941.

Air Forces47. Tasks

(a) In conjunction with land and naval forces, defend the British Isles against air attack and invasion.

(b) In conjunction with naval forces, protect shipping against surface, submarine and air attack.

Note: The execution of Tasks (a) and (b) will involve the devotion of a substantial proportion of the air effort to attack on enemy bases.

(c) Conduct a sustained air offensive against German Military power in all areas within range of the United Kingdom.

48. British Commonwealth and Allied Air Forces

These are of the order of 165 Squadrons of all classes.

S E C R E T**E.U.S.(J)(41) 30****U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)****Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3****March 27, 1941.****49. United States Air Forces**

United States Air Forces of the order of 32 squadrons (Bombardment and Pursuit) with appropriate command echelons, will be available for despatch to the United Kingdom during 1941. Additional units will be provided as resources become available, the number and disposition being determined by the Military situation from time to time. In addition the United States will provide one Pursuit and one Bombardment squadron for the defense of Iceland.

50. Pursuit (fighter) units operating in the British Isles will undertake the air defense of those general areas in which bases used primarily by United States Naval forces are located, and subsequently of such other areas as may be agreed upon.

51. United States Air Bombardment units will conduct offensive operations primarily against objectives in Germany. Operations to defeat attempted invasion or Blockade will be conducted as demanded by the situation.

52. United States Army Command Relationships

Administrative command of all United States land and air forces stationed in the British Isles and Iceland will be exercised by the Commander, United States Army Forces in Great Britain. This officer will have authority to arrange details concerning the organization and location of task forces (organization of units in appropriate formation) and operational control with the War Office and the Air Ministry.

NORTH ATLANTIC AREA**Definition of Area**

53. The North Atlantic Area is defined as follows:

- (a) Northern boundary, Latitude 43° North,
- (b) Southern boundary, Latitude 20° North,
- (c) Western boundary, Longitude 40° West,
- (d) Eastern boundary, the coasts of Spain, Portugal, and Africa, and Longitude 5° West,

together with the islands and land areas contiguous thereto.

S E C R E TE.O.S. (J)(41) 30U. S. Serial 0-1512-12(R-A3)Short Title - ABCal Annex 3March 27, 1941**Naval Forces****54. Tasks**

(a) Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

(b) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

(c) Raid Axis sea communications, territories and forces in the Western Mediterranean.

55. British Commonwealth Naval Forces**Force H (Gibraltar)**

1 Battleship
1 Battle Cruiser
1 Aircraft Carrier
1 6" Cruiser
8 Destroyers

Gibraltar and Straits Force

7 Destroyers

56. Initial United States Naval Forces**(a) Submarines**

Task. Raid enemy shipping in the Mediterranean under the strategic direction of the Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, acting through the Flag Officer Commanding North Atlantic.

10 Submarines (old)(Gibraltar)

NOTE: It is estimated that an additional 7 United States submarines (old) can be assigned to Gibraltar by July 1, 1941.

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57. As soon as the situation in the Pacific permits their transfer to the Atlantic, the following United States naval forces will be assigned the tasks in paragraph 54, unless the strategic situation in the Atlantic at that time dictates a different decision. It is possible, depending upon the situation in the Far East, that Force H will have left Gibraltar for the Indian Ocean or Far East Area before its relief by United States naval forces.

United States Gibraltar Force

3 Battleships
1 Aircraft Carrier
4 8" Cruisers
13 Destroyers
12 Patrol type Seaplanes

NOTE: Upon arrival of this force, the United States submarines shown in paragraph 56 (a) will be assigned to it.

Special Command Relationships

58. Strategic direction of the United States Gibraltar Force will be exercised by the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff except when he specifically delegates it for a stated period as follows:

(a) To the British Naval Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, for operations in the Western Mediterranean.

(b) To the Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, for operations in the Central Atlantic.

59. Subject to the preceding paragraph, the Commander of United States Gibraltar Force will exercise strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers which operate in that area. He will be responsible for administrative matters to the Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.

SECRETB.U.S.(J) (41) 30U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-43)Short Title-ABC-1 Annex 3March 27, 1941Land Forces60. Task

Hold Gibraltar

NOTE: This will be a British responsibility. The present garrison at Gibraltar is four battalions.

Air Forces61. Task

Support the land and naval forces.

NOTE: There is at present a British Flying-Boat Squadron at Gibraltar which will be released for employment elsewhere when the United States Gibraltar Force assumes the naval tasks in this area.

SOUTH ATLANTICDefinition of Area

62. (a) The area between Latitudes 20° North and 25° South, bounded on the west by Longitude 30° West and on the east by the African coast,

(b) The South Atlantic Ocean, south of Latitude 25° South, between Longitudes 74° West and 33° East,

together with the islands and land areas contiguous thereto.

Naval Forces63. Tasks

(a) Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

(b) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

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(c) In conjunction with land and air forces, protect the territories of the Associated Powers.

64. British Commonwealth Forces

1 Aircraft Carrier
1 Seaplane Carrier
5 8" Cruisers
7 6" Cruisers (2 old)
14 Armed Merchant Cruisers
6 Corvettes
6 Sloops

Land Forces

65. Task

In conjunction with naval and air forces, defend British and Allied territory.

66. British Commonwealth Forces

British West African Colonies

Approximately 2 Divisions.

South Africa

Field Army

One Division forming.

67. United States Forces

If the United States Navy regularly uses a base in this area, the United States Army will provide the necessary anti-aircraft units.

Air Forces

68. Tasks

(a) In conjunction with naval forces, protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers.

(b) In conjunction with land forces, protect British and Allied territories.

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69. On April 1, 1941; it will not have been possible to provide any British air forces to fulfill these tasks. If the United States Navy regularly uses a naval base in this area, the United States Army will provide one pursuit squadron and two light bombardment squadrons there.

THE MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST

70. The Mediterranean and Middle East Areas comprise the Mediterranean Sea east of Longitude 5° West, the Suez Canal, and the islands and countries adjoining them, including the present theaters of operations in North and East Africa. The Black Sea, Iraq, and Aden are also included in this area.

Naval Forces71. Tasks

(a) Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

(b) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

(c) Conduct offensive operations against Axis sea communications to North Africa and Albania, and against Axis territory and islands.

72. British Commonwealth Naval Forces

3 Battleships

2 Aircraft Carriers

1 8" Cruiser

■ 7 6" Cruisers (includes some ships armed with 5.25" guns)

2 Anti-Aircraft Cruisers

23 Destroyers

4 Corvettes

14 Submarines

■ One returns to Far East if Japan enters the war.

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73.. As described in paragraph 58, when operating in the Mediterranean area the Commander of the United States Gibraltar Force will operate under the strategic direction of the British Commander in Chief, Mediterranean.

Land and Air Forces74. Tasks

(a) Hold the naval bases necessary for executing the naval tasks given in paragraph 71.

(b) Defend the British position in North Africa, Kenya and Palestine, and conduct offensive operations against Italian overseas possessions.

(c) Support Turkey and Greece.

(d) Conduct offensive operations against the Axis Powers on the Continent of Europe.

75. In view of the operations at present in progress in this theater of war it is not considered desirable to set out the present dispositions and strengths of British land and air forces in this area.

76. It is not proposed to employ United States land or air forces in the Mediterranean and Middle East areas in the initial stages.

INDIA AND EAST INDIESDefinition of Area

77. (a) India.

(b) Indian Ocean, including the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, bounded on the West by the coasts of Africa and Longitude 33° East, and on the East by the western boundaries of the Far East Area and the Australia Station.

(c) The islands in the above ocean area.

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Naval Forces78. Tasks

(a) Protect sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

(b) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

(c) Conduct offensive operations against Axis territory in the Red Sea.

79. British Commonwealth Naval Forces

- 1 8" Cruiser
- * 5 6" Cruisers (4 old)
- 1 A.A. Cruiser
- 5 Armed Merchant Cruisers
- 3 Destroyers
- 12 Sloops
- 1 Submarine (ex-Italian)

* One returns to Far East if Japan enters the war.

Land and Air Forces

80. The task of the land and air forces is the defense of India and of the islands in the area. The whole of the Army in India is available for this purpose. Six squadrons of obsolete aircraft are maintained for tribal control.

GENERAL

81. In view of the facts that a considerable number of British Commonwealth naval forces are undergoing repair, and new vessels are continually coming forward from construction, it is not practicable to present here the complete distribution of all naval forces of the British Commonwealth. A Note by the British Delegation on this subject is attached as Appendix B.

SECRETE.U.S.(J)(41)30U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3March 27, 1941.APPENDIX ALIMITS OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND STATIONS

The Australia Station is bounded on the west by Longitude 80° East south of Latitude 30° South, thence through lines joining the following positions:

| | <u>Latitude</u> | <u>Longitude</u> |
|-----|---|------------------------|
| (a) | $30^{\circ} 00'$ South | $95^{\circ} 15'$ East |
| (b) | $13^{\circ} 00'$ South | $95^{\circ} 15'$ East |
| (c) | $13^{\circ} 00'$ South | $120^{\circ} 00'$ East |
| (d) | $11^{\circ} 00'$ South | $120^{\circ} 00'$ East |
| (e) | Southern point of boundary between
Papua and Dutch New Guinea (Latitude
$9^{\circ} 00'$ South, Longitude $141^{\circ} 00'$ East). | |
| (f) | $0^{\circ} 00'$ | $141^{\circ} 00'$ East |
| (g) | $0^{\circ} 00'$ | $169^{\circ} 00'$ East |
| (h) | $1^{\circ} 00'$ South | $169^{\circ} 00'$ East |
| (i) | $1^{\circ} 00'$ South | $170^{\circ} 00'$ East |
| (j) | $32^{\circ} 00'$ South | $170^{\circ} 00'$ East |
| (k) | $32^{\circ} 00'$ South | $160^{\circ} 00'$ East |

remainder of Eastern boundary being Longitude 160° East to south of (k).

The New Zealand Station is bounded on the west by Eastern boundary of Australia Station (to position (g)), thence through lines joining:

| | <u>Latitude</u> | <u>Longitude</u> |
|-----|------------------------|------------------------|
| (g) | $0^{\circ} 00'$ | $169^{\circ} 00'$ East |
| (i) | $4^{\circ} 00'$ North | $169^{\circ} 00'$ East |
| (m) | $4^{\circ} 00'$ North | $180^{\circ} 00'$ |
| (n) | $30^{\circ} 00'$ North | $180^{\circ} 00'$ |
| (o) | $30^{\circ} 00'$ North | $150^{\circ} 00'$ West |
| (p) | $0^{\circ} 00'$ | $150^{\circ} 00'$ West |
| (q) | $0^{\circ} 00'$ | $120^{\circ} 00'$ West |

remainder of Eastern boundary being Longitude 120° West, south of the equator.

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APPENDIX BGENERAL NOTE ON THE DISPOSITION OF BRITISH NAVAL FORCES

1. The foregoing tentative distribution of British Naval units is based on the latest detailed information available to the United Kingdom Delegation and anticipated adjustments to meet the contingency of Japan entering the war.

2. The distribution does not include certain units which were still under long repair in January, or new construction. These are listed below. Their distribution will depend on requirements at the time each comes into service and cannot be predicted with any certainty at present.

3. It is probable that new construction cruisers, and those coming out of repair, would replace cruisers required in the Far East, or augment the latter strength; and some of the destroyers shown as allocated in the further reinforcements to the Far East would have to come from the new construction program.

Units under long repair

- 1 Battleship (under repair: completion date uncertain)
- 1 Aircraft Carrier (" " " " " ")
- 4 8" Cruisers (one ready in February; 1 in March;
1 in September; 1 date uncertain).
- 3 6" Cruisers (one ready in June; others later).
- 1 Armed Merchant Cruiser (date uncertain).
- 15 Destroyers (not repaired until April or later).
- 4 Sloops (" " " " " " " ")

New Construction

- 1 Battleship (working up. Probably to Home Fleet).
- 1 Battleship, reconstructed. (working up. Probably to Mediterranean Fleet).

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| | | |
|--------------------|---|--------------------|
| 1 6" Cruiser |) | |
| 15 Destroyers |) | |
| 32 Corvettes |) | Completing before |
| 3 Sloops |) | April 1, 1941. |
| 6 Submarines |) | |
| 3 Fast Minelayers |) | |
| 1 Aircraft Carrier |) | |
| 4 6" Cruisers |) | |
| 15 Destroyers |) | Completing between |
| 30 Corvettes |) | April 1, 1941 and |
| 1 Sloop |) | July 1, 1941. |
| 8 Submarines |) | |
| 1 Fast Minelayer |) | |

SECRETU.S. Serial 011512-12(R-A4)S.U.S.(J)(41)30.Short Title ABC-1 Annex 4March 27, 1941UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONSREPORTANNEX IVCOMMUNICATIONSGENERAL

Note: The United Kingdom Delegation tentatively accepts this Annex IV, subject to technical examination by the British Chiefs of Staff.

1. The United States and the United Kingdom will establish as soon as possible in London the "Associated Communication Committee" which is to be constituted as follows:

(a) A representative of the United States Army and a representative of the United States Navy, who will become members of the staff of the United States Military Mission when that Mission is established in London.

(b) Representatives of the British Combined Signals Board in the United Kingdom.

2. The Associated Communications Committee will be the supreme controlling body with relation to inter-communications by radio (W/T), wire, visual, and sound affecting the armed services and the merchant marines of the two nations.

3. The British Authorities will appoint staff members of their Military Mission in Washington as representatives to confer with:

(a) The Communication Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, U. S. Navy.

(b) United States Army Signal Corps and United States Army Air Corps.

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SECRETU.S. Serial 011512-12(R-A4)B.U.S.(J)(41)30.Short Title ABC-1 Annex 4March 27, 1941**NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS**

4. The United States and British Navies will exchange the following, as essential for intercommunication between the United States Navy and the British Navy:

(a) Necessary fundamental instructions on methods and procedure for radio (W/T) for ships and aircraft.

(b) Shore radio (W/T) organization, frequency plan, and instructions for ship (airplane) to shore communications.

(c) Call sign lists for certain shore and operating units.

(d) Recognition system keys and instructions.

(e) Information as to total wave bands covered by certain Navy transmitters and receivers, installed in operating units.

(f) Signal flags and any special visual signalling equipment, when required.

(g) Communication liaison officers to certain important ships and stations, which are to be designated later.

(h) Codes and Ciphers for use when intercommunicating.

(i) Data as to locations and organization of strategic D/F stations.

(j) Merchantship - Navy communication instructions, codes, ciphers, etc.

(k) Weather broadcasts, meteorological information, time signal data, and other special broadcasts.

Note: Some details of the foregoing exchanges have already been completed and others are now in progress.

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5. The following principles will be observed relative to intercommunication of United States and British ships:

(a) Ships which customarily operate within the area of strategic responsibility of their own Power will normally use their own communication systems for direct communication with their own ships and shore stations. When beyond visual or sound signalling distance, such ships will normally intercommunicate with ships or shore stations of the other Power via their own principal bases or shore radio (W/T) stations; but when it becomes necessary for such ships to communicate directly with a ship or shore station of the other Power, they will do so via joint frequencies and joint codes assigned for this purpose. When within visual or sound signalling distance, visual and sound intercommunication will be by International Code, or in English text using International Procedure.

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(b) Ships which customarily operate within an area of strategic responsibility of the other Power will normally intercommunicate as in 5 (a), unless they usually engage in tactical cooperation with forces of such Power. In such case they will adopt the complete communication systems of the Power having strategic responsibility, and this Power will supply them with details of communications, liaison personnel if necessary, and appropriate codes, ciphers, flags and special apparatus. Decision as to which system to adopt will be made on the merits of each case.

Note: The United States Navy has prepared one hundred sets of British signal flags for use of United States Naval ships which may require them.

(c) In areas of joint strategic responsibility, intercommunication will be via joint frequencies, codes, and procedures if such have been previously agreed upon. In the absence of previous agreement, intercommunication will be through liaison officers or via International Code, as may be most convenient.

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5. (Cont'd)

(d) Communications between ships of a convoy, and between the Commander of a convoy and the escort, regardless of nationality, will be via the system now in use for this purpose by the United Kingdom which is based on the employment of International Code and International Procedure.

6. The Associated Communications Committee will prepare the following, which will be made effective by direction of the competent authorities when conditions require:

(a) Joint radio (W/T) frequency plan for intercommunication.

(b) United States Navy - British Navy recognition signals in all systems to be used for aircraft, surface ships (including merchant ships), and submarines, in order to permit safe joint operations, and to effect entrance to defended harbors.

(c) Joint United States Navy - British Navy call signs.

(d) Plan for joint operation of United States Navy and British Navy strategic D/F stations, including joint codes or ciphers, as may be necessary, and with intercommunications preferably by landline or cable, rather than by radio (W/T).

(e) Joint United States Navy - British Navy plan for radio (W/T) transmissions from certain British shore stations in Africa, Australia, etc., to United States ships operating in the South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean; and for transmissions from United States' stations to British ships operating in the Eastern Atlantic, if necessary.

(f) Plan for cable and, secondarily, radio (W/T) point-to-point communication between certain United States and certain British cable terminals and radio (W/T) shore stations.

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6. (Cont'd)

(g) Joint United States Navy - British
Navy cryptographic systems.

MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS

7. In view of the fact that no United States Army forces, either ground or air, are expected to operate in areas where intercommunication with British forces is necessary prior to September 1, 1941, it has not been considered necessary to define at this stage the detailed arrangements which will be necessary.

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SECRETU.S. Serial 011512-12(R-A5)B.U.S.(J)(41)30Short Title ABC-1 Annex 5March 27, 1941UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONSREPORTANNEX VCONTROL AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING

1. British authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which British authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces, (vide Annex II). United States authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which the United States authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces (vide Annex II).

2. United States and British shipping scheduled to pass from an area assigned to one Power into an area assigned to the other Power, will be controlled and protected by agreement between the respective naval authorities. The British Admiralty is the supreme authority in the control of shipping in the North Atlantic bound to and from the United Kingdom.

3. The British Naval Control Service Organization will continue in the exercise of its present functions and methods in all regions pending establishment of effective United States agencies in United States Areas. The Chief of Naval Operations, immediately on entry of the United States into the war, will arrange for the control and protection of shipping of United States registry or charter within United States Areas. Requests from the British Naval Control Service Organization for protection by United States forces within United States Areas will be made to the Chief of Naval Operations.

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| List of Effective Pages | No. of pages
1 | Change in effect
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| Letter to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations, U. S. Navy; the Chiefs of Staff of the United Kingdom; of March 29, 1941. | title page
unnumbered
page 2 | ORIGINAL |
| Air Policy | title page
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pages 2 to 6 inc. | ORIGINAL |

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SECRETU. S. Serial 011512-15E.U.S.(J)(41) 38Short Title ABC-2UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONSAIR COLLABORATION

March 29, 1941.

To: The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
The Chief of Naval Operations, U. S. Navy.
The Chiefs of Staff of the United Kingdom.

Sirs:

1. The joint letter of transmittal forwarding the report of the staff conversations held in Washington between the United States Staff Committee and the United Kingdom Delegation, contains a recommendation as follows:

"5. The Staff Conference recommends that immediate steps be taken to provide for the following:

(c) Allocation of Military Material

The establishment at the earliest possible moment of a method of procedure which will ensure the allocation of Military Material, both prior to and after the entry of the United States into the war in the manner best suited to meet the demands of the Military situation."

2. The general subject of Air Collaboration, in which the policy pertaining to the supply and distribution of aircraft is an essential factor, is considered of such immediate and vital importance as to deserve special treatment.

3. Accordingly, a subcommittee of the United States Staff Committee and the United Kingdom Delegation was appointed to study this subject and to submit a report. The constitution of this subcommittee was as follows:

J. C. Slossor,
Air Vice Marshal, Royal Air Force.
Dewitt C. Ramsey,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
J. T. McNamoy,
Colonel, U. S. Army.

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March 29, 1941

Short Title ABC-2

4. The report of this subcommittee is forwarded herewith for consideration.

S. D. Embick,
Major-General, U. S. Army)

) On behalf of
) the United
) States Staff
) Committee.

R. L. Ghormley,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy.)

R. H. Bellairs,
Rear-Admiral, Royal Navy, on behalf of the
United Kingdom Delegation.

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March 29, 1941

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UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONSAIR POLICY

1. The general subject of Air Policy, in which the supply and distribution of aircraft is an essential factor, is considered of such immediate and vital importance as to deserve special treatment.

The Air Subcommittee, accordingly, submits the following report and recommendations.

REQUIRE- 2. United States Naval Aviation is employed in
MENTS OF naval tasks. It consists of four categories of
UNITED combat airplanes: 1st, those considered as integral
STATES parts of the combatant ships to which attached, viz.,
NAVAL aircraft carriers, battleships, and cruisers; 2nd,
AVIATION long-range patrol bomber airplanes attached to shore
 bases or mobile tenders; 3rd, shore-based observation airplanes
 for the patrol of coastal zones; and 4th, bombers, scouts, and
 fighters for the use of the Marine Corps. The priority of
 organization and equipment of these four categories is
 approximately equal to that accorded to vessels of the United
 States Fleets.

The current United States Naval Aviation 15,000 airplane expansion program, both for airplanes and shore stations, has been integrated with the expansion of the United States Navy as a whole. Any change in this program will influence the size and character of the naval forces which will be available to the United States for use in the war, and for future national security (See ABC-1 Paragraph 9).

The proposed allocation of United States Naval Aviation Units is set out in Table "A" (limited circulation).

REQUIRE- 3. In conditions under which the British Isles
MENTS OF no longer were available as a base for air operations
UNITED against the Axis Powers, an air force of 54 combat
STATES groups, plus the necessary personnel and facilities
ARMY to undertake an expansion to 100 combat groups, is
 the minimum strength required by the United States Army for its
 proportionate effort in achieving the air security of United
 States interests.

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It will, however, in present circumstances, be the policy of the United States to operate a substantial proportion of these forces from advanced bases in the British Isles in the event of United States intervention in the war as an Associate of the British Commonwealth.

The development and proposed allocation of units of the 54 Group program are set out in Table "D" (limited circulation).

REQUIRE-
MENTSBRITISH
COMMONWEALTH
AIR FORCES

4. Details of the British Commonwealth air strengths and expansion program, which include requirements for the security of the British Commonwealth and its sea communications are set out in Table "C" (limited circulation).

ALLOCATION
OF MATERIAL

5. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, United States Army, in consultation with the British Military Mission in Washington, will jointly advise the President on the allocation of air equipment among the United States Navy, the United States Army, and the air forces of the British Commonwealth in accordance with the requirements of the Military situation.

The Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chiefs of Staff Committee will be kept informed as to the progress of the aviation expansion programs of the British Commonwealth and United States. The United States Military Mission in London and the British Military Mission in Washington will be furnished with all pertinent information by the appropriate Military authorities.

6. The rate of expansion of the air combat forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth largely depends upon the ability of the two nations to provide adequate air material. All programs of aircraft construction will be accelerated as rapidly as circumstances permit. Deliveries of material to the United States Navy, to the United States Army, and to the air forces of the British Commonwealth will be conditioned by the ability of those organizations to absorb material usefully, either for the equipment of operating units, or for reserves of such magnitude as may be agreed upon, according to Military circumstances. The broad policy with respect to the provisions of equipment should be as set out in the following paragraphs.

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SECRETU.S. Serial 011512-15B.O.S. (J)(4)739March 29, 1941Short Title ABC-27. (a) United States Naval Aviation and Army Air Corps.

In principle, the United States programs for the equipment and maintenance of existing and new units and training establishments, should be based on total United States Production less:

- (i) Allocations to the British Commonwealth as outlined in subsequent paragraphs, and
- (ii) Allocations to other nations that may be authorized.

(b) British Air Forces.

In principle, the British Commonwealth programs for the equipment and maintenance of existing and new units and training establishments should be based on:

- (i) The output from production in the British Commonwealth,
- (ii) The output of the approved British 14,375 and 12,000 airplane programs from United States industry.
- (iii) The allocation of a continuing output from United States capacity now existing or approved, in such numbers as the Military situation may require and circumstances may permit.

8. In addition, allocation of output from new capacity for the production of Military aircraft beyond that envisaged in paragraph 7, should, in principle and subject to periodical review, be based on the following:

- (a) Until such time as the United States may enter the war, the entire output from such new capacity should be made available for release to the British.

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- (b) If the United States enters the war, thereafter the output from such new capacity should be divided among the Associated Powers as the military situation may require and circumstances may permit. For planning purposes the United Kingdom should assume that such capacity will be divided on approximately a 50/50 basis between the United States and the British Commonwealth.

UNITED STATESNAVAL AVIATION

9. The United States should expand its Naval Aviation, in the four categories listed in paragraph 2, on the plan of the 15,000 plane program. This program is expected to reach maturity concurrently with the completion of the authorized shipbuilding program in the fiscal year 1946. A pilot training program has been initiated which contemplates an ultimate yearly output of 6720 naval aviators. This program is coordinated with the expansion of the Navy as a whole.

The 15,000 plane program envisages an operating strength of combatant airplanes as follows:

| | |
|----------------------|--------------|
| Observation-Scouting | 854 |
| Fighting | 1,272 |
| Scout-Bombing | 1,662 |
| Torpedo Bombing | 588 |
| Bombing | 52 |
| Patrol Bombing | <u>1,540</u> |
| | 5,968 |

Excess primary training capacity will exist at various United States Naval Reserve Aviation Bases during fiscal year 1942 which, if British instructing personnel are available, could be applied to British needs.

UNITED STATESARMY AVIATION

10. Subject to the principles set out in the foregoing paragraphs, and so long as the United States does not enter the war, the United States should agree to defer completing the aircraft equipment of the 54 Combat Group program of the United States Army except as set out in detail in Table "B", provided any additional aircraft, thus made available, contribute directly to the effectuation of the policy stated in paragraphs 11 and 13 (h) of the Main Report.

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11. The United States Army should proceed with the initiation of its planned Second Aviation Objective (the 100 Group program referred to in paragraph 4) to include total training facilities for 30,000 pilots and 100,000 technicians per year, on the basis of a planned first line strength of:

| <u>Class</u> | <u>Airplanes</u> |
|--------------------------------|------------------|
| Heavy Bombardment | 1,520 |
| Medium Bombardment | 1,059 |
| Light Bombardment | 770 |
| Pursuit (Interceptor) | 2,500 |
| Pursuit (Fighter) | 525 |
| Observation, Liaison and Photo | 806 |
| Transport | 469 |
| Amphibian | 150 |
| TOTAL | 7,799 |

The time schedule for the completion of this program will periodically be adjusted to conform with deliveries of combat aircraft to the United States made in accordance with paragraph 10 or necessitated by wastage in combat units. Excess training capacity resulting therefrom will be made available for the training of British personnel.

BRITISH 12. The United Kingdom is now developing the COMMONWEALTH program outlined in Table "C". The rate of AIR FORCES development will depend in the main on the rate at which aircraft and trained pilots become available. The allocation of resources as between the different strategic Commands in the United Kingdom and as between the United Kingdom and overseas theaters of war will be determined in accordance with the requirements of the strategic situation from time to time, and, if the United States enters the war, in accordance with the joint war plans of the Associated Powers.

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It is the British intention to build up their offensive power as rapidly as possible.

J. C. Slessor,
Air Vice Marshal, Royal Air Force.

DeWitt C. Ramsey,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

J. T. McNarney,
Colonel, U. S. Army.

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**AMERICAN-DUTCH-BRITISH
CONVERSATIONS**

SINGAPORE, APRIL, 1941

(Short Title—"A.D.B.")

REPORT

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(Short Title: "A.D.B.")

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| Major J.M.J. Wegner. | Military Liaison
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D.S.O., A.F.C. (Secretary
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| Group Captain L. Dervall, M.C.,
Royal Air Force. | |

Commander in Chief, China and Staff.

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Batavia. |

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India.

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| Major General G.N. Molesworth. | Deputy Chief of General Staff (representing Defence Department). |
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East Indies Station.

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| D.S.O., M.V.O., R.N. | |

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A.D.B.
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AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS.
APRIL 1941.

REPORT.

SIGNED at Singapore this twenty-seventh day of April 1941

(Sd.) W.R. Purnell

CAPTAIN, U.S.N.
CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET.

(Sd.) V. Staveren.

(Sd.) H. ter Poorten.

CAPTAIN, R.N.N.,
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF, NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.
MAJOR-GENERAL,
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.

(Sd.) R.M. Colvin.

ADMIRAL,
FIRST NAVAL MEMBER,
AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH NAVAL BOARD.

(Sd.) W.E. Parry.

COMMODORE,
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF, NEW ZEALAND.

(Sd.) G.N. Molesworth.

MAJOR-GENERAL,
DEPUTY CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, INDIA.

(Sd.) A.G.B. Wilson.

COMMODORE,
CHIEF OF STAFF, EAST INDIES STATION.

(Sd.) G. Layton.

VICE-ADMIRAL,
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHINA STATION.

(Sd.) R. Brooke-Popham.

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL,
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, FAR EAST.

MOST SECRET.A.D.B.
Page 6.AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS.
APRIL 1941.INTRODUCTION AND TERMS OF REFERENCE.1. Introduction.

The following conditions apply:-

- 2nd
Preliminary*
- (a) State of war between Germany, Italy and Japan on one hand, and British Empire with its present Allies and the United States of America (referred to herein as the Associated Powers) on the other.
 - (b) No political commitment is implied.
 - (c) Any agreement is subject to ratification by Government concerned.

Terms of Reference.

2. To prepare plan for conduct of military operations in Far East on basis of report of Washington conversations.

3. Particular points for agreement are:-

- (a) Plan for employment and disposition of forces in whole area Indian Ocean, Pacific and Australian and New Zealand waters before and after arrival of Far East Fleet, as agreed in Washington conversations, and summarised in Admiralty Telegram 1848 of 4th April.
- (b) Details of arrangements for co-operation, e.g. communications, exchange of Liaison Officers, etc.

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Page 7.AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS.
APRIL 1941.I - OBJECT.

4. Our object is to defeat Germany and her allies, and hence in the Far East to maintain the position of the Associated Powers against Japanese attack, in order to sustain a long-term economic pressure against Japan until we are in a position to take the offensive.

Our most important interests in the Far East are:-

(a) The security of sea communications

and

(b) The security of Singapore.

An important subsidiary interest is the security of Luzon in the Philippine Islands since, so long as submarine and air forces can be operated from Luzon, expeditions to threaten Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies from the East are out-flanked.

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Page 8.AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.II - SUMMARY OF SITUATION.

5. The war situation is that obtaining on the 20th April, 1941.

6. The Associated Powers are convinced that any action against one is of vital importance for the others. 2

7. JAPAN's object is assumed to be to obtain complete political and economic domination of South East Asia and the islands in the Far East Area in order to secure control for herself of the sources of vital war supplies.

8. Knowledge by Japan that aggression by her against one of the Associated Powers would immediately lead to united resistance by all might prevent war.

9. In spite of the signing of a Non-Aggression Pact between Russia and Japan, it is considered that the Japanese will not feel relieved of responsibility for maintaining considerable forces in the North to guard against the possibility of a change of policy by Russia. The signing of a Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and Russia has not led to the growth of mutual trust between these countries.

10. The influence of China is likely to be considerable. The Russians declare that they are not reducing their military support to China. Nothing could give Chinese resistance more encouragement than if the Associated Powers went to war with Japan.

Considerable progress has already been made in organising British assistance to China. A scheme for the operation of Air Forces and Guerillas controlled and advised by the British is already well advanced in the planning stage.

COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO JAPAN.

11. To achieve her object Japan must assume the offensive; she can launch attacks against any of the following:-

- (a) The Philippines and/or Hong Kong.
- (b) Malaya, direct or via Thailand.
- (c) Burma, via Thailand and Indo-China.
- (d) Borneo or the Northern line of Netherlands East Indies.
- (e) Sea communications in all areas, (including the establishment of advanced bases).

/ (contd.).....

MOST SECRET.A.D.B.
Page 9.AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.II - SUMMARY OF SITUATION (contd.)

12. Attacks on :-

(a) The Southern line of Netherlands East Indies
(Java - Sumatra) and

(b) Australia and New Zealand

are ruled out as initial operations.

*While of low priority
of feasibility, should
not be ruled out*Attack on the Philippines and/or Hong Kong.

13. This would eliminate a serious threat to the flank of further Japanese expeditions to the Southward. All the other possible lines of attack would be hampered by an active United States naval and air base at Manila.

It would also be the nearest objective to Japan and so easiest to cover as regards air support and lines of communications. If successful, the attack would provide useful bases from which further expeditions could be launched.

The disadvantage to the Japanese of an attack on the Philippines is that the economic resources of the islands are of comparatively little value for war purposes, so that it would be primarily a strategical move towards Japan's main object.

An attack on the Philippines might well be combined with an attack on Hong Kong on similar principles.

Attack on Malaya.

14. An attack on Malaya via Thailand would have to be made in two stages :-

(a) Political domination which would give some indication of intention;

(b) Military occupation which would take time and would provide an opportunity of forestalling action in the Kra Isthmus.

On the other hand, attack by direct landing on the East coast of the Malay Peninsula could be undertaken without preliminary warning, but requires a greater degree of control of the sea and air communications.

15. It must be obvious to Japan that the forces available for the defence of Malaya have been greatly reinforced during the last six months, and an attack on them is becoming a much more formidable proposition than it was in October, even taking into account only the British forces available on the spot. Either line of attack, if undertaken before the reduction of Hong Kong and Manila, involves a long and precarious line of communications.

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MOST SECRET.A.D.B.
Page 10AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.II - SUMMARY OF SITUATION (contd.)Attack on Burma.

16. Attack on Burma only becomes a possibility after occupation of Indo-China and Thailand and prior indication of Japanese intention would be available. Even after occupation of Thailand the routes to Burma are so poor that they severely limit the size of forces available to attack Burma. The great advantage to Japan would be the cutting of communications between Burma and China, which would have a disastrous effect upon Chinese resistance. It would also cut the air route between India and Malaya except for long range aircraft.

The principal threat to Burma and Eastern India would be of air bombardment on oil refineries and docks at Rangoon and possibly on vulnerable points in Eastern India (Digboi, Calcutta, Tatanagar).

Although the immediate economic gains to Japan of an occupation of Burma would be negligible, the denial of Burma's resources to us would be serious.

Attack on Borneo or the Northern Line of Netherlands East Indies.

17. Although Manila and Hong Kong are on the flanks of the line of communications of Japan, an attack launched from an advanced base such as Kamranh Bay or Pelew on Borneo would facilitate the subsequent reduction of the Philippines, provide a base for air attack on Singapore, and assist further Southward advance. It might also establish control of vital sources of oil supplies. An attack on other points in the Northern line of the Netherlands East Indies would provide useful subsidiary bases for further expeditions.

The possibility of attack on the oil fields by landing operations in conjunction with parachute troops cannot be overlooked and is being provided against.

Attack on Sea Communications.

18. Attack on sea communications will certainly form part of any Japanese plan of action and may constitute a most serious threat to the war effort of the Associated Powers. In spite of the influence of the United States Pacific Fleet, Japan's local naval superiority in the Eastern Theatre (paragraph 34) places her in a position to devote a limited number of cruisers and submarines, in addition to a considerable number of armed merchant raiders, to attack on sea communications in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. Though the distances involved are considerable, they present no greater difficulties than those confronting Germany in operating raiders in the same areas. The problem for the Japanese is connected with the use of isolated harbours

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Page 11.AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.II - SUMMARY OF SITUATION (contd.)

fuelling bases, and also with the passage of Japanese ships through the straits and narrows of the Netherlands East Indies.

19. The Associated Powers must therefore be prepared for a greatly increased and sustained scale of attack on their sea communications in the Eastern Theatre, including attack by armed merchant raiders and a limited number of cruisers and submarines, operating singly or in company. This will be concerted with attacks by German raiders.

20. Active operations by the United States Pacific Fleet against Japanese bases in the Marshall and Caroline Islands may have the effect of considerably reducing the scale of attack on sea communications in the Southern Pacific, at least as regards warships.

REMARKS ON POSSIBLE JAPANESE COURSES OF ACTION.

21. Until the forces, particularly submarine and air, maintained in the Philippines, are eliminated, Japan would be taking great risks in launching an attack either West of them on Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies, or East of them on the Netherlands East Indies or Australia and New Zealand.

22. The question whether Japan is in a position to launch two or more sea-borne attacks simultaneously is influenced by the following factors :-

- (a) Japan not established in South Indo-China and Bangkok area.
- (b) Japan established in South Indo-China and Bangkok area.

23. Under the conditions of 22(a) all Japanese forces attacking Malaya must be moved by sea. The Japanese can never afford to ignore the needs of home defence against the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets. While maintaining in home waters a force slightly inferior to the U.S.A. Fleets she can just provide sufficient covering and escort forces to protect her first expedition against small scale raids by surface craft and submarines. For the passage of subsequent expeditions the same warships could be used but escorts of supply ships would be additional commitments. In consequence, simultaneous attacks on more than one of the objectives described in paragraph 11 can only be undertaken if the Japanese accept great risks.

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Page 124AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL, 1941.II - SUMMARY OF SITUATION (contd.)

24. Under the conditions of 22(b), the risks attendant on simultaneous attacks on any two of these would be reduced.

25. If it is clear to Japan that the united forces of the British Empire, the United States and the Dutch would meet aggression on her part, her immediate intervention in the war is unlikely. The only situation which would be likely to appeal to her as offering outstanding chances would be such a deterioration in our position in Europe that it appeared probable that all United States and British effort would have to be concentrated in that theatre for a considerable time. On the other hand, such is the national psychology of the Japanese that acts of hysteria which might lead to the plunging of Japan into war must be faced. It is for this reason in particular that it is necessary for combined plans to be made by the Associated Powers to meet threats to their interests which may occur at very short notice.

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AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS.
APRIL 1941.III - NECESSITY FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION.

26. Our collective military strength can only be developed fully if our Governments agree to act together, should any of them judge that the Japanese have taken action which necessitated active military counter-action. It is agreed that any of the following actions by Japan would create a position in which our failure to take active military counter-action would place us at such military disadvantage, should Japan subsequently attack, that we should then advise our respective Governments to authorise such action:-

- (a) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the Territory or Mandated Territory of any of the Associated Powers. It is not possible to define accurately what would constitute "a direct act of war". It is possible for a minor incident to occur which, although technically an act of war, could be resolved by diplomatic action. It is recognised that the decision as to whether such an incident is an act of war must lie with the Government concerned.
- (b) The movement of the Japanese forces into any part of Thailand to the West of 100° East or to the South of 10° North.
- (c) The movement of a large number of Japanese warships, or of a convoy of merchant ships escorted by Japanese warships, which from its position and course was clearly directed upon the Philippine Islands, the East coast of the Isthmus of Kra or the East coast of Malaya, or had crossed the parallel of 6° North between Malaya and the Philippines, a line from the Gulf of Davao to Waigeo Island, or the Equator East of Waigeo.
- (d) The movement of Japanese forces into Portuguese Timor.
- (e) The movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands.

27. The Conference recommends that steps should be taken to evolve a satisfactory procedure to ensure immediate decision to take counter-measures. This applies particularly to 26 (c) above.

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Page 14AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.IV - ACTION OPEN TO THE ASSOCIATED POWERS.

28. To ensure that we are not diverted from the major object of the defeat of Germany and Italy, our main strategy in the Far East at the present time must be defensive. There, are, however, certain measures open to us which will assist greatly in the defence of our interests in the Far East, but which are themselves offensive.

29. It is important to organise air operations against Japanese occupied territory and against Japan herself. It is probable that her collapse will occur as a result of economic blockade, naval pressure and air bombardment. This latter form of pressure is the most direct and one which Japan particularly fears.

In addition to the defensive value of operating submarine and air forces from Luzon, referred to in para. 21 above there is even greater value from the offensive point of view in holding this island. It is therefore recommended that the defences of Luzon should be strengthened and that every effort should be made to maintain a bombing force in the island in addition to building up a similar force in China.

30. Other positive activities which may be undertaken are as follows:-

- (a) Support to the Chinese Regular Forces by financial aid and provision of equipment.
- (b) Operation of Guerillas in China.
- (c) Organisation of subversive activities in Japan.

31. So far as economic pressure is concerned, the entry of the United States of America, the British Empire, and the Netherlands East Indies into a war against Japan would automatically restrict Japanese trade to that with the coast of Asia. Since China will be in the war against her, and our submarine and air forces should be able to interfere considerably with trade from Thailand and Indo-China, a very large measure of economic blockade would thus be forced upon Japan from the outset.

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AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS.
APRIL 1941.V - COMMAND.

32. The following arrangements are subject to the right of any of the Governments of the Associated Powers or British Dominions to withdraw or withhold its forces, provided that prior information of such an intention is passed to the Strategic Commander concerned.

33. The United States will undertake responsibility for strategic direction of its own and British Forces in the Pacific area, together with Islands therein contained and adjacent continental land areas. The Pacific Area is defined as area North of 30° North and West of 140° East: North of Equator and East of 140° East; South of Equator and East of 180° to South American coast and 74° West. The United States will support British Naval Forces in regions South of Equator as far West as 155° East. The Far Eastern Area is defined as area from coast of China in 30° North, East to 140° East, thence South to Equator, thence East to 141° East, thence South to boundary between British and Dutch New Guinea on South coast thence Westward to 11° South, 120° East, thence South to 13° South, thence West to 98° East, thence North to 20° North, thence to boundary between India and Burma.

34. For the purposes of this report the term "Eastern Theatre" is used to indicate the whole Sea area included in the East Indies, China, Australia and New Zealand British naval stations except parts included in the Pacific Area as defined in the preceding paragraph.

NAVAL FORCES.

35. In order to attain greater flexibility and economy in the employment of naval forces in the Eastern Theatre, it is recommended that the British Commander-in-Chief, China Station, should exercise unified strategical direction over all naval forces, excluding those employed solely on local defence, or operating under Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet.

This direction would include movements of warships from any part of the area to that point where the Commander-in-Chief, China, considers they can best be employed.

In exercising this direction the Commander-in-Chief, China, must be fully acquainted with the operations being carried out from day to day in all areas concerned; and he will decide which of the regional operations must be modified in order to deal with a more dangerous situation elsewhere.

While the Commander-in-Chief, China, will thus direct the dispositions of naval forces throughout the area and the general plan for their employment, the Commander-in-Chief of each station would retain full operational command of forces within that station.

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Page 16.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS.
APRIL 1941.V - COMMAND (contd.)

In order to work out operational plans and to exercise this strategic direction, the immediate establishment at Singapore of a combined staff including representatives from Dominions and Associated Powers is recommended. ✓

LAND FORCES.

36. In the particular circumstances the primary task of the land forces has been decided to be the defence of the naval and air bases and the denial of potential naval and air bases to the enemy. There is little possibility of strategic offensive action by land forces and a localised strategic policy is therefore already established for the land forces. They will continue to be controlled by the authorities of the territories in which they are stationed except as where otherwise mutually arranged, e.g. TIMOR.

AIR FORCES.

37. Air forces have the power to concentrate provided the decision can be made quickly, the orders issued rapidly, and the necessary bases and facilities are available throughout the area. Unless one central authority with power to direct concentrations is established in advance the great strategic advantages of this power to concentrate rapidly to meet particular situations in different areas cannot be obtained.

38. In effect such central control would only be exercised over those portions of the air forces of the Associated Powers which can from time to time be made available for concentration in the area that is at any time most important to the common interest. The central controlling authority would be empowered to decide the time and area for the concentration, direct the moves to take place, and indicate the main task of the forces. The operational control of the forces thus concentrated would be exercised by the Commander of the Power in whose operational area the concentration was effected.

39. It is recommended that the authority empowered to exercise this strategical direction of air forces in the FAR EAST should be the Commander-in-Chief, FAR EAST, with General Headquarters at SINGAPORE.

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MOST SECRETA.D.B.
Page 17.ANGLO - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.VI - PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES.Definition of Phase I and Phase II.

40. Phase I is regarded as existing from the outbreak of hostilities with Japan until the arrival of the British Far Eastern Fleet in the Eastern Theatre.

Phase II refers to operations subsequent to this.

OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN IN THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEANS
DURING PHASE I.

41. The basic principle of the strategy of the Associated Powers is that the Atlantic and Europe are the decisive theatre of war. It follows that the forces employed in other theatres must be reduced to a minimum so as not to impair our main effort in the decisive theatre.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to allot large forces to other theatres, and such forces should be used whenever possible, to inflict the maximum loss on our enemies.

The chief example of this is the United States Pacific Fleet, which it is essential to maintain in strength at least equal to the Japanese fleet, in order to hold our position in the Pacific and to act offensively against Japanese forces and bases in order to counter the certain Japanese offensive against the position of the Associated Powers in the Eastern Theatre.

The remaining naval forces of the Associated Powers in the Eastern Theatre are so weak that they will inevitably find themselves very largely occupied with the local defence of bases and the protection of vital sea communications. Nevertheless, whenever and wherever they can, they should assume the offensive against Japanese naval forces and sea communications.

United States Pacific Fleet.

42. As stated in the Report of the Washington Conversations, the United States Pacific Fleet at Hawaii will operate offensively against the Japanese Mandated Islands and against Japanese sea communications in the Pacific. The support to be afforded to British forces south of the equator between 155° East and 180° cannot be defined until further information is received from the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, as to his intentions.

As the United States Pacific Fleet is responsible for operations, including the protection of sea communications, to the Eastward of 180°, it will be necessary for Australia and New Zealand to co-operate direct with the Commander in Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet.

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MOST SECRETA.D.B.
Page 18.AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941VI - PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES...contd.United States Asiatic Fleet.

(?) 43. Based on Manila initially. Should movements of Japanese naval and air forces become threatening, it is proposed to despatch the submarine, destroyer and large patrol plane tenders and the tankers to Singapore before the commencement of hostilities. If hostilities start before these auxiliaries are safely disposed, the combatant vessels will escort them. It is estimated that Japan's most probable course of action will be to :-

- (a) contain the Asiatic Fleet in Manila Bay with the object of destroying it by air and torpedo attacks and failing in this, to
- (b) locate the fleet at the earliest possible moment and endeavour to destroy it by air, submarine or surface vessel attacks.

44. The submarine, naval air and naval local defence forces will be employed in support of the Army in its defence of Luzon, conducting reconnaissance and such offensive operations against Japanese sea communications and naval forces as are consistent with that mission. Hong Kong will be available as a base for these operations.

45. The cruisers with attached aviation units and destroyers will, when ordered by C in C Asiatic Fleet, proceed towards Singapore reporting to Commander in Chief China, to operate under his strategic direction.

46. Upon the "Ultimate Defence Area" (which includes Corregidor at the entrance to Manila Bay) becoming untenable, all remaining naval and naval air forces retaining combat value will, when released by Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, retire southward passing under the strategic direction of Commander in Chief China.

British Naval Forces.

47. Apart from the local defence of bases, British naval forces will be employed on the defence of our vital sea communications, and the attack on Japanese sea communications. It is clear that the forces available are quite inadequate for the introduction of general convoy system and that evasive routing or sailings under cover must therefore form the main defence for trade.

Dutch Naval Forces.

48. These will be employed primarily for the defence of the Netherlands East Indies and of the narrow passages between the islands.

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MOST SECRET.A.D.B.
Page 19.AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.VI - PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES...cont.Dutch Naval Forces. (Cont.)

49. One cruiser, two destroyers and two submarines will be available initially to operate under British control.

Submarine Operations.

50. Co-ordinated direction of the operations of allied submarines is of great importance since these working in conjunction with our air forces, constitute our most powerful weapon for attacking Japan's seaborne forces.

51. United States submarines, so long as they operate in defence of the Philippines, will operate under the orders of Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet. Upon being released by Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, they will pass under the control of Commander in Chief, China, who will be responsible for co-ordinating their operations with those of the Dutch submarines.

52. The Dutch submarines will principally operate under the orders of Commander in Chief, Netherlands East Indies, for defence of the channels through the Netherlands East Indies to the Indian Ocean and to meet any enemy action in Netherlands East Indies waters, but as described in para. 49, two initially, and possibly others at a later stage, will be allotted to general tasks at the direction of the Commander in Chief, China. These Dutch submarines will operate in the South China Sea south of the line joining Cape Paderan and Kudat, all United States submarines keeping north of this line until both forces operate under Commander in Chief, China.

DEFENCE OF SEA COMMUNICATIONS.

53. The security of the following must be ensured:-

- (a) Reinforcements and supplies to our forces in Middle East.
- (b) Reinforcements and supplies to our forces in the Eastern Theatre.
- (c) Conveyance of vital supplies between the United Kingdom, U.S.A., Malaya, Netherlands East Indies, Australia and New Zealand.
- (d) Empire Air Training Scheme to Canada and U.K.
- (e) Empire Air Training Scheme to South Africa.
- (f) Troop movements to Ambon and Koepang.
- (g) Troop movements to Pacific Islands.

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Page 20.AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS.
APRIL 1941.VI - PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES....cont.DEFENCE OF SEA COMMUNICATIONS....cont.

54. The above entails protection to the following routes :-

- (a) Cape to Aden, Indian Ports, Colombo and Malaya.
- (b) Australia to Colombo, Indian Ports and Aden.
- (c) Australia and New Zealand to Singapore via Sunda Strait.
- (d) Australia and New Zealand to Cape.
- (e) Australia and New Zealand to West Coast of America.
- (f) Indian Ports to Aden.
- (g) Persian Gulf to Aden.
- (h) Persian Gulf to Indian Ports and Colombo.
- (i) Darwin to Netherlands East Indies.
- (j) N.E.I. to the Philippines.
- (k) Coastal trade.

55. Methods of protection may be summarised as follows:-

- (a) Convoy.
- (b) Cover.
- (c) Patrol of focal and terminal areas by surface vessels and aircraft.
- (d) Routing of shipping, either evasive or coast-wise. The latter, when feasible, requires :-
 - (i) Seaward cover by surface ships including A/S vessels.
 - (ii) Air cover and availability of air striking forces.
 - (iii) Protective minefields.

Convoy.

56. The volume of trade passing along the routes denoted in paragraph 54, the great distances involved and the number of warships available render impossible the adoption of a universal convoy system throughout the whole Eastern Theatre. We should therefore be prepared to provide escorted convoys as necessary to meet the following requirements :-

- (a) important troop movements (capital ship escort for the more important).
- (b) supply ships between Colombo (and Indian ports) and Malaya.
- (c) supply ships from Australia to Singapore and Netherlands East Indies.
- (d) shipping between America, Australia and New Zealand while in the Tasman area.

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MOST SECRET.A.D.B.
Page 21.AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.VI - PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES...cont.

The Commander in Chief of the Stations concerned will continue to arrange convoy escorts as hitherto, with the Commander in Chief, China, acting where necessary as the co-ordinating authority.

Routeing.

57. Routeing of independent sailings should be conducted on the following general lines :-

- (a) Shipping in the Indian Ocean, with the exception of that to and from Australia should be routed as far to the North as is feasible. No shipping to pass South of the Seychelles Group or at more than 100 miles South of Ceylon.
- (b) Wherever feasible, all shipping to be routed close inshore.
- (c) Australia to Aden shipping to be routed via Durban.
- (d) All shipping on Indian and Pacific Ocean routes to be evasively routed.

Protective Minefields.

58. It is not yet possible to consider the provision of protective minefields for inshore routeing in any area of the Eastern Theatre.

Disposition of Naval and Air Forces.

59. Naval Forces and air forces detailed primarily for defence of sea communications should be disposed with the following principles in view :-

- (a) prevention of the passage of enemy forces through the Netherlands East Indies.
- (b) cover of focal and terminal areas by both surface and air forces.
- (c) provision of escorts for convoys as in paragraph 56, without unduly affecting (a) and (b) above.
- (d) rapid concentration of forces employed in (b) above to deal with any attack on a particular section of a trade route.

60. A table giving the intended initial dispositions and functions of the naval forces of the Associated Powers in the Eastern Theatre, based on the foregoing principles, is attached as Appendix I, but it should be understood that offensive operations by the United States Pacific Fleet may so contain Japanese forces that it may be possible to release both naval and air forces allocated for trade protection for other operations.

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MOST SECRET.A.D.B.
Page 22.AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS.
APRIL 1941.VI - PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES..cont.DEFENCE OF SEA COMMUNICATIONS.....cont.PHASE II.

61. In Phase II with the arrival of the British Far Eastern Fleet the balance of strength of naval forces in the Eastern Theatre will be altered considerably against Japan, and taking the Pacific and Indian Oceans as a whole, Japan would probably be in a position of inferiority.

62. The immediate object of the British Far Eastern Fleet is to operate from Singapore. While alone it is inferior to the Japanese Main Fleet, its strength should be sufficient to enable the Associated Powers to seize the initiative, launch powerful counter-attacks against such Japanese forces as may have established their position in territories of Associated Powers, and intensify the attack on Japanese forces, territories and sea communications.

63. In the unlikely event of it proving impossible for the British Fleet to operate from Singapore, it will operate from bases in the Indian Ocean with the object of securing our vital sea communications in the Indian Ocean and Australian and New Zealand areas, disputing any further advance by the enemy to the southward or westward, and if possible, relieving pressure on Malaya by operations in the Malacca Straits and against any enemy activities on the West coast of Malaya.

64. So many developments must precede the arrival of the British Far Eastern Fleet that it is not profitable to examine in greater detail the operations that would then be possible.

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Page 23.AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS.
APRIL 1941.VII - PLAN FOR EMPLOYMENT OF LAND AND AIR FORCES.

65. The only land frontiers in the area to be guarded are those of Burma and Malaya.

66. The northern frontier of Malaya is strategically weak, and attack across it becomes possible after Japanese occupation of Southern Thailand, either by moving down the Isthmus, or after a landing.

67. In Java, Sumatra, the West coast of Malaya, Luzon, and Celebes, land communications are well developed. In all other areas, such communications are almost entirely absent and could only be improvised with great difficulty. Movement is chiefly coastwise by ship or by means of native boats up the rivers.

68. Except therefore in Burma and Northern Malaya, any enemy land forces moving to attack our territory must be sea-borne. This involves seizure of bases from which to operate naval and air forces and from which to advance to the objective, except that if the Philippines are attacked only advanced air bases will be required. Adequate air support is an essential requirement for a combined operation.

69. The most suitable objectives for enemy attack are the sea and air bases on which the defence mainly rests. The policy should therefore be to organise the defence system to give the greatest possible security to these bases. This, together with the denial of potential air and naval bases to enemy occupation, will be the primary task of the land forces. We can thus fully employ the mobility of air forces both independently and in co-operation with naval submarine and surface forces, to effect concentrations against any naval forces or sea-borne expeditions during their approach and landing, to discover and destroy enemy air forces and to operate dispersed for the protection of sea communications.

70. The method adopted to implement the policy set out in paragraph 69 above, is to establish protected air bases along the line Burma - Malaya - Borneo - Philippines - New Guinea - Solomons - New Hebrides - Fiji - Tonga. This line of bases is supported by a second line from Sumatra through the Netherlands East Indies and the East coast of Australia to New Zealand. At present the numbers of aircraft and land forces available are below what is considered to be the safe minimum required, but to some extent the power to concentrate air forces quickly makes up for lack of numbers. The move of land forces, in the circumstances, is much more difficult.

71. The Associated Powers undertake responsibility for air operations, including reconnaissance, in the following spheres:-

(a) U.S.A.

(1) Pacific area as defined in paragraph 33.

Note. The extent of the United States support to

/ (contd.)

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the British air forces in areas (d) and (e) cannot be defined until further information is received from the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, as to his intentions.

- (11) Philippine Islands including the Sulu Se. area and bounded on the West by a line joining Kudat to Cape Padaran. On the South it is bounded by a line joining Kudat to Sangi Island, and thence to 4° North 140° East.
- (b) N.E.I. On the West: 92° East. On the North: the line of the equator from 92° East to 113° East, thence North-East to the frontier of Sarawak and from thence following the frontier to the sea. The boundary continues N.E. along the coast of British North Borneo to Kudat, thence East to Sangi Island and thence to 4° North, 140° East. On the South: a line drawn along 15° South from 92° East to 120° East, thence just excluding the Islands of Reti, Seman, Timor and Molu to Cape Valsche, continuing along the South shore of Dutch New Guinea to its boundary in 141° East, thence North.
- (c) British. The area northward and westward of the Dutch sphere.
- (d) Australia. The area southward and eastward of the Dutch sphere as far East as the western boundary of the New Zealand Naval Station and the northern reconnaissance line from New Guinea - New Hebrides (Sandwich Island).
- (e) New Zealand. The area of the New Zealand Naval Station, excluding the Pacific area, and the northern reconnaissance line from New Hebrides (Sandwich Island)-Fiji - Tonga.

AIR RECONNAISSANCE AND STRIKING FORCES IN THE PRECAUTIONARY STAGE.

72. On the introduction of the "precautionary stage", air reconnaissance will be intensified throughout the whole of the Eastern Theatre and co-ordinated with naval reconnaissance. Air striking forces will be prepared to attack raiders, naval forces or expeditions.

73. To enable concentrations to take place to deal with major operations in specially important localities, certain air base areas are prepared to receive and operate reinforcements from other areas. Such areas are Burma, Southern Malaya, West and East Borneo, South Celebes, Ambon, Timor, Luzon in the Philippine Islands, and the Australian and New Zealand areas. It is important that the aerodromes concerned should be adequately supplied with fuel, bombs

/ (contd.)

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and S.A.A. for the use of reinforcing squadrons, reasonably secured against air and land attack and with good signal communications.

74. - As a basis for planning it can be assumed that the forces available for reinforcing will be as follows:-

| | |
|--|--|
| From Malaya | 4 (B) Squadrons. |
| From Netherlands East Indies | 3 (B), 1 (F) Squadrons. |
| From Philippines (in event of evacuation only) | All available. |
| From Australia | Up to possible 2 (B) Squadrons for the Ambon - Timor area. |

Flying boats are very short in the whole area. It is impracticable to lay down now from which area or in what numbers they might be spared for reinforcement, but it is important that the mobility of flying boats shall be exploited to the full to make good the deficiency in numbers.

75. The maintenance of a secure air route, adequately supplied with fuel, permitting reinforcement via India through Burma, Malaya, Netherlands East Indies to Australia, with a branch to Luzon, is of great importance.

76. The Conference recommends that it should be a definite object of the Associated Powers to build up the capacity to operate aircraft offensively against Japan to the maximum extent in their power with due regard to the main object, which is the defeat of Germany and Italy.

77. Plans will be prepared and co-ordinated for air bombardment of targets on the Japanese lines of sea communications in the South China Sea and Pelew areas, and objectives in China, Formosa and the Pelew Islands. It may be possible also to attack targets in Japan from air bases to be established in China.

OTHER OPERATIONS.

78. (a) Support to Chinese Regular Forces by financial aid, provision of equipment and establishment of military and air missions. A British nucleus Mission is already established, and a United States Mission possible combined with the British Mission would be of considerable value, and it is recommended that preparations to establish it should now be made.

(b) The operating of Chinese Guerilla Forces armed, equipped and directed by the Associated Powers. Steps have already been taken by the British Government to organise such operations. It is recommended that the United States Government organise similar guerilla forces.

/ (contd.)

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(c) The organisation of subversive activities, sabotage and corruption in Japan and Japanese occupied territories. Activities of this kind are already being organised by the British Government. It is recommended that the United States Government should also undertake such activities and co-ordinate them closely with those of the British.

/ (contd.)

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APRIL 1941.VIII - LIAISON, COMMUNICATIONS.LIAISON.

79. Arrangements for the exchange of liaison officers and observers are already well under way and the Conference does not recommend any special extension of these. It is recommended, however, that the Liaison Officers and Observers of the Dominions and Associated Powers at Singapore should be instructed that, on the outbreak of hostilities they will be available for duty ✓ on the Combined Staff of the C-in-C., Far East or C-in-C., China.

80. A list of the present Liaison Officers and Observers is appended for reference as Appendix III.

COMMUNICATIONS.

The following is a summary of the present situation :-

(Radio)

81. Point-to-point W/T Services.

- (a) Singapore, Batavia and Australian W/T Stations communicate direct by W/T at routine times daily.
- (b) Arrangements have been made for Cavite to Join in, making a four cornered W/T point-to-point service (Singapore - Batavia - Cavite - Australia). Up to the present Cavite has not taken part. It is considered desirable that permission should be given by the United States Naval Authorities for Cavite to open up direct W/T communication with stations named, as soon as possible. ✓
- (c) No arrangements have been made for a point-to-point service between Australia, New Zealand and Honolulu. It is now considered that such a point-to-point service is required and should be arranged directly by the parties concerned. ✓

82. Communications to and from 'Associated' Ships.

- (a) The normal method is for ships to pass their messages to their own shore bases, the latter forwarding relevant messages (via the services in 81 above) to other Commanders-in-Chief.
- (b) Ships can, if desired, pass messages direct to 'Associated' shore stations.

/ (contd.)

MOST SECRET.A.D.B.
Page 28.AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.VIII - LIAISON, COMMUNICATIONS. (contd.)83. Communications between 'Associated' ships
in an operation.

A means is provided whereby, at a certain stage of an operation, Associated ships may be ordered to set watch on a common wave to allow direct communication between them.

CODES AND CYPHERS.

84. The following are in force now or will be distributed and brought into force when available :-

- (a) A cypher for use between Flag Officers afloat and ashore and Senior Officers Commanding Ports, etc. (Dutch ENIGMA at present in use, with very limited distribution. A British cypher is being distributed now and will be brought into force about the end of May 1941).
- (b) A cypher for use between all ships and shore authorities (in production in England now).
- (c) A code (with low degree of security) for use between all ships and shore authorities. It also contains Self Evident Code for use between ships and aircraft. (Distributed and ready to be brought into force now).
- (d) A code for use between ground stations and aircraft or ships and aircraft (in production in Far East now).
- (e) A book of Call Signs (in course of distribution now).
- (f) Recognition signals for use between ships, aircraft and signal stations at defended ports (distributed and ready to be brought into force now).

85. In addition to the above the following books are distributed and in force in the Far East for use between British and Dutch ships and aircraft :-

- (a) Code as in 84(c).
- (b) Call signs as in 84(e)
- (c) Recognition signals as in 84(f).

CONFERENCE OF SIGNAL OFFICERS.

86. A further conference of Communication Officers will be required and will probably be convened by Commander-in-Chief, China, about the end of May.

/ (contd.)

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APRIL 1941.APPENDIX I.LIST OF INITIAL DISPOSITIONS AND FUNCTIONS OF NAVAL FORCES.

| SHIP | BASE | FUNCTION |
|---|------------------------------------|---|
| (a) British Commonwealth Forces - East Indies Station. | | |
| GLASGOW
RANCHI
CARTHAGE
KANIMBLA | Durban | Cover to shipping from Cape Area through Mozambique Channel. |
| SHROPSHIRE
ENTERPRISE
HERMES (or
EAGLE)
4 HUNTS (if
available) | Seychelles
Mombasa | Cover to shipping from N. end
Mozambique Channel towards
Maldives area.
Reconnaissance over Saya de
Malha area.
Escort of troop and supply
convoys as required. |
| 1 Cruiser
2 A/S Sloops | Maldives | Cover to shipping to westward
of Maldives to Ceylon.
Escort of troop and supply
convoys in this area as
necessary. |
| EMERALD
COLOMBO
EAGLE (if
available)
2 A/S Sloops | Colombo | Cover to shipping in Ceylon
area and to eastward.
Escort of troop and supply
convoys to and from Bay of
Bengal and Arabian Sea as
requisite. |
| CERES
CAPETOWN | Trincomalee
Madras.
Calcutta | Cover of shipping in Bay of
Bengal.
Escort of troop and supply
convoys from Indian ports as
requisite in conjunction with
China cruisers operating from
Penang area. |
| CALEDON
HECTOR
ANTENOR | Bombay | Cover of shipping in Arabian Sea.
Escort of troop and supply
convoys Bombay-Aden, Bombay -
Colombo as requisite. |
| RENOWN
ARK ROYAL
5 destroyers
(Force "H") | Trincomalee | General cover to route Seychelles
to Aden.
Escort of troop convoys Frem-
antle - Colombo and onward as
necessary. Escort or cover
of troop convoys in Bay of
Bengal as requisite.
Destroyers A/S protection of
Force H in terminal areas. |

/ (cont)

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APRIL 1941.APPENDIX I. (cont).

| SHIP | BASE | FUNCTION |
|---|---|--|
| (a) <u>British Commonwealth Forces - East Indies Station</u>
(continued) | | |
| SEABELLE
PALMOUTH
3 R.I.N.
Sloops. | Bahrein
Basra
Khor Kuwait | Protection of shipping in
Persian Gulf.
Patrol of Straits of Ormuz. |
| 3 Sloops | Aden
Suez | Protection of shipping in Red
Sea. Patrol and convoy cover
in Perin Strait. |
| ===== | | |
| (b) <u>British Commonwealth Forces - China Station.</u> | | |
| DAUNTLESS
DURBAN
DANAE | Singapore
and
Penang | Protection of shipping in
Malacca Straits and to
westward. |
| ===== | | |
| (c) <u>British Commonwealth Forces - Australian Station.</u> | | |
| AUSTRALIA
CANBERRA | Operating in
and from S.W.
Pacific. | Act as Hunting Force in
Indian Ocean or SW Pacific.
Escort of troop convoys to
Middle East as far as
Fremantle.
Escort of supplies Fremantle
to Malaya. |
| 2 6-inch
cruisers. | Operating in
S.W. Pacific. | Act as Hunting Force in S.W.
Pacific.
Escort trans-Tasman convoys.
Escort troop convoys to
Tulagi and Vila.
Provide cover for supplies
to islands in S.W. Pacific. |
| 1 6-inch
cruiser. | Operate in
N. Australian
waters. | Escort troop convoys to Ambon
and Koepang.
Escort reinforcements to
Singapore. (Then to be at
disposition of C-in-C China). |
| Note: Cruisers in the Tasman Sea will provide a
degree of cover for the east coast trade. | | |
| ADELAIDE @
MANOORA
WESTRALIA | Melbourne | Escort westbound shipping from
Melbourne and Adelaide to
Fremantle and/or point of
dispersal for independent
routeing. |
| ③ ADELAIDE - effectiveness considered to be that
of an A.M.C. only | | |
| ===== | | |
| / (contd.) | | |

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APRIL 1941.APPENDIX I. (cont).

| SHIP | BASE | FUNCTION |
|---|--------------------------|---|
| (d) <u>British Commonwealth Forces - New Zealand Station.</u> | | |
| ACHILLES
LEANDER
MONOWAI | Auckland | (1) Escort of troop convoy.
(2) Protection of eastbound shipping (N.Z. - Panama) within focal area.
(3) Protection of N.Z.-Fiji-Vancouver convoys, in focal area.
(4) Troop movements in Pacific Islands.
(5) General defence of territory and shipping on New Zealand Station. |
| (e) <u>Dutch Naval Forces in Netherlands East Indies.</u> | | |
| JAVA
2 destroyers | Sourabaya | Under orders of Commander-in-Chief, China.
Escort of important convoys. |
| DE RUYTER
TROMP
4 destroyers
6 submarines | Sourabaya | Defence of straits and passages in N.E.I., and general action against enemy forces in N.E.I. waters. |
| 3 submarines | Sourabaya | Local defence of Sourabaya. |
| 2 submarines | A ₈ requisite | Available for offensive action in S.China Sea south of line Cape Padaran-Kudat under C-in-C., China. |
| (f) <u>United States Asiatic Fleet.</u> | | |
| HOUSTON
MARBLEHEAD
13 destroyers
(1200-ton class) | Singapore | Under orders of Commander-in-Chief, China.
(1) To attack enemy naval forces and sea communications.
(2) To escort important convoys. |
| 17 submarines | Manila | Under orders of Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet.
(1) Defence of Philippines.
(2) Attack on enemy naval forces and sea communications. |

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APRIL 1941.APPENDIX II.SYSTEM OF AIR REINFORCEMENT.

It is intended that the system of air reinforcement shall conform to the following general principles :-

- (a) If any reinforcing squadrons are ordered to proceed to the Philippines in the event of the main attack falling on those islands, they will be found from the Netherlands East Indies squadrons mentioned in paragraph 74. Such squadrons will be replaced in the Netherlands East Indies from Malaya.
- (b) If the main attack falls on the Netherlands East Indies the Malayan squadrons will proceed to Borneo; initially 2 to Sinkawang II, and 2 to Samarinda II.
- (c) If the main attack falls on Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies (B) and (F) squadrons will proceed to Malaya.
- (d) If the circumstances occur when the evacuation of air forces from LUZON is required the United States (F) and (B) Squadrons will proceed to Samarinda II in Borneo, initially for operations under control of the Dutch Command. The Flying Boats will proceed to Singapore for operations under the control of the British Commander-in-Chief, China Station.
- (e) The Australian (B) Squadrons will be prepared to operate as a striking force from Ambon as soon as possible after war breaks out. When not required for striking force duties, they will be based on Darwin for reconnaissance and striking duties in the Darwin - Timor areas. Australian land force detachments will proceed to Ambon and Timor to reinforce the Dutch garrison at Ambon and to take over military control of Dutch Timor.

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APRIL 1941.APPENDIX III.LIST OF LIAISON OFFICERS AND OBSERVERS.UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET.

| | |
|--|--|
| British Observers U.S.S. WEST VIRGINIA | Commander G.R.L. Parry, R.N. |
| U.S.S. BOISE | Lieutenant Commr. C.C. Martell, R.N. |
| U.S.S. STERRETT | Lieutenant Commr. Hon. D.C. Cairns, R.N. |

MANILA.

| | |
|-----------------|--------------------------------|
| Dutch Observer. | Commander H.D. Lindner, R.N.N. |
|-----------------|--------------------------------|

BATAVIA.

| | |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| British Naval Liaison Officer | Commander J.B. Heath, R.N. |
| British Air Liaison Officer | Squadron Leader Watkins, R.A.F. |
| Australia Naval Liaison Officer | Commander V.E. Kennedy, R.A.N. |
| Australia Air Liaison Officer | Wing Commander Thomas, R.A.A.F. |

SINGAPORE.

| | |
|---|--|
| United States of America Naval Observer | Captain A.M.R. Allen, U.S.N. |
| United States of America Army Observer | Lieutenant Colonel F.G. Brink, U.S.A. |
| Dutch Naval Liaison Officer | Captain L.G.L. Van der Kun. |
| Dutch Military Liaison Officer | Major J.H.J. Wegner. |
| New Zealand Liaison Officers | Group Captain L. Darvall, M.C., R.A.F. |
| | Commander E.K.H. St. Aubyn, D.S.C., R.N. |

AUSTRALIA.

| | |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| United States Naval Attache | Commander L.D. Causey, U.S.N. |
| United States Naval Observer (Darwin) | Commander M. Collins, U.S.N. |
| Dutch Naval Liaison Officer | Commander G.B. Salm, R.N.N. |
| New Zealand Liaison Officer | Group Captain T. Wilkes, R.N.Z.A.F. |

NEW ZEALAND.

| | |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|
| United States Naval Observer | Commander Olding, U.S.N. |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|

COLOMBO.

| | |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| United States Naval Observer | Commander H.M. Lammers, U.S.N. |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------|

J.B.N.
Secret
From:
To:
Subject

Enclosure

The
Division
mandate

EXHIBIT NO. 51

THE JOINT BOARD,
JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE,
Washington, August 12, 1941.

J. B. No. 325 (Serial 717)

Secret

From: The Joint Planning Committee,

To: The Joint Board.

Subject: Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2 (Short
Title—ABC-22).

Enclosure: (A) Subject Plan (draft of 28 July 1941) with permanent Joint
Board on Defense letter of transmittal, dated: Montreal, 30th
July, 1941.

The subject plan, which was prepared in collaboration with the War Plans
Divisions of the War and Navy Departments, is transmitted herewith with recom-
mendation that it be approved.

(Signed) L. T. Gerow

L. T. GEROW,

Brigadier General, U. S. Army.

(Signed) C. J. Moore

C. J. MOORE,

Captain, U. S. Navy.

1586 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

J. B. No. 325 (Serial 717)

Secret

CANADA—UNITED STATES OF AMERICA—PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE

Office of the Secretary
East Block Parliament Buildings
Ottawa

MONTREAL, 30th July, 1941.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
The Chief of Staff, United States Army
The Chief of Naval Staff, Canada
The Chief of the General Staff, Canada
The Chief of the Air Staff, Canada

There is submitted herewith a copy of Joint Canadian—United States Basic Defence Plan No. 2 (short title ABC-22) prepared by the Service members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

(Sgd) S. D. Embick
S. D. EMBICK,
Major-General, U. S. Army.
(Sgd) H. W. Hill
H. W. HILL,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
(Sgd) Forrest Sherman
FORREST SHERMAN,
Commander, U. S. Navy.
(Sgd) Clayton Bissell
CLAYTON BISSELL,
Lieut.-Colonel, U. S. Army.
(Sgd) F. L. Houghton
F. L. HOUGHTON,
Captain, R. C. N.
(Sgd) Maurice Pope
M. A. POPE,
Brigadier.
(Sgd) A. A. L. Cuffe
A. A. L. CUFFE,
Air Commodore, R. C. A. F.

SECRET

U. S. Registered Copy No. 34

[1] J. B. No. 325 (Serial 717)

This Draft includes corrections made up to 28 July 1941.

JOINT CANADIAN-UNITED STATES BASIC DEFENSE PLAN No. 2

(Short Title ABC-22)

SECTION I—PURPOSE OF THIS PLAN

1. There has been submitted to the Government of the United States and to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom a report of Staff Conversations held in Washington from January 20, 1941 to March 27, 1941. The United Kingdom Government has referred this report to the Canadian Government for their concurrence. The report, which bears the short title "ABC-1", includes a United States-British Commonwealth Joint Basic War Plan.

2. ABC-1 assumes that joint agreements between Canada and the United States for common action in war under the concepts of ABC-1 will conform generally to the agreements reached in the United States-British Staff Conversations. This plan is intended to supplement those agreements, and to provide for the most effective use of Canadian and United States Forces for the purposes listed in paragraph 3, should the United States and the British Commonwealth be associated in a war against Germany and her allies.

3. Under such circumstances, cooperative action by Canadian and United States Forces will be required primarily for purposes connected with:

(a) the protection of overseas shipping within the northern portions of the Western Atlantic and Pacific Areas;

(b) the protection of sea communications within the coastal zones;

(c) the defense of Alaska, Canada, Newfoundland, (which includes Labrador) and the northern portion of the United States.

4. The coastal zones are the whole area of the navigable waters adjacent to the seacoast and extend seaward to include the coastwise sea lanes and focal points of shipping approaching and departing from the coast.

(2)

SECTION II—SPECIAL PROVISIONS

5. Except as otherwise provided herein, the assumptions, concept and other provisions of ABC-1, where applicable, shall form a part of this plan.

6. Coordination of the military effort of the United States and Canada shall be effected by mutual cooperation, and by assigning to the forces of each nation tasks for whose execution such forces shall be primarily responsible. These tasks may be assigned in Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plans, or by agreement between the Chiefs of Staff concerned, the United States Chief of Naval Operations being considered as such.

7. In effecting mutual cooperation, as provided in paragraph 6, the forces of one nation will, to their utmost capacity, support the appropriate forces of the other nation.

8. Each nation shall retain the strategic direction and command of its own forces, except as hereinafter provided.

9. A unified command may, if circumstances so require, be established over United States and Canadian forces operation in any area or areas, or for particular United States and Canadian forces operating for a common purpose:

(a) when agreed upon by the Chiefs of Staff concerned; or

(b) when the commanders of the Canadian and United States forces concerned agree that the situation required the exercise of unity of command, and further agree as to the Service that shall exercise such command. All such mutual agreements shall be subject to confirmation by the Chiefs of Staff concerned, but this provision shall not prevent the immediate establishment of unity of command in cases of emergency.

10. Unity of command, when established, vests in one commander the responsibility and authority to coordinate the operations of the participating forces of both nations by the setting up of task forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as the commander deems necessary to ensure the success of the operations. Unity of command does not authorize a commander exercising it to control the administration and discipline of the forces of the nation of which he is not an officer, nor to issue any instructions to such forces beyond those necessary for effective coordination. In no case shall a commander of a unified force move naval [3] forces of the other nation from the North Atlantic or the North Pacific Ocean, nor move land or air forces under his command from the adjacent land areas, without authorization by the Chief of Staff concerned.

11. The assignment of an area to one nation shall not be construed as restricting the forces of the other nation from temporarily extending appropriate operations into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.

12. For all matters requiring common action, each nation will require its commanders in all echelons and services, on their own initiative, to establish liaison with and cooperate with appropriate commanders of the other nation. The principal commanders of Canadian and United States forces who will cooperate under this plan are as follows:

Canada

Commodore Commanding Newfoundland Force (RCN)
Commanding Officer, Atlantic Coast (RCN)
Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command (RCAF)
General Officer Commanding in Chief, Atlantic Command (CA)
Air Officer Commanding Eastern Air Command (RCAF)

United States

Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, (USN)
Task Force Commanders, United States Atlantic Fleet (USN)
Commander North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier (USN)
Commanding General Northeast Defense Command (USA)
Commanding General, GHQ

| <i>Canada</i> | <i>United States</i> |
|--|--|
| Commanding Officer, Pacific Coast | Commander in Chief, United States |
| (RCN) | Pacific Fleet (USN) |
| Air Officer Commanding Western Air Command (RCAF) | Task Force Commanders, United States Pacific Fleet (USN) |
| | Commander Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier (USN) |
| General Officer Commanding in Chief Pacific Command (CA) | Commanding General Western Defense Command (USA) |
| Air Officer Commanding Western Air Command (RCAF) | |

13. Under the provisions of ABC-1 the United States will assume responsibility for the control and protection of Associated Overseas shipping in the Western Atlantic and Pacific Areas. Pending the establishment of effective United States agencies the British Naval Control Service Organization will, in accordance with ABC-1, continue in the exercise of its present functions.

14. Within the coastal zones of Canada and the United States, responsibility for routing and protection of shipping is allocated as follows:

[4] (a) Canada will be responsible for routing and protecting coastwise and independently routed overseas shipping within the coastal zones of Canada and Newfoundland.

(b) The United States will be responsible for routing and protecting Associated overseas shipping except as provided in sub-paragraph (a).

(c) The routing of shipping passing from the coastal zone of one nation into the coastal zone of the other, will be effected in the Atlantic by agreement between the Canadian Commanding Officer, Atlantic Coast, and the United States Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier; and in the Pacific by agreement between the Canadian Commanding Officer, Pacific Coast, and the United States Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.

15. Each nation will provide within its own territory certain base facilities for use by the other nation. These facilities are listed in Annex II. So far as practicable, each nation will make available its own bases, harbors, and repair facilities, for use by the forces of the other.

16. To facilitate common decision and action, Canada and the United States will establish in Washington and Ottawa, respectively, officers of all Services who will be charged with the duty of representing their own Chiefs of Staff, vis-à-vis the appropriate Chief of Staff of the other nation. They will also arrange to assign liaison officers where needed for effectuating direct cooperation between Commanders of forces in the field.

17. This plan will be placed in effect by the Chiefs of Staff of Canada and the United States when so directed by the Canadian and United States Governments.

SECTION III—JOINT TASK OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

18. Protect the sea communications of the United States and the British Commonwealth, and defend the territory of Canada, Newfoundland, and the United States, including Alaska, in order to ensure the ultimate security of Canada and the United States.

SECTION IV—TASKS

[5] 19. The tasks set forth in this section are those which will be undertaken jointly by the armed forces of Canada and the United States, should the latter enter the war. These joint tasks are:

JOINT TASK ONE: PROTECT ASSOCIATED OVERSEAS SHIPPING IN THE NORTHERN PORTIONS OF THE WESTERN ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC AREAS.

JOINT TASK TWO: DEFEND NEWFOUNDLAND AND PROTECT ASSOCIATED SEA COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN THE COASTAL ZONE.

JOINT TASK THREE: DEFEND EASTERN CANADA AND THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AND PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN THE COASTAL ZONES.

JOINT TASK FOUR: DEFEND ALASKA AND PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN THE COASTAL ZONE.

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JOINT TASK FIVE: DEFEND WESTERN CANADA AND THE NORTH-WESTERN PORTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AND PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE COASTAL ZONES.

20 Joint Task One: PROTECT ASSOCIATED OVERSEAS SHIPPING IN THE NORTHERN PORTIONS OF THE WESTERN ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC AREAS.

Canadian Tasks

All Services—Support the United States Navy in the execution of this joint task.

United States Tasks

Army—Support Associated naval operations.

Navy—Protect overseas shipping by escorting, covering, and patrolling, as may be appropriate, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

21. Joint Task Two: DEFEND NEWFOUNDLAND AND PROTECT ASSOCIATED SEA COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN THE COASTAL ZONE.

Canadian Tasks

Army—Defend Newfoundland, in cooperation with other Canadian and United States Services. Cooperate in the defense of United States bases in Newfoundland.

Navy—Protect sea communications in the coastal zone. Provide the naval defense of St. John's and Botwood. Support the defense of Newfoundland.

[6] Cooperate with the Royal Canadian Air Force in denying Hudson Strait to enemy forces. Assist the United States Navy in initial movements of United States forces from the Maritime Provinces to Newfoundland.

Air Force—Defend Newfoundland in cooperation with other Canadian and United States Services. Cooperate in the defense of United States bases in Newfoundland.

United States Tasks

Army—Defend Newfoundland in cooperation with Canadian and other United States Services. Defend United States bases. Support associated naval operations.

Navy—Support the defense of Newfoundland and its coastal zone. Patrol Placentia Bay. Provide sea transportation for the initial movement and the continued support of United States forces in Newfoundland.

22. Joint Task Three: DEFEND EASTERN CANADA AND THE NORTH-EASTERN PORTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AND PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN THE COASTAL ZONE.

Canadian Tasks

Army—Defend the Maritime Provinces and the Gaspé Peninsula.

Navy—Protect sea communications in the Canadian Coastal Zone. Provide the naval defense of the harbors of Gaspé, Halifax, Sydney, Shelburne, and Saint John, N. B.

Air Force—Defend Eastern Canada. Support Associated naval operation.

United States Tasks

Army—Defend the northeastern portion of the United States. Support Associated naval operations. Support the defense of the Maritime provinces and the Gaspé Peninsula.

Navy—Protect sea communications in the United States Coastal Zone. Support the defense of the northeastern portion of the United States. Support the defense of Eastern Canada and its Coastal zone.

23. Joint Task Four: DEFEND ALASKA AND PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN THE COASTAL ZONE.

Canadian Tasks

Navy—Protect sea communications in the Canadian coastal zone. Assist the United States Navy in the initial [7] movements of United States forces between the United States and Alaska.

Air Force—Support the defense of Alaska. Support Associated naval operations.

United States Tasks

Army—Deny the use by the enemy of sea and land bases in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. Defend United States military and naval bases and installations in Alaska. Support Associated naval operations.

Navy—Protect shipping in the United States coastal zone. Support the defense of Alaska. Provide sea transportation for the initial movement and continued support of United States forces in Alaska.

24. *Joint Task Five*—DEFEND WESTERN CANADA AND THE NORTH-WESTERN PORTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AND PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS IN THE COASTAL ZONES.

Canadian Tasks

Army—Defend Western Canada. Cooperate with the United States Army in the defense of the Straits of Juan de Fuca—Puget Sound Area.

Navy—Provide the naval defenses of Esquimalt-Victoria, Vancouver and Prince Rupert. Protect sea communications in the Canadian coastal zone.

Air Force—Defend Western Canada. Support military and naval operation, particularly in the straits of Juan de Fuca—Puget Sound Area.

United States Tasks

Army—Defend the northwestern portion of the United States. Support the defense of Western Canada. Cooperate with Canadian forces in the defense of the Straits of Juan de Fuca—Puget Sound Area. Support Associated naval operations.

Navy—Protect sea communications in the United States coastal zone. Support the defense of the northwestern portion of the United States. Support the defense of Western Canada and its coastal zone.

[8]

SECTION V

25. The forces estimated to be available for the operations required by this plan are indicated in Annex I—*Military Forces*.

SECTION VI

26. The facilities to be provided by the two governments concerned for the joint execution of this plan are indicated in Annex II—*Facilities to be Provided by Canada and the United States*.

SECTION VII

27. The general communication principles outlined in Annex IV of ABC-1 shall serve as a guide for this plan, subject to such additional instructions as may be issued from time to time by the Chiefs of Staff concerned.

[9]

ANNEX I—MILITARY FORCES

In view of the uncertainties which exist as to the stability of the strategic situations in various theatres, and as to the date on which the United States may enter the war, the strengths of forces listed below must be regarded as subject to change in the light of the strategic situation which may exist when the plan is placed in effect. The forces now estimated to be initially available for the operations required by this plan as of 15 July, 1941, are:

(A) ATLANTIC

Ocean Escorts United States Atlantic Fleet

6 Battleships
5 8" Cruisers
54 Destroyers
4 Mine Sweepers (destroyer type)
54 Patrol Planes

North Atlantic Naval Coastal Force (U. S. N.)

5 Eagle Boats
3 Gunboats
4 Patrol Yachts
18 Patrol Planes

Newfoundland Force (R. C. N.) (Allocated to operate with Ocean Escorts, U. S. Atlantic Fleet)

5 Destroyers
15 Corvettes

Atlantic Coast Command (R. C. N.)

8 Destroyers
28 Corvettes
4 Mine Sweepers
4 Magnetic Mine Sweepers
11 Armed A/S Yachts

Eastern Air Command (R. C. A. F.)**Headquarters****Maritimes**

Three Bomber Reconnaissance Squadrons
One Bomber Reconnaissance Squadron (Partly Operational)
One Bomber Reconnaissance Squadron (Not Fully Equipped)
One Fighter Squadron (Partly Operational)
One General Reconnaissance School Squadron (Partly Operational)
One Operational Training Reconnaissance and Bombing Squadron (Partly Operational)
Three Coast Artillery Cooperation Detachments

[10]

Newfoundland

One Bomber Reconnaissance Squadron

Newfoundland Base Command (U. S. A.)**Force Headquarters**

One Regiment Infantry (Less two battalions)
Two Batteries Coast Artillery A. A., 37 mm Gun (Reinforced)
Two Batteries Coast Artillery A. A., 90 mm Gun (Reinforced)
Two Batteries Coast Artillery A. A., M. G. (Reinforced)
One Battery Coast Artillery, 8" RR.
One Battery Coast Artillery 155 mm Gun (Reinforced)
One Reconnaissance Squadron (Heavy)
One Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor)
Service Troops

Total Force, 5400

Northeast Defense Command (U. S. A.)**Headquarters First Army**

One Army Corps (Three Divisions)
One Division
Harbor Defense Units
4 Regiments Infantry
1 Battalion Field Artillery (Pack)
Service Troops

Total, 130,000

Antiaircraft Artillery and pursuit aviation units may be assigned as warranted by the category of defense.

Atlantic Command, Canadian Army

Atlantic Command Headquarters----- 65

Maritimes----- 10,508

Three Fortress Headquarters
Five Infantry Battalions
Two M. G. Battalions
Four A. A. Batteries
Four G/L Batteries
Harbor Defense Units
Service Troops

Newfoundland----- 2,911

Headquarters
Two Infantry Battalions
One A. A. M. G. Battery
Two Heavy Batteries (CA)
Service Troops

General Reserve

One Infantry Division (less units overseas)

Total Force----- 34,630

[11] (B) PACIFIC

Naval Local Defense Force, Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, (U. S. N.)

5 Destroyers
1 Eagle Boat
1 Gunboat
2 Submarines
12 Patrol Planes

Pacific Coast Command (R. C. N.)

1 Armed Merchant Cruiser
1 Corvette
2 Armed A/S Yachts

Western Air Command (R. C. A. F.)

Headquarters
Three Bomber Reconnaissance Squadrons (Not Fully Equipped)
One Operational Training Reconnaissance Squadron
One Coast Artillery Cooperation Detachment

Pacific Command, Canadian Army

| | |
|------------------------------|-------|
| Pacific Command Headquarters | 45 |
| Puget Sound Area | 4,180 |

Puget Sound Area

Victoria—Esquimalt Fortress Headquarters
Headquarters Vancouver Defenses
Two Infantry Battalions and Six Platoons
One A. A. Battery
Two Search Light Batteries
Coast Defenses
Service Troops

Prince Rupert-----1.222

Headquarters Prince Rupert Defenses
One Infantry Battalion
One Search Light Battery
One Heavy Battery

General Reserve----- 3.717

One Infantry Brigade
One Infantry Battalion

Total Force----- 9.164

Western Defense Command (U. S. A.)

Headquarters Fourth Army
One Army Corps (Two Divisions)
One Army Corps (One Division)
Harbor Defense Units
1 Cavalry Brigade
[12] 1 Cavalry Regiment
5 Field Artillery Battalions (75 mm Gun)
1 Infantry Regiment
2 Antitank Battalions
Service Troops

Total, 100,000.

Antiaircraft artillery and pursuit aviation units may be assigned as warranted by the category of defense

Alaska Defense Command (U. S. A.)

3 Regiments and 3 Companies of Infantry
1 Light Tank Company
1 Composite Battalion and 1 Battery, Field Artillery
8 Regiments and 4 Batteries of Antiaircraft Artillery
2 Battalions and 2 Batteries of Harbor Defense, Coast Artillery
1 Squadron each of pursuit, bombardment medium, bombardment heavy, and transport aviation
1 Air Base Group
Service Troops

Total, 24,000.

[18] ANNEX II—FACILITIES TO BE PROVIDED BY CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

In order to provide for the joint execution of the tasks contained in this plan, the two governments concerned have agreed to provide facilities as follows, primarily for use by the military forces of either or both nations;

By Canada

At the Newfoundland Airport, facilities for the operation of a composite group (73 planes) of United States Army aircraft, and storage for 1,500,000 gallons of aviation gasoline.

In the Botwood-Lewisporte area, storage for 1,000,000 gallons of aviation gasoline.

In the Botwood area, shore facilities permitting the operation of one squadron of United States Navy Patrol planes.

Land plane staging facilities at Sydney, Nova Scotia, including radio facilities.

A fighter aerodrome in the vicinity of St. Johns, N. F.

Defenses for the ports of St. Johns, Botwood, and for other points as required.

Expansion of the aircraft operating facilities in the Maritime Provinces to include provisions for the early operation by the United States of one squadron and the ultimate operation of four squadrons of naval patrol planes (48 planes).

Staging facilities for aircraft en route between Alaska and the continental United States.

Airdromes on the north end of Vancouver Island and at Uceleulet.

Additional coast defenses at Christopher Point, B. C.

By United States

At Argentina, a defended base for the operation of two squadrons of patrol planes (24 planes), including storage for 110,000 barrels of fuel oil and 1,800,000 gallons of aviation gasoline.

[14] Staging facilities at Stephenville for short range aircraft between Sydney and the Newfoundland Airport; these to include radio facilities.

Improvement of the Newfoundland railway and an increase in rolling stock of 5 locomotives and 100 cars to meet United States requirements.

Development of airways and other transportation facilities leading into Eastern Canada.

Army bases at Anchorage and Fairbanks.

Land aviation facilities at Ketchikan, Yakutat, Cordova, Anchorage, Bethel, Nome, Boundary and Big Delta.

Naval air stations at Sitka, Kodiak and Dutch Harbor and their defenses.

Airways between Ketchikan and Kodiak, and between Nome and Boundary.

Readjustment of coast defenses in Juan de Fuca Straits to coordinate with Canadian fixed defenses at Esquimalt.

Aircraft operating facilities at Seattle, Whidby Island, Tongue Point, Aberdeen, Bellingham, Everett, Olympia and Spokane County.

EXHIBIT NO. 52**COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN****WAR DEPARTMENT AND GENERAL HERRON****CONCERNING 1940 ALERT***Communications between War Department and General Herron concerning 1940 Alert*

| Date | From | To | Subject | Page ¹ |
|------------------|---------------|---------------|--|-------------------|
| 17 June 40..... | AG..... | Herron..... | Ordering immediate alert..... | 1 |
| 17 June 40..... | Herron..... | AG..... | Acknowledging alert order..... | 2 |
| 17 June 40..... | Herron..... | Marshall..... | Reporting action under alert..... | 3 |
| 18 June 40..... | Herron..... | AG..... | Requesting funds..... | 4 |
| 19 June 40..... | AG..... | Herron..... | Authorizing modification of alert..... | 5 |
| 19 June 40..... | Herron..... | AG..... | Acknowledging authorization..... | 6 |
| 19 June 40..... | Herron..... | Marshall..... | Reporting continuance of air precautions..... | 7 |
| 21 June 40..... | Herron..... | Marshall..... | Reporting Navy not put on alert..... | 8 |
| 22 June 40..... | Marshall..... | Herron..... | Ordering modified alert continued..... | 9 |
| 24 June 40..... | Herron..... | Marshall..... | Reviewing alert developments..... | 10 |
| [26 June 40..... | Marshall..... | Strong..... | Requesting draft of explanation for field on why alert called..... | 11] |
| [27 June 40..... | Strong..... | Marshall..... | Submitting draft; recommending not be sent..... | 12] |
| | | | [Unused draft..... | 13] |

¹ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

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Communications between War Department and General Herron concerning 1940 Alert—Continued

| Date | From | To | Subject | Page ¹ |
|-----------------|---------------|---------------|---|-------------------|
| 1 July 40..... | Herron..... | Marshall..... | Alert status end two weeks..... | 14 |
| 8 July 40..... | Herron..... | Marshall..... | Alert status end three weeks..... | 15 |
| 10 July 40..... | Marshall..... | Herron..... | Re transportation wear..... | 16 |
| 15 July 40..... | Herron..... | Marshall..... | Alert status start fifth week..... | 17 |
| 16 July 40..... | Marshall..... | Herron..... | Authorizing partial relaxation of alert..... | 18 |
| 21 Aug 40..... | Herron..... | Marshall..... | Alert status end two months..... | 19 |
| 28 Aug 40..... | Marshall..... | Herron..... | Inquiry on effects of alert..... | 20 |
| 6 Sept 40..... | Herron..... | Marshall..... | Reply on effects of alert..... | 21 |
| 15 Oct 40..... | Herron..... | Memo..... | Reporting Navy resumption outer air patrol..... | 22 |

¹ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[1] Sent June 17, 1940 Number 428. WE.

Secret

June 17, 1940.

COMMANDING GENERAL,
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid comma to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge.

ADAMS.

[2] LW

127WVY

Received at the War Department, June 17, 1940, 6:29 P. M.

From: Honolulu,
To: The Adjutant General.

Secret

Honolulu Number 1843. June 17th.

Receipt acknowledged your radiogram 428.

HERRON.

[3] Received at the War Department, June 18, 1940, 4322, 737 A. M.

W 2

1140 P

From: Hawaii
To: General George C. Marshall

Secret

Number 1. June 17th.

All antiaircraft observations and security of detachments in position with live ammunition and orders to fire on foreign planes over restricted areas and in defense of any essential installations. Some local interest in ammunition issues but no excitement. Navy inshore and offshore air patrols in operation.

HERRON.

Initialed "G. C. M."

[4] Received at the War Department, June 19th, 1940, 12:11 A. M.

46-WTJ

From: Ft. Shafter, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General.
No. 1848 June 18th. 426PM. Priority.

Secret

Following funds urgently required for local procurement of services and supplies in connection with your radio 428 seventeenth; U S and S A. three thousand dollars; S F E, eighty eight thousand five hundred dollars broken down as follows: Engineer construction materials, forty eight thousand dollars; rental of motor vehicles and construction equipment, twenty five thousand dollars; wages, two

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thousand dollars; transportation of equipment and supplies two thousand five hundred dollars; Medical and Hospital treatment, one thousand dollars; Miscellaneous, ten thousand dollars.

HERRON.

[5] Secret

Number 434. Sent 6-1940—MWW.

JUNE 19, 1940.

COMMANDING GENERAL,

Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

Concerning your 1848, June 18 period You are authorized to modify gradually measures ordered in our 428 but adequate guards on a semipermanent basis will be maintained at all critical points period guard detachments may be rotated at your discretion period In view of above resubmit your request for funds with concise explanation as to their application under each appropriation subhead period every effort should be made to avoid publicity and to place maintenance of alert as modified herein on strictly a training basis period Acknowledge.

ADAMS.

[6] Secret

Received at the War Department, June 20, 1940, 113 A. M.
37 WTJ

From: Hawaii

To: The Adjutant General

Number 1849. June 19th.

Acknowledge receipt your 434 of 19th.

HERRON.

[7]

Received at the War Department, June 20, 1940, 8:00 A. M.

W 1

From: Honolulu,

To: Chief of Staff.

Secret

Honolulu Number 2. June 19th.

Yours of 19th acknowledged. Full aircraft and antiaircraft precautions will be continued with easing in other lines. Local publicity on maneuvers favorable and not excited.

HERRON.

[8]

Received at the War Department, June 21, 1940, 8:47 P. M.
W-27.

From: Fort Shafter, T. H.

To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.

Number 3, June 21st. Filed 2:00 PM

Secret

In interpreting your cable consideration is given to the fact that Navy here has nothing from Navy Department regarding Alert. Navy now turning over to Army inshore aerial patrol in accordance with existing local joint agreement. Will not modify Army Air and Antiair Alert before Monday except on further advice from you.

HERRON.

[9]

Secret

JUNE 22, 1940.

Memorandum for the Chief, War Department Message Center:

Subject: Defense Precautions.

No. 1. Sent 6-22-40 BFS

The Secretary of War directs that the following radiogram, in the Chief of Staff's secret code, be dispatched to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

"Reurad 3 June twenty-first. In view of present uncertainty instructions for the Navy other than local Naval Forces have not been determined. Continue

your Alert in accordance with modifications directed in War Department Number 434.

MARSHALL.

GEO. V. STRONG,
/s/ Gen. Strong
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

ml

[10]

JUNE 24, 1940.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,

Chief of Staff of the Army, War Department, Washington, D. C.

This is to report that the Hawaiian portion of your domain is quiet this morning. I have just come in from seeing the dawn patrols take the air, and the antiaircraft men roll out of their blankets at the first grey light at the sound of the claxon and stand to their guns. The Infantry at Walter Dillinghams bathing beach on the North shore were standing by their guns and looking out to sea.

I have been highly gratified by the promptness and precision with which the planes get off the ground every morning promptly at 4:30. It is further encouraging to see the discipline and quiet efficiency among the ground crews. It is my belief that the Air Corps here comes on well.

A week ago today I gave the command for a surprise alert, which went off smoothly and efficiently. In view of the disturbing state of the world I thought that the command might as well get accustomed to having live ammunition, but did not realize how much this would excite the post war portion of the Army. However, they are all quieted down now, as is the city, which buzzed for a couple of days. Some of the young people thought that M day had come and two or three young couples that had intended to get married this month hustled around and did it at once just as in 1918!

We really worked the young men for the first few days but have now eased up so that not more than 25% of any command is on actual reconnaissance or observation at any one time.

Our officer strength ebbs fast and we rapidly approach the day when we will have but one officer per battery or company. However, with our "maneuver officers" for combat and the expected Thomason Act officers to carry the administrative portion, I will have no complaint. It is, of course, unorthodox to contemplate using Thomason Act officers for administrative duties but the proportion of that is heavy and the few remaining [10A] regular officers must be released to train their companies.

Under existing War Department Directives but little use can be made of local Reserve Officers without obvious racial discrimination. I am still convinced that the discreet employment of a few orientals will have a tremendous effect upon the mass and will rally much of the disaffected to our side. I may soon ask to have War Department Directives entailing racial discrimination set aside insofar as they apply to Hawaii.

In planning the M day organization of a police force to relieve the command from guarding our hundred miles of cables we have found that the project makes a great hit with the Plantation Managers, although they would be asked to supply the personnel. It seems that the desirability of an increased police force in war has been a good deal on the minds of some of the managers.

I have turned over nearly everything in the office to the Chief of Staff and am spending my time with the troops, which is one of the things that I learned from Charles Pelow Summerall and the First Division!

Your crack that "yesterday we had time but no money and that today we have money but no time" is good and has made a great hit in particular with the civilians.

With warmest regards and best wishes, I am,
Sincerely,

/s/ C. D. Herron
C. D. HERRON.

Please pardon typographical error—the mail closes too soon to have this rewritten. [Handwritten]

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War Department [11] Confidential

JUNE 26, 1940.

Memorandum for General Strong:

It seems to me I should write to both Van Voorhis and Herron something of what led up to our emergency radios of the other day; that is, if you think we can trust to Air Mail for such a confidential message. Personally, I think it is reasonably safe.

Will you have somebody make a rough draft of what I should say.

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL, *Chief of Staff.*

[12] Secret

JUNE 27, 1940

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Defense Precautions.

1. Reference to your memorandum of June 26, with reference to writing General Van Voorhis and General Herron in regard to the background for our emergency radios; I am inclined to think that developments of the last 10 days, as reflected in the press, have given both all the background necessary.

2. Another point to be considered is that air mail may be tampered with, any reference in the matter covered in your secret code might jeopardize that code.

3. However, if you think that you should write them, I suggest that the communication go by registered mail. Drafts of suggested remarks herewith.

GEO. V. STRONG,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

Incls.

2 drafts:

1 for Gen. Van Voorhis.

1 for Gen. Herron.

[13] Secret

MY DEAR HERRON: You have no doubt wondered as to the alert instructions sent to you on the 17th. Briefly, the combination of information from a number of sources led to the deduction that recent Japanese-Russian agreement to compose their differences in the Far East was arrived at and so timed as to permit Japan to undertake a trans-Pacific raid against Oahu, following the departure of the U. S. Fleet from Hawaii.

Presumably such a raid would be in the interests of Germany and Italy, to force the United States to pull the Fleet back to Hawaii.

Whether the information or deductions were correct I cannot say. Even if they were, the precautions you have taken may keep us from knowing they were, by discouraging any overt act.

In any event it would have been foolhardy not to take special precautions. The world situation is so troubled and changing so rapidly that I think it wise for you to keep the command definitely on its toes until I give you the "all-clear" signal.

Best of luck.

Sincerely yours,

G. C. M.

Not used

[14] Received at the War Department, July 1, 1940, 5:45 P. M.

W-15.

From: Honolulu, T. H.

To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.

Honolulu Number 4. July 1st. Filed 10:35 AM

Secret

Alert on two weeks today. All quiet locally no ill effects on command except cumulative hours on plane engines and impaired overhaul facilities due to move from Fords Island.

HERRON:

1598 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[15] Received at the War Department, July 8, 1940, 9:42 P. M.
W-28.

From: Honolulu, T. H.
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
Number 5, July 8th. Filed 2:05 PM.
Secret

Three weeks of Alert completed today with no unfavorable reaction on personnel but a good deal of wear on motor transportation. No developments in local situation.

HANON.

[16] Secret

No. 2. Sent July 10, 1940. BFS. July 10, 1940.

Memorandum for the Chief, War Department Message Center:
Subject: Defense Precautions.

The Secretary of War directs that the following radiogram in the Chief of Staff's secret code, be dispatched to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

"Your 5, July 8. Can you not avoid undue wear on motor transportation by putting present Alert stations on a permanent basis without unfavorable reaction on convenience or morale of personnel? If this meets your approval submit an estimate for the necessary construction of temporary type. As to your shortage of transportation it is expected that 1½-ton types will be delivered by October 1 and other types by December 1, 1940. These vehicles will be placed at ports of embarkation and shipped as rapidly thereafter as transport space permits.

"MARSHALL.

/s/ Gen. STRONG
GEO. V. STRONG,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

ml

[17] Received at the War Department, July 15, 1940, 5:47 P. M.
W 14

From: Honolulu,
To: Chief of Staff.

Secret

Honolulu Number 6. July 15th.

Alert entering 5th week. As now conducted is without undue strain on personnel or materiel including motors. New construction unnecessary. Navy continues cooperation by outer aerial patrol.

HANON.

Memorandum for the Chief, War Department Message Center:
Subject: Defense Precautions.
No. 3. Sent July 16, 1940. BFS

The Secretary of War directs that the following radiogram, in the Chief of Staff's secret code, be dispatched to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

"Your Number 6, July 15. You are authorized, at your discretion, to relax Alert provisions except that first, precautions against sabotage will be continued on the basis of instant readiness and second, aerial patrol measures can be reduced to a training status, but so arranged as to be reestablished on an Alert basis on short notice.

"MARSHALL."

/s/ Gen. Strong,
GEO. V. STRONG,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

[19]

AUGUST 21, 1940.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: You will be interested to hear that the evacuation of Ford Island proceeds on schedule and that we will be completely out on the agreed date. Our shops are about set up in hangers and we can get by until the new Hickam shops are finished, although that time is several months off.

In addition, we seem about to complete satisfactorily our local joint agreement with the Navy. In the original agreement concluded last winter, there were necessarily some gaps—matters, such as the allocation of local man power, upon which we could not then pin the Navy Down.

Admiral Bloch, who commands the 14th Naval District, is a fine, upstanding officer, always amenable to reason and never narrow-minded or stupid. However, he is a tough guy who plays his cards closely and shamelessly picks up his opponents tricks, if the latter does not protect himself. But that kind of a game serves its purpose of dividing up the chips before the joint is raided, and suits me as well as any other kind. I think the Army has lost none of its garments to date, except Bishop's Point. Ford Island ought to belong to the Navy.

Richardson is the salt of the earth and I am devoted to him.

The Reserve Officers begin to come in and to date we have 38. They are alright and an infinite help.

We have an allotment of funds for the Supersonic Warning Service and hope to be ready to go the day the instruments arrive, although it will be no child's play to do the preliminary work on these mountain tops. If the system works, it will be a major addition to our strength.

[19A] The Alert has now been on two months. The only present measurable loss is in the weathering of the hundreds of miles of field wire in place, largely for anti-aircraft purposes, but that is probably worth while.

I trust that you keep well and do not allow them to drain away in any day strength that you cannot regain before the next dawn. However acute things be now, it is not yet war!

Best wishes!

Yours as ever,

/s/ Herron
 C. D. HERRON.

[20] Confidential

WASHINGTON, D. C., August 28, 1940.

DEAR HERRON: I have appreciated very much your letters and notes keeping me generally advised of the situation.

As to "the alert", what is your frank reaction? Do you think it is imposing too heavy a tax to continue on the present basis? In Panama the condition is much more different. We have had to give them about \$300,000 to construct temporary shelters for the numerous anti-aircraft stations in the high hills. The rainy season makes life under these circumstances very difficult, but I do not feel that we can expose ourselves to the risks of a sudden lunge from some unexpected quarter. It is a very difficult business and I am deeply concerned that we do not exhaust the morale of the command by heavy requirements during what is supposed to be a period of peace, yet a failure would be catastrophic.

Let me have your frank opinion.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL.

General C. D. HERRON,
Commanding Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

[21] Confidential

KILAUEA MILITARY CAMP,
Hawaii, T. H., 6 Sept. 40.

DEAR GEORGE: Your note of August 28th has just reached me here, where I have come to collect my wits and obtain a little perspective. Wish you could do the same!

1600 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

My absolutely frank and honest opinion is that "the alert" as now carried on here does not dull the keen edge, or exhaust morale. I think that our real power accumulates and that now that the season of individual target practice and instructions is about over, the maneuverers of numerous small units camped along the beaches will build up naturally and easily the effectiveness of the alert.

The presence of the fleet here and its frequent putting to sea with absolutely secret destinations and periods naturally eases the situation very much. As things now are, I feel that you need not have this place on your mind at all. The position of this place on the Army priority lists is still all right, for our essentials can still be quickly supplied when the necessity arises. You know what they and War Plans can refresh your mind.

Am flying back early tomorrow morning to greet Mr. Knox.

Best wishes!

C. D. HERRON.

[All of above hand written.]

[22] Confidential

OCTOBER 15, 1940.

Secret

The Navy has resumed the outer air patrol at 180 miles, but has not asked us to take any measures. Having no evidence of marked change in the situation and with an eye to the conservation of material I have not resumed the Army inner air patrol at 40 miles, nor the putting of the pursuit planes in the air at dawn.

We now have guards on utilities and highway patrols at times when they will be observed. There are constantly small maneuvers (company) on the beaches. It is my guess, however, that the international situation drifts to the left and that precautions must increase.

C. D. H.

EXHIBIT NO. 53

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENERAL MARSHALL AND GENERAL SHORT

| Date | From | To | Subject | Page |
|---------|------------------------------|--------------------------|--|------|
| 7 Feb. | Marshall | Short | Advise to Short on assumption of command | 1 |
| 19 Feb. | Short | Marshall | Plans for Hawaiian Department | 4 |
| 5 Mar. | Marshall | Short | Urging air defense preparations | 10 |
| 6 Mar. | Short | Marshall | Expediting of AWS project requested | 11 |
| 13 Mar. | Marshall | Short | Short's coordination with Navy approved | 13 |
| 15 Mar. | Bryden
(Marshall absent). | Short | Need for clearance with Interior on AWS sites | 14 |
| 15 Mar. | Short | Marshall | Report on measures for defense from air attack | 15 |
| 28 Mar. | Marshall | Short | Hawaiian defense needs | 15 |
| 14 Apr. | Short | Marshall | Strong points & new airfield; forwarding Army-Navy air defense plans | 19 |
| 1 May | Short | Marshall | Requesting funds for airfield construction | 21 |
| 2 May | Short | Marshall | Amplifying request | 22 |
| 5 May | Marshall | Short | Acknowledging receipt of air defense plans forwarded 14 April. | 25 |
| 15 May | Short | Emmons
(to Marshall). | Statement on projects of interest to Hawaiian Department. | 28 |
| 29 May | Short | Marshall | Reporting recent maneuvers | 35 |
| 3 July | Marshall | Short | Recreation camp | 37 |
| 11 July | Short | Marshall | Site for new airfield | 38 |
| 25 July | Short | Marshall | Army-Navy mutual use of airfields; plans for Army-Navy air exercise | 39 |
| 19 Aug. | Marshall | Short | Choice of airfield site | 40 |
| 10 Oct. | Marshall | Short | Missions of air units under Short's tentative SOP | 41 |
| 14 Oct. | Short | Marshall | Same | 42 |
| 28 Oct. | Marshall | Short | Same | 43 |

NOTE.—Items 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 13, 18 were classified Secret. Items 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14 were classified Confidential.

Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[1]

FEBRUARY 7, 1941.

Lieut. General WALTER C. SHORT,
Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.

MY DEAR SHORT: I believe you take over command today, however, the reason for this letter is a conversation I had yesterday with Admiral Stark.

He spoke of Admiral Kimmel, the new Fleet Commander, regarding his personal characteristics. He said Kimmel was very direct, even brusque and undiplomatic in his approach to problems; that he was at heart a very kindly man, though he appeared rather rough in his methods of doing business. I gathered that he is entirely responsive to plain speaking on the part of the other fellow if there is frankness and logic in the presentation. Stark went so far as to say that he had, in the past personally objected to Kimmel's manners in dealing with officers, but that Kimmel was outstanding in his qualifications for command, and that this was the opinion of the entire Navy.

I give you this as it may be helpful in your personal dealings with Admiral Kimmel, not that I anticipate that you would be supersensitive, but rather that you would have a full understanding of the man with whom you are to deal.

Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the deficiencies of Army matériel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically to planes and to antiaircraft guns. Of course the facts are as he represents them regarding planes, and to a less serious extent regarding caliber .50 machine guns. The 3-inch antiaircraft gun is on a better basis. What Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this matériel throughout the Army, and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army.

The fullest protection for the Fleet is *the* rather than a major consideration for us, there can be little question about that; but the Navy itself makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it difficult for us to meet the requirements of Hawaii. For example, as I told Stark yesterday,—he had been pressing me heavily to get some modern antiaircraft guns in the Philippines for the protection of Cavite, where they have collected a number of submarines as well as the vessels of the Asiatic Fleet—at the present time we have no antiaircraft guns for the protection of Cavite, and [2] very little for Corregidor. By unobtrusively withdrawing 3-inch guns from regiments now in the field in active training, we had obtained 20 3-inch guns for immediate shipment to the Philippines. However before the shipment had been gotten under way the Navy requested 18 of these guns for Marine battalions to be specially equipped for the defense of islands in the Pacific. So I am left with two guns for the Philippines. This has happened time and again, and until quantity production gets well under way, we are in a most difficult situation in these matters.

I have not mentioned Panama, but the Naval requirements of defense there are of immense importance, and we have not been able to provide all the guns that are necessary, nor to set up the Air units with modern equipment. However, in this instance, we can fly the latest equipment to Panama in one day, some of it in four hours.

You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are doing everything that is humanly possible to build up the Army defenses of the Naval overseas installations, but we cannot perform a miracle. I arranged yesterday to ship 31 of the P36 planes to Hawaii by aircraft carrier from San Diego in about ten days. This will give you 50 of this type of plane, deficient in speed compared to the Japanese carrier based pursuit, and deficient in armament. But at least it gives you 50 of the same type. I also arranged with Admiral Stark to ship 50 P40-B pursuit planes about March 15th by Naval carrier from San Diego. These planes just came into production this week and should be on a quantity basis of about 8 a day by the first week in March.

The Japanese carrier based pursuit plane, which has recently appeared in China, according to our information has a speed of 322 miles an hour, a very rapid ability to climb and mounts two .20mm and two .30 cal. guns. It has leak-proof tanks and armor. Our P40-B will have a speed of 360 miles an hour with two .50 cal. machine guns and four of .30 caliber. It will lack the rapidity to climb of the Japanese plane. It will have leak-proof tanks and armor.

We have an earlier model of this plane, the P40, delivered between August and October, but the Chief of the Air Corps opposes sending it to Hawaii because of some engine defect which makes it unsafe for training flights over water. Up to the present time we have not had available a modern medium bomber or a light bomber. This month the medium bomber will go into production, if not quantity production. This plane has a range without bombs of 3,000 miles,

carriers 2,000 pounds and has a speed of 320 miles an hour—a tremendous improvement on the old B18 which you now have. It can operate with bombs 640 miles to sea, with a safe reserve against the return trip. We plan to give you first priority on these planes. I am looking into the question of providing at least a squadron of Flying Fortress planes for Hawaii.

[3] I am seeing what can be done to augment the .50 caliber machine gun set-up, but I have no hopes for the next few months. The Navy approached us regarding barrage balloons. We have three now under test, and 80 in process of manufacture, and 3,000 to be procured if the President will release our estimates. However, this provides nothing against the next few months. I am looking into the question of possibly obtaining some from England, but they are asking us and not giving us these days. The first test of the first forty deliveries in June will probably be made in Hawaii.

You, of course, understand the pressures on the Department for the limited material we have, for Alaska, for Panama, and, *most confidentially* for the possible occupation of the Azores, not to mention the new leased bases. However, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in mind that our first concern is to protect the Fleet.

My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.

Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentrations, and that purpose should be made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel, I accentuate this because I found yesterday, for example, in a matter of tremendous importance, that old Army and Navy feuds, engendered from fights over appropriations, with the usual fallacious arguments on both sides, still persist in confusing issues of national defense. We must be completely impersonal in these matters, at least so far as our own nerves and irritations are concerned. Fortunately, and happily I might say, Stark and I are on the most intimate personal basis, and that relationship has enabled us to avoid many serious difficulties.

Faithfully yours,

[Stamped.] (Sgd.) G. C. MARSHALL.

[4]

FEB. 19, 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I was very glad indeed to have your letter of February 7th as it gave us some very definite information on aircraft we did not have.

Since assuming command, I have had two conferences with Admiral Kimmel and two with Admiral Bloch. I have found them both most approachable and cooperative in every way. I have told them that from my point of view there will be no hair-splitting, but that the one thing that would affect any decision where there is an apparent conflict between the Army and the Navy in the use of facilities would be the question of what could produce the greatest combined effort of the two forces. They have assured me that they will take exactly the same view. From my brief intercourse with them I feel that our relations should be extremely cordial.

As a result of my short study of conditions here I believe that the following are of great importance and I am taking steps to carry out the necessary changes:

- (1) Cooperation with the Navy.
- (2) Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft.
- (3) Improvement of the Antiaircraft defense.
- (4) Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery.
- (5) Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights.
- (6) Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improvement in roads and trails.
- (7) Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and communication centers.
- (8) Increase in the number of Engineer troops.

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Cooperation with the Navy. A series of joint committees consisting of Army and Navy officers has been appointed with a view to the study of cooperation of the Army and Navy especially with reference to employment of air and aircraft. These committees have been directed to report on March 1st. Copy of the letter creating these committees is attached hereto as well as copy of instructions to the echelon commanders concerning cooperation with the Navy.

[5] *Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft.* Provision has been made for a number of emergency fields upon the various islands but no provision has been made for dispersion of the planes in the vicinity of fields and other protection by either camouflage or by bunkers. The emergency fields on other islands will be valueless for pursuit aviation except possibly on the Island of Molokai. The pursuit aviation is capable of only approximately one hour's flying with the throttle wide open. This means that the dispersion of pursuit aviation must take place upon the Island of Oahu if it is to be able to meet an attack from any direction. The dispersion and bunkers for the greater part of the pursuit aviation can be made in the immediate vicinity of Wheeler Field by the use of ravines and bunkers. The maintenance and repair facilities can be placed in ravines under ground without an exorbitant cost in time or money. Tanks are now available for the distribution of gas and we are asking for money to install tanks.

The bombers can make use of the landing fields on other islands but it will be necessary to make provisions for their dispersion in the vicinity of those fields and also on the Island of Oahu. Their dispersion is more difficult than that of the pursuit. The repair and maintenance facilities require so much space that it will be necessary, at least temporarily, to place them above ground protected by hills. At present the only repair facilities for the bombers are in buildings on Hickam Field which would undoubtedly be attacked by any surprise raid. Up to the time that we make runways for dispersion of planes on all the fields surprise enemy raids would be extremely serious.

Improvement of the Antiaircraft Defense. The major shortages in Antiaircraft artillery armament are sixteen 3-inch or 90 m.m. antiaircraft guns (six enroute) 135 37-mm antiaircraft guns, 236 .50 caliber machine guns and 30 sound locators. The locators are expected in June. The shortage of personnel, however, is much more serious than the shortage in materiel. Practically all the coast artillery units have dual roles. If they man antiaircraft artillery the Harbor Defense Artillery will not be manned, and vice versa. To man the entire antiaircraft artillery defense project avoiding dual assignments to all but four Harbor Defense batteries requires an increase in the existing antiaircraft personnel as follows:

Two regiments of Coast Artillery Antiaircraft (Mobile) T-O 4-11.

One Battalion Gun Coast Artillery Antiaircraft (mobile) (less searchlight battery) T. O. 4-15.

Approximately 90 officers and 2,000 enlisted replacements to activate three gun batteries and three 37-mm batteries of the 64th Coast Artillery Antiaircraft, now inactive. With the increasing critical international situation at this time it is urgently recommended that all reinforcements of Antiaircraft Artillery personnel, [6] both unit and individual reinforcements mentioned above, together with the shortage in antiaircraft artillery materiel, be furnished to this department with the least practicable delay.

These reinforcements to the antiaircraft artillery garrison, as well as those for the Harbor Defense artillery listed below, are required to complete the approved defense project. No provision of the defense of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station has been made in the defense project. This problem has been made the subject of a separate letter, copy attached as Inclosure No. 4.

Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery. There are no major shortages of equipment for Harbor Defense Artillery. However, about 150 officers and 2,700 enlisted men as individual reinforcements and one regiment, Coast Artillery (T. D.) T. O. 4-31W are required to fully man the Harbor Defense Artillery, not including the three obsolescent seacoast mortar batteries. It is urgently requested that these replacements and reinforcements be furnished at the earliest practicable moment.

As an accessory to the Harbor Defense Artillery, the north shore Railroad connection is extremely important to give access to railway gun positions on the north shore.

Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights. The only serious shortage is in beach defense searchlights. A 24-inch carbon-arc light is under development; but the receipt of these lights here may be unduly delayed. This

shortage can be overcome immediately by supplying power units for 42 Mack 36-inch projectors which are now on hand. The trucks and power units for these lights are unserviceable but the projectors are in fair to good shape.

There is a shortage throughout of spare parts for 60-inch searchlights, which were requisitioned some months ago. These would be required for any prolonged action. Information from the Chief of Engineers indicates that they will probably be furnished in the near future.

Provision for more rapid movements of supplies and reserves by improvement in roads and trails. With the increase in the number of motors available in the department it is most necessary that roads be provided to make the maximum possible use of the motors in the movement of reserves and supplies. The Engineers have made a very careful study of the roads and trails which are necessary for the defense of the island.

There are numerous bottlenecks in the islands where it is not practicable to construct alternate roads. If these roads are damaged by shelling or bombing it is most important that they be repaired in the minimum of time. To provide for this stores of [7] repair material should be placed in close proximity to the vital points. It is believed that the Territorial government will cooperate with the Army in this matter, thus reducing expenses to be charged to National Defense.

Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and communication centers. Command Posts, communication centers and items of critical supply should be bombproofed. This protection of Command Posts particularly should be done immediately in order that these installations can be trained to function in these locations before hostilities start.

Increase in the number of Engineer Troops. The protection of aircraft and the construction of air fields will keep one regiment of engineers employed constantly. The work on roads and trails would be such as to employ one General Service Regiment constantly. The combat Engineer regiment of the Hawaiian Division should be left available for bombproofing of Headquarters and communication centers and other tactical work.

Previous recommendations for a regiment of Aviation Engineers, less 1 battalion, and an increase in enlisted strength of Third Engineers were based on assumption that some civilian labor would be available. The situation on civilian labor has become acute, and while it has been necessary to import skilled labor, the recent increase in defense work is going to necessitate importing unskilled labor as well. The only alternative would be to curtail activities of the plantations and much of our defense work should not be postponed until that is done.

Communications covering all the above recommendations are being or have been submitted to The Adjutant General. The following are the titles and dates of letters covering these subjects:

Cooperation with the Navy. Joint letter, HHD, 14th Naval District, 14 February, 1941, subject: "Army and Navy Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," copy attached, Inclosure No. 1.

Letter, HHD to major echelon commanders, 17 February 1941, subject: "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," file 354.2/JAX, copy attached, Inclosure No. 2.

Dispersion and protection of aircraft. Letter Engr. 452, 19 February 1941, subject: "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft." Copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 3.

Improvement of Anti-aircraft defense and of Harbor Defense Artillery. Letter HHD to TAG, 19 February 1941, subject: "Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department," file 320.2/55, copy attached, Inclosure No. 4.

[8] Letter, HHD to TAG, 18 February 1941, subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." file 381, copy attached, Inclosure No. 5.

North Shore Railroad Connection. Letter, HHD Engr. 662/7, 19 February 1941, copy attached, Inclosure No. 6.

Improvement of situation with reference to searchlights.

a. Beach Defense Lights: Letter, Engr. 470.3/6 x 470.3/10, 29 January 1940 with 11 Indorsements, 11th Indorsement AG 470.3 (1-29-40) M-D, 26 August 1940. 12th Indorsement, HHD dated 18 January 1941, to TAG being transmitted, copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 7.

b. Searchlight Parts. Letter, Engr. 470.3/8, 2 November 1940, to the Chief of Engineers, subject: "Priority Items, Engineers Status Report, Revision, 1940." 1st Indorsement, O., C. of E., (381.4) (Hawaii) 101, 28 January 1941, states: "Reference Par. 1 c, the requisition for spare parts for searchlights was concurred in by this office. The requisition now is undergoing review by G-4 and action

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is expected shortly. You will be promptly informed of the action taken." Copy of 1st Indorsement inclosed, Inclosure No. 8.

Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improvement in Roads and Trails. Letter, Engr. 611, 19 February 1941, subject: "Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department." Copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 9.

Bombproofing of vital installations. Letters, Engr. 600.96, following subjects and dates. (Copies attached):

1. Bombproof Command Posts, Hawaiian Air Force, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 10.
2. Bombproof Protection, Command Posts, Hawaiian Division, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 11.
3. Bombproof Construction for Magazines at Fort Barrette and Fort Weaver, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 12.
4. Splinterproof Protection for Antiaircraft and Mobile Seacoast Batteries, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 13.
5. Bombproof Command Post, Antiaircraft Groupment, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 14.
6. Bombproof Gasoline Storage, Hawaiian Department, 5 February 1941, Inclosure No. 15.
7. Bombproof Protection for Signal Installations, Hawaiian Department, 6 February 1941, Inclosure No. 16.
8. Storage of Defense Reserves, Aviation Gasoline, Hawaiian Air Force, 6 February 1941, Inclosure No. 17.
9. Department Command Post, Allamanu Crater, last correspondence 660.9 (S), copy attached, Inclosure No. 18.

[9] *Increase in number of Engineer Troops.* Letter Engr. 322.03, 19 February 1941, subject "Additional Engineer Troops", copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 19.

Enclosures herewith are made for your ready reference and information.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.

19 Incls: ¹

[10]

MARCH 5, 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, Hawaii.

MY DEAR SHORT: I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority. General Chaney has prepared a report of recent exercises held in the United States and incorporated therein his views and recommendations based on his experience in these exercises and his observation of the system and method employed by the British. A copy of this report is being sent to you.

An air defense exercise is contemplated for the West Coast in the Spring. This exercise is to include an establishment similar to that which has been set up in the Air Defense Command exercise in the Northeast and tested during January. It is highly desirable that representatives from Hawaii be present to observe the details of this exercise. If this is found to be impracticable, we will consider having officers sent to the exercise who shortly thereafter are due for station in Hawaii.

Faithfully yours,

[Stamped] (Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

¹ Omitted.

[11] Via "Clipper" Air Mail

General **GEORGE C. MARSHALL**,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: One of the first projects which I investigated in this department was the Aircraft Warning Service which I believe is vital to the defense of these islands. At the present time the maximum distance an approaching airplane can be detected is about five miles. The radio detector equipment of the Aircraft Warning Service increases this distance to one hundred and twenty miles, and in these islands, the use of this equipment is the only way by which the detection distance can be increased. With the present international situation it seems to me that if this equipment is to be used at all the need for it is now here.

The Navy is vitally interested in this project. At present with the fleet in Hawaiian waters, there is no adequate warning service. The Commander in Chief of the Fleet has expressed his concern about this and has communicated this concern to the Navy Department; as you know, the Secretary of War has advised the Secretary of the Navy that the equipment would be received in this department some time in June and the stations be operating shortly thereafter. I have discussed this matter with Admiral Kimmel and have assured him that personnel would be trained and the stations in operation within thirty days after receipt of the equipment.

All this leads up to a radiogram of 3 March 1941 just received from The Adjutant General regarding the Haleakala installation. A copy of this radio and a paraphrase of my reply are inclosed for ready reference. The Adjutant General's radio indicates to me that the seriousness of this situation has not yet been appreciated in the War Department. It lists certain restrictions regarding construction, and if it is necessary to comply with these, the completion of this station will be unduly delayed. The fixed station at the summit of Haleakala is one of the two most important in the warning net; its commanding location gives it greater coverage than any of the others, and its early completion is vital. I believe that this matter is sufficiently important to be brought to the attention of the Secretary of War to see if permission can not be obtained from the Secretary of the Interior to construct the Haleakala installation without the necessity of submitting detailed plans for consideration by the National Park Service.

[12] Defense of these islands and adequate warning for the United States Fleet is so dependent upon the early completion of this Aircraft Warning Service that I believe all quibbling over details should be stopped at once. This project was very thoroughly studied by a Board of officers in this department who made several personal investigations of each one of the sites. Now that basic decisions as to locations, types of stations, and general plans have been approved by the War Department, I strongly recommend that this project be decentralized and that I be authorized to give final approval to designs, layouts and other details to expedite its completion.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) **Walter C. Short**
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, Commanding.

2 Incls: ¹
 Radio 3 Mar 1941
 Paraphrase

[13]

MARCH 13, 1941

Lieutenant General **WALTER C. SHORT**,
Commanding, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR SHORT: The progress that you are making in reaching close coordination with local naval authorities, and so insuring a maximum degree of readiness in your Department, is most gratifying.

Since the Navy development in Kaneohe Bay has exceeded the project originally contemplated, I agree with you that the Army should consider assuming responsibility for its defense, and meanwhile defend it within the means available.

The several letters which you have submitted to The Adjutant General requesting personnel, matériel and funds are being processed. To avoid delay in initiating

¹ Omitted.

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projects that may be approved, I am tentatively including \$3,000,000 in the estimates now being prepared.

Faithfully yours,

[Stamped] (Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

[14]

MAR. 15, 1941.

Lieut. General WALTER C. SHORT,
*Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.*

DEAR GENERAL SHORT: The matters referred to in your secret letter dated March 8, 1941, and the inclosures thereto, have been given careful study.

The War Department appreciates fully the necessity for the early establishment of the aircraft warning service stations in the Hawaiian Department. However, it will be necessary to comply with certain fixed regulations in those cases where facilities are to be established on lands pertaining to the Department of the Interior. The National Park Service officials are willing to give us the temporary use of their lands when other lands are not suitable for the purpose, but they will not waive the requirements as to the submission of preliminary building plans showing the architecture and general appearance. They are also very definitely opposed to permitting structures of any type to be erected at such places as will be open to view and materially alter the natural appearance of the reservation.

I have given these matters my personal attention, and have conferred with officials of the National Park Service. War Department radiogram of March 12, 1941, outlines what appears to be the most practical solution at this time. The War Department finds it necessary to ask the Department of the Interior for the use of many tracts of land in the National Parks, and for their cooperation in the transfer of large areas of public lands. It is not believed that it would be advisable to attempt to alter the informal decisions of the Department of the Interior by carrying this matter to higher authority, or to prolong the discussion through official channels.

We are as anxious as you to work out a solution for these problems with the least practicable delay, and I know that I can count upon you for fullest co-operation.

Faithfully yours,

[Stamped] (Signed) WM. BEYDEN.
In the absence of the Chief of Staff.

Distribution:
1 Chief of Staff.

[15]

15 MARCH 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
*Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: In reply to your letter of March 5th I shall give you a brief review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department in regard to defense from air attack.

DISPERSION AND PROTECTION OF AIRCRAFT

The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability of both the Army and Navy air fields to the attack. Hickam Field is the most conspicuous target in sight and the Ford Island Navy Field is not much better. Wheeler Field is less conspicuous only because it is in the center of the Island. On all fields the planes have been kept lined up on the field where they would suffer terrific loss. As I wrote you in my letter of February 19th some work has been done towards the preparation of emergency fields on outlying islands, but in no case has arrangements been completed for the dispersion of the planes in the vicinity of the field or the preparation of bunkers to protect them. I asked for money and Engineer troops to do this work. The pursuit planes must necessarily be protected on the Island of Oahu on account of their limited cruising radius.

The Navy is organizing its new landing field at Barbers Point for the use of the carrier borne planes. They also are well along on the construction of an air base at Kaneohe Bay to which the 5 patrol squadrons will be moved. From their point of view this will improve the situation greatly. With the arrival

of the additional 50 pursuit planes Wheeler Field will be so badly congested that it will be necessary to establish another landing field. Before my arrival this had practically been decided upon adjacent to the new Navy landing field at Barbers Point. However, the Navy objected very strenuously to this and I think rightly so as planes coming in or going out from either field would have to fly over the other field and constitute a considerable element of danger. We have located another field about four miles northeast of Schofield Barracks. I think this is far more desirable from every point of view as we shall not be in danger of losing planes through the action of small landing parties or of having them damaged or of having the field put out of use by shelling from enemy ships. The runway will be about 5,000 feet so the bombers can use it as an emergency field should Hickam Field be out of action on account of bombing. The Observation Squadron and the squadron of light bombers is being moved to Bellows Field in the next few days so as to lessen the congestion at Wheeler Field.

[16] Plans have been made to provide gas and bombs at all emergency landing fields on outlying islands and for the stationing on Kauai, Maui, and Hawaii of the Battalions of National Guard which came from these islands for the protection of the air fields from sabotage and small landing parties. Incidentally these battalions would serve to prevent local disorders. Unless there is an emergency these troops will not be sent to the other islands until the camp buildings for one company have been provided at each air field. Part of each battalion can be quartered in existing Armories on these islands usually at some distance from the air field.

ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY

In general we have no serious shortage in 3 inch antiaircraft artillery, only 16 guns being required to complete our complement. As far as I know no provision has been made for 90-mm antiaircraft guns. 20 out of 135 37-mm antiaircraft guns have been received. The exact date of the arrival of the others is not known. We are still short 236 of .50 caliber machine guns. Perhaps the most serious shortage is 8 long range detectors (AWS) which are supposed to arrive in June. Our present sound locators have a range of only $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles so they are practically useless. The new detectors will have a maximum range of 120 miles.

The shortage of personnel is much more serious than that of equipment. Practically all of the Coast Artillery is assigned dual roles. This means that much of the Antiaircraft equipment would not be manned if it were essential to man the Harbor Defense guns at the same time. To man the authorized equipment would require 2 regiments of Coast Artillery (AA) (Mobile) (TO 4-11), 1 battalion, gun, Coast Artillery (AA) (Mobile) (less searchlight battery) (TO 4-15). 90 officers and 2,000 replacements to activate 3 gun batteries and 37-mm batteries. These were covered in my letter of February 19th.

COORDINATION OF ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE

The coordination of Antiaircraft defense presents quite a different picture at Hawaii from that existing in most places on the mainland. The island is so small that there would not be the same degree of warning that would exist on the mainland. After the installation of our new detectors we shall have some warning from the different islands and almost continuous service in the most dangerous direction for approximately 75 miles. The pursuit aviation, however, will have to be prepared to take the air in the minimum amount of time.

On account of the congestion in the areas at Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, and Barbers Point, the coordination of the Army and Navy aircraft and of the Antiaircraft Artillery presents a very serious problem. We have had a committee of the Army and Navy working on this subject. The committee submitted its report March 1st and it is now being reviewed by General Martin, commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, General Gardner, commanding the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, and Admiral Bellinger, commanding the Naval Air Station. We have had a number of combined air exercises in the past [17] month and expect to have a minimum of one each week so we should find out anything that is wrong with the plan.

WEST COAST DEFENSE

If the situation here is such as to make it possible I would like to send both General Martin and General Gardner to the West Coast Defense Exercise. Martin is the senior with his temporary rank and probably will command our

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air defense if it appears that such a command is the proper solution of our problem. Gardner has had much more experience with this subject and I feel that it would be wise to send him also as he would be able to get all the details. If it is not advisable at the time to send these two officers I would like to send their Executives as I am sure a lot would be learned from the exercise.

I feel that the question of Antiaircraft Defense against air attack is the most serious problem that we have to face and I hope that funds and Engineer troops can be made available soon so that we can get definitely on the way on this subject.

Very sincerely,

(Signed) Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT.

[18]

MAR 28 1941

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
*Headquarters, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, Hawaii.*

MY DEAR SHORT: I was very glad to receive your letter of March 15 reviewing the air defense situation in your department.

Your proposal for relieving congestion by the construction of one additional field and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in protected bunkers at existing airfields is undoubtedly sound. As soon as you have submitted sufficient details to support the defense of the anticipated expenditures, funds for these purposes will be included in estimates.

A company of aviation engineers will be sent to you during April, and further increases in your engineer garrison are contemplated when the necessary personnel can be made available.

Antiaircraft and aircraft warning service matériel to complete your project requirements is expected to be available for delivery as follows: sixteen 3" antiaircraft guns, December, 1941; one hundred and fifteen 37 mm antiaircraft guns, February, 1942; caliber .50 antiaircraft machine guns, in 1942; four SCR No. 268, April, 1941; five SCR No. 270 and three SCR No. 271, April and May 1941.

I am hopeful of arranging for the early augmentation of your antiaircraft garrison so as to provide full strength units for the armament available within your department. Additional Coast Artillery reinforcements probably will be held in the United States unless the situation in the Pacific becomes more acute.

I approved your proposal to send General Martin and General Gardner, or their Executives, to the West Coast Defense Exercise. Due to various reasons that exercise has been postponed till Fall, as you may know.

Faithfully yours,

[Stamped] (Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Distribution:

1 Copy for the Chief of Staff

[19]

APRIL 14, 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
*Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: On April 12th I sent a radio to the War Department requesting that I be authorized to make leases of 230 separate parcels of land, none of which exceed 5 acres on island of Oahu, totaling approximately 467 acres and asking for \$10,000.00 to cover the rental. The purpose in leasing this land is to begin the construction of strongpoints at all places where they are not located in cane fields and pineapple fields. The greater part of the other land is rock so the construction of the strongpoints requires the use of explosives and takes a great amount of time. One company strongpoint on the West Coast is now in the process of being constructed and the troops have been working most of the time for seven months. The strongpoint lacks considerably of being completed. I feel that it is essential to get these under way at once rather than taking several months to get the exact metes and bounds and get the approval of the War Department on each separate lease before starting work. At the best I do not believe they can all be completed before September. Any field fortifications to be constructed in cane fields and pineapple fields will be very simple as the nature of the soil is such that the construction can be carried on without the use of explosives. I am enclosing a copy of the radio sent.

We have completed the reconnaissance and estimates for the new air field. We had some difficulty in meeting all the technical requirements as I was insistent that it should be located somewhere in the interior where it could not be picked up so easily at night, could not be shelled from ships and would not require a special guard. We have located a place that seems to meet all requirements and is exceptionally well located from a tactical point of view. I am enclosing a copy of the letter of transmittal. The complete document is being sent forward to the Adjutant General by this same mail. With the great increase in the number of pursuit planes I feel that it is essential to push this construction as rapidly as possible.

Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making in cooperating with the Navy I am enclosing the following agreements made with them:

1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District. Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure.

[20] 2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Forces, to implement the above agreement.

3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the joint agreement.

I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very cooperative and we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and Navy Air Forces to act together and with the unity of command as the situation requires.

We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air force and the antiaircraft defense. I hope we shall arrive at something on that in the near future. The more I go into the details the more I am becoming convinced that it will be necessary for us to set up an air defense command. Some months before my arrival this matter was considered and at that time the conclusion was reached that it was not necessary. On this account I am anxious that both General Martin and General Gardner attend the West Coast Air Defense Exercise in the Fall.

Everything is going along extremely well although there is a great deal to be done as rapidly as possible. The Navy has felt very much encouraged by the increase in our Air and Antiaircraft defense. I shall write you from time to time as matters come up which I think will interest you.

Very sincerely,

(Signed) Walter C. Short.
WALTER C. SHORT.

[21]

MAY 2, 1941. 4:39 AM.

From: Honolulu.

To: General George C. Marshall.

Honolulu No. 2755. May 1st.

Hawaiian Department has submitted estimates for construction of airports for the Hawaiian Air Force as follows: Island of Oahu, Kipapa \$4,940,000.00, Belows Field \$2,543,000.00. Island of Kauai, Barking Sands \$1,772,000.00. Island of Hawaii, Morse Field \$1,688,000.00, Hilo airport \$670,000.00, Parker Ranch \$1,993,000.00, Total \$13,606,000.00. Additional estimates will be submitted for airports as follows: Island of Oahu, Haleiwa \$450,000.00. Island of Kauai, Burns Field \$640,000.00. Island of Molokai, Homestead Field \$400,000.00. Island of Lanai \$1,990,000.00, total \$3,480,000.00. It is recommended that provision be made in the current 1942 appropriation bill for the inclusion of these items at a total estimated cost of \$17,860,000.00.

In addition request that amount of \$10,000,000.00 be included in estimates for use in this Department on projects which can not be completely anticipated at this time. This fund should be available without waiting for future congressional action for projects under construction but lacking sufficient funds to complete, and upon [22] approval for those projects now under study but not yet approved including fortifications, bombproofs, housing, military roads and other structures. Understand fiscal year 42 appropriation bill now before Senate and recommend inclusion of these general amounts before bill passed and sent to conference. Clipper letter follows.

SHORT.

[23]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,

OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,

Fort Shafter, T. H., May 2, 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,

Chief of Staff, U. S. Army,

War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: This letter is being written to amplify the requests made in my radiogram of 1 May to you for inclusion of funds in the Fiscal year 1942 estimates now before Congress.

I believe that the two requests made in this radiogram are both necessary to solve the problem existing in this department. The development of adequate airfields for the rapidly expanding Hawaiian Air Force is essential. An effort has been made to develop these fields through use of troop labor and WPA, but this is entirely too slow and uncertain. The projects which have been and are being submitted at a total estimated cost of \$17,086,000 will provide satisfactory operating conditions. Copies of the project letters already submitted are enclosed for ready reference. Our request for the inclusion of \$10,000,000 in these estimates is intended to establish a source of funds which can be drawn upon to finance necessary projects as the need for them occurs. With the rapidly changing situation it is impossible to anticipate all our needs and submit detailed projects for consideration. In addition to this difficulty there have been several instances in the past six months where projects have been submitted and approved by the War Department as desirable and necessary but construction work could not be initiated due to a lack of funds. I think that the situation has progressed to such a point that we can no longer afford the delay in time which has heretofore been required to secure appropriations by Congress after the projects have been approved. I can foresee several requirements this coming year which must be met. Among these are housing for the increases in the garrison, increased storage needs, work on roads, fortifications, gasoline storage (both aviation and motor vehicle), and other requirements. As stated, all of the details cannot be anticipated at this time but some source of funds should be available for their construction without having to wait for congressional action.

If these funds could be secured it would give us an equal opportunity with the Navy. The Navy is apparently getting an allotment of funds without the necessity of submitting detailed projects and as a result they have been able to accumulate required materials and almost corner the local labor market. There has already developed a shipping shortage between the mainland and the islands and the situation in regard to shipping in the present war makes it highly probable that many of the ships now plying between here and the coast may be transferred to trans-Atlantic service and this will make the situation serious. I think it is extremely important that funds be made available without delay for the procurement and shipment to these islands of the materials required in our construction program.

[24] At the time my radio was sent I understood that this appropriation bill was still pending before the Senate and speed in obtaining your consideration of these recommendations was important.

Very sincerely,

/S/ Walter C. Short

WALTER C. SHORT,

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.7 Incls:¹

Letters:

1. Bellows Field (Pursuit and Bombardment)
2. Kipapa Field (Pursuit)
3. Barking Sands Field (Bombardment)
4. Morse Field (Bombardment)
5. Hilo Airport (Bombardment)
6. Parker Ranch (Bombardment)
7. Homestead Field, Molokai (Pursuit)

Letters being submitted later:

1. Burns Field, Kauai (Bombardment)
2. Lanai (Pursuit and Bombardment)
3. Haleiwa, Oahu (Pursuit)

¹ Omitted.

[illegible]

MAY 5, 1941.

[illegible][illegible][illegible][illegible]

1961 APR 21 - IF I COULD BE
ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD I WOULD
BE IN NEW YORK CITY.

[illegible][illegible]

In reply refer to:

Pencilled notation of WPD Action

HR. 4545, to provide for Public Works including schools, now pending in Senate.
S. 1313, a bill to provide educational means, now being studied by G-1 preparatory to submitting WD report thereon.

Information furnished by 1st Ind. (5-3-41) to AG 000.73 (4-16-41) M-B.

Activated by G3/45351 (5-29-41). G-1 states no action taken re assignment by Brig. Gen. for AA Brig.
Under study by G-3.

¹ The words "to General Marshall" are handwritten in the original.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 15 May 1941.

Memorandum for Lieutenant General D. C. Emmons, U. S. A.¹ to
Gen. Marshall
The following projects are of vital interest to the Hawaiian Department:
G-1

1. a. No action has been taken by the U. S. Commissioner of Education to provide school buildings and facilities for approximately 3,000 children of service personnel and defense workers (Army and Navy combined). Most of the Army children belong to personnel on duty at Air Fields.

b. The Territory of Hawaii has appropriated \$121,294.00 to pay teachers.

G-2

Letter 326.2 (G-2) from Hawaiian Dept to The Adjutant General, dated 16 April 1941, subject: Censorship, Hawaiian Department. Requested information concerning current policy of the War Department regarding Army operation, control and coordination of publicity, propaganda and censorship in this Department, particularly the censorship of mail and local telephone service in case of war in the Pacific area.

G-3

1. Authorization for activation of 53d C. A. Brigade (AA), Hq. Battery, and Intelligence Battery, and assignment of Brigadier General to command.

2. Authorization for reorganization of troops in Hawaiian Department:

a. Formation of two triangular divisions.

b. Creation of Air Defense Command.

[27]

5th Ind (AG 580, 12-12-40) dated 5-10-41 rec'd WPD 5-28-41. Under study.

Information governing the distribution of controlled items and estimated future delivery dates have been furnished. 100% of requirements for 37mm (AA and AT) guns by May 1942. 60% AP Shot (AT)—Nov. 1941. 60% HE Shell (AA) March 1942.

AG 565.4 (2-11-41) Mar. 27, 1941 informed that funds for 1 barge for Pearl Harbor would be included in next estimate.

AG 561.11 Haw Dept (3-13-41) Apr 26, 1941 approved request for 2 ocean-going barges and 1 ocean-going tug. QMG taking action to procure.

Not rec'd in TAG (6-11-41)

Activation of Tow Target Det. authorized May 29, effective July 1, 1941. (AG 320.2, 5-22-41)

4th Ind (4-18-40) to AG 472.2 (2-10-40) M-WPD. 105mm not available for issue to Haw Dept. Will be issued, when available, in accordance with established priorities.

Action taken by 3d Ind 4-18-41 to AG 600.12 (1-4-41)

AG 600.12 (5-17-41) Under study G-3

3. Provision of facilities for Army bombers, Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Canton Islands, and provision for trans-Pacific movements of bombers, if such action is contemplated by the War Department. All installations to be constructed, maintained and defended by Navy.

4. Need for 37mm ammunition and matériel (antiaircraft and anti-tank). (No ammunition and only 20 out of 120 guns now on hand.)

5. Need for more water transportation to outlying islands.

6. Troops and matériel for defense of Kaneohe Air Station. Plans now in preparation (due in Department Headquarters 1 June).

7. Formation of 5th Target Squadron so as to relieve load on tactical units. Increased demands due to doubling antiaircraft garrison will interfere greatly with tactical training of Air Force units.

8. Provision of 105mm howitzers for light regiments of 11th Field Artillery Brigade.

G-4

Quartermaster Projects:

Letter to The Adjutant General, 4 January 1941, which requested \$312,500 for warehousing in Hawaiian Department.

Approved by radio 5-22-41 (AG 600.12) 34th Engineer Camp Mobilization Housing-----\$276,000.00

804th Co., requested 13 May 1941, Scho. Bks----- 34,000.00

[28]

Action by radio 4-25-41 AG 672 (4-14-41)
 Action by 3d Ind (6-11-41) AG 671.1 (6-5-41)
 Approved 3d Ind (5-6-41) AG 673.1 (2-13-41)
 Action by 3d Ind (5-6-41) AG 673.1 (2-13-41)
 Latest action—by 3d Ind (9-25-30) WD to HAW Dept AG
 41234 (9-23-39)

Auth. by radio May 20 #AG 600.12 (4-28-41)
 Action by 5th Ind (5-10-41) #AG 600.12 (3-3-41)
 Auth by QMG May 23 (QM 634 C-EP)
 AG 614 (Haw Dept) (5-16-41) to Ch/AC by 5th Ind (6-5-41)
 Under Study

Sewage Disposal, Scho. Bks----- 130,000.00
 Water Distribution System, Fort Kamehameha----- 23,000.00
 Dry Battery Storage, Fort Shafter----- 3,500.00
 Rehabilitation of Transformer Station, Cho. Bks----- 54,000.00
 Water Lime for Water Softener, Laundry, Fort Armstrong----- 1,700.00
 G. M. Warehousing, Fort Armstrong----- 92,000.00
 Q. M. Warehousing & Utilities, Schofield Barracks----- 164,000.00
 Two Fire Stations, Schofield Barracks----- 28,000.00
 Survey Bombing Range & Landing Field, Lanai----- 1,800.00
Engineer
 Important projects which have been submitted to the War Department and on which no reply has been received to date:
 a. Airfields:

| Location | Date | Funds | Remarks |
|--------------------------|-------------|-------------|---------------------|
| Bellows Field, Oahu | 5 Apr 1941 | \$2,542,900 | 118 Off. 1049 E. M. |
| Kipapa Field, Oahu | 14 Apr 1941 | 4,938,950 | 15th Pur. Sqn. |
| Hilo Airport, Hawaii | 2 May 1941 | 670,140 | 1 Bomb. Sqn. |
| Homestead Field, Molokai | 2 May 1941 | 407,600 | 1 Pur. Sqn. |
| Morse Field, Hawaii | 2 May 1941 | 1,687,530 | 2 Bomb. Sqs. |
| Barking Sands, Kauai | 2 May 1941 | 1,772,220 | 2 Bomb. Sqs. |
| Parker Ranch, Hawaii | 2 May 1941 | 1,992,600 | 1 Bomb. Sqn. |
| Lanai Airport | () | 1,990,000 | 1 Pur. Sqn. |
| Burns, Field, Kauai | () | 640,000 | 1 Hv. Rcn. Sqn. |
| Haleiwa, Oahu | () | 450,000 | |

Under study Ch/AC AG 600.12 (4-8-41).
 Action rec. in Memo Ch/Staff (AC #50) (5-28-41).
 AG 600.12 (5-2-41). Action rec. in Memo Ch/Staff (AC #51) (5-28-41).

AG 580 (5-22-41) to Ch/AC (5-27-41) Under study.

Projects will be ready for mailing this week.

Memo to Ch/Staff
 WPD 2550-22 (6-10-41)

The above projects were summarized in radio and letter to General Marshall 2 May 1941 (AG 600.12 (6-10-41)). The radio also included request for a blanket allotment of \$10,000,000 to cover immediate needs of this department for fortifications, bombproofs, and other construction.

[29]

Information furnished by: 9th Ind (1-25-41) AG 662.1 (10-7-40) 5th Ind (4-2-41) AG 662.1 (2-6-41) 4th Ind (4-3-41) AG 662.1 (2-4-41) 1st Ind (4-17-41) AG 662.1 (2-4-41) 1st Ind (5-12-41) AG 662.1 (2-4-41) 4th Ind (5-22-41) AG 662.1 (2-4-41) 5th Ind (5-9-41) AG 611 (11-8-40) 4th Ind (6-41) AG 662.1 (4-14-41) Copy of 3d Ind (5-15-41) AG 633.5 (4-17-41) will be sent to Haw Dept (G-4 - Capt Horton). Advised by 8th Ind (5-12-41) AG 662.1 (2-5-41) re funds for QM gas storage.

5th Ind (5-9-41) to AG 611 Haw (11-8-40) informed of status of funds. \$50,000 for roads and \$300,000 for RR in FY 1942 (SCD). \$900,000 for roads in FY 1943. Will be allotted when available.

By 1st Ind (4-16-41) to AG 600.12 (3-17-41) the WD requested justification of additional funds. No reply to date but \$613,000 tentatively included in FY 1943 Est. to complete project.

AG 600.12 (4-4-41) Under study—G-4

Action, based on approved Memo Ch/Staff (WPD 4483 (5-13-41), taken by 4th Ind (5-31-41) to AG 600.12 (2-9-41).

b. Bombproof Construction.

(1) The various bombproof projects which were submitted to the War Department in February have been answered either directly or indirectly but no definite statement has been received as to the funds which will be available for the construction of the approved projects. General Marshall has stated that funds in the amount of \$3,000,000.00 have been tentatively set up for the bombproofing requirements in this department but what proportion, if any, of this money is earmarked for the casemating of the major caliber seacoast batteries is not known.

c. Roads and Trails.

(1) The last revision of the military roads and trails program was returned to the War Department by 4th Indorsement dated 4 April 1941 requesting immediate release of funds in the amount of \$1,249,620 for the construction of necessary roads, trails and railroads. Information has been received that \$300,000 is included in 1942 estimates for the construction of the railroad items of the program but there has been no release of or information on funds for the remainder of the items.

d. Ammunition Storage.

(1) Final estimates for the magazine construction at Schofield Barracks were submitted to the War Department 17 March 1941 with a request for funds in the amount of \$1,203,900. Last War Department advice has been that \$937,000 has been included in the 1942 estimates for Schofield Barracks and Aliamanu magazines. This amount is inadequate by approximately \$600,000 (\$287,000 for Schofield Barracks and \$335,000 for Aliamanu).

(2) Hickam Field. Letter submitted 4 April 1941 requested funds in the amount of \$148,600 to complete igloo magazine construction at Hickam Field for the storage of bombs.

e. Bunkering for airplanes.

(1) Letter submitted 19 February requested funds in the amount of \$1,565,600 for the construction of bunkers for the pursuit and bombardment planes at Wheeler and Hickam Fields respectively.

[30]

Action by 4th Ind (6-9-41) AG 600.12 (4-5-41)

Action by 4th Ind (5-20-41) to AG 600.12 (4-5-41)

Action by 4th Ind (6-6-41) to AG 600.12 (3-22-41)

No record of request.

Priority on cable delivery has been given Haw. Dept. Cable will be sent as rapidly as procured. Signal Officer, Haw. Dept, being so notified. (Ch SO—Maj Lanahan)

7. Mobilization Housing.

(1) Letter submitted 5 April 1941 requested funds in the amount of \$250,000 for the purchase of kitchen equipment for the approved mobilization housing program at Hickam and Wheeler Fields.

(2) Letter submitted 5 April 1941 requesting funds in the amount of \$170,000 for the construction of the Headquarters Building for the Hawaiian Air Force.

(3) Letter submitted 22 March 1941 requesting funds in the amount of \$113,500 for the construction of 5 warehouses and 1 theatre at Hickam and Wheeler Fields.

(4) In addition to the foregoing, the District Engineer is submitting this data to this headquarters his final estimate for the additional funds required to complete the present authorized mobilization construction program at Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields. The additional funds required are \$1,256,647, and should be asked for immediately.

Signal

1. *Cable.* All cable for Command and Fire Control Cable System Projects now on hand will be installed by 31 July, 1941, with the exception of that for Project SCD-1120, Mail to Station "U". 100 pair cable for projects SCD-1115, 1116, 1117, 1119 and 200 pair cable for Project SCD-1118 will not be shipped until after 1 September, 1941. Shipment of conduit and part of 100 pair lead covered cable for Project SCD-1128 has been promised for 1 July 1941. This will permit the installation of the conduit and manhole system on SCD-1126 between 1 July and the arrival of cable for the other projects. However, this work will not be sufficient to keep our trained crews working during that period. Shortage of labor and higher wages in other governmental departments and in contract work will result in our men going to other work if forced to lay off due to lack of cable. All possible steps should be taken to advance the delivery date of part of the 100 or 200 pair cable now on order so that our construction force can be kept intact.

[31]

Issue automatic. CG Haw Dept being so informed. (Ch SO—Maj Lanahan)

Signal Off., Haw Dept. being furnished information requested.
(Ch SO—Maj Lanahan)

2. *Teletype Machines.* The Hawaiian Air Force has a dire need for more teletype machines. Information is requested as to whether the teletype equipment now authorized on the TBA for aviation units in this Department will be issued automatically or whether requisitions should be submitted. A tabulation based on the aviation unit now stationed in Hawaiian Department indicates that the following are authorized on TBA:

| | |
|-----------------------------|----|
| Perforators | 32 |
| Model 15 WX | 6 |
| Model 15 Standard | 18 |
| Model 19 | 16 |
| Reperforator | 32 |
| Switchboard Teletype 6 Line | 20 |

It is noted in TBA that the peacetime allotment of the last item is by rental only. If this is to be issued automatically, information is requested in what quantities and at what intervals it will be shipped.

3. *Schofield Barracks Telephone Exchange.*

Present condition of this telephone exchange is such that it is impossible to give good communications. A new telephone exchange is absolutely essential. A project for this purpose is in Washington at the present time. Information is desired as to when this project will be approved and whether it would be possible to place this exchange in a bombproof shelter to provide adequate protection at all times so that it will work for both administrative and tactical purposes. Authority to bombproof Hut Y, which is adjacent to the Schofield Telephone Exchange has been received and the work is to start in the near future. Hut Y is so designed that at a later date the new Schofield Exchange could be placed adjacent to it and bombproofed, without any additional changes to Hut Y other than cutting through of two doors. In the project for the Schofield Barracks Exchange, \$40,000.00 was requested for a new building. That amount with an additional \$25,000.00 would provide a building underground and properly bombproofed. The combination of these two units in bombproof shelter is considered highly desirable.

Project requires Congressional approval. \$303,300 included in Req. Est FY 1942 eliminated by Bureau of Budget. Hem now in Tent. Est FY 1943. Ch/SO asking for earlier consideration. CG Haw Dept will be informed. (Ch/SO—Maj Lanahan)

[32]

4. Data re current personnel needs for Signal Corps.
a. Signal Div 450 11 15, 1 Nov 1940, comprising 114 Co Com-

[32]

See para. e below.

Action by radio (6-9-41)

Officers being procured by WD and Corps Areas as rapidly as possible.

No record of request. Xth Sig Bn eliminated from authorized War Reinforcements on recommendation CG Haw Dept (AG 320.2, 11-4-40).

See remark para. d above.

4. *Data re urgent personnel needs for Signal Corps.*

a. Signal Bn T/O 11-15, 1 Nov 1940, comprising Hq. Co—construction and operations Companies.

b. Two (2) sections of Signal Depot Company, T/O 11-107, 11/1/40, (1 Section—Repair—1 Section—Storage and Issue.)

c. Commissioned personnel for Hawaiian Air Force. Signal Corps activities on duty with Hawaiian Air Force are short 10 Reserve officers. Radio to TAG transmitted a week or ten days ago requesting they be furnished prior to June.

d. Short 14 Reserve officers for Signal Corps activities *other than those with A. C.* Request has been submitted to War Department requesting them.

e. Action now being initiated requesting authority to activate the following units and to increase the 9th Signal Service Co. from 230 men to 320.

1 Signal Bn.

1 Signal Depot Co. (2 Sections only)

The most urgent commissioned personnel problem at present is to bring the HAF Signal Corps officers up to full strength of 20. They are urgently in need of at least 5 Captains to command their Company units, consisting of:

307 Sig. Co. Air Wing—W. F.

324 Sig. Co. Air Wing—H. F.

328 Sig. Co. AWN H. F.

53 Sig Mtc Co.

The enlisted men and units, etc., are urgently required and are essential to facilitate the installation-operation and maintenance of wire and radio communications systems and the Command and Fire Control cable system, and to take care of the additional abnormal load placed on all Signal Corps activities due to current emergency.

Food.

1. At the present time the only War Department project in which this Department is primarily interested is the effort being made through the Governor's committee (Mr. H. H. Warner and Mr. Richard Kimball) in Washington for the purchase by the Emergency Procurement Management of Supplies of essential food such as:

[33]

Letter S/W to Mr. Chester C. Davis, Advisory Commission to Council of National Defense, April 10, 1941, endorsed plan for stockpile of foodstuffs in Haw Dept. (WPD 3915-12, 4-10-41)

Rice,
Wheat flour and products,
Canned Milk
Fats and Oils,

and their shipment without delay as emergency food supplies to Hawaii. At the present time it appears that Mr. Warner has been successful in making arrangements for the purchase of two million dollars worth of this food through the office of the Emergency Procurement Management. The thing which is holding up the project is the lack of storage warehouses here.

The War Department is apparently ready to certify that this storage is necessary as an emergency defense measure if any private interests here will undertake to put up the necessary warehouses under a plan to amortize the entire cost of the warehouses in five years.

At present the Hawaiian Pineapple Company is considering the project but apparently is holding back on final arrangements because the Government will retain an equity in the property equal to the rent paid. Until this obstacle can be overcome the project is still in the air.

2. It is believed that the War Department recognizes the storage of emergency food supplies here as of paramount importance. It is only necessary that the various governmental agencies concerned in the project be kept informed from time to time of the War Department's interest in the subject.

/s/ Walter C. Short

WALTER C. SHORT,

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

Also to be added to Engineer List, Project for Anti-Sabotage Protection submitted by letter 15 May requesting funds in the amount of \$240,000 for installation of protective fences and other guards against sabotage.

AG 600.12 (5-15-41) Under Study—C-4

[34]

No record of request.

None available at present.

Rec'd—W. P. D. May 27, 1941

Facilities for bathing, cooking; toilet facilities, mess halls, etc., for camps for convalescents and evacuation for women and children to be developed at regimental recreation camps in time of peace, so that they may be maintained for future use: \$100,000.

(In handwriting) 90 mm AA guns are necessary for defense of Pearl Harbor.

[344]

A. ARMY

Morse Field: 1 paved runway 3,400' long, 300' wide, Gasoline storage 450,000 gallons, construction for 2 bombardment squadrons, total estimated cost \$1,687,530.00.

Belows Field, Oahu:

1 runway 300' wide, 3,400' long.
1 runway 50.0' long, 300' wide.
Buildings, 4
1 night bombardment squadron
1 observation squadron
1 pursuit squadron
Gasoline storage, aqua system, 600,000 gallons.
Cost, \$2,542,900.00

New Pursuit Field: 3 runways each 5000' long, paved width 200', gasoline storage of 900,000 gal. aqua system, housing facilities for 1 pursuit group, cost if land is leased \$4,668,950.00, if land is purchased \$4,938,950.00

Parker Ranch, Hawaii: 3 runways 5000' long, 200' wide, gasoline storage for 300,000 gallons, housing and facilities for 1 bombardment group, estimated cost \$1,992,600.00

Lanai Airport: 2 runways each 5000' long, paved width 300', gasoline storage 200,000 gallons, housing and facilities for 1 pursuit squadron, estimated cost \$1,990,000.00

Barking Sands: 2 runways 5000' long, 200' wide, housing and facilities for 2 bombardment squadrons, gasoline storage for 450,000 gallons, estimated cost \$1,772,220.00

B. Following fields to be improved by Civil Aeronautics Authority. Army construction necessary for housing and other facilities

Molokai: 1 runway 31000' long, 200' wide; 1 runway 4200' long, 200' wide. gasoline storage 350,000 gallons, buildings and facilities for 1 pursuit squadron, estimated cost \$407,600.00

Hilo Airport: 3 runways each 200' wide respectively 3000', 4000' and 4500' long. gasoline storage for 450,000 gallons, housing and facilities for 1 bombardment squadron, estimated cost \$670,140.00

Burn Field: 2 runways 200' wide, 3200 and 2600 feet long, storage for 200,000 gallons gasoline, housing and facilities for 1 heavy reconnaissance squadron, estimated cost \$640,000.00

C. ARMY

Haleiwa Airport: Flying condition to be improved as follows: Construction 1 runway 4000' by 300', installation of 100,000 gallons gasoline storage, no housing facilities except for small permanent detachment, estimated cost \$450,000.00.

Housing for 1 company of National Guard to be provided at all airports except Hilo where 2 companies will be housed and excepting Haleiwa where none will be built.

[35]

MAY 29, 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I know that you will not have time to look over a detailed account of our recent maneuvers but feel that you might like to have a birds eye view of what we did and the purpose back of it.

The maneuver was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted of the air action and the actual issue of one days fire and of Engineer Supplies for Field Fortifications and of Engineer tools. During the air phase our bombers acted under navy command in cooperation with the Naval Patrol Squadrons and actually located and bombed airplane carriers 250 miles out at sea. The movement of the carrier was entirely free so that the navy patrol planes had the mission of locating the ship and notifying our bombers and they then made the attack. Pursuit attacked enemy bombers represented by naval planes and our own bombers when they came in to attack ground defenses. Upon receipt of the warning for this phase our bombers were sent to fields on outlying islands

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and pursuit planes were dispersed. The Navy cooperated very fully during this phase and I believe we learned more about the coordination of Army Air Force, Navy Air Force and Antiaircraft than we had during any previous exercise.

Ammunition and engineer supplies had never been actually issued before and we got considerable data in regard to the time and transportation required to complete the issue.

The second phase consisted of the completion of our plans and the organization of the ground, including the construction of Field Fortifications. Naturally this work should have been completed before any warning of enemy landing was received. However, it would have been impossible to actually construct field fortifications until we got authority for the leasing of the ground. Cost of leasing of the ground is going to be extremely low. The whole command dug diligently upon them day and night. We accomplished a very great deal and I believe shall be able to complete all necessary field fortifications soon after July 1st. Fifty-five bunkers for pursuit planes were actually constructed at Wheeler Field. To my mind the construction of the field fortifications are extremely important since our plans are so intimately tied in with the organization of the ground. My theory of the defense of Hawaii is based upon the following:

1. Complete organization of the ground at all important points.
2. Holding of the most important field fortifications lightly.
3. Holding of large mobile reserves centrally located with sufficient motor transportation to move all reserves at once if necessary.

[36] 4. Detailed plans for the employment of reserves with complete reconnaissance and reserves actually rehearsed in carrying out of the plans.

5. All troops to be highly trained in delaying action and counterattack.

We have received enough of our new transportation so that with proper planning I am convinced that we can move all of our reserves. With the completion of our field fortifications we shall make small changes in our plan so as to make more reserves available.

Third phase, the maneuver proper—Repelling of a Serious Attack. The situation was based on the theory that a serious enemy attack against Oahu would be possible only under the following conditions:

Our fleet would be either absent or very greatly inferior.

Our air force would be destroyed or very greatly inferior.

Five enemy landings were made. The Navy furnished ships to simulate enemy transports and enemy naval ships. They did not make actual landings as the Marines were not available at that time. The 27th Infantry was employed to represent the enemy, being sent to landing places by train and motors. Landings were made at widely dispersed places on the island. The situation was developed so that our forces were rather widely dispersed in driving off the four minor landings and had to be moved rapidly for a general counter-attack when the main enemy threat developed. The situation was built up by the destruction of our large guns so that the Harbor Defense troops in the later phase of the exercise manned 3" and 6" secondary armament which are not normally manned on account of the lack of personnel. In the final phase the Harbor Defense troops were required to take over one sector of beach defense to release Infantry for the main attack. Likewise air personnel which were available through almost complete destruction of our planes were used for anti-sabotage work and finally to take over a short sector of beach defense. 155-mm guns and Antiaircraft batteries were moved from their usual positions and missions and acted as Army artillery in support of the main attack.

I feel that we put across the necessity for organization of the ground and for mobility. Some time later we expected to have a maneuver without any warning whatever to the troops. But will wait until after the organization of our air defense command, the construction of division, wing and air defense C. P.'s, which have been authorized, and probably for the completion of the 13 weeks training of the selectees which will be called on July 1st.

I am sending under separate cover a few photographs of field fortifications.

Very sincerely,

/s/ Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT.

[37]

JULY 3, 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

MY DEAR SHORT: I have examined the proposal outlined in your letter of June 7th concerning the establishment of a training camp in the Koolaus Mountains which could be used as a convalescent and recreational center, and possibly as an evacuation area.

With funds at hand or in sight we are having difficulty in satisfying requirements for troops less fortunately situated with respect to recreational and training facilities. The proximity of the mountains to Schofield Barracks and the ideal recreational facilities of the beaches on Oahu place your project relatively in priority. Consequently, I believe that favorable consideration of your request must be declined.

The official communication is being returned to your headquarters through regular channels.

Faithfully yours,

[stamped] (Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

[38]

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.,
 July 11, 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
*Chief of Staff of the Army,
 War Department, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: On April 14th I submitted a letter recommending the establishment of a new air field between Kipapa and Waikakalua gulches on the Island of Oahu. This field is more important to us than any of the other fields recommended as they were on outlying islands. This field was selected after a very thorough search of the whole island on the part of the Air Corps. General Martin considers it the only suitable place on the Island of Oahu. I agree with him fully. On July 4th I received a wire from the War Department stating that this site for the field was not approved and recommending the reconsideration of Kahuku Point. On July 7th I replied to the wire stating that I considered Kahuku Point impossible from a tactical point of view owing to the fact that it had practically no protection from Harbor Defenses and would be subject to raids by small landing parties. This data I forwarded to the Adjutant General a complete study of all air fields considered, with a map showing existing Army and Navy Fields, as well as those considered and discarded. I am enclosing copies of all the correspondence, as well as a copy of the map, in order that it may be immediately available to you. I consider it important that we get a decision on this matter at the earliest practical moment since General Martin tells me that planes for the 15th Group may arrive at almost any time.

I am afraid that someone in the Office of the Chief of Air Corps who has been out here is considering Kahuku Point purely from the point of view of technical flying and is giving no consideration whatsoever to its tactical location. I would not bother you with this unless I felt that it was a matter of prime importance.

Very sincerely,

/s/ Walter C. Short
 WALTER C. SHORT.

[39]

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.,
 25 July 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
*Chief of Staff of the Army,
 War Department, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: Continuing our cooperation with the Navy I have arranged with Admiral Kimmel to have all Navy air fields on Hawaii and outlying islands extended wherever possible so as to provide for landing of B-17s. With very few exceptions this is going to be practicable.

I am enclosing copies of Admiral Kimmel's instructions on this matter and also copies of our orders and Naval orders to effect the use of Navy fields by Army planes and Army fields by Navy planes. The matter is a little more simple from the point of view of the Army than the Navy inasmuch as we can use their bombs but our bombs cannot be used by the Navy without an additional attachment.

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We are now experimenting to see if we can manufacture locally such an attachment. When the fields are completed at Midway, Wake, Palmyra and Johnston I think it will perhaps be a good idea to send a squadron of B-17s to each island. I am sure that we can arrange with Admiral Kimmel for the stationing of destroyers to guarantee the safety of the flight.

Tomorrow we are carrying out an attack exercise with tanks, infantry and artillery, supported by thirty-four Navy Dive Bombers. It is the first time I have had an opportunity to see the use of dive bombers directly in support of ground troops and I think this is perhaps true of all the officers here. I am giving an opportunity to as great a number of officers as possible to see this exercise.

Very sincerely,

/s/ Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT.

[40]

8-19-41

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR GENERAL SHORT: Your letter of July 11, has been received recommending the selection of Kipapa Field rather than the Kahuku Point Field as a base for the 15th Pursuit Group. The advantages and disadvantages of each site have been considered. As a result, I feel that the advantages of the Kahuku Point Field outweigh those of the Kipapa Field sufficiently to result in my decision to establish the base on Kahuku Point.

The following factors are among those having a bearing upon my decision:

a. Low clouds and ground mist frequently obtain over the Wheeler Field—Kipapa area, while at the same time on the north shore of Oahu visibility conditions are good. It is believed tactically unsound to place two pursuit groups in an area subject to the same adverse weather conditions. Pursuit operations in defense of Oahu would be seriously hampered during such weather conditions. Selection of the Kahuku Point site places one group in a location where relatively favorable weather may exist when the reverse is true in the Kipapa area.

b. The close proximity of two Army and two Navy air bases in the Schofield Barracks—Pearl Harbor area has resulted in a situation under present conditions which necessitates continuous coordination and control of air traffic in the interests of safety. The addition of a fifth air base in this area will appreciably aggravate this situation.

I feel sure that the Naval authorities comprehend fully the importance of adequate air defense of the Oahu Naval Installation and [41] accordingly, will entertain favorably any proposal which will implement the efficiency of such defense. I hope, therefore, that they will be agreeable to our proposal to establish an air base at Kahuku Point to the extent of releasing any claim they may have previously established to any part of the area involved.

With best personal regards,

Faithfully yours,

[Stamped] (Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff.

[42]

OCTOBER 10, 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, Hawaii.

DEAR GENERAL SHORT: The mimeographed standard operating procedure for the Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, has just come to my attention and I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units. For instance, the Hawaiian Air Force, among other things, is assigned the mission of defending Schofield Barracks and all air fields on Oahu against sabotage and ground attacks; and with providing a provisional battalion of 500 men for military police duty.

This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in Hawaii, particularly in view of the fact that only minimum operating and maintenance personnel have been provided. As a matter of fact, we are now in process of testing the organization of airbase defense battalions, consisting tentatively of a rifle company and two antiaircraft batteries, designed for the specific pur-

pose of relieving the air maintenance people from ground missions of this kind at locations where there are no large garrisons for ground defense, as there are in Hawaii.

I wish you would give this your personal consideration.

Faithfully yours,

[Stamped] (Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

[43]

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.,
October 14, 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I have your letter of October 10th with reference to the use of men of the Air Force on other than strictly air duties. At the time our tentative Standing Operating Procedure was put out the Air Corps had 7,220 men. Full Combat details and all overhead required only 3,835 men for the planes and organizations actually on hand. This left a surplus of 3,344 men with no assigned duties during Maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the assignment was to give these men something to do during the Maneuvers. Another reason was the belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground attack of Oahu could come only after destruction of our Air Forces. The fact that our planes had been destroyed would not mean that all the men had been put out of action. It is probable that several thousand men would still be left and it would not look plausible to have them sit down and do nothing while Infantrymen were detailed to protect them and their air fields. The training after the first two weeks takes up only about four hours per month of their time. It seems to me that they should continue to be trained as Rifleman in the immediate defense of air fields. As regards their use as Military Police that was not correct. The plan was to use them for guarding certain essential utilities, which did not require team training. However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has just passed the Home Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon. They will be able to take over guarding of all essential utilities, highway bridges, railroad bridges, etc.

If it is not desired to train Air Corps men for their own protection and for the final defense of the air fields I would like to be so advised.

Very sincerely

/s/ Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT.

[44]

OCTOBER 28, 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR SHORT: With reference to your letter of October 14, I can understand your motives in giving ground defense training to Air Corps personnel which at present are excess for the equipment provided. However, the present rate of expansion of the Air Force is such that they are having considerable difficulty in obtaining experienced maintenance men and it is important that they be permitted to concentrate on the technical training of all potential mechanics, regardless of available equipment. Also, it is equally important that they utilize all available time on this specialized training and the men not be left without assigned duties particularly during the maneuver period.

I suggest that you prepare a separate phase of your alert plan based on the assumption that the Air Force has been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. This plan could provide for the use of the necessary Air Corps personnel for ground defense and afford a means of indoctrinating them in ground defense tactics. It should, however, for the present at least, be subordinated to their own specific training requirements.

It would appear that the best policy would be to allow them to concentrate on technical Air Corps training until they have completed their expansion program and [45] have their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is concerned. War Department Training Circular 47, which was issued July 18, 1941, can be accepted as a guide except in extreme situation.

Faithfully yours,

/S/ G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

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EXHIBIT NO. 54

FEBRUARY 19, 1941.

NOTES ON GENERAL COUNCIL MEETING, 10:00 A. M., FEBRUARY 19, 1941

Present:

General G. C. Marshall, Chief of Staff
 Maj. Gen. Wm. Bryden, Deputy Chief of Staff
 Maj. Gen. R. C. Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff
 Chief of Infantry, General Lynch
 Chief of Cavalry, General Herr
 Chief of Field Artillery, General Danford
 Chief of Coast Artillery, General Green
 Chief of Air Corps, General Brett
 Chief of Engineer, General Kingman
 Chief Signal Officer, General Mauborgne
 The Adjutant General, General Adms
 The Inspector General, General Peterson
 The Judge Advocate General, General Gullion
 The Surgeon General, General Magee
 The Chief of Finance, General Loughry
 Chief of Ordnance, General Wesson
 The Quartermaster General, General Gregory
 Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, Gen. Baker
 Chief of Chaplains, Colonel Arnold
 Reserve Affairs, General Hester
 Exec. for Under Sec. of War, Gen. Burns
 GHQ—(Col. Hyssong represented Gen. McNair)
 Chief of National Guard Bureau, Gen. Williams
 A. C. of S., G-1, Gen. Shedd
 A. C. of S., G-2, Col. Smith (Act'g)
 A. C. of S., G-3, Col. Twaddle (Act'g)
 A. C. of S., G-4, Col. Meyer (Act'g)
 A. C. of S., WPD, Col. Anderson (Act'g)
 Colonel Orlando Ward, Secretary, General Staff.
 Subject: Defense Objectives (Revised Feb. 13, 1941)

To give you a further view of the special circumstances, we have been pressed by the Navy to provide more security for the Fleet that has been gathering at Manila. They have added one or two major vessels, old large cruisers, I believe. Some time back they added some modern submarines but there was not an AA gun to defend the Cavite anchorage. Not one. And that put Admiral Hart out there in a very embarrassing, if not careless, position, particularly as the Japanese were coming in with a new plane of remarkable speed, 360 mps and climbing ability and heavy gun armament, 6 guns, two of which are 20 mm. The planes out there are well under 300 (mi. per hour).

We have a very archaic plan in the Philippines at the present moment, and I have described the AA situation to Admiral Hart. Under those conditions we have abstracted 18 guns, gotten them out of organizations (very quietly) in order to get them out to the Philippines. That is no complete defense. It is only a very small fraction but it is something. It has the effect of boosting morale and of preventing the Japanese planes from just being contemptuous in their approach. Just as we got it arranged, the Navy wanted equipment for some battalions to go to Wake, Midway and another island where they have to have AA. They took 16 of the guns and left us with 2. We have no more deliveries until July, so all we can send out are 4 unless we take them away from troops, but that is a dilemma.

Out in Hawaii the Fleet is anchored but they have to be prepared against any surprise attack. I don't say any probable attack but they have to be prepared against a surprise attack from a trick ship or torpedo planes. Our whole Navy power in general is concentrated there; they can't cruise for next six months.

We are pretty well off in AA 3" guns out there; we are not so well off in the .50 caliber.

But when it came to planes, we only had 36, of which 19 could cruise 202 miles an hour, with only four guns, two .50's and two .30's. With the new Japanese

plane you can see the situation there. So we arranged to send 31 more P-36s to reinforce the 16. (Supposed to have 180.) The carrier is to come back on March 15 and then for the first time we give them the most modern plane—the P-40D, with six guns, two of which are .50 caliber speed 360 miles, leak-proof tanks and armor; not as rapid to climb as the Japanese plane. 50 of those will go on the 15th on the carrier from San Diego to Honolulu to safeguard the Fleet.

General Mauborgne said that another question has to do with change in priorities; these pursuit people can't work without their detectors and if the situation is such that you need guns for the protection of the Navy somewhere in Hawaii, that you are going to have change priorities and get some aircraft warning units mobilized.

Gen. Marshall said we are on that right now.

Gen. Moore said that we are making a complete study of that whole question on aircraft warning and also with reference to priorities and where we are going to establish this service first. The question came up in connection with the Alaskan aircraft warning service.

Gen. Marshall said that with reference to priorities, he had put the cards on the table with Admiral Stark and said, where do you want it. The protection of the Fleet is of major consideration. He said that Admiral Stark was quite embarrassed. When the next planes come out over and above the 50 mm. planes, it is a question of where they go, to Panama or the Philippine Islands. That will be up to the Navy. "I am going to allow them to practically dictate where those planes should go until we reach a certain degree of security." We haven't any modern medium bombers. They are just beginning to come off the line. The question is where do they go. That is a Navy decision, for the protection of the Fleet, and at the present time for the protection of our shores. "I don't think they want the first ones in Manila. They will probably say that they want them first in Hawaii. Then how many in Panama. The Navy can almost tell us. Those priorities will all have to be solved in terms of protection of the Navy in the immediate situation."

EXHIBIT NO. 55

CONFERENCE IN THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF AT 10:00 A. M., TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1941

Present: Chief of Staff, General Emmons, General Arnold, General Brett, General Spaatz, General Gerow, Colonel McNarney, Colonel Anderson, Colonel Twaddle.

CHIEF OF STAFF: In view of the Japanese situation the Navy is concerned with the security of the fleet in Hawaii, and apparently the new commander of the fleet there has made a check and reported it to Washington and the Secretary of the Navy has outlined the situation to the Secretary of War. Their particular point is the type of air force in Hawaii, particularly Pursuit. They are in the situation where they must guard against a surprise or trick attack. It is necessary for the fleet to be in anchorage part of the time and they are particularly vulnerable at that time. I do not feel that it is a possibility or even a probability, but they must guard against everything. We also have information regarding the possible use of torpedo planes. There is the possible sudden introduction of Japanese carrier-based planes of the Messerschmidt type which has a speed of 322 miles per hour, armored, etc. The Navy viewpoint is that the whole fleet is involved and that the sea power of the United States might be jeopardized. We have already arranged to send 31 P-36 ships there. The Curtis plant has moved up the delivery date of 50 additional planes to March 10th; the Navy is sending a Carrier back for these ships. The issue is the priority with regard to new equipment. Admiral Hart has six new submarines, one old cruiser, and not one AA gun. They have now brought up the question of moving some armament from Corregidor. The planes in the Philippines are of the Swedish type which the Chinese turned down. If we had a single squadron of modern planes in the Philippines, it would at least give the Japanese something to think about. Then we have the question of Panama—no modern planes. I understand that the P-40s have some engine trouble which makes them dangerous flying over water.

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Consequently, our original allocation will be changed by the Japanese situation. Also I have a memorandum with reference to a British request for 50,000 airplanes, to be delivered in 1942. We have a deficiency of 10,000 in organizing the 14,000 program. We are concerned with the reduction of the assignment to the GHQ Air Force. It was thought to our advantage to have as many as possible in foreign garrisons. I have just been talking about pursuit. We have started a proposition to fill up outlying garrisons, those close to home aren't so much of a problem.

Colonel ANDERSON. We have made a tentative allocation of planes as follows: *First priority:* to the Philippine Islands—one interceptor squadron, one medium bomber squadron. To Alaska—one composite group. To Hawaii and Panama—sufficient strength to meet a two-carrier attack. To Puerto Rico—one pursuit group and two bomber groups. *Second priority:* The equipment for an emergency force to South and Central America—three groups of heavy or medium bombers, two groups of light bombers, and two groups of intercept. *Third priority:* Remainder of the GHQ, minimum training requirements for the remainder of the 54 group program. We will complete training requirements before January 1942; will complete the 54 group in intercept pursuit in January 1942; fighter pursuit in July 1942; heavy bombers in April 1942; medium bombers in December 1941; light bombers in April 1942.

CHIEF OF STAFF. What do you think about this, Emmons?

GENERAL EMMONS. We have little means to accomplish our plans in GHQ Air Force. We are 850 officers short on the 25 group program and we won't get the shortage made up until July, then we will only have graduates of training centers. If we make the normal assignments to staff echelons, we will have less than 100 officers with 2 years service to distribute over 34 groups. With respect to planes, we have 500 combat types for instance. With regard to the P-36 we had to get 31 to send to Hawaii, it took all we had (71) to get the 31 out, due to repairs, ships on the ground, etc. The backbone of our present airplane strength is the B-18 of which we have 140. Of the 193 P-40s we now have only 175, many are out of commission for lack of spare parts. We have 50 B-17s, also 4 P-39s and 5 A-20As. We are also short of spare parts. Although we have on paper about 500 planes, I doubt that we could put 300 in the air.

General ARNOLD. The 25 group program is supposed to be completed by July 1941; the 54 group by April 1942.

General EMMONS. With regard to sending equipment on foreign service it would be a mistake to send new planes over-seas until the defects inherent with new materiel have been ironed out. We have changes on the 50 P-40Bs to go to Hawaii, probably won't make much difference except with the engine.

General BRETT. The engine is improving all the time. The P-40D has a new engine.

CHIEF OF STAFF. How about the Air Depot in Hawaii?

General EMMONS. It functions very well.

General ARNOLD. With regard to this shortage of parts, we are going to have to manufacture parts in the depots—we used to do it before.

General BRETT. The shortage in parts is due to the fact that we have pushed the plane manufacturers so far the planes that they have been forced to neglect, in a measure, the production of spare parts.

General EMMONS. With regard to organization equipment, we are in pretty good shape. The only shortage is in cameras and octants. With regard to the allocation, I don't know what to say. With regard to a tactical point, Hawaii has a peculiar situation—pursuit is of little value at night, at which time—due to phosphorescence in the water—primary targets, dry-docks, the fleet, etc., stand out on the darkest night. They will have no warning service until they get detectors and pursuit would be useless. I would have long range bombers and not send pursuit, but bombers.

Conference adjourned.

[1]

EXHIBIT NO. 56

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
WAR PLANS DIVISION,

Washington, D. C., May 13, 1941.

AG 600.12 (2-19-41)

WPD 4483

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department.

I. DISCUSSION

1. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, recommends (Tab A) that \$1,565,600 be allotted his department as soon as possible to initiate the installation of dispersed protective bunkers for 263 pursuit ships and 95 bombers at Wheeler and Hickam Fields. The Chief of Engineers concurs (Tab B) in the principle of providing such protection and recommends an initial allotment of \$1,000,000 with a view to providing necessary balances when costs are more fully determined.

2. The Chief of the Air Corps urges (Tab C) the construction of similar protective bunkers, to include gas proofing and bombproof shelters for crews, for 170 pursuit ships and 83 bombers, these being the total number of airplanes presently visualized as an attainable objective in Hawaii within a reasonable time. The gas proofing visualized consists of an impregnated covering provided with collective protector units to keep out gas. He states that such revetments should be located at the "battle stations" of airplanes dispersed at present and projected airdromes in the Hawaiian Islands. He recommends that \$1,955,000 for the construction of gas proof revetments in the Hawaiian Islands be included in estimates now being prepared pending receipt and approval of estimates revised to include gas proofing for 253 airplanes.

3. War Plans Division believes:

a. That the danger of sustained air attack against air fields in Hawaii from carrier based aviation is not serious. On the other hand, the relatively small sum required per airplane to provide protection against bomb attack is undoubtedly justified in any locality where heavy air attacks are envisaged.

b. That gas attacks against air fields in the Hawaiian Islands are not probable and, if encountered, reasonable protection can be secured through the medium of impregnated clothing and gas masks. Accordingly, the gas proofing of revetments as proposed by the Chief of the Air Corps is not concurred in.

c. That the construction of splinter-proof shelters within the walls of the revetment for the protection of crews against splinters will be relatively inexpensive and should be a standard item of construction where revetments are to be built. Bombproof shelters for individuals in battle positions are not believed justified.

II. ACTION RECOMMENDED

1. That the construction of revetments in the Hawaiian Department for 70 four engine bombardment, 13 light bombardment and 170 pursuit airplanes be approved.

2. That the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, be directed to submit revised estimates covering the construction of these revetments incorporating splinter-proof shelters for the plane crews.

3. That the Chief of the Air Corps be authorized to include funds in the amount of \$1,358,000 for this purpose in the next estimates to be prepared, subject to correction in amount on receipt of revised estimates from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

4. That, if approved, these papers be returned to War Plans Division for further necessary action.

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III. CONCURRENCE

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/s/ Harry J. Malony
HARRY J. MALONY,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

Incls

AG 600.12 (2-19-41) w/3 inds. and 2 incls (as listed on 3d Ind.)

Memo, 4-29-41, to ACofS., WPD from C/AC.

MAY 21 1941

Approved

By order of the Secretary of War

R. C. MOORE,
Deputy Chief of Staff.
(Sgd) W. T. Sexton
by W. T. SEXTON,
Maj., G. S. C., Asst. Sec. W. D. G. S.

NOTED—Deputy Chief of Staff W. T. S.

EXHIBIT NO. 57

MAY 19, 1941.

CONFERENCE IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, MAY 19, 1941

Present:

The Secretary of War—Mr. Stimson,
The Under Secretary of War—Judge Patterson,
The Assistant Secretary of War—Mr. McCloy,
The Assistant Secretary of War for Air—Mr. Lovett,
The Chief of Staff—General Marshall,
The Deputy Chiefs of Staff—General Bryden; General Moore; General Arnold,
The Secretary, General Staff—Colonel Ward.

* * * * *

Subject: Martinique.

General MARSHALL: In the light of statements made in the Sunday papers with reference to Dakar and Martinique, I had the plans checked immediately. The plan provides for 2,800 Marines, with the necessary landing equipment to make the initial landing, followed by the 1st Division. The Marines have the necessary landing equipment for their troops. They will be opposed by 4,000 to 5,000, 50% effective, troops. About 50 officers of the Martinique garrison will fight, including the Admiral. The G-3 of the force is very pro-American. The French cruiser in Martinique is a first class cruiser ship with a top speed of 40 knots.

The Secretary of War asked whether she was in good condition, and was informed that she was.

General Marshall indicated that it would take about ten days for the Navy to get boats for the 1st Division. He further indicated that it was primarily a Naval mission, but that Army Air should participate, both for the help it could give and the experience it would gain. He indicated that the B-18's in Puerto Rico would be staged at St. Croix. Puerto Rico is almost 400 miles from Martinique.

General Marshall then indicated that there were now in the United States 14 B-17's of the most modern type which he thought should not be sent out of the country in view of the current situation. These had been withheld from the Hawaiian Department contingent.

The Secretary of War asked if this would affect the impregnability of Hawaii.

General Marshall said that it would not. He further said that we need some B-17's (but not of the most modern type) in Panama, and that he is recommending that 9 be sent there. This matter is under consideration.

General ARNOLD. There are now available 50 B-17's without leak-proof tanks and without armor.

General MARSHALL. High bombing is possible in the Caribbean area, due to weather conditions, and these ships without leak-proof tanks could be effectively used there.

EXHIBIT NO. 58

CONTENTS

1. List taken from President Roosevelt's appointment book specifying his engagements with the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, General Marshall and Admiral Stark, for period October 1 to December 7, 1941.
2. Telephone calls made from outside through White House switchboard on December 6, 1941, and December 7, 1941, as compiled from operators' notes available.
3. List of dinner guests at White House Saturday evening, December 6, 1941.
4. List showing the President's appointments Saturday, December 6, 1941.
5. List showing the President's appointments Sunday, December 7, 1941.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S ENGAGEMENTS WITH THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, WAR AND NAVY, GENERAL MARSHALL AND ADMIRAL STARK—OCTOBER 1st TO DECEMBER 7, 1941

1941

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| <i>October 7th—1 P. M.</i> | Admiral Stark and Harry Hopkins. |
| (lunch) | |
| <i>October 7th—2.15 P. M.</i> | Secretary Knox. |
| <i>October 9th—2.30 P. M.</i> | The Secretary of War, General Marshall, General Lewis B. Hershey and Dr. Leonard G. Row-tree. |
| <i>October 14th—3.40 P. M.</i> | The Secretary of State. |
| <i>October 16th—12 noon</i> | The Secretary of State. |
| <i>October 16th—2 P. M.</i> | The Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, General George C. Marshall, Admiral Harold R. Stark and Hon. Harry Hopkins. |
| <i>October 21st—10 A. M.</i> | Secretary Hull, The Vice President, Senator Alben W. Barkley, Senator Tom Connally, Speaker Rayburn and Congressman John W. McCormack. |
| <i>October 22nd—2 P. M.</i> | The Secretary of the Navy. |
| <i>October 29th—3 P. M.</i> | Secretary Hull. |
| <i>October 31st—1.15 P. M.</i> | Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox. |
| <i>November 6th—11.15 A. M.</i> | The Secretary of War. |
| <i>November 7th—12 noon</i> | The Secretary of War. |
| <i>November 10th—12 noon</i> | Secretary Hull and French Ambassador. |
| <i>November 13th—11.45 A. M.</i> | Secretary Hull. |
| <i>November 15th—11.30 A. M.</i> | The Secretary of War, General Robert C. Richardson. |
| <i>November 15th—12.15 P. M.</i> | Director Harold Smith, General Marshall, General Brown, Mr. Blandford. |
| <i>November 17th—11 A. M.</i> | Secretary Hull, The Japanese Ambassador, Hon. Saburo Kuruasu. |
| [2] | |
| <i>November 24th 4.15 P. M.</i> | The Secretary of the Navy. |
| <i>November 25th 12.15 P. M.</i> | The Secretary of State, The Secretary of War, The Secretary of the Navy, General George C. Marshall, Admiral Harold R. Stark. |
| <i>November 27th 2.20 P. M.</i> | Secretary Hull. |
| <i>November 27th 2.30 P. M.</i> | Secretary Hull, Japanese Ambassador (Nomura), Hon. Saburo Kuruasu. |
| <i>November 27th 3.45 P. M.</i> | Admiral Ernest J. King. |
| <i>November 28th 12 noon</i> | The Secretary of State, The Secretary of War, The Secretary of the Navy, General Marshall, Admiral Stark. |
| <i>December 1st 11.45 A. M.</i> | Secretary Hull, Admiral Stark. |
| <i>December 2nd 12 noon</i> | The Secretary of War, The Secretary of the Navy, The Under Secretary of State. |
| <i>December 4th 2.15 P. M.</i> | The Secretary of the Navy. |
| <i>December 4th 3.30 P. M.</i> | The Secretary of State. |
| <i>December 5th 1 P. M.</i> | Secretary Hull (Lunch). |
| <i>December 5th 2 P. M.</i> | Cabinet. |
| <i>December 7th 3 P. M.</i> | Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, Hon. Harry Hopkins, General George C. Marshall, Secretary Hull. |

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TELEPHONE CALLS MADE FROM OUTSIDE THROUGH WHITE HOUSE SWITCHBOARD ON
12/6/41 AND 12/7/41 AS COMPILED FROM OPERATOR'S NOTES AVAILABLE

Dec. 6

920a Mr. Stettinius cld Mr. McCloy—OK.
925a Secy Knox cld Sumner Welles—OK.
930a Secy Knox cld Jesse Jones—in NYC—nm.
931a Secy Knox cld PMG—OK.
955a Secy Stimson cld AG—lwc—ok 1000a
1030a Secy Knox cld Secy Stimson—OK.
1030a Mr. Stettinius cld James Roosevelt—OK.
1047a Secy Knox cld Secy Hull—lwc—OK 1050a
1045a Secy Knox cld Bob Hinckley—OK.
1100a James Forrestal cld Secy Knox—OK.
1138a Mr. Stettinius cld Mr. Forrestal—OK.
1150a Secy Stimson cld Secy Hull—OK.
1201p Secy Hull cld Ad'm Stark—OK.
1201p Wayne Coy cld Dir. Smith—lwc—of 1225p
1205p Ad'm Stark cld Gen. Marshall—OK.
1258p Secy Stimson cld Secy Hull—lwc—OK 1259p.
100p Ed. Stettinius cld Dean Acheson—OK.
105p Ad'm Stark cld Gen. Marshall—OK.
109p Ad'm Stark cld Secy Hull—OK.
333p Wayne Coy cld AG—lwc—OK 338p.
830p Secy Knox cld Secy Stimson—OK.
845p Secy Knox cld Secy Hull—OK.
847p Secy Knox cld Secy Stimson—OK.
850p Secy Navy cld Oprns WD—OK.

Dec. 7.

1044a Secy Knox cld Ad'm Stark—OK.
1140a Gen. Marshall cld Ad'm Stark—OK.
1130a Gen. Marshall cld Ad'm Stark—OK.
1138a Secy Knox cld Ad'm Stark—OK.
1210p Ad'm Stark cld Gen. Marshall—OK.
1229p Ad'm Stark cld Gen. Marshall—OK.
119p Secy Knox cld Ad'm Stark—OK.
201p Ad'm Stark cld Gen. Marshall—OK.
205p Ad'm Stark cld Secy Hull—busy—OK 215p
210p Ad'm Stark cld Gen. Marshall—OK.
250p Ad'm Stark cld Gen. Marshall—OK.
305p Gen. Marshall cld Ad'm Stark—OK.
310p Capt. Beardall cld Ad'm Stark—OK.
315p Secy Stimson cld Secy McCloy—OK.
335p VP from NY talked Sen. Hill and Sen. McNary—OK.
445p Secy Hull cld Ad'm Stark—OK.
600p Secy Knox cld J. E. Hoover—talked to Tamm OK.
635p James Forrestal cld Jesse Jones—OK.
845p Ad'm Stark cld Gen. Marshall—OK.

DINNER AT THE WHITE HOUSE SATURDAY EVENING, DECEMBER 6, 1941 AT EIGHT
O'CLOCK

The President and Mrs. Roosevelt.

Mrs. Breckenridge Long.

Vice Adm. Sir Wilfred & Lady French, Friends of Gladys Hopwood (Wolyche Whitmore). Sir Wilfred sent here from England on business in connection with Navy Dockyard.

Maj. Gen. Blanton Winship.

Brig. Gen. & Mrs. Shelley U. Marietta, Walter Reed Hospital.

Hon. and Mrs. Norman S. Case, Member, Federal Communications Commission.

Mr. and Mrs. Frederick B. Adams, Sr., Friends and house guests.

Mr. and Mrs. Frederick B. Adams, Jr., Friends and house guests.

Miss Laura Adams, Friend and house guest.
 Maj. and Mrs. Clifford Blitch, Walter Reed Hospital, Medical Corps.
 Mrs. Grenville T. Emmet, Friend
 Mr. Raymond H. Geist, Chief of Division of Commercial Affairs, Department of State.
 Mrs. Charles Hamlin, Friend and house guest.
 Hon. Nan Wood Honeyman, Former member of Congress.
 Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Le Blanc, Artist.
 Lt. Comdr. Garrison Norton, Friend of Hon. Frederic A. Delano.
 Mr. and Mrs. Conyers Read. He is head of British Empire Division under Colonel Donovan.
 Capt. and Mrs. James Roosevelt.
 Mr. and Mrs. Charles P. Taft.
 Mr. and Mrs. Charles Warren, Friends.
 Capt. Chester Hammond, White House Aide.
 Lieut. Wilkie A. Rambo, White House Aide.

THE PRESIDENT'S APPOINTMENTS, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1941

10 A. M.: Justice Wm. O. Douglas.
 11:15 A. M.: Director Harold Smith.

THE PRESIDENT'S APPOINTMENTS SUNDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1941

12.30 P. M.—The Chinese Ambassador.
 3.05 P. M.—The Secretary of War.
 The Secretary of the Navy.
 Mr. Harry Hopkins.
 Captain John Beardall.
 Secretary Marvin McIntyre.
 Secretary Early.
 Miss Grace Tully.
 3.20 P. M.—Gen. George Marshall.
 The Secretary of State.
 7.00 P. M.—The Solicitor General.
 8.40 P. M.—The Vice President and entire Cabinet.
 9.45 P. M.—The Vice President.
 Senator Alben W. Barkley.
 Senator Charles McNary.
 Senator Connally.
 Senator Warren Austin.
 Senator Hiram Johnson.
 Speaker Rayburn.
 Congr. Jere Cooper.
 Congr. Joe Martin.
 Congr. Sol Bloom.
 Congr. Charles Eaton.
 10.45 P. M.—Under Secretary Sumner Welles.
 12.00 P. M.—Mr. Ed Murrow.
 Col. William Donovan.

EXHIBIT NO. 59

*Modern Planes have completely
 Situation as to defensibility*

ALIDE MEMOIRE

Defense of Hawaii

changed the

file

confidential

(came to file 5/3/41)

The Island of Oahu, due to its fortification, its garrison, and its physical characteristics, is believed to be the strongest fortress in the world.

To reduce Oahu the enemy must transport overseas an expeditionary force capable of executing a forced landing against a garrison of approximately 35,000 men, manning 127 fixed coast defense guns, 211 antiaircraft weapons, and more than 3,000 artillery pieces and automatic weapons available for beach defense. Without air superiority this is an impossible task.

Air Defense. With adequate air defense, enemy carriers, naval escorts and transports will begin to come under air attack at a distance of approximately 750 miles. This attack will increase in intensity until when within 200 miles of the objective, the enemy forces will be subject to attack by all types of bombardment closely supported by our most modern pursuit.

Hawaiian Air Defense. Including the movement of aviation now in progress Hawaii will be defended by 35 of our most modern flying fortresses, 35 medium range bombers, 13 light bombers, 150 pursuit of which 105 are of our most modern type. In addition Hawaii is capable of reinforcement by heavy bombers from the mainland by air. With this force available a major attack against Oahu is considered impracticable.

In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected and may, within a very limited time, cause great damage. On this account, and in order to assure strong control, it would be highly desirable to set up a military control of the islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement in the Far East.

** Due to make a mass flight from mainland
 to Hawaii May 20th. A number of this type
 of plane could be dispatched immediately
 if the situation grew critical*

EXHIBIT NO. 60

[1]

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Ground Forces.

1. *Basic Considerations.*a. *National Policy.*

Defense of Western Hemisphere.

Preservation of war effort of Britain, Russia and associated powers.

Curb of Japanese aggression.

Eventual defeat of Germany.

b. *Requirements.*

Germany cannot be defeated by supply of munitions to friendly powers, and air and naval operations alone. Large ground forces will be required.

(1) *Western Hemisphere Security.*

Provide minimum garrisons necessary to hold outlying bases in event of sudden collapse of United Kingdom.

Prepare task forces for prompt employment against Atlantic islands and Natal region of Brazil.

(2) *Western Pacific Theater.*

Rush build-up of air power to Philippines, together with small increases in modern ground army equipment and personnel to restrain Japan from advance into Malayasia or Eastern Siberia.

(3) *European Theater.*

Prepare security forces for air and naval bases in the British Isles and Ireland.

Prepare task forces to secure, when opportunity offers, additional bases encircling Germany. Britain is reaching limit of usable man power. We must supplement her forces.

Prepare framework for forces eventually to defeat Germany. Time is required to organize, train and equip these.

(In handwriting
on Margin:)

[2] 2. *Immediate Requirements.*

As long as Britain stands and her Fleet remains intact.

a. *ATLANTIC BASES.*

1,500 total this fall

(1) *Greenland.* Authorized 2,500; Now there only construction troops and local guards. Base for staging aircraft to Britain and patrol base for North Atlantic. Secure defense of bases and cryolite mines essential. Forces must be dispatched earliest moment.

4,500 total this fall

(2) *Newfoundland.* Authorized 5,500; now there 2,500. Naval and air bases for protection of Great Circle Route, and to assist Canadians in defense of Newfoundland. Dispatch of approximately 1,000 men of the total force can be deferred, but these must be equipped and available in United States.

2,000 total this fall

(3) *Bermuda.* Authorized 4,000; now there 800. Air and naval base. Contribute to defense of Atlantic Seaboard. Dispatch of about 1,000 men of the total force can be deferred, but these forces must be available in United States.

350 total this fall

(4) *Jamaica.* Authorized 876; now there 14. Essential staging field. Ground forces of 350 men required for protection United States installations. Dispatch of remainder can be deferred.

Leave

(5) *Puerto Rico.* Authorized and present garrison 21,000. Advanced air and naval base. New naval base under development. Covers approaches to Panama Canal. From military point of view, reduction in garrison by demobilization of Puerto Rican National Guard is feasible. Demobilization would have adverse political reaction and serious economic repercussions.

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12,000 total this
fall

(6) *Trinidad*. Authorized 16,000; now there 1,800. Naval anchorage. Major air base for protection Southeast approaches to Caribbean. Jumping off point for prompt movement into South America. Ground forces required for protection and mobile reserve for prompt movement. Dispatch of about 4,000 men of the total force can be deferred, but this remainder must be immediately available in United States.

O. K.

(7) *British Guiana, St. Lucia, Antigua*. Authorized and presents 350 men each. Essential air and naval bases and staging fields.

O. K.

(8) *Panama*. Authorized and present 33,000. Ground forces essential to protect locks and utilities, and for ship guards and small reserve for use in South and Central America. Air defense demands continuous alert, necessitating forces occupying over 300 scattered positions. Ground forces cannot be safely reduced.

O. K.

b. PACIFIC BASES.

(1) *Alaska*. Authorized 24,000; now there 16,000. Air and naval bases covering Great Circle Route to Far East. Isolated. [3] Poor communications. Great distances. Fleet in Pacific reduces threat. Authorized garrison essential to reasonable security.

O. K.

Leave as is.

(2) *Hawaii*. Authorized and present 41,000. Naval installations (Kaneohe Bay) being expanded, requiring additional defenses. Presence of Fleet reduces threat of major attack. Reinforcements can be deferred as long as Fleet remains in Pacific. Reinforcements must be available in United States to give Fleet freedom of action.

12,000 additional

(3) *Philippines*. Present garrison or enroute 31,000 (12,000 native troops). Critical situation. Japan wavering. Strong air and naval forces on her flank may deter her or wean her from Axis. If Japan moves, forces in position to assist Associated Powers. No reduction possible, on the contrary reinforcements of about 12,000 troops, including air complements, in prospect. Philippine Army in process of organization. 80,000 by January 1, 1942.

c. TASK FORCES.

(1) Organized forces for overseas expeditions. Two forces especially trained for landing attacks. Complete equipment and ammunition reserves necessary.

O. K.

(a) *East Coast Task Force with amphibious training*. One division (reinforced) 27,000 men. Possible use; Azores, Cape Verdes, Martinique.

Out but O. K. as an
Emergency Task
Force

(b) *West Coast Task Force with amphibious training*. One division (reinforced) 27,000 men. For use in Pacific or west coast South or Central America. Available for use in Atlantic.

O. K.

(c) *Relief Forces*. For Azores, Cape Verdes, one division (reinforced) 27,000 men. After taking Azores, Cape Verdes, specially trained amphibious task force should be relieved and quickly reconstituted for additional operations.

O. K.

(d) *Expeditionary Force*. Reinforced Corps (3 divisions foot; two divisions armored; reinforcing units)—154,000. For use as required; Brazil, Africa, Philippines, England, Middle East. Essential to security Western Hemisphere, for exploiting success of task forces and for carrying out commitments of ABC-1.

O. K.

(e) *Iceland Force*. One division (reinforced) 28,000 men. 5,000 now in Iceland. Remainder to relieve Marines and British in spring of 1942.

d. REMAINDER OF ARMY.

(1) *Ground Forces*:

| | |
|--|---------|
| (a) GHQ Reserve (4 armored, 2 cavalry divisions, antiaircraft) - | 115,000 |
| (b) Two field armies (20 infantry divisions)----- | 465,000 |

[4] *Air Forces.*

| | |
|----------------------|---------|
| (a) Combat..... | 80,000 |
| (b) Maintenance..... | 40,000 |
| (c) Schools..... | 150,000 |

(3) *Additional personnel.*

| | |
|---|---------|
| (a) Harbor Defenses..... | 45,000 |
| (b) Administrative overhead..... | 125,000 |
| (c) Trainees not assigned to units and instructors..... | 150,000 |

Total..... 1,150,000

(4) The Ground and Air Combat Forces are essential:

(a) For reinforcement of expeditionary forces—always unpredictable and to meet the unexpected.

(b) To permit rapid expansion.

(c) For training of new units and reserves.

(5) Armored Forces included are difficult to train. Approximately 9 months required. Large number of specialists. Cannot be readily created by conversion of other forces. Any operations against Axis will require high percentage of armored forces. First two armored divisions about 90% equipped, with 95% proposed by April 1, 1942. Second two divisions recently organized, about 45% equipped. Equipment for third two divisions 20% or less. By spring of 1942, four armored divisions will be 85% or better equipped and trained. The remaining two cannot be ready for operations before the late summer of 1942. No reduction in armored units should be made.

3. *Effect on Defense Aid of reducing Ground Forces.*

a. Policy of Defense Aid should be based on:

(1) Task forces equipped 100%.

(2) Overseas forces equipped 100%.

(3) Remaining Army Forces equipped 50%.

b. Task forces require 100% equipment for combat. Any reduction in strength will reduce Tasks which can be undertaken.

c. A reduction of 25% in the personnel of overseas departments would have no effect on antiaircraft material and combat vehicles and only minor effect on infantry and artillery matériel. Similar reduction in strength of Base Forces would not materially increase the amounts of Defense Aid releases. Excluding the Philippines, the saving in shipping would amount to some 32,000 tons annually.

d. Reduction of equipment of Remaining Army Forces below 50% is impossible without seriously lowering morale and retarding development of new units. Additional Defense Aid matériel from this source can be obtained only by reduction in number of units.

[5] e. Summarizing, no appreciable increase in Defense Aid items desired by the British can be realized except by eliminating units of Remainder of Army.

4. *Future Requirements.*

By 1943, Nazis may dominate Europe from Urals to Iberian Peninsula and from Scandinavia to North Africa. Germany's war machine may comprise 400 divisions. Collapse of Russia, England, offensive tactics by Japan and belligerent attitude in Latin America are possibilities. We must prepare to meet these eventualities.

Our broad concept of encircling Germany and closing in on her step by step is the only practical way of wearing down her war potential by military and economic pressure. In the final decisive phase we must come to grips with and annihilate the German military machine. Forces deemed necessary at this time to accomplish role of ground units in supreme effort to defeat Germany comprise five field armies of about 215 divisions (infantry foot, armored, motorized, airborne, mountain and cavalry). If the United States remains committed to the policy of defeating Germany, making an all-out effort mandatory, then we must build toward these forces as rapidly as possible. To seize and hold the initiative we must have forces available for employment at the time and place of our own choosing, not Hitler's. Any reduction of our present forces may result in fatal delay. Time is required for the training of forces in the technique of modern war. We are already late. We must not abandon present gains and

we should push on with unremitting effort. Furthermore, sudden basic changes of policy are seldom justified in prolonged efforts, and are devastating to organized effort. The "long view" is essential to our interests. In other words, to shift our national objectives by the reduction of our army at the present time, might well be disastrous. Certainly the momentary encouragement it would give the Russian and British governments, would be far outweighed by the positive indications it would give to the German government, that they need not fear an eventual onslaught of ground forces.

5. Conclusions.

No appreciable increase in items of equipment especially needed by the British (AA guns, armored vehicles and ships) will result from any reduction of Army ground forces, which can be justified by the present international situation.

Chief of Staff.

Confidential

Proposed United States deliveries of light tanks, M3, October 1, 1941, to completion of contracts

NOTE: No English Contracts Scheduled

| Months
(1) | Total pro-
ductions
(2) | Allocations to— | |
|----------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Other
Nations
(3) | United
States
(4) |
| October..... | 290 | 183 | 107 |
| November..... | 300 | 180 | 120 |
| December..... | 310 | 180 | 130 |
| January..... | 330 | 100 | 230 |
| February..... | 360 | 110 | 250 |
| March..... | 400 | 300 | 100 |
| April..... | 400 | 300 | 100 |
| May..... | 400 | 300 | 100 |
| June..... | 400 | 300 | 100 |
| Sub total..... | 3,190 | 1,953 | 1,237 |
| July..... | 400 | 300 | 100 |
| August..... | 400 | 300 | 100 |
| September..... | 400 | 300 | 100 |
| October..... | 130 | 98 | 32 |
| Totals..... | 4,520 | 2,951 | 1,569 |

EXHIBIT NO. 61

WAR DEPARTMENT

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFFS AGENCY OF A. G. OF S. W.

WAR PLANS DIVISION
WASHINGTON**SECRET**

12/7/41

December 7, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL (Through Secretary, General Staff)

Subject: Far East Situation.

The Secretary of War directs that the following ~~first priority~~ ~~secret radiogram~~ be sent to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the Far East; Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command; Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; Commanding General, Fourth Army:

Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication.

MARSHALL

*Inter O.C.S.
12/7/41 JWS*

L. T. GREGG
Lt. T. GREGG,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

*Code message
sent out
12/7/41*

Radios as follows dispatched 11:52 AM, 12-7-41.

by Code Book, WEMC:

12:05 #133 to CG, USAFFE, Manila, P.I.;
12:17 #529 to CG, Haw. Dept., Ft. Shafter, HI.
12:08 #519 to CG, Cbn. Def. Cmd., Quarter Islands, C.
12:11 #26 to CG, Fourth Army, Pres. of San Francisco, Cal.
msh - 1205.

SECRET

EXHIBIT NO. 62

THE JOINT BOARD
Washington

S E C R E T

MINUTES OF MEETING, NOVEMBER 26, 1941.

The weekly meeting of The Joint Board scheduled for November 26, 1941, was held today in Room 2003, Munitions Building, at 11:35 a.m.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations, Presiding;
General G. C. Marshall, U.S.A., Chief of Staff;
Rear Admiral H. E. Ingersoll, U.S.N., Assistant Chief of Naval Operations;
Major General William Bryden, U.S.A., Deputy Chief of Staff;
Major General H. H. Arnold, U.S.A., Deputy Chief of Staff for Air;
Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, U.S.N., Director, War Plans Division, Office Naval Operations;
Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, U.S.A., Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division;
Captain D. C. Ramsey, U.S.N., Bureau of Aeronautics, in the absence of Rear Admiral J. H. Towers.
Colonel W. P. Scooby, U.S.A., Secretary.

The presiding Officer directed the minutes of the meeting of November 19, would stand approved unless there were objections. There were no objections and the minutes were approved.

The Secretary then announced the agenda for the meeting as follows:

Serial 724 - Priority of A-1-a for Medium Tanks.

Serial 718 - Construction of Airdromes in the Aleutian Islands and the Alaskan Peninsula.

Action of the Board on the two serials was as follows:

Serial 724 - Priority of A-1-a for Medium Tanks. Following a discussion of the Joint Planning Committee report during which the Navy members announced their agreement to eliminate consideration of the four-engine bomber program in order to expedite action on the tank program, motion was made and seconded that the serial be approved. Motion was adopted without objection.

Serial 718 - Construction of Airdromes in the Aleutian Islands and the Alaskan Peninsula. In the course of the discussion of this subject the Army members agreed with Admiral Stark that the work proposed in the recommendations made in the Joint Planning Committee report would not be pushed at the expense of other defense construction projects in more vital areas. It was moved and seconded that the serial be approved. Without objection the serial was approved.

The Board having disposed of the agenda proceeded to a discussion of professional topics.

SECRET

Admiral Stark raised the matter of United States military requirements in Brasil and read a dispatch from Admiral Beauregard, the United States Naval Attache in Rio de Janeiro, outlining the difficulties encountered in obtaining Brazilian authority to base Navy patrol planes in Natal and Maceio for protecting our shipping. The attitude of the Brazilian Government, as reported by Admiral Beauregard, is to oppose further military development in Brasil by the United States. General Marshall recounted his experience during his recent visit to Brasil. At that time the Brazilian military chiefs favored U. S. military assistance in Brasil. Since that time there had been a marked change in their attitude and now collaboration with the United States had been supplanted by opposition. The responsibility for this reversal in relationship was attributed largely to Nazi efforts, and should the democracies suffer further reverses, continued and further opposition to the United States in Brasil might be expected. No Joint Board action was taken on this subject, but Admiral Stark requested that the Army postpone further requests to base troops or planes in Brasil until the Navy is fully established there.

Admiral Stark wanted to know if any material had been forwarded by the Army to Chiang Kai Shek by airplane or if any such request had been received. His query was based upon a request made by Mr. Currie for the use of one Navy patrol plane to fly certain critical items of equipment from Manila to Singapore or Rangoon. General Arnold knew of no materials being forwarded by airplane except some spares for pursuit airplanes which had become necessary because of damage to airplanes already delivered to China.

The Board next engaged in a discussion of the Pacific situation. The Navy had information that Japanese airplanes had been making reconnaissance and photographic flights over the United States islands in the Western Pacific. It was felt that in view of recent developments indicating reinforcements and activity in the construction of defense installations in the Marshall and Caroline Islands, efforts should be made on the part of the United States to photograph the more important of these islands. General Arnold announced that two planes were already enroute from Dayton to the Philippines with photographic equipment and with instructions to photograph Truk, Jaluit, and such other important Japanese islands as required. With reference to this mission, Admiral Turner announced that the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Hart, had proposed that the United States, the British, and the Dutch undertake to photograph all of the islands in the Far East and Western Pacific, but since the Army was engaged in the stated photographic mission, the Navy would like the planes to obtain certain specific information. General Arnold proposed that the Army would assist the Navy in obtaining desired data if the Navy would furnish to him, without delay, a memorandum of exactly what was desired so that instructions could be given to the pilots engaged on the two photographic missions.

The Board next discussed the stationing of Army pursuit aviation on islands of Midway and Wake. The Army is willing to locate a squadron of twenty-five airplanes on each of the islands. The Navy members announced their agreement. In connection with the operation General Marshall proposed: 1st, that a Navy airplane carrier be used to transport the Army pursuit units from Hawaii to their destinations; 2nd, that

S E C R E T

the Navy cooperate in the movement of Army air units to the Philippines by furnishing air and sea protection at Midway and Wake Islands, utilizing patrol planes and such other Navy facilities as available. Speaking for the Board Admiral Stark directed that Admiral Turner and General Serow get together and make necessary arrangements for the movement.

In a discussion on the development of an airplane route across the Pacific further eastward, the Navy raised the question as to the extent of Army plans for the development of Johnston Island as one of the landing fields on this route. It was the Navy's belief that developments contemplated by the Army would be made on Palmyra rather than Christmas Island, because the sovereignty of Christmas Island, being in dispute between the United States and the United Kingdom, would be claimed by the British following the war. Explaining the reason for the developments on Christmas Island, General Arnold pointed out that in the early considerations for the development of an interior southern air route, the Naval Commandant of the 12th District, Hawaiian Islands, had given General Short, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, information that the Palmyra developments could not be completed until August of 1942. A reconnaissance made by Army engineers indicated that construction of landing field facilities on Christmas Island could be expedited and the minimum development for flight operations could be completed by January 15, 1942. Considering the necessity for early completion of the field the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, had secured transportation facilities and operating equipment and moved into Christmas Island, and now construction was well under way. So that the Navy members might have the full picture of Army action, General Serow read the message sent to the War Department by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. General Arnold stated that Canton and Christmas Islands were to be staging fields, and the permanent installations would be kept at a minimum. Following this explanation Admiral Stark stated that, whereas the Navy considered Palmyra more desirable than Christmas, nevertheless the Navy would not now offer further objections to the development and completion of the Christmas Island project.

There being no further business before the Board, adjournment was taken at 12:45 p.m.

W. P. SCOBIE,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary.

EXHIBIT NO. 63

(This Exhibit comprises the Top Secret Report and Top Secret Memoranda of the Army Pearl Harbor Board Investigation and will be found printed as a part of Joint Congressional Committee Exhibit No. 157. See Table of Contents.)

EXHIBIT NO. 64**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

1. Memorandum from General H. H. Arnold for Chief of Staff recommending change in proposed "Standing Operating Procedure" of Hawaiian Department dated 14 July 1941.
2. Memorandum from Col. R. H. Dunlop inviting constructive criticism of the proposed "Standing Operating Procedure," Hawaiian Department.
3. "Standing Operating Procedure," Hawaiian Department (tentative) dated 14 July 1941.

OCS 19741-62

RESTRICTED

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

October 7, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department.

1. Attention is invited to the attached letter of instructions covering "Standing Operating Procedure" of the Hawaiian Department dated July 14, 1941.

2. This memorandum provides, Page 4 Paragraph 14 d. (8) and (9) as follows:

"(8) Release to Department Provost Marshal a provisional battalion of four (4) companies totaling five hundred (500) men, to assist Auxiliary Police Force when necessary, see Paragraph 14 g. (2) below;

"(9) Defend Schofield Barracks against ground and sabotage attacks;"

3. I strongly recommend that these provisions be rescinded for the following reasons:

a. The Air Force units in order to carry out their missions must have 100% effective mechanic and maintenance strength.

b. Air Force enlisted men have been trained for particular purposes, and in most cases it has taken over a year to train them for these specialized jobs.

c. In general, it may be said that these provisions are "putting the cart before the horse." The ground troops should provide protection for the air bases rather than the air units provide protection for the ground bases.

H. H. Arnold
H. H. ARNOLD,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.

Incl:
Restricted by "Headquarters
Hawaiian Department" dated
7-14-41, mimeographed book,
subj, "Standing Operating
Procedure."

RESTRICTED

10/13/41
hac u/s 5/48

136-001
10-7-41
(10-7-41)

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Fort Shafter, T. H.

14 July 1941

Subject: Standing Operating Procedure.

To: All Officers.

1. Attention is directed to the Tentative Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, attached.

2. Constructive criticism is invited. All suggestions will be submitted to the Office of A. C. of S., G-3, this headquarters, on or before 15 August 1941.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

Robert H. Dunlop
ROBERT H. DUNLOP,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

1 Encl:
Tentative SOP-HD

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E DHEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Fort Shafter, T. H.

14 July 1941

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
(Tentative)SECTION I GENERAL

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R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E DSTANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
(Tentative)

14 July 1941

SECTION I

General

1. Purpose. The purpose of a "Standing Operating Procedure" is stated in paragraph 205, FM 100-5, "Tentative, Field Service Regulations, Operations."

2. Unit Procedures. Conforming to the Department Procedure, subordinate units and staff sections will develop appropriate Standing Operation Procedures.

3. Short Title. "SOP HD" will signify this Standing Operating Procedure.

4. Department Headquarters: Department Headquarters may operate either as a whole or in two groups. When divided, the headquarters will consist of a forward and a rear echelon, the composition of which ordinarily will be as follows:

a. Forward Echelon:

Commanding General and Aides.
General Staff (less G-1 and G-5).
Engineer Officer.
Signal Officer.
Chemical Officer.
Ordnance Officer.
Surgeon.
Headquarters Commandant.
Provost Marshal.

b. Rear Echelon:

G-1
G-5
Special Staff (less those in forward echelon).

5. Tactical Principles. The chief tactical principles applicable to the problem of the defense of Oahu and the air fields on the outlying islands are as follows:

- a. Complete organization of the ground;
- b. Position to be held lightly;
- c. Large reserves, held mobile, with motor transportation sufficient to transport them;
- d. Automatic counter-attack.

6. Security. Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground or air forces.

7. Liaison. a. Officers: During operations, a liaison officer with motor transportation will be sent from each of the following units to Department Headquarters and will remain thereat except when on a mission to their own headquarters:

Hawaiian Division(s).
Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.
Hawaiian Air Force.

R E S T R I C T E D

88th Observation Squadron.
Department Reserve. (If and when established).

b. Responsibility: Liaison responsibility is from left to right.

8. Orders. a. The Department Commander will issue orders covering the action of the Division(s), the Air Force, the Coast Artillery Brigade and all attached troops.

b. Orders issued by the Department (except as in c below) will be brief written field orders with an operation map. Circumstances may require the issuance of an oral order but this will be confirmed later in writing.

c. Fragmentary orders, oral or written, may be issued when appropriate. Copies of the Department Commander's decision or directives, together with a roughly sketched operation map, will be sent by staff officers to lower units as soon as issued in order that plans may be initiated prior to receipt of the field order from the Department.

d. To expedite issue and to conserve time, unit commanders and staff officers will dictate their decisions, directives, plans and orders. Competent stenographer-clerks and draftsmen will be trained within each headquarters.

9. Movement. a. In general, all troops will be moved by motor. The maximum space in the trucks will be utilized for the troops (standing if necessary) since all movements are necessarily for short distances.

b. Trucks will not close up and every effort will be made to avoid halting in the open. In general, trucks will move directly from one concealed position to another concealed position. Maximum use will be taken of overhead cover, and vehicles either in bivouac or assembly areas will always be dispersed.

c. All truck movements in daylight will be by truck infiltration, the distance between vehicles being not greater than 800 yards nor less than 300 yards. The maximum speed authorized by law will be maintained during daylight hours. When necessary, officers' control points and route markers (par. 84, FM 26-10) will be utilized.

d. Truck movements at night will be in convoy with blue lights. The distance between vehicles will be sufficient to permit the unimpeded flow of commercial traffic.

e. Trucks attached to a unit for a specific mission will revert to control of the parent unit when the specific mission has been accomplished.

10. Antiaircraft Defense. a. Antiaircraft defense is a responsibility of every unit.

b. All Infantry units not occupying front line positions will have their automatic weapons habitually in readiness for antiaircraft defense, and all other units will be prepared likewise to engage hostile aircraft.

c. On marches, all weapons suitable for use against aircraft will be in readiness for action. When enemy air action is imminent trucks will halt, troops will detruck, disperse and fire on enemy planes.

d. All unit commanders will be held responsible for the following:

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Warning: To maintain air guards to give timely warning of the approach of hostile aviation.

Concealment: To adopt necessary measures to defeat both visual reconnaissance and aerial photography through proper choice of position, utilization of cover, and use of camouflage either when halted or when in movement.

Dispersion: To reduce vulnerability to air attack and observation by dispersion and increased speed of movement.

Reports: To report to the next higher headquarters without delay each action with hostile aircraft

11. Sentries. Double sentries will be placed at all important installations and an adequate alarm system will be established.

12. Guides. In case of a relief, guides from the relieved organization will meet the incoming unit and remain with it until ordered back to their organization by the commander of the incoming unit.

SECTION IIAlerts

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (§) alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack, see paragraph 17 below.

14. Alert No. 1.

a. Alert No. 1 requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations on outlying islands.

b. The Hawaiian Division(s) (less detachments) attached 298th Infantry, will:

(1) Defend Oahu;

(2) Be responsible for all military traffic regulations except in the area AIEA JUNCTION - WUHANU PALI - MAKAPUU HEAD.

c. The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, attached Det. 11th P. A., will:

(1) Oppose enemy aircraft by antiaircraft fire;

(2) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament;

(3) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels;

(4) Support the Hawaiian Division(s);

(5) Provide method for protection of friendly aircraft from friendly antiaircraft fire;

(6) Coordinate all antiaircraft and seacoast intelligence agencies;

(7) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.

-3-

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R E S T R I C T E Dd. The Hawaiian Air Force will:

- (1) Destroy enemy aircraft;
- (2) Carry out bombing missions as directed;
- (3) Cooperate with Naval air forces. see par. 17 b. below;
- (4) On Oahu, defend all air fields against sabotage air and ground attacks;
- (5) Arm all planes;
- (6) Prepare bombers for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and disperse on fields;
- (7) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers;
- (8) Release to Department Provost Marshal a provisional battalion of four (4) companies totaling five hundred (500) men to assist Auxiliary Police Force when necessary. see par. 14 g. (2) below;
- (9) Defend Schofield Barracks against ground and sabotage attacks;
- (10) Perform observation, command and photographic missions;
- (11) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders, see par. 14 f. below.

e. G-5 will be prepared to establish the following:

- (1) A Food Administration.
- (2) A Labor Procurement Service.

f. The District Commanders of Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai Districts, assisted by the air corps detachments stationed within the districts, will defend the air fields against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

g. The Department Provost Marshal, in addition to his normal duties, will:

- (1) Cooperate with the Auxiliary Police for the protection of all vital installations within Police District No. 1, exclusive of those on Army and Navy reservations;
- (2) Inform Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, reference details of provisional battalion, see par. 14. d. (8) above;
- (3) Regulate military traffic within area AIEA JUNCTION - NUUANU PALI - MAKAPUU HEAD, see par. 14. b. (2) above;
- (4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all air Raid Precautions including blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.

h. The Air Defense Command, when activated, will:

- (1) Assume command of all air and antiaircraft defense forces on Oahu.

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D15. Alert No. 2.

a. Alert No. 2 is applicable to a condition not sufficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in Alert No. 1, but does require the availability at all times of fifty percent (50%) of all troops either in garrison or in the field and the guarding of important installations.

b. The Hawaiian Division(s) (less detachments) attached 298th Infantry, will:

(1) Maintain available fifty percent (50%) of all troops;

(2) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice;

(3) Protect all vital installations and regulate traffic as provided in paragraphs 16 b. (3) and (4), Alert No. 3;

(4) Place all 240mm howitzers in position, establish necessary guards, and place ammunition at positions, if directed.

c. The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade will:

(1) Maintain available fifty percent (50%) of all troops;

(2) Be prepared to put fifty percent (50%) of the armament into action without delay;

(3) Protect all vital installations as provided in paragraphs 16 a. (1), (2) & (3), Alert No. 3;

(4) Place the fire control units in position.

d. The Hawaiian Air Force will:

(1) Maintain available fifty percent (50%) of all troops;

(2) Be prepared to place one (1) squadron of each group in operation without delay.

(3) Protect all vital installations on air fields and bases;

(4) Be prepared to furnish the provisional battalion, see [par. 14. d. (8) above.]

e. The District Commanders will:

Assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, and maintain order in the civil community.

f. The Department Provost Marshal will:

Be prepared to assume his responsibilities without delay under Alert No. 1.

g. The Air Defense Command, when activated, will:

Assume command of all air and antiaircraft defense forces on Oahu.

16. Alert No. 3.

a. Alert No. 3 is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no particular threat from without.

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b. The Hawaiian Division(s) (less deta), attached 298th Infantry, will:

(1) Suppress all civil disorders including sabotage except in Police District No. 1;

(2) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice;

(3) Protect all vital installations, except in Police District No. 1 and on garrisoned Army and Navy reservations, as follows:

Command and Fire Control Cable System, see inclosure No. 1;

Railway and Highway Bridges, see inclosure No. 2;

Water supply for Schofield Barracks;

Radio station at FOU MAWAMAHUA;

Telephone Exchange at WAIPAHU, WAHIANA, WAILUA, LAIE and

KANEHOE;

Electric sub-stations at WAHIANA, KAILUA, PUULOA, WAIPIO, PEARL CITY and EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO - WAHIANA - SCHEFFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARKETTE, exclusive, from KOOLAUP switch station - BELLWATER FIELD, see inclosure No. 3;

(4) Regulate traffic except in Police District No. 1.

(5) Release the 11th Tank Company to the Department Provost Marshal;

(6) Be prepared to assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

c. The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade will:

(1) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense;

(2) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the Brigade;

(3) Protect the Territorial dump and radio beacon on Sand Island.

(4) Provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

d. The Hawaiian Air Force will:

(1) Protect all vital installations on air fields and bases;

(2) Release the provisional battalion to Department Provost Marshal, see paragraph 14. d. (8) above.

e. The District Commanders will:

(1) Assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, and maintain order in the civil community.

f. The Department Provost Marshal will:

(1) Be responsible for the protection of all vital instal-

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

lations within Police District No. 1, exclusive of those on Army and Navy reservations;

(2) Inform Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, when he desires the provisional battalion, see paragraph 14. d. (8), and Commanding General, Hawaiian Division, when the 11th Tank Company is desired.

(3) Regulate military traffic within Police District No. 1.

SECTION IIIARMY AND NAVY COOPERATION

17. a. Air Forces. In case of hostile attack all available shore based Naval and Marine Corps fighter planes in appropriate condition of readiness pass to Army control, and all Army bombers in condition of readiness "A" pass to Navy control and the bomber commander will report to the Commander of Patrol Wing TWO.

b. The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, supported by all available Marine Corps antiaircraft artillery, will defend Oahu, and;

(1) Provide personnel to cooperate with the Navy in the operation of the Harbor Control Post.

(2) Provide method of protection of friendly aircraft from friendly antiaircraft fire.

* (3) Disseminate warning by radio broadcast of the AAAIS.

c. The Department Signal Officer will insure that joint communications are in readiness for immediate employment. Special arrangements will be made to transmit to the Navy information from the A.W.S.

d. Conditions of readiness.

(1) Conditions of readiness will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

(2) Material Readiness.

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

(3) Degree of Operational Readiness.

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and proceeding with the assigned task.

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1. For pursuit and VF types - four minutes. Types other than fighters - fifteen minutes.
2. All types - 30 minutes.
3. All types - one hour.
4. All types - two hours.
5. All types - four hours.

SECTION IVINTELLIGENCE

18. The intelligence standing operating procedure indicated below is applicable generally to all Alerts.

19. Essential Elements of Enemy Information:

a. Will the enemy attempt to destroy or neutralize NAVAL BASE, PEARL HARBOR, KANEOME BAY, and air fields on OAHU with the object of denying their use to the United States without occupation? If so, will his air attacks be accomplished by Naval bombardment and blockading operations?

b. Will the enemy attempt to capture OAHU by expeditionary forces with the object of utilizing the NAVAL BASE, PEARL HARBOR, KANEOME BAY, and air fields thereon? If so, when, where, and with what strength will he make his main attack?

c. Will the enemy attempt to capture any other of the principal islands of the Hawaiian Group with the object of utilizing the air fields and establishing bases thereon?

d. Will the enemy military operations be accompanied by acts of sabotage and terrorism on the part of resident sympathizers?

20. Measures to Obtain Information:

a. NAVY.

(1) Transmit, through the Joint Intelligence Loop, information received from the Offshore and Inshore Patrols, from any escort or attack forces formed, and from any other Naval ships relative to:

(a) Location, composition, course, and speed of enemy units encountered, with particular reference to location of aircraft carriers and transports.

(b) Indications of landings on any island of the main Hawaiian Group, with particular attention to the number and type of landing boats, and the composition of supporting Naval units.

(c) Indications of attempts to block HONOLULU and PEARL HARBORS.

(d) Indications of any hostile aerial activity in strength.

(e) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately.

(f) Report damage by hostile Naval and air bombardment, incurred or observed. Important damage, including damage to landing fields, and use of chemicals, immediately.

b. ARMY.

(1) Hawaiian Air Force.

(a) Observe water area corresponding generally to the

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"Defensive Sea Area" for the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. Report location, composition, course, and speed of enemy units encountered. Maintain continuous contact with major subdivisions. Particular attention to location of aircraft carriers and transports. First contact, material changes of direction, and definite location of aircraft carriers to be reported immediately by Joint Intelligence Loop; thereafter on the hour by Department Intelligence Loop.

(b) Report indications of landing on any island, giving location, number, type and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting naval group. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(c) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops, and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment, incurred or observed by their operations. Important damage, including damage to landing fields, and use of chemicals, immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop; other damage at 1815 by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report any hostile aerial activity in strength, including number, type, direction and area of attack or observation, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(2) 86th Observation Squadron.

(a) Observe water area corresponding generally to the "Defensive Sea Area" for the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. Report location, composition, course and speed of enemy units encountered. Maintain continuous contact with major subdivisions. Particular attention to location of aircraft carriers and transports. First contact, material changes of direction, and definite location of aircraft carriers to be reported immediately by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(b) Report indications of landing on any island, giving location, number, type, and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting naval group. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(c) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops, and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment, incurred or observed. Important damage, including damage to landing fields, and use of chemicals, immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop; other damage at 1815 by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report any hostile aerial activity in strength, including number, type, direction, and area of attack or observation, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(3) Aircraft Warning Service.

(a) Report immediately any and all information of hostile air force or surface vessel to Air Defense Command, when, activated, thence by Intelligence Loop.

(4) Hawaiian Division.

(a) Report location, number, type, and formation of transports and landing boats and composition of supporting naval group. Report when observed thereafter hourly, on the hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(b) Report enemy front lines and boundaries between units. Report immediately any significant change. Otherwise report every two hours, on the even hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.

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(c) Report location of own front lines. Report every two hours, on the even hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report all identifications. Infantry identifications are most important. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report indications of landing of artillery, including caliber of same, and tanks. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(f) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment. Important damage immediately; other damage at 1830, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(g) Report time, place, kinds, and method of employment of chemicals. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(h) Report weather and surf conditions on all favorable landing beaches. Report at 0300, 0700, 1200, 1700 and 2200, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(5) Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.⁴

(a) Report immediately, by Department Intelligence Loop, initial contact with enemy units, giving location, composition and course of formations.

(b) Report immediately, by Department Intelligence Loop, when an action is begun by either hostile aircraft and vessels or by the seacoast artillery and antiaircraft, giving location of naval vessels or aircraft, locality being attacked, and units engaged.

(c) Report upon completion of any action, by Department Intelligence Loop, damage inflicted on hostile capital ships and transports.

(d) Report upon completion of any action, by Department Intelligence Loop, important damage from hostile naval and air bombardment, and report the use of chemicals immediately. Other damage at 1800 by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop, location, number, type, and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting naval force.

(f) Report, when observed, by Joint Intelligence Loop, indications of attempts to block HONOLULU HARBOR, PEARL HARBOR, or KANEHOE BAY.

(g) Report, upon completion of action by or with enemy air force, composition of enemy forces, direction of approach, time of action, area attacked, and damage to enemy airplanes.

(h) Report as soon as practicable important damage to ground installations, including damage due to use of chemical agents.

(i) Report visibility at 0400, 0700, 1200, 1700 and 2200, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(j) Any of the above reports may be transmitted by telephone when necessary to avoid delay.

(6) Hawaii District Commander, report when observed, by radio to Hawaiian Air Force, thence by Department Intelligence Loop:

(a) Nature of hostile activity, including number, type, direction, and area of attack or observation;

(b) Damage by hostile naval and air bombardment;

(c) Location, number, type, and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting naval group;

(d) Enemy front lines and boundaries between units;

(e) All identifications. Infantry identifications are most important;

(f) Time, place, kinds, and method of employment of chemicals.

(7) Kauai District Commander.

Same as Hawaii District Commander above.

R E S T R I C T E D(8) Maui District Commander.

Same as Hawaii District Commander above.

(9) Department Signal Office.

Radio intercept and goniometric service. Report when obtained.

c. ALL ELEMENTS OF HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND NAVY.

Report assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers and overt acts of sabotage or terrorism, giving location, time, numbers involved, and probable intentions or damage accomplished.

x. MISCELLANEOUS.(1) Transmission of G-2 Information.

In the absence of specific instructions as to transmission, or in the event of failure or overload of specified channels, G-2 information will be transmitted by direct line, where available, or by the most expeditious routing over the circuits set forth in current Signal Operations Instructions.

21. MEASURES FOR HANDLING.

a. Prisoners: Examination stations will be located at all Prisoner of War collection points.

b. Documents and Captured Material.

(1) Documents will be sent to G-2's of Department or Division(s), with the minimum of delay, by regularly scheduled messenger service.

(2) Reports of captured material will be sent to the same stations by the same means.

(3) Documents and material identifying organizations or indicating the use of chemicals are of major importance. They will be given special priority in shipment to examination stations and will be reported to Department G-2 by the most expeditious means.

c. Maps. Maps will be supplied initially by the Department Engineer.

22. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.

Distribution of reports from Department Headquarters: Summaries of Intelligence at 0800, 1300, 1800 and 2300.

23. The DEPARTMENT G-2 will:

a. Establish a counter-espionage service that will not only guard against the subversive activities of the external enemy, but will also enable The Department G-2 to keep the Department Commander constantly advised as to the attitude, trend of thought, and probable course of action of the civil population particularly that of alien extraction. This service will maintain close liaison with the Provost Marshal, with a view to:

(1) Furnishing the Provost Marshal with all information gained through the counter-espionage service of value in the prevention of civil disorders, sabotage and incipient uprisings.

R E S T R I C T E D

(2) Receiving and evaluating information relative to the internal situation collected by the Provost Marshal through his agencies set up for the actual control of the civil population.

b. Collect, evaluate, and disseminate information relative to assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers, and overt acts of sabotage and terrorism.

c. Prepare propaganda and publicity for the encouragement of the loyalty and support of the civil population, particularly that of alien extraction.

24. G-2 Forms:

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation, see Inclosure No. 4.

b. Periodic Report, see Inclosure No. 5.

SECTION VADMINISTRATION25. SUPPLY.

a. Classes I, II, III and IV, see Pars. 75-77, FM 100-10. The existing system of supply for items of Class I, II, III and IV will be continued during all Alerts, except that a standard menu ration will be initiated for Alert No. 1.

b. Class V (Ammunition)

(1) Supply points remain unchanged. Dumps and ammunition Distributing Points will be established as directed by this headquarters.

(2) Credits of an "Initial Issue" and of one "Unit" of fire are automatically placed at the disposal of all units whenever an Alert is ordered. Quantities of various types of ammunition included in the "Initial Issue" and in a "Unit" of fire are shown in Inclosure Nos. 6 and 7, herewith.

(3) When Alert No. 1 or No. 2 is ordered, unless ammunition has already been drawn, all units will draw their "Initial Issue". Wherever issues cannot be made simultaneously, they will be made according to the following order of priority:

Aircraft bombs and ammunition for aircraft weapons.
Antiaircraft 3" and 37-mm ammunition.
Ground machine gun ammunition - all types.
Other small arms ammunition.
All artillery ammunition, less AA.

(4) When Alert No. 3 is ordered, only small arms ammunition included in the "Initial Issue" will be drawn.

26. EVACUATION.

a. Casualties: No change in present procedure.

b. Salvage: No change in present procedure.

c. Prisoners of War.

(1) Collecting Points - Schofield Barracks, Fort Shafter, Fort Ruger, Kaneohe Bay. To be established and operated by Department

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Provost Marshal, assisted by Provost Marshal(s), Hawaiian Division(s).

(2) Prisoner of War Inclosures - Establishment and operation by Department Provost Marshal, as directed by this headquarters.

27. TRAFFIC. Present regulations and procedure will continue in effect.

28. MOTOR TRANSPORTATION.

a. When Alert No. 1 is put into effect, all attached motor transportation is automatically released to parent organization.

b. Motor pools will be established by the Hawaiian Division(s) and the Separate Coast Artillery Brigade. These pools will consist of all available tactical vehicles and administrative vehicles, the latter obtained by reducing to a minimum administrative requirements.

c. The assignment of motor vehicles for one specific purpose will be the exception. All motors will be used to the maximum for all purposes.

d. Current movement and loading tables will be maintained by the Hawaiian Division(s) and the Separate Coast Artillery Brigade as follows:

(1) Number of vehicles, tactical and administrative in the pool showing the number of men and amount of impedimenta that can be moved initially into position, see par 9 above.

(2) Number of vehicles, tactical and administrative, subsequent to move into position which are available for movement of reserves, the number of men which can be moved.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

PHILIP HAYES,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.


OFFICIAL 
WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Lt. Col., G. S. C.,
Asst. Asst. C. of S., G-3.

7 Inclosures.

11

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1. The first part of the document is a list of names and titles, including "The Hon. Mr. Justice" and "The Hon. Mr. Justice".



R E S T R I C T E D

Inclosure No. 2

RAILROAD BRIDGES

| Number | Location | TYPE | | Height | Span |
|--------|------------------------------|----------------|----------|--------|------|
| | | Piers | Girders | | |
| 1 | 0.9 mi. W of Honolulu | Concrete pile | Timber | 4.0' | 100' |
| 2 | 1.0 mi. W of Honolulu | Concrete pile | Concrete | 6.0' | 32' |
| 3 | 1.9 mi. W of Honolulu | Concrete pile | Timber | 4.5' | 180' |
| 4 | 2.4 mi. W of Honolulu | Concrete pile | Timber | 5.0' | 180' |
| 5 | 2.6 mi. W of Honolulu | Concrete pile | Timber | 5.8' | 32' |
| 6 | 2.6 mi. W of Honolulu | Concrete pile | Timber | 5.0' | 12' |
| 9 | 0.7 mi. E of Aiea | Concrete pile | Timber | 4.3' | 208' |
| 10 | 0.2 mi. W of Aiea | Concrete pile | Timber | 4.5' | 48' |
| 11 | 0.3 mi. E of Kalaheo | Concrete pile | Timber | 4.0' | 96' |
| 12 | 0.2 mi. E of Kalaheo | Concrete pile | Timber | 3.5' | 28' |
| 13 | 0.4 mi. W of Kalaheo | Concrete pile | Timber | 4.0' | 112' |
| 14 | Waiau Station | Timber pile | Timber | 3.8' | 27' |
| 15 | 0.2 mi. W of Waiau | Timber pile | Timber | 1.5' | 32' |
| 16 | 0.3 mi. W of Waiau | Concrete pile | Timber | 2.0' | 32' |
| 17 | 0.4 mi. W of Waiau | Concrete pile | Timber | 6.0' | 32' |
| 18 | 0.3 mi. W of Pearl City | Concrete pile | Timber | 5.6' | 180' |
| 19 | 0.8 mi. W of Pearl City | Concrete pile | Timber | 3.0' | 16' |
| 20 | Waipahu | Timber Trestle | Timber | 6.5' | 63' |
| 29 | 1.3 mi. W of Gilbert | Timber Trestle | Timber | 10.6' | 64' |
| 36 | 2.2 mi. S of Manakuli | Timber Trestle | Timber | 12.5' | 64' |
| 40 | 0.6 mi. S of Manakuli | Timber Trestle | Timber | 10.3' | 96' |
| 42 | 1.0 mi. N of Manakuli | Timber Trestle | Timber | 8.5' | 64' |
| 43 | 2.5 mi. S of Waianae | Timber Trestle | Timber | 7.0' | 64' |
| 44 | 1.1 mi. S of Waianae | Timber Trestle | Timber | 12.0' | 96' |
| 47 | 0.5 mi. N of Waianae | Timber pile | Timber | 7.0' | 96' |
| 50 | 3.3 mi. N of Waianae | Timber pile | Timber | 7.0' | 64' |
| 51 | 3.4 mi. N of Waianae | Timber Trestle | Timber | 10.6' | 80' |
| 57 | 0.2 mi. S of Makua | Timber Trestle | Timber | 10.5' | 62' |
| 58 | 0.1 mi. S of Makua | Timber Trestle | Timber | 8.5' | 114' |
| 74 | 0.7 mi. W of Mokuleia | Concrete pile | Timber | 8.0' | 80' |
| 75 | 0.5 mi. W of Mokuleia | Concrete pile | Timber | 9.2' | 112' |
| 77 | 0.6 mi. W of Waialua | Concrete pile | Timber | 7.0' | 448' |
| 78 | Ealiwa | Timber Trestle | Timber | 8.0' | 224' |
| 81 | 2.1 mi. N of Haleiwa | Timber Trestle | Timber | 14.0' | 96' |
| 84 | 0.7 mi. S of Waimoa | Concrete pile | Timber | 20.0' | 272' |
| 87 | 0.7 mi. N of Waimoa | Timber Trestle | Timber | 15.0' | 80' |
| 88 | 1.0 mi. N of Waimoa | Timber Trestle | Timber | 13.0' | 90' |
| 89 | 2.2 mi. N of Waimoa | Timber Trestle | Timber | 20.0' | 96' |
| 90 | 2.9 mi. N of Waimoa | Timber Trestle | Timber | 14.0' | 75' |
| 92 | 4.0 mi. N of Waimoa | Timber Trestle | Timber | 10.5' | 128' |
| 101 | 0.6 mi. N of Waipahu | Concrete arch | Timber | 23.5' | 96' |
| 102 | 2.0 mi. N of Waipahu | Wood Trestle | Timber | 22.0' | 144' |
| 103 | 4.1 mi. N of Waipahu | Wood Trestle | Timber | 11.0' | 64' |
| 104 | 3.4 mi. S of Wahiawa | Wood Trestle | Timber | 22.0' | 224' |
| 105 | 3.3 mi. S of Wahiawa | Wood Trestle | Timber | 20.0' | 180' |
| 106 | 2.7 mi. S of Wahiawa | Wood Trestle | Timber | 30.0' | 320' |
| 107 | 0.6 mi. S of Wahiawa | Wood Trestle | Timber | 75.0' | 272' |
| 108 | 0.4 mi. N of Wahiawa | Wood Trestle | Timber | 115.0' | 608' |
| 109 | 2.0 mi. N of Wahiawa | Wood Trestle | Timber | 107.0' | 448' |
| 110 | 2.3 mi. N of Wahiawa | Wood Trestle | Timber | 55.0' | 272' |
| 111 | 0.2 mi. N of Brodie Junction | Wood Trestle | Timber | 13.0' | 112' |

INCL. NO. 2

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R E S T R I C T E D

1672 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

R E S T R I C T E D

Inclosure No. 2

HIGHWAY BRIDGES

Priority 1

| <u>Number:</u> | <u>Location:</u> | <u>Coordinates:</u> |
|----------------|--|---------------------|
| 52 | Kam Highway over Waiawa Stream | 01.95 - 84.12 |
| 49 | Kam Highway over Kipapa Stream | 98.25 - 82.99 |
| 17 | Kam Highway over S. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir | 96.46 - 95.68 |
| 16 | Kam Highway over N. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir | 96.37 - 96.75 |
| 9 | Kam Highway over Anahulu R. Haleiwa | 87.98 - 07.98 |
| 74 | Kam Highway over Waimea R., Waimea | 92.82 - 13.52 |
| 15 | Kam Highway over Poamoho Gulch | 95.27 - 98.92 |
| 45 | Old Kam Highway over Kaulaonahua Gulch, Schofield Barracks | 93.72 - 96.96 |

Priority II

| <u>Number:</u> | <u>Location:</u> | <u>Coordinates:</u> |
|----------------|--|---------------------|
| 13 | Kam Highway over at Waialua | 87.78 - 06.33 |
| 127 | Kam Highway at Kuapa Pond (Koko Head) | 32.45 - 70.22 |
| 5 | Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa | 86.06 - 04.57 |
| 6 | Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa | 86.12 - 05.76 |
| 7 | Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa | 86.52 - 06.20 |
| 61 | Dillingham Blvd. at Keehi Lagoon | 11.76 - 76.55 |
| 99 | Kam Highway at Kahana Bay | 14.34 - 03.25 |
| 160 | East Range Road over S. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir | 97.79 - 95.34 |
| 161 | Waipahu cut-off over O.R. & L. RR at Waipahu | 98.56 - 82.46 |
| 57 | New Kam Highway over Halawa Stream S. of Aiea | 06.82 - 80.30 |
| 109 | Kam Highway at Heeia fish pond | 21.04 - 89.11 |

R E S T R I C T E D

INCL. NO. 2

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[illegible][illegible]

R E S T R I C T E D**ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION**

Title
Place
Date and hour

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Naval Operations.-Movements (by fleet or groups).
- b. Enemy land operations.
 - (1) Enemy activities in forward areas and new identifications.
 - (2) Movements, concentrations and establishments in rear areas.
 - (3) Sabotage.
 - (4) Terrain, weather, visibility and surf as they affect the enemy.

2. CONCLUSIONS.

- a. Enemy capabilities.-An enumeration of lines of action open to the enemy which may affect accomplishment of the mission of the command.
- b. (1) A statement of the relative probability of adoption of the foregoing lines of action when such statement can be justified.
(2) Reasons justifying any statement made in (1) above.

Chief of section.

INCLOSURE NO. 4

R E S T R I C T E D

RESTRICTED

From: (Date and hour)
To: (Date and hour)

PERIODIC REPORTS

Issuing unit
Place
Date and hour of issue

No. _____
Maps. (These needed for an understanding of the report.)

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. Enemy front line (or nearest elements).--Location and nature.
- b. Defensive organization. - Trenches, emplacements, observation posts, command posts, obstacles, etc.
- c. Units in contact.-- Composition of units, with identifications if known; location of their flanks, estimated combat efficiency (strength, training, physical condition, morale, and other pertinent factors).
- d. Artillery.-- Location and calibers.
- e. Reserves and other forces capable of intervention.-- Location, strength, composition, dispositions, estimated combat efficiency, and where and when they probably can be employed.
- f. Supply and evacuation establishments.-- Location and nature.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

- a. General summary - action of enemy forces as a whole.
- b. Operations of component elements.
 - (1) Enemy Naval Operations.-- Movements (by fleet or groups).
 - (2) Enemy Land Operations.
 - (a) Landings. (By areas. Each entry to show, for that area, the front lines and identifications).
 - (b) Operations of Land Components.
 - 1. Antiaircraft artillery.
 - 2. Antitank units.
 - 3. Armored forces.
 - 4. Artillery.
 - 5. Aviation, combat.
 - 6. Aviation, observation.
 - 7. Cavalry.
 - 8. Chemical warfare.
 - 9. Engineers.
 - 10. Infantry.
 - 11. Tanks.
 - 12. Administrative elements.
- c. Sabotage.
- d. Miscellaneous.-- Such enemy activities, movements or changes since last report as are not conveniently included in b above.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

- a. Estimated enemy casualties, including prisoners.
- b. Morale.
- c. Supply and equipment.
- d. Terrain not under our control.
- e. Enemy's probable knowledge of our situation - observation, reconnaissance, prisoners and documents lost by us, inhabitants, etc.
- f. Weather, visibility and surf, by areas.
- g. Any enemy intelligence not specifically covered by headings of this report.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.-- A discussion of each of the lines of action open to the enemy which may affect the accomplishment of our mission, in the order of their possible imminence. For each capability, the effect of time, space, terrain, present known dispositions, and other factors in the situation should be evaluated. The earliest estimated time at which the enemy can put each into effect should be stated. When applicable, the possible result of the adoption by the enemy of any capability should be included.

AC of S, C-2.

ENCLOSURE NO. 5

RESTRICTED

R E S T R I C T E DALLOWANCES OF ORDNANCE AMMUNITION PER WEAPON FOR INITIAL ISSUE
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

| WEAPON | No. of rds. per Weapon | | | |
|---|------------------------|------|--------|-------|
| | AP | BALL | TRACER | TOTAL |
| Rifle, cal. .30, M1903 | 10 | 100 | 10 | 120 |
| Rifle, U.S., cal. .30, M1 | 25 | 250 | 25 | 300 |
| Rifle, automatic, cal. .30 (all) | 40 | 320 | 40 | 400 |
| Machine gun, cal. .30, ground (M1917) | 500 | 4000 | 500 | 5000 |
| Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A4)
(other than combat vehicle) | 150 | 1200 | 150 | 1500 |
| Machine gun, cal. .30 AA (M1917) | 250 | 2000 | 250 | 2500 |
| Machine gun, cal. .30, AC | 600 | 2400 | 600 | 3600 |
| Machine gun, cal. .30 (Tank or Armd. Car) | 4800 | | 1200 | 6000 |
| Machine gun, cal. .50, WC (A1) (AW Bn) | 2880 | 2880 | 1440 | 7200 |
| Machine gun, cal. .50, WC (AA)
(other than Automatic Weapons Bn) | 1440 | 1440 | 720 | 3600 |
| Machine gun, cal. .50, Aircraft | 120 | 840 | 240 | 1200 |
| Machine gun, cal. .50, HB (ground) | 960 | | 240 | 1200 |
| Machine gun, cal. .50, HB (Tank or Armd. Car) | 1568 | | 392 | 1900 |
| Pistol, cal. .45 | | 21 | | 21 |
| Shotgun, riot type | | | | 25 |
| Grenades, hand, frag. (per Rifle Co.) | | | | 150 |
| Signals, ground (assorted) or | | | | 25 |
| Lights, Very signal (assorted) | | | | 24 |
|
 | | | | |
| | HE | AP | SHRAP | |
| 37 mm gun, M1916 (Inf.) | 200 | | | 200 |
| 37 mm gun, Antitank (Note 1.) | 100 | 100 | | 200 |
| 37 mm gun, Antiaircraft (Note 1.) | 1620 | 180 | | 1800 |
| 60 mm Mortar (Note 1.) | 120 | | | 120 |
|
 | | | | |
| 81 mm Mortar | (Light) 120 | | | 150 |
| | (Heavy) 30 | | | |
|
 | | | | |
| 3" Trench Mortar | | | | 150 |
| 75 mm gun (Note 2.) | | | | 300 |
| 155 mm Howitzer, M1918 | 122 | | 28 | 150 |
| 3" AA Gun, Mobile | 300 | | | 300 |
| 3" AA Gun, fixed | 300 | | | 300 |
| 155 mm Gun, M1918 M1 | 100 | | | 100 |
| 240 mm How. M1918 | 60 | | | 60 |
| 8" Ry Gun | | 85 | | 85 |
| <u>FIXED SEACOAST ARTILLERY</u> | | | | |
| 3" gun, M1903 | 505 | | | 505 |
| 6" gun | | 1000 | | 1000 |
| 8" gun | 200 | 350 | | 550 |
| 12" gun (Barbette Carriage) | | 267 | | 267 |
| 12" gun (Disappearing Carriage) | | 272 | | 272 |
| 12" Mortar | | 300 | | 300 |
| 14" Gun | | 279 | | 279 |
| 16" Gun | | 250 | | 250 |

Note 1. - No service ammunition for this weapon on hand in Hawaiian Department at present.

Note 2. - Proportion of types (Shrapnel, reduced charge HE, and normal charge HE) to be as shown on requisitions kept on file at the designated supply points.

INCLOSURE NO. 6

R E S T R I C T E D

EXHIBIT NO. 65

[Copy]

SECRET

[1]

Op-12-VED
(SC)A16-1/RF13-13
Serial 075112

Secret

JULY 3, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations, and The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

To: The Special Naval Observer, London. The Special Army Observer, London.

Subject: Comment on the report of the American-Dutch-British Conversations, Singapore, April, 1941. (Short title "A. D. B.")

References: (a) United States—British Staff Conversations, ABC-1.

1. You are directed to advise the British Chiefs of Staff that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff regret that they are unable to approve the subject report, because in several major, as well as numerous minor, particulars, it is at variance with reference (a).

2. The major differences between the two reports may be summarized as follows:

(a) The Singapore report contains political matters which must be omitted from this military agreement. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are unable to recommend approval, as being beyond the scope of their authority, such political proposals as are contained in paragraphs 6, 8, 25, 26, 27, and 78. These should be taken up by the political departments of the governments, should these departments deem it possible to arrive at definite agreements.

(b) The scope of the naval strategic matters discussed is too broad. The Singapore report aims to set up a new intermediate command not envisaged by ABC-1. The "Eastern Theater," and the "Commander in Chief, Far Eastern Fleet," though not mentioned in ABC-1, form the basis for the naval strategic concept in the ADB Report [2]. Under ABC-1, the United States proposed to commit its Naval forces in the Far Eastern Area, except such forces as were operating in the defense of the Philippines, to British naval strategic direction only for employment in the Far Eastern Area. The United States has not agreed, and does not at this time propose to agree, to enter into any commitment for the employment of the naval forces of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet in areas outside of the Far Eastern Area, except as to limited operations having a direct relation to those in the Far Eastern Area. Should it become necessary in the future to retire from that area, further plans may then be concerted. This subject is discussed in detail in a subsequent paragraph.

(c) There is apparent a failure by the Delegates to appreciate the great strategic importance of holding the Netherlands East Indies, and particularly Sumatra and Java, and preventing enemy use of ----- and Loubok Straits. It will be impossible to hold Singapore if these Dutch Islands are captured by Japan.

(d) At British insistence during the ABC conversations the following was inserted in paragraph 11 (b) of the Report:

"A permanent feature of British strategic Policy is the retention of a position in the Far East such as will insure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the maintenance of its war effort."

In other exchanges during the ABC conversations the British Delegates emphasized repeatedly their view that the retention of the general line of the Malay Barrier was vital to the continued security of the United Kingdom itself. Nevertheless, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff note in Appendix 1 of the ADB Report that, of forty-eight British naval vessels available in the "Eastern Theater," only three British vessels are to operate in the vicinity of the Malay Barrier. No British vessels whatsoever are committed to the naval defense of the Barrier against Japanese naval forces advancing southward, nor to offensive operations designed to close the passages of the Barrier to the passage of Japanese raiders. All British naval forces are assigned to escort and patrol work, most of them at great distances from the position which the British Chiefs of Staff have asserted to be "vital." It may be pointed out that the naval defense of this position is entrusted, by the ADB Report, solely to United States

and [3] Dutch forces. Even the British Force II would not be placed in a position to operate offensively. It would only be during Phase II, which contemplates sending a strong British Fleet to the Far East, that British naval forces would be employed in a manner which might support the defense of the Malay Barrier. Since the eventual despatch of a strong British Fleet to the Far East is considered problematical, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff advise you that, until such time as a plan is evolved whereby British naval forces take a predominant part in the defense of the British position in the Far East Area, they will be constrained to withdraw their agreement to permit the United States Asiatic Fleet to operate under British strategic direction in that Area.

(e) The ABD Report contravenes the agreement set forth in paragraph 14 (f) of the reference. The Chief of Naval Operations cannot agree to permit aviation forces of the United States Navy to operate for other than naval purposes, or to be placed under other than naval command. It is particularly important, in the case of a naval force of inferior strength, to have available naval aviation units which are well trained in naval operations.

(f) After conclusion of the ABC conversations the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff advised the British Chiefs of Staff of their desire that, as soon as practicable, delegates be assembled in Singapore for the purpose of drawing up a practical operating plan for the Far East Area in accordance with the ABC agreements. Their view was that a plan should be gotten ready for immediate use in case of eventualities. The report of ADB conversations cannot be considered as a practical operating plan. In it, proposed United States operations in the Philippines are clearly outlined. Dutch plans are fairly definite. British plans may be approximately deduced only from the deployment proposed in Appendix 1. There is no strategic operating plan set forth for operations in common by the three Powers involved. The ADB Report cannot take the place of such a plan, and the opinion is entertained that, until such a plan is drawn up, the cooperative effort of the Associated Powers in the Far East Area will be largely ineffective.

[4] 3. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff can see no particular advantage in establishing the "Eastern Theater," and appointing a new British Commander termed the "Commander in Chief, FAR EASTERN FLEET." It is suggested that the same purposes could be served by giving appropriate authority to the British Commander in Chief, China, and have that officer, familiar with the general situation, continue to exercise direction even after the arrival on that station of additional British naval forces. It is agreed that there is no objection to giving this officer general strategic control of the various British naval stations in the Indian Ocean and the China Sea, but the establishment of an officer in a superior echelon, in command of all is considered of questionable value. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are disposed to discuss this matter further, if so requested by the British Chiefs of Staff, but question the present utility of such discussion, in view of the length of time before it would be practicable to establish such an office.

4. Details of the subject report which either vary from ABC-1, or appear to be unacceptable for other reasons, are indicated below. The numbers referred to are the paragraph numbers of the report.

3 (a): The operating plan should be confined to the plan for the Far East Area, rather than for the "Eastern Theater."

4: This paragraph does not give sufficient emphasis to the security of the Dutch position, nor to the necessity for the greatest possible degree of offensive operations. Attention in this connection is invited to the naval tasks set forth in paragraph 35, Annex 3, ABC-1. It is not agreed that Japanese expeditions against the Netherlands East Indies can be outflanked from Luzon if such expeditions go south via the protected line of the Pelews. This latter remark applies also to paragraph 13.

13: As indicated in previous correspondence, the usefulness of Hong Kong depends on its ability to contain Japanese blockade forces, as that base is unlikely to be usable for naval base purposes.

17: The opinion is held that, if the Pelews line of southward movement is taken by the Japanese, the early capture of Borneo and the northern line of the Dutch Islands is essential to a serious Japanese attempt against Java.

[5] 29: With respect to strengthening the defenses of Luzon, the conference apparently failed to give appropriate importance to paragraph 13 (d) of reference (a). Because of the greater needs of other strategic areas, the United States is not now able to provide any considerable additional reinforcement to the Philippines. Under present world conditions it is not considered possible to hope

to launch a strong offensive from the Philippines. The United States is taking steps to strengthen the defenses of the Philippines through improving the quality of native troops, and by providing additional modern material.

32: This subject was discussed during the ABC conversations, and decision reached to forego inclusion of it in the report, as the right is sovereign. Reference to it should be omitted from the ADB Report.

35: (last subparagraph)—The establishment of a combined staff, (presumably for all Services and all Powers), in Singapore is not considered advisable, there being no agreement, nor possibility of agreement, for a single commander of all of the military forces of the Associated Powers. Appropriate liaison should, of course, be established. Existing liaison for the purposes indicated is considered adequate, so far as the United States is concerned.

38 and 39: These paragraphs cannot be accepted as to United States naval aircraft, for the reason given previously.

41: This paragraph should be omitted as it has already been covered by reference (a). It differs in certain respects from that reference. The United States does not agree that the United States Pacific Fleet must under all circumstances be equal in strength to the Japanese Fleet.

42: The matter of cooperation in the Tasman Sea between the United States Pacific Fleet and the British Naval Forces has been clarified in other correspondence.

45 and 46: This is not in accord with ABC-1, which requires that the Associated Powers, except in an emergency, will exercise command over their own forces. United States Naval Forces would not be "released" to British operation, in the sense in which paragraph 46 is construed, but would be assigned appropriate strategic tasks, derived from those listed in ABC-1, under the strategic direction of the British Commander in Chief, China.

47: As previously indicated, the small part which is proposed for British Naval Forces in the Far East Area is not acceptable. This and succeeding paragraphs should be clarified.

[6] 53, 54 and 55: Since this plan should apply particularly to the Far East Area, the details listed in these three paragraphs cover too wide a scope.

57: This paragraph seems rather indefinite.

61, 62, 63, and 64: It is suggested that reference to Phase II might be omitted from the present consideration, since plans as to operations in that Phase must necessarily be highly speculative at this time.

Appendix II: United States naval aircraft should be listed under the United States Asiatic Fleet. Subparagraph (d) is not acceptable as regards United States naval aviation.

5. If further conferences are to be held in Singapore for drawing up an operating plan for the Associated Powers, it is suggested that the conference would have its work simplified were its deliberations to be guided by an agenda which had been agreed upon in advance between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Government of the Netherlands East Indies. Therefore, you will inform the British Chiefs of Staff that, after they have had sufficient opportunity to give further study to this matter, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff will be pleased to entertain suggestions which they may have to offer with respect to such an agenda.

(Sgd.) H. R. STARK,
Chief of Naval Operations.

(Sgd.) G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

JUL 25 1941.
Out OCS

Copy to:

Cincaf To CNO for dispatch
Cincpac To CNO for dispatch
Room 2055

Serial #261

Comdg. Gen., Philippine Dept. Reg. No. 900051, 7-26-41
British Jt. Staff Mission in Washington

2 Copies to C. N. O.—Rm. 2055

1 Carbon copy accompanied original to S. P. O. B. (checked him)
7-26-41 acw-rlc

EXHIBIT NO. 66

| | | |
|---|---------------|----------------|
| TO: CINCPAC | FROM: CINCPAC | SUBJECT: SPRAY |
| DEC 6, 1941. | CINCPAC | OPNAV |
| CURTIS | CINCPAC | OPNAV |
| ROBINSON | OPNAV | OPNAV |
| \$61255 OR \$151 | | |
| REPORT BY CINC CHINA "25 SHIP CONVOY WITH ESCORT OF 6 CRUISERS AND 10 DD'S LAT 08-45 N, 106-45 EAST AT 0316 GMT TODAY. CONVOY OF 15 SHIPS WITH TWO CRUISERS AND 10 DESTROYERS 07-45 NORTH, 106-25 EAST TWO HOURS LATER ALL ON COURSE WEST. THREE ADDITIONAL SHIPS 07-51 NORTH 105 EAST AT 0442. COURSE 310. THIS INDICATES ALL FORCES WILL MAKE FOR HONOLULU KONTRON" | | |
| SIGHTED BY MY SCOUTING FORCE ANCHORED CAMRANH BAY - 30 SHIPS AND ONE LARGE CRUISER. | | |
| ACTION: 388..... | | |
| RECORD COPIES 12.....13.....16.....38.....388.....NAVAIDE.....FILE..... | | |
| CNO.....P1A FILE..... 25 OP..... | | |
| SECRET BAD | | |

SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

December 6, 1941.

Memorandum for State Department.

Following report has been received from the Commander
in Chief Asiatic Fleet dated December 6th:

British Commander in Chief China reports a twenty five
ship convoy escorted by 5 cruisers and 10 destroyers in
Lat. 08 - 00 N. Long. 106 - 00 East at 0316 Greenwich time
today. A convoy of ten ships with two cruisers and 10
destroyers were in Lat. 07 - 40 North Long. 106 - 20 East
two hours later. All on course west. Three additional
ships in Lat. 07 - 51 North Long 105 - 00 East at 0442
course 310°. This indicates all forces will make for
Kohtron in Lat. 10 - 01 N. Long 104 East.

Commander in Chief Asiatic Admiral Hart's Scouting Force
has sighted 30 ships and one large cruiser anchored in
Camranh Bay.

R. E. Schuirmann
R. E. Schuirmann,
by direction.

Reproduction of this material in any form is not
authorized except by specific approval of the
Secretary of the Navy.

JUN 25 1943

FILED

Confidential File

894.30/128-1/2

EXHIBIT NO. 67

From: Washington.
 To : Tokyo.
 17 August 1941
 (Purple)

#708 (Probably an error for #706)

This afternoon, in spite of the fact that it was Sunday, I called, at his personal request, on the President, who had just returned to Washington this morning. (Secretary Hull was also present). Upon our arrival, he read two papers, the contents of which is being sent to you as my message #707* (the gist of which was that if Japan makes further aggression through the use of force of arms, the United States will take any and all necessary steps immediately to protect the interests of the United States and of United States citizens), and my message #708** (the gist of which is that in connection with Japan's proposal to conduct a meeting of leaders of the two countries, the United States would like to be advised of the aims of the Japanese Government).

After reading them, he requested me to relay the contents to my home government. He added that the two papers were not to be considered as oral statements, but were to be given the status of only reference material. As such, he said, he had had the State Department prepare them. I accepted the papers on condition that they would be for only my information.

I am sending you the gist of our talks and the opinions expressed in subsequent messages.

*JD-1: 4672.

**JD-2: _____.

21225

JD-1: 4671

(D) Navy Trans. 8-20-41 [1]

From: Washington.
To : Tokyo.
17 August 1941
(Purple)

(English text, enciphered in Purple)

#707(In 2 parts, complete).

During past months the Governments of the United States and of Japan, through the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, have engaged in protracted conversations directed toward exploring the possibility of reaching a sound basis for negotiations between the two countries relative to the maintenance of peace with order and justice in the Pacific. The principles and policies which were under discussion in these conversations precluded pursuit by either government of objectives of expansion by force or by threat of force.

On July 24 last the President of the United States informed the Japanese Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington that he was willing to suggest to the governments of Great Britain, of the Netherlands and of China that they make a binding and solemn declaration that they had no aggressive intentions with regard to Indo-China and that they would agree that the markets and raw materials of Indo-China should be available to all powers on equal terms. The President stated further that he would be willing to suggest to the powers mentioned that they undertake this declaration, in which the United States would be willing to join, upon the understanding that the government of Japan would be disposed to make a similar declaration and would be further disposed to withdraw its military and naval forces from Indo China. Notwithstanding these efforts, the government of Japan has continued its military activities and its disposal of armed forces at various points in the Far East and has occupied Indo-China with its military, air and naval forces.

The government of the United States is in full sympathy with the desire expressed by the Japanese Government that there be provided a fresh basis for amicable and mutually profitable relations between our two countries.

This government's patience in seeking an acceptable basis for such an understanding has been demonstrated time and again during recent years and especially during recent months. This government feels at the present stage that nothing short of the most complete candor on its part, in the light of evidence and indications which come to it from many sources, will at this moment tend to further the objectives sought.

Such being the case, this government now finds it necessary to say to the government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a

(continued) Navy Trans. 8-20-41 (2)

21226

JD-1: 4672

policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

21226

JD-1: 4672

Navy Trans. 8-20-41 (2)

From: Washington (Nomura)
To : Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
(Purple)
17 August, 1941

(English text, enciphered in
Purple)

#708 Part 1 of 8 (Strictly Confidential)

Reference is made to the question which the Japanese Ambassador raised on 8 August during a conversation with the Secretary of State, whether it might not be possible for the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States to meet with a view to discussing means whereby an adjustment in relations between the United States and Japan might be brought about. The thought of Prince Konoye and of the Japanese Government in offering this suggestion is appreciated.

Reference is also made to the desire expressed by the Japanese Ambassador during a call on the Secretary of State on 16 August, that there be resumed the informal conversations which had been in progress between the two governments toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation.

Part 2 of 8

Part 3 of 8

On two occasions officers of the Department of State, pursuant to instructions from the Secretary of State, called on the Japanese Ambassador to indicate concern over the reports that Japan intended to acquire by force or threat of force military and naval bases in French Indo-China. Subsequently, On July 20 and July 23 the Acting Secretary of State raised with the Japanese Minister and with the Japanese Ambassador the question of Japan's intentions with regard to French Indo-China and pointed out that the government of the United States could only assume that the occupation by Japan of French Indo-China or the acquisition of military and naval bases in that area constituted notice to the United States that Japan had taken by forceful means a step preparatory to embarking on further movements of conquest in the south Pacific area. The Acting Secretary pointed out further that this new move on Japan's part was prejudicial to the procurement by the United States of essential raw materials and to the peace of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands.

Part 4 of 8

The government of the United States accordingly had no alternative but to inform the Japanese Ambassador that, in the

(continued) Navy Trans. 8-21-41 (2)

2133
D-1:4696

opinion of this government, the measures then being taken by the Japanese Government had served to remove the basis for further conversations relative to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area.

Informal discussions between the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States directed toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation would naturally envisage the working out of a program attainable by peaceful methods. It goes without saying that no proposals or suggestions affecting the rights and privileges of either the United States or Japan would be considered except as they might be in conformity with the basic principles to which the United States has long been committed.

Part 5 of 8

Part 6 of 8

If such a program based upon peaceable and constructive principles were to be adopted for the Pacific and if thereafter any of the countries or areas within the Pacific were menaced, the policy of aiding nations resisting aggression would continue to be followed by this government and this government would cooperate with other nations in extending assistance to any country threatened.

Under such a program for the Pacific area Japan would, in the opinion of the government of the United States, attain all the objectives which Japan affirm that it is seeking. This program would not enable any country to extend its military or political control over other peoples or to obtain economic rights of a definitely monopolistic or preferential character.

Part 7 of 8

In those areas where the production and distribution of essential commodities are vested in monopolies, the government of the United States would expect to use its influence to see that all countries are given a fair share of the distribution of the products of such monopolies and at a fair price.

If the Japanese Government is seeking what it affirms to be its objectives, the Government of the United States feels that the program above outlined is one that can be counted upon to assure Japan satisfaction of its economic needs and legitimate aspirations with much greater certainty than could any other program.

In case the Japanese government feels that Japan desires and is in position to suspend its expansionist activities, to readjust its position, and to embark upon a peaceful program

21334

JD-1:

(continued) Navy Trans. 8-21-41 (2)

the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles to which the United States is committed, the government of the United States would be prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory discussions which were interrupted in July and would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to exchange views.

Part 6 of 8

The government of the United States, however, feels that, in view of the circumstances attending the interruption of the informal conversations between the two governments, it would be helpful to both governments, before entering a resumption of such conversations or proceeding with plans for a meeting, if the Japanese Government would be so good as to furnish a clearer statement than has yet been furnished as to its present attitude and plans, just as this government has repeatedly outlined to the Japanese Government its attitude and plans.

*Parts 2 and 5 not available.

21334

JD-1:

Heavy Trans. 8-21-41 (2)

From: Washington (Nomura).
 To : Tokyo.
 17 August 1941
 (Purple)

(English text, enciphered in Purple)

#708

Part 2 of 8

When the Japanese Ambassador brought up the suggestions, the Secretary of State reminded the Ambassador that the government of the United States had shown great patience and had been prepared to continue in that course of patience so long as the Japanese Government manifested a desire to follow courses of peace. It was pointed out to the Ambassador that while proceeding along this course this government had received reports indicating clearly that the Japanese Government was adopting courses directly the opposite of those on which the recent conversations between the Ambassador and the Secretary of State had been predicated. It was pointed out also that the Japanese press was being constantly stimulated to speak of encirclement of Japan by the United States and was being officially inspired in ways calculated to inflame public opinion. The Secretary of State made it clear that he did not see how conversations between the two governments could usefully be pursued or proposals be discussed while Japanese official spokesmen and the Japanese press contended that the United States was endeavoring to encircle Japan and carried on a campaign against the United States.

Part 5 of 8

The program envisaged in such informal discussions would involve the application in the entire Pacific area of the principles of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. It would thus make possible access by all countries to raw materials and to all other essential commodities. Such a program would envisage cooperation by all nations of the Pacific, on a voluntary and peaceful basis toward utilizing all available resources of capital, technical skill, and progressive economic leadership for the purpose of building up not only their own economies but also ~~that~~ the economies of regions where productive capacity can be improved. The result would be to increase the purchasing power of the nations and peoples concerned, to raise standards of living, and to create conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace.

21335

JD-1:

Navy Trans. 8-22-41 (X)

4713

EXHIBIT NO. 68

1053

Page

| UNITED STATES SHIP | BOILER | Tender | No. | November 1941 |
|--|--------|--------|-----|---------------|
| ZONE DESCRIPTION - 11 REMARKS | | | | |
| 0 to 4. | | | | |
| Steaming in company with Task Group 13.4, on course 267°T and pgo, 235°psc, at speed 13.6 knots, (142 rpm). Boilers #5, #6, and #7 in use. Ship darkened and in Material Condition Baker. Condition of Readiness Three set throughout the ship. Average steam 426.6. Average rpm. 142.1. | | | | |
| 4 to 5. | | | | |
| Steaming as before, on course 267°T and pgo, at 13.6 knots. Average steam 425. Average rpm. 141.5. | | | | |
| <i>R. O. Dwyer</i>
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy. | | | | |
| 6 to 9. | | | | |
| Steaming as before. 0640 Unset Material Condition Baker above third deck. 0715 Sighted plane bearing 313°T. Position of convoy: Latitude: 20° 00' 00" N.; Longitude: 168° 07' 00" E. Average steam 426.6. Average rpm. 142.6. | | | | |
| <i>W. E. Sawyer</i>
Ensign, D-V(1), U.S.N.R. | | | | |
| 9 to 12. | | | | |
| Steaming as before. 0815 Mustered crew at quarters; absentees, none. 0915 Set Material Condition Baker. 0930 Sounded General quarters for damage control drill. 0931 Set Material Condition Afirm. 1037 Unset Material Condition Afirm. 1040 Set Material Condition Baker. 1042 Set Condition of Readiness III. 1159 Position of convoy by latitude and longitude indicator: Latitude: 19° 58' 50" N.; Longitude: 167° 11' 00" E. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. Average steam 426.6. Average rpm. 143.2. | | | | |
| <i>W. E. Thomas, Jr.</i>
Ensign, D-V(1), U.S.N.R. | | | | |
| 12 to 16. | | | | |
| Steaming as before. 1256 Changed course to 267°T. 1300 Changed speed to 13.8 knots, 143 revolutions per minute. 1440 On signal from S.S. FREQUENT PRANT changed course to 236°T. 1511 Shifted steering control to steering aft. 1544 Shifted steering control to navigation bridge. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 144.6. | | | | |
| <i>A. C. Fox</i>
Ensign, D-V(1), U.S.N.R. | | | | |
| 16 to 18. | | | | |
| Steaming as before. 1645 Set Material Condition Baker. 1716 Darkened ship. Average steam 425. Average rpm. 142.8. | | | | |
| 18 to 30. | | | | |
| Steaming as before. Average steam 420. Average rpm. 141.9. | | | | |
| <i>R. O. Dwyer</i>
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy. | | | | |
| 20 to 24. | | | | |
| Steaming as before. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 141.6. | | | | |
| <i>A. T. Hathaway</i>
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy. | | | | |
| Approved: <i>S. B. Robinson</i>
S. B. Robinson,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding. | | | | |
| Examined: <i>Edward J. Hayes</i>
Edward J. Hayes,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy. | | | | |

Original Edition copy of this page to be used as Bureau of Production reference only

1056

| LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP | | | | | | | | | | BOISE | | 1047 | |
|---|-------|------|------|-----------|--------------|----------|--------|-----|---------|----------------|--|-----------------------------|--|
| Pearl Harbor, T.H. | | | | | | | | | | TO | | Wednesday 26 November 41 | |
| ZONE DESCRIPTION -11 | | | | | | | | | | S. E. ROBINSON | | Capt. T. J. May, Commanding | |
| Time | Lat | Long | Wind | Barometer | Temperature | Moisture | Clouds | Sea | Remarks | | | | |
| 1 | 140.0 | 14.0 | 13.0 | 256 | ENE 18 22:00 | 78.73 | 81 | bc | cu | | | | |
| 2 | 142.3 | 13.9 | 13.2 | 256 | ENE 16 23:00 | 77.73 | 81 | bc | st cu | | | | |
| 3 | 141.6 | 13.9 | 13.2 | 256 | ENE 15 23:00 | 76.73 | 81 | bc | cu nb | | | | |
| 4 | 141.7 | 13.9 | 12.7 | 256 | NE 19 23:00 | 76.74 | 81 | bc | st cu | | | | |
| 5 | 141.3 | 13.9 | 12.6 | 256 | NE 19 23:00 | 78.73 | 81 | bc | st cu | | | | |
| 6 | 141.3 | 13.9 | 12.6 | 256 | NE 16 23:00 | 78.74 | 81 | bc | cu | | | | |
| 7 | 141.3 | 13.9 | 12.6 | 256 | NE 16 23:00 | 79.73 | 81 | bc | cu | | | | |
| 8 | 141.3 | 13.9 | 12.6 | 256 | NE 16 23:00 | 79.74 | 81 | bc | cu | | | | |
| 9 | 141.3 | 13.9 | 12.6 | 256 | NE 16 23:00 | 79.74 | 81 | bc | cu | | | | |
| 10 | 141.3 | 13.9 | 12.6 | 256 | NE 16 23:00 | 79.75 | 81 | bc | cu nb | | | | |
| 11 | 142.0 | 13.9 | 12.6 | 256 | NE 16 23:00 | 79.73 | 81 | bc | cu | | | | |
| 12 | 141.3 | 13.9 | 12.6 | 256 | NE 16 23:00 | 79.73 | 81 | bc | cu | | | | |
| <p>Latitude 18° 50' 00" N.
Longitude 162° 17' 00" E.</p> <p>Latitude 18° 45' 00" N.
Longitude 161° 21' 00" E.</p> <p>Latitude 18° 16' 00" N.
Longitude 159° 17' 00" E.</p> <p>Current: Set 235°
Drift 0.50</p> <p>Gyrocompass in Use
Error 0.2° N.</p> <p>Beavercamp Mag Compass
Compass No.
S. H.
Error
Variation
Deviation</p> <p>Received None
Expended 23,720
On hand 482,295</p> <p>Distilled 20,120
Received None
Expended 17,315
On hand 137,174</p> <p>Refrigerating Pumps
Draft for'd
Draft aft</p> <p>After Entering Port
Draft for'd
Draft aft</p> <p>Maximum Temperature:
Maximum 82° at R.R.
Minimum 73 at 24M
Normal.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <p>DRILLS AND EXERCISES</p> <p>Decision Making Attention</p> <p>Steering casual. Fire drill.
2 ty drill. Fire and rescue
School for re-drill.
4 pair parties. Steering casual.
AAA Condition II drill.
6 gun drill. Instruction in
7 min & AA loading. Firing 45 cal
8 sight setting. pistol for
9 control. track. compass
ing drill. General lecture
Visual operating for 2nd division
drill. Divisional in-
struction supply structure in
drill for turret. Naval terms
III. definitions and
AA gun crews in. naval etiquette
struction in first Condition
aid. rifle and Baker.
pistol.
Lookout instruction.
Spotting drill.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 13 | 141.2 | 13.9 | 13.4 | 256 | ENE 17 22:00 | 80.73 | 81 | bc | cu | | | | |
| 14 | 142.0 | 13.9 | 13.4 | 256 | ENE 18 22:00 | 80.73 | 81 | bc | cu nb | | | | |
| 15 | 142.0 | 13.9 | 13.4 | 256 | ENE 19 22:00 | 79.73 | 81 | bc | cu nb | | | | |
| 16 | 142.1 | 13.9 | 13.4 | 256 | ENE 22 22:00 | 80.73 | 81 | bc | cu nb | | | | |
| 17 | 141.8 | 13.9 | 13.4 | 256 | ENE 23 22:00 | 80.73 | 81 | bc | cu nb | | | | |
| 18 | 142.0 | 13.9 | 13.4 | 256 | NE 23 22:00 | 78.74 | 81 | bc | cu nb | | | | |
| 19 | 141.8 | 13.9 | 13.4 | 256 | NE 24 22:00 | 78.74 | 82 | bc | cu nb | | | | |
| 20 | 141.9 | 13.9 | 13.4 | 256 | NE 22 22:00 | 79.74 | 82 | bc | cu nb | | | | |
| 21 | 141.9 | 13.9 | 13.4 | 256 | NE 22 22:00 | 80.73 | 82 | bc | cu nb | | | | |
| 22 | 142.1 | 13.9 | 13.4 | 256 | NE 22 22:00 | 80.73 | 82 | bc | cu nb | | | | |
| 23 | 142.1 | 13.9 | 13.4 | 256 | NE 22 22:00 | 79.74 | 82 | bc | cu nb | | | | |
| 24 | 141.4 | 13.9 | 13.4 | 256 | NE 20 22:00 | 80.73 | 82 | bc | cu nb | | | | |
| <p>DOWNWIND RUN DATA - CIRCULAR</p> <p>Run No. (Serial)
Time to submerge
Crackoff depth</p> | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

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| UNITED STATES SHIP | BOISE | Wednesday 20 | November 1941 |
|---|---|---|---------------|
| ZONE DESCRIPTION -11- | | REMARKS | |
| 0 to 4. | | <p>Steaming on course 256°T and pgo, 246°psc, in company with Task Force 15.4. Steaming on boilers #5, #6, and #7, at speed 13.8 knots, 143 rpm. (standard speed 15 knots). Ship darkened, in Material Condition Baker and in Condition of Readiness III. Average steam 426.5. Average rpm. 142.4.</p> <p><i>D. H. Adams</i>
D. H. ADAMS,
Lieutenant (jg), D-V(G), U.S.N.R.</p> | |
| 4 to 6. | | <p>Steaming as before. Average steam 423. Average rpm. 141.6.</p> <p><i>F. G. Dierman</i>
F. G. DIERMAN,
Lieutenant (jg), U.S. Navy.</p> | |
| 6 to 8. | | <p>Steaming as before. 0623 Sighted ship; Unset Material Condition Baker above the third deck. Average steam 426. Average rpm. 141.0.</p> <p><i>T. D. Morris</i>
T. D. MORRIS,
Ensign, D-V(F), U.S.N.R.</p> | |
| 8 to 12. | | <p>Steaming as before. 0815 Mustered crew at quarters; no absentees. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal. Average steam 420. Average rpm. 141.9.</p> <p><i>L. A. Collins, Jr.</i>
L. A. COLLINS, JR.,
Ensign, U. S. Navy.</p> | |
| 12 to 16. | | <p>Steaming as before. 1435 Exercised crew at fire drill. 1437 First stream of water. 1443 Secured from fire drill. 1446 Sailed away fire and rescue party. 1453 Secured from general drills. 1500 Steering aft took steering control. 1537 Navigation bridge took steering control. Average steam 425. Average rpm. 142.</p> <p><i>A. C. Fox</i>
A. C. FOX,
Ensign, C-V(3), U.S.N.R.</p> | |
| 16 to 18. | | <p>Steaming as before. 1712 Set Material Condition Baker above the third deck. 1742 Darkened ship. Average steam 423. Average rpm. 141.0.</p> <p><i>T. D. Morris</i>
T. D. MORRIS,
Ensign, D-V(F), U.S.N.R.</p> | |
| 18 to 20. | | <p>Steaming as before on course 256°T and pgo, at 13.6 knots. Average steam 422.5. Average rpm. 141.6.</p> <p><i>W. G. Butler, Jr.</i>
W. G. BUTLER, JR.,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy.</p> | |
| 20 to 24. | | <p>Steaming as before. Average steam 421. Average rpm. 141.6.</p> <p><i>D. S. Edwards, Jr.</i>
D. S. EDWARDS, JR.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.</p> | |
| Approved: | Examined: | | |
| <i>S. B. Robinson</i>
S. B. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding. | <i>Edward S. Pearson</i>
Edward S. Pearson,
Lieutenant Commander, R.N.R. Surgeon. | | |

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N. NAV. 44

Page 1059

ADDITIONAL SHEET

U. S. S. BOLLE

Date 27 November 1941.

20 to 24. (Continued).

port, distant about 8000 yards, on course about 0600T. 2304 Cut in boilers #3 and #4 on main steam line. 2310 secured from forward quarters. Set Material Condition Baker. On various courses resuming position ahead of convoy. 2350 Resumed course 2490T and pgo, in station ahead of convoy. Average steam 428.3. Average rpm. 141.6.

E. S. Edwards, Jr.
E. S. EDWARDS, Jr.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

Approved:

B. B. Robinson

B. B. ROBINSON
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.

Checked:

Edward S. Pearce

Edward S. Pearce
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy.

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets)

100-10

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| UNITED STATES SHIP | ACIER | Friday | 25 | November | 1941 |
|--|--|--|----|----------|------|
| ZONE DESCRIPTION -10 | | REMARKS | | | |
| 3 to 4. | | <p>Steaming on course 249°T and 430, 2400 per psi at 13.8 knots, 141 rpm, acting as escort to a convoy consisting of U.S.S. FAIRBANKS, PRESIDENT GRANT, DONA NATI, JOHN WYKES, and U.S.S. FAIRBANKS. 1000 to 2300 yards ahead of PRESIDENT GRANT, convoy guide. Convoy in line divisions. Boilers #3, #6, #7 in use. Ships darkened, in material condition BAKER, in condition of readiness II. Average steam 430. Average rpm 140.9.</p> <p><i>A. T. Hathaway</i>
A. T. HATHAWAY,
Lieutenant, (jg), U.S. Navy.</p> | | | |
| 4 to 5. | | <p>Steaming as before. 0605 Limited ship; set Modified Condition BAKER; secured from Condition of Readiness II; set Condition of Readiness III. Average steam 427.5. Average rpm 140.7.</p> <p><i>U. S. EDWARDS</i>
U. S. EDWARDS,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy.</p> | | | |
| 5 to 17. | | <p>Steaming as before. 0805 Changed speed to 12 knots. 0832 Changed speed to 13.8 knots. 1400 25 November, 1941, the Captain held court and assigned the following punishments: COCKER, J.R., SeaPc, Unseamanlike conduct, throwing lighted cigarette on linoleum deck; 4 hours extra duty. GOGO, J.W., Matt2c, (1) having another man's clothing in his possession; (2) marking another man's clothing with his name; 5 days solitary confinement. WILFEL, J.W., SeaPc, smoking during general quarters; 5 days restriction. FRASER, W.F., M2c, allowing a man to smoke during general quarters; 5 days restriction. HANLY, F.P., Sea2c, asleep on lookout watch at 0100 11/25/41; Deck Court. TETI, F.L., Sea2c, asleep on lookout watch at 0100, 11/25/41; Deck Court. 1038 Out in boiler #5. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; Conditions normal. Average steam 428.7. Average rpm 137.7.</p> <p><i>T. D. MORRIS</i>
T. D. MORRIS,
Ensign, D-V(P), U.S.N.R.</p> | | | |
| 17 to 18. | | <p>Steaming as before. 1300 Commanding officer conducted inspection of lower decks. 1500 Various courses and speeds launching two aircraft for reconnaissance; Lt. (jg) BOAL, U.S.N., in charge. Average Steam 428.8. Average rpm 131.2.</p> <p><i>L. A. COLLINS</i>
L. A. COLLINS,
Ensign, U.S. Navy.</p> | | | |
| 18 to 20. | | <p>Steaming as before, on various courses at various speeds. 1614 Secured from flight quarters, having recovered two aircraft. On various courses resuming position ahead of convoy. 1641 Resumed course 249°T and speed 13.8 knots. 1703 Set Material Condition BAKER. 1719 Lighted off boilers #3 and #4. 1733 Darkened ship. 1743 Sighted ship bearing 285°T, hull down. Changed course to 250°T, changed speed to 15 knots. Manned battle stations. 1750 Out in boilers #3 and #4 on main steam line. 1752 Set Condition AFIRM. On various courses at various speeds keeping between ship sighted at 1743 and convoy. Ship appeared to be H.I.J.N.S. "ATAGO" type. Steaming darkened at 14 knots on various courses toward convoy. 1800 Ship turned so course about 250°T. 1804 On various courses closing convoy. 1838 Unseen Condition AFIRM. 1920 On various courses in rear of convoy, having lost Japanese cruiser bearing 072°T. Average steam 431.2. Average rpm 139.5.</p> <p><i>U. S. EDWARDS</i>
U. S. EDWARDS,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy.</p> | | | |
| 20 to 24. | | <p>Steaming as before. Average steam 430. Average rpm 139.4.</p> <p><i>A. T. Hathaway</i>
A. T. HATHAWAY,
Lieutenant, (jg), U.S. Navy.</p> | | | |
| Approved: <i>S. B. Robinson</i>
S. B. ROBINSON,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding. | Examined: <i>Edward S. Pease</i>
Edward S. Pease,
Lieutenant Commander,
R.A.N. Foreign. | | | | |

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1696 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

1062

Page

| LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BOISE | | 747 | | | | | | | |
|--|-------|------|------|-----|-----|----|-------|-------|----|----|-------|----|---|----|---|----|--|--|---------------------|--|--------|--|-----|--|
| AT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pearl Harbor, T.H. | | TO | | Friday 20 Nov. 1941 | | | | | |
| ZONE DESCRIPTION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | S. H. ROBINSON | | Capt. U. S. Navy, Commanding | | | | | | | |
| TIME | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | WIND | | BAROMETER | | TEMPERATURE | | CLOUDS | | SEA | |
| 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2 | | 3 | | 4 | | 5 | | 6 | |
| 1 | 140.0 | 13.0 | 13.2 | 249 | NNE | 17 | 12:52 | 81.74 | 82 | bc | ou nb | NE | 4 | 11 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 2 | 140.0 | 13.0 | 13.5 | 249 | NNE | 16 | 12:55 | 81.74 | 82 | c | ou nb | NE | 5 | 5 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 3 | 140.0 | 13.0 | 13.6 | 249 | NNE | 16 | 12:55 | 80.75 | 80 | bp | ou nb | NE | 8 | 5 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 4 | 141.0 | 13.0 | 13.4 | 249 | NNE | 16 | 12:54 | 81.72 | 82 | bc | ou nb | NE | 8 | 5 | 2 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 5 | 140.0 | 13.0 | 13.5 | 249 | NNE | 13 | 12:54 | 81.72 | 82 | bc | ou nb | NE | 7 | 5 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 6 | 141.0 | 13.0 | 13.4 | 249 | NNE | 17 | 12:53 | 81.73 | 82 | c | st cu | NE | 3 | 10 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | 141.0 | 13.0 | 13.2 | 249 | NNE | 20 | 12:56 | 81.73 | 82 | c | ou nb | NE | 5 | 30 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 8 | 142.0 | 13.0 | 13.2 | 249 | NNE | 17 | 12:59 | 82.76 | 82 | bc | st cu | NE | 5 | 30 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 9 | 142.0 | 13.0 | 13.2 | 249 | NNE | 23 | 12:50 | 82.76 | 82 | c | st cu | NE | 7 | 30 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 10 | 141.0 | 13.0 | 13.2 | 249 | NNE | 17 | 12:50 | 81.76 | 82 | c | ou nb | NE | 8 | 30 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 11 | 140.0 | 13.0 | 13.2 | 249 | NNE | 17 | 12:56 | 83.77 | 82 | c | ou nb | NE | 8 | 30 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 12 | 138.0 | 13.0 | 13.3 | 249 | NNE | 19 | 12:53 | 83.75 | 82 | c | ou nb | NE | 8 | 30 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 1 Latitude: 13° 59' 00"N
2 Longitude: 150° 51' 00"E
3 Latitude: 13° 52' 00"N
4 Longitude: 149° 56' 00"E
5 Latitude: 14° 53' 00"N
6 Longitude: 148° 17' 00"E | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Reported: None
Expected: 24.785
On hand: 403.047 | | Morning
1. Blowing casual - Lower decks ins.
2. City drill. - position.
3. Gun drills for - detached & fixed
4. AA Battery. - for reconnaissance
5. Condition III - deck readiness
6. Watch. - Condition 3455
7. Field Day. - General quarters
8. Condition 4111 | | | | | | | |
| 1. BEFORE LEAVING PORT
Draft: 10 ft
Draft: 10 ft | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | AFTER ENTERING PORT
Draft: 10 ft
Draft: 10 ft | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. COMPASS IN USE
Type: 1000
Standard Mag. Compass
Compass No.
Error
Variation
Deviation | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Magnetic Tendency
Maximum 90° 25' E
Minimum 70° 45' W
No PMS 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| 13 | 138.0 | 13.0 | 13.3 | 249 | NNE | 19 | 12:50 | 83.76 | 82 | bc | ou nb | NE | 3 | 35 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 14 | 140.0 | 13.0 | 13.4 | 249 | NNE | 20 | 12:50 | 83.77 | 82 | bc | st cu | NE | 3 | 35 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 15 | 142.0 | 13.0 | 13.8 | 249 | E | 19 | 12:57 | 83.77 | 82 | bc | st cu | NE | 3 | 35 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 16 | 144.0 | 13.0 | 13.9 | 249 | E | 20 | 12:57 | 84.77 | 82 | bc | st cu | NE | 3 | 35 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 17 | 146.0 | 13.0 | 13.9 | 249 | E | 19 | 12:50 | 83.77 | 82 | bc | st cu | NE | 3 | 35 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 18 | 148.0 | 13.0 | 13.9 | 249 | E | 18 | 12:51 | 82.78 | 82 | bc | st cu | NE | 3 | 35 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 19 | 144.0 | 13.0 | 13.1 | 249 | E | 19 | 12:52 | 82.78 | 82 | bc | st cu | NE | 3 | 35 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 20 | 144.0 | 13.0 | 13.8 | 249 | E | 17 | 12:53 | 82.78 | 82 | bc | st cu | NE | 3 | 35 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 21 | 140.0 | 13.0 | 13.5 | 249 | NNE | 18 | 12:54 | 82.77 | 82 | bc | st cu | NE | 3 | 35 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 22 | 139.0 | 13.0 | 13.5 | 249 | E | 16 | 12:55 | 82.77 | 82 | bc | ou | NE | 3 | 35 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 23 | 139.0 | 13.0 | 13.0 | 249 | E | 17 | 12:54 | 82.78 | 82 | bc | ou | NE | 3 | 35 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |
| 24 | 136.0 | 13.0 | 13.8 | 249 | NNE | 17 | 12:53 | 82.78 | 82 | bc | ou | NE | 3 | 35 | 1 | NE | | | | | | | | |

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| LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | NOISE | | CT 47 | | | | |
|---|-------|------|-----------|-------------|--------|-------|-----|------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|----------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|----------------|---|
| NEW PASSAGE Pearl Harbor, T.H. TO Sunday 30 November 41 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (Station Number) | | (Date) | | | | |
| TIME DESCRIPTION - 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | P. B. ROBINSON | | Capt. V. E. Mays, Commanding | | | | |
| Lat. | Long. | Wind | Barometer | Temperature | Clouds | Sea | Sky | Visibility | Direction of surface current | Force of surface current | Direction of bottom current | Force of bottom current | Direction of drift | Force of drift | Direction of surface current | Force of surface current | Direction of bottom current | Force of bottom current | Direction of drift | Force of drift | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| 140.0 | 13.6 | 13.4 | 274 | NE | 17 | 29:84 | 81 | 77.83 | bc | cu | N | 3 | 12 | 1 | NE | | | | | | |
| 139.9 | 13.6 | 13.4 | 274 | E | 16 | 29:83 | 81 | 77.84 | bc | cu | NR | 3 | 12 | 1 | NE | | | | | | |
| 140.0 | 13.6 | 13.4 | 274 | NE | 14 | 29:82 | 81 | 77.84 | bc | cu | NR | 3 | 15 | 1 | NE | | | | | | |
| 139.9 | 13.6 | 13.4 | 274 | ENE | 13 | 29:81 | 81 | 77.83 | bc | st cu | NE | 2 | 8 | 2 | NE | | | | | | |
| 139.0 | 13.6 | 13.4 | 274 | ENE | 13 | 29:81 | 81 | 77.83 | bc | cu | nb | NE | 7 | 8 | 2 | NE | | | | | |
| 139.0 | 13.6 | 13.4 | 274 | ENE | 13 | 29:84 | 81 | 77.83 | bc | cu | nb | NE | 7 | 12 | 2 | NE | | | | | |
| 139.1 | 13.6 | 13.4 | 274 | ENE | 12 | 29:83 | 81 | 77.83 | bc | cu | nb | NE | 6 | 15 | 2 | NE | | | | | |
| 139.0 | 13.6 | 13.4 | 274 | ENE | 12 | 29:87 | 81 | 77.84 | bc | cu | nb | NE | 4 | 13 | 2 | NE | | | | | |
| 140.4 | 13.6 | 13.4 | 268 | ENE | 11 | 29:87 | 81 | 77.83 | bc | cu | nb | NE | 4 | 12 | 2 | NE | | | | | |
| 140.4 | 13.6 | 13.4 | 268 | ENE | 17 | 29:86 | 82 | 78.83 | bc | cu | NE | 5 | 45 | 2 | NE | | | | | | |
| 140.4 | 13.6 | 13.4 | 268 | ENE | 16 | 29:83 | 82 | 78.83 | bc | cu | NE | 7 | 45 | 2 | NE | | | | | | |
| 139.9 | 13.6 | 13.4 | 268 | ENE | 15 | 29:83 | 82 | 77.83 | bc | cu | nb | NE | 6 | 45 | 2 | NE | | | | | |

| Latitude | | Longitude | | Received | | Expended | | On hand | |
|----------------|-----------------|-----------|--------|----------|--|----------|--|---------|--|
| 14° 04' 30" N. | 139° 23' 00" E. | None | 22,620 | 352,880 | | | | | |
| 14° 11' 30" N. | 139° 23' 00" E. | None | 30,570 | | | | | | |
| 14° 12' 00" N. | 139° 23' 30" E. | None | 23,810 | 132,052 | | | | | |

| CURRENT | | REMARKS | |
|---------|---------|---------|-------|
| Set | Drift | REMARKS | Drift |
| 0.30 N. | 0.30 E. | REMARKS | Drift |

| OBSERVATIONS IN USE | | REMARKS | |
|---------------------|---------|---------|-------|
| 0.30 N. | 0.30 E. | REMARKS | Drift |

| STANDARD MEAS. COMPASS | | REMARKS | |
|------------------------|---------|---------|-------|
| 0.30 N. | 0.30 E. | REMARKS | Drift |

| MAXIMUM TEMPERATURE | | REMARKS | |
|---------------------|-----------------|---------|-------|
| Maximum 90.7 F. | Minimum 77.8 F. | REMARKS | Drift |

| REMARKS | | REMARKS | |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| REMARKS | REMARKS | REMARKS | REMARKS |

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1700 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

| UNITED STATES SHIP | | BOISE | Day | 30 | Month | November | Year | 1941 |
|--------------------|---|---------|--|----|-------|----------|------|------|
| ZONE DESCRIPTION | -2- | REMARKS | | | | | | |
| 0 to 4. | <p>Steaming on course 174° and pgs. 1690 pgs. standard speed 15 knots, steaming at 139.7 rpm. Acting as escort to a convoy consisting of U.S. 1 KILLNET GRANT, ITA WATSON, JOHN WYER, and AMERICAN LEADER. BOISE 2000 to 3000 yards ahead of PRESIDENT TRANT, convoy guide. Boilers #5, #6, #7 and #8 in use. Ship tanks, in Material Condition Baker. Condition of Readiness II. Average steam 428.7. Average rpm. 139.7.</p> <p><i>A. T. Hathaway</i>
A. T. HATHAWAY,
Lieutenant (jg), U.S. Navy.</p> | | | | | | | |
| 4 to 8. | <p>Steaming as before. 0649 Lighted ship, unmet Condition Baker above third deck. 0607 Set Condition III. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 139.</p> <p><i>L. A. Collins, Jr.</i>
L. A. COLLINS, Jr.,
Ensign, U. S. Navy.</p> | | | | | | | |
| 8 to 12. | <p>Steaming as before. 0805 Held quarters for muster and physical drill; absentees, none. 1036 Changed course to 264° and pgs. 2640 pgs. and 2600 pgs. upon signal from the PRESIDENT TRANT. 1130 Vade daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder magazines, conditions normal. Average steam 428.7. Average rpm. 140.</p> <p><i>A. C. Fox</i>
A. C. FOX,
Ensign, C-7(3), U.S.N.R.</p> | | | | | | | |
| 12 to 16. | <p>Steaming as before. 1200 Increased speed to 15 knots, 150 rpm. 1453 On various courses and speeds while outgunning two planes for scouting. 1508 Outgunned by planes, Lt(jg) W. C. MARTIN, Jr., USN, in charge. 1508 Secured from flight quarters and returned to base course, 266° and pgs. at 16 knots speed. Average steam 432.5. Average rpm. 142.2.</p> <p><i>T. D. Morris</i>
T. D. MORRIS,
Ensign, D-7(P), U.S.N.R.</p> | | | | | | | |
| 16 to 19. | <p>Steaming as before. 1612 Steamed various courses at various speeds recovering aircraft, Cast Method. 1650 Set Material Condition Baker. 1700 Went to General Quarters. 1704 Took station 2000 - 2500 yards ahead of PRESIDENT TRANT and set course 266° and pgs. 2660 pgs. at 13.8 knots, 139 rpm. 1706 Secured from General Quarters, set Condition II. 1722 Darkened ship. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 140.9.</p> <p><i>A. T. Hathaway</i>
A. T. HATHAWAY,
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.</p> | | | | | | | |
| 19 to 20. | <p>Steaming as before. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 139.4.</p> <p><i>E. S. Edwards, Jr.</i>
E. S. EDWARDS, Jr.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.</p> | | | | | | | |
| 20 to 24. | <p>Steaming as before. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 139.5.</p> <p><i>A. T. Hathaway</i>
A. T. HATHAWAY,
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.</p> | | | | | | | |
| Approved: | <p><i>S. B. Robinson</i>
S. B. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.</p> | | <p>Examined:</p> <p><i>Edward S. Pearce</i>
Edward S. Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy.</p> | | | | | |

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U. S. NAVY, 1916

LOG BOOK

MAY 13 1942

OF THE

U. S. S. _____

NO 1 5 2

CLASS _____ Rate,

COMMANDED BY _____

_____, U. S. Navy,

_____, Division,

Attached to _____, Squadron,

_____, Fleet,

Commencing _____, December 1, 1941,

at Sea, Latitude: 14° 15' 00" North; Longitude: 136° 23' 00" East,

and ending _____, December 31, 1941,

at _____, Latitude: 2° 00' 00" South; Longitude: 114° 42' 00" East.

1947

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets.)

Page 10.

ADDITIONAL SHEET

Date: 2 December 1941.

16 to 18. Continued.

INCIDENT 1807, 1808, 1809, 1810, 1811, 1812, 1813, 1814, 1815, AMERICAN LADDER. 1811 Sighted Batog Light, Samar Island, bearing 230.6°, distance 19 miles. Average steam 422.2. Average rpm 135.2.

L. D. Morris
L. D. MORRIS,
Ensign, D-V(F), U.S.N.R.

18 to 20.

Testing as before. 1800 Let fires die under boiler #7. 1835 Changed course to 240° speed 11 knots. Forming 1000 yards astern of convoy column. 1842 Steadied 1000 yards astern of convoy column on course 239°, speed 13.6 knots. 1951 Passed Batog Island Light steam to port, distant 12 miles. Average steam 430. Average rpm 127.9.

L. S. Edwards Jr.
L. S. EDWARDS Jr.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

20 to 24.

Testing as before. Captain on the bridge. 2045 Batog Light on quarter, bearing 124°, distant 16.5 miles. 2105 Changed speed to 2/3 standard speed, 10 knots. 2119 Changed speed to 13.6 knots. 2125 Sighted San Bernardino Light bearing 268°, distant 21 miles. 2145 Put in DeCaussing gear on course 239°. 2145 Batog Light dipped, bearing 107°. 2237 Changed course to 239°. 2240 Changed course to 235°. 2245 Changed course to 250°. 2250 Sighted Batog Light bearing 216°, distant 19 miles. 2252 Changed course to 240°. 2253 Changed speed to 10 knots. 2255 Changed course to 230°. 2256 Changed course to 220°. 2304 Changed course to 215°. Set DeCaussing gear on course 212°. 2315 Changed course to 220°. 2320 Changed speed to 13.2 knots. 2325 Changed course to 230°. 2333 Changed course to 212°. 2340 Changed course to 215°. Average steam 430. Average rpm 127.6.

A. T. Matway
A. T. MATWAY,
Lieutenant (jg), U.S. Navy.

Approved

S. D. Robinson
S. D. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.

Present

Edward S. Rogers
Edward S. ROGERS,
Lieutenant Commander,
U. S. N. Submarine.

UNITED STATES SHIP

BOISE

Wednesday

December, 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION

REMARKS

2 to 4.

Steaming darkened in condition of readiness for Action II, and Material Condition Baker; on various courses at 12 knots, 125 rpm, standard speed 15 knots, entering San Bernardino Strait, 7.1, with convey connecting of S.M. AMERICAN LEADER, PRESIDENT GRANT, JAIL FAIRWAY, DOA NATI and TOWN LXX-8. Acting as convey escort. Boilers #1, #2, #3, #4, and #5 in use. 0015 Changed course to 214°T, increased speed to 14 knots. 0016 Sighted Delantosa Island light bearing 235°T. 0045 Passed through tide rips. 0058 Passed Agulha Island light abeam to port, distant 2.1 miles. 0106 Sighted darkened ship bearing 225°T, distant 6 miles. 0106 Changed course to 130°T. 0110 Changed course to 260°T. 0112 Changed course to 270°T. 0117 Passed Delantosa Island light abeam to starboard, distant 2.1 miles. 0129 Changed course to 301°T. 0220 Sighted Pozos light bearing 100°T. 0215 Sighted Bulen light bearing 353.5°T. 0218 Sighted darkened sailboat bearing 350.7°T. 0242 Sighted San Miguel light bearing 291°T. 0252 Secured boilers #1 and #2. 0307 Sighted ship bearing 290°T. 0310 Sighted off boilers #1 and #2. 0310 Changed course to 301°T, increased speed to 20 knots. 0320 Changed speed to 16 knots, 141 rpm. 0325 Challenged strange ship on port beam. Ship's name: BOYVILLE. 0325 Changed speed to 14 knots. 0330 Changed course to 270°T. 0342 Changed course to 210°T. Sighted Agulha Point light bearing 245.7°T. 0346 Changed course to 240°T. 0447 Passed an Agulha Point light abeam to port, distant 3 miles. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 143.1.

4 to 8.

Steaming as before. 0424 Changed course to 242°T. 0436 Changed course to 280°T. 0445 Put out reefing gear. 0450 Passed Agulha light abeam to port, distant 5 miles. 0536 Changed course to 290°T. 0537 Let fires die out under boilers #1 and #2. 0545 Reduced condition III; set Condition III. 0556 Unset Material Condition Baker above third deck. 0554 Changed course to 285°T. 0700 Changed standard speed to 12 knots, steering at 10 knots, 84 rpm. 0716 Changed course to 190°T and ppc, 295°psc. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 179.

8 to 12.

Steaming as before on course 290°T and ppc, 286°psc at 1/2 standard speed, 8.5 knots, standing up Sibuyan Sea. 0817 Netherlands S.S. "Aurora" passed abeam to port on opposite course, distant 4 miles. 0830 Published Deck Court in the case of TERTI, Vernon L., #660-01-30, Sec2c, V-3, USNR, tried November 27, 1941; offense: sleeping upon his watch; sentence: to be confined for a period of fifteen (15) days, and to lose \$9.00 per month of his pay for a period of 2 months, total loss of pay, \$18.00. Approved by convening authority November 29, 1941. 0900 Published Deck Court in the case of KELLY, Philip L., #201-90-94, Sec2c, USNR, tried November 27, 1941; offense: sleeping upon his watch; sentence: to be confined for a period of twenty (20) days, and to lose \$12.00 per month of his pay for a period of 2 months, total loss of pay, \$24.00. Approved by convening authority November 29, 1941. 1000 Changed course to 287°T. 1025 Changed course to 290°T. 1103 Tagbungan Point broad on port bow, distance 7.7 miles. 1141 Tagbungan Point abeam to port, distance 6.7 miles. Average steam 433.7. Average rpm. 86.7.

12 to 16.

Steaming as before. 1305 Sighted Baltasar Island light bearing 311°T, distance 8 miles. 1340 Sighted Dumali Point light bearing 261°T, distance 16 miles. 1352 Baltasar Island light abeam to starboard, distance 3 miles. 1402 Changed course to 290°T and ppc. 1405 Changed course to 300°T and ppc. 1416 Changed course to 261°T and ppc, 300°psc. 1508 Dumali Point light abeam to port, distance 10 miles. Average steam 428. Average rpm. 79.7.

Approved:

E. S. Robinson
E. S. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:

Edward S. Pearce
Edward S. Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy.

Revised edition of this page as an exhibit to the Committee on Organization, November 1941

1073

ADDITIONAL SHEET

P. A. A. 1073

Per. 3 December 1941.

18 to 20.

Steaming as before. 1800 Changed course to 302°, 280° rate, 200° rev. 1808 Sighted Malabrigo Point Light bearing 318°, 1833 Changed course to 303°, 280° rate, 200° rev. 1835 Set Material Condition Wake. 1900 Set Condition of Readiness Two. Tetch Two. 1950 Changed course to 301°, 280° rate, 200° rev. 1904 Sighted the Corroco Light bearing 341°, 1850 Changed course to 301°, 280° rate, 200° rev. 1908 Put in boilers #1 and #2 on main stem line. 1907 Sighted Caleren Light bearing 195°, distant 5 miles. 1915 Changed course to 302°, 280° rate, 200° rev. 1920 Caleren Light abeam to port, distant 4 1/2 miles. 1940 Sighted two darkened ships bearing 180°, distant 6 miles. 1945 Sighted ship bearing 205°, Average steam 428. Average rpm. 74.1.

20 to 24.

J. R. ROAL
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

Steaming as before, on various courses. 2019 Sighted tug towing a barge bearing 231°, distant 6 miles. 2100 Changed course to 318°, increased speed to 8 knots. 2102 Passed Escoroso Point Light abeam to port, distant 2.3 miles. 2125 Changed speed to 7 knots. 2141 Sighted ship bearing 300°, distant 8 miles. 2200 Turned on navigation lights. 2205 Secured fires under boilers #1 and #2. 2211 Turned off running lights. 2212 Sighted Santiago Point Light bearing 307.7°, 2213 Passed steamer abeam to starboard, distant 1700 yards. 2223 Sighted submarine bearing 301°. 2239 Turned on navigation lights. 2240 Turned off running lights. 2255 Observed submarine on starboard bow. 2302 Submarine passed abeam to starboard, distant 1.5 miles. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 74.0.

G. E. MARSH, Jr.
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

B. B. B.
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

Charles E. ...
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

107

| UNITED STATES SHIP | | 50101 | Friday | 5 | December | 1941 |
|--------------------|---|-------|--------|---|----------|------|
| ZONE DESCRIPTION | REMARKS | | | | | |
| 0 to 4. | <p>anchored in berth 24, in 4 fathoms of water in Manila, P.I., with 40 fathoms of cable in the stern. The ship was used for auxiliary purposes. The following names of the Manila Fleet. Commander Vanette patrol. Senior Officer Robert. The following named men returned aboard from temporary duty at the Manila, P.I. 10000, 10001, 10002, 10003, 10004, 10005, 10006, 10007, 10008, 10009, 10010, 10011, 10012, 10013, 10014, 10015, 10016, 10017, 10018, 10019, 10020, 10021, 10022, 10023, 10024, 10025, 10026, 10027, 10028, 10029, 10030, 10031, 10032, 10033, 10034, 10035, 10036, 10037, 10038, 10039, 10040, 10041, 10042, 10043, 10044, 10045, 10046, 10047, 10048, 10049, 10050, 10051, 10052, 10053, 10054, 10055, 10056, 10057, 10058, 10059, 10060, 10061, 10062, 10063, 10064, 10065, 10066, 10067, 10068, 10069, 10070, 10071, 10072, 10073, 10074, 10075, 10076, 10077, 10078, 10079, 10080, 10081, 10082, 10083, 10084, 10085, 10086, 10087, 10088, 10089, 10090, 10091, 10092, 10093, 10094, 10095, 10096, 10097, 10098, 10099, 10100, 10101, 10102, 10103, 10104, 10105, 10106, 10107, 10108, 10109, 10110, 10111, 10112, 10113, 10114, 10115, 10116, 10117, 10118, 10119, 10120, 10121, 10122, 10123, 10124, 10125, 10126, 10127, 10128, 10129, 10130, 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11704, 11705, 11706, 11707, 11708, 11709, 11710, 11711, 11712, 11713, 11714, 11715, 11716, 11717, 11718, 11719, 11720, 11721, 11722, 11723, 11724, 11725, </p> | | | | | |

H. H. H.

Page 100.

ADDITIONAL SHEET

F. H. H.

Date 5 December 1941.

20 to 24. (Continued).

by shore patrol, report to follow.

L. A. Collins Jr.
 L. A. COLLINS, Jr.,
 Ensign, U. S. Navy.

Approved

S. B. Robinson
 S. B. ROBINSON,
 Captain, U. S. Navy,
 Commanding.

Reviewed

Edward S. Pearce
 Edward S. Pearce,
 Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy, Destroyer.

This page should be attached to the original report and not the other way around

Form 100-10

Page 114-1

| UNITED STATES SHIP <u>BOISE</u> | Saturday 6 December 1941 |
|--|--|
| ZONE DESCRIPTION -B | REMARKS |
| 0 to 4. | <p>Anchored in berth #2, Manila Bay, Manila, P.I., in 20 feet of water with 45 fathoms of chain out to starboard anchor. Boiler #2 in use for auxiliary purposes. Doctor Officer Present Afloat, Commander Submarines, Asiatic Fleet, in U.S.S. "OLLAM". Ships present: Asiatic Fleet less detached units. 0130 "MAGWAY", C, #407-80-50, OS1c, returned to ship, on recall. 0145 ELI, J.J., (U.S.S. "STEARNS"), treated for cuts on ring and forefinger; cause, unknown. Wound on forefinger approximated with two sutures. Dressing applied. Treated by WARDEN, P., 1003c. 0200 ELI, J.J., 1003c, treated for lacerated index finger; cut finger with knife while mending for library host. Dressing applied; treated by WARDEN, P., 1003c. 0345 In accordance with commanding officer's orders, dated December 5, 1941, the following men returned from temporary shore patrol duty in Manila, P.I.: 0345, A.L., 1003c, USNR; DUNKEL, A.L., 041c, USNR; COX, F., 042c, USNR; RANGLIO, A.V., 043c, USNR; COX, F., 044c, USNR; and ROSEN, A.L., 045c, USNR.</p> <p><i>W. H. Adams</i>
U. S. NAVY
Lieutenant (jg), D-V(2), U.S.N.R.</p> |
| 4 to 8. | <p>Anchored as before. 0500 Lighted off boilers #1, #3, and #6. 0550 Made preparations for getting underway. 0600 Cut in boilers #1, #2, #4, and #6. 0600 BRANTON, F., 061c, USNR returned from shore patrol duty in Manila, P.I. 0615 Stationed special sea detail. 0620 Tested main engines. 0630 Commenced heaving short. 0635 Underway, on various courses at various speeds to go alongside "ECOS". 0717 Moored port side to alongside "ECOS". 0740 Commenced fueling ship. DeWISSE, R., 021c, returned from 2 days leave. 0745 Secured boilers #3 and #6.</p> <p><i>D. S. Edwards</i>
U. S. NAVY
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.</p> |
| 8 to 12. | <p>Moored as before, portside to U.S.S. "ECOS". Absentee at quarters for muster: RANDONG, E., 052c, recalled from leave, but not returned. 0820 RENO, Fidel, 053c, returned aboard from two days leave on time. 0930 Provisioning lighter #274 came alongside to starboard. 0937 WIMOVIN, J., 052c, returned aboard from two days leave on time. 0940 Provisioning lighter #730 shoved off from alongside. 0944 Captain left the ship. 0950 CHIN and LEVIE, Philippine troop ships stood in. 1003 IAT, Philippine steamer, stood in. 1003 U.S.S. "POPE" stood in. 1030 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. 1045 Received the following from San Miguel Brewery: 30 gallons ice cream for general mess; inspected as to quality by Lt. (jg) J.E. GROISSER, (MC), USNR, and as to quantity by Ensign P.R. GRIFFIN, 30-V(3), USNR. 1060 Provision lighter left ship. 1055 Lighted fires under #5 and #6 boilers for boosting purposes. 1102 Captain returned aboard. 1115 Stationed special sea detail. 1116 Closed all watertight doors. 1120 Cut in #5 and #6 boilers on main steam line. 1120 Tested main engines. 1131 Lighted fires under #8 boiler. 1133 Let go all lines, having received 331, 666 gallons of fuel oil at 60°F. 1145 Set course 278°T. 1146 Changed course to 250°T, 289°psc, 2420 psg. 1153 Cut in #8 boiler on main steam line. 1155 Changed course to 235°T. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 123.5.</p> <p><i>G. E. Marcus, Jr.</i>
U. S. NAVY
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.</p> |
| 12 to 16. | <p>Steaming as before. 1205 Set Modified Material Condition Baker. 1206 Changed course to 250°T. 1212 Changed course to 252°T. 1236 With San Nicholas Shoal Light abeam to port, distant 2.75 miles, changed course to 247°T. 1254 Changed course to 245°T. 1255 Changed course to 249°T. 1258 Sighted Orrigador Island Lighthouse bearing 233°T. 1258 Changed speed to 2/3 standard speed. 1245 By order of the commanding officer, WARDEN, H.R., 041c, was released from confinement. 1259 Changed course to 247°T. 1253 Changed course to 270°T. 1335 Changed course to 240°T. 1343 Changed speed to standard speed 15 knots, 150 rpm. Changed course to 181°T. 1355 Changed course to 165°T. 1355 With Osella Lighthouse bearing 076.5°, distant 4.6 miles, El Freile Lighthouse bearing 330°T, distant 6 miles, 18 Monje Lighthouse bearing 330°T, distant 2 miles, took departure for Cebu, P.I. 1358 Changed course to</p> |
| <p>Approved: <i>S. S. Johnson</i>
S. S. Johnson
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.</p> | <p>Examined: <i>Edward S. Pearce</i>
Edward S. Pearce
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy.</p> |

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ADDITIONAL SHEET

U. S. S. ROISE

Date 5 December 1941.

12 to 16. (Continued).

220⁰r and ppg and increased speed to full speed, 20 knots, 20 rpm. 1359 Put in DeLussins gear. 1400 Set Condition III in the anti-aircraft battery. 1408 Changed course to 180⁰r and ppg. 1423 Changed course to 174⁰r and ppg, 173⁰rsc. 1434 Lighted fires under boilers #1 and #2. 1437 Put boilers #1 and #2 in on main steam line. 1449 Jassed Fortune Island Lighthouse abeam to stbd, distant 1.6 miles. 1505 Sighted Santiago Lighthouse bearing 147⁰r. 1522 Changed course to 140⁰r and ppg, 141⁰rsc. 1535 Changed course to 145⁰r. 1536 Changed course to 157⁰r. 1543 Changed course to 124⁰r and ppg. Average steam 428.7. Average rpm. 177.7.

16 to 18.

A. T. Mathaway
A. T. MATHAWAY,
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

Steaming as before. 1631 Changed course to 110⁰r. 1635 Secured DeLussins gear. 1636 Changed course to 090⁰r. 1640 Sighted Milbrige Light bearing 090⁰r. 1644 Sighted Escocoe Light bearing 136⁰r. 1650 Set "material Condition Baker. 1718 Changed course to 135⁰r. 1717 Changed speed to 15 knots. 1720 Changed speed to 20 knots. 1726 Darkened ship. 1735 Turned on dim masthead and side lights. Average steam 425. Average rpm. 208.9.

L. A. Collins, Jr.
L. A. COLLINS, JR.,
Ensign, U. S. Navy.

18 to 20.

Steaming as before. 1800 Set Condition of Readiness for Action II. Slowed to 2/3 standard speed, 10 knots, 105 rpm. 1805 Changed course to 128⁰r and ppg. 1807 Secured boilers #1 and #2. 1820 Sighted Dumall Light bearing 140.5⁰r. 1824 Sighted Tres Reyes Island Light bearing 104⁰r. 1840 Changed course to 131⁰r and ppg. Average steam 432.5. Average rpm. 104.3.

E. J. Edwards, Jr.
E. J. EDWARDS, JR.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

20 to 24.

Steaming as before. 2020 Changed course to 174⁰r, ppg and ppg. 2040 Passed Dumall Light abeam to starboard, distant 3.0 miles. Average steam 432.5. Average rpm. 104.7.

A. T. Mathaway
A. T. MATHAWAY,
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

Approved: *S. B. Robinson*
S. B. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined: *E. J. Edwards, Jr.*
E. J. EDWARDS, JR.,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy.

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets)

Page 103

ADDITIONAL SHEET

U. S. S. POISE

Date 9 December 1941.

12 to 18. (Continued).

1200^{hr} and pgo and increased speed to full speed, 20 knots, 200 rpm. 1359 Put in DeLussine gear. 1400 Set Condition III in the anti-aircraft battery. 1408 Changed course to 190[°] and pgo. 1423 Changed course to 174[°] and pgo, 1750 pgo. 1434 Lighted fires under boilers #1 and #2. 1437 Put boilers #1 and #2 in on main steam line. 1449 Passed Fortune Island Lighthouse abeam to starboard, distant 1.6 miles. 1505 Sighted Santiago Lighthouse bearing 147[°]. 1522 Changed course to 140[°] and pgo, 1410 pgo. 1535 Changed course to 145[°]. 1536 Changed course to 157[°]. 1543 Changed course to 124[°] and pgo. Average steam 428.7. Average rpm. 177.7.

16 to 18.

A. T. Pathaway
A. T. PATHAWAY,
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

Steaming as before. 1631 Changed course to 110[°]. 1635 Secured DeLussine gear. 1636 Changed course to 090[°]. 1640 Sighted Milbrige Light bearing 090[°]. 1644 Sighted Escocoe Light bearing 138[°]. 1653 Set Material Condition Baker. 1718 Changed course to 133[°]. 1719 Changed speed to 15 knots. 1720 Changed speed to 20 knots. 1726 Darkened ship. 1732 Turned on dim masthead and side lights. Average steam 423. Average rpm. 208.9.

L. A. Collins, Jr.
L. A. COLLINS, JR.,
Ensign, U. S. Navy.

18 to 20.

Steaming as before. 1800 Set Condition of Readiness for Action II. Slowed to 2/3 standard speed, 10 knots, 105 rpm. 1805 Changed course to 128[°] and pgo. 1807 Secured boilers #1 and #2. 1820 Sighted Dumall Light bearing 140.3[°]. 1824 Sighted from Reeves Island Light bearing 104[°]. 1840 Changed course to 131[°] and pgo. Average steam 432.5. Average rpm. 104.5.

D. C. Edwards, Jr.
D. C. EDWARDS, JR.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

20 to 24.

Steaming as before. 2020 Changed course to 174[°], pgo and pgo. 2040 Passed Dumall Light abeam to starboard, distant 3.0 miles. Average steam 432.5. Average rpm. 104.7.

A. T. Pathaway
A. T. PATHAWAY,
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

Approved: *S. B. Robinson*
S. B. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.

Endorsed: *Edward Pearce*
Edward Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy.

This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets

LIST OF OFFICERS

Attached to and on board of the U. S. S. BOISE (TA-7), commanded by R. R. ROBINSON, Captain, U. S. N., during the period covered by this Log Book, with date of reporting for duty, detachment, transfer, or death from 1 December, 1941, to 31 December, 1941.

| NAME | RANK | DATE OF REPORTING FOR DUTY | DETACHED
Date | DUTIES |
|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| R. R. ROBINSON | Captain, USN | 6/21/40 | | Commanding Officer |
| R. J. MOGAN | Commander, USN | 6/21/40 | | Executive Officer |
| W. H. TAYLOR | Lieut. Commr. USN | 6/4/40 | | Navigator |
| R. J. SMITH | Lieut. Commr. USN | 2/6/41 | | D.C. Officer |
| J. H. CLARK | Lieut. Commr. USN | 10/26/40 | | First Lieutenant |
| R. J. LAFAN | Lieut. Commr. USN | 2/21/41 | | Engineer Officer |
| W. H. GOODSON | Lieut. USN | 12/21/40 | | Gunnery Officer |
| R. J. MARTIN, Jr. | Lieut. USN | 12/12/39 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. SMITH | Lieut. USN | 9/23/39 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. SMITH, Jr. | Lieut. USN | 12/19/40 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. LEE | Lieut. USN | 9/12/39 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. LATHAM | Lieut. (Jr) USN | 1/18/40 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. LATHAM, Jr. | Lieut. (Jr) USN | 6/25/40 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. LATHAM | Lieut. (Jr) USN | 9/26/41 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. LATHAM | Lieut. (Jr) USN | 10/24/40 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. LATHAM | Lieut. (Jr) USN | 8/12/39 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. LATHAM | Ensign (V-1), USN | 9/12/41 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. KUNTZ | Ensign, USN | 6/24/39 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. KUNTZ | Ensign, USN | 6/24/39 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. KUNTZ | Ensign, USN | 6/24/39 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. KUNTZ | Ensign (V-1), USN | 7/14/40 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. KUNTZ | Ensign (V-1), USN | 11/20/40 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. KUNTZ | Ensign, USN | 1/11/40 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. KUNTZ | Ensign, USN | 6/11/40 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. KUNTZ | Ensign, USN | 7/1/40 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. KUNTZ | Ensign, USN | 6/10/40 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. KUNTZ | Ensign, USN | 6/11/40 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. KUNTZ | Ensign (V-1), USN | 12/27/40 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. KUNTZ | Ensign (V-1), USN | 12/27/40 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. KUNTZ | Ensign (V-1), USN | 12/27/40 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |
| R. J. KUNTZ | Ensign (V-1), USN | 12/27/40 | | Asst. Eng. Officer |

Summed and bound to be correct.

Edward S. Pearce
Edward S. Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander, USN, *Signature*

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets.)

(The remaining portion of Exhibit 68 consists of a map reflecting the Disposition of U. S. Pacific Fleet, 7 Dec. 1941 together with typewritten table reflecting the position of the U. S. S. Boise at the times indicated. These items will be found reproduced as Item No. 25 in EXHIBITS - ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee)

EXHIBIT NO. 69

[illegible]

B.I.S. - Board of Inspection Survey
M.I. - Material Inspection

- Annual Military Inspection
- Damage Control Practice

CONFIDENTIAL

EXHIBIT NO. 70

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 18, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached a draft telegram to the Embassy at London containing a proposed message from you to the British Prime Minister. If you approve of the draft I will arrange to have the message transmitted.

C H

AK
JHR

| | | |
|--|---|---|
| PREPARING OFFICE
HALL MESSAGE WRITING
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
Charge Department
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
Charge to | TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

This cable was sent in Confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. <i>SC</i> | TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN |
|--|---|---|

Washington,

August 18, 1941

87°

NO DISTRIBUTION

3208

AMEMBASSY,
LONDON (ENGLAND).

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR CHURCHILL.

QUOTE With reference to our discussions in regard to the situation in the Far East, upon my return to Washington I learned that the Japanese Ambassador had on August 16 approached the Secretary of State with a request for a resumption of the informal conversations which the Ambassador and the Secretary of State had been holding directed toward exploring the possibility of reaching a basis for negotiations in regard to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area and that the Secretary of State had in reply confined himself to repeating what he had previously said in regard to the developments in Japan's course of conquest which had led to the cessation of those conversations.

On August 17 I sent for the Japanese Ambassador, and the Secretary of State and I received him. I made to him a statement covering the position of this Government with respect to the taking by Japan of further steps in the

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FM/WHK
Confidential File
13

Prepared by _____

Sent by operator _____

| | | |
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| PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect ☐ Full rate
☐ Day letter
☐ Night letter
Charge Department: _____
☐ Full rate
☐ Day letter
☐ Night letter
Charge to _____
\$ _____ | TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

-2-

Washington, | TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL OR
NON-CONFIDENTIAL OR
SECRET
PLAN |
|--|--|---|

direction of military domination by force along the lines of the proposed statement such as you and I had discussed. The statement I made to him was no less vigorous than and was substantially similar to the statement we had discussed.

The Ambassador renewed the request made by him to the Secretary of State in regard to the resumption of conversations. I replied by reviewing the Japanese Government's action in actively pursuing a course of conquest and in inspiring the Japanese press to attack this Government. I dwelt on the principles of peaceful, lawful and just international relations which this Government has emphasized and I suggested that if the Japanese Government is prepared to adjust its position and to embark upon a peaceful program this Government would be prepared to resume the exploratory conversations and that before undertaking the resumption of those conversations we felt that it would be helpful to have a clear statement of the Japanese Government's attitude and plans.

The Japanese Ambassador said that he would communicate what I had told him to his Government.

Responsible
Heard

EXHIBIT NO. 71

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Select (Full rate)
Day letter
Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to

3

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington.

August 28, 1941

EMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN) VIA SHANGHAI (CHINA) AND NAVAL RADIO.

535

~~Having in mind the restrictions which govern the~~
~~Japanese press there is requested that for your information~~
~~the Associated Press copy from London~~
extract from Prime Minister Churchill's radio address of

August 24: ~~as recorded by the New York Times:~~

But Europe is not the only continent to be tormented and devastated by aggression. For five long years the Japanese military faction, seeking to emulate the style of Hitler and Mussolini, taking all their inspiration as it is were a new European revelation, have been invading and carrying the war of aggression to China and Japan's armies have been wandering about that continent in futile excursions, carrying with them famine, ruin and corruption, and calling it conquest. The Chinese Government has fled to China. They snatch Indochina from the watched Vichy French. They menace by their advance Siam, hence Singapore, the critical link with Australasia, and even the Philippines Island under the protection of the United States.

It is certain that the situation is being studied. Every effort

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M. _____ 19 _____

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

PREPARING OFFICE
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TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
CABLES
PLAIN

Collect
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
Charge Department

Department of State

Washington,

Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
Charge to

-2-

direction of military domination by force along the lines of the proposed statement such as you and I had discussed. The statement I made to him was no less vigorous than and was substantially similar to the statement we had discussed.

The Ambassador renewed the request made by him to the Secretary of State in regard to the resumption of conversations. I replied by reviewing the Japanese Government's action in actively pursuing a course of conquest and in inspiring the Japanese press to attack this Government. I dwelt on the principles of peaceful, lawful and just international relations which this Government has emphasized and I suggested that if the Japanese Government is prepared to embark upon a peaceful program this Government would be prepared to resume the exploratory conversations and that before undertaking the resumption of these conversations we felt that it would be helpful to have a clear statement of the Japanese Government's attitude and plans.

The Japanese Ambassador said that he would communicate what I had said him to his Government.

Handwritten: R. A. ...
...
...

EXHIBIT NO. 71

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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☐ Night letter

Charge Department ☐
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

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\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
X NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL PLAIN

Washington,

August 28, 1941

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN) VIA SHANGHAI (CHINA) AND NAVAL RADIO.

535

~~Having in mind the restrictions which govern the~~
~~Japanese press, there is repeated~~ *There follows* for your information
~~the Associated Press~~ *the Associated Press* extract from Prime Minister Churchill's radio address of

August 24: ~~Recorded by the New York Times:~~

But Europe is not the only continent to be tormented and devastated by aggression. For five long years the Japanese military faction, seeking to imitate the style of Hitler and Mussolini, taking all their inspiration as it is were a new European revelation, have been invading and carrying the East, Borneo, Indonesia, etc. Their armies have been wandering about the vast land in futile excursions, carrying with them parks of ruin and corruption, and killing it before the Chinese front. Now, they stretch a ramping line into the heart of China. They snatch Indochina from the grasp of the French. They menace by their advance the British link with Australia, and threaten the Philippines under the protection of the United States.

It is certain that the world is in a state of great

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M. _____ 19 _____

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAINCollect Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to

Department of State

-2-

Washington,

will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with infinite patience to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed. But this I must say: That if these hopes should fail we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States. UNQUOTE

Hull

[Signature]

cc
FE:CC:MHPJMB
Fe
NEW

PA/H

CI

[Signature]

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M. _____ 19 _____

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RECEIVING OFFICE
WILL TRANSMIT WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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PARTIAL
PLAIN

Current
Special

Department of State

Chief Clerk
Director
Assistant Secretary

Washington.

August 1, 1941.

Charge to

\$

The President would like to know the
results of the investigation of the attack on
Pearl Harbor.

W. L. Hughes

100-100000

not

FE

Aug 1 1941

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M. 19.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TO: [illegible]
FROM: [illegible]



FILED

JUN 11 1911

TRB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo

FROM Dated August 2, 1941

Rec'd 7:48 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSR.

1153, August 2, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

Two. In reply to my request for an inter-
view with the Foreign Minister on Monday afternoon after
his return from Ise, Mr. Yamamoto said that he would
of course arrange for the interview if I desired to
communicate further views or information with regard
to the American Government's proposition, but that if
the purpose of the interview were to receive some indi-
cation of the Japanese Government's considered views
with regard to the proposition he believed that the
interview might be usefully deferred for a few days.
He said that the proposition was being carefully studied
by the Japanese Government with every desire to find
a solution. He added that a telegram in the sense of
the preceding sentence had already been sent to Am-
bassador Nomura.

GREW

RPD

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF CURRENT INFORMATION

Radio Bulletin No. 186

August 6, 1941.

NOTE: This digest has been compiled from press and other sources and is in no way an expression of official opinion.

STATE DEPARTMENT

Press Conference. Questioned again today whether any credence could be placed in reports of a possible meeting between the President and Prime Minister Churchill, the Secretary said that he had nothing more to say than he had said yesterday morning.

A correspondent asked whether the Secretary could say what Mr. Duff-Cooper's mission to the United States was about. The Secretary replied that as far as he knew Mr. Duff-Cooper had not as yet landed. He added that he had heard a report, which he could not vouch for, that during the next few days Mr. Duff-Cooper might pass through this country on his way to the Far East. Asked if he expected to see him, the Secretary said that if he came by and proposed to call, he supposed he would see him as he did other important and prominent people who come to this country.

A correspondent mentioned that there were increasing indications that Japan was making demands on Thailand and he referred to Mr. Eden's speech in the House of Commons to the effect that anything that threatened the security and integrity of Thailand was of immediate interest to Britain, and he wondered whether the Secretary would care to say anything on the situation in regard to our own policy. The Secretary said that he thought that we had many times discussed the question of conquest by force on the part of certain countries, and that it included the Pacific area. He said that we had made very clear our concern and our interest in respect to steps carrying out that sort of policy. He pointed out that Mr. Welles just a few days ago had occasion to give the correspondents a statement on that general question as it related to the Pacific area.

Asked if he could say whether this Government had had occasion to express any views to the Government of Thailand concerning the present crisis out there, Mr. Hull said he could not go into details now because it was not at a stage where he could be very definite. A correspondent pointed out that certain steps followed the occupation by Japan of Indochina and he inquired whether it was fair to assume that certain other steps would follow the occupation or attempted occupation of Thailand by Japan. The Secretary replied that it was fair to have increasing concern about a movement that would include the step to which the correspondent referred.

Asked if the correspondents could infer that this Government has increasing concern about events over there, the Secretary said that that was what he was trying to say. He added that anything that Mr. Welles had said regarding the Pacific area and Indochina would have especial application to Thailand and the present situation.

A correspondent mentioned that the Japanese had also made some demands upon the Ecuadorans, and he asked whether we were going to do anything about that. The Secretary said that we had nothing on that subject except what appeared in the newspapers. He added that he had not heard from Ecuador nor from our representatives.

A correspondent asked whether there had been some indications that Thailand had been offered what amounted to a protectorate over Malaya as well as Indochina so that the Japanese would have a protectorate similar to that of the British Commonwealth of Nations over Canada, of which Canada is a part. The Secretary said that he had not been advised on that subject. He mentioned the multiplicity of rumors and reports coming from that area lately and said that we were observing all of these as closely as possible.

A correspondent, with reference to an article in a Netherlands Indies paper that there was no question that the United States was behind the Netherlands Indies but the question was how far behind, asked whether we had any indications of a weakening of their attitude towards Japan out there. The Secretary said that he had nothing new on that subject.

-3-

To a question of whether the United States had had any change in relations with Finland, the Secretary said that there had been nothing especially new on that recently.

Asked whether he had any report or definite assurance from Vichy on Admiral Leahy's conversations, the Secretary said that he had not yet heard from him.

A correspondent asked whether there was any development on the question of evacuating Americans out of Japan. The Secretary said that there was nothing especially new. He said that we had not had any communications yet from any of the persons who were refugees if we might call them that or from our consuls. He added that at the same time we are giving every attention to the whole problem.

A correspondent mentioned that there was a private group, including several Republican leaders, who issued an appeal last night to Congress (see below) to put a stop to the step-by-step projection of the United States toward an undeclared war and he asked for the Secretary's comment on that. Mr. Hull said that he would repeat his statement to the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives in January in support of the Lend-Lease Bill in which he sought to state the issues confronting us in the international situation.

Paraguay. The Department of State today made public a translation of a letter dated July 28 to the Acting Secretary of State from the Minister of Paraguay expressing the appreciation of the President of Paraguay and Señora de Morínigo for the courtesies shown in the United States to Señora de Morínigo and their son. The letter said that the general health of the child has improved notably and that the difficulties have begun to give way with the treatment applied. (See Radio Bulletin No. 172 of July 21).

Chile. Señorita Magdalena Potit, distinguished authoress and musician from Chile, will arrive in New York on August 11 on an invitation extended by the Department of State to visit the United States.

Max W. Thornburg. The Department has announced the appointment of Max W. Thornburg as a Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, to act as consultant to the State Department on international petroleum matters. Mr. Thornburg has been assigned to the Office of the Adviser on International Economic Affairs.

CONGRESS

Defense Seizure. The House yesterday voted 241 to 136 to adopt the Property Requisitioning Bill. The House added three amendments to the measure as passed by the Senate, thus necessitating its going to conference to iron out the differences. (See Radio Bulletin No. 173 of July 22)

Highway Defense Program. The Senate today over-rode by 57 to 19 the President's veto of the \$320,000,000 highway defense bill.

The measure will now go to the House for consideration (See Radio Bulletin No. 185 of July 5).

DEFENSE

Naval Bases. The Navy Department will establish six additional section bases for refueling and minor repairs for small ships at Key West, Fla.; Mobile, Ala.; Corpus Christi, Tex.; Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico; Monterey, Calif., and Nash My. Wash., as soon as funds are available. The Department said that additional section bases would also be established in Alaska.

Airplane Deliveries. The GPM reported that its Director General Knudsen, Rear Admiral John H. Towers, and Under Secretary of the Navy Forrestal would leave tomorrow on a three-day tour to inspect East Coast Airplane factories with a view to possible speeding up of deliveries to the Army, Navy and the British.

Naval and Aircraft Equipment. Federal Loan Administrator Jones announced that the Defense Plant Corp., at the request of the Navy Department, had authorized a lease agreement with Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., N. Y. C. to construct and equip a plant at Baltimore, Md., costing \$3,100,000, to be used for naval equipment production.

The Defense Plant Corporation also authorized a lease agreement with Bell Aircraft Corporation, Buffalo, to construct and equip a plant at Niagara Falls Airport

EXHIBIT NO. 73

DRAFT TELEGRAM

October 16, 1941.
(Draft no. 2)

His Imperial Majesty

Hirohito,

Emperor of Japan.

I have just been informed that the Cabinet of Prince Konoye has tendered its resignation. As Your Imperial Majesty is aware, discussions have been carried on during the past few weeks between high officials of the Government of the United States and high officials of the Government of Japan directed toward working out a basis in principle for a meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself which we both hoped would be contributory to maintenance and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area. The original messages I received from the Premier of Japan on this subject were very gratifying. Unfortunately, the concrete proposals subsequently presented by the Japanese Government seemed to present a narrower concept than I had anticipated. The Secretary of State therefore on October 2 suggested to the Japanese Ambassador here that we return to the original concepts and endeavor through re-examination of those concepts to evolve general lines of action which

-2-

would be clear manifestations of the high purposes we have in mind and thus might be expected to establish a durable and fundamental peace in the Pacific area.

The procedure which the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have been following during these past weeks has not produced the results hoped for. In view of the fact that, as high officials of your Government have repeatedly stated, time presses, I suggest to Your Imperial Majesty that there be a meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself and the Chairman of the Executive Yuan of the National Government of China, General Chiang Kai-shek. I believe that such a meeting, to be held as soon as arrangements therefor can be completed, furnishes in present circumstances the best hope of maintaining and preserving peace in the Pacific area.

I have not as yet consulted General Chiang Kai-shek in regard to this, but I shall be pleased to do so immediately upon receipt from you of a favorable reply.

FE:MMH:HES

*substantive drafts which were discarded
upon receipt of a draft from the White House.*

DRAFT TELEGRAM

October 16, 1941.

His Imperial Majesty

Hirohito,

Emperor of Japan.

I have just been informed through news reports that the Cabinet of Prince Konoye has tendered its resignation to you. As Your Imperial Majesty is aware, discussions have been carried on during the past few weeks between high officials of the Government of the United States and high officials of the Government of Japan directed toward working out a basis in principle for a meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself which we had both hoped would be contributory to maintenance and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area. The original messages I received from the Premier of Japan on this subject were very gratifying. Unfortunately, it seems to me that the concrete proposals subsequently presented by the Japanese Government seemed to present a more narrow concept than I had anticipated (than that conveyed by the Premier's message). The Secretary of State therefore on October 2

-2-

suggested to the Japanese Ambassador here that we return to the original concept and endeavor through re-examination of that concept to evolve general lines of action which would be clear manifestations (of the lofty concepts) of our original concepts and thus might be expected to establish a durable and fundamental peace in the Pacific area.

The procedure which the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have been following during these past weeks has not produced the results hoped for. In view of the fact that, as high officials of your Government have repeatedly stated, time presses, I suggest that Your Imperial Majesty signify approval of a meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself and the Premier of China. I believe that such a meeting to be held as soon as arrangements therefor can be completed furnishes in present circumstances the best hope of maintaining and preserving peace in the Pacific area.

I have not as yet consulted General Chiang Kai-shek, the Premier of China, in regard to this, but I shall be pleased to do so immediately upon receipt from you of a favorable reply.

FE:MMH:HES

78

October 16, 1941

DRAFT OF A PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN -- SUPERSEDED BY A LATER
DRAFT DATED OCTOBER 17, 1941.

THIS DRAFT WAS NOT USED.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

October 16, 1941



✓
Mr. Secretary:

Mr. Hamilton does not recommend taking the proposed action. Mr. Ballantine feels that it is premature to come to any decision on the matter. I feel strongly that this proposed message in the form in which it stands should not at this time be sent.

A redraft is submitted here attached. The important paragraphs are, of course, the last two. We all feel that great care should be exercised to avoid making any too broad commitment or any too emphatic threat. I myself feel that we should avoid anything that implies countenance of the Japanese operations in China.

EXHIBIT NO. 74

TELEGRAM SENT

AG

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (Br)

October 6, 1940

2 p.m.

AMEMBASSY

TOKYO (JAPAN) VIA SHANGHAI (CHINA)

INFO: AMEMBASSY, CHUNGKING (CHINA)
AMEMBASSY, PEIPING (CHINA)
AMERICAN CONSUL, HONG KONG

361.

The continuance of an abnormal situation in the Far East which has in widespread areas disturbed and interfered with the legitimate commercial, cultural, and philanthropic activities of American citizens and which has adversely affected conditions of order and general living conditions has impelled the Department to the conclusion that the time has come for it to adopt with reference to China (including Manchuria), to Japan (including Kwantung Leased Territory, Korea, and Formosa), to Hong Kong, and to French Indochina an attitude toward passport control and withdrawal of American citizens therefrom similar to that which has been adopted for some time toward these questions with reference to disturbed areas of Europe. The Department accordingly desires that its diplomatic and consular officers in China, in Japan, in Hong Kong, and in French Indochina quietly repeat quietly inform American citizens in their respective districts of the substance of the preceding

- 2 - 381, October 6, 2 p.m. to Tokyo

preceding sentence and suggest withdrawals insofar as is practicable from the areas in question to the United States. This applies especially in regard to women and children and to men whose continued presence in China, in Japan, in Hong Kong, and in French Indochina is not repeat not considered urgently or essentially needed. There should be pointed out to American citizens the advisability of their taking advantage of transportation facilities while such facilities are available, as it goes without saying that no one can guarantee that such facilities will remain available indefinitely.

In order that this instruction be not repeat not misconstrued in any quarter, it is desired that effort be made to avoid publicity in regard thereto and that endeavor be made to preclude the reading into it of sensational implications.

The Department would appreciate receiving from you and from Peiping, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Saigon, and other interested offices an estimate of the number of Americans who will be inclined to heed these suggestions. Tokyo should instruct consuls in Japanese territory and Peiping should instruct those in China.

The Department will expect shortly to issue further instructions embodying various administrative considerations.

Sent to Tokyo via Shanghai. Repeated to Peiping, Chungking, and Hong Kong. Hong Kong repeat to Saigon.

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TOKYO (JAPAN) 200005
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"Br" PLAIN
Washington,
February 11, 1941
7 p.m. |
| | | This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to others. | |

URGENT.

Department's 381, October 8, 2 p.m., withdrawal of American citizens.

It is desired that the Embassy at once instruct American consulates in Japanese territory to renew, immediately and quietly and with effort to avoid any sensational publicity, to American citizens, especially women and children and men whose continued presence in Japan is not highly essential, this Government's suggestions that they withdraw to the United States. In so doing, the Embassy and the consulates are to understand and should explain to American inquirers that this Government is making no repeat no assumption that a situation of acute physical danger to American nationals is imminent, but that this Government, in the light of obvious trends in the Far Eastern situation, desires to reduce the risks to which American nationals and their interests are exposed by virtue of uncertainties and, through the process of withdrawal of unessential personnel, to improve its position in relation to problems which may at any time be presented.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

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Washington,

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Charge to of affording maximum appropriate protection to those persons
1 who are not in position to withdraw, those interests which cannot be abandoned, and those principles and those rights to which it is the duty of the American Government to give all appropriate support at all times. This instruction and the advice to be given under it is not repeat not meant to be alarmist, but is a further and necessary precautionary measure. We do not repeat not wish to impose unnecessary hardships upon any American nationals, but we ask that those whom you address shall realize that there are real risks, that we wish to reduce these risks, and that this advice is being given in the interest both of the safety and convenience of the American nationals addressed and in the interest of national security.

The Department is sending similar instructions to Peiping, Hong Kong, and Indochina.

The Department does not repeat not contemplate sending a special vessel or special vessels to assist in the withdrawal and American nationals who make inquiry in this particular connection should be advised to take advantage of such transportation facilities as may be currently available.

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PA/H


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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SUBJECT: [Illegible]
[Illegible text follows, mostly obscured by heavy noise and bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.]

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Department of State

Washington,

5 10:00 AM 12/7/41
URGENT 12/7/41
TO ALL AMERICAN CONSULS IN JAPAN AND MANCHUKUO
FROM DEPT. OF STATE
SUBJ: RE: [REDACTED]
RE: [REDACTED]

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Sent by operator M.

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EXHIBIT NO. 74A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 4, 1941

PA/H--Mr. Hornbeck: No objection. Do not clearly perceive a need. SFH

Le---Mr. Haekworth: No objection. GWH

SD Mr. Green: It would appear highly desirable to take such a step immediately. J.C.G.

A-L Mr. Long: I agree. L.

U Mr. Welles: I agree. SW(?)

S Mr. Secretary:

Mr. Hayter, First Secretary of the British Embassy, called on an officer of this Division this afternoon and stated that the British Ambassador in Tokyo had raised the question whether endeavor should not be made to effect an arrangement with the Japanese Government under which, in the event of British-Japanese hostilities, British and Japanese officials and nationals in the territory of the other would be withdrawn or exchanged. Mr. Hayter did not know whether the British Ambassador in Tokyo had in mind an arrangement designed also to be effective as regards Manchuria and Japanese-occupied areas of China. Mr. Hayter stated that the British Foreign Office, before acting in the matter, desired that the British Embassy discuss it with the Department with a view to learning our views.

Although it is possible that the Japanese Government would not be willing to enter into such an arrangement, especially with regard to Manchuria and occupied areas of China, it is believed that, for the sake of the personal safety

-2-

safety of American officials and other American nationals, it would be advisable for this Government as well as the British to attempt to make such arrangement. Such attempt might, at this time, be advisable also in that it would be definite indication to the Japanese Government of the firmness of the American position in the present crisis and would be one means of impressing upon the Japanese Government the seriousness with which we view the present situation.

It is our opinion that, if endeavor is made to effect such an arrangement, earnest effort should be made to have included within its scope both the occupied areas in China and Manchuria. It seems to us that there is a fair possibility that American officials and other nationals in Japan would, in case of hostilities between Japan and this country, ^{would} receive reasonably correct treatment (although such treatment in the case of nationals placed in concentration camps would naturally, because of the lower standard of living in Japan, involve much more physical discomfort than would be the case in this country). On the other hand it is likely that our officials in Manchuria, who have no official status vis-à-vis the "Manchukuo" regime, and our nationals there as well as our officials and nationals in occupied areas of China, might receive extremely harsh treatment especially as the Japanese military authorities in control of those areas are to be classed

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in general among the extremists and are in general anti-American.

The proposed agreement would seem necessarily to envisage assent on the part of this Government to the withdrawal from United States territory of a number of Japanese subjects many times as great as the number of American nationals in territory controlled or occupied by Japan.

The officer of this Division on whom Mr. Hayter called informed Mr. Hayter that the matter would be brought to the attention of the high officers of the Department and that the British Embassy would be informed as soon as it was possible to reach a conclusion. It is suggested that, if it is decided that endeavor will be made to effect the suggested arrangement, the American approach to the Japanese Government be made independently of the British.

M.M.H.

As the making of such an approach would be interpreted by the American public as a definite indication that this Government ~~to/ expects war~~ between Japan and the United States, the Secretary may wish to speak to the President in regard to the advisability of this Government's making such an approach at this time.

M.M.H.

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EXHIBIT NO. 75

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Washington,

November 28, 1941

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR AND THE
COUNSELOR ONLY.

I called in the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu
in the afternoon of November 26 and gave them two documents—
an oral statement and draft outline of a proposed basis
for a broad agreement covering the entire Pacific area.

A summary of these documents follows in a subsequent
telegram.

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November 26, 1941

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AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE ~~COMMISSIONER~~ ^{and Counselor} AMBASSADOR ONLY.

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at
 my request November 26.

I handed the Japanese Ambassador an oral statement
 substantially as follows:

It is believed that some progress has been made in
 reference to the general principles which we have been
 discussing for the past several months in informal and
 exploratory conversations in an effort to reach a settle-
 ment of problems of the entire Pacific area. Included
 among those principles are the principles of reliance upon
 international cooperation and conciliation to improve world
 conditions through peaceful ways and means and to prevent
 and solve controversies, inviolability of territorial
 integrity and sovereignty, no interference in internal
 affairs of other nations and the principle of equality.
 Mention is made of the proposals of the Japanese Government
 received on November 20 and recent statements of the
 Japanese Ambassador that his Government desires to continue

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Washington.

s these conversations and that a modus vivendi would be helpful toward creating a propitious atmosphere.

This Government most earnestly desires to further the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific area and to provide full opportunity to continue discussions with the Japanese Government looking to the working out of ^a broad program of peace. In the opinion of this Government the Japanese proposals of November 20 in some ways conflict with the fundamental principles to which each Government has committed itself and would not be likely to further our ultimate objectives. It is suggested that further efforts toward resolving divergences of views on the practical application of these principles be made. There is therefore offered the Japanese Government a draft plan as one practical manifestation of the sort of program this Government has in mind to be worked out during further discussions. The hope is expressed that there thus may be expedited progress toward a setting of minds.

The draft proposal for a broad-gauge settlement was substantially as follows:

The first section contained a draft mutual declaration

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of expressions of extreme nationalism such as excessive trade restrictions and promotion of international economic cooperation; (e) full protection of consuming countries' and populations' interests ^{as regards} the operation of international commodity agreements.

The second section of the draft proposal calls for ten steps to be taken:

1. Both Governments to exert their influence to ~~bring~~ bring about other governments' adherence to and practical application of the basic political and economic principles set forth ~~herein~~.

2. Both Governments to seek the conclusion of a multilateral non-aggression pact among Thailand, China, the British Empire, the Netherlands, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States.

3. Both Governments to agree that no agreement already concluded by either with any third power or powers will be interpreted so as to conflict with this agreement's fundamental purpose--establishment and preservation of peace in the entire Pacific.

4. Both Governments to seek the conclusion of an agreement among the Netherland, Thai, American, British,

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Chinese, and Japanese Governments calling for
pledges on the part of each Government to respect Indochina's
territorial integrity and should a threat to that
integrity develop to embark upon immediate consultation
~~with regard to that threat,~~
~~in order that measures necessary and advisable to meet~~
~~that threat may be taken.~~ such agreement to provide
also that each ^{signatory} ~~signatory~~ could not refuse to accept or
seek preferential economic or commercial treatment in
Indochina and each signatory would exert its influence
toward obtaining for all signatories equality of treat-
ment in those matters.

5. Japan to withdraw from China and Indochina all
police, air, naval and military forces.

6. Both Governments to give up all extraterritorial
rights in China and rights and interests in and with
regard to concessions, international settlements and
rights under the Boxer Protocol; both Governments to
seek to obtain from other governments, including the
British, an agreement to give up all similar rights in
China.

7. Both Governments to undertake negotiations toward
conclusion of an American-Japanese trade agreement on the

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Washington

8 basis of mutual reductions of tariffs, including an American undertaking to bind raw silk on the free list, and of reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment.

8. Both Governments to remove their freezing restrictions on each other's funds.

9. Both Governments to agree upon a dollar yen rate stabilization plan, each allocating one-half of the funds adequate for that purpose.

10. Both Governments not repeat not to support--economically, politically, militarily--any government or regime in China except the National Government located temporarily at Chungking.

An account of the conversation will be sent you in a later telegram.

H.C.C.
(22-1)

11/16
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

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Sent by operator M. 19

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AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR AND THE
COUNSELOR ONLY.

Reference Department's 784, November 26, 9 p.m.

After reading the documents summarized in the Department's telegram under reference Mr. Kurusu asked whether those documents represented the reply of this Government to the Japanese proposals. The Secretary said that just as Japan had to deal with a domestic political situation this Government also had its internal political problems and that the suggestion contained in the documents he had given the Ambassador represented all that we could do at this time in the light of the Japanese proposals. The Secretary went on to mention that the proposal he had just given the Japanese would make possible certain international financial arrangements which were not actually outlined in the documents.

Mr. Kurusu offered various depreciatory comments in regard to the arrangement suggested in the documents which he had just received.

He mentioned Japan's bitter experience with international

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3 organizations as the basis for his objection to the proposed multilateral non-aggression pacts. He added that China had received the wrong impression from the Washington treaties and had used them advantageously to flaunt Japan's rights. He said that if this proposal represented the ideas of the American Government he did not see the possibility of any agreement and added that he did not see how the Japanese Government could consider the proposal that Japan withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and withdraw all support from regimes or governments in China except that of Chiang Kai-shek.

The Secretary inquired whether we could not work out these questions.

Mr. Kurusu suggested that as his Government would be likely to throw up its hands at our proposal and as the document was marked tentative and without commitment, it might be the wiser course further to discuss it informally before sending it to the Japanese Government.

The Secretary suggested the Japanese might want carefully to study the documents before further discussion. The Secretary said that with the public having lost its perspective it was necessary to present a complete picture of our position. He mentioned the acute public feeling on the oil question and

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reminded the Japanese of the great injury being done to us by Japan's immobilizing large forces of democratic countries in territories near Indochina and indicated that should Japan pour troops into Indochina the American people would have misgivings as to the possible menace in countries south and west of Indochina and to our direct interests.

Mr. Kurusu offered specious and unconvincing arguments on Japan's difficulty in renouncing support of Wang Ching-wei and observed that the standing of the Nanking regime was a matter of opinion.

The Japanese clearly indicated their disappointment over our response to their proposal and their feeling that we had reached an end. They asked whether we were not interested in a modus vivendi, whether any other arrangement was not possible and whether they could see the President.

The Secretary replied that we had explored the question of a modus vivendi and, in response to a further inquiry as to whether our inability to consider a modus vivendi was because of the attitude of other powers, he added that he had done his best. He said that the President would undoubtedly be glad to see the Japanese (an appointment for such a meeting has been arranged for November 29).

FI:KMS:HMS/HES

Enclosed by

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Hull

Sent by operator

EXHIBIT NO. 76

[Translation of Document 1881-PS, Office of U. S. Chief of Counsel]

[1]

Notes Fueh 20/41

NOTES REGARDING THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE FUEHRER AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND OF THE MINISTER OF STATE MEISSNER IN BERLIN ON THE 4TH OF APRIL, 1941

Matsuoka further mentioned, that he was induced to make those endeavours for peace particularly in view of the personality of Cardinal CASPARI.

Furthermore he had endeavoured to convince the POPE, that the United States and particularly the American President prolonged the war in Europe and in China. It was not the question to determine, if America or its President were right or wrong. They certainly had their definite reasons for their policy. Notwithstanding the question of right or wrong one had to state the fact, that they prolonged the war in Europe and in China. In regard to China he tried to convince the POPE, that Japan was not fighting the Chinese or China herself, but merely the Bolshevism which threatened to spread in China and in the entire far East. It is regretful that America and England sided with Bolshevism.

The FUEHRER interrupted that both countries also sided in Spain with Bolshevism.

Matsuoka then also expressed the request, that the FUEHRER should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as broad-mindedly as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly concerning the U-boat war fare, which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In case that the country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the United States, because in that case America probably would side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed, that the United States could be restrained by diplomatic exertions from entering the war at the side of Great Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst situation, that is with war against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in the South Sea. For this reason the German experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as periscope and such like, could best be exploited by Japan.

To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning navy and army, which were needed by the Japanese.

The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowances for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion that America's contributions depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany's war against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not merely against England, but also against America. Germany has made her preparations so, that no American could land in Europe. She would [2] conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact, that the German soldiers naturally ranks high above the American.

In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out, that Germany on her part would immediately take the consequences, if Japan would get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would first get involved if with Germany or with Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany

would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joined action, their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.

Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer might give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to them. Because the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.

As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His organization went on, why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated, that, if Japan continued to walk along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances than at present.

The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of the Ruineland, declaration of sovereignty of armed Forces. He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to instantly reply to any widening of the war, be it my Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.

Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their ruling politicians had recently still attempted a last manoeuvre towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave free passage to the consignments of rubber and tin to America to their place of destination. However, America would war against Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an argumentation naturally did not miss its effect upon the Japanese, because of the education oriented on English lines which many had received.

The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America did not mean anything but that the United States had the hope, that as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they could advance against Japan together with Great Britain whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan.

The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the powerful position of England in East Asia, but that on the other hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany.

Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he (Matsuoka) in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan itself a single word of all that he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese Minister for Foreign affairs, to tell a close friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which he as Foreign Minister had to oppose energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly and carefully in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of his proper plans towards the Prince Konoye and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.

Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he would succeed.

On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.

Besides this Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in the matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by cabling something might leak out. If necessary he would send a courier.

The Fuehrer agreed and assured after all, that he could rest entirely assured of German reticence.

Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately could not say the same of Japan.

The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal parting words.

BERLIN, the 4th of April 1941.

Signed: SCHMIDT.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. 1881-PS

4 APRIL 1941

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc., 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1881-PS.

ERNST COHN,
Pfc.
33925738.

EXHIBIT NO. 77

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MO

This message must be
closely paraphrased be- FROM
fore being communicated
to anyone. (BR)

Peking via N.R.

Dated August 31, 1940.

Rec'd 9:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

300, August 31, 3 p.m.

Mr. A. T. Steele, Far Eastern correspondent for
the CHICAGO DAILY NEWS, returned last week from home
leave in the United States spending some days in Japan
and Manchuria before coming here. As Mr. Steele is an
experienced and able observer the Embassy asked him
to prepare a statement of his impressions and a summary
thereof is respectfully submitted below as of interest
to the Department.

(Begin summary) Returning to Japan and Manchuria
after an absence of four months I noticed many striking
changes. Japan is moving toward totalitarianism at a
faster pace than at any time since the commencement of
the China hostilities. The Yonai Government which was
a neatly balanced arrangement of pro-Anglo-American and
pro-Nazi influences has been followed by a regime based
on the expectation and hope of an early German victory
over Great Britain.

(END OF SECTION ONE)

EXB

SMYTH

834.00/951

F/FG

800.00
note
7/32.94
7/11/94
1-11-94

MC

This is **TELEGRAM RECEIVED**
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (BR)

Piping via H.R.

Dated August 31, 1940.

FROM

Rec'd 11:59 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

300, August 31, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO)
 (e)

This/has made no secret of its intentions to profit in every possible way from that victory, if it comes. Four months ago Japanese agricultural interests, businessmen and liberals were still acting as a brake against precipitate acts of aggression and opportunism, but these elements have been momentarily submerged under the current wave of pro-Axis enthusiasm. Japan has gone frankly and starkly "realistic".

Germans in Tokyo, and they are numerous, are nevertheless not entirely satisfied with the pace at which Japan is turning toward the Axis, rapid though it seems to outsiders. German newspaper men with whom I have talked complain that the Japanese seem prone to delay decision until they are quite certain of ultimate German success. They claim that German diplomats have pointed out to the Japanese that the quicker they make some kind of a deal, the more generous the Germans will be in the

Page 3, No. 305 from Peiping, Section two.
in the final reckoning.

I was not able to learn whether the Germans want the
Japanese as active allies in the European conflict or
whether they are simply seeking some kind of a diplomatic
alignment which would give the Japanese a free but inde-
pendent hand against the British in the Far East.

(END SECTION TWO)

(*) Apparent omission. SMITH
FMB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Y3

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated FROM
to anyone. (BR)

Peiping via N.

Dated August 3

Rec'd 1:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

2:00, August 31, 3 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

In any case German newspaper men told me the most important factors in any possible agreement between Germany and Japan would be: (one) definite assurances concerning the future German stake in the market which Germany regards as of great importance (two) some satisfactory solution of the East Indian South Sea problems in which Germany has interest especially economically; and (three) of the Japanese as a means of keeping the United States constantly worried and preoccupied with Pacific so that Germany would have a freer hand in Europe.

Very few of the Germans with whom I have talked are pro-Japanese at heart and some are doubtful of to which the Japanese could help them. Most of them, however, recognize that at ~~least~~ ^{least} the Japanese have a certain nuisance value and Germany would like to make ~~use~~ ^{allies of} them. The Germans foresee of course

Japan



Page 2 No. 300, from Peiping (Section Three)

Japan's exclusionist policy in the Orient will be applied
to all white people including themselves in the long run
if and when Japan becomes strong enough to enforce it.

(END SECTION THREE)

SMYTH

EMB

... of the ...
... of the ...
... of the ...
... of the ...
... of the ...

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

20

This message must be FROM
 immediately relayed or-
 from being communicated
 to any one. (BB)
 Principal via
 Dated August
 Rec'd 5:10 a

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Aug, August 31, 3 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

In view of Japan's extremely difficult position
 believe that she is in no position at the present
 to wage a successful war alone against the U
 of Russia although with allies her position
 would change. I feel sure, however, that
 in Japan are extremely desirous of avoiding
 with the United States. I might add that on
 visit to the United States I was struck with
 of people who mistakenly believe that any
 strength by the United States would automatically
 the United States into war. The trouble is
 Japanese know we feel this way and are making
 of it by flourishing the war scare in our face
 I believe the Japanese have no intention of
 except as a last resort; in the face of this
 I believe that firmness is the soundest and

Page 2 No. 300 from Preparing Section Five.

American Naval policy. The risks involved are much less than is commonly supposed in the United States. Of course if Great Britain is defeated then we can expect the Japanese to become more belligerent.

(END SECTION FIVE)

SMYTH

END

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

23

This message must be FROM
 properly paraphrased or-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (S)

Palpant via N.R.

Dated August 31

Rec'd 5:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

SAC, August 31, 3 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

In view of Japan's extremely difficult position
 believe that she is in no position at the present
 to have a successful war alone against the United
 States although with allies her position would
 course change. I feel sure, however, that the
 in Japan are extremely desirous of avoiding a
 with the United States. I might add that on my
 visit to the United States I was struck with the
 of people who mistakenly believe that any strong
 strength by the United States would automatically
 the United States into war. The trouble is that
 Japanese know we feel this way and are making
 of it by flourishing the war scare in our faces.
 I believe the Japanese have no intention of fighting
 except as a last resort; in the face of this
 I believe that firmness is the soundest and safe

Amr

Page 2 No. 300 from Preparing Section Five.

American Naval policy. The risks involved are much less than is commonly supposed in the United States. Of course if Great Britain is defeated then we can expect the Japanese to become more belligerent.

(END SECTION FIVE)

SMYTH

END



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MG

This telegram must be
properly paraphrased be-
fore being communicated From
to any one. (BR)

Piping via N.

Dated August 31

Rec'd 5:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

300, August 31, 3 p.m. (SECTION SIX)

The Japanese appear to be so confident of victory and are so powerful that such a victory will enable them to realize their ambitions in Asia. It appears quite useless for the United States at this time to suggest any halfway measures of appeasement or friendship. In fact the reception that has been shown to such ideas recently by the Japanese press shows the tendency is to interpret them as signs of fear and weakness. No form of appeasement short of American recognition of the Japanese created new order in the world will satisfy the Japanese at this time. It is foolish to attempt to reason with the Japanese. The course of events in Europe becomes clear. Britain holds out against Germany contrary to Japanese expectations. Japan will then have to follow the policy for Japan today is a nation whose policy is dictated solely by expediency. (End Summary)

1075
1076
1077

Page 2, No. 550 from Bureau (Section Six.)

(END OF MESSAGE).

Sent to Department. Repeated to Bureau by Bureau.

Code text by air mail to Tokyo.

1078

FMB

1079
1080
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EXHIBIT NO. 78

DESPATCHES ON KRA PENINSULA ALERT

Despatches on KRA Peninsula alert (1941)

| Date | From | Action |
|-------------|-------------|-----------------|
| 28 Nov..... | COM14..... | OPNAV..... |
| 30 Nov..... | OPNAV..... | CINCAF..... |
| 30 Nov..... | CINCAF..... | OPNAV..... |
| 1 Dec..... | CINCAF..... | OPNAV..... |
| 2 Dec..... | CINCAF..... | OPNAV..... |
| 2 Dec..... | CINCAF..... | OPNAV..... |
| 2 Dec..... | CINCAF..... | OPNAV..... |
| 3 Dec..... | CINCAF..... | CXM CINC C..... |
| 3 Dec..... | CINCAF..... | OPNAV..... |
| 4 Dec..... | CINCAF..... | OPNAV..... |

¹ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brace pages of original exhibit.

[1] Top Secret

28 November 1941

From: Com 14

Action: Opnav

Info:

280240

Following received by British Consul from usually reliable source will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on 1 December without declaration in order get between Bangkok and Singapore. Attack proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main landing to be made

[2] Top Secret

30 November 1941

From: Opnav

Action: Cincaf

Info: Cincpac

300419

Indications that Japan about to attack points on Kra Isthmus expedition X In order to ascertain destination this expedition our position in the Philippines desire you cover by air the line Bay on three days commencing upon receipt this despatch X to observe only X They must not approach so as to appear to must defend themselves if attacked X Understand British search arc 180 miles from Tedta Bharu and will move troops Kra Isthmus near Singora X If expedition is approaching MacArthur X British mission here informed X

[3] Top Secret

30 November 1941

From: Cincaf

Action: Opnav

Info:

301135

Only 1 small cruiser and 1 auxiliary were disclosed by today in position approximately 14-00 north 110-00 east.

[4] Top Secret

1 December 1941

From: Cincaf

Action: Opnav

Info: Cinc China

011140

Results of today's reconnaissance negative even including the close vicinity Camranh Bay: Reference Opnav's dispatch 301700.

[5] Top Secret

2 December 1941

From: Cincaf

Action: Opnav

Info: Cincpac

020730

Bearing 070 from Saigon distant 180 miles 3 type 1-61 submarines in cruising formation headed south 15 knots. 21 transports anchored Camranh Bay with six planes patrolling overhead.

Comment: This is in position Lat 11-50 N Long 100-20E, 600 miles from Manila. /s/ EW

[6] Top Secret

2 December 1941

From: Cincaf

Action: Opnav

Info: Cincpac

020345

Patrol plane sighted 9 submarines speed 10 course south at 0230 Greenwich Lat 13-10 N, Long 110-00 East.

[7] Top Secret

2 DECEMBER 1941

FROM: CINCAF

ACTION: C X M

CINC CHINA

INFO: OPNAV

021030

No results of significance today's reconnaissance other than as reported before. The 9 subs were line abreast 5 miles spacing. Ships in Camranh are mostly large, several probably cargo only. Our planes have been sighted on Indo-China coast three successive days have discontinued search for the present of that locality.

[8] Top Secret

3 DECEMBER 1941

FROM: CINCAF

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO:

031400

No results from reconnaissance today.

[9] Top Secret

4 DECEMBER 1941

FROM: CINCAF

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO:

041315

Negative results from Dec. 4th reconnaissance.

EXHIBIT NO. 79**DESPATCHES****ON****DUTCH ALERT***Despatches on Dutch alert (1941)*

| Date | From | Acti |
|-------------|----------------------|--------------|
| 21 Nov..... | OPNAV..... | CINCPAC, C |
| 22 Nov..... | CINCPAC..... | OPNAV..... |
| 22 Nov..... | SPENAVO, LONDON..... | OPNAV..... |
| 23 Nov..... | CNO..... | SPENAVO..... |
| 23 Nov..... | CINCAF..... | OPNAV..... |
| 24 Nov..... | OPNAV..... | SPENAVO, L |
| 25 Nov..... | CINCAF..... | OPNAV..... |
| 3 Dec..... | SPENAVO, LONDON..... | OPNAV..... |
| 4 Dec..... | SPENAVO, LONDON..... | OPNAV..... |
| 5 Dec..... | CNO..... | SPENAVO, L |

NOTE.—Despatch from Dutch Legation is in exhibit 21.

[1] Top Secret

21 November 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: CINC AF CINC PAC

Info:

211833

Have been informed by Dutch Legation that they have received flows quote according to information received by the Government Netherlands East Indies a Japanese expeditionary force has arrived at Palau X should this force be strong enough to form Netherlands Indies or Portuguese Timor command move beyond following points Davao Walgea Equator the Governor General as an act of aggression and will under those circumstances consider opening and act accordingly unquote inform Army authorities request any information you may have concerning developments threat against the Dutch East Indies and your evaluation of for

[2] Top Secret

22 November 1941

From: CINCPAC

Action: OPNAV

Info:

220315

Have no info which substantiates your 211833 other than your information are 4th Fleet may move Palau. Third Base force there evaluation Dutch report rating "B"

[3] Top Secret

22 November 1941

From: Spenavo London

Action: OPNAV

Info:

221122

By Vice Admiral Furstner, Minister for Marine in the Dutch East Indies and CINC of all Dutch naval forces. I have been asked to present the following to you and request your informal reply. The Government has received reports to the effect that Japan is concentrating a large force in Palau. Dutch state it is difficult to ascertain verification but they consider that this point does not absolve them

what should be done by the Dutch in case this reported concentration leads to an expedition crossing the Davao-Walgeo line or the Equator east of that line (see PARA 26ADB April 1941). Dutch Government are inclined to consider that any such expedition could only be regarded as a direct menace to Netherlands East Indies and thereby as a non direct threat to the territories and interest of the United States and Great Britain and that therefore it would have to be immediately countered by force. Dutch state that before definitely making up their minds in this respect, they would like to have the views of our C. N. O. The possibility of an individual Japanese commander acting against the intentions of the Japanese Government should be taken into account and also the fact that in case of that nature, the Japanese Government has the tendency to back up the commander in question considering that otherwise the Japanese would lose face. Dutch have received information that 4,000 laborers have left Japan for Palau.

I suggested the possibility of confusion between the movement of laborers with the reported movements of expeditionary force.

Biddle requests this be passed to State for information.

[4] Top Secret

23 November 1941

From: CNO

Action: SPENAVO

Info:

222040

Your 221122 introduces political questions upon which the CNO is not in a position to offer advice but you may express my views concerning the importance of the Pelews for the defense of the mandates and for offensive operations against either the Philippines or Nei. OPNAV questions accuracy of information concerning an expeditionary force near the Pelews but is aware that land and air forces and facilities there are in process of expansion. CINCPAC and CINCAF are checking on recent Japanese movements. Will advise you further.

[5] Top Secret

23 November 1941

From: CINCAF

Action: OPNAV

Info: CINCPAC

221150

No information here supporting Dutch report in your 211833. We have not detected presence in mandates of any men of war other than those normally assigned Fourth Fleet and although all units of latter have not been positively identified since 1 November it is probable that they are all in mandates but no concentration these units is apparent. There may have been an increase in number of transports and marus but this is hard to establish with certainty. The concentration of marus in Saipan area which has been apparent since about 20 October and numbers between 35 and 40 continues. CINCFORTH is at Saipan and AIRON 24 may be. Traffic association between units combined fleet and mandates mentioned in COM 16 0916 of 27 October continues. One BATDIV and two carriers may be preparing to proceed mandates but no such movement has been detected. We continue to watch closely.

[6] Top Secret

24 November 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: SPENAVO London

Info:

250100

CNO advises as follows after studying special reports from CINCAF CINCPAC and Guam on the subject of my 222040;—you are at liberty to disclose the info to Vice Admiral Furstner and the British CNS. None of these special reports show any info supporting the Dutch report. Unquestionably activity in the mandates has increased both as regards warships and merchant types. A con-

1772 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARB

siderable number of garrisons are being strengthened. CI in Saipan and some units of fleet plus merchant types are used throughout the mandates. Air force submarine and is increasing but as a general proposition Japanese emphasis is on Truk and Jaluit areas. The CNO does not believe that aggressive force is now prepared for any immediate movement under discussion but he is concerned over southward movement from Shanghai and Japan to Formosa and also apparent preparation for an early aggressive movement from Formosa and Indo China. There are no clear indications at present as to the direction of such a movement and the situation should be carefully watched.

[1] Top secret

25 NOVEMBER 1941
FROM: CINCAF
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: CINCPAC
250623

Shipping Adviser Batavia informs that Dutch report coincided with Army in Timor. Portuguese Timor was named alleged expeditionary force. Info was classified as very doubtful and no confirmation.

[8] Top Secret

3 DECEMBER 1941
FROM: SPENAVO LONDON
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO:
031411

Part 1 of 2: I have kept Admty informed regarding message 222040 as Admty has discussed same subject with Dutch and suggested to Admty that it might now be necessary for Dutch to declare area south and west of Davao-Malgeo-Equator line free of shipping in order that Dutch forces might be free to take possession of suspicious vessels crossing from north and east. Admty in view of naval point of view would constitute useful defense for political reasons that one should be declared in as early as possible and should further be represented as a defense one rather than one. Admty informed Furstner they also doubt accuracy of Dutch proposal involved matters of high policy, it was recommended to question up with Foreign Office thru Dutch Foreign Minister. Minister visited Eden, his proposal went beyond that of Furstner's joint declaration of defense.

(See page two)

[9] Top Secret

3 DECEMBER 1941
FROM: SPENAVO LONDON
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO:
031411

(Page Two)

One by A or B Powers. After consulting Admty Eden replied to Minister as follows; A. That during the continuance of the peace between Japan and the US in Washington, it was undesirable to declare an expedition against Netherlands territory. The declaration would be particularly likely to be influenced by this consideration.

[10] Top Secret

4 December 1941

From: SPENAVO LONDON

Action: OPNAV

Info:

931413

(Part Two Baker)

That it therefore seemed better to make no declaration at all until there was evidence more definite than was at present available of concentrations of Japanese forces constituting a threat to Netherlands territory. (C). His Majesty's Government recognise the military value that the declaration of a defense zone would have if definite evidence of such concentrations was obtained but that they consider the declaration would be less provocative to Japan and less prejudicial to the Washington negotiations if it were confined to a unilateral declaration by the Netherlands East Indies of a zone manifestly designed as a defense measure for their own shores. (D). That in similar circumstances His Majesty's Government had been compelled to make a unilateral declaration of a defense zone on the open seas off the coast of Johore when the Japanese concentrations on the northern border of Indochina began to constitute a threat to Malaya. The declaration of this zone in waters adjacent to British territory was plainly a measure only [11] of defense and was at the time accepted as such by Japan without serious criticism. (E). Mr. Eden therefore suggested that if a declaration proved necessary the Netherlands Government should declare that a certain military and naval defense measures have been taken in the area south and west of the Davao-Waigeo-Equator line and that accordingly all vessels intending to enter this zone must notify the Netherlands naval authorities of their intention and call at specified ports for routing instructions. Such a declaration would be analogous to that made by His Majesty's Government off Johore and would not be likely to increase existing tension. Winant and Biddle informed. Please inform State.

[12] Top Secret

5 December 1941

From: CNO

Action: Spenavo London

Info:

942239

While CNO agrees with you that November reports of a Japanese concentration in the Pelews were unfounded, the possibility of an attack by the Japanese from that region against the Philippines or NEI cannot be ruled out. This replies to your 931411 and gives CNO views as to the military aspects of the Dutch project to declare areas south and west Davao dash Waigo dash equator line dangerous to shipping in order that Dutch forces might attack suspicious vessels entering from north and east. Were this area declared dangerous to shipping the prohibition would apply to all merchant shipping of whatever nationality and to naval vessels of the United States and United Kingdom as well as to those of Japan. Large amounts of shipping traverse this general area and it is questionable if Dutch could set up promptly a naval control system that would obviate excessive delays of shipping most important to the United States and particularly shipping carrying United States naval and army reinforcements to the Philippines as all United States shipping between west coast of United States and the far east area is now routed via Torres Strait. If NEI declares this large area closed it would be quite a different matter from the British closure of the Johore area which is a very small one. Japan would be free to close Okhotsk Sea, the Sea of Japan, and all the western portion of the South China Sea and the Gulf of Siam. Were the United States to acquiesce in the Dutch declaration it would have few grounds for objecting to a Japanese declaration of the same character. At present United States defense aid is going to Russia via the Okhotsk Sea and the Sea of Japan, and the United States, United Kingdom, and Netherlands East Indies are executing extensive reconnaissance measures in all directions considered dangerous. Shipments to Siberia and reconnaissance measures ought to continue and CNO is convinced a declaration by the Dutch closing the area in question would be most prejudicial to naval and military interests of the three powers. If Dutch authorities consider some warning should be given Japan CNO believes it should take the form of a declaration to Japan that in view of the current situation Japanese naval vessels or expeditionary forces crossing the Davao Waigeo line would be considered hostile and would be attacked. Communicate these views to the admiralty and the Dutch naval command in London.

EXHIBIT NO. 80

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Office of Chief of Naval Operations
Office of Naval Intelligence
Washington

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No.
Serial No

December

FORTNIGHTLY SUMMARY OF CURRENT NATIONAL SITUATION

(Information concerning Anti-Axis Belligerents
is omitted from this publication due to
its wide dissemination by mail.)

Because of the CONFIDENTIAL nature of the
sources from which some of the information embodied
in the text of this publication issues, and because
of the CONFIDENTIAL channels through which it is
transmitted to the Division of Naval Intelligence
it is appropriate to invite particular attention
the CONFIDENTIAL character of this publication.

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Director of Naval Intelligence

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Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations

A. The Diplomatic Situation

1. Japan

Unless the Japanese request continuance of the conversations, the Japanese-American negotiations have virtually broken down. The Japanese Government and press are proclaiming loudly that the nation must carry on resolutely the work of building the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The press also is criticising Thailand severely. Strong indications point to an early Japanese advance against Thailand.

Relations between Japan and Russia remained strained. Japan signed a five-year extension of the anti-comintern pact with Germany and other Axis nations on November 25.

2. Germany

Members of the German Armament Commission in Casablanca are now authorized to wear uniforms and make arrests. General Schultheiss of the Air Force, Head of the Commission, is reported to favor a German military occupation of Morocco.

There is evidence that Germany, now virtually in control of the governments of Spain and Portugal, has impressed upon these governments the necessity of maintaining friendly relations with the United States and with Britain. It is Germany's expectation that such a policy will increase the resources of these two countries with materials which eventually can be turned against those who have supplied them.

Turkey still is being subjected to diplomatic pressure to join the Axis or "take the consequences." Germany's representations have had no apparent effect.

According to a press report from Berlin, seven more nations have signed the anti-comintern pact. The new signatories are Finland, Denmark, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovakia, Rumania, and the Nanking Government in China. This pact should not be confused with the Tri-Power Accord of which Germany, Japan and Italy were the original signatories and to which Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia subsequently adhered.

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3. Italy

The repurchase of war materiel sold to the French is now the subject of conversation by a French delegation which arrived recently. These conversations were initiated by were based on Italy's urgent need for foreign. These negotiations are not expected to meet particular success.

The visit of the German Minister of Economics (Dr. Funk) to Rome in October apparently was by the serious concern felt by Germany over a slump in Italian prices of exports to Germany. Funk threatened to raise the price of coal to Italy, but it was agreed finally that it not raise prices, and that Germany would increase yearly exports of coal to Italy from the two tons previously agreed upon to eighteen million. Previous shipments of coal from Germany bore two-thirds of the Italian national requirement was demonstrated by the recent laws restricting this winter.

4. France

France moved a step closer to the "new Europe" on November 18 when Marshal Petain, under continued pressure from Berlin and the pro-German elements within the Vichy government, announced "retirement" of General Maxime Weygand as de facto general and military commander of French North Africa. That strategic area henceforth is to be administered from Vichy under the direct control of Vice Admiral Darlan. Lieutenant General Alphonse Juin, until this year a prisoner of war of Germany and commander of French troops in Morocco, succeeds as military commander in North Africa. The command of French West Africa goes to General Barrau, formerly in command of troops at Dakar. Admiral Fenard was named permanent Secretary of French Africa, and Yves Chatel is the new Governor of Algeria. Additional concessions to Germans may be announced following the meeting of Darlan with Reichsmarshal Goering which for the near future. There are indications that meeting may be followed by a conference with Hitler, with the possible attendance of Premier

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The Reich is said to be attempting to persuade Vichy to provide naval convoys for Italian supply vessels and to have requested that French Army divisions replace Nazi troops between Nantes and Irun. Germany, meanwhile, is reported to have cut the occupation cost levied against France from \$8,000,000 to \$6,000,000 a day, retroactive to May 10, 1941.

France's concern over the situation in Africa is manifested by the sudden departure from Vichy of Admiral Platon (Minister of Colonies), General Bergeret (Air Secretary) and Admiral Auphan (Chief of the Naval General Staff) to inspect the defenses of North and West Africa. During the absence of Platon and Bergeret, Admiral Darlan will act as interim Secretary of Colonies and Air. Additional powers have been granted Darlan by placing under his National Defense Ministry all services under the Franco-German armistice formerly administered by the War and Foreign Ministries.

Following the dismissal of General Weygand, the United States Department of State announced that trade with North Africa would be suspended and that Franco-American relations were to be studied in the light of the new developments. At the same time American lend-lease aid was extended to the Free French of General Charles de Gaulle.

On November 26, General Catroux (Free French Commander in Syria) proclaimed the independence of Lebanon and the termination of the mandate in the name of France. The new government will be headed by President Alfred Macache.

France is understood to have protested to the Japanese government over the size of the mission, numbering 350 political and economic experts, accompanying Kenkichi Yoshizawa, new Japanese Ambassador to French Indo-China.

Despite rumors of capitulation, the situation in French Somaliland remains unchanged. The Paris radio announced on November 21 that the colony could not hold out longer than four to six weeks under the continued British blockade.

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President Roosevelt has nominated the pro-
bassador to Cuba, George S. Messersmith, to be
Josephus Daniels as Ambassador to Mexico. The
British Ambassador to Mexico, Charles Bateman,
posted to arrive in mid-December, which is about
same time that Messersmith probably will take
new duties.

The State Department announced an agreement
been reached with Mexico providing: (1) The set-
tlement of a final fair price for American properties
lost over in 1933, through experts or through further
negotiations. Mexico tendered \$9,000,000
advance as a token payment. (2) General and
claims comprised, Mexico to pay \$40,000,000 in
settlement. Mexico has already paid \$3,000,000
claims and will pay \$3,000,000 upon exchange of
ratifications of the conventions covering them. The
\$34,000,000 is payable at the rate of \$2,500,000
annually. (3) A reciprocal trade agreement to
be negotiated at once. (4) The United States will
provide a \$40,000,000 stabilization fund to maintain
at its present rate. (5) The United States will
ship up to 6,000,000 ounces of newly-mined Mexican
silver monthly.

The Export-Import Bank has established a \$500,000
credit for the development of roads and highway
credit will be available in yearly increments of
\$10,000,000 over a three year period. The Bank
guarantees payment unconditionally; and security
is provided, in the form of highway bonds,
backed by the Federal gasoline tax.

Costa Rica

President Calderon has reported his offer
fields, air and naval bases to the United States
from a surplus of hemispheric funds.

El Salvador

Pro-Axis Chief of Police Colonel Marin has
placed by pro-Ally Colonel Monterrosa.

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Panama

Little progress is noted in the new government of Panama towards consolidation of its gains. The second designate to the presidency is named Minister to Washington; the third designate, Anibal Rios, is in Colombia, and will be arrested if he returns to Panama, where a number of his supporters have been jailed. Key positions still are occupied by Ariaristas, although there is a cordial disposition to cooperate with the United States. The extreme nationalist laws passed by Arias are not repealed, but already their application is lapsing. The government is unlikely to do anything that will frighten off U. S. tourist or business dollars.

Argentina

There are many indications that a secret understanding as to the joint defense of the Straits of Magellan has been established between Argentina and Chile. The recent death of the President of Chile probably will reopen discussions on defense in that area. There have been expressions of annoyance on the part of high Argentine officials over staff discussions between the United States and countries adjacent to the Argentine, and over the U.S. lend-lease aid promised to Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil. The view is held that the Argentine is an interested party to all such discussions and dispositions.

A new political party, of Fascist character, called Patria has been launched in Buenos Aires by the pro-Axis Manuel Fresco. Observers note a new student's party, or "Young Argentine" party, in process of formation. It is a coalition of radical nationalist groups.

German influence in the Argentine is very low, the Russian war having alienated many former supporters. There is demand for a more vigorous attitude toward the Axis than that exhibited by Vice-President Castillo, and an intensification of the Tiborda Committee activities may be expected.

While there are no immediate signs of trouble in the Argentine, the next few weeks will be critical. The conscripts are finishing their military service and returning home. Justo, always a dubious factor in

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politics, seems firmly in control of the As-
senate, the nationalists and the Democratic
have reached an impasse. A coalition of ne-
or totalitarian - factions, under a strong
probably would mean the overthrow of the pi-
ment.

Brazil

During the period under review there
some alarming reports from various sources
forecasting trouble between Vargas and the
elements in his government. To date, howe-
serious has occurred. Brazil is meeting, a
hesitation, her commitments in hemisphere
cooperating in the movement of U. S. troops
by sending a military mission to Paramaribo
ing her border forces in that area. CURRIE
Goes is denouncing U. S. aims as imperialist
America, and his good faith in staff discus-
be accepted with grave reservations.

Chile

The sudden death of President Aguirre C.
bronchial affection, has caused considerab-
in Chile, and responsive unconsciousness in the
neighbors. Don Tinto, as he was affection-
because of the red wine for which his vine-
famous, headed the only popular front gover-
was generally regarded as a friend to Demo-
has preserved for some years an uneasy equi-
between highly antagonistic and immoderate
His successor pro tempore is a noted concil-
observers believe that the government will
during the sixty-day period before the elec-
President.

Colombia

The Colombian Senate has rejected the
List of Axis firms in the Western Hemisph-
grounds that, in a matter of such mutual in-
the American Republics, all their govern-
have been consulted.

The Colombian press condemns articles
country by Benjamin Welles and John Gunthe-
them "Ambassadors of Ill-Will." It is not

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in the United States to what a high degree the Latin-American press is sensitive to criticism of national custom and usage. The sum total of U. S. literary comment on the Latin Americas is undoubtedly harmful to Pan American accord.

Bolivia

A U. S. Army Air Mission has been established in La Paz.

Ecuador

The notorious and able Dr. Kuhne, suspected Nazi-agent in Quito, has been banished to a small town on the Ecuador-Colombian border, because of attention focused on him by the writer John G. Gunther.

Peru

Early in the period observers in Peru reported widespread popular resentment over Peru's failure to receive certain airplanes and material, embargoed by the U. S. Department of State pending settlement of the Ecuador-Peru border dispute. Concessions have been made in the procurement of non-combatant types, and the excitement is subsiding. Affairs on the border are quiescent.

In Lima, the Aprista Party announces the possibility of the resignation of President Prado, because of popular dissatisfaction with the border situation. General Ureta, the hero of the Ecuadorian war, is a strong Presidential possibility, but he is said to have no desire to gain the office by unconstitutional means. Ureta is pro-U.S. and anti-Axis.

General

The ABC countries at large are showing signs of disillusionment and exhausted patience in the matter of lend-lease material. Much has been promised, almost literally nothing has been sent. Some deliveries, even token deliveries, would have a happy effect at this time.

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Trends

Military and Naval

Mexico. The naval budget for 1942 has at 35,000,000 pesos, or about \$8,000,000, twice the 1941 budget.

South America. Nothing to add to summary November 15.

Economic.

The period under review has been characterized by numerous complaints in the press of the Republics, and in reports from various local sources over the growing dearth of materials essential to support of industries. Deprived of European markets, the American Republics look to the United States for a variety of heavy materials, neither produced nor manufactured south of the Rio Grande. Immediate obstacles are: The matter of priorities, and ability of shipping. Here, as in the land and naval material, the patience of the Latin Americans is about exhausted, and their confidence in United States faith is deteriorating. Few Latin American governments are now of the demands upon United States production, are widely advertised. United States and to Pan American policies are all taken advantage of current circumstances. As for the future, no less than for immediate, the allotment to Latin American trade of sea priorities, however limited, and of shipping is urgently desirable.

CONFIDENTIALB. The Japanese Military Situation

Japanese troops, supplies and equipment were pouring into Indo-China during the past fifteen days. Units landed at Haiphong were sent south by rail to Saigon. Troops were moved quickly through Saigon towards the interior and the Thailand border. The arrival of reinforcements continues. Japanese army strength now in Indo-China is believed to be about 25,000 in Tongking province, and between 70,000 and 100,000 in south Indo-China.

Naval craft and aircraft also moved south. It is estimated that there are about 200 Japanese planes in Indo-China and roughly the same number on Hainan Island.

C. The Japanese Naval Situation

Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date this task force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.

The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.

D. The Chinese Military Situation

The Chinese are concentrating troops to defend the Burma Road. In position, or moving up for this duty, are about 185,000 men, including China's only mechanized units. Skirmishing was reported during the period in north Honan, south Hopei, Shantung, south Anhwei, near Shanghai and near Canton.

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Following the freezing of the ground, German offensive operations have been resumed.

Finnish Sector - There is evidence of renewed pressure towards Murmansk, Kandalaksha and the White Sea. None of these objectives has been reached to date. The situation along the Svir River and in the southern Karelian front remains unchanged. There has been a resumption of artillery action at Hangoe.

North-Central Sector - The siege of Leningrad continues with no apparent change in the situation. The Kronstadt batteries are reported to be still active against the Finnish right flank on the Isthmus and against the German left flank engaged in the siege of Leningrad.

Russian counter-attacks have prevented German forces at Tichvin, just east of the Volkhov River, from effecting a junction with Finnish-German units in the Svir River section. This leaves the Russian route to Leningrad via Lake Ladoga still open.

The Russians claim to have carried out counter-attacks in the vicinity of Novgorod. These attacks have had no visible results to date.

Central Sector - German assault against Moscow has been resumed during the past 6-10 days. Despite bitter Russian resistance and incessant counter-attacks, the Germans have made some headway north and south of the city. At Kalinin no appreciable shift in the lines has been apparent. Southeast of Kalinin the Russians have admitted fighting near Klin, and the Germans have officially claimed the capture of Solnechnogorsk, indicating considerable German penetration northwest of Moscow. The Russians admit being forced back in the Moshaisk sector. Another threat is developing at Tula, where the Russians report great German pressure.

South-Central Sector - Gradual German advances along the Orel-Kursk front, which have been hinted at for some time but not substantiated, are confirmed in the reports that Yofremov (on the Moscow-Yelets railroad) has been captured and that advance units, progressing toward the important center of Voronezh, have reached Tim, 40 miles east of Kursk.

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Donetz Basin Sector - The Russians advances in a counter-attack on the "Don" but fail to mention the recapture of any industrial centers. Axis reports have a gradual progress along a broad front, but vague as to details.

Rostov apparently has been captured. Soviets insist street fighting is still in progress. A crossing of the lower Don River and the retiring Red forces towards the Caucasus from Berlin.

Crimcan Sector - According to reports Crimea except Sevastopol is now in German hands. Defeat of Russian forces in the central (Crimean) Peninsula, the capture of Kerch and of the shore of Kerchinski Straits have opened an avenue for the invasion of the Caucasus.

Sevastopol is isolated and under siege. It apparently has lost its value as a base for the Black Sea Fleet.

Personalities

General Kurt von Briessen was killed on the eastern front on November 20, 1941.

2. NavalDistribution

| Ship | | |
|--------------------|------|-------------|
| Name | Type | Date |
| TIRPITZ | BB | November 9 |
| SCHARNHORST | BB | November 21 |
| GNESSEN | BB | November 21 |
| SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN | BB | November 9 |
| SCHLESSEN | BB | October 7 |

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| Ship | | Date | Location |
|--------------------------|------|---------------|--|
| Name | Type | | |
| (Continued) | | | |
| GRAF ZEPPELIN | CV | Prior Nov. 16 | Departed Stettin |
| ADMIRAL SCHEER | CA | November 19 | Swinemunde |
| LUETZOW | CA | November 9 | Kiel |
| SEYDLITZ | CA | October 12 | Bremen |
| PRINZ EUGEN | CA | November 21 | Brest |
| ADMIRAL HIPPER | CA | November 5 | Off Sassnitz |
| MUERNBERG) | CL | (| One of these |
| LEIPZIG) | CL | (November 5 | two ships off |
| | | | Sassnitz |
| KOELN | CL | September 29 | Gdynia |
| EMDEN | CL | November 9 | Kiel |
| 4 Units | DD | September 24 | Northern Norway |
| 5-7 Units | DD | September 24 | In the Baltic |
| 1 Unit | DD | September 24 | Bergen |
| 3 Units | DD | September 24 | North Sea ports |
| 2 Units | DD | October 24 | Cherbourg |
| Remaining Units | DD | - | Unknown |
| 150 Units (estimated) SS | | | Operating out of German, Norwegian and French Atlantic ports |

Operations

A smaller number than usual of German submarines were encountered during the period November 6 to November 13. Two forces were operating: one off the Portuguese coast, and one off the southern coast of Greenland.

British October shipping tonnage losses were less than 75% of the September, 1941, losses.

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HMS ARK ROYAL was attacked and sunk by two German submarines just east of Gibraltar on 11 May 1941. It is not certain whether these submarines were operating out of the usual French West Coast bases or from newly established bases in the Mediterranean.

In the light of available information, it is practically certain that all Rumanian and Bulgarian Black Sea ports are being prepared by the Germans for use as bases for offensive operations. The ports at Axis disposal in this sea are still very few compared to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Axis Black Sea operations on any extensive scale are not to be expected until such time as the Red Black Sea Fleet has been destroyed or otherwise neutralized.

It is reported that Axis Black Sea forces have been reinforced by five small submarines from the Danube. A sixth small U-boat is to follow.

A shortage in available Axis Black Sea forces may be indicated by the recent sinking of a Hungarian river motor vessel. This ship was reported to have been carrying munitions for Axis forces and was sunk by a mine in the Black Sea.

H.M.S. DEVONSHIRE (CA) encountered and converted German commerce raider on November 1940 in the South Atlantic. The Axis raider, believed to be the TAMESIS, was blown up by a magazine explosion thirteen minutes following the commencement of engagement.

According to belated evidence, it is now certain that the German 6,000-ton light cruiser was engaged in operations leading to the capture of the Baltic (Oesel) Islands six weeks or so ago.

Personalities

Lt. Roschke and Lt. Guggenberger were the two German submarines credited with the sinking of the ARK ROYAL. Roschke entered the Navy and Guggenberger in 1934. Neither officer was previously mentioned in connection with Axis operations.

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Captain Bernhard Rogge was in command of the raider reported sunk by H.M.S. DEVONSHIRE. Captain Rogge entered the Navy in 1915 and was advanced to his present rank in 1940. He has been awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross.

3. AirStrength and Disposition

According to a recent reliable report, the disposition of the German Air Force in Russia is as follows:

| | <u>Leningrad</u> | <u>Moscow</u> | <u>South of
Kharkov-Kiev</u> | <u>Finland &
North Norway</u> |
|------------------------|------------------|---------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Long range bombers | 90 | 200 | 240 | 40 |
| Bomber reconnaissance | 30 | 30 | 45 | 10 |
| Dive bombers | 0 | 90 | 60-75 | 30 |
| Single-engine fighters | 30 | 180 | 130 | 30 |
| Two-engine fighters | 30 | 35 | 0 | 10 |
| Totals | 180 | 535 | 475-490 | 120 |
| Grand Total - | 1310-1325 | | | |

A previous report from the same source estimated that, as of October 1, 1941, the Germans had almost exactly twice the above number of planes on the Russian front. This reduction in air strength may be due to some, or all, of the following factors: (a) reported withdrawal of some 560 bombers and 150 single-engine fighters from the Russian front to Central Germany for refitting; (b) losses; (c) shift of air strength to the Mediterranean, which has recently been reported from several sources.

In the Mediterranean, prior to the beginning of the recent British offensive in Cyrenaica, German Air Force distribution was reliably reported as follows:

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| | | Dive | |
|--------------|---------|---------|----------|
| | Bombers | Bombers | Fighters |
| Cyrenaica | 30 | 70 | 75 |
| Sicily | 10 | - | - |
| Crete | - | 20 | 10 |
| South Greece | 60 | - | - |

Total - 325

This represented a slight decrease in strength in the Mediterranean from the last reported figures.

Operations

West - Reconnaissance continues to be German aerial activity in this theater, of being carried out over the British Isles and sea approaches. A small number of bombers are in action, and activity of mine-laying is reported occasionally.

Russian Front - According to German sources, German Air Force has been very active on the Russian Front. Leningrad and Moscow were bombed during the past two weeks. The northern city of Leningrad is now in ruins, the German bombers also are said to have paid attention to railroad communications; namely yards near Moscow and the Lurmansk railroad north of Vologda.

The Luftwaffe also claims many successes in pounding the Russians in the Crimea at Sevastopol and at Kerch.

Up to November 1, German sources claim 85,000,000 pounds of supplies in 30,000 flights been carried to the front by German air transport.

On November 21, the Germans claimed that, to that date, 15,877 Russian planes had been destroyed.

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Mediterranean - German activity in this theater has been limited largely to defensive operations. It has been reported that German air units in Libya have recently vainly requested reinforcements of troop-carrying planes.

Personalities

During the last fortnight, the German Air Force has lost its greatest technical expert and its leading ace. Col. Gen. Udet was killed while testing a new secret weapon. Lt. Col. Koelders was killed when a transport plane in which he was a passenger crashed near Breslau on November 22. Koelders was returning to the front after attending Udet's funeral.

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F. The Italian Military, Naval and Air Situations

1. Military

Libya

At dawn, Tuesday, November 18, the Italians launched their long-awaited offensive against the German forces in the Libyan Desert. They have been preparing for this drive for many weeks. A steady stream of materiel has been flowing East. For the first time British forces are confronting the Germans with ample equipment and air support.

The main spearhead of the attack began at Sidi Omar, fifteen miles from the coast and branched northward to Bir el Gobi and Sidi Barrani. At Bir el Gobi, the Italian 132nd Ariete Division, apparently was badly mauled by the British. The Italian forces captured the British planes and personnel. Further south another Italian force, starting from Giarabub, raced across to Gialo Oasis and captured the Italian garrison at Augila.

Since the initial thrust a tank battle between German and British armored forces, ensued where both sides lost heavily in mechanized warfare. To date the fighting is still fluid, and no final decision has been reached. However, the British have regained possession of Resegh, Gambut and Sidi Omar, the main supply bases of the German armored forces. The Tobruk garrison has been captured, and the junction with the main Imperial forces at

East Africa

Gondar, the last stronghold of the Italians in Ethiopia, is expected to capitulate within a few weeks. The beleaguered Italian forces are on a mountain top north of Lake Tana where they are cut off from supplies for the past seven weeks. German forces are closing in now and are only a few miles from Gondar.

(Note: Since the preparation of this report, the fall of Gondar has been announced.)

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CONFIDENTIALRussian Front

Italian ground lines of communication are being obstructed on the Russian Front and air transport is being used to supply the troops. Italian difficulties are due to mined and mired roads, lack of transportation facilities and the refusal of the Germans to repair the railroads in that sector. As a result, Italian forces in the Stalino area have been directed to exploit whatever local resources are available.

2. Naval

The Italian Navy is demonstrating its inability to protect convoys to Africa. In the attack on an Italian convoy November 8 by the British, the two Italian 8-inch gun cruisers stayed beyond the range of the British 6-inch gun cruisers during the entire action. Seven of the ten ships sunk in this convoy contained German troops. Again on November 21/22 a British submarine attacked another Italian convoy escorted by three cruisers and three destroyers in the Straits of Messina. One cruiser and a destroyer were hit. On the night of November 22 the convoy was again attacked by British aircraft off Cape Spartivento in which hits were claimed on another cruiser and several merchant ships.

German submarines are basing now in the Mediterranean. Reports indicate that the principal German submarine base in the Mediterranean is located at Capri. Permits to visit Capri are almost unobtainable, even for persons of Italian nationality. A German submarine base also is being established on the West Coast of Sardinia which will accommodate seven submarines.

3. Air

On November 15 a serious shake-up occurred in the Italian Air Force when General Rino Corso Fougier succeeded General Francisco Pricolo as Under-Secretary for Air. First reports of the ousting of General Pricolo indicated that he had failed to protect Italian cities from British air attacks because his interest lay in bomber and torpedo planes. It was believed that General Fougier, who is a specialist in pursuit aviation, would relegate bombers to second place in favor of the manufacture and use of pursuit planes. However, subsequent reports state that the Germans have taken over complete control and command of the Italian Air Force because of

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the sinking of the big convoy on Novemb
German soldiers were drowned. Mussolin
have acquiesced to the German demand ar
submit, General Pricolo resigned.

General Fougier is only a figure-h
reported that he is not respected by th
was a protege and satellite of the late
and commanded the 3rd Italian Air Fleet

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MEMO

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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NAVY DEPARTMENT

Office of Chief of Naval Operations
Office of Naval Intelligence
Washington

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Serial 1
November 1, 1941

MEMO
TO
THE
JOINT

FROM
THE
NAVY

PORTUGUESE SUMMARY OF RECENT NAVAL SITUATION

(Information concerning British Navy
is omitted from this summary.)
Wide dissemination by radio.

Re: Summary of Portuguese Navy situation
as of 10/1/41. The summary is based on
the text of the Portuguese Navy's
report of 10/1/41, which was
transmitted to the Joint Committee
on 10/1/41. It is an extract from the
summary of the Portuguese Navy's
situation as of 10/1/41.

T. B. Sullivan

Chief of Naval Operations
November 1, 1941

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November 15, 1941Fortnightly Summary of Current National SituationsA. The Diplomatic Situation1. Japan

The approaching crisis in United States-Japanese relations over-shadowed all other developments in the Far East during the period.

Saburo Kurusu, former Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, is flying to Washington with compromise Japanese proposals. No one apparently expects his mission to succeed, the envoy himself reportedly expressing extreme pessimism. American spokesmen, including Secretary Knox, have indicated that the United States will not budge from her position. Prime Minister Churchill warned that if war breaks out between Japan and America, Britain will declare war on Japan "within the hour." The United States is preparing to withdraw the marine detachments from China. The Japanese press continued to rail at Britain and the United States.

Japan protested to Panama against treatment of Japanese subjects in Panamanian territory. Panama rejected the protest. Japan also protested to Russia against floating mines in the sea of Japan which sank a Japanese passenger vessel in Korean waters.

Russia and Japan reached agreement on demarcation of the Mongolia-Manchukuo border in the Lake Buir Nor area.

2. Germany

In accordance with tradition, Hitler returned with prominent members of his Party to the Buergerbraukeller in Munich on November 8, 1941, to celebrate the 18th anniversary of the Beer Hall Putsch. In his speech, Hitler declared that he had ordered the German Navy to fire on American ships only after being attacked. Orders have been issued, however, to torpedo any ships carrying war materials to Britain.

In a recent magazine article, Dr. Goebbels tells the German people that it is comparatively unimportant when the war will end and all-important how it will end. The article is calculated to steel the nation to endure further hardships and to be prepared for a continuation

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of military effort for an indefinite period. The New York Times calls the article "a rare concession of the possibility of defeat."

It has been reported that eighty per cent of the Iranians are pro-Axis and would welcome German intervention as a means of securing liberation from Russian and British control.

Karl Schnurre, Minister in the German Foreign Office, returned to Stockholm early in November. His return was followed by a report that Sweden had acceded to the wishes of the Reich and would not permit ten Norwegian vessels in Swedish ports to be returned to Norwegian owners.

Germany is pressing Bulgaria to assume police duties in Serbia and thus release the two or three German divisions engaged in putting down the Serbian uprisings.

Construction of a new highway and railroad line between Hamburg and Copenhagen, via the Islands of Fehmern and Laaland, has been commenced. This new line will shorten the distance between Copenhagen and Hamburg by more than eighty kilometers and will reduce travel time materially between the two cities.

3. Italy

The Brazilian Foreign Office announced on November 7th that the proposal for the purchase of Italian ships in Brazilian ports had been accepted by Italy. Eight ships are involved in the transaction for which Italy will receive a non-negotiable credit in the Bank of Brazil, which, when the war ends, will be liquidated, no transfer of funds being involved. The CONTE GRANDE, 23,861 tons, and three other Italian vessels, which have not discharged their original cargoes, were not included in the proposal.

On October 31st, the Yugoslav vessel TOMISLAV, which has been at Shanghai since April, was boarded and seized by a company of Italian Marines. The master and crew members were threatened with pistols and forced to abandon the ship and their personal effects. This is the second incident involving the vessel, the first occurring last April when the Italians seized the ship, claiming it had been

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purchased by Lloyd Triestino. This attempt failed, however, when the Japanese intervened. Since the second seizure, the Italians have been busy removing the last vestiges of Yugoslav ownership and the hull is being repainted with the colors of Lloyd Triestino. In connection with the reported purchase of the vessel by Italian interests, a Japanese naval spokesman stated that under the Chinese Maritime code, the transfer of the vessel would not be valid unless it was duly registered with the Chinese Government.

Because of the intolerable conditions existing in Croatia, the Duke of Spoleto (King Aimone of Croatia) has abdicated the throne of that country.

4. France

The reprisal executions of Frenchmen, followed by Marshal Petain's appeal to the people, appear to have had the desired result, the only recent act of terrorism being the suspected sabotage of an Orleans passenger train in a Paris station. Little progress has been made in Franco-German collaboration, however, and it is reported that Adolph Hitler has become dissatisfied with what he characterizes as the "ambiguous" attitude of the Vichy government. It is thought that under renewed German pressure France must agree both to military and naval collaboration in French Africa and to the early retirement of General Weygand from his North African command. This latter demand has the support of Admiral Darlan and Minister of the Interior Pucheu. Petain, attempting to gain time, sent General Huntziger, Minister of War, to Africa to make a survey of local opinion, but it is felt that the Marshal must yield eventually and agree to Weygand's recall. De Leuss, personal representative of Weygand in Vichy, already has been removed from his post.

(Note: General Huntziger was killed in a plane crash on November 12, 1941, while returning to Vichy from this mission to Africa.)

Indications point to an increase of German activity in Tunisia. Two reputedly Rumanian engineers have been in that colony making surveys of the general terrain, highways, bridges, etc., and the French Resident General, Admiral Esteva, has gone to Vichy for consultations.

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The Vichy Government has announced that French Somaliland officials had agreed to negotiate with the British regarding the use of the port of Djibuti and the railroad linking the port to Addis Ababa. However, Colonial Secretary Admiral Platon, after a hurried trip to Djibuti, stated that the harbor works and railroad would be blown up before the port was surrendered to the British.

Diplomatic relations have been completed by the United States with Great Britain for sending a \$1,000,000 Red Cross cargo of milk, clothing and medicines to unoccupied France. Arrangements still must be completed with Germany and Italy for safe conduct of the vessel.

The Vichy government has protested to London against the capture of a convoy of five French merchant vessels en route from Madagascar to France. The British action was believed based on the possibility that the vessels carried tin and rubber from French Indo-China destined for the Nazis. Vichy, however, denies that there was contraband aboard. The 4,578-ton freighter SENEVILLE was reported damaged by Royal Air Force planes on November 3, while in Tunisian territorial waters.

It has been reported that the BB RICHELIEU is now looked upon as one of the fixed defenses of Dakar and that there is no intention of having it undergo trial runs.

5. Latin America

Mexico

The Mexican Government apparently is attempting to take advantage of the desire to eliminate all existing differences between the United States and Mexico quickly, in order to force acceptance of a settlement on the oil companies. Various high officials of the Mexican Government have issued thinly-veiled threats to the oil companies to agree to the negotiated settlement, "or else."

Reports have been received of several Supreme Court decisions which indicate a conservative trend. One decision held that an expropriation of property was in violation of constitutional guarantees in that no payment

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was made of "prompt and fair compensation considered as another indication of government away from the leftist policy of the Cardenas. As the Supreme Court usually reflects the administration, its decisions being dictated by the executive.

Conservatism is gradually replacing munistic policies in the Department of Education the new Minister, Bejar Vasquez.

Acceptance of policies regarded as United States is apparently greatly impeded in high governmental posts of officials influenced or motivated by Anti-American sentiment.

Four hundred additional Spanish refugees Casablanca, Morocco, among them Alcala Zamora, President of Republican Spain, are expected.

Sinarquismo and Accion Nacional, two organizations attaining significant strength which are apparently under Nazi influence directly and through the Falange and Spanish members of the Catholic clergy, constitute danger to internal order in Mexico and to States relations. If recent information figures as ex-President Portes Gil and Alcala and many other influential Mexicans, are the scenes in these organizations, proves danger is even more serious than had previously thought.

Guatemala

German propaganda has effectively used economic problems arising from blacklisting coffee producers to produce friction between Ubico and the American Legation. A campaign against the American Military Mission, and have it a Spanish Mission has been started, but little has been noted.

Costa Rica

Under discussion, according to a recent legislation to permit the registry under the flag of American merchant vessels. Little

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appeared, and sentiment trends toward permitting the arming of such vessels. Foreign Minister Echandi of Costa Rica, only pro-German cabinet member, went to Panama, apparently to secure permission of that country for ex-President Arnulfo Arias to live in Costa Rica.

Panama

Arnulfo Arias is now in Mexico City. It is reported that he has been offered refuge in Canada, provided that he stays for a minimum of three months. It is doubted that he will accept this offer, as most of his feminine contacts appear to be in Latin America, a factor which has radically influenced his movements hitherto.

The new government in Panama is still somewhat under the control of the national revolutionary party organized by Arnulfo Arias, and contains a number of high officials friendly to Arias, which inspires some doubts as to continuous satisfactory cooperation from the new regime.

Anibal Rios proposes to return to Panama to assert his claim as third designate to the Panamanian presidency.

Colombia

A committee of the Colombian Legislature published on November 9 a report on the American Black List and specified that the report itself should be brought to the attention of the foreign officers of the other American Republics. The report is said to have asserted that the United States Government criticized the Black List in the World War as being in violation of the law of nations, and implied that bribery and espionage by foreign service officials were involved in the compilation of the Black List and that the lists themselves are based on acquisitive ambitions.

Ecuador

Ecuador has agreed to allow American naval vessels to operate from her waters, but has not publicized the agreement, merely stating that patrols by United States vessels in Ecuadorian waters had been authorized.

CONFIDENTIALChile

The President of Chile requested leave of absence due to illness, and designated Jeronimo Mendez, head of the Radical Party, as Acting Vice President to administer the executive powers in his absence. The Radical Party is the largest element in the Popular Front Government which elected Aguirre Cerda to power. Upon first receiving news of the change it was feared that the Popular Front would be broken up by secession of the Communists, or that the new Vice President would swing so far to the right as to side with the Nazi Conservatives, inasmuch as his Radical Party is the middle of the road element and farther to the right than any other part of the Popular Front which supports the present government. However, as the Communist press has registered approval of the change and recommends increased watchfulness against the Rightist conspiracies of the Nazis, while Conservative members of the legislature have attacked the Acting President, it is believed that the Popular Front will remain intact and Acting President Mendez will not favor the Nazi-dominated Conservatives. Therefore, it would appear that the change would result in greater unity of the forces opposed to Nazism.

Peru

Dr. Rafael Larco Herrera, Vice President of Peru, arrived by plane from Rio in Buenos Aires on November 11. It seems significant that he has visited on his current trip the three countries which offered their good offices to re-establish peace between Peru and Ecuador. It is reported that he intends to remain several days in Buenos Aires and confer with Acting President Castillo, the Foreign Minister, and other prominent officials. Vice President Larco provides a democratic window-dressing for Peru to cover up the "behind the scenes" totalitarian methods employed against Ecuador. It appears reasonable to suppose that by his current visit to the three countries offering to mediate in the dispute, that he is trying to discover what fate lies in store for Peru in case mediation is forced upon her. Mexico was probably the first country to suggest that steps be taken against Peru due to her invasion of Ecuadorean territory. It is interesting to recollect that Mexico dispatched her Minister to Panama on a swing around the circle of South American capitals immediately after the expropriation of the oil fields, probably in order to ascertain what would be the result if consultation were invoked against Mexico.

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Indications are not lacking that now, as then, consultation of the other American nations would result in severe criticism of the "aggressor" nation.

Argentina

Brazilian Foreign Minister Aranha arrived in Buenos Aires by plane from Rio November 11. Recurrent rumors have been heard that Brazil has been successful in efforts to draw closer to herself her immediate neighbors in a net work of alliances that might be used to exert pressure on Argentina. Argentine official circles do not appear disturbed, however, but say they are fully informed as to what Brazil is doing and see no reason for alarm.

Argentine naval circles are disturbed by fears that the elevation of Dr. Mendez to the Acting Presidency in Chile will obstruct joint Argentine-Chilean defense of the Straits of Magellan.

Paraguay

Paraguay has recently had several small naval vessels operating in combined maneuvers with the Argentina fleet, and Argentina has offered to send a naval mission to Paraguay. The offer is still under consideration, with good prospects of being accepted.

Brazil

Foreign Minister Aranha was quoted in November 11 at Porto Alegre as saying that Brazil would remain neutral if another American nation entered the war. He said, according to the newspaper, "We are not with the big American nations. We follow the American way. We are along with American fortunes." Despite these public declarations, he is opposed to the placement of certain Brazilian firms on the Black List and has forbidden temporarily the publication of the latest edition of the Black List in Brazil. He is also at odds with the American Airways, probably due to the consistent lack of a operating in South America and the fact that the company is not a Brazilian one. He is also at odds with the American Airways, probably due to the consistent lack of a operating in South America and the fact that the company is not a Brazilian one. He is also at odds with the American Airways, probably due to the consistent lack of a operating in South America and the fact that the company is not a Brazilian one.

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Current action of the Brazilian Government in facilitating use of Brazilian airports by American planes and by reinforcing garrisons in northern Brazil, indicate that President Vargas has decided definitely to throw his influence to Pan American cooperation. The opposition may become desperate, however, and cause open disorders as a result.

TrendsMilitary and Naval

There is a marked trend towards military and naval cooperation by the southern countries of South America for mutual defense of their territories. This is exemplified by the joint maneuvers of the Paraguayan and Argentine navies and the plans for joint Argentine-Chilean defense of the Straits of Magellan.

Economic

The economic trend is towards increased interchange of commodities between South American countries in an effort to supply the necessities and dispose of surpluses amongst themselves. There appears to be much hope for considerable success in this direction as, surprisingly enough, in normal times the tendency was to export and obtain manufactured articles in return from Europe, but little commerce was conducted among themselves. Now it has been found that many of the articles formerly obtained from Europe can be obtained from neighboring South American countries which produce them. When projected improvements in communications between South American countries are completed, still further economic interchange will become possible.

Totalitarian Penetration

Arnulfo Arias, ex-President of Panama, while in Mexico manifested a strong desire to get in communication with a German General in Argentina. This would indicate that Arias also had been involved in contacts with Germany in Argentina, as had the Honduran exiles, to whom Ambassador von Thiermann had promised assistance in the contemplated revolt against the present government of Honduras. Fernando Gomez Ayau, Guatemalan police official lent to Panama as Chief of Arias' secret police, has been mentioned in connection with a project to secure arms for the Honduran exiles. It now appears that Arias may have been aware of this and a party to the plot, though the possibility exists that he had requested German aid against the Honduran

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CONFIDENTIALB. The Japanese Military Situation

Reports of Japanese strength in Indo-China range from 100,000 to 120,000. It is believed that actually there are about 70,000 Japanese troops in Indo-China, which number is being increased slowly. China fears an attack on Yunnan, and Thailand fears attack. Both governments are attempting to obtain British-American military (particularly air) support. It does not appear that Japan is yet strong enough in Indo-China to attack Yunnan or win Thailand.

C. The Japanese Naval Situation

The Combined Fleet remains in home waters, mainly in Formosa and the Island Sea. The only large combat units believed immobilized are the HARUNA (BB) and IAKAO (CA). The Fleet aircraft units, which were sent to southern Formosa about two months ago, have been returned to home waters. Thus no major units remain off their regular stations.

With troop transports and cargo vessels sent to the coast, however, down to Indo-China ports small naval units are probably present. There is, however, no indication of any large naval concentration at present in any area.

Naval aircraft in Indo-China are being augmented. These aircraft are being drawn not only from Formosa and China, but also, but probably also from units normally stationed in Japan. Accurate numbers are not available.

A naval guard ship is now stationed in the Taiwan Straits which challenges all maritime traffic passing through the straits.

The IZUMO, a converted liner to carrier, fighting ship was a passenger liner of 27,000 gross tons, was launched in 1930, and on October 30. Now construction is almost completed, but lack of materials but evidence is being given that the ship will be completed very soon.

An increasing number of submarines are being constructed by the Navy since the introduction of the new type of submarine. It is believed that the new submarines will be completed very soon.

D. The Chinese Military Situation

Reports of Chinese strength in Indo-China range from 100,000 to 120,000. It is believed that actually there are about 70,000 Chinese troops in Indo-China, which number is being increased slowly. China fears an attack on Yunnan, and Thailand fears attack. Both governments are attempting to obtain British-American military (particularly air) support. It does not appear that Japan is yet strong enough in Indo-China to attack Yunnan or win Thailand.

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The Soviet government has indicated that the Russian war materials can be shipped to China.

C. The German Military, Naval, and Air Situations1. MilitaryStrength

No new information regarding the strength of the German Army has been received since the last fortnightly summary.

Distribution

No new information regarding the general distribution of the German Army has been received since the last fortnightly summary.

Equipment

There has been no sensitive change in the military equipment of the German Army since the last summary. The equipment of the German Army is still largely the same as in the last summary, except in the details.

Finland Factor - To date all Finnish-German troops in the Finnish-German border have been concentrated in the Finnish-German border. The Finnish-German troops have been driven back to the Finnish-German border. A new wave of Finnish-German troops is now being sent to the Finnish-German border, and it is expected that this will be the last of the Finnish-German troops. There are, as yet, no final indications as to the progress of this effort.

Due to their failures in northern Finland, the German Army is now reported to have detailed a group of their best officers to take instruction in winter warfare at the Finnish Army Military School.

Except for limited advance up along the Finnish-German border, approximately 40 miles north of Petrozavodsk, operations in Eastern Karelia were practically stationary. Of the western front of the Finnish-German border, the German Army were reported to have captured Korpilampi and Korpilampi. The German Army will now be in the Gulf of Finland. The German Army will now be in the Gulf of Finland.

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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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North-Central Sector - The siege of Leningrad continues. Both Russians and Germans claim to have repelled one another's attacks. A reliable source reports famine conditions inside Leningrad. A move to cut off a Soviet route of supply to the city (via the Volga Railway to Lake Ladoga, and via this lake to the city) was undertaken by the Germans. Moving eastward from their bridgeheads across the Volkhov River, German forces were reported to have seized the rail junction of Tichvin last week (about 100 miles ESE of Leningrad). The Soviets partially confirmed this move when they claimed to have stopped German attacks 25 miles south of Tichvin.

Central Sector - The basic situation around Moscow appears to have remained unchanged during the past two to three weeks. After considerable fighting, the front appears to have been stabilized in the Kalinin area. At Volokolamsk successive Russian counter-attacks are said (by the Soviets) to have resulted in the encircling of German forces of considerable size. From Moshensk, through Nari-Pominsk, Maloyaroslavets and Serpukhov, to the region about Tula, heavy fighting apparently has failed to make much of an impression on the Soviet defenses. The Germans denied a report that their forces had captured Tula.

Southern Sector - Little detailed information on operations along the front from Ural to Rostov has been received. While minor territorial gains may have been made by the Germans and their Allies, no further cities or areas of prime importance are known to have been lost by the Russians. It is quite possible, however, that the Germans have been busy preparing another major offensive, designed to carry them to the Don, or perhaps toward Volga River.

Crimson Sector - Considerable gains were made by the German force invading the Crimea. Simferopol, Theodosia and Yalta have fallen, and the defending Red Army has been split and driven back in the directions of Sevastopol and Kerch. The Red Black Sea Fleet was forced to abandon its Sevastopol operating base. Active fighting is now in progress on the Kerch Peninsula, and on the outskirts of Sevastopol.

South-East - Full Red German Army trucks have been reported moving into Bulgaria. This may indicate concentration and equipment for a possible German offensive thrust to be launched from Bulgarian shores. According to the latest reports, three German divisions are now reported stationed in Bulgaria.

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The total mobilized strength of the Bulgarian Army now is reported to have reached 270,000 men, including 6,000 now in process of mobilization. Two Nazi SS Divisions, hitherto assigned to the forces of occupation in Yugoslavia, are now reported being relieved by Bulgarian Army units. It is not known where the two SS Divisions are to be sent.

South - An unconfirmed report states that the Germans are organizing four light armored and 10 motorized divisions for tropical service. Another report claims that 150,000 young German Army recruits are being trained and acclimated for tropical service in the Bordeaux-Hendaye area.

A reliable source reports the transit of German colonial forces to Italy, estimated at 8 divisions. A recent unconfirmed report from supposedly reliable sources claims that German forces in North Africa have been increased from 40,000 to 70,000 men. Light tank units are also said to have been moved into Greece by way of Yugoslavia, for eventual transportation by plane to Libya.

2. NavalDistribution

| <u>Ship</u> | | <u>Type</u> | <u>D to</u> | <u>Location</u> |
|--------------------|-----|-------------|----------------|-----------------|
| <u>Name</u> | | | | |
| TIRPITZ | BB | November 9 | Kiel | |
| SCHARNHORST | BB | October 27 | Brest | |
| GNEISENAU | BB | October 27 | Brest | |
| SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN | OBB | November 9 | Hamburg | |
| SCHEER | OBB | October 7 | Central Baltic | |
| GRAF ZEPPELIN | CV | October 12 | Stettin | |
| ADMIRAL SCHEER | CA | November 7 | Swinemunde | |
| LUETZOW | CA | November 9 | Kiel | |
| SEYDLITZ | CA | October 12 | Bremen | |
| FRINZ EUGEN | CA | October 27 | Brest | |

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| | | | |
|-----------------------|----|--------------|---|
| ADMIRAL HEPER | CA | November 5 | Off Salsnitz |
| MUERNBERG | CL | November 5) | One of these |
| LEIPZIG | CL | November 5) | two off Salsnitz; |
| | | | location of |
| | | | other unknown. |
| KOELN | CL | September 29 | Gdynia |
| EMDEN | CL | November 9 | Kiel |
| 4 Units | DD | September 24 | Northern Norway |
| 1 Unit | DD | September 24 | Bergen |
| 5-7 Units | DD | September 24 | In the Baltic |
| 3 Units | DD | September 24 | North Sea ports |
| 2 Units | DD | October 24 | Cherbourg |
| Remaining Units | DD | - | Unknown |
| 150 Units (estimated) | SS | | Operating out of German, Norwegian and French Atlantic ports. |

Operations

Two German submarines are now reported to be operating in the Aegean. German naval off-shore patrols in Greek waters are said to have been increased.

On November 4, some 1,100 German naval seamen were reported stationed at Naples. Hotel Bependile on Pon-pynza Baccadileone, Rome, is now German submarine headquarters, which will control German submarines now entering the Mediterranean.

3. Air

Strength and Disposition

No further information regarding German overall plane strength and production has been received since distribution of the last Fortnightly Summary.

A reliable report just received puts Nazi air strength in the Mediterranean, on October 21, at:

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| | Bombers | Dive
Bombers | Fighters | Reconnaissance | Coastal
Aircraft |
|-----------|---------|-----------------|----------|----------------|---------------------|
| Cyrenaica | 30 | 70 | 80 | 10 | - |
| S. Greece | 80 | - | - | 25 | - |
| Crete | - | 20 | 10 | - | 25 |
| Sicily | - | - | 10 | - | - |

The total number of German planes available in the Mediterranean area is estimated at 380.

Operations

West - No substantial change in German air operations has been noted since distribution of the last fortnightly Summary.

Eastern Front - There is reason to infer that the Nazis may be getting ready to curtail operations along the Moscow section of the front during the winter.

A shortage of gasoline at forward stations of German fighter commands is holding up fighter operations around Rostov. These forward stations are supplied by air transport.

The strength of German close support forces has been kept up well. Replacements have been made available to these units, several of which have gone into action above their normal strength.

Though Nazi losses in the war with Russia as regards most equipment and material have not been overly severe, this does not apply to the loss of German aircraft which has been serious.

From German sources come the following claims of air action:

- (1) Finns sunk Russian troops ship and hit PT in the Gulf of Finland.
- (2) Raids on the Caucasus area.
- (3) During week ending November 9. 1 warship sunk
17 transports sunk
2 warships damaged
29 merchantmen damaged

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Mediterranean - No information of a change in the basic air situation has been received since the last fortnightly summary.

Personalities - Germany's No. 1 flyer, Lieutenant Colonel Moelders, until recently in Russia, has been sent to Greece and Crete to assume charge of large scale operations against the Suez Canal, Alexandria and the British Mediterranean Fleet, according to a recent report.

The Flying Corps of Lieutenant General Plugge is reported taking part in the offensive in the Crimea.

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CONFIDENTIALF. Italian Military, Naval and Air Situations1. MilitaryLibya

No unusual military operations have taken place in the Western Desert area. Patrol activities continue and there are indications that the Axis have increased substantially their forces in recent weeks.

East Africa

British forces in Abyssinia have encountered some opposition from native forces who have been harassing their line of communications along the Sardo-Dessie road. Lately the natives shifted to the northwest toward Alomato and communications have been reestablished.

Recently three Italian battalions were moved out of the Jorgora-Geiga sector west of Gondar, eastward to the line of Meldiba-Deva.

Russian Front

Four Black Shirt battalions entrained at Rome on November 3 for the Russian front. These were specially selected men who have recently undergone a period of special training in Italy so that their technical-military efficiency is at present considered high. The force wears the insignia "M" and are known as the "Mussolini Battalions". The greater part of them are veterans of the Italian campaigns in East Africa, Spain and Greece.

The many reports of 1,000,000 men, 350,000 men, 25 divisions, etc., being sent to Russia, can be boiled down to the 4 divisions already at the front, the above taken Black Shirt force and the 4 divisions earmarked, which may or may not actually leave.

2. Naval

On the night of November 8/9, an Italian convoy, consisting of ten merchant ships and an escort of 2 10,000-ton, 8-inch gun, TRENTO class cruisers and 4 destroyers, was attacked by a British naval force of

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two light cruisers and two destroyers. In the ensuing action, nine Italian merchant ships were sunk, a tanker left burning and abandoned, and two Italian destroyers were sunk. On the following night, a British submarine sank one destroyer and damaged another, east of Messina.

The badly damaged Italian battleship CAVALIER is now in the water off the Eastern Drydock Arsenal of La Spezia at Trieste. The 10,000-ton cruiser BOLIVAR, which was damaged seriously in August, is now undergoing repairs at Genoa. The battleships VITTORIO and VITTORIO VENETO are still at Naples and the DORIA and EMBILIO are at Taranto. The light cruiser EUGENIO DI SAVOIA is at La Spezia undergoing overhaul. Of the twenty-three submarines which were based recently at Bordeaux, only six are left, the balance having returned to Italy.

3. Air

The latest disposition of the Italian Air Force is as follows:

| Type | Libya | Aegean | Balkans | Sardinia | Total |
|-----------------------|-------|--------|---------|----------|-------|
| Fighters | 230 | 40 | 110 | 60 | 440 |
| Bombers | 60 | 20 | 25 | 50 | 155 |
| Torpedo Bombers | 10 | | | | 10 |
| Bomber Reconnaissance | 50 | 40 | | 20 | 110 |
| Dive Bombers | 20 | | | | 20 |
| Reconnaissance | 30 | | 80 | 10 | 120 |
| Transport | 25 | | | | 25 |
| TOTAL | 425 | 96 | 215 | 140 | 876* |

* Serviceability 60%

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NAVY DEPARTMENT

Office of Chief of Naval Operations
Office of Naval Intelligence
Washington

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Copy No. 83
Serial No. 231

November 1, 1941

FORTNIGHTLY SUMMARY OF CURRENT NATIONAL SITUATIONS

(Information concerning Anti-Axis Belligerents
is omitted from this publication due to
its wide dissemination by mail.)

Because of the CONFIDENTIAL nature of the
sources from which some of the information embodied
in the text of this publication issues, and because
of the CONFIDENTIAL channels through which it is
transmitted to the Division of Naval Intelligence,
it is appropriate to invite particular attention to
the CONFIDENTIAL character of this publication.

T. S. Wilkinson

T. S. Wilkinson
Captain, U. S. Navy
Director of Naval Intelligence

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CONFIDENTIALSerial No. 23
November 1, 1941Fortnightly Summary of Current National SituationsA. The Diplomatic Situation1. Japan

Prince Konoye's Cabinet resigned on October 16. Lieutenant-General Tojo, Konoye's Minister of War, formed a new cabinet in which he holds the posts of Premier, Minister of War, and Minister of Home Affairs. He also reshuffled the membership of the powerful Cabinet Advisory Council to ensure that this body would cooperate with the government. Tojo has thus concentrated enormous powers in his own hands, far more than any Premier of modern times. He is jingoistic and anti-foreign, particularly anti-Russian. He has strong pro-Axis leanings.

Tojo stated that Japan would seek settlement of the China incident, strengthen her ties with the Axis, and continue her policy of building the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere. An early Japanese attack upon Siberia is predicted by many observers, a drive against Thailand by others. Still others think an advance into Yunnan to cut the Burma Road is imminent. However, General Tojo announced that Japan-United States conversations will continue. This, together with the fact that a special five-day session of the Diet has been called for November 15, makes it appear probable that Japan will not launch any new attacks at least until after mid-November.

2. Germany

Since the beginning of the Russian Campaign, there have been indications of growing unrest among the civilian population in Germany - particularly along the Baltic littoral. At Danzig, military forces had to be called upon to assist the police in restoring order. Workmen are reported to have thrown pieces of iron at the soldiers, who thereupon fired into the crowd. It must not be assumed, however, that unrest has reached serious proportions. Blind faith in Hitler is still widespread, and signs of internal dissensions are, as yet, only slight. Incidents like the Danzig affair are isolated and should not be considered indicative of a general trend.

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Coincident with the fall of the Japanese Cabinet of Premier Prince Kengo, Germany announced three important assignments to the Far East. Heinrich von Stahmer, specialist in Far Eastern and Asiatic affairs, was appointed Minister to the "Government in China" in Hankow, on October 15, 1941. Fritz Wiedemann, former German Consul at San Francisco, was appointed Consul General to Tsingtao on October 16, 1941. Tsingtao is the former German colony of Kiao-chau. Dr. Ernst Wendler, former German minister to Bolivia, whose removal from this office was requested by the Bolivian authorities in July, 1941, was appointed Minister to Thailand on October 16, 1941.

The Russian Campaign has created an oil situation in Germany more serious than any which has existed since September, 1939. Industrial plants have had their quotas cut sixty per cent in many instances. Many individual consumers have been cut off entirely.

Since the beginning of the Russian Campaign, Germany has had to investigate the possibility of an alternative route if she is to continue to receive rubber from the Far East. It is reported that arrangements with the French authorities have been made for rubber shipments from Saigon to Valparaiso, thence by land to Buenos Aires, and from there to Portugal or Casablanca.

Because of the inadequacy of leather supplies from other sources, Germany has been attempting to run the blockade from Brazilian ports with German and Italian ships loaded with heavy hides.

Germany and Spain have signed a labor agreement whereby Spain will send 100,000 workers to Germany, but will accept no German workers in return. Germany had asked for an "exchange" of some 200,000 men.

The majority of Russian prisoners are employed by the Todt Organization on reconstruction in German-occupied Russia. About 20,000 Russian prisoners are employed in agriculture.

Dr. Karl Clodius, after concluding the German-Turkish trade agreement, went almost immediately to Rome, where he conferred with the German Minister of Economic Affairs, Dr. Walther Funk, and the Italian Minister of Exchange.

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3. Italy

A series of important conversations began in Rome on October 19 between Dr. Walther Funk, Germany's Minister of Economics and Ruffalo Ricciardi, the Italian Minister of Exchange. The outcome of these conversations was that Germany not only made important concessions to Italy on the price and delivery of oil, but Dr. Funk took the occasion to paint a glowing picture of Italy's place in the post-war order. Italy is to have undisputed control of the Mediterranean. In view of, of course, she furnishes in advance the most and best Germany is demanding. Another one of the aims of the discussion was to provide a rearrangement of priorities to embrace not only Italy's trade with Germany, but that between Italy and the Balkans, as well as southern European countries.

Shortly after the discussions with the German delegation, Ricciardi left for Bucharest to negotiate a new Italo-Rumanian commercial accord. A large Italian delegation is soon to follow, in order to complete the details.

Also, discussions are being carried on at the Nazi headquarters in Russia between Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italy's Foreign Minister, and Hitler and the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop. The purpose of this meeting is somewhat obscure, but it is believed that plans are being made for a new diplomatic move aimed at Turkey.

A treaty fixing the borders between Croatia and Montenegro was signed in Zagreb October 27 by Italian and Croat officials. The new border starts from the zone of Dobricevo, northern limit of the border, and follows roughly the ancient borders of 1914 between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Montenegro and Serbia, reaching Mount Kluinack-Clava, which is the point where the borders between Montenegro, Croatia and Serbia meet.

The exiled Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin el Hussein, has arrived in Rome, after escaping the British in Iran. As a result, Italy is provided with a great propaganda weapon, which may be used to turn the Moslem world against the British and Jews. The Grand Mufti fled from Palestine to Syria in 1937, when the British attempted to arrest him for Arab terrorist activities.

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From Syria, the Mufti went to Iraq when the French were about to seize him, and in Baghdad he directed the Iraqi revolt, which the British had to put down last May. After the British occupation of Iraq, the Grand Mufti sought shelter in Iran, from where he mysteriously disappeared when the British and Russians entered Teheran.

4. France

The termination of one year since the Moustaire signing of Adolph Hitler and Marshal Petain, at which the foundation for Franco-German collaboration was laid, finds France moving slowly into the Axis orbit. Economic collaboration is well under way, and political collaboration is expected to follow under renewed Nazi pressure. With a slowing up of German military operations in Russia during the winter, new developments are expected in the negotiations between France and Germany which may determine whether this policy is to survive. A strong effort is being made to return Pierre Laval to a position in the French government, in order to remove existing obstacles to collaboration.

While a state of war exists between France and Germany, normal diplomatic relations cannot be restored. However, an agreement has been reached for establishing, on a reciprocal basis, Nazi consulates in the French unoccupied zone and French consulates in the Reich. Krug von Nidda has been named German representative to Vichy and Georges Scapini, present Vichy negotiator concerning war prisoners, is expected to be the French envoy to Berlin.

In reprisal for the assassination of two German military authorities in France, 100 French hostages have been executed, bringing to 198 the total to date. The execution of an additional 100 hostages, sentenced to be shot unless the assassins of the German officers were found, has been postponed indefinitely.

Contrary to rumor, Gaston Henri-Hays will remain as French Ambassador to Washington, his appointment having been extended in July for another six months. The renewals for six months of the missions of Ambassadors Francis Pietri to Madrid and Leon Berard to the Vatican have been announced also.

General Gamelin, ex-Premiers Daladier, Blum and Reynaud, and former Minister Mandel have been ordered

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confined in the Pyreneas fortress of Fourtalet by Marshal Petain under the charge of having failed in official duties and engaged France in the war unprepared. This sentence is independant of the proceedings of the Supreme Court at Riom, which is attempting to fix responsibility for the French defeat.

French Fleet

No recent movements have been reported among units of the Vichy fleet. The disposition of the vessels is as follows:-

| | |
|----------------------|---|
| <u>Toulon</u> | BB STRASBOURG, OBB PROVENCE,
CVB COMMANDANT TESTE, 4 CA's,
3 CL's, 18 DL's, 17 DD's,
23 SS's, and 14 PG's. |
| <u>North Africa</u> | BB DUNKERQUE (damaged), 1 DL,
4 DD's and 10 SS's. |
| <u>Casablanca</u> | BB JEAN BART (77% completed),
2 CL's, 2 DL's, 6 DD's, 12 SS's,
and 6 PG's. |
| <u>Dakar</u> | BB RICHELIEU (Damaged), 2 CL's,
1 DL's, 1 DD, 10 SS's, and
4 PG's. |
| <u>Madagascar</u> - | 3 SS's and 1 PG. |
| <u>West Indies</u> - | CV BEARN, 2 CL's, 1 PG. and 1 XCL. |
| <u>Indo-China</u> - | 1 CL, 12 PG's and PR's. |
| <u>Unreported</u> - | 1 SS and 1 PG. |

French Colonies

North Africa

Germany is bringing strong pressure upon the Vichy Government for the ouster of General Weygand as French pro-Consul for Africa and his replacement by General Henri Dostz, who directed the French defense of Syria. Weygand, upon his recent return from Vichy, declared that the government of France has made no decision on changing the present status of France's African possessions and that no concor-

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sions have been granted the Axis for the use of air and naval bases in Africa. In accordance with the agreement between Vichy and Berlin, German consulates will be established in Algiers and Morocco, and an agreement between Darlan and Germany authorizes two Nazi "cultural missions," each consisting of about ten members, to Morocco and Algeria.

French Somaliland

According to a Vichy announcement of October 24, two "Anglo-de Gaullist" light columns of 300 men, invaded French Somaliland, crossing the border from Eritrea. Two days later it was announced that the troops had been withdrawn. No British or Free French comment has been made.

Syria

It was announced in London on October 28 that Great Britain formally recognised the independence of the Syrian Republic.

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5. Latin America

Mexico

Relations have been renewed between Mexico and Great Britain. The British Minister to Mexico will be Charles Harold Bateman, Chancellor of the British Embassy at Cairo since 1937. The Mexican Minister to London will be Alfonso de Rosenzweig Diaz, now Minister to Venezuela.

Mexico and Colombia raised their respective legations to embassies "through the desire to tighten and make more cordial the relations between the two countries."

Guatemala

On Monday, October 20, a report emanating from Berlin, but first heard in Guatemala over station KGEI of San Francisco, stated the United States had delivered an ultimatum to Guatemala as follows: Withdrawal of German Minister Reinebeck; rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany; insistence that the United States would not purchase a single grain of produced coffee; and a demand that the firms on the United States proclaimed blacklist be forced out of business. The news was widely re-broadcast throughout Central America with many variations as to the terms of the alleged ultimatum.

A variation heard from a Costa Rican station was that German coffee was banned from the United States markets, and that the United States demanded that German banking firms in Guatemala be closed. On Tuesday, October 21, the Guatemalan Government officially denied that it had received any ultimatum from the United States Government. Reliable informants in Guatemala reported that the ultimatum news originated in Guatemala and that Foreign Minister Carlos Belasco and the President's German valet, Ibarra, had collaborated with the German Legation on the subject. The German Legation has ordered certain prominent firms to discharge their employees by the end of November, indicating pressure being exerted by the United States Government as a reason for this action.

CONFIDENTIALHonduras

Messages intercepted in Honduras indicate that Liberal revolutionary plots still are being plotted, but the plans discovered appear so impractical that little serious effort is expected if attempts are made in the near future to put them into effect.

Panama

The new Government of Panama has revoked the order of the former Arnulfo Arias Administration, which forbade the landing of Panamanian marchers who were taking the tension has not subsided entirely, the Government is clarifying and improving its position. Arnulfo Arias still is at Miraflores in Nicaragua, from where his departure is made difficult by the Nicaraguan Government's requirement that he have a valid passport, issued by Panama and by the country of destination. Arias is allowed to leave. Thus far he has not left the country.

Colombia

The Congressional debates concerning former Minister Castro Martini's sale of Colombian territory, believed worth \$200,000, for \$50,000, subsided, although the opposition press continued to campaign against the Foreign Minister. The House is now controlled by an anti-Lopez Liberal, but election of such leaders has been delayed as a protest against the rift between anti-Lopez Liberals and Conservatives.

Peru

Rumors are current in Peru that the country has asked Japanese help if the United States withdraws. Brazil attempts to restrain Peru in her attitude toward Japan. Peru purchases Japanese goods from Japan. Latin dispute with Colombia, a small territory, sold them to her, and Japanese relations with Peru are still quiet in the spring of this year.

Chile

Chilean Foreign Minister Jossely, who was formerly secretary of the Chilean Navy, was elected on September 22, 1932. Strong opposition to the Chilean Government and opposition to the Chilean Government stated that the Government was a success.

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absolutely necessary, and that Chile could be helped by a military alliance with the United States and by participation in the general continental defense plan. He also stated that Argentina had made to work out an agreement between Chile and Argentina regarding the fortification and defense of the Magellan area.

Argentina

Responsible government leaders state that Argentina is seeking to work out details with Brazil for defense in the Atlantic, and with Chile for the defense of the Magellan area.

Paraguay

Two Paraguayan minevessers recently joined the Argentine fleet in maneuvers, the first time in the history of South America in which the war ships of the countries have engaged in joint maneuvers.

Brazil

The Brazilian Army has taken over the inactive RAF facilities in northern Brazil, notably Natal, which will prevent any possibility that the Italian LUF or German CONDOR lines might use them.

President Vargas and the Brazilian Minister of War, General Dutra, apparently have decided to turn in their lot with the democracies. They have issued instructions that various groups of younger army officers be impressed with the urgent need for the closer Brazilian-American cooperation. Apparently a marked turn for the better is in progress among Brazilian army leaders in their feeling toward the United States, although many continue to express their disappointment at the big gap encountered in securing much needed military material ordered from the U. S.

Venezuela

Two important treaties have been completed between Colombia and Venezuela. One settles an old boundary dispute, and the other provides for a non-aggression, conciliation and arbitration pact between the two countries.

CONFIDENTIALCuba

The Cuban House of Representatives has enacted a resolution to send a protest to Hitler against the killing of hostages in France and is considering requesting all the Latin American countries to take similar action.

TrendsMilitary and Naval

Argentina is reported to be contemplating sending a Military and Naval Mission to the United States to discuss her part in the hemisphere defense and acquisition of needed material.

Economic

Efforts are being exerted by Germany in Guatemala and Costa Rica with some success through their sympathizers in those governments, to avoid the full effect of the application of the United States Blacklist to German economic interests in the countries concerned.

Federal Loan Administrator Jesse Jones has announced that the Export-Import Bank has agreed to lend Mexico \$50,000,000 for national highway developments, at the rate of \$10,000,000 per year.

A free commerce treaty has been signed between Guatemala and El Salvador which should be of mutual advantage to those countries, and which imports certain products which the other exports.

Totalitarian Penetration

The situation, as far as can be ascertained, of the free industries, continues to improve throughout Latin America. This is particularly gratifying in view of the continued successes of the Nazis in Europe. Although such outstanding German successes have been visible throughout Latin America in the shape of increased spending of the local Governments toward their activities. It is felt that the present attitudes of the Governments now may consider the only connection to be maintained against Axis activities that any further penetration would be extremely dangerous and if such a situation were to

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it is believed that the Latin American nations will proceed in a much more efficacious and expeditious manner to rid themselves of Axis activities than anything that they have manifested hitherto. Apparently Brazil already definitely considers herself in that position. It is believed that the majority of the other countries do, with the possible exceptions of Mexico, Guatemala, Costa Rica and Peru. Mexico still continues a delicate balancing act on the fence, while she distributes favors equally both to the Democratic and Nazi-Fascist sides, despite her lip service to democracy. Guatemala and Costa Rica, in view of their acknowledged weaknesses, may feel constrained not to offend the Axis too deeply thus far. Peru, while continuing to conduct her relations with Ecuador in the best totalitarian manner, has her Vice President in the United States stirring up a smoke-screen of democracy.

B. The Japanese Military Situation

The Japanese forces in Manchukuo, Korea and Inner Mongolia, disposed for attack upon Russia, are reliably reported to have been increased to 684,000. At the same time reinforcements are arriving in Indo-China and it is believed that the garrison in that colony is to be increased from 50,000 to approximately 100,000 men. A large new air base is being established in northern Indo-China. The Japanese force at Canton is also being strengthened. The small Japanese garrison at Sharps Peak near Foochow has been withdrawn. A minor clash near the Siberian-Manchukuo border, in which both sides suffered casualties, was reported by the Russians but denied by the Japanese.

C. The Japanese Naval Situation

The Japanese Navy now, according to the Navy Department's spokesman, is ready for any immediate eventuality. Intensive plans have been carried out including not only changes in command but the increase of ships' crews to full war complements.

The Combined Fleet has remained in home waters on normal stations except that a few units possibly including one capital ship have moved over to stations on the Japan Sea. Fleet air force units, however, in considerable strength have moved down to Southern Formosa. The Third Fleet, normally stationed on the China Coast, continues to remain in home waters. Other fleets on normal stations. Although troop transports and cargo ships have been taking troops and supplies to ports in Indo-China, these vessels have not been accompanied by naval escorts.

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D. The Chinese Military Situation

On October 13, after three days of indecisive street fighting, the Chinese attackers withdrew from Ichang. Since that time nothing but sporadic skirmishing has been reported in this area. Skirmishing also occurred in southern Shansi, in north Honan and near Canton.

Russia has notified Chungking that she is unable to continue shipments of war supplies to China.

CONFIDENTIALE. The German Military, Naval and Air Situations1. MilitaryStrength

No new information regarding the strength of the German Army has been received since the last Fortnightly Summary.

Distribution

According to a reliable source, the distribution of the German Army on October 8, 1941, was estimated to be as follows:

| <u>Location</u> | <u>Total Number
of Divisions</u> | <u>Including
(Mechanized)</u> | <u>(Motorized)</u> |
|--|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------|
| Russia | 167 | (15) | (21) |
| Northern Group - 31 | | | |
| Central " 77 | | | |
| Southern " 59 | | | |
| Finland | 8 | | (1) |
| Poland/East Prussia | 10 | | |
| Balkans | 14 | | |
| Italy - Libya | 3 | (2) | |
| Holland-France-Belgium | 30 | | |
| Norway | 7 | | |
| Denmark | 2 | | |
| Germany and Austria
(exclusive of E. Prussia) | 19 | | (2) |

The Tank Army, commanded by Colonel-General Hoepfner, has been transferred from the Northern to the Central Group of German Armies on the Russian Front.

Operations

Eastern Front - The second half of October saw the large German offensive slowed down by strong local

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Russian opposition and inclement weather.

Finnish Sector - Following the capture of Petrozavodsk, on Lake Onega, Finnish forces have been advancing northward along the Leningrad-Murmansk Railway. A Finnish column operating eastward out of Central Finland has joined forces with the column pushing north from Petrozavodsk at a point near the northwest tip of Lake Onega. The Finns are waiting for full winter weather, prior to resuming a vigorous offensive.

The Finns are reported contemplating cessation of offensive operations upon reaching and securing the following line:

White Sea to Lake Onega
Lake Onega - Svir River - Lake Ladoga
Lake Ladoga - Karelian Isthmus - Gulf of Finland

A partial demobilization of the Finnish Army is to be carried out, as dwindling Russian resistance releases more and more Finnish military manpower.

The Finns have apparently assumed a defensive attitude on the Karelian Isthmus facing Leningrad, at the Soviet-held island fortress of Koivisto and at Hangoe.

North-Central Sector - Dagoe, last Russian stronghold in the Baltic Islands, was taken by the Germans a week ago. Siege operations continued at Leningrad, with no apparent change in the local situation. The beleaguered Russians still obtain some supplies and reinforcements by water via Lake Ladoga. The Germans are reported to have established and enlarged a bridgehead across the Volkhov River, while a German division, farther east, crossed the Svir River and advanced some 20 miles to the southward. These German operations may be designed to eliminate the remaining Russian-held shore line on Lake Ladoga. Strong Russian positions still exist in the Valdai Hills sector. It now appears that the Germans have made no progress eastward from the line: Lake Ilmen - Seliger Lake.

Central Sector - The Germans officially claimed to have eliminated the bulk of Marshal Timoshenko's Group of Field Armies in the double-encirclement battles of Vyazma and Bryansk. The Soviets denied

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these claims and maintain that the main strength of these armies fell back to new positions closer to Moscow. The northern flank of the German force advancing along the Moscow-Smolensk highway branched north from Vyazma, took Rzhev, and drove on to Kalinin, where it was apparently stopped by Russian counter-attacks. Near Mozhaisk, west of Moscow, the principal German advance was halted, fighting spreading northward to Volokolamsk and southward to Kaloyaroslavetz. German forces, coming by way of Bryansk, captured Orel and Kaluga, and pushed up towards Moscow as far as Baro-Pominsk. Severe Russian resistance and inclement weather, which bogged down mechanized equipment and supply trains, slowed down and stopped the Germans. With freezing weather hardening the ground, however, the Germans may regain a great deal of their mobility.

Southern Sector - The German advance into the Donetz industrial area has been relatively slow. Severe local Russian opposition and inclement weather are believed largely responsible. During the past two weeks, the Germans took Kursk, Belgorod, Kharkov, Kramatorsk, Stalino and Taganrog. Rostov is threatened; severe fighting is reported 20 miles west of that town.

In a battle beginning October 15, the Germans officially declare to have broken through two Soviet defense lines just south of the Perekop Isthmus, taking 15,000 prisoners. Farther west, Odessa fell to a siege by German and Rumanian forces. The Russians claimed to have successfully evacuated the garrison and most industrial equipment.

Troop Units

German SS-Panzer troops in tropical uniforms were recently seen for the first time in the streets of Berlin. Inasmuch as these militarized Nazi Party troops are selected carefully and trained as special assault units, these new SS formations may be an indication of contemplated offensive operations somewhere in the lower latitudes - either North Africa, the Near East, or perhaps West Africa.

Army Personalities

General of Aviators Lindbergh, succeeded by General von Scharndorff as military commander in Berlin,

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is reported to be in command of three German Divisions in Yugoslavia. These forces are being employed to put down the rebellion.

2. Naval

Distribution

| Ship | | Type | Date | Location |
|-----------------------|--|------|---|-------------------------|
| Name | | | | |
| TIRPITZ | | BB | September 29 | Danzig Bay |
| SCHARNHORST | | BB | October 13 | Brest |
| GOEBENAU | | BB | October 13 | Brest |
| SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN | | OBB | Prior Oct. 17 | Departed Kiel |
| SCHLESSEN | | OBB | October 7 | Central Baltic |
| GRAF ZEPPELIN | | CV | October 12 | Stettin |
| ADMIRAL SCHEER | | CA | Prior Oct. 24 | Departed Hamburg |
| LUETZOW | | CA | October 17 | Kiel |
| SEYDLITZ | | CA | October 12 | Bremen |
| PRINZ EUGEN | | CA | October 13 | Brest |
| ADMIRAL HIPPER | | CA | October 17 | Kiel |
| MUERNBERG | | CL | September 29 | Gdynia |
| LEIPZIG | | CL | October 20 | Off coast of
of Kiel |
| KOENIG | | CL | September 29 | Gdynia |
| ERSEN | | CL | October 20 | Kiel |
| 4 Units | | DD | September 24 | Northern Norway |
| 1 Unit | | DD | September 24 | Bergen |
| 9-12 Units | | DD | September 24 | In the Baltic |
| 1 Unit | | DD | September 24 | North Sea ports |
| 2 Units | | DD | October 24 | Cherbourg |
| Unknown | | DD | - | Unknown |
| 150 Units (estimated) | | DD | Operating out of German, Russian, and French Atlantic ports | |

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CONFIDENTIALOperations

A German official communique on October 21, 1941, announced the conclusion of operations in the Baltic and along the Estonian littoral. Sea forces under the command of General Admiral Carls are credited with contributing decisively to the conquest of the Baltic Islands. Units of the fleet transported troops and broke up mine fields, and naval personnel participated in operations on land.

Grand Admiral Raeder has not given whole-hearted approval to the all-out submarine campaign advocated by Vice Admiral Doenitz, Commander of German U-boats. Admiral Raeder is believed to have recommended that Germany concentrate her naval efforts in the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean and reduce her scale of operations in the Atlantic.

Approximately 20 submarines have been operating recently west of longitude 30 and between latitudes 50 and 56. Some submarines have been operating as far west as longitude 53. Five or six submarines continue to patrol the water in the vicinity of the Azores and of the Canary Islands. One submarine is known to have been operating recently in the approaches to the White Sea.

Personnel

The presence of Lieutenant-Commanders "under instruction" on German U-boats indicates that the German Navy is reaching out into the older brackets for U-boat officer material. At the same time it appears that younger officers, even from classes as recent as those of 1935 and 1936, are also filling command positions in the U-boat service. At the beginning of the war, the most successful U-boat commanders came from the 1932 and 1931 classes. Many of these have been lost to the service through death, capture or physical disability. There is evidence that there is also a lack of trained U-boat ratings.

Personalities

General Admiral Carls is the third ranking officer in the German Navy. While the HISMARCK was on her last

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cruise, Admiral Ullrich, as Commander-in-Chief "Gruppe West", directed the course of the BISMARCK from shore.

3. Air

Strength and Disposition

German air forces were reliably reported disposed as follows on October 1:

| <u>Western Fr.</u> | <u>Russian Fr.</u> | <u>Mediterranean</u> | <u>Central Ger.</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|---------------------|--------------|
| 1032 | 2545 | 360 | 593 | 4530 |

More than half of all Nazi planes in Russia are said to be concentrated in the drive on Moscow.

Estimated total air strength and monthly plane production remains as shown in the last Fortnightly Summary - 2900 planes of all types and 2200 monthly production.

Operations

West - There has been no substantial change as regards German air operations over the British Isles and in the Western approaches since the last Fortnightly Summary.

Eastern Front - German reports make the following claims regarding air activity during the last fortnight:

- (1) hits on Kuznetsk railway;
- (2) troops short of supplies in Kalinin area provisioned by air;
- (3) much of Colonel General Keller's air fleet, formerly employed in the Latvia-Estonia-Lake Peipus section, liberated for action elsewhere;
- (4) sank 30,000 tons of Russian shipping in the evacuation of Odessa.

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Mediterranean - Until recently General Weinsler maintained air headquarters in Sicily for operations in the vicinity of Malta. The bulk of his planes have now been transferred to Greece, where he will direct Nazi air activity throughout the Mediterranean.

German air forces have been relieved of the air defense of Bardia by the Italians.

Personalities

The former German Air Attache in London, General of Aviator Henninger, is now on the staff of Field Marshal von Sperrle, Commander of Air Fleet No. 3, which is operating against the British Isles and shipping in the Atlantic.

CONFIDENTIALF. Italian Military, Naval and Air Situations1. MilitaryLibya

Recently the Germans augmented their forces in the Western Desert by one armored and one infantry division, which brings their total strength to:

2 Armored Divisions (15th and 21st)
1 Motorized (5th)
1 Infantry

The Italian forces in Libya total 11 full divisions, plus 4 divisions which are being reconstituted from four divisions destroyed by the British last winter.

East Africa

The Italians still are continuing the fight in the Gonder area of Ethiopia, where their strength is now estimated to be: 15,000 men; 12,000 rifles; 200 guns.

Eastern Front

The German High Command gave Italian troops a share of the credit for the capture of Staling in the Don to Basin. The Italian forces are now operating about forty miles west of Rostov on Don.

Occupied Territory

There is every indication that a real war is under way in Serbia. Nearly all railroad operations have ceased because of the activities of saboteurs and a number of trains have been derailed or blown up. Between forty to fifty thousand armed soldiers are conducting guerrilla activities from the hills of Montenegro and Herzegovina against Italian and German occupational forces. These guerrilla bands are receiving the cooperation of the rural population to the extent that almost the entire occupied territory is in a state of insurgency. To control the situation, the Italians have been forced to send a total of at least 25 divisions and possibly as many as 30 divisions to this theater. However, there are reports to the effect that Italian soldiers are selling their weapons and military supplies, deserting and entering into conspiracies with the inhabitants of this area.

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In the occupied territory, the Italian forces are distributed as follows:

| | |
|---------------------------|--------------|
| Croatia and Dalmatia | 3 divisions |
| Albania and Montenegro | 8 divisions |
| Dalmatia | 1 division |
| Greece and Aegean Islands | 10 divisions |

Several losses have been sustained by the Italian Navy during the past six months. On October 5 an Italian submarine was sunk by a British destroyer when two or three Italian submarines attempted to attack an English convoy in the Atlantic. The small destroyers were sunk by mines in the Central Western area. About the middle of October another auxiliary or transport cruiser, the CITTA' del SENNA, was sunk off Naples by a British submarine.

The present estimated strength of the Italian Navy is as follows:

Butterflies: 2 LINDORIOS
3 CAYORS

Crushers:

1. 8" gun crushers (1 badly damaged)
11. 6" gun crushers
- 2 light crushers (old, efficiency very low)

Destroyers: 91

Submarines: 72

At the start of the war Italy had 121 submarines and her war plans were based on the fact that the striking effect of this large submarine force would assist her surface forces in rapidly gaining control of the entire Mediterranean. This was the basic submarine plan in Europe and was made up mostly of two types. The first, after Italy finished her war submarine, was a design to considerable and serious proportions. The second Italy had lost approximately forty-nine submarines. However, Italy is constructing and repairing craft (believed to be of small type) at the rate of two per month and it is possible that about twenty of these have been built since the war began. Some reports state that building up is less but that the personnel problem is an effective hindrance to the submarine force.

CONFIDENTIAL3. and

Contrary to the general belief, there is no evidence that the morale and fighting spirit of Italian pilots is poor. On the other hand, there is ample proof that in actual combat the Italians are outclassed frequently by the superiority of British pilots and aircraft. The Italian Air Force has been hampered by inadequate training and outmoded planes.

The estimated strength and disposition of the Italian Air Force is as follows:

Italy

| | |
|-----------------------|-----|
| Central & East Sector | 302 |
| Western Sector | 159 |
| Southern Sector | 50 |

| | |
|----------------|-----|
| <u>Balkans</u> | 188 |
|----------------|-----|

| | |
|---------------|-----|
| <u>Africa</u> | 104 |
|---------------|-----|

| | |
|-----------------|-----|
| <u>Sardinia</u> | 130 |
|-----------------|-----|

Italy suffered its worst air raid of the war on September 1 when the British attacked Naples for 5 1/2 hours. The heavy damage was inflicted on the electric power plant which has paralyzed train service. Entire districts of buildings were destroyed by fire, the industrial section around the suburb of San Giovanni a Teduccio was razed and fuel oil tanks near Grunelli were hit. In spite of the tremendous damage there were very few civilian casualties as the raid was confined entirely to military objectives.

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EXHIBIT NO. 81

O. N. I. No. 107

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 6, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR the Director
Assistant Director
Subject: Burning of Secret and Confidential Codes
and Ciphers by Japanese Embassy

I was informed from a reliable source last evening that the Japanese have destroyed by burning their confidential and secret codes and ciphers.

It is probable that the Japanese Embassy has retained one copy of one secret or confidential code for emergency use.

Respectfully,

Harold G. Davis
Harold G. Davis

Confidential

MSB-735 + F-2 *unified*

1838 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Opinion

SECRET

December 6, 1941

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Subject: O.N.I. estimates of Japanese forces in Indo-China, and adjacent areas.

25,000 men in Tonkin Province (North)
20,000 men in Southern Indo-China
10,000 men.....TOTAL

20 planes near Hanoi (North)
100 planes Southern Indo-China
120 planes.....TOTAL

NAVAL FORCES

At Camranh Bay or vicinity: 1 Heavy Cruiser
1 Destroyed Submarine Tender
2 Submarines
20 Transports or supply vessels.

At Haiphong: 1 Destroyers

Indo-China Coast: 1 Light Cruiser
1 Minelayer

In the Formosa Strait:
1 Heavy Cruiser
1 Light Cruiser
2 Destroyers
1 Submarine
1 Aircraft Tender
1 Submarine Tender
1 Minelayer
20 (approx.) transports or supply vessels.

In supporting distance areas:

On Hainan: 1 Light Cruiser and 100 planes.
On Formosa: 1 Light Cruiser and 100 planes.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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Copy No. 7

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

December 1, 1941.

Memorandum for the Director

1. Attached hereto is a resume of the outstanding military, naval and political moves made by Japan during the past two months. No effort is made to draw conclusions in each instance but a view of the general situation would indicate that the principal preparatory effort has been directed by the Japanese looking towards, first: an eventual control or occupation of Thailand followed almost immediately by an attack against British possessions, possibly Burma and Singapore.

A. E. McCollum.

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1840 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Memorandum for the Director

December 1, 1941.

ARMY PREPARATIONS

Starting about 1 October and continuing until about the middle of November the Japanese shipped out of the port of Shanghai a large quantity of military supplies. Vessels carrying this equipment were seen loaded south or southwest. The equipment consisted of all sorts of military stores and equipment, a large number of landing boats being particularly noted. Other especially noteworthy items consisted of a considerable number of tanks and trucks, quite a few of which were camouflaged, and considerable railroad equipment, particularly locomotives and rolling stock. While a few troops were taken out at this time these ships principally carried equipment. Starting about 11 November the character of the shipments underwent a marked change. From 11 to 13 November large transports took out of Shanghai a large number of fully equipped veteran troops, while an additional 10,000 were reported as being withdrawn from North China. Reports dated the same day, 13 to 15 November 1941, troops were loaded at Tientsin and moved at Haiphong where with other troops already there were sent south to Saigon and Bangkok by rail. The ships which docked at Haiphong and Saigon are reported loaded with Japanese transport and other supplies and men. It is estimated that the following Japanese troops are now in French Indo-China ready and equipped for action.

- (a) South and Central Indo-China
- (c) Northern Indo-China

25,000
10,000

The landing of reinforcements continues and additional troops and supplies are undoubtedly available on nearby Hainan Island and now the fact remains.

NAVAL PREPARATIONS

Starting about 1 October and continuing through November extensive naval preparations have been made. The following are the main points of these preparations.

- (a) All patrol ships have been recalled to Japan for a quick mobilization and a patrol check up that has now been completed.
- (b) One additional naval aircraft carrier has been sent to the Japanese Mandate Island area.
- (c) A new and larger patrol was established on a line between the Marshall Islands and the Philippines. Japan was placed under air and submarine observation.
- (d) The Third Fleet organized two task groups, both rather loosely with orders to operate No. 1 to operate in the South China Area and group No. 2 to operate in the Mandate Islands area. This means

ization is about finished and the CINC of the 2nd Fleet expects to be in Southern Formosa by 3 or 4 December.

(r) The CINC of the Combined Air Force has just completed an inspection of all outlying naval air groups, particularly those in the Mandates, South China and Formosa.

(s) Many merchant vessels have recently been taken over by the Navy and at least three of these have been equipped as anti-aircraft ships.

POLITICAL PREPARATIONS - 1 October - 30 Nov.

Japanese residents particularly women and children have been evacuated from

- (a) British India and Singapore
- (b) Netherlands East Indies
- (c) Philippine Islands
- (d) Hongkong
- (e) Australia
- (f) Many Japanese residents have recently withdrawn from the United States, Canada and South America.

Preparations have been made to shift the center of the War Council - General and Japanese, now covering the American Area, to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Japanese Embassy at Rio de Janeiro has been equipped with short wave radio transmitter.

Great stress has been laid on establishment of espionage net in Thailand and Singapore as follows:

- (a) Japan as consulate at Singapore is headed by a Army intelligence officer.
- (b) A consulate has been established at the northern railroad of Chongqing.
- (c) Army communication personnel and equipment to protect at Singapore, Bangkok and Chongqing.
- (d) Four Army and Navy officers under assigned names have been sent to the Embassy at Bangkok. The Ambassador has received instructions not to interfere in the work of these men.
- (e) A chain of dispatches named by intelligence agencies in process of establishment.
- (f) Japanese Army doctor under assigned names are in the naval hospital at Bangkok.
- (g) At the end of November 1941 Santa was sent in gold to the Ambassador at Bangkok with instructions to help in the Army intelligence work.
- (h) At least two sabotage agents have been sent into Singapore.

In French Indo-China the Japanese military has taken over many police functions. Many Chinese and Annamese are being summarily arrested. At the end of November Japanese Ambassador Yoshizawa queried his government as to whether he and his staff should take over the governmental functions of French Indo-China or continue to function through the front of the French Government General.

The Consul General at Shanghai has informed his government that all preparations are complete for taking over all physical property in China belonging to British, Americans and other enemy nationals.

The Army General Staff sent urgent requests for information for U.S. and Dutch troop and plane strengths and dispositions in the Philippines and Netherlands East Indies.

Special Ambassador Kurusu sent to the United States to conduct negotiations with the United States.

Op-16-F-2

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Office of Naval Intelligence
Washington, D.C.

November 1, 1941

Memorandum for the Director

SUBJECT: Dispatch from Aluzana, Chungking, 30/10/41

1. In this dispatch Major McHugh assumes that a Japanese drive from northern Indo-China to cut the Burma Road is imminent. He further states that the only hope of blocking this drive would be active participation in the campaign of all American and British Far Eastern air units which would require foreign (presumably American) seizure and control of means of transportation and air fields in Yunnan province.

2. In a message which the American Ambassador states is now being forwarded to President Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek states that the Japanese will launch a drive to cut the Burma Road within 30 days. He takes a somewhat less serious view of the situation than does Major McHugh. Chiang says that he has land forces adequate to defend the road but will need air support. He indicates that he desires aid from British and American air effective in Singapore and Manila in a voluntary status. He says nothing about foreign control of Chinese air fields and Chinese means of communication.

3. Considering the extreme difficulty of the terrain between the Indo China border and Kunming, it is believed that the Chinese, if they fight and are given some air support from Britain and America, can halt this Japanese drive. The Japanese now have less than 100,000 men in Indo-China. How many they can transport there in the next 30 days is problematical, but it is considered that they cannot maintain their present concentrations (which threaten Russia in the North), maintain their present garrisons in China, and at the same time spare more than 200,000 troops for the drive into Yunnan.

4. The real question here is: Will the Chinese fight? In this connection there have been many rumors that Lung Yun, Governor of Yunnan Province has sold out or soon will sell out to Wang Ching-wei. If this happens there is little that Chiang Kai-shek, the British, or the United States can do to save the Burma Road. This rumor, however, lacks confirmation.

5. Chinese character should also be taken into consideration. When aid is promised to them they have a strong tendency to stop fighting themselves sit back, and wait until the aid arrives. For this reason it might be well not to promise them too much. One other point should be mentioned. What Major McHugh recommends is war-like action by the United States and Britain against Japan - in short, de-facto war with Japan. If we are going to fight Japan, rather than transporting our men and equipment to far-off West Yunnan province, thus placing ourselves under all the handicaps of difficult transportation, it would seem more sensible to attack the Japanese supply lines and base bases from our already established bases, thus diverting their attention from the Burma Road.

H. H. McCallum

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1844 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

In reply refer to letter
and No.

Copy No. 5 of 5 Copies

Op-16-P-2

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

October 21, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Summary of the Far Eastern Situation.

1. The ultra-nationalistic element of Japan has seized control of the Government and is prepared to push collaboration with the Axis powers and the opposition to the democracies to the ultimate extent.
2. At the present time Japan has about 684,000 troops in Manchukuo, Korea and Inner Mongolia in a position to attack Siberia. There is every evidence that due to the recent weakening of Russian forces the Japanese have the position and strength to attack Siberia. The Japanese armies in China are bogged down and a stalemate has resulted with neither side capable of obtaining a decision.
3. Economically food is not a problem for Japan but in order to supply her war industries which are essential for her present war effort Japan must have access to over-seas markets or must open up an over-land supply route to Europe through Russia. Failing in either of these two alternatives, she must face a situation in which she will see her total war effort gradually decline which must eventually result in her eviction from the Asiatic continent and her decline as a world power.

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Op-16-F-2

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

October 21, 1941

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: Far Eastern Situation.

1. The Political Situation - Japan

With the advent of the Tojo Cabinet Japan swings back to closer Axis ties under the aegis of the jingoistic military clique. Although Tojo's Cabinet retains a balance between the comparatively conservative Navy members and the more radical Army there are remaining a number of old wheel horse politicians. The report that General Tojo is filling the Home Ministry and War Portfolios in addition to the Premiership indicates clearly however that the Army intends to take the reins of the Government, and such being the case, the intimation is clear that positive action detrimental to United States' interests may be expected.

2. The Economic Situation - Japan

The basic weakness in Japan's economic situation is her lack of raw materials to feed her war industries. She depends on overseas imports for 65% to 100% of her supplies of nickel, cotton, rubber, molybdenum, aluminum, lead, mercury, oil, tin, mica, iron; this dependence is partly offset by stockpiles, particularly oil, molybdenum and aluminum, but existing stocks of other items are not sufficient to meet current requirements for more than six months. A basic restriction on expansion of Japan's industries is the lack of machine tools, precision instruments, refinery installations, and workmen skilled in producing and installing these items. The living standards of Japan's industrial and agricultural workers reflect the condition of Japan's foreign trade, particularly the export of silk and the import of industrial raw materials. The steady decline of foreign trade has caused the living standards of the entire nation to deteriorate. On the other hand, Japan is 77% self-sufficient in basic food items; in recent weeks, however, the government has completed elaborate plans for increased restriction of food consumption and for admixture of substitute and synthetic foods and drinks; plans have been made also for nationwide distribution of 150,000,000 pieces of canned goods and for distributed storage of rice, biscuits, canned fish, and vegetables. In brief, Japan is not prepared to feed her war industries for a period exceeding six months if a blockade closes her main overseas routes; she is prepared, however, to provide for an indefinite period staple food supplies.

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3. The Military Situation - Japan

There are reliably reported to be 684,000 Japanese troops in Manchukuo, Korea and Inner Mongolia. These forces are disposed for an attack upon Siberia. Russian strength east of the Baikal Lake is believed inferior to these Japanese concentrations.

There are slightly over half a million Japanese troops in China Proper. Three limited objective Japanese offensives have been carried out or attempted in China during the last month. Japanese planes continue an intensive bombing of points in unoccupied China. Japan shows no indication of giving up any important points in China or relaxing her efforts to crush the Chiang Kai-shek regime.

There are roughly fifty thousand Japanese troops in Indo-China. These units are not disposed for an attack on Thailand. It is reported, however, that Japan plans to double this force in the near future and some of these reinforcements may have already arrived at Haiphong.

The dry season in Thailand begins in November and lasts until April. Japan launched her 1904 war against Russia on February 1 and attacked Manchoukuo in late September. The Nipponese seem to prefer winter campaigns in this area. Thus, both to the north and south, weather conditions are favorable to military operations. In Japan Proper, training of reserves continues. The maximum of Japanese manpower is being placed on a war footing.

4. The Naval Situation - Japan

The naval forces of Japan may now be considered to be fully mobilized for imminent action. All forces not urgently required in the Mandates and the Asiatic continent have been called back to home waters and during a period of recent marked inactivity extensive personnel changes have been carried out and mobilization plans probably completed.

5. The Military Situation - China

Chiang Kai-shek has at least one million men under arms. There are almost half as many guerrillas back of the Japanese lines. China's army lacks almost everything except manpower and small arms. It has practically no offensive striking power, but possesses considerable defensive strength. For almost three years the Sino-Japanese war has been a stalemate broken only by occasional limited Japanese offensives designed to break up Chinese concentrations close to Japanese lines. The stalemate is likely to continue for a long time because:

- (1) Japan cannot annihilate the Chinese army.
- (2) The Chinese cannot drive the Japanese back.
- (3) No mutually satisfactory basis for peace has been suggested.

U.S. help to China on the scale now planned will greatly raise Chinese morale and make more effective China's war of attrition. The possibility of a Chinese offensive actually recapturing territory strongly held is, however, still far distant.

6. French Indo-China

Vichy and the Colonial Government are beginning to resist Japanese demands. It is not believed that they will be successful in these efforts, and Indo-China may be considered virtually under Japanese domination.

7. Thailand

The Thai Government is resisting Japanese pressure and will probably fight if the Japanese invade the country. They have an army of about 70,000, backed by some 200,000 reserves. Their air force and navy are negligible. However with British help they could give the Japanese a lot of trouble. At least it is believed that the conquest of Thailand, aided by the British, would develop into a major military campaign. It is not believed that Japan has the strength to carry on major campaigns in the north and the south simultaneously.

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Op-16-F
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1848 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Copy 4

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-F-2

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

September 25, 1941.

MEMORANDUM TO ADMIRAL TURNER

SUBJECT: Far Eastern Situation.

JAPANESE ARMY

An analysis of all available reports indicates that there are in Manchoukuo, Korea and Inner Mongolia about 500,000 Japanese troops. Movement of Japanese units from Japan and China to these territories continues. Within the territories feverish movements of men and supplies, designed to place forces in position to attack Russia, have been proceeding since shortly after the outbreak of the Russo-German hostilities. Recent relaxation of restrictions, permitting some railroad travel by civilians, lends to the belief that military preparations are nearing completion. Russian strength east of Lake Baikal is believed to be less than these Japanese concentrations.

In Indo-China there are roughly 50,000 Japanese soldiers. The Japanese are strengthening their positions here and working on long range plans to occupy the region permanently, but they are not ready to attack Thailand, nor are they making sound logistic preparations for such an attack. The forthcoming Japanese maneuvers near the Thai border are believed more of a political than a military gesture.

Half a million Japanese troops remain in China proper. Japan is at present conducting three sizable offensives against Chiang Kai-shek's men and during the last two months has greatly intensified her bombing raids. It is plain, therefore, that Japan intends neither to give up any important points in China nor to relax her efforts to destroy Chiang's regime.

Training of reserves continues in Japan. The maximum of Japanese man power is being placed on a war footing.

The Japanese Army is, in brief:-

1. Ready, or nearly ready, to strike at Russia.
2. Continuing the campaign in China.
3. Not in position for a southward drive.
4. Preparing for a maximum effort.

JAPANESE NAVY

Recent dispositions of the Japanese naval forces afloat have shown a marked transfer of interest from the South, in waters off India and Indo-China, to the waters. The entire Third Fleet has been withdrawn from blockade duty off the China coast back to home ports. With the exception of certain minor operations of light craft in the Japanese Sea and more recent submarine operations off the southern coasts of Japan, the Combined Home Fleet has been inactive, undergoing extensive personnel changes. This personnel reorganization which is not normal for this time of year, may be interpreted to mean that preparations are being made for an emergency

(6.

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requiring employment of all naval forces. Remaining in China waters and off Indo-China now are only the regularly stationed 1st (Central), 2nd (South) and 3rd (North) Expeditionary Fleets, augmented by the so-called Special Expeditionary Fleet consisting principally of auxiliaries servicing the occupation forces in Indo-China.

Naval shipbuilding remains shrouded in secrecy, but it has been reasonably well established that two (2) new carriers have been or are being commissioned, one light cruiser has recently been added to the forces afloat, and within the past year five destroyers and at least one submarine have been completed. Lack of materials has in the recent past retarded the building program and is undoubtedly an increasing handicap. One new battleship may be nearing completion, but there is no conclusive evidence to this effect.

CHINA

Counting provincial forces and Reds, Chiang has at least one million men under arms. There are almost half as many guerrillas back of the Japanese lines. China's army lacks almost everything except man power and small arms. It has practically no offensive striking power but possesses considerable defensive strength. Unless the Japanese greatly increase their forces, they will not be able either to drive to Kuning and cut the Burma Road or to capture Chungking. It is doubtful if they could capture Chungking in any event. Chinese skill in guerrilla operations and attrition warfare is such that Japan cannot measurably reduce her present garrison in China without shortening her lines and giving up territory.

For almost three years the Sino-Japanese war has been a stalemate, broken only by occasional limited Japanese offensives designed to break up Chinese concentrations close to Japanese lines. These offensives succeed, but the concentrations always reform. The Japanese are at present engaged in such an offensive in the Wutai Mountain district of Shansi, - their 20th drive in this area.

The stalemate is likely to continue for a long time because:

1. The Japanese cannot annihilate the Chinese armies.
2. The Chinese cannot drive the Japanese back.
3. No mutually satisfactory basis for peace has been suggested.

U.S. help to China on the scale now planned will greatly raise Chinese morale and make more effective China's war of attrition. A Chinese offensive actually recapturing territory strongly held is, however, still far distant.

JAPANESE POLITICAL-MILITARY-ECONOMIC SITUATION

All phases of Japanese economy have been or are rapidly being placed on a totalitarian war footing. The Japanese army and navy are preparing for supreme emergencies. By taking virtual control of the army the emperor may be either (a) insuring cooperation of the army with the foreign policy of the government or (b) taking the final step to prepare the nation for a totalitarian military effort. By getting rid of Matsuo, initiating negotiations with the U.S., and appointing two conservatives, Yamada and Toyoda, as head of the army and foreign service respectively, Nippon is inclining away from the Axis and towards the democracies. Japan acquired Indo-China partly as a result of joining the Axis and the Axis nations have recognized Manchukuo and Nanking. Tokyo's reason that the Axis has nothing more to give her and can now be dropped.

1850 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

What Japan will do depends on a number of factors, chief of which are:

1. Progress of fighting on the Russo-German front. If Russia collapses Japan would be strongly tempted to take Manchuria and the Maritime Provinces. Germany's successes in the Ukraine have strengthened the pro-Axis groups in Japan.
2. Japan's economic situation. She must get basic war materials, including oil, iron ore, scrap iron and cotton. Her most immediate serious shortage, rubber, has been alleviated by her conquest of Indo-China. It is believed that Japan's reserve stocks of other materials will permit her to sit on the fence between the Axis and the Democracies for several months.
3. The progress of her U.S. negotiations. It is not believed that Japan will agree to withdraw her forces from China on a fixed date, or from Indo-China at all.
4. The progress of the naval war in the Atlantic. The President's "shooting order" committed strong units of the American fleet to operations in the Atlantic. This delighted the Japanese who would like to see the entire U.S. fleet committed there. If in future we are compelled to transfer additional vessels to the Atlantic we may anticipate that each such transfer will be followed by a stiffening of Japan's attitude towards us.
5. Weather conditions. Japan started her campaign against Manchukuo in September and her 1904 war against Russia in February. In spite of some obvious disadvantages the Japanese seem to prefer winter campaigns in this area, probably because the frozen ground makes widespread operations possible.

In Thailand the dry season lasts from November to April, the wet season from May to October.

Thus both to the north and south winter campaigns are feasible.

The undersigned believes that Japan will:

1. Continue the negotiations with the U.S., but not yield on any points which she considers would endanger the "East Asia co-prosperity sphere".
2. Watch closely the Russo-German fighting and the naval warfare in the Atlantic.
3. If Russia collapses, attack Siberia.
4. If the bulk of the U.S. fleet is withdrawn to the Atlantic, strike south. she does not expect this development but could quickly exploit it.
5. If Russia is still resisting strongly by December, wait, at least until late next spring, before taking any decisive action.

A. A. Moore.

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"Once it is signed as we (CHI) need
time now, to get all set in advance
of Tuesday.....a.g.k."

(In a.g.k.'s notation)

1852 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

(M-1)

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-F-2

July 2, 1941.

Memorandum for the Director

SUBJECT: Possibility of Early Aggressive Action by Japan.

1. The Commandant of the 3rd Naval District reports that a reliable informant close to Japanese industrial interests has stated that these interests expect Japan to make an aggressive move against Russia on July 20th. Too much credence should not be placed in this report as in the past the Japanese industrial and business community in New York has not proved to be a very reliable barometer of Japanese government action. Nevertheless the following factors would seem to indicate that some sort of action probably distasteful to the United States may be planned, namely:

(a) Since about June 25th there has been an absence of sailings from Japan of merchant vessels bound for United States East coast and gulf ports and if this trend continues, in about two weeks there will be no Japanese merchant ships in the Atlantic.

(b) Simultaneous recognition by the Axis powers of the Japanese-sponsored Wang Ching-wei government of China may have been procured by Japan's promise to take aggressive action against the non-Axis powers.

(c) The announcement today that the Japanese government had decided on its policy in regard to the Russo-German war, coupled with the fact that publication of any policy whatsoever or comment on any such policy has been deferred, suggest the possibility that the policy may be other than the often publicized southward advance policy.

(d) Japan has for many years coveted the pre-Amur provinces of Siberian Russia, both as a security measure and for the natural resources of these areas.

2. The present disposition of the Japanese armed forces would seem to preclude the possibility of any sudden thrust against Russia. Their disposition and composition appear to be such that if any sudden aggressive action at all is planned, such action would be in the direction of further minor action against the South China coast or possibly directed towards seizure of additional bases in French Indo-China. Nevertheless the naval forces in particular may be re-Oriented in a very short interval of time and the situation is such that the possibility of Japanese action against Russia, though still considered unlikely, cannot be ruled out entirely.

CC -Op-16-F
Op-10/11
Op-12
Op-38W

W. H. C. Tolson
A. H. C. Tolson

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WP
CNO 6
ACNO 2 4/17/41.
Op-12
 For info & return.
 The significance
 of these moves
 ought not to be
 overlooked.
 My view is that
 Japan will strike
 first soon. (RP2) Think 11/11/41

1854 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-P-2

April 17, 1941

Memorandum for the Director

SUBJECT: British-Japanese Crisis.

1. On April 16, 1941, the Domei (Japanese) News Agency reported from Bangkok that repeated attacks by British troops on Thai territory along the Thailand-Laoa frontier caused the Thai government to lodge a protest with British authorities. Domei said the protest was announced by the Thai Foreign Ministry, and added that no further details regarding these attacks were given.

2. For some months past the Japanese have been concentrating troops at Formosa, Hainan Island and Kwangshu. There has been a gradual shortening of lines in Central China, and movement of troops from this area to Formosa and Hainan Islands. There has been also a gradual reduction of Japanese troops in North China, which were in some instances replaced by Manchurian levies. Within the last two weeks some 2,000 Japanese troops, 7,000 of whom had received special instruction in jungle warfare, left China-China for unknown destinations. Shortly after the same period, some 11,000 fresh troops from Japan arrived in Central China, and 11,000 veterans left Central China for Formosa. The Japanese Fleet is in home waters. A strong force is near the Palau Islands. It is probable that in case of a drive on Singapore, a strong fighting force would be maintained in the Palau Island area.

3. A report from the Naval Attache, Tokyo, states that there are prevalent rumors in Tokyo that Japan plans an early attack on Singapore. Although the Japanese Navy has no intention of doing the story by the above unit, it is a severe blow suffered by Britain in the Pacific. The Japanese Navy is maintaining so heavily that the movement of American vessels is being prevented to the west. Some time to her, the American Fleet in the Pacific and the present the movement of an American fleet from the Pacific to the Atlantic is the Atlantic Ocean is being prevented by the Axis to prevent this.

4. Much to all this is added Japan's new navy with recent additions, whereby she is, are the new Japanese submarine force, which in case of a southern drive, it may be that the force which is the

292 (2 pp + 1st + 1st by line)

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Op-16-F-2

-2-

April 17, 1941

beginning of a Japanese drive on Singapore. Newspaper attacks have often preceded Japanese military attacks, and newspaper attacks invariably precede the military attacks of our Axis partners.

Arthur H. Collins
 U.S. Navy

The Japanese fleets have
 been reorganized, also.
apc

CC - Op-16-1
 Op-16-f

I do not agree that Japan
 has decided to strike, even
 against Indochina. See
 my memo of Feb 5th
 282 RKT 40

1856 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

NAVY DEPARTMENT Office of the Chief of Naval Operations OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

In reply refer to No.

Op-16-B-7

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

April 17, 1941

MEMORANDUM for the Director

Evacuation of Japanese Nationals from Panama

The Commandant Eleventh Naval District (DIO) in a report of April 4, 1941, to ONI states as follows:

"The Los Angeles Japanese press under a Tokyo dateline of April 5, 1941, states that a large number of the colony of 800 Japanese have been forced to evacuate Panama due to that Republic's discriminatory laws against Japan. The Japanese Government is reported to be viewing the Panama Republic's attitude with great concern and is considering counter-measures.

"The item further states that it is apparent that the United States is behind the Panama Republic's anti-Japanese policy in an effort to hit at the Axis nations. The item also bitterly mentions anti-Japanese actions of the governments of Peru and Brazil, stating that the Japanese Government has attempted to keep the facts secret and avoid outbursts of public opinion in Japan."

Japanese Armed Merchant Men

Recent unconfirmed reports indicate that the Japanese Government is arming some of its best merchant ships with four to six inch guns. Specifically mentioned are the YAMATA MARU, NITTA MARU and HELLAN MARU.

The Commandants, Twelfth and Thirteenth Naval Districts, have been requested to inspect these ships upon arrival in their respective ports to ascertain the facts and report.

Japanese Oil Shipments from West Coast Ports

Commandant Eleventh Naval District (DIO) reported on April 9 that the Japanese are now purchasing quantities of petroleum products in drums and 5 gallon tins and shipping same on cargo vessels to Japan.

CONFIDENTIAL

253 (211)

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CONFIDENTIAL

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

1857

- 2 -

Op-16-B-7

April 17, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

The Japanese Government has ordered all Japanese tankers to load oil hereafter at West Coast ports foregoing trips to Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico ports.

W. B. Phillips
W. B. Phillips,
Captain, U.S. Navy

CONFIDENTIAL

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1858 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Office of Chief of Naval Operations

Op-16-F

SECRET

Situation Briefs
Serial No. 1

February 15, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF WAR PLANS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Briefs on:

- (a) Japanese Missions to Berlin, Rome
(Europe)
- (b) Japanese Observation of United States
Naval Movements
- (c) German Submarines and Raiders in the
Pacific

H. J. Bode
By Direction

Copy to:
Lt. Comdr. A. H. McCollum

Japanese Commissions to Berlin and Rome

1859
1860

1861

1862

1863

1864

1865

Under date of December 11, 1911, the Daily Herald Tribune at Tokyo reported that the Japanese Government had officially announced that the political, military, and economic commissions provided for in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce in the near future. At the same time the Japanese Government announced the appointment of General Hiroshi Arima as Ambassador to Berlin. It will be recalled that General Arima was formerly Ambassador to Berlin and had been removed from his post shortly after the commencement of the European war in the summer of 1914 for being entitled "pro-German." He is undoubtedly as pro-German as he ever was and his appointment to Berlin has been widely interpreted in Japan as a vindication of General Arima's action in availing himself of the policy in Japan.

Pursuant to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce, the Japanese Minister in February 1, 1911, arrived Berlin and Rome for the purpose of the completion of the Japanese section of the treaty, political and military commissions provided for in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. The Japanese section of these commissions are as follows:

In Berlin

- Political - Ambassador Arima
- Political - Minister Matsuda
- Political - General Arima
- Political - General Arima
- Military - Major General Yamashita
- Military - Vice Admiral Hara

In Rome

- Political - Ambassador Arima
- Political - General Arima
- Military - Major General Yamashita
- Military - Vice Admiral Hara

In London

- Political - General Arima
- Political - Major General Yamashita
- Political - Major General Yamashita
- Political - Major General Yamashita
- Military - Major General Yamashita
- Military - Major General Yamashita

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1860 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

3. The U.S. Naval Attache at Tokyo on December 7, 1941, reported that Lieutenant General Tadayuki Yamashita, Chief of the Japanese Army Air Corps, was proceeding to Berlin, together with a corps of experts for the purpose of making a comprehensive study of Hitler's tactics and latest aviation technical developments. General Yamashita is said to have been accompanied by a large staff of technical experts and they departed from Japan on December 25, 1941, and proceeded to Berlin, Germany via Russia. It is reported that later on this Japanese military aviation mission intends to proceed to Rome.

4. The Japanese naval transport Akara departed from Japan on January 14th bound for Lisbon, Portugal, transited the Panama Canal on February 14th and had on board a large Japanese naval mission to Berlin. The mission was headed by three Rear Admirals, two of them specialists in technical naval engineering matters, while the other flag officer is a specialist in naval aviation matters. Most of the other officers comprising the mission appear to be experts on various technical, engineering and aviation matters. From this the presumption follows that the naval mission is largely technical in character and is designed to obtain information concerning German technical developments.

Japanese Observation of United States Naval Movements

1. Japanese consulates throughout the United States and its possessions have been instructed to make dispatch reports concerning U.S. naval movements. The Japanese Consulate along the West coast and at Honolulu have been particularly active in making these reports and Japanese naval officers are stationed at Seattle and at Los Angeles to assist the consuls in compiling these reports.

2. In June of 1940, the U.S. Naval Attache at Tokyo reported that Japanese submarines were said to maintain an observation patrol in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands and that the submarines were supplied from time to time by making contact with Japanese naval tankers at sea. The tracks of Japanese naval tankers moving between Japan and the West coast of the United States were plotted and it was found that most of them passed through a point just to the northward of the Hawaiian Islands and in this same area the tankers seemed to make very slow progress for a day or two leading to the presumption that it was in this general locality that contact was made between the observing submarines and their supply ships. This area was searched on several occasions and no contact with Japanese submarines was made. Reported reports have been received, usually of a vague nature, that Japanese submarines have been seen operating off the West Coast of the United States, at various localities off the coast of Central America, and as far south as the Galapagos Islands. In several instances it has been possible to make a fairly comprehensive investigation of these reports and in these instances they have been found to be wholly without foundation. An analysis of the various reports concerning the operation of Japanese submarines in close proximity to the coasts of the Americas and the Hawaiian Islands leads to the conclusion that these reports are of doubtful reliability.

3. British Intelligence at Singapore reports that Japanese merchant ships are stationed at 100 mile intervals across the Pacific Ocean all the way from New Zealand to Lower California, that these ships make periodic reports to Tokyo on a frequency of 40 Kilocycles. At our request the various radio calls used by the alleged Japanese station ships were furnished and it was determined that all of these radio calls were once used by the naval transport ship A while she was en route from Yokohama to the Panama Canal zone.

1862 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

German Submarine and Raider Situation in the Pacific

1. In the late summer of 1940 reports were received that the Japanese were turning over submarines to the Germans for use by the latter in attacking British commerce in the Pacific. These rumors have been carefully sifted and to date no evidence has been developed indicating that the Japanese have supplied the Germans with submarines. Furthermore, no sinking or attacks by German submarines have been reported in the Pacific.

2. German raiders have been reported in the Pacific and there is a strong presumption that these such raiders are being supplied from Japanese sources. Latest reports indicate that these raiders were operating from bases in the Japanese Mandate Islands and attacking shipping to the southward of this general area. Several authenticated captures have been made and so far none of these raiders have been eliminated. At least one captured vessel, the Norwegian tanker Ole Jacob, in charge of a German prize crew, made port at Kobe, Japan and sailed the next day after transferring prisoners to the German merchant ship Scharnhorst which has been in Kobe Harbor since the outbreak of the war. The evidence so far indicates that Japan is willing to furnish supplies to German raiders operating in the Pacific but this action has been taken with great circumspection and has been carefully concealed. No raider sinkings or captures in the Pacific have been noted during the past month.

3. Since early in 1940, there have been recurrent rumors, emanating (as it eventually appeared) from the same or parallel source, that Germans were transporting fabricated submarine parts to Vladivostok for erection at that port; that German officers were proceeding via Trans-Siberian to man German submarines at Vladivostok; that German officers were proceeding to Vladivostok to instruct Russians in submarine warfare and in the operation of submarines; and, finally, that German nucleus crews, consisting of warrant and petty officers, were being sent to Vladivostok for manning submarines, presumably either German-fabricated, Russian or Japanese. At the time of the receipt of these various reports and rumors, there was no evidence to either substantiate or definitely contradict any of them, except that two reports (one proceeding from British and another from another source considered by the Consulate at

Tsingtao to have been reliable) when finally investigated, were found to be without substance.

4. There has been no evidence, either direct or indicative, of German submarine activity, either erection of submarines or training of crews by German officers, at Vladivostok or at any other port in the Siberian maritime provinces.

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EXHIBIT NO. 82

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (OP 16)

16-1. Duties:

(a) *The Foreign Intelligence Branch will:*

- (1) Secure all classes of pertinent information concerning foreign countries, especially that affecting naval and maritime matters, with particular attention to the strength, disposition, and probable intentions of foreign naval forces.
- (2) Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable.
- (3) Direct the activities of U. S. Naval Attaches.
- (4) Maintain liaison with Naval Missions.
- (5) Maintain liaison with foreign naval attaches accredited to the United States.
- (6) Maintain liaison with other Government Departments for the exchange of foreign information.

(b) *The Domestic Intelligence Branch will:*

- (1) Secure all classes of pertinent information pertaining to naval and maritime matters, with particular attention to potential enemy, enemy agents and sympathizers.
- (2) Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable.
- (3) Maintain liaison with and cooperate with other Government Departments, particularly with the Military Intelligence Division of the Army and with the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice in the collection and dissemination of such information as will assist in the protection of the Naval Establishment against espionage and subversive activities.
- (4) Except as otherwise specifically provided for, prepare security letters, instructions on policy, rules, regulations and instructions on Naval information to assist the Naval Establishment and interested Government agencies in safeguarding the general security of Naval classified matter.
- (5) Regulate the visits of foreign Nationals to the United States Naval Establishment and to commercial concerns engaged in production for the Navy.
- (6) Maintain liaison with those Government agencies charged with the control of travelers, ships and shipping with a view to assisting them in preventing the travel of persons engaged in activities inimical to Naval interest; the movement of ships and shipping harmful to Navy interests; and sabotage of shipping of value to the Navy.
- (7) Maintain cognizance of the general Naval interest in safe and unobstructed building and production for the Naval Establishment and prepare pertinent directives and advisory matter in connection therewith.

(c) *The Public Relations Branch will:*

- (1) Prepare and present to the Public in cooperation with Bureaus and other offices of the Navy Departments, pertinent information not incompatible with military secrecy, regarding the United States Navy.
- (2) Maintain for the Press representatives, a point of contact with the Navy Department.
- (3) Act on inquiries for information concerning naval matter received from the public and the press.

(d) *The Censorship Branch will:*

- (1) Provide detailed plans and personnel for the censorship of the international radio and cable communications of the general public.
- (2) When national censorship is established, and until the Administrator of Public Relations takes office, conduct censorship of the international radio and cable communications of the general public through the agency of the Joint Army-Navy Public Relations Committee.
- (3) Prepare regulations for Naval Censorship of personal communications originating within the Naval Establishment.

(e) *The Historical Branch will:*

- (1) Administer the Navy Department Library and Archives.
- (2) Select, index and file the most important Naval records in such manner that they will be available for reference and printing.
- (3) Receive, record, classify and distribute as necessary photographs of current or potential strategic or historical interest.

(4) Prepare for issue to the Naval Establishment necessary instructions covering the preparation and disposal of War Diaries.

(f) *The Administration Branch will:*

- (1) Handle matters of administration for the Division of Naval Intelligence.
- (2) In conjunction with the Bureau of Navigation and with the Naval Reserve Policy Division procure, administer and train Naval Reserve Officers, Class I-V(S).

16-2. The Intelligence Division has membership on the following Committees:

Joint Board Sub-committee on Rules concerning Press Releases.

Joint Board Sub-committee on Special Joint Army and Navy Public Relations.

| NAVAL MESSAGE | | NAVY DE. THEAT | |
|--|------------------|--|--------------------|
| PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER | 3599 | ADDRESSES | MESSAGE PRECEDENCE |
| FROM | OPNAV | CINCPAC
CINCPAC
COM 14
COM 16 | PRIORITY 1 |
| RELEASED BY | T.S. Wilkinson | | ROUTINE |
| DATE | December 3, 1942 | | DEFERRED |
| FOR CODEROOM | | | PRIORITY |
| DECODED BY | | | ROUTINE |
| PARAPHRASED BY | | | DEFERRED |
| INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY | | | |
| UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE | | | |
| ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY | | | |
| TEXT | | DATE | TIME |
| <p>HIGHLY RELIABLE INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT CATEGORIC AND URGENT INSTRUCTIONS WERE SENT YESTERDAY TO JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS AT HONGKONG X SINGAPORE X BATAVIA X MANILA X WASHINGTON AND LONDON TO DESTROY MOST OF THEIR CODES AND CIPHERS AT ONCE AND TO BURN ALL OTHER IMPORTANT CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET DOCUMENTS X FROM FORTHWITH INFER THAT THERE PLANS EARLY ACTION IN SOUTH-SEA AREA</p> | | | |

EXHIBIT NO. 84

. 83

(Handwritten note:) Telephone conversation of Dec. 3, 1941 between a citizen in Honolulu (Japanese) & a military or naval officer in Tokio. Translated & available to Military Intel. Hawaii, Dec. 5, 1944.

IC (J) Hello, is this Mori?

(H) Hello, this is Mori.

(J) I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all.

(J) I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at present. Are airplanes flying daily?

(H) Yes, lots of them fly around.

(J) Are they large planes?

(H) Yes, they are quite big.

(J) Are they flying from morning till night?

(H) Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the air.

(J) I hear there are many sailors there, is that right?

(H) There aren't so many now. There were more in the beginning part of this year and the ending part of last year.

(J) Is that so?

[2] (H) I do not know why this is so, but it appears that there are very few sailors here at present.

(J) Are any Japanese people there holding meeting to discuss US-Japanese negotiations being conducted presently?

(H) No, not particularly. The minds of the Japa- here appear calmer than expected. They are getting along harmoniously.

(J) Don't the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese?

(H) Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here and we get along very well. All races are living in harmony. It appears that the people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There are some who say odd things, but these are limited to newcomers from the mainland, and after staying here from three to six months, they too begin to think and feel like the rest of the people in the islands.

(J) That's fine.

(H) Yes, it's fine, but we feel a bit amused.

(J) Has there been any increase in . . . ? . . . of late? That is, as a result of the current tense situation.

[3] (H) There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war building boom.

(J) What do you mean by enjoying a war building boom?

(H) Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians and plumbers. Students at the High School and University have quit school and are working on these jobs, regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work.

(J) Are there many big factories there?

(H) No, there are no factories, but a lot of small buildings of various kinds are being constructed.

(J) Is that so?

(H) It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year.

(J) How large is the population?

(H) The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy personnel and workers from the mainland.

(J) What is the population?

(H) About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people.

(J) What about night time?

(H) There seem to be precautionary measures taken.

(J) What about searchlights?

(H) Well, not much to talk about.

[4] (J) Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night?

(H) No.

(J) What about the Honolulu newspapers?

(H) The comments by the papers are pretty bad. They are opposite to the atmosphere pervading the city. I don't know whether the newspaper is supposed to lead the community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to Japan daily. The main articles concern the US-Japanese conferences.

(J) What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii?

(H) A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and he was very adept at answering queries of the press.

(J) Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate Hawaii?

(H) There are almost none wishing to do that.

(J) What is the climate there now?

(H) These last few days have been very cold with occasional rainfall, a phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly, a very unusual climate.

(J) Is that so?

(H) Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian ambassador to the United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he enplaned for the mainland today. He made no statements on any problems.

(J) Did he make any statements concerning the US-Japan question?

[5] (H) No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US-Japan question, he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war. It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement.

(J) Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu.

(H) Yes.

(J) What kind of impression did Litvinoff make?

(H) A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and a gentleman.

(J) Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?

(H) Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian overnight. He has already enplaned for the mainland.

(J) Do you know anything about the United States fleet?

(H) No, I don't know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet. At any rate, the fleet here seems small. I don't all of the fleet has done this, but it seems that the fleet has left here.

(J) Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?

(H) Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. However, the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now.

*(J) Does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know.

(J) Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods?

[6] (H) Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japanese soy, and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are enough foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year, at any rate it is a big inconvenience.

(J) What do you lack most?

(H) I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the freeze order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods are having a hard time.

(J) Thanks very much.

(H) By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a standstill due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese sake here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland.

*(H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called "Takara-Masamune", that a person named Takagishi was the technical expert in charge of the brewing; that said Takagishi is a son-in-law of Grand Chamberlain Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter; and that said Takagishi returned recently to Japan on the Talyo Maru. He adds that Japanese here and the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J) that Japanese chrysanthemums are in full bloom here, and that there are no herring-roe for this year's New Year celebration.

(J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according to last surveys made?

[7] (H) About fifty thousand.

(J) How about the second generation Japanese?

(H) About 120,000 or 130,000.

(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the United States Army?

(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About 1,500 have entered the army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are Japanese.

(J) Any first generation Japanese in the army?

(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese.

(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?

(H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be inducted in January.

(J) Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use.

(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.

(H) Wait a moment please?

(J) Off phone.

1870 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

EXHIBIT NO. 85

PH(3)

SECRET

Cp-16-F-2

November 4, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Japanese Fleet Locations.

(Note: See Cp-16-F-2 CNI Serial #54-41, dated October 30, 1941 for the new organization of the Japanese Fleet).

FLEETS First Fleet

BB - NAGATO
BB - MITSU
BB - YAMASHIRO
BB - FUJIO
BB - ISE
BB - HYUGA
BB - MIYET
BB - KONGO
BB - KIRISHIMA
BB - HARUNA

10 BB
4 CA
2 CL
27 DD

Second Fleet

12 CA
1 CA
2 CL
28 DD

Third Fleet

1 CL
4 CM
12 AM
12 PC
1 CL
12 DD
1 AS
6 SS
2 CM
6 IFC
46 AP or AK

LOCATIONS

In Kure-Saeki area (1)
In Kure-Saeki area (1)
" " " "
At Yokosuka
In Kure-Saeki area (1)
" " " "
" " " "
" " " "
At Maizuru
In Kure-Saeki area (1)
Undergoing repairs (2)
In Kure Saeki area (3)
" " " " "
" " " " "
In Kure-Saeki area (8)
In Kure-Saeki area (8)
In Yokosuka (4)
In Kure-Saeki area (3)
" " " " "
Near Maizuru or Sasebo
Near Maizuru
" "
" "
" "
Near Sasebo
" "
" "
" "
" "
" "
" "

66 (4 pt.)

10

Fourth Fleet

| | LOCATION |
|---------------|---------------------|
| 4 CL | Mandated Islands |
| 8 DD | In Truk-Jonape area |
| 1 AS | " " " " |
| 3 SS | " " " " |
| 8 XPG | " " " " |
| 8 AP or AK | " " " " |
| 2 CM | Near Saipan |
| 1 DD | " " |
| 3 XPG | " " |
| 11 AP or AK | " " |
| 4 SS | " Palao |
| 4 XPG | " " |
| 17 AP or AK | " " |
| 1 Survey Ship | " Jaluit |
| 1 AS | " " |
| 4 IAM | " " |
| 3 PC | " " |
| 1 AP or AK | " " |
| 1 CM | In home waters |
| 7 SS | Near Sasebo |
| 2 SS | Near Maizuru |

Fifth Fleet

1 CL Maizuru (6)
(The composition of the Fifth Fleet is still unknown)

Sixth Fleet

| | In Home waters |
|-------|----------------|
| 4 CL | " " " |
| 2 AS | " " " |
| 1 AP | " " " |
| 42 SS | " " " |

Carrier Fleet

CV - AKAGI
CV - KAGA
CV - SORYU
CV - HIRYU
CV - HOSHO
CV - KORYU
CV - KASUGA
CV - RYUJO
CV - ZUIKAKU
CV - SHOKAKU

S. Kyushu - Takao

S. Kyushu
" (7)
" (2)
" (7)

Takao area

| | |
|-------|-----------|
| 4 DD | " " |
| 11 DD | S. Kyushu |

()

SECRET

NOTES:

- (1) The Combined Fleet has been located somewhat more exactly than before, in the Kure-Saeki area. This includes the western portion of the Inland Sea, between the western parts of Honshu and Shikoku, and the northern part of Kyushu.
- (2) Earlier in the year, the HARUNA was reported undergoing major repairs. Since the HARUNA has not been specifically mentioned among the active battleships for some time, it is believed that the ship is still undergoing repairs.
- (3) It is believed that the various cruisers and destroyers in the Combined Fleet, which were formerly divided between Yokosuka, Kure and Sasebo, have now rejoined the main body of the Fleet in the Kure-Saeki area.
- (4) The TAKAO (CA) is in dry-dock at Yokosuka.
- (5) The Fifth Fleet has its flag in a light cruiser at Maizuru, but nothing else is known about the force as yet. It is possibly the nucleus of a Japan Sea Fleet.
- (6) No new information concerning the location of individual submarines is at hand, so that the detailed survey given last week no longer holds good. However, certain units of the submarine fleet have been active in the Chichijima-Marcus-Saipan area, south and southeast of Honshu.
- (7) The SATA has moved from Canton to Takao.
- (8) The SHIRETOKO, previously reported in Jaluit, has moved near Yap.
- (9) The detached torpedo boats and mine sweepers in the South China Fleet are believed to have rejoined the main force in the Hongkong area.

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Op-38W - Copy No. 4
Op-16-F - Copy No. 5

1874 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Cp-16-F-2

November 10, 1941

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Japanese Fleet Locations

| <u>FLEETS</u> | <u>LOCATIONS</u> |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| <u>First Fleet</u> | In Kure-Saeki area |
| BB - NAGATO | In Kure-Saeki area |
| BB - MITSU | " " " " |
| BB - YAMAHIRO | A* Yokosuka |
| BB - FUSO | In Kure-Saeki area |
| BB - ISE | " " " " |
| BB - MYUGA | " " " " |
| BB - MIYEI | " " " " |
| BB - KONGO | At Maizuru |
| BB - KIRISHIMA | In Kure-Saeki area |
| BB --HARUNA | Undergoing repairs |
| 10 BB | |
| 4 CA | In Kure-Saeki area |
| 2 CL | " " " " |
| 27 DD | " " " " |
| <u>Second Fleet</u> | In Kure-Saeki area |
| 12 CA | In Kure-Saeki area |
| 1 CA | In Yokosuka |
| 2 CI | In Kure-Saeki area |
| 29 DD | " " " " |
| <u>Third Fleet</u> | Near Maizuru or Sasebo |
| 1 CL | Near Maizuru |
| 4 CM | " " |
| 12 AM | " " |
| 12 PC | " " |
| 1 CL | Near Sasebo |
| 12 DD | " " |
| 1 AS | " " |
| 6 SS | " " |
| 2 CM | " " |
| 6 XFG | " " |
| 46 AF or AK | " " |

47 (4)

5D

SECRET

FLEETS
Fourth Fleet

LOCATION
Mandated Islands

| | |
|---------------|---------------------|
| 4 CL | In Truk-Ponape area |
| 8 DD | " " " " |
| 1 AS | " " " " |
| 3 SS | " " " " |
| 6 XPG | " " " " |
| 8 AP or AK | " " " " |
| 2 CM | Near Saipan |
| 1 DD | " " |
| 3 XPG | " " |
| 11 AP or AK | " " |
| 4 SS | " Palao |
| 4 XPG | " " |
| 17 AP or AK | " " |
| 1 Survey Ship | Jaluit |
| 1 AS | " " |
| 4 XAM | " " |
| 3 PC | " " |
| 1 AP or AK | " " |
| 1 CM | In Home Waters |
| 7 SS | Near Saesebo |
| 2 SS | Near Maizuru |

Fifth Fleet

1 CL Maizuru
(The composition of the Fifth Fleet is still unknown)

Sixth Fleet

| | |
|-------|----------------|
| 4 CL | In Home Waters |
| 2 AS | " " " |
| 1 AP | " " " |
| 42 SS | " " " |

Carrier Fleet

CV - ANAGI
CV - KAGA
CV - SCRYU
CV - HIRYU
CV - HOSHO
CV - KORYU
CV - KASUGA
CV - RYUJO
CV - ZUIKANU
CV - SHOKAKU

S. Kyushu - Takao

S. Kyushu

"
"
"
"
"

Takao area
Kure-Sasebo area (1)
Takao area (?)

| | |
|-------|-----------|
| 4 DD | " " |
| 11 DD | S. Kyushu |

SECRETFLEETS
Combined Air Force4 AV
1 AV
2 IAV
1 IAVLOCATIONSKure-Saeki area
Sasebo-Kure area (1)
Sasebo-Kure area (2)
Saigon-Cochinchina Bay area (3)Combined Fleet Train4 AO
2 AO
1 AO
1 AO
1 AC
1 AP
2 AR
1 Ice Breaker
1 Target ShipScattered
In Kure-Saeki area
Mitsuru
Takao
Near Yap
" "
Kure-Saeki area
" "
Saghalien
Kure-Saeki areaJapanese Naval Forces in China.1 OCA
1 PC
3 DDLeft Chefoo October 3rd.
Shanghai
"Central China or 1st Expeditionary Fleet4 PC
10 PR
1 APBetween Wuhu and Ichang
" " " "
" " " "South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet1 CA
1 CA
4 TB
1 PC
2 AM
13 Misc.Sasebo
Canton-Hongkong area
" " "
" " "
" " "
" " "North China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet1 OCA
1 DD
8 TB
1 APTsingtao
"
"
"Southern Expeditionary Fleet1 CL
1 CMFrench Indo-China coast
" " " "**SECRET**

SECRET

SECRET

NOTES:

The fleets have remained in the same operating areas as previously reported. Several minor changes in the position of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders have been observed:

- (1) The ZUIKAKU (CV) and the NOTORC (AV) have moved from the Formosan straits to the Dura-Sasebo area.
- (2) Two auxiliary seaplane tenders are now in the Sasebo-Kure area. One of these was formerly in the Gulf of Tongking.
- (3) The KENJO MARU (XAV) has moved south from Takao to the Saigon-Camranh Bay area.

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Op-38W - Copy No. 4
Op-16-F - Copy No. 5

NOTES:

- (1) The CHOKAI (CA) is in Yokosuka. The TAKAO is still in drydock at Yokosuka.
- (2) The NAKA (CL), Flagship of Desron 4, is at Yokosuka. The destroyers in Desron 4 are still in the Kure-Saseki area.
- (3) The NATSRI, Flagship of Desron 5, sailed Amoy November 4th.
- (4) Ten of the 12 destroyers in Desron 5, formerly at Saseki, have been shifted - 3 to Maizuru, and 7 to Okae.
- (5) Three of the 9 destroyers in Desron 6, formerly in the Truk-Fonape area, have moved to Saseki; and 2 to Saipan.
- (6) The flagship of the Fifth Fleet, an unidentified CL, has moved from Maizuru to Yokosuka.
- (7) Many of the units of the 6th Fleet have been located more exactly.
- (8) The RYUJO has returned to Kure from Taiwan.
- (9) The ISUZU (CL), temporary flagship of the 2nd (or South) China Expeditionary Fleet, has moved from Hongkong to Foochow.

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12D

Fourth Fleet

| | LOCATION |
|---------------|---------------------|
| 4 CL | Marshall Islands |
| 3 DD | In Truk-Ponape area |
| 1 AS | " " " " |
| 9 SS | " " " " (9) |
| 8 XFG | " " " " |
| 16 AP or AK | " " " " |
| 2 DD | Near Saipan (9) |
| 1 SS | Near Saipan (9) |
| 1 Survey ship | Near Saipan (9) |
| 3 XFG | " " " " |
| 17 AP or AK | " " " " |
| 4 SS | Palau |
| 4 XFG | " " " " |
| 30 AP or AK | " " " " (9) |
| 1 AS | Jaluit |
| 4 LAM | " " " " |
| 3 PC | " " " " |
| 13 AP or AK | " " " " |
| 1 CM | In Yokosuka |
| 3 DD | Near Saasebo (8) |
| 1 SS | At Misura (9) |
| 1 SS | At Kure (9) |

Fifth Fleet

1 CL Chichi-jima (10)

(The composition of the Fifth Fleet is still unknown)

Sixth Fleet

| | |
|-------|----------------------------------|
| 2 CL | Near Kure |
| 2 CL | " Saasebo |
| 1 AS | " Kure |
| 1 AS | Saasebo |
| 1 AP | Yokosuka |
| 7 SS | Yokosuka |
| 12 SS | Kure |
| 23 SS | In Saasebo and other Home waters |

Carrier Fleet

CV - ARAGI
CV - KAGA
CV - SORYU
CV - KIRYU
CV - HOSHO
CV - KORYU
CV - KASUGA
CV - MYUJO
CV - ZUIKAKU
CV - SHOKAKU

S. Ryushu
" "
Kure (11)
" (11)
" (11)
S. Ryushu
" "
Kure
Kure
Kure (11)
S. Ryushu and Kure
Yokosuka (11)

10 DD
5 DD

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1884 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SECRET

| <u>FLEETS</u> | <u>LOCATIONS</u> |
|---|-------------------------|
| <u>Combined Air Force</u> | |
| 4 AV | Near Kure |
| 1 AV | Truk (12) |
| 2 XAV | Near Sasebo |
| 1 XAV | Saigon-Camrath Bay Area |
| <u>Combined Fleet Train</u> | |
| 2 AO | Near Yokosuka (13) |
| 2 AO | Near Kure |
| 1 AO | Near Sasebo (13) |
| 1 AO | Near Maizuru |
| 1 AO | Near Saipan |
| 1 AO | Near Yap |
| 1 AC | Near Saipan (13) |
| 1 AP | Near Yokosuka (13) |
| 2 AR | Near Kure |
| 1 Ice Breaker- | Saghalien |
| 1 Target Ship | Sasebo |
| <u>Japanese Naval Forces in China</u> | |
| 1 OCA | Shanghai (14) |
| 1 PG | Shanghai |
| 3 DD | " |
| 7 AK or AP | (15) |
| <u>Central China or 1st Expeditionary Fleet</u> | |
| 4 PG | Between Wuhu and Ichang |
| 10 PR | " " " " |
| 1 AP or AK | " " " " |
| <u>South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet</u> | |
| 1 CA | Sasebo |
| 1 CL | Foochow |
| 4 TB | Canton-Hongkong area |
| 1 PG | " " " |
| 2 AM | " " " |
| 13 Misc. | " " " |
| About 30 Ap or AK | South China coast (15) |
| <u>North China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet</u> | |
| 1 OCA | Tsingtao |
| 1 DD | " |
| 1 TB | " |
| 1 AP | Tsingtao |
| <u>Southern Expeditionary Fleet</u> | |
| 1 CL | French Indo-China coast |
| 1 CM | " " " |

SECRET

- (1) The Kure area includes the whole Inland Sea area, together with the Sasebo area, which controls the straits between Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku.
- (2) The MIYEI (BB) has moved to Sasebo from the Kure area.
- (3) The HARUNA (BB), formerly undergoing repairs at Sasebo, has rejoined the fleet as flagship of Batdiv 3.
- (4) The FURUTAKA (CA) is at Sasebo, separated from the other CA of the division which are near Kure.
- (5) The TAKAO (CA) has left the drydock at Yokosuka, and rejoined 2nd Fleet units near Kure.
- (6) The SUZUYA (CA) shifted from the Kure to the Sasebo area.
- (7) The 13 of the 28 destroyers in the 2nd Fleet have been reported near Yokosuka. The other 15 are still near Kure.
- (8) The Third Fleet has reduced the number of its units near Maizuru, and increased the number in the Formosan Straits. The NATSRI, which sailed from Amoy on Nov. 4th, is now at anchor in Bias Bay.
- (9) The Fourth Fleet has been augmented by the addition of 8 divisions of ex-merchantment (about 32 ships). Increased activity has been noticed among other units of the Fourth Fleet, but except for the shift of 6 submarines to Truk, the total number of fighting ships in the Mandates has not been increased.
- (10) The Fifth Fleet has moved from Yokosuka to Chichijima, with certain portions possibly near Marcus Island.
- (11) The aircraft carriers SORYU, HIRYU, and HOSHO have moved from South Kyushu to the Kure area. The SHOKAKU has moved from Takao to Kure. The plane guard destroyers have shifted slightly.
- (12) The KAMOI (AV) is near Truk.
- (13) The Combined Fleet Train has made a number of minor shifts.
- (14) The IZUMO is assumed to be in Shanghai.
- (15) Ten transports left Shanghai between the 14th and 17th, with troops, supplies and landing boats; seven transports are still there. In addition, 17 transports, southbound, were sighted between Hongkong and Shanghai between the 10th and 14th. Over the week end, 18 transports sailed up the Pearl River, and 12 downstream.

Distribution:

- CNO - Copy No. 1
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- Op-12-Copy No. 3
- Op-32W - Copy No. 4
- Op-16-F - Copy No. 5

SECRET

1888 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SECRET

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

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|-----------|--------------------|------------|--------------|--------|
| Reference | [REDACTED] | | | |
| Source | Radio Intelligence | Evaluation | Rating "A" | |
| Subject | Japan | New | Organisation | Fleets |

Cruidiv 7
Airon 6
Defense Div 1
Desron 3
Subron 6

Cruidiv 5
Cardiv 3
RYJJO and 1 Merchantman
Desrons 2 and 4
Subron 5
Desdiv 23
1st Base Force of 3rd Fleet
3rd " " at Palau
5th " " at Saipan
Miscellaneous unidentified units

The status of those units of the 3rd Fleet not mentioned above, including Desron 5, is doubtful but it may be assumed that they will take station in the Straits of Formosa or further south.

There are slight indications today that Desron 3, Grudiv 7 and Subron 6 are in Tokao area.

Distribution By Originator

[illegible]

205

Combined Air Force units from the Japanese Empire are located at Pakhoi, Moihow, Saigon, Takao and other bases in Formosa and the China Coast. (Pakhoi is on the China Coast in the Gulf of Tonking, Moihow is the principal port in northern Hainan, Saigon is in southern French Indo-China, Takao is on the southwestern coast of Formosa). There is no confirmation of the presence of carriers and a submarine force in the Mandates.

Our best indications are that all known 1st and 2nd Fleet carriers are still in the Sasebo-Kure area, and that the CinC Combined Fleet is in the MAGATO, CinC 1st Fleet in the MYUGA, and CinC 2nd Fleet in the ATAGO in the Kure area, the CinC 3rd Fleet in the ASHIGARA in the Sasebo area, CinC 5th in the Bonin Islands area, Commander Submarine Force in the KASHIMA in the Yokosuka area although this last is believed unreliable.

The South China Fleet seems to have been strengthened by units from Central or North China, probably torpedo boats.

The Southern Expeditionary Fleet is apparently being reinforced by one Base Force unit.

Directives to this task force, if it is such, are directed to individual units and not to complete groups. Special calls usually precede the formation of task forces used in area operations.

The CinC 2nd, 3rd and Southern Expeditionary Fleet appear to have major roles.

Traffic from the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff to the CinCs of all fleets appears normal.

The evaluation of the above is considered reliable.

Comment

The forces enumerated in this report are summarized as follows:

TASK FORCE

Task Group #1 — *South China Sea*
 Crudiv 7 — 4 CA
 Airron 6 — 3 IAV
 Defense Div 1—Miscellaneous small craft
 Desron 3 — 1 CL, 15 DD
 Subron 6 — 1 CL, 6 SS
 Crudiv 6 — 4 CA (possible)

Task Group #2 — *Mandarin Sea*
 Crudiv 5 — 3 CA
 Cardiv 3 — 2 CV, 4 DD
 — 1 CV, 1 IAV or IAV
 Desrons 2 & 4 — 2 CL, 24 DD
 Subron 5 — 1 CL, 6 SS
 Desdiv 23 — 4 DD
 1st Base Force — 3 CM, 12 AM, 12 PC, one ex-merchantman
 3rd " — 4 SS, 4 IFO, 6 ex-merchantman
 5th " — 2 CM, 3 IFO, miscellaneous small craft.
 Batdiv 3 — 4 BB (possible)

SUMMARY OF TYPES IN TASK FORCE

4 BB (possible only)
 3 CV
 11 CA
 5 CL
 47 DD
 16 SS
 5 CM
 4 IAV
 12 AM
 12 PC
 7 XPO
 7 ex-merchantmen
 Miscellaneous small craft.

Although there are variations in the strengths estimated by Com 14 and Com 16 the principal confliction of opinion seems to be in the actual locations of carriers. In general Com 16's estimate appears to place units of the task force in not as advanced position as did Com 14.

The fact that CinC, 2nd Fleet remains in home waters and the composition and reported locations of the task groups indicate individual assignments rather than concerted operations, at least for the present.

This report transmitted on November 26th by Com 16 was addressed for action to Opnav, CinCPac, Com 14, CinC AF.

Forwarded by W. M. M. M.
 24. Com. In. C. T. H.

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS -2 0019
NAVY DEPARTMENT

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial # 70 Message and Index Cards No. 997-100
From Op-16-F-2, ONI, at Washington, D.C. Date November 29, 1941
Reference Op-16-F-2 Serial # 66 of November 27, 1941
Source Radio Intelligence Evaluation Rating "A"
Subject Japan Navy Operations

The following has been submitted by the 16th Naval District
Communication Intelligence Unit:

The following encrypted addresses have been noted in the past
two days traffic:

| | |
|---|--|
| "Commander First Patrol Force" | Headquarters apparently in
Yokosuka or Palao. |
| "Fifth Air Battalion" | At Takao |
| "French Indo-China Milling
Detachment" | In Saigon Area. |
| "Third Fleet Headquarters" | Previously at Yokosuka. |
| "Commander Airborne Troops" | Location undetermined. |

Commander-in-Chief THIRD Fleet shifted flag from the ASHIMARU (CA)
to the NAGARA (CL); Commander-in-Chief Southern Expeditionary Fleet shifted
flag from the KASRII (CL) to a unit tentatively identified as the SUKAI (CA).

New arrivals in the Takao Area that may be placed in Task Group # 1
of the Task Force mentioned in reference reports: Destroyer Squadron FOUR, Air
Squadron SEVEN, and one command that appears to be a Submarine Squadron.
The HIMEI (BB) and KOWAO (BB) now appear definitely associated with these
units in First Section but no movement noted by them.

The Commander-in-Chief SECOND Fleet indicates he will shift commu-
nications from the Kure Communication Zone at 0000, 1st; from the Basebo
Communication Zone at 0000, 1st; and enter the Takao Communication Zone at
0000, 2nd, thus implying a move from Japan proper to the South.

Comments:

Since the Cinc, 2nd Fleet is the Commander of Task Force moving south-
ward his movements as given in the last paragraph are of the greatest im-
portance. There is no known definite delimitation of the Communication Zones
mentioned.

Desron 4, consisting of 1 CL and 10 DD was in 2nd Fleet. Desron 7 con-
sists of three (3) modern new AV. It is a unit of the Combined Air Force
previously operating with the 1st Fleet.

HIMEI (BB) and KOWAO (BB) are in Pacific 3 which in the reference re-
port were given as possibly a part of Task Group # 2. This has not been

For Section 2, 0000, 1st

to 0000, 2nd.

1894 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

changed to Task Group # 1 indicating movement to waters off S.E.
Asia rather than the Mandates.

Forwarded by A.H. McCollum,
Comdr., SS.

25D

SECRET

Op-16-F-2

December 1, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Japanese Fleet Locations.

FLEETS
First Fleet

BB - NAGATO
BB - MITSU
BB - YAMASHIRO
BB - FUSO
BB - ISE
BB - HYUGA
BB - HIYEI
BB - KONGO
BB - KIRISHIMA
BB - HARUNA

LOCATIONS
Home Waters

Near Kure
" "
At Yokosuka
Near Kure
" "
" "
Near Sasebo
Near Maizuru
Near Kure
" "

10 BB
3 CA
1 CA
1 CL
1 CL
27 DD
Near Kure
Near Sasebo
Near Kure (1)
Near Sasebo (1)
Near Kure

Second Fleet

10 CA
2 CA
1 CA
1 CL
1 CL
4 DD
12 DD
In Home Waters
Near Kure (2)
Near Sasebo (2)
Off Cam Ranh Bay (3)
Near Kure
Near Bako (4)
Near Yokosuka (4)
Near Kure (4)

Third Fleet

1 CL
5 CM
12 AM
12 PC
4 DD
1 AS
6 SS
6 XFG
46 AP or AK
1 CL
1 CM
1 DD
Sasebo and Bako area
Near Sasebo
" "
" "
" "
" "
" "
" "
" "
" "
Bias Bay
Near Bako
Near Maizuru

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260 SECRET

1896 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Second Fleet

| | |
|---------------|---------------------|
| 4 CL | Mandated Islands |
| 1 DD | In Truk-Ponape area |
| 1 AS | " " " " |
| 4 SS | " " " " |
| 2 XCG | " " " " |
| 16 AF or AK | " " " " |
| 2 DD | Near Saipan |
| 1 SS | " " " |
| 1 Survey Ship | " " " |
| 3 XPG | " " " |
| 17 AF or AK | " " " |
| 4 SS | " Palao |
| 4 XPG | " " " |
| 30 AF or AK | " " " |
| 1 AS | " Jaluit |
| 4 XAW | " " " |
| 3 PC | " " " |
| 13 AF or AK | " " " |
| 1 CM | In Yokosuka |
| 3 DD | Near Sasebo |
| 1 SS | At Maizuru |
| 1 SS | At Kure |

Fifth Fleet

1 CL Chichiima
(The composition of the Fifth Fleet is still unknown)

Sixth Fleet

| | |
|------------|---------------------------------|
| 2 CL | Near Kure |
| 2 CL | Near Sasebo |
| 1 AS | Near Kure |
| 1 AS | Sasebo |
| 1 AF (XAG) | Kobe (5) |
| 4 SS | Kobe (5) |
| 5 SS | Yokosuka (5) |
| 12 SS | Kure |
| 21 SS | In Sasebo and other Home waters |

Carrier Fleet

| | |
|--------------|------------------|
| CV - AKAGI | S. Kure |
| CV - KAGA | " " |
| CV - SOFYU | Kure |
| CV - HIRYU | " " |
| CV - HOSHIO | " " |
| CV - KOFU | S. Kure |
| CV - KATAGA | " " |
| CV - HIRYU | Kure |
| CV - ZUIKAKU | " " |
| CV - SHOKAKU | " " |
| 10 DD | S. Kure and Kure |
| | Yokosuka |

SECRET

FLEETS
Combined Air Force

3 AV
1 AV
1 AV
2 XAV
1 XAV

LOCATIONS

Near Bako (6)
Near Kure (6)
Truk
Near Sasebo
Saigon-Camrinh Bay area

Combined Fleet Train

2 AO
2 AO
1 AO
1 AO
1 AO
1 AO
1 AO
1 AF
2 AR
1 Ice Breaker
1 Target Ship

Near Yokosuka
Near Kure
Near Sasebo
Near Maizuru
Near Saipan
Near Yap
Near Saipan
Near Yokosuka
Near Kure
Saghalien
Sasebo

Japanese Naval Forces in China

1 OCA
1 FG
3 DD
7 AR or AF

Quanghai
Quanghai
.
.

Central China or 1st Expeditionary Fleet

1 FG
10 FR
1 AF or AR

Between Kure and Iwakuni
.
.
.

South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet

1 OCA
1 CL
1 TB
1 FG
1 AR
10 Misc.
1 AF or AR

Shanghai
Fuzhou
Shanghai-Tientsin area
.
.
.
South China coast

North China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet

1 OCA
1 CL
1 TB
1 FG
1 AF

Tientsin
.
.
.
Shanghai-Tientsin area (7)
Tientsin

Southern Expeditionary Fleet

1 CL
1 CL

Between Kure-Saigo coast
.
.

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-5-

28D

1898 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SECRET

NOTES:

- (1) (CL) SENDAI moved from Kure to Sasebo
- (2) The ATAGO (CA), Flagship of the 2nd Fleet, has moved from Kure to Sasebo. Further southward movements are expected.
- (3) The CHOKAI (CA) has probably become flagship of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, off Indo-China.
- (4) Squadron 4, consisting of the NAKA (CL) and 12 DD have moved to Bako
- (5) The NAGAYA MARU and the 4 Minesweeping AS of Subron 6 (I-121 - 124) are now near Bako.
- (6) Squadron 7 has moved from Kure to Bako.
- (7) At least one division of Torpedo Boats have moved to South China.

Distribution:

- CNO - Copy No. 1
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- Op-32W - Copy No. 3
- Op-16-F - Copy No. 4

SECRET

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290

F-2 0020

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
NAVY DEPARTMENT

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial # 71 Monograph Index Guide No. 907-100
(Print new serials only, from 1 to 10, 000) (To correspond with MONOGRAPH guide, when used in U. S. Index Guide)
From Op-16-2, ONI at Washington, DC Date Dec. 1, 1941
(Ship, boat, aircraft, office, station, or person)

Reference (Inserting, appropriate, previous report, etc. if applicable)

Source Radio Intelligence Evaluation Rating "A"
(Is official, personal observation, published or unpublished with authority, or from publication, etc.)

Subject Japan Navy Operations
(What is the report on?) (What title is the report on?) (What is the report on?)

Notes:—Give more careful summary of report, attaching enclosures suitably stated, include in pertinent data, names, places, dates, etc.)

The following has been submitted by the 16th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit:

The following arrived in Takao during the past two days:

Commander Destroyer Squadron FIVE in MOTOH
MAKA to join Destroyer Squadron FOUR
Unidentified units of Number Two Base Force
CHOGKI which is considered to be tender for two
divisions of submarines.

All of the above units are now under the command of Commander-in-Chief, THIRD Fleet.

Commander-in-Chief SECOND Fleet in ATAGO shifted from Kure to Sasebo Communication Zone, apparently enroute South China waters.

All ORANGE service radio calls for units afloat were changed at 0000, 1 December 1941.

CINCPAC, CINCPAC and COM FOURTEEN have received the above information.

Comments

The movements reported above are still of small units. All of Desrons 4 and 5 are now given as located at Takao. Subdivs 9 and 13 have already been reported at Takao.

Although the CINC, 2nd Fleet is in command of the entire task force, the organization of the subordinate commanders has not yet been clarified. Apparently CINC 3rd Fleet commands a major subdivision.

Forwarded by W. H. H. H.
Commander, U.S.N.

Distribution by Originator

| 1-5-C-D-I-I-I-2 | | | | | | | | | |
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| 62 | 62 | 62 | 62 | 62 | 62 | 62 | 62 | 62 | 62 |
| 63 | 63 | 63 | 63 | 63 | 63 | 63 | 63 | 63 | 63 |
| 64 | 64 | 64 | 64 | 64 | 64 | 64 | 64 | 64 | 64 |
| 65 | 65 | 65 | 65 | 65 | 65 | 65 | 65 | 65 | 65 |
| 66 | 66 | 66 | 66 | 66 | 66 | 66 | 66 | 66 | 66 |
| 67 | 67 | 67 | 67 | 67 | 67 | 67 | 67 | 67 | 67 |
| 68 | 68 | 68 | 68 | 68 | 68 | 68 | 68 | 68 | 68 |
| 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 |
| 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 |
| 71 | 71 | 71 | 71 | 71 | 71 | 71 | 71 | 71 | 71 |
| 72 | 72 | 72 | 72 | 72 | 72 | 72 | 72 | 72 | 72 |
| 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 |
| 74 | 74 | 74 | 74 | 74 | 74 | 74 | 74 | 74 | 74 |
| 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 |
| 76 | 76 | 76 | 76 | 76 | 76 | 76 | 76 | 76 | 76 |
| 77 | 77 | 77 | 77 | 77 | 77 | 77 | 77 | 77 | 77 |
| 78 | 78 | 78 | 78 | 78 | 78 | 78 | 78 | 78 | 78 |
| 79 | 79 | 79 | 79 | 79 | 79 | 79 | 79 | 79 | 79 |
| 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 |
| 81 | 81 | 81 | 81 | 81 | 81 | 81 | 81 | 81 | 81 |
| 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 |
| 83 | 83 | 83 | 83 | 83 | 83 | 83 | 83 | 83 | 83 |
| 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 |
| 85 | 85 | 85 | 85 | 85 | 85 | 85 | 85 | 85 | 85 |
| 86 | 86 | 86 | 86 | 86 | 86 | 86 | 86 | 86 | 86 |
| 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 |
| 88 | 88 | 88 | 88 | 88 | 88 | 88 | 88 | 88 | 88 |
| 89 | 89 | 89 | 89 | 89 | 89 | 89 | 89 | 89 | 89 |
| 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 |
| 91 | 91 | 91 | 91 | 91 | 91 | 91 | 91 | 91 | 91 |
| 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 |
| 93 | 93 | 93 | 93 | 93 | 93 | 93 | 93 | 93 | 93 |
| 94 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 94 |
| 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 95 |
| 96 | 96 | 96 | 96 | 96 | 96 | 96 | 96 | 96 | 96 |
| 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 |
| 98 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 98 |
| 99 | 99 | 99 | 99 | 99 | 99 | 99 | 99 | 99 | 99 |
| 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

300

1900 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Copy No. 1

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
NAVY DEPARTMENT

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial # 73-41 Message No. 927-100
From Op-10-P-2, CNI Washington, DC Date December 3, 1941
Reference
Source Radio Intelligence Evaluation RATING "A"
Subject Japan Navy Operations

The following has been submitted by the 10th Naval District
Communication Intelligence Unit:

Commanders-in-Chief, SECOND and THIRD Fleet plus Commander
Southern Expeditionary Force are in the Tokyo Area.

Broadcasts to fleet units are now being sent by Tokyo or
Tokyo Radio in addition to Tokyo Radio.

The Japanese Ambassador at Honolulu on the 30th requested permission
to destroy all but a limited number of codes.

SINCAP, SINCAPAC and JMS JOHNSON have received the above informa-
tion.

Comments: The assembling of units in the Tokyo area is beginning to
indicate a concentration in this area.

Forwarded by
Society, U.S.N.

123

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------|---------------|-----------|----------------|------------|--------------|------------|-----------|------------|----------|------------|-----------|------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Mr. Tolson | Mr. E.A. Tamm | Mr. Clegg | Mr. Glavin | Mr. Ladd | Mr. Nichols | Mr. Rosen | Mr. Tracy | Mr. Carson | Mr. Egan | Mr. Gurnea | Mr. Harbo | Mr. Hendon | Mr. Jones | Mr. Mumford | Mr. Quinn | Mr. Nease | Mr. Gandy |
| Mr. Boardman | Mr. Belmont | Mr. Mohr | Mr. Winterrowd | Tele. Room | Mr. Holloman | Miss Gandy | | | | | | | | | | | |

cc Army Aide
cc War to
cc Navy Pres.

310

EXHIBIT NO. 86

CONFIDENTIAL

NAVAL COMBATANT STRENGTH, ATLANTIC OCEAN, May 1, 1941.

| | AXIS | | | | |
|-------------------|------------|--------|--------------|--------------------------|--------|
| | GERMANY | ITALY | VICHY FRANCE | OTHER
"AUGMENTATIONS" | TOTALS |
| Battleships | 6 (a) | 6 (b) | 5 (c) | - | 17 |
| Aircraft Carriers | - | - | 1 (h) | - | 1 |
| Heavy Cruisers | 4 | 4 (o) | 4 | - | 12 |
| Light Cruisers | 4 | 11 (d) | 9 (i) | 2 (k) | 26 |
| Destroyers | 18 (est.) | 84 (e) | 52 (j) | 9 (l) | 163 |
| Submarines | 150 (est.) | 77 (f) | 58 | 9 (m) | 294 |

- (a) Includes 2 overage battleships, SCHLESIER and SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.
- (b) Includes damaged DUILIO and CAVALIER, heavily damaged, resting on bottom.
- (c) Includes damaged BOLZANO.
- (d) Includes 6 ineffective light cruisers.
- (e) Includes 2 ineffective destroyers.
- (f) Includes 8 ineffective submarines.
- (g) Includes 4 damaged or incomplete battleships.
- (h) Interned in Martinique.
- (i) Includes 2 interned in Martinique.
- (j) Includes 4 damaged or incomplete destroyers.
- (k) Includes Yugoslavian DALMACIA and Dutch GELDERLAND.
- (l) Includes 3 Yugoslavian, 1 Greek, and 5 Norwegian destroyers.
- (m) Includes 3 Yugoslavian, 5 Dutch submarines.

1902 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONFIDENTIAL

NAVAL COMBATANT STRENGTH, ATLANTIC OCEAN, May 1, 1941.

| | ALLIED | | | | TOTAL |
|-------------------|---------------|---------------|-------------|---------------------|-------|
| | UNITED STATES | GREAT BRITAIN | FREE FRANCE | OTHER AUGMENTATIONS | |
| Battleships | 8 | 16(a)(b) | 3(g) | - | 27 |
| Aircraft Carriers | 3 | 7(n)(d) | - | - | 10 |
| Heavy Cruisers | 5 | 13(e) | 3(h) | 1(k) | 22 |
| Light Cruisers | 5 | 30(f) | 1(h) | 2(l) | 41 |
| Destroyers | 85 | 191(f) | 12(i) | 11(m) | 299 |
| Submarines | 53 | 65(f) | 8(j) | 15(n) | 141 |

- (a) Includes 3 battle cruisers.
- (b) Includes 6 battleships damaged and under repair.
- (c) Includes 1 escort carrier.
- (d) Includes 1 large carrier damaged and under repair.
- (e) Includes 5 heavy cruisers damaged and under repair.
- (f) Estimated, no accurate figures available at this time.
- (g) Includes 2 base ships and 1 interned at Alexandria.
- (h) Interned at Alexandria.
- (i) Includes 4 incomplete and 8 interned at Alexandria.
- (j) Includes 1 incomplete and 1 interned at Alexandria.
- (k) Includes Greek GEORGIOS AVEROF.
- (l) Includes Dutch HENZLERSZ and SUMATRA.
- (m) Includes 6 Greek, 1 Dutch, 2 Norwegian, and 2 Polish destroyers.
- (n) Includes 5 Greek, 7 Dutch, 1 Norwegian, 1 Polish and 1 Yugoslavian submarine.

CONFIDENTIAL

NAVAL COMBATANT STRENGTH, PACIFIC OCEAN, as of May 1, 1941.

| | <u>AXIS</u> | | |
|-------------------|--------------|---------------------|---------------|
| | <u>JAPAN</u> | <u>VICHY FRANCE</u> | <u>TOTALS</u> |
| Battleships | 10 | - | 10 |
| Aircraft Carriers | 7 | - | 7 |
| Heavy Cruisers | 18 | - | 18 |
| Light Cruisers | 17 | 1 | 18 |
| Destroyers | 100 | - | 100 |
| Submarines | 68 | 2 | 70 |

| | <u>ALLIES</u> | | | |
|-------------------|--------------------------|----------------|--------------|---------------|
| | <u>UNITED STATES</u> | <u>GREAT</u> | <u>DUTCH</u> | <u>TOTALS</u> |
| | <u>Pacific - Asiatic</u> | <u>BRITAIN</u> | | |
| Battleships | 9 | 1 | - | 10 |
| Aircraft Carriers | 3 | 1 | - | 4 |
| Heavy Cruisers | 12 | 4(a) | - | 17 |
| Light Cruisers | 9 | 13(b) | 8 | 27 |
| Destroyers | 67 | 8(b) | 7 | 93 |
| Submarines | 27 | 15(c) | 15 | 70 |

(a) Includes 1 unit damaged and under repair.

(b) Estimated, no accurate figures available.

(c) Number unknown. Not enough data for estimate.

1904 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

NAVAL COMBATANT STRENGTH, ATLANTIC OCEAN, December 7, 1941.

| | UNITED STATES | TOTAL | ALLIES | |
|-------------------|---------------|-------|----------------|-------|
| | | | UNITED KINGDOM | OTHER |
| Battleships | 8(a) | 8(b) | 8(g) | - |
| Aircraft carriers | - | - | 1(h) | - |
| Heavy cruisers | 4 | 4(i) | 4 | - |
| Light cruisers | 4 | 12(j) | 9(k) | 3(l) |
| Destroyers | 20(m) | 77(n) | 33(o) | 9(1) |
| Submarines | 100(p) | 87(r) | 80 | 9(u) |

- (a) Includes 2 German battleships SCHLESWIG and SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.
- (b) Includes 2 German battleships SCHLESWIG and SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.
- (c) Includes 1 British aircraft carrier HMS GLARUE.
- (d) Includes 1 British aircraft carrier HMS GLARUE.
- (e) Includes 1 British aircraft carrier HMS GLARUE.
- (f) Includes 1 British aircraft carrier HMS GLARUE.
- (g) Includes 1 British aircraft carrier HMS GLARUE.
- (h) Includes 1 British aircraft carrier HMS GLARUE.
- (i) Includes 1 British aircraft carrier HMS GLARUE.
- (j) Includes 1 British aircraft carrier HMS GLARUE.
- (k) Includes 1 British aircraft carrier HMS GLARUE.
- (l) Includes 1 British aircraft carrier HMS GLARUE.
- (m) Includes 1 British aircraft carrier HMS GLARUE.
- (n) Includes 1 British aircraft carrier HMS GLARUE.
- (o) Includes 1 British aircraft carrier HMS GLARUE.
- (p) Includes 1 British aircraft carrier HMS GLARUE.
- (q) Includes 1 British aircraft carrier HMS GLARUE.
- (r) Includes 1 British aircraft carrier HMS GLARUE.
- (s) Includes 1 British aircraft carrier HMS GLARUE.
- (t) Includes 1 British aircraft carrier HMS GLARUE.
- (u) Includes 1 British aircraft carrier HMS GLARUE.

CONFIDENTIAL

NAVAL COMBATANT STRENGTH, ATLANTIC OCEAN, December 7, 1941.

| | ALLIED | | | | TOTALS |
|-------------------|---------------|---------------|-------------|---------------------|--------|
| | UNITED STATES | GREAT BRITAIN | FREE FRANCE | OTHER AUGMENTATIONS | |
| Battleships | 8(a) | 12(e)(f) | 3(k) | - | 21 |
| Aircraft Carriers | 4(b)(a) | 8(g)(h) | - | - | 12 |
| Heavy Cruisers | 5 | 12(i) | 3(l) | 1(o) | 21 |
| Light Cruisers | 3(d) | 28(j) | 1(i) | 2(p) | 39 |
| Destroyers | 92 | 225(j) | 11(m) | 11(q) | 339 |
| Submarines | 58 | 80(j) | 8(n) | 15(r) | 161 |

- (a) Does not include NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON both on trials.
 (b) Does not include HORNET on trials.
 (c) Includes LONG ISLAND (Escort Carrier).
 (d) JUNEAU, ATLANTA, SAN DIEGO and SAN JUAN carried on Atlantic Fleet lists but were not completed or commissioned and are not included.
 (e) Includes 1 battle cruiser.
 (f) Includes one damaged battleship under repair.
 (g) Includes 2 Escort Carriers.
 (h) Includes 2 damaged aircraft carriers under repair.
 (i) Includes 5 damaged heavy cruisers under repair.
 (j) Estimated. No accurate figures available.
 (k) Includes 2 base ships and 1 interned at Alexandria.
 (l) Interned at Alexandria.
 (m) Includes 4 incomplete, 3 interned and 1 repairing.
 (n) Includes 1 incomplete and 1 interned at Alexandria.
 (o) Includes Greek GEORGIOS AVEROF.
 (p) Includes Dutch HEBESKERCK and SUMATRA.
 (q) Includes 6 Greek, 1 Dutch, 2 Norwegian, and 2 Polish destroyers.
 (r) Includes 5 Greek, 7 Dutch, 1 Norwegian, 1 Polish, and 1 Yugoslavian submarine.

5

1906 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONFIDENTIAL

NAVAL COMBATANT STRENGTH, PACIFIC OCEAN, as of December 7, 1941.

| | <u>AXIS</u> | | |
|-------------------|--------------|---------------------|---------------|
| | <u>JAPAN</u> | <u>VICHY FRANCE</u> | <u>TOTALS</u> |
| Battleships | 10 | - | 10 |
| Aircraft Carriers | 9 | - | 9 |
| Heavy Cruisers | 18 | - | 18 |
| Light Cruisers | 17 | 1 | 18 |
| Destroyers | 103 | - | 103 |
| Submarines | 74 | 1 | 75 |

| | <u>ALLIES</u> | | <u>GREAT BRITAIN</u> | <u>FREE FRANCE</u> | <u>DUTCH</u> | <u>TOTALS</u> |
|-------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------|---------------|
| | <u>UNITED STATES</u> | <u>Pacific - Asiatic</u> | | | | |
| Battleships | 9 | - | 4(e)(f) | - | - | 13 |
| Aircraft Carriers | 3 | - | 1(g) | - | - | 4 |
| Heavy Cruisers | 12 | 1 | 4 | - | - | 17 |
| Light Cruisers | 10(a) | 1 | 17(h) | - | 3 | 31 |
| Destroyers | 54(b)(c) | 13 | 13(h) | 1 | 7 | 88 |
| Submarines | 25(d) | 28 | - (i) | - | 15 | 68 |

- (a) Includes BOISE which at that time was escorting in Asiatic waters.
 (b) Includes 4 destroyers assigned 14th Naval District.
 (c) Does not include destroyers assigned other West Coast Naval Districts.
 (d) Status of two submarines not clear.
 (e) Includes 1 battle cruiser.
 (f) Includes 1 damaged battleship under repair.
 (g) This aircraft carrier damaged and under repair.
 (h) Estimated, no accurate figures available.
 (i) Number unknown. Not enough data for estimate.

EXHIBIT NO. 87

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Room 4D757
The Pentagon

18 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MITCHELL:

Inclosed is a memorandum prepared by General Strong
on the subject "Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments
on 17 June 1940".

Harmon Duncombe
HARMON DUNCOMBE 15 15
Lt. Col., GSC

Incl.



1908 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

15 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

SUBJECT: Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on 17 June 1940

1. In connection with your testimony before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack you were asked repeatedly for the reasons which prompted you to alert the Panama and Hawaiian Departments on 17 June 1940. As your Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division at that time, I was responsible for advising the action you took, and I feel that it may complete the story (in case it is not self-evident to the Committee from a review of contemporaneous historical events) if I summarize the situation leading to the alert which I recommended and you approved.

2. You will recall that Axis ascendancy in May and early June of 1940 gave us cause for gravest concern. The British had evacuated Dunkirk by 4 June, and on the 17th Petain waited upon the Nazis for surrender terms. Germany had a good chance of acquiring the French fleet intact. Russia appeared to be cooperating with the Axis; on 12 June she moved in on Lithuania; on 16 June she demanded a change of government in Estonia and Latvia. On 10 June Russia and Japan signed a treaty fixing the Manchukuo-Outer Mongolia border, and the inference was that these two had composed their differences with a view to negotiating a neutrality pact. The Japanese navy would then be free for any adventure. Japanese land forces were concentrating in Hainan, Formosa, and Kyushu, apparently for further aggressive action.

3. You may remember a conference held in your office at 0830 on 17 June 1940 at which I was present, along with General Andrews and General Moore. We believed at that time that German control of the French fleet would create a very serious situation in the South Atlantic. Should Great Britain fall, a hostile move toward South America was far from unlikely. Anticipating a desperate need for troops in Brazil and Uruguay, General Andrews and I recommended at this meeting that the National Guard be ordered into Federal Service. That was our frame of mind on 17 June 1940. At the conclusion of the conference you directed us to consider the questions which had been raised.

4. In looking to our own security I apprehended the most immediate threat to be a raid or major sabotage effort which would effectively close the Panama Canal. Evidence of sabotage plans existed; certain specific evidence is mentioned below. In the event of a raid, a diver-

See 20

sionary attack in the Hawaiian area could not be ruled out, since a large part of our fleet was based on Pearl Harbor. Accordingly, on 17 June 1940 I recommended placing these two Departments on an alert status. The documents directly bearing on my decision do not tell the story nearly so well as does a vivid recollection of Axis capabilities and American weakness at that time when the collapse of France was imminent and the fall of Britain by no means impossible. However, I cite and summarize below a few significant papers which reflect those times and give some indication of what was in our minds during those late spring days of 1940.

See 21

See 22

See 23

See 24

See 25

See 26

See 27

See 28

See 29

See 30

a. State Department 793, 94119/640, dated 25 May 1940. Mr. Grew discusses "a flurry of official activity" in Tokyo. Although he sees no reason to expect an attack on the Netherlands East Indies he acknowledges that preparations for such an attack "would presumably be guarded with the utmost secrecy." (This, to our minds, did not exclude, but rather drew our attention to, the possibilities of attack or raids elsewhere.)

See 31

See 32

See 33

See 34

See 35

See 36

See 37

See 38

See 39

See 40

See 41

See 42

b. State Department 711.94/1518, dated 3 June 1940. In surveying the Japanese situation Mr. Grew states in diplomatic terms that "a complacent view of the future would no longer be warranted." He cites the opinion of Japanese militarists that their fleet had nothing to fear from the use of force and expresses his own belief that Japan "may be tempted to resort to desperate courses."

See 43

See 44

See 45

See 46

See 47

See 48

See 49

See 50

See 51

See 52

See 53

See 54

See 55

See 56

See 57

See 58

See 59

See 60

c. State Department 811 F. 812 PROTECTION/165, dated 10 June 1940. The Navy furnishes information obtained by Brazilian sailors from the Japanese crew of ARGENTINA MARU that all Japanese ships have orders to scuttle if in the Panama Canal when the United States "declares mobilization."

See 61

See 62

See 63

See 64

See 65

See 66

See 67

See 68

See 69

See 70

See 71

See 72

See 73

See 74

See 75

See 76

See 77

See 78

See 79

See 80

d. War Department WED 3730-18, undated. Information from a Navy source describes how a German sailor, under influence of liquor, revealed to an American petty officer on 1 May 1940 at Bureka, California, some specific and detailed plans to blow up the Panama Canal if our entry into the war "became imminent."

See 81

See 82

See 83

See 84

See 85

See 86

See 87

See 88

See 89


See 90

e. War Department WED 4326, undated. In an unused draft of a letter prepared for your signature at your request, the Commanding General, Panama Department, was informed that "the background of the instructions (for the alert of 17 June) has doubtless been made clear from matters that have appeared in the public press", and that "the increasing tension and uncertainty in the world situation, as affecting Canal security, emphasized the necessity of a continuous and vigilant alert basis for some time to come." (This letter remained unsent on

1910 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

my recommendation, largely because I considered the reasons for the alert to be obvious, as indeed they were.)

5. I can think of no more conclusive way to summarize the situation as of 17 June 1940 than to point out that the factors which guided my decision to recommend alerting these overseas bases were essentially those which made it necessary for the President of the United States to issue his Proclamation of 27 June 1940 (F. R. Dec. 40-2639), which extended the scope of the national emergency proclaimed 8 September 1939 and gave additional and exceptional authority in regard to safeguarding the Panama Canal.



Incls (w/orig only)
As listed in par 4 above (cys)
F.R.Dec.40-2639 (cy)

GEO. V. STRONG
Major General, USA (Retired)

and the news

way to present
at the time
some have not
much of the
Don. 4-25/1
received 1 Sep
y do report to

7, 2000
General, 10)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED MAY 31 1911

FROM
TO
RECEIVED AT
MAY 31 1911

FAP
A portion of this telegram must be placed in the hands of the public before the communication to any one (3)

Division of
HARBOR INC
MAY 31 1911
A. H. H. H. H.

COPIES OF PARAGRAPH SENT TO G. S. T. AND M. I. D. IN CONSIDERATION

Secretary of State
Washington

375, May 26, 7 p.m. (GRAY)

The following series of events has led to uneasy speculation in foreign circles here:

(One) Yesterday General Poico, Minister of Overseas Affairs, called on the Prime Minister just before the cabinet meeting and is reported in the press as having discussed "a vital issue" and as having made "an important recommendation to the Premier in connection with the settlement of the China affair".

(Two) Last night the spokesman of the Foreign Office delivered the radio address reported in our 375, May 26, 3 a.m.

(Three) This morning the Navy Minister called on the Prime Minister at 9:17. The Prime Minister went to the Emperor at 10 o'clock and after the audience called on Yase, Lord Privy Seal. (END GRAY)

(Four) CONFIDENTIAL. Whatever step if any is proposed by this flurry of official activity there appears to be good reason to believe that it envisages a descent on the Netherlands

783,94119/660

79716 O-46-pt. 15-33

1912 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

PAP - 25 May 22, 7 lines from Tokyo

Netherlands East India, preparations for which would
presumably be guarded with the utmost secrecy. We shall,
however, watch the situation closely and report whatever
significant evidence may emerge from the current writer
or speculation.

ORW

OW

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 378) of May 22, 1940, 7 p.m., from the American Embassy at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

The following series of events has led to undue speculation in foreign circles in Tokyo:

On May 21 General Reine, Minister of Overseas Affairs, called on the Prime Minister just before the cabinet meeting and is reported in the press as having discussed "a vital issue" and as having made "an important recommendation to the Premier in connection with the settlement of the China affairs".

On the evening of May 22 the spokesman of the Foreign Office delivered the public address reported in Tokyo's press, May 22.

On the morning of May 23 the Army Minister called on the Prime Minister at 11:15. The Prime Minister went to the Hospital at 10 o'clock and after the audience called on him, left Tokyo at 12:30.

In view of this series of events in official circles, particularly on May 22, there seems to be no real ground for thinking that any connection whatsoever exists between the Government and the Japanese, particularly the fact that the Government is in contact with the Japanese.

1914 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

To FE
470
Caracian

FROM
Date
at Jun 1, 1914
Receivd at

at
at
at



711.94/1518

, June 1, 1914.
and
1914.
I have never held the view
that such reversal of Japanese policies could be procured
at the cost of modification of our own policies
in China. I have reported by several telegrams sent during
the last two weeks that there is growing suspicion in
the War Office in East Asia' conceived in terms of
exclusive rights and monopolies in China, which tends to
confirm

Confidential

10-10-47, Jan. 10, noon, (37000-100) from Tokyo.

as far as belief that popular dissatisfaction in the
 country combined with the traditional strength
 of those elements in this country who believe in law
 and order and who realize that Japan's economic well-
 being is unshakable, bound up with economic and therefore
 political cooperation with the United States and the
 British Empire would in the long run be the desired
 reversal of Japanese policies. It seems to me in Europe
 they were during the first six months of
 the war in no (repeated) substantial reason to
 doubt that the movement in the direction desired by us
 would have accelerated. The situation today is that the
 field has been left to the Germans who are in a
 position to succeed with a view to aggravating
 relations between the United States and Japan. A
 complacent view of the future would no longer be warranted.

(END SECTION ONE)

NLP

END

1916 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA
This telegram must be
carefully paraphrased
before being communi-
cated to anyone (C)

TO: G
FROM: Dated June 3, 1940
Received 10:45 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

400, June 3, noon (SECTION TWO)

Two. I venture respectfully to hope that this telegram may have your special attention because I regard its substance and conclusion as of prime importance. My analysis of the situation is as follows.

Three. Japan is at present in a state of political turmoil of unusual intensity. Dominating elements are united in the desire to bring about an early settlement of the hostilities in China but they are radically opposed with regard to the nature of the settlement and the means to bring it about. While these various schools of thought exist in general in clear-cut categories, they enjoy support from considerable elements in the Japanese Government in the army and navy and in the mainlands are respectively receiving attention and are equally characterized in the mainlands.

Four. One school of thought advocates an immediate standing with Soviet Russia for the partition of China on Polish lines. It is reported that Russia's attitude

such

EDA - 2 - #400, June 3, noon from Tokyo

such proposal to Japan last autumn and that Japan turned it down. Informants have told us that Russia has recently renewed the proposal, desiring a free hand to cope with eventualities in Europe, including the Balkans and the possibility of eventually having to fight the Germans for control of the Baku oil fields, and that a Japanese colonel has already arrived in Moscow to negotiate. Informants look for fruition of this scheme by autumn and they maintain that the desire to settle the China conflict is so pressing that even this solution would be welcomed by the Japanese public as a whole. Some supporters of this thesis furthermore advocate seizure of the Netherlands East Indies before a German victory in Europe would give Germany a similar opportunity. They realize that economic reprisals by the United States would have to be faced but they maintain that no country has ever been destroyed by embargoes and that Japan would find a way out. They discount the possibility of war with the United States and believe that in any case the Japanese fleet has nothing to fear from the use of force. This faction, which expects to bring about the overthrow of the present Japanese Cabinet before autumn, is made up largely of members of the reactionary societies and younger officers in the army and is

supported

1918 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FILE - #100, Date, 10/10/1918, 10/10/1918

On the morning of December 7, 1941, the United States Navy's Pacific Fleet was in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The fleet consisted of 34 ships, including 3 battleships, 3 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 10 submarines, and 7 auxiliary ships. The fleet was under the command of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise attack by the Japanese Navy, which resulted in the sinking of 4 ships and the damage to 3 others. The attack was a major turning point in the Pacific War.

107

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM

TOKYO

Dated June 3, 1940

Rec'd 12:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

400, June 3, noon (SECTION THREE)

FIVE. A second school of thought, which is fundamentally pro-German, has been given increased prestige by the recent German successes in Europe. The movement for closer relations with Germany is being assiduously furthered by the German citizens in Tokyo whose main efforts are directed at strengthening anti-American sentiment through constant propaganda, especially among the military. The character of such propaganda indicates that the German thesis is that if such relations between the United States and Japan are directed and maintained in increasingly dangerous channels, the United States will be less prone to enter the European war against Germany. They aim to bring about a situation where the entry of the United States into the war against Germany would ensure a similar clash with Japan. The pro-German elements in Japan, especially those who forecast a German victory in Europe, argue that Japan can expect nothing from Great Britain or France and that

1920 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

- - 210, also 5, noon (M 1800) per page

of or from another person; and (c) the person who has been so treated is not entitled to compensation.

It is important to note that the above results are based on the assumption that the data are stationary. If the data are non-stationary, the results may be biased. Therefore, it is important to test for stationarity before using the above methods.

James Earl Ray

-3- #400, June 3, noon (SEC THREE) from Tokyo

drating lines, namely the United States and the British Empire. Representatives of this school of thought have pointed out to us that at present the democracies seem disinclined even to raise a finger to strengthen the hands of the forces in Japan which are striving for a return to moderate courses. They inquire whether, in the event of the conclusion with Chiang Kai Shek of a peace considered satisfactory by the American and British Government, they could be assured thereafter of economic assistance in assuring day to day normal supplies of raw material as well as of such special credits from the United States.

(END SECTION THREE)

• TOTAL =

Keywords: child sexual abuse; disclosure; social support; coping strategies

FROM

[illegible]

Seven. It has recently come to my attention that

time

[illegible]

• • • • •

• • •

1. The following information is being furnished to you for your information only. It is not to be used for any other purpose. It is not to be distributed outside your agency. (C)

Tokyo

Dated June 3, 1940

Dec'd 10:50 a.m.

Department of State,

[illegible]

June 1, noon. (SECRETLY FILE)

[illegible]

• • •

1 2 3 4

-2- 1410, June 3, noon (SECTION FIVE) from Tokyo.

Japan genuinely desires and genuinely intends to relinquish these as an instrument of national policy and to direct its policy and effort toward achieving its objectives by peaceful and legal methods and means, involving a discontinuance of past and current interferences with American rights and interests in China, the United States for its part will be disposed to view such a re-orientation of policy and effort with sympathy and with the hope that the effectiveness of such a movement will be the surest omen for way to a new and an American-Japanese relations in which the future will hold out possibilities of helpful economic and financial cooperation. What I have chiefly intended to convey to the Committee and to others with whom I may have occasion to talk, without any commitments whatsoever, the thought that a new and mutually helpful American-Japanese relations is by no means impossible and that in my own belief the time is ripe for a positive move by Japan in that direction. I am not without hope that it is within our reach in the short or current Japanese period (I hope) to seriously fix course an important influence on Government thought at this crucial moment.

None. I have finished, and provide that the Committee through the level of view of any further comment which would be properly and helpfully be

made

1926 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

1927

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JT
 This telegram was sent in
 Naval Code and must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated to
 anyone.

FROM: OPNAV
 FROM Reo'd June 10, 1940
 6:37 p.m.


INFO: STATE DEPARTMENT

ACTION COMELEVEN. PASSED BY COMELEVEN TO COMELEVEN
 AND OPNAV FOR INFO

PRIORITY.

10 June, 1940. For Captain E.H. Zacharias from
 T-Enc. S.S. SANTA MARIA former S.S. WARWICK UNION OIL
 sailed 6 June for Balboa with Brazilian crew. Urgent
 brought to Pedro by ARGENTINA MARU. Brazilian crew
 learned from Japanese crew of ARGENTINA MARU all Japanese
 ships have orders to scuttle if in Panama Canal when
 United States of America declares mobilization.

NPL



SIF.312 PROTECTION/ICS US/L
 FILED
 Confidential File

1928 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM

COMMANDER LOS ANGELES
SECTION COAST GUARD

FROM June 10, 1940

Rec'd 8:33 p. m.

TO: COM 11

INFO: OPNAV
SECSTATE

RESTRICTED PRIORITY

For Captain E. M. Zacharias from T-ones, S.S. SANTA MARIA former S.S. WARWICK Union Oil sailed 6 June for Balboa with Brazilian crew. Crew brought to Pedro by ARGENTINA MARU. Brazilian crew learned from Japanese crew of ARGENTINA MARU all Japanese ships have orders to scuttle if in Panama Canal when U.S.A. declares mobilization.

HPD

U.S. COAST GUARD PROTECTION DIVISION

June 17, 1940

Notes of conference in office of Chief of Staff, 8:30 A.M., June 17, 1940.

SUBJECT: Defense Problems.

PRESENT: General Marshall
General Strong

General Andrews
General Moore

The Chief of Staff remarked that in going over the various possibilities it seems that we may suddenly find Japan and Russia appear as a team operating to hold our ships in the Pacific. If the French navy goes to Germany and Italy, we will have a very serious situation in the South Atlantic. Germany may rush the South American situation to a head in a few weeks.

Are we not forced into a question of reframing our naval policy, that is, purely defensive action in the Pacific, with a main effort on the Atlantic side. There is the possibility of raids with resultant public reaction. The main effort may be south of Trinidad, with any action north thereof purely on the basis of a diversion to prevent our sending material to south America. This seems to indicate that we are reaching a point where we should mobilize the National Guard.

General Strong stated that the Navy reports that they have a definite information that the French fleet has already been turned over to and incorporated in the British fleet. (NOTE: Later information from the Navy Department indicates that this is questionable.) If this is so, and if the next move of the German's, possibly through Ireland, results in the capitulation of Great Britain proper, the combined Atlantic fleets may move to the western hemisphere. In this case, they must operate from our ports as there are no others adequate. From this point WPD and the Navy disagree on action. WPD believes in defensive operations only in the

17

1930 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Pacific and concentrating everything in this hemisphere.

The Chief of Staff commented that if the British and French fleets come here the Navy point of view is OK; if not, it is all wrong. We have to be prepared to meet the worst situation that may develop, that is, if we do not have the Allied fleet in the Atlantic.

Thinking out loud, should not Hawaii have some big bombers. We have 56. It is possible that opponents in the Pacific would be four-fifths of the way to Hawaii before we knew that they had moved. Would five or ten flying fortresses at Hawaii alter this picture?

General Andrews stated that this small number would be overwhelmed by hostile pursuit. We are weak in pursuit and any small force would be destroyed. He believes we should not split our forces but should send more ^{or} ~~as~~ none. He also believes that if we could get our reserves of ammunition, bombs, etc. to Hawaii, we could put big planes there in three days if necessary. The Chief of Staff remarked that three days might be fatal. General Strong thinks we would have less than 24 hours notice.

We have a combined Army and Navy Air force of 476 combat planes in Hawaii. Japan at present can hardly bring more than 400 because of the small size and number of her carriers. Merchant ships can be converted for launching planes, but the planes cannot land again on the ship.

In response to a question regarding the use of the 3d Division in Alaska, General Strong thought this premature. A landing field is being put in at Kodiak.

Both General Andrews and General Strong recommend ordering the National Guard into Federal service. General Strong anticipates a desperate need within 60 days for troops in South America, (Brasil and Uruguay.) The Chief of Staff thought that although we cannot at once send expeditions, we might be able to guarantee to some of the South

American governments the occupation and holding of certain key ports.

With respect to further equipment for the Allies as per the President's statement, we have scraped the bottom so far as the Army is concerned.

General Andrews wishes to motorize the 4th Division. He wants an air-ground team in training, preferably at Fort Benning.

The Chief of Staff directed consideration of all questions raised during this conference by the heads of staff Divisions present.

W.B.S.

RECEIVED

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

1933

C O P Y

COPY

(Pencilled: fr 3730
Panama)

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander, San Francisco District.
To: Commandant.

Subject: Sabotage, Panama Canal, alleged method to be used by Germans.

Inclosures: (1) Sketch.

1. Lieutenant Commander S. B. Johnson, upon an inspection by him of the Humboldt Bay Lifeboat Station on 1 May, 1940, was informed by Chief Boatswain (1) Churchill that a personal friend of Churchill's in the town of Eureka, California, had met a German who had been drinking. Churchill's friend was invited to have a drink with the German, who bragged about a plan to blow up the Panama Canal if the United States' entry into the war became imminent. Churchill's friend plied the German with drinks and appeared to drink with him but in fact spilled his drinks. The German did not identify himself other than that he had been in the country one year. The German said that a small vessel would be fitted out, with mines secured to the vessel's bottom, detachable from inside the ship. The mines would be operated by a timing device set in motion, apparently, when detached from the ship. To prevent an obvious change in the water line of the vessel when the bombs were released, special tanks were to be fitted inside the vessel to take in water in a location and weight to counteract the effect of dropping the load of mines.

2. Two sketches were made by the American to describe the method by which mines were attached and tanks distributed in the vessel. These two sketches are on the tracing, inclosure (1).

Signed: Stanley V. Parker,
Typed: Stanley V. Parker.

Copy:

FBI,
ONI, 12th Naval District.
G-2, 9th Corps Area Hq.

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

C O P Y

3.

1934 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

C O P Y

SECRET

My dear Van Voorhis:

special* recently*
The/instructions/sent you some-10-days-ago were based
on information which we had here and upon consultations between
the State, War and Navy Departments. The background of the
instructions has doubtless been made clear from matters that
have appeared in the public press. I only want to add that
the increasing tension and uncertainty in the world situation,
as affecting Canal security, emphasized the necessity of a
continuous and vigilant alert basis for some time to come.

I trust that the instructions in question did not
cause you people to lose too much sleep.

Best of luck

Sincerely yours,

G. C. M.

(Pencilled: Not used)

* Pencilled notations

SECRET

C O P Y

C O P Y

C O P Y

(Pencilled: File in WPD

14 Fr

"Armed guards on public
vessels transiting
Panama Canal"

THE PRESIDENT

6-27-40 4415-1
PanamaCONTROL OF VESSELS IN TERRITORIAL
WATERS OF THE UNITED STATESBY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

1

WHEREAS, A proclamation issued by me on September 8, 1939, proclaimed that a national emergency existed in connection with and to the extent necessary for the proper observance, safeguarding and enforcing of the neutrality of the United States and the strengthening of our national defense within the limits of peace-time authorizations, and that specific directions and authorizations would be given from time to time for carrying out these two purposes,

WHEREAS, The continuation of the conditions set forth in said proclamation of September 8, 1939, now calls for additional measures within the limits of peace-time authorizations,

WHEREAS, Under and by virtue of section 1 of title II of the Act of Congress approved June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 220 (U.S.C. title 50, sec. 191), it is provided as follows:

"SECTION 1. Whenever the President by proclamation or Executive order declares a national emergency to exist by reason of actual or threatened war, insurrection, or invasion, or disturbance or threatened disturbance of the international relations of the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury may make, subject to the approval of the President, rules and regulations governing the anchorage and movement of any vessel, foreign or domestic, in the territorial waters of the United States, may inspect such vessel at any time, place guards thereon, and, if necessary in his opinion in order to secure such vessels from damage or injury, or to prevent damage or injury to any harbor or waters of the United States, or to secure the observance of the rights and obligations of the United States, may take, by and with the consent of the President, for such purposes, full possession and control of such vessel and remove therefrom, the officers and crew thereof and all other persons not specially authorized by him to go or remain on board thereof.

"Within the territory and waters of the Canal Zone the Governor of the Panama Canal, with the approval of the President, shall exercise all the powers conferred by this section on the Secretary of the Treasury."

AND, WHEREAS, It is essential, in order to carry into effect the provisions of said Act, which are quoted herein, that the powers conferred

¹ 4 F.R. 3851.

C O P Y

1936 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

C O P Y

therein upon the President, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Governor of the Panama Canal be at this time exercised, or available for exercise, with respect to foreign and domestic vessels.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the powers conferred upon me by the provisions of the said Act of Congress quoted herein, do hereby declare the continuation of the conditions set forth in my proclamation of September 8, 1939, and the existence of a national emergency by reason of threatened disturbance of the international relations of the United States.

AND, I therefore consent to the exercise, with respect to foreign and domestic vessels, by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Governor of the Panama Canal, of all the powers conferred by the provisions of said Act.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 27th day of June in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty and of the Independence of the United States of America, the one hundred and sixty-fourth.

FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT

By the President:

CORDELL HULL

Secretary of State.

(No. 2412)

(F. R. Doc. 40-2639; Filed, June 28, 1940; 10:05 a.m.)

copy/lt

COPY

C O P Y 23